MALACAÑANG

Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1602

PRESCRIBING STIFFER PENALTIES ON ILLEGAL GAMBLING

WHEREAS, Philippine Gambling Laws such as Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code (Forms of
Gambling and Betting), R.A. 3063 (Horse racing Bookies), P.D. 449 (Cockfighting), P.D. 483 (Game
Fixing), P.D. 510 (Slot Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 of the Ministry of Justice, P.D.
1306 (Jai-Alai Bookies) and other City and Municipal Ordinances or gambling all over the country prescribe
penalties which are inadequate to discourage or stamp out this pernicious activities;

WHEREAS, there is now a need to increase their penalties to make them more effective in combating this
social menace which dissipate the energy and resources of our people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree:

Section 1. Penalties. The following penalties are hereby imposed:

(a) The penalty of prison correccional in its medium period of a fine ranging from one thousand to
six thousand pesos, and in case of recidivism, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period or a
fine ranging from five thousand to ten thousand pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person other than those referred to in the succeeding sub-sections who in any manner,
shall directly or indirectly take part in any illegal or unauthorized activities or games of
cockfighting, jueteng, jai alai or horse racing to include bookie operations and game fixing,
numbers, bingo and other forms of lotteries; cara y cruz, pompiang and the like; 7-11 and any
game using dice; black jack, lucky nine, poker and its derivatives, monte, baccarat, cuajao,
pangguingue and other card games; paik que, high and low, mahjong, domino and other
games using plastic tiles and the likes; slot machines, roulette, pinball and other mechanical
contraptions and devices; dog racing, boat racing, car racing and other forms of races,
basketball, boxing, volleyball, bowling, pingpong and other forms of individual or team
contests to include game fixing, point shaving and other machinations; banking or percentage
game, or any other game scheme, whether upon chance or skill, wherein wagers consisting of
money, articles of value or representative of value are at stake or made;

2. Any person who shall knowingly permit any form of gambling referred to in the preceding
subparagraph to be carried on in inhabited or uninhabited place or in any building, vessel or
other means of transportation owned or controlled by him. If the place where gambling is
carried on has a reputation of a gambling place or that prohibited gambling is frequently
carried on therein, or the place is a public or government building or barangay hall, the
malfactor shall be punished by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of six
thousand pesos.

(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine of six thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon the maintainer or conductor of the above gambling schemes.

(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period with temporary absolute disqualification or a
fine of six thousand pesos shall be imposed if the maintainer, conductor or banker of said gambling
schemes is a government official, or where such government official is the player, promoter, referee,
umpire, judge or coach in case of game fixing, point shaving and machination.
 (d) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period or a fine ranging from four hundred to
two thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall, knowingly and without lawful
purpose in any hour of any day, possess any lottery list, paper or other matter containing letters,
figures, signs or symbols pertaining to or in any manner used in the games of jueteng, jai-alai or
horse racing bookies, and similar games of lotteries and numbers which have taken place or about to
take place.

(e) The penalty of temporary absolute disqualifications shall be imposed upon any barangay official
who, with knowledge of the existence of a gambling house or place in his jurisdiction fails to abate
the same or take action in connection therewith.

(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine ranging from five hundred
pesos to two thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any security officer, security guard, watchman,
private or house detective of hotels, villages, buildings, enclosures and the like which have the
reputation of a gambling place or where gambling activities are being held.

Section 2. Informer's reward. Any person who shall disclose information that will lead to the arrest and final
conviction of the malfactor shall be rewarded twenty percent of the cash money or articles of value
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. Provisions of Art. 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic
Act No. 3063, Presidential Decrees Numbered 483, 449, 510 and 1306, letters of instructions, laws,
executive orders, rules and regulations, city and municipal ordinances which are inconsistent with this
Decree are hereby repealed.

Section 4. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication at least once in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
eight.
 Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand three.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9287             April 2, 2004

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAMES, AMENDING

CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1602, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all. It is likewise the policy of the State that the promotion of social justice shall
include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Hence, the State hereby condemns the existence of illegal gambling activities such as illegal numbers games
as this has become an influential factor in an individual's disregard for the value of dignified work,
perseverance and thrift since instant monetary gains from it are being equated to success, thereby becoming
a widespread social menace and a source of corruption.

Towards this end, the State shall therefore adopt more stringent measures to stop and eradicate the existence
of illegal numbers games in any part of the country.

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Illegal Numbers Game. - Any form illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or combinations
thereof as factors in giving out jackpots.

b) Jueteng. - An illegal numbers game that involves the combination of thirty-seven (37) numbers
against thirty-seven (37) numbers from number one (1) to thirty seven (37) or the combination of
thirty-eight (38) numbers in some areas, serving as a form of local lottery where bets are placed and
accepted per combination, and its variants.

c) Masiao. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the results of
the last game of Jai Alai or the Special Llave portion or any result thereof based on any fictitious Jai
Alai game consisting of ten (10) players pitted against one another, and its variants.

d) Last Two. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the last two
(2) numbers of the first prize of the winning Sweepstakes ticket which comes out during the weekly
draw of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and its variants.

e) Bettor ("Mananaya", "Tayador" or variants thereof). - Any person who places bets for
himself/herself or in behalf of another person, or any person, other than the personnel or staff of any
illegal numbers game operation.

f) Personnel or Staff of Illegal Numbers Game Operation. - Any person, who acts in the interest of
the maintainer, manager or operator, such as, but not limited to, an accountant, cashier, checker,
guard, runner, table manager, usher, watcher, or any other personnel performing such similar
functions in a building structure, vessel, vehicle, or any other place where an illegal numbers game is
operated or conducted.
 g) Collector or Agent ("Cabo", "Cobrador", "Coriador" or variants thereof). - Any person who
collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is
usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia.

h) Coordinator, Controller or Supervisor ("Encargado" or variants thereof). - Any person who

exercises control and supervision over the collector or agent.

i) Maintainer, Manager or Operator. - Any person who maintains, manages or operates any illegal
number game in a specific area from whom the coordinator, controller or supervisor, and collector or
agent take orders.

j) Financiers or Capitalist. - Any person who finances the operations of any illegal numbers game.

k) Protector or Coddler. - Any person who lends or provides protection, or receives benefits in any
manner in the operation of any illegal numbers game.

Sec. 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer the
following penalties:

a) The penalty of imprisonment from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as a
bettor;

b) The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such person
acts as a personnel or staff of an illegal numbers game operation;

The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to any person who allows his vehicle, house, building or
land to be used in the operation of the illegal numbers games.

c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such person
acts as a collector or agent;

d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if such
person acts as a coordinator, controller or supervisor;

e) The penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen (14)
years, if such person acts as a maintainer, manager or operator; and

f) The penalty of imprisonment from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years, if
such person acts as a financier or capitalist;

g) The penalty of imprisonment from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, if such
person acts as protector or coddler.

Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia or Materials. - The possession of any gambling

paraphernalia and other materials used in the illegal numbers game operation shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of any offense covered by this Act.

Sec. 5. Liability of Government Employees and/or Public Officials. - a) If the collector, agent, coordinator,
controller, supervisor, maintainer, manager, operator, financier or capitalist of any illegal numbers game is a
government employee and/or public official, whether elected or appointed shall suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three million pesos (P3,000,000.00)
to Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute disqualification from public office.

In addition to the penalty provided in the immediately preceding section, the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any local government official who, having
knowledge of the existence of the operation of any illegal numbers game in his/her jurisdiction, fails to abate
or to take action, or tolerates the same in connection therewith.

b) In the case of failure to apprehend perpetrators of any illegal numbers game, any law enforcer shall suffer
an administrative penalty of suspension or dismissal, as the case may be, to be imposed by the appropriate
authority.

Sec. 6. Liability of Parents/Guardians. - The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year or fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon any parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or
ascendancy over a minor, ward or incapacitated person, and not otherwise falling under any of the foregoing
subsections, who induces or causes such minor, ward or incapacitated person to commit any of the offenses
punishable in this Act. Upon conviction, the parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or
ascendancy over the minor, ward or incapacitated person shall be deprived of his/her authority over such
person in addition to the penalty imposed.

Sec. 7. Recidivism. - The penalty next higher in degree as provided for under Section 3 hereof shall be
imposed upon a recidivist who commits any of the offenses punishable in this Act.

Sec. 8. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any person who serves as a witness for the government or provides
evidence in a criminal case involving any violation of this Act, or who voluntarily or by virtue of a subpoena
testificandum or duces tecum, produces, identifies, or gives testimony shall be immune from any criminal
prosecution, subject to the compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1732, otherwise
known as Decree Providing Immunity from Criminal Prosecution to Government Witnesses and the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 9. Prosecution, Judgment and Forfeiture of Property. - Any person may be charged with or convicted
of the offenses covered by this Act without prejudice to the prosecution of any act or acts penalized under
the Revised Penal Code or existing laws.

During the pendency of the case, no property or income used or derived therefrom which may be confiscated
and forfeited shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond
shall be admitted for the release of the same.

The trial prosecutors shall avail of provisional remedies provided for under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Upon conviction, all proceeds, gambling paraphernalia and other instruments of the crime including any real
or personal property used in any illegal numbers game operation shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the State. All assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him/her in his/her name or in
the name of another person found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income shall be prima
facie presumed to be proceeds of the offense and shall likewise be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
State.

Sec. 10. Witness Protection. - Any person who provides material information, whether testimonial or
documentary, necessary for the investigation or prosecution of individuals committing any of the offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 herein shall be placed under the Witness Protection Program pursuant to
Republic Act. No. 6981.

Sec. 11. Informer's Reward. - Any person who, having knowledge or information of any offense committed
under this Act and who shall disclose the same which may lead to the arrest and final conviction of the
offender, may be rewarded a certain percentage of the cash money or articles of value confiscated or
forfeited in favor of the government, which shall be determined through a policy guideline promulgated by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in coordination with the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
The DILG, the NAPOLCOM and the DOJ shall provide for a system of rewards and incentives for law
enforcement officers and for local government official for the effective implementation of this Act.

Sec. 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act, the
DILG, DOJ, NAPOLCOM, and other concerned government agencies shall jointly promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations, as may be necessary to ensure the efficient and effective
implementation of the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 13. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any section or provision of this Act, or any portion thereof,
or the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to any person, group or circumstance is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of this Act shall not be affected by such
declaration and shall remain in force and effect.

Sec. 14. Amendatory Clause. - The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1602, in so far as they
are inconsistent herewith, are hereby expressly amended or modified accordingly.

Sec. 15. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Sec. 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2547 and House Bill No. 6575 was finally passed by
the Senate and House of Representatives on January 27, 2004 and February 4, 2004 respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: April 2, 2004

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
MARTIN VILLAMOR Y TAYSON v. PEOPLE, GR No. 200396, 2017-03-22

Facts:

A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private
homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances where
arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an
illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a
cellphone, and cash.

Another Information[5] was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the
latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Floren... t... cio inside their
house. Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went
outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD
Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act
ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the
house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and
brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.

the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng... respectively as a collector
or agent... and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor... he RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers
game locally known as "lotteng,"

Issues:

whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for
Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.

Ruling:

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by
the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a
search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure,
none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible
against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of probable
cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a
search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on
the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.

In... warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."
After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest
on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing,
or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers.
Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away
from petitioners.

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the
Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to
allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless
arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence
5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that
the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be
committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act
before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest.
 FIRST DIVISION

March 22, 2017

G.R. No. 200396

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.1 A mere tip from an
unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first
securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances where arrests and searches
may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13, 2011 Decision2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the October 25, 2006 Judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464)
convicting both petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1602 as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 9287, otherwise known as "An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending
Certain Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other Purposes." Petitioner Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was
convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal numbers game of "lotteng" under Section 3(c) of RA 9287,
while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra (Bonaobra) was convicted as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor
under Section 3(d) of the said Jaw. The RTC sentenced Villamor to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9) years as maximum, while Bonaobra was sentenced to
suffor the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as
maximum.

Factual Antecedents

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an
illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng' and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a
cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the following lnformation:4

That on or ahout the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, \vi thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with
intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [ willfully ], unlawfully and feloniously engage, collect
[and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known as "Lotteng" by having in his possession [a]
calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Another Information5 was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with
intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and
operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in possession of gambling paraphernalias,
such as [a] calculator, cellphone, list of various numbers and cash in the amount of ₱1,500.00 representing
collection of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed t1eir respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both granted by the RTC.
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued separate Resolutions both dated September 13,
2005 amending the Informations in both cases.

In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was included to charge Villamor as a
collector in an illegal numbers game. The Amended Information6 provides:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused acting
as a collector with intent [to] gain thru illegal means[,] did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
foloniously engage, collect and solicit bets for illegal numbers game locally known as "Lotteng" by having
in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On the other hand, Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator in the Amended Info1mation,7 the
incriminatory paragraph of which states:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused acting
as manager and operator with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in possession
of gambling paraphernalia, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, lists of variott5 numbers and cash in the
amount of ₱l,500,00 representing colleciion of bets.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When separately arraigned, Villamor, on October 4, 2005 and Bonaobra, on November 29, 2005, both
pleaded not guilty to the respective charges filed against them. After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial on
the merits followed.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director, Police
Superintendent Francisco Penaflor (PD Peñaflor), SP04 Severino Malasa, Jr., and POI David Adrian Saraspi
(POI Saraspi). Culled from the records were the following facts:

On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an infonnant regarding an ongoing
illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A
team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO 1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to
Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.

Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by
bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the
police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which
means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet
numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated
the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to ₱l,500.00 in different denominations, the
"papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco
Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the
petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra. the brother of
Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra (Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas, and Jonah Bonaobra
(Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are summarized below.

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30 a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the
latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside their house.
Villamor gave Bonaobra ₱2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went outside
the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor
kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!"
Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the house
and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in
for investigation at the police headquarters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng," a variant of
the game Last Two,8 respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller,
or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in
flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant of Last Two. The
RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting bets before the arrest was
made inside Bonaobra' s compound. 1he petitioners were also caught holding "'papelitos," which contained
the three rows of two-number combinations. Since the winning combination in "lotteng" is taken from the
first two numbers of the winning combinations in the daily draw of the lotto in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes, the RTC held that the number combinations shown in the ''papelitos" were meant to
correspond to the lotto results.

The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector since
he brought bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator, controller, or supervisor after it
was shown that he received the money from Villamor.

The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby SENTENCES Martin Villamor
to suffer a penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9) years as
maximum, and Victor Bonaobra to suffer a penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven
(11) years as maximum. Likewise, the money amounting to ₱l,500.00 and the other personal properties used
as gambling paraphernalia, like the calculator, ballpen and cellular phone are confiscated in favor of the
state.

SO ORDERED9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's argument that his
right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that with which he was
charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer, manager, or operator includes a coordinator,
controller, or supervisor.10 The CA ratiocinated that to hold a maintainer guilty of the lesser offense of
acting as a coordinator will not be violative of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of his
accusation since the graver offense of acting as a maintainer necessarily includes being a coordinator.

With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting officer
who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The CA held that
Villamor' s denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the police officers who caught him in the
act of revising and counting bets.

The CA disposed the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or
agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor m1der Section 3(d) for
Bonaobra, should be upheld.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition meritorious.

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision [based
on] x x x grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors."12

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by
the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a
search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure,
none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible
against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of probable
cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a
search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on
the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.13 "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and
seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree."14

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in
the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that petitioners were
committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested without a warrant.

We are not persuaded.

Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a warrant of
arrest in the following instances:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of
Rule 112.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."15

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest
on petitioners.1âwphi1 It was not properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15
to 20 meters away from petitioners. PO 1 Saraspi's testimony during cross examination reveals the
following:

ATTY. SAMONTE:

Q While you were outside the compound of Bonaobra, what was your distance to accused Martin Villamor
and Victor Bonaobra?

A More or less fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters.

Q Is it not that the compound of Bonaobra is surrounded with fence?

A Yes, sir.

Q Bamboo fence, right?

A Yes, sir, without a gate.

Q Are you sure it's without a gate?

A Probably it was open.

Q Can you determine the height of the fence?

A Between 5'7" to 5'9".

Q More than your height?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us whether you can see what the person is doing inside the compound while you are outside?
A The fence is made up [sic] of bamboo and there were gaps as far as the fence is concerned that is why
when we alighted from the Frontier we saw what was inside the compound.

Q And the space of each bamboo, can you determine [sic]?

A One and half to two inches apart.

Q When you were already outside the compound what were the accused doing?

A They were sitting and they were revising.

Q Were they seated with [sic] a table?

A They were sitting and Victor Bonaobra was without a shirt.

Q What were they holding?

A 'Papelitos'.

Q What else?

A While they were holding 'papelitos' the monies were just on the table.

Q At the distance of 15 to 10 meters can you determine the contents of the 'papelitos'?

A No, sir.

Q So you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphernalia?

A No, sir.

Q Because you do not know the contents of that and you are not sure whether those are gambling
paraphernalia you went inside, is that right?

A After we introduced ourselves that we are [sic] police officers we entered the compound.

Q Meaning to say you were outside the compound and saying you are policemen?

A We entered first and we introduced ourselves.

Q Which is first, going inside or introducing yourselves?

A While entering we were also introducing ourselves simultaneously.

Q When you reached inside, what did you determine?

A We determined that there were lotteng paraphernalia on the table.

Q That is the only time that you determined that those were gambling paraphernalia?

A No, even on the [sic] outside we identified it already.

Q A while ago you said at a distance of 15 to 10 meters you can determine whether they were in possession
of the illegal gambling paraphernalia?
A What I am trying to say is that I cannot identify those that are written on the 'papelitos' at the distance and
I saw the calculator, the money bets.

Q So what you saw within a distance of 15 to 10 meters are calculators, money and cellphone?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you consider money gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q So every time you see money you will consider that a gambling paraphernalia?

A In other situations.

Q How about calculator, do you consider calculator gambling paraphernalia?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you go to a department store there are calculators, do you consider those calculators gambling
paraphernalia?

A If you are going to consolidate all these items in a table all of these are gambling paraphernalia

Q So when you consolidate these items and papers and calculators, if you see those items at Century
Trading, will you consider those as gambling paraphernalia?16

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the
Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a c1iminal activity was ongoing to
allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless
arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence
5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that
the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been c01m11itted, was actually being committed, or was about to
be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act
before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted
that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet,
upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be
gambling paraphernalias.

On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not
determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the compound, since
he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly saw the gambling paraphernalia. PD Peñaflor's
testimony in this regard is as follows:

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness, the distance of the house of Victor Bonaobra to that place
where you parked your vehicle when you arrived in the vicinity?

A When I parked my vehicle in front of the compound because that is a street, the distance from the street to
that place where there is an on-going 'revisar' of 'lotteng', more or less 15 to 20 meters, I believe, from the
gate.

Q So, you did not immediately go inside the compound of Victor Bonaobra?

A Yes, sir. I verified first if there is really [sic] persons in the compound.
Q So, at that distance of 15 to 20 meters, you were able to verify what they were doing on the particular
1ime, Mt. Witness?

A No, sir.17

During his direct examination, Bonaobra testified that he was only answering his cellphone when PD
Peñaflor barged into his compound and arrested him. The relevant portions of his testimony reveals the
following:

ATTY SAMONTE:

Q At around 9:00 a.m. of June 17, 2005, what were you doing if you still remember?

A I stood up and I went out and made [sic] three steps from the door to answer the cellphone and later on I
was surprised when the police whom I could not identify, kicked the door.

Q Mr. Witness, which door [are you] referring to [that] was kicked by the police?

A The gate outside of our fence.

xxxx

Q You said a while ago that the policeman kicked the door of your fence x

xx who was that policeman, if you know him?

A: Provincial Director Peñaflor.

Q: Who was with PD Peñaflor on [sic] that particular time, if any, Mr. Witness?

A Two (2) persons in civilian clothes.

xx xx

Q After PD Peñaflor kicked the door of your fence, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A He held my hand and he seized my cellphone.

xxxx

Q After PD Peñaflor seized your cellphone, what else did he do?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q Which comes first, Mr. Witness, the utterance made by PD Peñaflor that you were caught in the act or the
utterance made by your father whether they had a warrant?

A When my father asked them whether they have a warrant.

Q And what was the answer of PD Peñaflor when your father asked that question?

A He said, "caught in the act."

Q And what was the reply of your father?

A My father said that what you am doing is wrong, that is prohibited.

Q And what did PD Peñaflor answered [sic] to your father?

A He shouted at my father, "Di na kailangan yan" (That is not needed).18

From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act indicating
that the petitioners were actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that he caught the
petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this observation was highly improbable
given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the compound was surrounded by a
bamboo fence.

For his part, Villamor claimed that he was at the Bonaobra compound to repay his loan to Jonah. The
prosecution, through Prosecutor Tañon, even admitted this fact during Jonah's direct examination. The
following exchange between the prosecution and the defense was quite revealing:

ATTY. SAMONTE:

Your Honor, please, [may] I respectfully offer the testimony of Jona[h] Bonaobra to show that she is the
·wife of Victor Bonaobra; that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 17, 2005 she was inside their residence at
Bonaobra's compound, Francia, Virac, Catanduances and on that particular time and date, Martin Villamor
arrived to pay his debt and she personally witnessed the unlawful act committed by the policemen who
entered their dwelling on that particular lime and date and such other matters relative thereto, Your Honor.

COURT:

Any comment from the prosecution?

PROS. TAÑON:

We will admit that she is the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that on Jw1e 17, 2005 at 8:30 in the morning she was
inside the residence of Bonaobra's compound; that accused Martin Villamor arrived to pay his debt. We are
to contest on that she personally witnessed the unlawful act.

A1TY. SAMONTE:

To clarify that, the prosecution is admitting the fact that Martin arrived to pay the loan on that particular
day?

PROS. TAÑON:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, so that we can proceed to the other matters.19 (Emphasis supplied)

From the exchange above, it is clear that the prosecution admitted that Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to
pay his loan to Jonah. Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither Bonaobra, who was answering his
cellphone, nor Villarr1or, who was paying his loan. was performing any overt act constitutive of a crime.

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does not
satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure of the effects
found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no valid search incident to an
illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for being a fruit of
the poisonous tree.

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before
arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially
when the accused actively participated during trial as in this case. However, we have clarified that such
waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized
during an illegal arrest. In People v. Racho,20 the Court held that:

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, 'any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding'.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence.
Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal gambling
as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section
3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any person who collects, solicits or produces
bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling
paraphernalia."21 On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is defined as, ''any person who
exercises control and supervision over the collector or agent."22 The prosecution merely relied on the
alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the
specific overt acts that constitute the offense.

All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it
was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which
affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Criminal Case Nos.
3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor
Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

SECOND DIVISION

July 1, 2019

G.R. No. 238141

WILLIAM CRUZ y FERNANDEZ and VIRGILIO FERNANDEZ y TORRES, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated
November 29, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated March 14, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 38062, which affirmed the Joint Decision4 dated September 29, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. L-10557 and L-10558 finding petitioners
Virgilio Fernandez y Torres (Virgilio) and William Cruz y Fernandez (William; collectively, petitioners)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (c)5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9287,6 otherwise
known as the "Illegal Gambling Law."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations7 filed before the RTC, charging petitioners with violation of
Section 3 (d)8 of RA 9287 for unlawfully engaging in an illegal gambling bookies activity. The prosecution
alleged that on July 10, 2015, the Chief of Police of Binmaley, Pangasinan, instructed Police Officer 3
Ramon de Guzman (PO3 de Guzman) and Police Officer 2 Joel Sabordo (PO2 Sabordo) to conduct a
surveillance of illegal gambling activities along Mabini Street in Barangay Poblacion, Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Upon arriving thereat, PO3 de Guzman and PO2 Sabordo saw petitioners from a distance of
around five (5) meters carrying ball pens, papelitos, and money and allegedly collecting jueteng9 bets from
some persons. They then approached petitioners and asked them if they were employees of Meredien Vista
Gaming Corporation (MVGC). When petitioners failed to show any authority to conduct business, PO3 de
Guzman and PO2 Sabordo began arresting them, confiscated their ball pens, papelitos, and money, and
thereafter, brought them to the police station. 10

Both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, 11 but only Virgilio testified during trial. 12 He
maintained that at the time of the incident, he went to see his wife in Mabini Street and saw William along
the way. Moments later, some policemen arrived and invited them to the police station for questioning. At
the police station, they discovered that they were being charged with violation of RA 9287 for allegedly
participating in an illegal numbers game. Virgilio, however, denied the charges. 13

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision14 dated September 29, 2015, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 3 (c) of RA. 9287, and accordingly, sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum, to nine (9) years,
as maximum. 15 It upheld the validity of petitioners' warrantless arrest as it was shown that they were
caught in flagrante delicto collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game called ''jueteng." It
pointed out that their acts of receiving money and writing on some pieces of paper engendered a well-
founded belief on the part of the police officers that they were actually committing an offense under RA
9287. 16 It likewise observed that the seized papelitos contained number combinations and bet amounts that
were used in the game of jueteng, and that mere possession of such gambling paraphernalia is deemed prima
facie evidence of a violation of RA 9287. 17

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed18 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated November 29, 2017, the CA affirmed in toto petitioners' conviction. It held that
petitioners' bare denials cannot be given credence in light of the arresting officers' positive and categorical
statement that they caught petitioners in the act of soliciting bets for jueteng; and as such, they had
conducted a valid in flagrante delicto arrest on petitioners. 20

Undaunted, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,21 which was likewise denied in a Resolution22
dated March 14, 2018; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioners for violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 9287.

The Court's Ruling

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law."23

Guided by this consideration, and as will be explained hereunder, the Court believes that petitioners'
conviction must be set aside.

Section 2, Article III24 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III25 of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 26

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.27 Relatedly, a lawful arrest may be effected with or
without a warrant. With respect to the latter, a warrantless arrest may be done when, inter alia, the accused
is caught in flagrante delicto pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense[.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law requires two (2) requisites for a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest, namely, that: (a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Essentially, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the fact of
the commission of an offense, i.e., he must have personally witnessed the same.28

In Villamar v. People,29 a case which also involved alleged illegal gambling activities, the Court held that
the conduct of an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest therein is unlawful because of the arresting officers'
failure to reasonably ascertain that the criminal activity was afoot before proceeding with the same. In that
case, the Court remarked that it was highly suspect for the apprehending officers to have witnessed an overt
act indicating that the accused therein had just committed, were actually committing, or were attempting to
commit a violation of RA 9287, considering, inter alia, the distance of the police officers from the purported
locus criminis, viz.:

[T]he Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity
was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental
to a warrantless arrest thereafter. x x x It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the
information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had
iust been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. x
x x PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the
contents of the so-called "papelitos"; yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the
table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling [paraphernalia].

On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could
not determine the activities of the persons inside. x x x.

xxxx

From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act indicating
that the petitioners were actuatly committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that he caught the
petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this observation was highly improbable
given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the compound was surrounded
by a bamboo fence.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court similarly finds that there could have been no lawful in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest made on petitioners. Based on the records, PO3 de Guzman himself admitted that he and PO2
Sabordo. were about five (5) meters away from petitioners when they allegedly saw petitioners carrying
papelitos, ball pens, and money. Perceiving that the same constitute gambling paraphernalia, the arresting
officers immediately concluded that petitioners were engaged in illegal gam8ling activities, i.e., collecting
jueteng bets, prompting them to swoop in with the intention of arresting petitioners. Pertinent portions of
PO3 de Guzman's testimony reads:

[Prosecutor Jeffrey Catungal]: When conducting surveillance particular place [sic], did you proceed to
conduct surveillance?

[PO3 de Guzman]: We conduct surveillance at Brgy. Poblacion particularly Mabini Street Binmaley,
Pangasinan, sir.

Q: In going to the said place, what purposes of conducting surveillance [sic], was there anything that called
your attention?

A: Yes, there were two (2) male factors, sir.

Q: What were you able to see or observe from them, if any?

A: They were collecting bets, sir.

Q: How sure are you that they were collecting bets?

A: They have [paraphernalia), sir.

Q: When you said they have [paraphernalia], what [paraphernalia]?

A: In collecting jueteng bets, sir.

Q: How far were you from them?

A: Almost 5 meters away, sir.

COURT:

Q: What those [paraphernalia) you are referring to?

A: [Ball pen), papelitos and money, sir.31 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Considering that the arresting officers were at a considerable distance of about five (5) meters away from the
supposed criminal transaction, it would be highly implausible for them - even assuming that they have
perfect vision - to ascertain with reasonable accuracy that the aforesaid items were being used as gambling
paraphernalia. In an effort to legitimize the warrantless arrest and the consequent search made incidental
thereto, the arresting officers insist that the arrest was made only after ascertaining that petitioners were not
MVGC employees. However, the fact that petitioners were: (a) holding ball pens, papelitos, and money; and
(b) not MVGC employees do not, by themselves, constitute an illegal gambling activity punishable under
RA 9287. Notably, there was no other overt act that could be properly attributed to petitioners so as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that the former had just committed, were committing, or were
about to commit a crime. Verily, these circumstances are not enough to justify a valid in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest on petitioners.

As a consequence of petitioners' unlawful warrantless arrest, it necessarily follows that there could have
been no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia from petitioners. Notably, while petitioners are deemed to have waived any objections as to
the legality of their arrest due to their failure to question the same before arraignment and their active
participation in trial, it must be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver only as to any question
concerning any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.32 In Sindac v. People,33 the Court held:

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a
result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.1âшphi1 It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and
justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In fine, since the items seized by the police officers are inadmissible against petitioners - as they were
obtained in violation of petitioners' right against unreasonable searches and seizures - and given that the
alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,35 the Court is hereby
constrained to acquit petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2017 and the Resolution
dated March 14, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 38062 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioners William Cruz y Fernandez and Virgilio Fernandez y Torres are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Senior Associate Justice, Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 12-23.

2 Id. at 28-36. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela with Associate Justices
Stephen C. Cruz and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.

3 Id. at 38-39.

4 Id. at 50-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Loreto S. Alog, Jr.

5 Section 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer
the following penalties:

xxxx

c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such
person acts as a collector or agent[.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

6 Entitled "AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAMES,
AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1602, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," approved on April 2, 2004.
 7 Both dated July 13, 2015. Records (Crim. Case No. L-10557), p.1; and records (Crim. Case No. L-
10558), p.1

8 Section 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer
the following penalties:

xxxx

d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if
such person acts as a coordinator, controller or supervisor[.] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

9 Note that the Informations state that "Jai-Alai" was conducted (See records [Crim. Case No. L-
10557], p. 1; and records [Crim. Case No. L-10558], p. 1), but narration in the decisions of the lower
courts, including the Brief for the Appellee, indicates the documents confiscated as one used in
"Jueteng" (see rollo, pp. 29, 34, 50, 51, and 59).

10 See rollo, pp. 30-31 and 51-52.

11 See id. at 30.

12 See id. at 31.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184130               June 29, 2015

SANDRA M. CAM, Petitioner,

vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his Capacity as Acting Ombudsman, MOTHALIB C. ONOS, in his
Capacity as Chairman of the Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman,
ROSANO A. OLIVA and LOURDES S. PADRE SAN JUAN, in their capacities as Graft Investigation
and Prosecution

Officers, IGNACIO "IGGY" ARROYO, JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO and RESTITUTO
MOSQUEDA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Resolution1 dated 9
October 2006 and Order2 dated 13 February 2008 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05-
0380-H dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, respectively.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

In 2005, herein petitioner Sandra Cam went to the Senate to link members of the First Family to jueteng
operations in the Bicol region. She confessed to being a "depository" of jueteng payola for General Restituto
Mosqueda. She positively declared that she had personally handed bundles of money to Ignacio "Iggy"
Arroyo (now deceased) and Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo – brother-in-law, and son, respectively, of then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

THE CASE

On 28 June 2005, petitioner executed her Complaint-Affidavit3 charging private respondents Iggy Arroyo,
Mikey Arroyo and Mosqueda with protecting or coddling jueteng operation under Section 2(k) of Republic
Act No. 9287 (R.A. 9287),4 entitled An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending
Certain Provisions of P.D. 1602 and for Other Purposes. She accused them of benefitting from jueteng.

Private respondent Mosqueda executed his Counter-Affidavit6 on 24 October 2005. In turn, respondent
Mosqueda filed a Rejoinder-Affidavit7 on 25 November 2005.

Private respondent Mikey Arroyo did not file a Counter-Affidavit.

FACTS

The conflicting versions of facts as narrated by petitioner and respondent Mosqueda are juxtaposed
hereunder. Respondents Iggy Arroyo and Mikey Arroyo proffer a blanket denial of any knowledge or
involvement in the controversy. They assert that they have never even met petitioner, seeing her only for the
first time in television when she first identified them to be recipients of jueteng payola.10

Petitioner claims that she met respondent Mosqueda sometime in 1998 in the course of her job as liaison
officer of the then governor of Masbate, Antonio Kho. She claims that from 1998 to 1999, after having had
frequent transactions with Police Security and Protection Office (PSPO) in Camp Crame, she became close
to PSPO officials.11 Respondent Mosqueda admits that he met petitioner in 1998, but only in passing.12

A disputed phone call on 1 August 2004 allegedly precipitated the engagement of petitioner as depository of
jueteng money. According to her, respondent Mosqueda called her that day to ask her to arrange a meeting
with the governors of Bicol at the Makati Shangri-la Hotel. That same day, respondent Mosqueda allegedly
met with Governors Jesus Typoco, Raul Lee and Luis Villafuerte (represented by his brother, Bong) in
Makati. Two days later, in Camp Ola, Legazpi, respondent Mosqueda allegedly asked her if she could do
him a favor of collecting "the thing," which later became clear to her as referring to ueteng money.[13]]
Records show that Typoco, Lee and Luis Villafuerte executed a Joint Affidavit;14 and that Bong Villafuerte
likewise executed an Affidavit15 categorically denying that he was present in the Shangri-la meeting.

On the other hand, respondent Mosqueda denies making the call and gives a different account of events on 1
and 2 August 2004. He claims that he was in Bicol from 29 July 2004 to 2 August 2004 to assume command
as the new Regional Director of the PNP. He denies arranging and attending a luncheon with the governors
in Makati on 1 August 2004, as he was the guest of honor at the inauguration of a new police station in
Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He presents a Certificate of Appearance to support his alibi. Respondent claims
that on August 2, he was informed by his staff that petitioner wanted to give him a courtesy call, and that he
obliged because he "wanted to be acquainted with more people as fast as possible."16

Petitioner alleges that on 4 August 2004, a certain "Tita Fanny" went to her room I Alicia Hotel to deliver
250,000 from Albay.17 Within 30 minutes, another person delivered 100,000 from Sorsogon. Petitioner
avers that respondent Mosqueda called her that same night to inquire about the money. He allegedly called
her up again to inform her that Colonel Gumban would pick it up the next day. Allegedly upon instruction of
respondent Mosqueda, petitioner kept 10,000 for herself and gave 340,000 to Col. Gumban. "Tita Fanny"
was supposed to have witnessed the delivery. The following day, 5 August 2004, petitioner gave her
Metrobank-Batangas and Calapan account details to Col. Gumban upon his request. He was said to have told
her that the gambling lords would make deposits to these accounts.18
Respondent Mosqueda presented an Affidavit19 executed by Col. Gumaban, in which the latter denied
petitioner’s allegations; and a Certification20 from the General Manager of Alicia Hotel to the effect that
based on hotel records, no room was registered on August 3 and 4, 2005 under the name of Sandra Cam.

Petitioner discloses that beginning 6 August 2004 until March 2005, weekly deposits were made to her
Metrobank accounts; and that within 24 hours, she would turn over the money to respondent Mosqueda
either in Bicol or McDonald’s Tagaytay.21 Respondent dismisses this allegation as unbelievable and
unsubstantiated.22

On two separate occasions, petitioner attests that upon respondent Mosqueda’s instructions, she withdrew
money from her bank accounts and gave it to him. The first instance was on 30 August 2004 when she
prepared 500,000 allegedly for the "hari." The second instance was on 21 September 2004 when she
prepared 1,000,00 allegedly for the "bata" and "tiyo."23

Petitioner recounts that on 20 October 2004, 21 November 2004, and 20 February 2005, respondent
Mosqueda instructed her to withdraw 1,000,000 for each occasion from her Metrobank account, to divide
the amount equally, and to place the money in separate envelopes.24 Respondent Mosqueda calls the
attention of the Court to petitioner’s lack of documentary proof to back up the allegations and her failure to
properly explain what happened to the 3,000,000.25

Petitioner claims that another phone call from respondent Mosqueda paved the way for her personal delivery
of bundles of money totaling 900,000 to then Congressmen Iggy and Mikey Arroyo in the second or third
week of December 2004.26

The circumstances surrounding the deliveries were narrated by petitioner. She reveals that around 3 or
4p.m., she proceeded to respondent Iggy Arroyo’s office located at Room 209 at the North Wing of
Congress. Once alone with him, petitioner gave him a brown envelope containing 400,000 in cash. After
peeking into the envelope, respondent Iggy Arroyo allegedly asked, "Bakit kulang to ng isa?" Petitioner
answered, "Pinapasabi po ni RD na nagbagyo at natigil ang Camarines Norte." Respondent Iggy Arroyo
supposedly replied, "Sabihin mo sa boss mo walang bagyo bagyo sa akin, ang pinag usapan ay pinag
usapan."27 Respondent Iggy Arroyo denies these allegations, and records reflect that he presented Affidavits
executed by four of his political assistants attesting that they had never seen or encountered anyone by the
name of Sandra Cam inside is office.28

According to petitioner, after delivering the brown envelope to respond Iggy Arroyo, she proceeded to the
office of respondent Mikey Arroyo located at Room 202 at the South Wing of Congress. Not finding
respondent Mikey Arroyo, she was allegedly directed by his staff to the session hall. There she approached
him and introduced herself. Respondent Mikey Arroyo allegedly excused himself from the group he was
conversing with and brought her near the gallery, where she gave him a gift-wrapped package containing
500,000.29 Respondent Mikey Arroyo denies that this event occurred. He informs the Court that a criminal
case for libel has been filed against petitioner in connection with her statements that he received benefits
from jueteng operations.30

After the alleged delivery, petitioner claims that she called respondent Mosqueda to report that she had
already delivered the "fruits". He allegedly told her in a happy voice, "Maasahan ka talaga."31

Aside from cash deliveries, petitioner alleges that the respondent Mosqueda also received an Isuzu D Max
and a Toyota Revo from the jueteng payola.32

As regards the Isuzu D Max vehicle, petitioner claims that sometime in August 2004, respondent Mosqueda
told her that he heard gambling lords were giving vehicles to regional directors. Allegedly, he then told her
that he also wanted an Isuzu D Max. Petitioner narrates that on 20 August 2004, she bought an Isuzu D Max
and paid for it through a Manager’s check for 870,000 and cash amounting 400,000 given by "Tita Fanny"
and a Mr. Tony Ong.33 Respondent Mosqueda counters that this was another unrealistic story, because if
petitioner were to be believed that he was receiving one million pesos per week as jueteng payout, and that
he was connected with gambling lords, then he could have bought an Isuzu D Max for himself or asked the
gambling lords to deliver one directly to him.34

Petitioner discloses that jueteng payola was again used to buy another vehicle for respondent Mosqueda.35
He admits ownership of the Toyota Revo and petitioner’s role in facilitating the transaction, but asserts that
he used his personal savings, as well as those of his wife, to buy the vehicle; and that he only accepted the
offer of petitioner to negotiate the sale because she knew someone who could give the spouses a big
discount on the purchase price.36

Petitioner also relates that respondent Mosqueda boasted of his connection to the Presidential Family and his
involvement with the Jose Pidal controversy. Petitioner narrates how on 30 October 2004, respondent
Mosqueda, while in a meeting with the President, texted her, "Makikita mo kamandag ko sa mga Arroyo;"
and "Titingnan ko galling ni Espinosa." He was referring to Mario Espinosa, who was then the Presidential
Assistant for Bicol Affairs. As events turned out later, Mario Espinosa was removed from that position.
Respondent Mosqueda also allegedly told petitioner, "Di mo baa lam na kung hindi dahil sa akin bagsak na
ang Arroyo Administration?" When asked why, he allegedly answered that it took them weeks to practice
Iggy Arroyo to sign as Jose Pidal. Respondent Mosqueda allegedly said, "Ang totoo si FG" and "Ako lang
ang may authority mag certify na ang signature ni Iggy ay si Jose Pidal."37

Respondent Mosqueda maintains that he never made these representations; and that petitioner was hurling
malicious accusations to get back at him for his relentless campaign against jueteng, thereby displacing her
financially.38 He adds that he could not have certified or authenticated the signature of "Jose Pidal", because
that was the job of the handwriting expert of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Mely Sorra, who testified before
the Senate that respondent Mosqueda did not interfere in her work.39

THE RULING OF THE OMBUDSMAN

On 9 October 2006, public respondents dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

First, public respondents evaluated the evidence presented by petitioners. They noted that the official
receipts covering the purchase of a Toyota Revo in the name of Marilyn Mosqueda, wife of respondent
Mosqueda, merely established the actual transaction of the subject vehicle, and nothing more. They ruled
that the evidence could not be appreciated to determine the source of funds used to pay for the vehicle, i.e.
whether or not the alleged jueteng payola was used as payment. Public respondents held that for an
imputation a crime or felony to stand, it must be adequately substantiated by the required quantum of
evidence; otherwise, the evidence presented cannot be used as basis for prosecution.40

Second, public respondents determined whether the burden of proof had been discharged by petitioner. On
the one hand, they observed that the respondents were able to adduce sworn statements of persons allegedly
involved in the transaction – Col. Gumbon Adam Claverio, Jesus Typoco, Jr., Raul Lee, Luis Raymond
Villafuerte, and Bong Villafuerte – who explicitly denied having participated in the illegal activities. On the
other hand, aside from her own declarations, petitioner miserably failed to controvert the statements by
relevant proof.41

Third, applying People v. Ymana,42 public respondents held that the uncorroborated and unsubstantiated
allegations of complainant would not suffice to determine the existence of probable cause against
respondents, more so in the presence of contrary declarations of the allegedly involved personalities in the
contested transactions.

In closing, public respondents recalled Gil v. People,43 in which the Court ruled that "the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense." Public respondents did not give
due course to the Complaint in view of petitioner’s failure to present sufficient proof to support the
accusation against private respondents.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied for being a mere rehash of the allegations in
the Complaint.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue that confronts the Court is whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s Complaint for insufficiency of
evidence and denying her motion for reconsideration.

After consideration of all the issues and arguments raised by the parties, this Court finds no clear showing of
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

There was no grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish
probable cause.

We note that the only documents presented to public respondents, aside from petitioner’s pleadings, are the
following:

1. Vehicle Sales Invoice for a Revo issued by Toyota Makati Inc. ("Toyota") on 21 January 2005 in
the name of Marilyn Mosqueda;44

2. Official Receipt No. 32008 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 12 January 2005 for the
cash payment of the reservation fee for a Revo;45

3. Official Receipt No. 32367 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 17 January 2005 for the
partial cash payment for a Revo;46 nad

4. Official Receipt No. 32669 issued by Toyota to Marilyn Mosqueda on 21 January 2005 for a full
check payment for a Revo.47

For the purpose of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof.48 The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of
the prosecuting officers after they have conducted a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended
party.49

A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof
of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not
be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.50 While probable cause should be determined in a
summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a
potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play.51 The need
for a careful examination of the evidence is also intended to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting and trying cases arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

Being the complainant, petitioner had the burden of establishing probable cause. Burden of proof is defined
in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."

In order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime
charged should be present. This rule is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements,
without which there should be – at the most – no criminal offense.52

Petitioner accuses private respondents of receiving benefits in the form of cash and vehicles in the operation
of the illegal numbers game of jueteng. However, aside from her testimony, petitioner presented only four
documents concerning the sale of a Toyota Revo. Public respondents correctly ruled that the official receipts
covering the purchase of a Toyota Revo in the name of Marlyn Mosqueda, wife of respondent Mosqueda,
cannot be appreacited to prove that the funds used to pay for the vehicle came from jueteng operations.

There was no grave abuse of discretion in not filing an Information on the basis of petitioner’s
uncorroborated testimony.

The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. The complaint may be dismissed should the Ombudsman find it
insufficient in form or substance, or the Ombudsman may proceed with the investigation if the complaint
appears to be in due form and substance.53 Hence, the filing or non-filing of the information is primarily
lodged within the full discretion of the Ombudsman.54

Petitioner argues that since she is more credible than any of the private respondents, public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course to her Complaint. What she loses sight of is
that mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.55 We are not saying that
uncorroborated testimony cannot stand alone. On the contrary, the Court does uphold a finding of guilt
based on uncorroborated testimony if the testimony is intrinsically credible, and there is no showing that it
was improperly or maliciously motivated.56

It must be emphasized that the issue before the Court is whether public respondents, in finding that the
evidence is insufficient to declare the existence of probable cause, committed grave abuse of discretion. We
find that they did not.

Public respondents gave petitioner many opportunities to substantiate her bare allegations. In fact, public
respondents Onos, Padre-Juan and Oliva alerted her of the need for more evidence. In their Evaluation
Report57 dated 8 July 2005, they recommended that the Complaint be referred to the Field Investigation
Office for appropriate case build-up.58

We note that in her Reply-Affidavit (Re: Respondent Mosqueda’s Counter-Affidavit),59 petitioner alluded
to several pieces of documentary evidence she submitted to the Senate in support of her allegations.60 She
assumed that the Office of the Ombudsman already had a copy of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes as
well as all of the documentary evidence submitted to the Senate, and made it part of the records of the
case.61 However, the records forwarded to this Court do not contain any other document aside from the
sales invoice and official receipts.

In any case, petitioner could have easily reproduced or obtained relevant documents, like bank statements or
affidavits, and attached these to her Motion for Reconsideration or subsequent pleadings. In the same Reply-
Affidavit, petitioner stated that"[n]o less than the officials of the PSPO will attest to the fact that I was close
to them,"62 However, she never did submit any such affidavit. For reasons known only to petitioner and her
counsel, they chose not to submit additional evidence.

Petitioner misquoted the Resolution.

The argument that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner was not
able to prove respondents’ guild beyond reasonable doubt is untenable, because it stems from a misreading
of the assailed Resolution. This was the exact wording of the Resolution: "[T]he instant complaint cannot be
given due course in view of complainant’s failure to present sufficient proofs to support the accusation
against the herein respondent."63 Nowhere in the Resolution do we find any statement that the Complaint
was dismissed because complainant failed to prove the guilt of respondents.

Further, petitioner misquotes public respondents when she alleges that "according to public respondent,
petitioner’s statements in her Complaint-Affidavit cannot be given credence because it is uncorroborated."64
Below is the explanation of public respondents quoted verbatim:
Applying [the ruling in People v. Ymana] in the instant case, therefore the uncorroborated and
unsubstantiated allegations of the complainant will not suffice to determine the existence of probable cause
against respondents, more so in the presence of contrary declarations of the alleged involved personalities in
the contested transactions."65

Again, nowhere in the Resolution do we find any statement that petitioner’s uncorroborated allegations
cannot be given credence.1âwphi1 Rather, the Resolution impressed that public respondents had been
unable to determine the existence of probable cause because petitioner presented only uncorroborated
allegations, which were met with contrary declarations of the alleged involved personalities in the contested
transactions.

The Court will not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion.

The extraordinariness of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for certiorari must not be diluted by
invocations of grave abuse of discretion as some sort of magic phrase to counter almost every unfavorable
decision, every adverse interlocutory order issued by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities.

As officers of the Court, litigators are enjoined to be circumspect about filing petitions for certiorari. This
Court deems it necessary to remind its officers that to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the
ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.66 Grave abuse of discretion is
the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.67

Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, unless
there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great
respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,68 the Court explained that the rule of non-
interference is rooted in the recognition that the Ombudsman’s exercise of investigatory and prosecutor
powers is mandated by the Constitution. The rule is also adopted for practicality. Otherwise, courts would be
swamped if they have to review the exercise of discretion of public prosecutors each time they decide to file
an information or dismiss a complaint.

Nevertheless, the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute.69
It remains incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in a manner that
would warrant the Court’s reversal of the Ombudsman’s findings.

In the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the present case, this Court cannot reverse the
ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05-0380-H are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 247589, August 24, 2020 ]

ROBERT PLAN, JR. Y BELONCIO @ "JUN", AND MARK OLIVER ENOLVA Y DICTADO@
"MARK", PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 12, 2018 and the
Resolution3 dated May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41149, which affirmed
with modification the Joint Decision4 dated December 27, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 81 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. QZN-17-04462-63, finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @
"Jun" (Plan) and Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @"Mark" (Enolva; collectively, petitioners), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations6 filed before the RTC charging petitioners with the
crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings, as defined and
penalized under Section 13,7 Article II of RA 9165.
The prosecution alleged that on March 31, 2017, members of the Philippine National Police, Police Station
7, Cubao, Quezon City, were dispatched to conduct Oplan Galugad at 33 1st Palanas St., Bo. Camp Panopio
Compound, Brgy. Kaunlaran, Quezon City, after receiving information about persons playing cara y
cruz where wagers supposedly included illegal drugs. Upon arrival thereat, they saw five (5) male persons
playing cara y cruz and immediately arrested said persons for violation of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1602 (Illegal Gambling).8 Arresting officer PO1 Stanley de Guzman (PO1 de Guzman) frisked petitioners
and recovered from each of them a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, as well as two (2)
cellphones purportedly containing messages about drug transactions. Thereafter, the seized items were
marked, inventoried, and photographed at the place of arrest in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Nenita
Dordas (Kgd. Dordas), and media representatives Earlo Bringas9 of Net 25 (Bringas), Jopel Pelenio of
DWIZ (Pelenio), and Bam Alegre of GMA 710 (Alegre). Petitioners and the other suspects,11 together with
the seized items, were brought to the police station. Subsequently, the seized sachets from petitioners
bearing the markings "SDG/RP 3/31/17" and "SDG/ME 3/31/17"12 were brought to the crime
laboratory,13 where, after examination,14 the contents tested positive for 6.10 grams and 0.71 gram,
respectively, of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.15

In defense, petitioners denied the charges against them, claiming that on March 31, 2017, Enolva was on his
way home to Bulacan when the gear of his motorcycle became loose. Unable to find an auto repair shop
(talyer), he went to the house of his kumpare, Plan, to have his motorcycle fixed. While they were repairing
the motorcycle outside Plan's house, several persons wearing civilian clothes suddenly appeared, poked their
guns at them, ordered them to raise their hands, and frisked them. While nothing was found on their persons,
they were arrested and brought to the police station along with three (3) other persons they did not know.16

In a Joint Decision17 dated December 27, 2017, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, sentencing Plan to a term of twenty (20) years and one (1)
day, and a fine of P400,000.00, and Enolva to a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and a fine of
P300,000.00.18 It gave credence to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over petitioners'
defense of denial,19 and found the prosecution to have ensured the security and integrity of the police
operations and of the seized items.20

In a Decision21 dated December 12, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the modification: (a)
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt, instead, of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165;
and (b) applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) in imposing the penalty of imprisonment on
Enolva.22 It observed that the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the seized items via
sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule concerning the handling of the confiscated illegal drugs
from the time of their seizure from petitioners until their presentation in court.23 However, it ruled that the
prosecution failed to establish the necessary element to qualify petitioners' Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs to the imposition of the maximum penalties pursuant to Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, i.e., when
possessed during a party, social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2)
persons, considering that they were arrested while playing cara y cruz with three (3) other persons, and were
not shown to have intended to use the illegal drugs while playing.24 It likewise applied the ISL in imposing
the penalty of imprisonment on Enolva for his possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu, which is
punishable with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and accordingly,
imposed on him imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as maximum.25

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution26 dated May 24, 2019. Hence, this
appeal seeking that their conviction be overturned.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law."27 Guided by this consideration, the Court modifies the conviction of both petitioners to
violation of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings, as
defined and penalized under Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, as will be explained hereunder.Ꮮαwρhi ৷

I.

To convict an accused for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the
necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.28

Here, the courts a quo correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty all the
foregoing elements, considering that: (a) by virtue of petitioners' arrest for playing cara y cruz, the police
officers recovered, among others, two (2) plastic sachets of shabu from their possession; (b) petitioners
failed to prove that their possession of the seized items was authorized by law; and (c) petitioners freely and
consciously possessed the same. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in the best position
to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.29 Hence, since there is no
indication that the said court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court finds no reason to deviate from its factual findings.

Further, the Court notes that the police officers sufficiently complied with the chain of custody rule under
Section 21, Article ll of RA9165, as amended by RA 10640.30

To be sure, in cases for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.31 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt which therefore warrants an acquittal.32

Notably, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation
in court as evidence of the crime.33 Thus, as part of the chain of custody procedure, the apprehending team
is mandated, immediately after seizure and confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA
9165 by RA I0640, a representative from the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), AND any
elected public official;34 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 1064035 an elected public
official AND a representative of the National Prosecution Service36 OR the media.37 The presence of these
witnesses safeguards the establishment of the chain of custody and removes any suspicion of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence.38

Records show that after petitioners were arrested on March 31, 2017 - or after RA 10640 took effect - PO1
de Guzman immediately took custody of the illegal drugs from petitioners' possession, and conducted the
requisite marking, inventory, and photography thereof, in the presence of an elected public official, Kgd.
Dordas, and media representatives, Bringas, Pelenio, and Alegre, right at the place where petitioners were
arrested. He retained custody while petitioners, together with the seized items, were brought to the police
station,39 until he brought the seized items to the crime laboratory, and personally turned them over to
Police Chief Inspector Bernardo Roque who performed the necessary examination40 thereon. During the
trial, he also positively identified the seized items41 bearing his initials "SDG/RP 3/31/17" and "SDG/ME
3/31/17."42 In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the seized dangerous
drugs remained unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been
properly preserved. Perforce, petitioners' conviction must stand.
 II.

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in finding petitioners guilty of only Section 11,43 and not
Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, on the notion that while they were playing cara y cruz "in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons," it was not shown that such occasion was meant for using drugs, as in a
pot session.

Section 13, Article II of RA 9165 reads:

Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - Any person
found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of this
Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, to qualify possession of illegal drugs as warranting the imposition of stiffer penalties pursuant to
Section 13, Article II of RA 9165, with which petitioners were charged, such possession must have
occurred: (a) during a party; or (b) at a social gathering or meeting; or (c) in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons.44

As may be gleaned from the explicit wording of the provision, nowhere does the law qualify that the above-
stated instances must have been intended for the purpose of using illegal drugs. In fact, under Section 13,
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, the phrase "company of at least
two (2) persons" was defined to "mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may
not be in possession of any dangerous drug." This means that the only qualification for the provision to
trigger is that the accused or suspect possessed illegal drugs in the proximate company of such persons who
may or may not be in possession of any dangerous drugs. With the foregoing in mind, the CA therefore
unduly restricted the meaning of the phrase "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons" in
Section 13, Article II of RA 9165 to merely contemplate "pot sessions."45

In this regard, the Court discerns that the apparent purpose of Section 13, Article II of RA 9165 is to deter
the proliferation of prohibited drugs to other persons. Possession of dangerous drugs is a crime in itself; but
when the possessor is found in a situation where there is a tendency or opportunity to proliferate drugs to
other persons, either through direct peddling or even some indirect influence, the gravity of the crime is
exacerbated. In addition, when one possesses dangerous drugs, there is always a chance that the possessor
uses and consequently, becomes "under the influence." Thus, in the circumstances stated in Section 13,
Article II of RA 9165, the possessor does not only become an imminent threat to his own safety and well-
being, but also to other people within his close proximity; hence, the stiffer penalties.

In this case, petitioners were found in possession of illegal drugs incidental to their arrest for playing cara y
cruz with three (3) other persons, or "in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons," warranting the
imposition of the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11, pursuant to Section 13, Article II of RA
9165. Notably, the imposition of the maximum penalties was expressly stated to be regardless of the
quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs. Under Section 11, the maximum penalty that may be imposed
upon any person who shall possess any dangerous drug without authority is life imprisonment to death, and
a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Accordingly,  the Court sentences petitioners to each
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.46 Moreover, petitioners are not eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the ISL.47

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12, 2018 and the Resolution dated
May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41149 are hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification finding petitioners Robert Plan, Jr. y Beloncio @ "Jun" and Mark Oliver Enolva y Dictado @
"Mark" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 13, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Accordingly, they are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, without eligibility for
parole, and a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Inting, and  Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Baltazar-Padilla, J., on official leave.