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no direct connection to al-Qaeda. Kenneth J. Williams reported in the EC that Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi was ³known to have contact with bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaydah.´ Kenneth J. Williams wrote, that Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi had moved to Arizona in 1998, but had left the United States in October 1999. Williams also wrote that two persons arrested in June 2001 in Bahrain had admitted to being members of alQaeda and had been planning an ³operation-to bomb the U.S. embassy and military forces in Saudi Arabia.´ At the time of their arrest, which was kept secret by the Bahrainians, they had in their possession a passport of a man who was believed to be a relative of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi. Williams wrote that the man who was believed to be a relative of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi previously had entered the United States in 1998 with this passport and was associated with an address known to be that of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi.1 The 9/11 Joint Intelligence Committee: ³The FBI also has determined since September 11, 2001 that (deleted) mentioned in the Phoenix Communication is also connected to the al-Qaeda network. (Deleted) was arrested along with Abu Zubaydah.´ Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi was captured in Pakistan on March 28, 2002 along with Abu Zubaydah. In August 2000, al-Sharbi, a Saudi citizen and Electrical engineering graduate of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, in Prescott, Arizona, departed the United States to train in Afghanistan. In July 2001 Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi attended the al-Qaeda al-Farouq training camp, where he was first introduced to Usama bin Laden. At al-Farouq, al-Sharbi's training included physical training, military tactics, weapons instruction, and firing on a variety of individual and crew-served weapons. During July and August 2001 Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi stood watch with loaded weapons at al-Farouq at times when Usama bin Laden visited the camp. From July 2001 to September 13, 2001, Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi provided English translation for another camp attendee's military training at al-Farouq, to include translating the attendee's personal bayat to Usama bin Laden. On September 13, 2001, anticipating a military response to al-Qaeda¶s¶ attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and the remaining trainees were ordered to evacuate alFarouq. Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and others fled the camp and were told to fire warning shots in the air if they saw American missiles approaching.2 The UBLU was adept at closing investigations of our Brothers. ³Lynn´ another Intelligence Research Specialist at the UBLU stated that she believed that ³Jane´ sent her the Williams EC because Jane was aware of her field office's earlier investigation of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and several of his associates. Lynn said that in these investigations, the FBI observed some trends, such as that all of the subjects were of Saudi descent, were employed by Saudi airlines, and were involved with aircraft maintenance or had pilots' licenses, and that the Saudi Airline company was paying for their training. Lynn said that the investigation also had revealed that the subjects were
. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf . http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/d20051104sharbi.pdf
calling various gun dealers and gun shops. She said that the FBI personnel involved in the investigation questioned whether the subjects were using Saudi Airlines to transport weapons, but that nothing further had developed in the investigations to support this theory and that the Field Office investigation was closed. According to Lynn by the time the name of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi resurfaced in June 2001 based on the arrest of the two al-Qaeda operatives in Bahrain, he had not been in her area for approximately three years. Did that make him any less dangerous, any less relevant to William¶s thesis? Basically all Kenneth Williams suggested was that the FBI should make a list of all the aviation schools in the United States and see if any jihadi were enrolled there.3 Had the FBI done so it might have actually come across the names of some of our jihadi? LOTFI RAISSI In February 2001 Brother Hanjour, the Shaheed who flew a plane into the Pentagon, enrolled at Sawyer flight school Phoenix, Arizona, where he studied advanced simulator training in order to learn how to fly an airliner.4 In his memo Kenneth Williams also reported the presence of two Algerian Islamist ³extremists´ at aviation schools in Arizona. One of them was Lofti Raissi, whom the FBI assumed to be September 11th Shaheed Hani Hanjour¶s associate. Raissi left the United States in April 2000 and returned in June 2001, remaining in the United States for approximately one month. The FBI speculated that Raissi might have returned to the United States either to evaluate Hanjour's flying skills, or to provide Hanjour with his final training on the flight simulator before the September 11th Events. Lotfi Raissi was an experienced flight instructor who was certified to fly Boeing 737s. The FBI seized on the fact that on five days when Hanjour trained on an AST simulator, Lotfi Raissi too recorded use of the machine. After being held for six months in a British goal, and then released, Lotfi Raissi has been indicted in the United States for not disclosing any information regarding his previous knee surgery on a FAA form and for not disclosing that he had a 1993 criminal conviction for theft, which carried a maximum penalty of ten years, from the Uxbridge Magistrate¶s Court in England. The Joint Inquiry noted: There are indications that hijacker Hani Hanjour, who was unknown to the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies before September 11th, associated with Lotfi Raissi, an individual who was mentioned in the Phoenix Electronic Communication, had taken flight training in the United States, and was possibly a radical fundamentalist. There are several reasons why Lotfi Raissi¶s association with Hani
3. Boston Globe page A16 May 24, 2002. July 10, 2001, ³Memo from a Phoenix FBI agent.´ 4. Jim Yardley and Jo Thomas ³Traces of Terror Report´ New York Times June 19, 2002. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10711FC3C5B0C7A8DDDAF0894DA404482
Hanjour did not bring Hani Hanjour to the FBI¶s attention before September 11th. FBI personnel believe that, beginning in 1997, Hani Hanjour and Lotfi Raissi in the Phoenix Electronic Communication trained together at a flight school in Arizona and may also have known each other through a religious center. The Bureau attempted to investigate Lotfi Raissi in May 2001, but discovered that he was out of the country. The Phoenix office generally did not open investigations on persons they believed had permanently left the United States. Although there were no legal bars to opening an investigation, Headquarters discouraged this practice. The Phoenix office did not notify INS, the State Department, or CIA of its interest in Lotfi Raissi. The FBI was apparently unaware that Lotfi Raissi returned to the United States soon thereafter and may have associated with Hanjour and several other Islamic extremists. For the FBI to be aware that persons of investigative interest have returned to the United States, close contact must be maintained with INS and CIA. Unfortunately, before September 11th, no system was in place to ensure coordination. In this case, the FBI did not notify the INS, State Department, or CIA of its interest in the Phoenix subject Lotfi Raissi. Therefore, Lotfi Raissi was able to get back into the United States without any notification to the FBI. Wes Fults, who had been the simulator manager at Sawyer, said that Raissi ³had a group of several guys who would come in and do simulator training with him´ and one of those men was September 11th Shaheed Ziad Samir Jarrah.5 The FBI should have been investigating Hani Hanjour but what little investigation it did was focused on Lotfi Raissi. FBI Agent Williams reported in the EC that investigations of ³Subject No.3 [Raissi] and Subject No. 4 had been opened based on information from foreign governments demonstrating that they were both involved with African Islamic extremist / terror activity and had associated with individuals who had associated with Ahmed Ressam.´ Others who might have been mentioned in the memo, which is still highly deleted, included Faisal Al Salmi, who was convicted of lying about having known Hanjour, and Malek Seif, who was convicted of using a false Social Security number and immigration violations. No one mentioned therein was ever charged with ³terrorism.´ FBI PREOCCUPIED WITH WAR ON DRUGS In an August 21, 2001 email message from the Phoenix FBI Field Office, Kenneth Williams urged David Frasca, head of the anti-Islamist unit aka Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters, to check all schools nationwide for such students - advice that wasn¶t followed until after September 11th because Kenneth Williams had suggested this was a long term operation to plant sleeper agents in the aviation industry and judging by the way he had handled it, there was no rush. Anyway
. Scott Thomsen and Jacques Billeaud ³Suspect frequented Phoenix school´ Associated Press September 29, 2001 http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/10929Npilotside.html
the priorities of FBI headquarters were focused on the War on Drugs, not on our activities. During the Clinton presidency more than three times the number of people were arrested for marijuana than were arrested during the Nixon administration, which Islamists approve of on two levels ± we oppose drug use and favor any pressing concern that takes the FBI¶s attention away from Islamism. A similar situation regarding priorities existed in the FBI¶s Field Offices. For much of the 1990¶s the Arizona division was preoccupied with fighting drugs, and treated our activities as a low priority, even though Tucson had been one of the nation¶s earliest meccas for radical Muslim groups. Before the September 11th Raids out of the Tucson division¶s total of 230 agents more than 60 were dedicated to drug work, while about 16 were to spy on Islamists and domestic militias; one former agent says the number of agents dedicated to guarding against international ³terrorism´ was about eight.
The FBI was so ashamed of their lack of vigilance that it waited until May 15, 2002 before they admitted that the memo about our agents training in the U.S. cited Usama bin Laden by name and suggested that his followers could use the flight schools to train for ³terror´ operations ± actually counter-terror operations - since America is the biggest terrorist state in existence. Had the analysts at FBI Headquarters put this information together with the information that follows, it would have been a whole new soccer game but prior to the September 11th Raids, only one FBI analyst was assigned full time to al-Qaeda, although others were working on individual ³terrorist´ cases related to Usama bin Laden¶s network. In 1999, the CIA¶s counter terrorism center had only three analysts assigned full time to al-Qaeda, as breaking up international drug cartels was even the CIA¶s priority. THE OTHER 2000 CLUES Additional evidence that al-Qaeda was planning an action involving aircraft surfaced at East African Embassy bombing trial when L¶Houssaine Kherchtou revealed:
I observed an Egyptian named Ali-Mohamed who was not a pilot debriefing a friend of his, Ihab Mohamed Ali (also known as Ihab Ali Nawawi), about how air traffic control works and what people say over the air traffic control system, and it was my belief that there might have been a plan to send a pilot to Saudi Arabia or someone familiar with that to monitor the air traffic communications so they could possibly attack an airplane perhaps belonging to an Egyptian president or something in Saudi Arabia.6 L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF KING ZAHIR SHAH King Muhammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, overthrown in 1973, became a symbol of national unity for the Mujahedin Islamic fundamentalist resistance groups. In 1991 the Afghan government restored Zahir's citizenship. L'Houssaine Kherchtou was involved in an assassination attempt on Zahir Shah while Muhammad Zahir Shah was in exile in Italy: In November 1991 an al-Qaeda operative pretending to be a journalist stabbed King Muhammad Zahir Shah in the middle of an pretense interview. The Brother grabbed a knife from a ³gift´ he had for the king and plunged it into his heart. Zahir Shah, however, smoked cigars and had a metal cigar case right there, and it deflected the blade. The Brother was arrested. He was carrying a Portuguese passport in the name of Jose de Almeida Santo Paulo, but police were unable to explain his motives or say if the passport was forged. Sergeant Ali-Mohamed was sent to Italy to investigate and reported the results of his investigation to L'Houssaine Kherchtou, who had lived in Italy and had aided the assassin. The U.S. Attorney downplayed Kherchtou¶s role: ³Ali-Mohamed was frustrated in his investigation and brought back articles from the Italian newspaper concerning the event of a stabbing of the king of Afghanistan and brought them back to Nairobi, and Kherchtou translated some of them.´7 L'Houssaine Kherchtou was placed in the witness protection program. THE CIA TAKES ITS LUMPURS MOHAMMED AHMED AL-HADA When questioned by the FBI about the East African Embassies Events, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-µOwhali gave agents the telephone number of an al-Qaeda safe house in the Yemeni city of Sanaa, owned by a Yemeni bin Laden loyalist Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada, the father-in-law of September 11th Shaheed Khalid alMidhar. Al-µOwhali had called Khalid al-Midhar's father-in-law at the Sanaa guesthouse right after the East African Embassy bombing despite the fact that Al-µOwhali was supposed to be dead. With the help of Yemeni Security Forces the NSA put a tap on Brother Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada¶s telephone. THE 1998 EAST AFRICAN EMBASSY EVENT AND ³KHALLAD´
. 98 Cr. 1023 USDC SDNY . 98 Cr. 1023 USDC SDNY
After giving up this phone number Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-µOwhali cooperated with the FBI and told them all he knew. Part of his confession involved a ³Khallad´ LNU: About two to three months ago I was instructed by Azzam to go to Pakistan and to meet with a man named Khallad. Upon arriving in Pakistan, I was briefed on the parts of the mission by Azzam and Khallad. Azzam departed and told me that Khallad would provide me with all the necessary details about the mission. Khallad told me that my mission was a martyrdom mission, where I would be driving a vehicle filled with explosives into a target that would result in my death. Khallad told me that the target was a U.S. Embassy in East Africa but I was not told the exact country. Since the mission was a martyrdom mission, Khallad took a video of me that would be played after the mission was completed. During the filming of the video Khallad told me to claim that I was from the Third Martyr Barracks, 1st Squad of the Al Bara¶ Bin Malik Division of the Liberation Army of Islamic Holy Lands. I never heard of this organization before this video but it was what Khallad wanted me to say. Khallad told me I would be traveling to Nairobi, Kenya where I would receive the rest of the details of my mission. I arrived in Nairobi on August 2, 1998 and called Khallad to tell him I had arrived. A man known as Harun who paid my hotel bill and took me to his house picked me up at the hotel. The next day at Harun¶s house I met Azzam and a man named Saleh [Rashid Saleh Hemed] both of who had arrived from Mombassa. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me Harun was the owner of the house and the facilitator/administrative person for this mission. Rashid Saleh Hemed then briefed me about the mission. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that their mission had two targets that were to be blown up on the same day, August 7, 1998. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that the two targets were the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar el Salaam, Tanzania. Rashid Saleh Hemed gave me some photographs and diagrams of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. I was shown the bomb-laden vehicle which was in the garage of Harun¶s house«I was told the bomb weighed about three times which had been cut back from the original plan of 5 tons because of concern about collateral damage to Kenyan civilians«Usama bin Laden has several people who control the missions. Bin Laden controls the political objectives and gives instructions to the senior people, not to people like myself, or Azzam. It was not that this was a bin Laden operation specifically but I believe it was. Bin Laden¶s method of operation in public statements was to shy away from taking direct responsibility for attacks like this«Every attack helps the morale of Muslims worldwide in their struggle. Rashid Saleh Hemed and I discussed attacks inside the U.S. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that there are targets inside the U.S. that could be hit but not everything is in place yet. Rashid Saleh Hemed added that many more attacks first had to be conducted on the U.S. in
other parts of the world first. These attacks would weaken the U.S. and open the way for strikes inside U.S. soil. I leaned at these camps that attacks on U.S. Embassies achieve several objectives to include hitting the U.S. ambassador, the military attaché, the press attaché and most importantly, intelligence officers. My training prioritized U.S. targets as being: 1. U.S. military bases or sites. 2. U.S. Diplomatic or political sites and 3. Kidnapping Ambassadors. The kidnapping of ambassadors would be done to arrange for a release of Muslim prisoners like Ramzi Yousef and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and myself.´8 In 1998 the FBI knew Khallad was a key player in al-Qaeda. Khallad was the nom de guerre of Tawfiq bin Attash. TAWFIQ BIN ATTASH Born in the late seventies in Yemen, Tawfiq bin Attash was raised in Saudi Arabia, where his father was an associate of Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and His Eminence Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. The Bin-Attashes were forced to move after the patriarch of the family was exiled from Yemen for holding Islamist religious views. The younger bin Attash joined the Afghan resistance¶s fight against the Northern Alliance in 1994, and after his brother was killed in battle in 1997, a meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was arranged between bin Laden and bin Attash, who then officially became a member of al-Qaeda. When Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in March 2003, bin Attash was seen as a possible successor, though he himself would be captured just two months later in a raid on a Karachi warehouse that also produced the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and four other al-Qaeda members. Since then, Bin Attash has been a key U.S. asset and is now known as Tawfiq bin Rattash.9 In early 1999 the NSA got Brother Nawaf al-Hazmi¶s full name and nothing else from the Sanaa guesthouse tap. This did not meet NSA¶s reporting threshold at the time. In late 1999 NSA heard the names Khalid and Nawaf and from this and other information were able to figure out the full names of two future Shaheeds. Then came what might have been a big break for America. The FBI Inspector General¶s Office reported, ³In the midst of the Millennium period concerns in late 1999, the NSA analyzed communications associated with a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East linked to Al-Qaeda activities directed against U.S. interests. The communications indicated that several members of an operational cadre were planning to travel to Kuala
. USA v Moussaoui Defendant¶s Exhibit 767 . http://tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6294
Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000.´ Analysis of the communications revealed that persons named ³Nawaf,´ ³Khalid´ and ³Salem´ (September 11th Shaheed Salem alHazmi, Nawaf¶s brother also attended the meeting)10 were involved. In early 2000, the NSA analyzed what appeared to be related communications concerning a ³Khallad.´ This met the reporting criterion as the Khallad call was about the upcoming meeting at Yazid Sufaat¶s vacation condominium, or safehouse, however you want to look at it. THE DEATH OF BROTHER AL-HADA On February 12, 2002 Brother Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada, aged 25, was killed after trying to flee from Yemeni Security Forces that had staked out his house in suburban San'a. Yemeni security forces were met with gunfire during the raid. Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada ran and in the process attempted to throw a grenade at security officers. The explosive, however, detonated in his hand and killed Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada instantly. No police were injured. The incident happened nearby the San'a University. Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada died a hero and his death inspired others in his family to take action. In May 2004, members of the Saudi al-Ansari family carried out an attack against a Saudi oil refinery. One of the attackers was Mustafa Abdel-Qader Abed al-Ansari, a former member of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Mustafa Ansari was the brother-in-law of Khalid alMidhar as both men married into the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Hada family.11 Mohammed al-Massari, a former Saudi diplomat and physicist who fled the country in the mid-1990s and was the secretary general of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in London, remembered al-Ansari well. From the tap the CIA had learned about the planned meeting in Malaysia one month in advance.12 In January 2000 Malaysian Security Forces photographed Hambali, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, entering and leaving Yazid Sufaat¶s apartment during a secret meeting in Kuala Lumpur.13 They also got a photo of a man identified only as ³Khallad.´ The United States Joint Committee on intelligence reported, ³CIA arranged surveillance of the meeting and the DCI was kept informed of the operation as it progressed.´14 The CIA however, did not have an ELSUR listening device planted within the safehouse and the Brothers were taught to be circumspect while talking on the telephone. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi told Khalid Shaikh Mohammed they believed they were surveiled from Thailand to the U.S.15 The Thai authorities were on to Khalid al-Midhar and he was watchlisted. The CIA had developed traces on Khalid al-Midhar by this time, and the Agency had his passport number and other minor personal data but he was on no Watchlists whatsoever. Despite the fact Attash used the name Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf when traveling with Khalid al-Midhar the Thais also watchlisted the Brother.16
. Oliver Schroum Die - ³U.S. Investigators Knew About Planned Terror Attacks Let the Suspects Get Away: More Clues That CIA and FBI Could Have Prevented the Attack on America´ Ziet [German newsweekly] - October 1, 2002. 11 . http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/katz_kern200507110810.asp 12 . Oliver Schröm Die Zeit, Hamburg Oct. 1, 2002 Deadly Mistakes 13. Philip Shelton ³Denial of Search Warrant For Subject¶s Belongings is at Center of Inquiry´ New York Times June 7, 2002. 14 . USA v Moussaoui Def. Ex. 538-H 15 . http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-0941.pdf 16 . USA v Moussaoui Def. Ex. 940
In January 2001 when shown a surveillance photo of the Kuala Lumpur meeting, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-µOwhali said he had previously encountered one of the participants. He identified Khallad in one of the photographs as the same Khallad he had described as involved with the East African bombings,17 thus connecting the purported mastermind of the attack on the East African Embassies with the Malaysia meetings attended by Khalid al- Khalid al-Midhar and others. This should have put September 11th martyrs al-Midhar and al-Hazmi high up on the Al-Qaeda food chain for associating with Khallad, a man who had killed hundreds of people many of them innocent Kenyans but the CIA and NSA must have been preoccupied tracking Columbian drug cartels and the FBI old drug cases.18 The meeting had taken place in January 2000 and the pictures were displayed one year later ± obviously terrorism was not a priority for the FBI or CIA. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA, ³In January 2000, the two operatives involved in the planes operation flew to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Al-Midhar and alHazmi knew that they would be involved in Shaheed operation somewhere in the United States. The operatives were in contact with Hambali during the visit to Kuala Lumpur, but only because Hambali as a rule had to be informed of the activities of al-Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia.´ On August 15, 2003 Hambali was captured in Thailand after the CIA tracked his cell phone calls. Under torture he confessed that he worked closely with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed who had sent him funds to finance an attack on a Marriott Hotel that took place after the Bali nightclub event, where, on October 12, 2002 two hundred infidels, mostly Christian Australians19 were killed and another 200 wounded.20 In March 2002 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service arrested Mohammed Monsour Jabarah Abdulrahman. Under interrogation he said he pledged bayat to bin Laden, ³to fight against all those who hate Islam and stand by Usama bin Laden until death.´ Circa May 2001 ± June 2001 bin Laden told him he had been chosen for a mission and he was sent to Karachi where he met Hambali and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who told Jabarah, ³he wanted [him] to go to Malaysia to meet with individuals who were planning an operation against the U.S. and Israeli embassies in the Philippines.´ Khalid Shaikh Mohammed gave Jabarah money and ordered him to leave Pakistan for Malaysia before September 11th 2001.21 Mohammed Jabarah told the Canadians that in January 2002 Hambali discussed carrying out attacks with his group: ³His plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by
. Infonnation developed after September 11, 2001, revealed this was a misidentification, and the person identified as Khallad was actually Hazmi. 18 . Independent June 6, 2002. 19 . Jack Roche - a Muslim convert and follower of Abu Bakar Bashir, was arrested in Australia for plotting to destroy two Zionist embassies there. Roche said that he had been a supporter of al-Qaeda, whom he did not believe was responsible for the th September 11 attacks and that our organization in Australia, Jemaah Islamiah was a term that could apply to ³any Muslim at any time´ as it meant ³a group of Muslims.´ ³Nobody ever says they're a member of JI and I'm not going to say I¶m a member of JI,´ Roche said. ³In Islam you can¶t divide politics from religion and any Muslim who tells you any different is a liar.´ Roche co-operated with the authorities and was given a nine year sentence although he could be released as eary as 2007. (JI Long Active in Australia´ The Age Melbourne Australia March 22, 2003) 20 . Matthew Moore ³Al Qaeda Sent Money for Bali Bombers - Hambali´ - The Age Melbourne Australia September 29, 2003. 21 . Sidney Morning Herald May 16, 2003.
Westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia." Hambali also stated that he had one ton of explosives in Indonesia. The West had warning of our intentions but concentrated on extraditing Jabarah to America ± eventually Jabarah went to the U.S. ³voluntarily.´22 KHALLAD AND THE COLE ATTACK Shortly after the U.S.S. Cole was attacked on October 12, 2000, the CIA and the FBI received a photograph and information that a man named Khallad was the purported mastermind behind the attack. As part of the Cole investigation, the FBI sought to find Khallad. Two Cole suspects, Fahd Al-Quso and Ibrahim Nibras had fingered Khallad: ³During his interview by FBI Agents in Yemen, Fahd Al-Quso originally told interviewers that on approximately January 6, 2000, he and Ibrahim Nibras traveled on a Gulf Air Flight from Yemen to Kuala Lumpur via Dubai, UAE. (Deleted) Al-Quso and Nibras ultimate destination was to be Bangkok, where he and Nibras would pass Khallad, the suspected financier of the Cole Operation $36,000 (US) which had been sent to Khallad from his parents. Al-Quso later retracted that statement and claimed he and Nibras traveled from Yemen to Bangkok where Thai authorities refused to allow the two to travel onward to Singapore because they did not possess the proper travel documents. Thus the money was passed to Khallad in Bangkok. Investigation of the USS Cole attack did not develop evidence to support either version of Al-Quso¶s story. (Deleted) of further interest is the fact that (deleted). According to Al-Quso, Nibras contacted his home where he left a message for Khallad as to where they could be reached when the two were unable to make their final travel destination.´ Yemeni authorities were holding Al-Quos in connection with the Cole attack when he escaped from prison in April 2003. Another member of the Cole Crew, Nasser Ahmad Nasser Al-Bahri, was released after receiving amnesty from the president of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh.23 I am sure everyone gets the idea« As you have heard, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-µOwhali had given the CIA and the FBI information about an al-Qaeda operative known as "Khallad" and described him as being heavily involved with the East African embassy bombings in August 1998 on behalf of Usama bin Laden. Not only was Khallad linked to the East African Embassy Action, but he was the jihadi who had helped put a hole in the battleship Cole. When the name Khallad popped up on the radar a CIA agent described him as ³a major league killer who orchestrated the Cole attack.´ For the love of Allah, why did the U.S. welcome his associates to their country with open arms? Finally, based on this information FBI Headquarters ordered New York to open a full field intelligence investigation, locate Khalid al-Midhar and interview him.´24 This was a case of too little, too late. AMERICA READMITS AL-MIDHAR
. http://www.ccla.org/pos/letters/Sep23toMcLellanreJabarah.pdf . http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP76704 24 . USA v Moussaoui FBI NA-88-1655
Additionally, the CIA knew that al-Midhar possessed a multiple-entry visa permitting him to travel freely to and from the United States. The CIA, however, still did not bother to tell the FBI that al-Midhar had a multiple-entry visa that would allow him to enter the United States, or at least that was what the FBI claimed as the CIA produced a cable showing this had been done. There was much rear-end covering over whether the CIA told the FBI anything at all about al-Hazmi and al-Midhar. CIA e-mail traffic, however, suggested that the CIA did brief the FBI in general terms but did not mention the Brothers ability to visit the U.S. ± This continues to be an [intelligence] operation. Thus far a lot of suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. Told [the first FBI agent] that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop. Like [the first FBI agent] yesterday, [the second FBI agent] stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the loop.25 The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice determined that the CIA cable was never transmitted to the FBI. ³Dwight´ drafted a Central Intelligence Report in which he summarized the information that had been disseminated by the NSA about Mihdhar. He also provided detailed information about Mihdhar's passport, visa, and visa application indicating that New York had been his intended destination. According to CIA records, this Central Intelligence Report never was disseminated to the FBI. A desk officer's note on the draft Central Intelligence Report indicated that the Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit, John, had instructed the draft Central Intelligence Report be put on hold (a note was added to the CIR in the CIA's computer system: "pls hold off on CIR for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit]" and Dwight contacted him through an e-mail about the disposition of the Central Intelligence Report a week later. Despite this e-mail, the evidence clearly shows that the Central Intelligence Report never was disseminated to the FBI.´ Dwight was a detailee from the Washington FBI Field Office who focused on the financial aspects of terrorism and obtained information through the Counter Terrorism Center to help identify and investigate persons who were responsible for funding terrorism. He had access to CIA cables and reviewed them for potential leads or other information related to terrorist financing. The NSA independently possessed information linking Brother Nawaf alHazmi to al-Qaeda from the tap on al-Hada¶s phone. Neither the CIA nor the NSA, however, saw fit to provide their names to the Justice Department¶s TIPOFF ³terrorist´ database. Nawaf al-Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, shortly after the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In early March 2000, the CIA learned of his arrival. Despite having just learned of the presence in this country of one of our key operatives, the CIA still told no one about this. The internal cable CIA transmitting this information about Nawaf al-Hazmi, in fact, contained the notation: ³Action Required: None, FYI.´ Nawaf al25
Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles at the height of the U.S. Intelligence Community¶s alarm over our ³Millennium Plot,´ when Ahmed Ressam was supposed to have arrived in Los Angeles to conduct operations. The CIA knew this. Still, Alhumdulallah, the CIA refused to notify anyone of Nawaf al-Hazmi¶s presence in the country. By this point, both al-Midhar and al-Hazmi ± both mujahedeen known to the CIA ± were living in San Diego under their true names. They signed these names on their rental agreement, both used their real names in taking flight school training in May 2000, and al-Midhar even used his real name in obtaining a motor vehicle identification card from the State of California. In July 2000, Nawaf al-Hazmi brazenly applied to the INS for an extension of his visa, sending in this application using both his real name and his current address in San Diego (where he would remain until that December). INS, of course, had no reason to be concerned, since the CIA had withheld the two Brothers¶ names from TIPOFF. Nor did the FBI have any reason to look for them by conducting a basic Internet search for their names or by querying its informants in Southern California ± since the last it had heard from CIA was that these two Brothers were overseas.
THE UNNOTICED CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION Al-Midhar had traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, at the time of this monumental intelligence failure, and applied for a new U.S. visa in June 2001. On June 13, 2001 alMidhar obtained a new U.S. visa in Jeddah, using a different passport than the one he had used to enter the United States in January 2000, but using the same name. On his visa application, he checked ³no´ in response to the question whether he had ever been in the United States. This was a clear predicate for a criminal investigation that no one appeared to notice at the time. In her Electronic Communication, FBI Agent Dina Corsi noted that Khalid al-Midhar had previously traveled to the United States, according to information she had obtained from the INS. After the FBI's intelligence investigation was opened, she obtained and forwarded to FBI Agent Robert Fuller a copy Khalid alMidhar's June 2001 visa application on which he stated that he had not previously been issued a visa and had never traveled to the United States. Thus, there was a clear basis to charge Khalid al-Midhar criminally with false statements or visa fraud. Significantly, this information had been provided to the FBI without the restrictive caveats placed on NSA reports and other intelligence information. As a result, if Khalid al-Midhar had been found, he could have been arrested and charged with a criminal violation based on the false statements on his visa application. However, the FBI did not seem to notice this when deciding whether to use criminal or intelligence resources to locate Khalid alMidhar. Dina Corsi, a woman, had composed this memo. Corsi had all the Khallad information at her disposal and knew how dangerous he was. Yet she maintained a tolerant attitude toward his associates. Why? Only a few re-treads from the Soviet-era were assigned to watch us. Many failed to take a personal interest in combating Islamism as they did Communism or they underestimated our ability to fight an asymmetrical war. None of the Agents were Jewish, or at least did not have Jewish-
sounding names, for the Jews have a heavy stake in all of this but were excluded due to their loyalty to the Zionist entity. The State Department officials who took Khalid al-Midhar¶s application followed procedures and checked his name against their Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database. The CLASS name check system includes information from the TIPOFF ³terrorist´ Watch List, which is managed by the State Department¶s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This list contains declassified biographical information, such as name, birth date, or passport number on thousands of suspected ³terrorists.´ This information is drawn from sensitive all-source intelligence and law enforcement data provided by the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence community agencies. When a consular officer using CLASS receives a TIPOFF ³hit´ on an applicant¶s name, the officer refers the case to the TIPOFF staff at the Department of State. The TIPOFF staff will then make available the classified information supporting the TIPOFF entry to authorized consular and legal experts within the Department of State, who then determine whether the evidence is sufficient to deny the visa request. The consular officer may not issue a visa until the Bureau of Consular Affairs has responded with its security advisory opinion. TIPOFF ³hits´ through the CLASS system are coordinated with the FBI and other agencies. Foreknowledge of pending ³terrorist´ travel has, in the past, enabled authorities to arrest ³terrorist´ suspects at ports of entry, or to conduct surveillance of them inside the United States. Because CIA failed to put the name of Brother Khalid al-Midhar into TIPOFF, however, no CLASS ³hits´ occurred, and Khalid al-Midhar was given a visa and returned to the United States on July 4, 2001. Putting his name on the Watch List would have enabled INS agents to stop him at the border.26 Even when given the opportunity to tell the FBI, in face-to-face meetings, about the presence of these two heroes of the Ummah in the United States, the CIA refused. At a meeting in June 2001 with FBI officials from the New York Field Office who were working on the U.S.S. Cole case, a CIA official refused to tell them that al-Midhar and al-Hazmi had come to the United States. CIA Director Tenet told a joint Congressional committee in October 2002 that he would reveal the names of counterterrorism officials responsible for the failure to put the men on the Watch List but in May 2003 the liar and child of liars refused to do so. The CIA actually promoted one of these counterterrorism officials. The CIA only decided to watch list al-Hazmi and al-Midhar on August 23, 2001: Subject: Request To Enter Bin-Laden Related Individuals Into VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF and TECS (paragraph deleted). Action: Please enter the following individuals into VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF and TECHS due to their confirmed links to (deleted) operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in South East Asia. We recommend that these individuals be watchlisted immediately to be denied entry into the United States.´ The rest of the information in the CIA document, save for passport, travel and visa details has largely been deleted.27 Some of it was revealed in another document which read,
26. David Johnston and Elizabeth Becker ³CIA Was Tracking Hijacker Months Earlier Than It Had Said´ New York Times June 3, 2002. http://www.senate.gov/~intelligence/shelby.pdf 27 . USA v Moussaoui Def Ex 468
³Bin-Laden related individuals´ al-Hazmi, the al-Midhar brothers and Khallad are to be watchlisted immediately and be denied entry into the United States, ³due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in East Asia.´ On August 23, 2001, the director of Central Intelligence was briefed about Moussaoui. On August 24, 2001 the State Department placed al-Midhar and his travel companions on its terrorism watchlist. This is the first record of the placement of al-Midhar or Hazmi on any U.S. watchlist. SHOULD FULLER GET THE BRUSH? The Office of the Inspector General of the United States Justice Department reported, On September 4, 2001 FBI Agent Robert Fuller requested a local criminal history check on al-Midhar through the New York City Police Department. Agent Fuller initially focused on al-Midhar since he was captioned as the subject of the investigation in the predicating Electronic Communication. After reviewing the Electronic Communication several times, Fuller noted the connection to Hazmi, so he conducted the same record checks on Hazmi as he had on al-Midhar.´ The OIG does not characterize Fuller as the brightest of lights and it was true FBI Agent Fuller was groping around in the dark. On September 4, 2001 FBI Agent Fuller completed a lookout request for the INS, identifying Khalid al-Midhar as a potential witness in a terrorist investigation. Due to his unfamiliarity with completing the lookout form, Fuller contacted an INS Special Agent who was assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. The INS lookout form had a box indicating whether the individual was wanted for "security/terrorism" reasons. FBI Agent Robert Fuller did not check this box. He said that he thought the INS Agent told him to identify the subject on the form as a witness, not a potential terrorist, to prevent overzealous immigration officials from overreacting. The INS Agent who was assigned to the Joint Terrorist Task Force since September 1996, claimed he did not provide this advice to Fuller and he always checked the security/terrorism box whenever he completed the lookout form for a potential witness in a terrorism investigation.28 By this point in time the Brothers were already in the United States and in the final stages of preparing for the September 11th attacks, all praise to Allah, and it was too late for the FBI to stop them. On September 5, 2001 Fuller requested an NCIC criminal history check, credit checks, and motor vehicle records be searched in reference to al-Midhar and Hazmi. On September 5, 2001 Fuller contacted the lossprevention personnel for the New York area Marriott hotels, since al-Midhar had indicated when he entered the United States in July 2001 that was his destination. No luck.
. USDOG IG¶S 9/11 Report November 2004 USA v Moussaoui Def Ex 952-A
Although the FBI scrambled and fumbled in late August 2001 and early September 2001 to locate the two in the United States, it denied itself the services of any of its own agents assigned to criminal work and refused even to conduct a basic Internet search that would have revealed al-Hazmi and al-Midhar living under their true names in San Diego. Instead the FBI went to a private contractor, ChoicePoint,29 which came up with nothing. Praise Allah for privatization! An FBI agent in New York conducted such an Internet search after the September 11th attacks, and found alMidhar¶s address within hours. The FBI also denied itself any assistance that could have been obtained from Treasury officials in tracking down al-Midhar and al-Hazmi through their credit card or banking transactions. Evidence of this was presented at the sentencing phase of the Moussaoui trial: The evidence will be that in late August of 2001 a high government official told [Robert Fuller], the rookie FBI agent tasked to try to find Khalid alMidhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi specifically not to seek credit card information from the Saudi airlines, the airline upon which these two had recently traveled and which is owned by our supposed ally. Why? That government official said she didn't think it was prudent to ask. You as jurors will be able to see how this occurred and what could have happened in the search for two known killers in our country had a more or less prudent approach been taken.30 Had these men been wanted on drug charges, the FBI would have put all their efforts into finding them and frozen their accounts. Alhumdulallah, for the FBI¶s blindness, the CIA¶s refusal to share its information and the NSA¶s bureaucratic bungling!31 We also wonder what happened to Operation Boulder, which was put into effect in 1972 and was designed to screen out and deny visas to jihadi.32 Had it met the same fate as the Alien Border Control Committee that had been formed in 1986 when the Jewish pervert Congressman Barney Frank and others amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, so that membership in a so-called terrorist group was not enough for the denial of a visa ± one had to have actually committed so-called terrorist acts.33 After the World Trade Center victory approximately 20,000 new lookouts were quickly entered into TIPOFF and the Central Information Integration Center began operation on May 1, 2003. The center fused and analyzed Jihad-related information collected domestically and abroad to form what America hopes to be a comprehensive threat picture. It is designed to be in one central location where information from all sources is shared, integrated, and analyzed. A senior U.S. government official, who will report to the Director of the CIA, will head the center. As soon as an appropriate facility
. This did not stop Carol A. DiBattiste for taking a job there after leaving her post as Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Safety Agency. 30 . http://cryptome.quintessenz.at/mirror/usa-v-zm-030606-02.htm 31. David Johnston and Don Van Natta Jr. ³Congress¶ Inquiry into 9/11 Will Look Back as Far as 1986´ New York Times June 5, 2002. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30C13FB355E0C768CDDAF0894DA404482 32 . Bill Richards and LaBarbara Bowman ³Slaying of Alon Activiated U.S. Watch for Terrorists´ Washington Post July 4, 1973 Page A1. 33 . Mark Reibling Wedge ± How the Secret War Between the CIA and FBI has Endangered National Security Touchstone Books, November 2002.
is available, FBI¶s Counterterrorism Division, the Director of Central Intelligence¶s Counterterrorism Center, and the center will relocate to a single new facility. As soon as al-Qaeda finds out that location it will be a prime target. The information gathered there, including biometric profiles, will be passed to the Terrorist Screening Center, which will consolidate this information with the FBI¶s Watch List, TIPOFF and the Transportation Security Agencies No-Fly List. The Americans hope to accumulate a list of 100,000 names. Brian Davis, a Canadian immigration official in Paris claimed, ³The U.S. lookout index contains some five million names of known terrorists and other persons representing a potential problem.´34 We must admit that this centralization will make it much more difficult for al-Qaeda to penetrate America¶s borders or infiltrate its institutions once we are within.35 ABDUSSATTAR SHAIKH: WAS HE ANOTHER TRIPLE AGENT? Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA, It was my idea that Khalid al-Midhar and al-Hazmi should reside in San Diego, California, after arriving in Los Angeles on January 2000. There was no al-Qaeda operative or facilitator in the United States to help alMidhar and al-Hazmi settle in the United States. Al-Midhar and al-Hazmi were not engaged in casing activity while in San Diego, given that they barely knew how to function in U.S. society. This statement was contradicted by the fact that many Arab-Americans AlMidhar and al-Hazmi came into contact with had been looked at by the CounterIslamist, or ³counter-terrorist´ community. The FBI thought it had a high-level informer in San Diego, California in its employ before the September 11th Raids named Abdussattar Shaikh of Lemon Grove, California, but Shaikh knew how to play the Bureau. Shaikh, a key FBI asset, was the landlord of Khalid al-Midhar from May 2000 to June 2000 and Nawaf alHazmi from May 2000 to December 2000! FBI Special Agent Steven Butler had recruited Abdussattar Shaikh On May 14, 1994. Agent Butler had first visited the Islamic Center of San Diego, a large Clairemont mosque, to investigate eight threatening calls that were received within hours of the Oklahoma City bombing. One caller said the center would be blown up if it were proved that Arabs were responsible. Abdussattar was the co-founder of this Mosque and a prominent member of the Muslim Community. When Butler realized that Muslims were not responsible for the Murrah attack he began to sympathize with them.
. http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/TorontoSun/News/2004/01/20/318488.html . http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/fed91603memund.pdf USDOS Memo Of Understanding signed by Colin Powell September 16, 2003.
Butler remained the asset's handling agent or "control agent" - until he retired in February 2002. Abdussattar Shaikh was as an informational source, providing the FBI with information acquired in his normal daily routine. The FBI normally questioned him, although he occasionally volunteered information that he thought might be relevant. After September 11th even the FBI¶s Office of the Inspector General was unable to interview Shaikh. The Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry had attempted to interview him also without success. The Committee then submitted interrogatories that Shaikh declined to answer, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. Shaikh indicated through his attorney that if subpoenaed by the Committee, he would not testify without a grant of immunity. The FBI was unwilling to allow this informer to testify even before a closed session of Congress, claiming it would damage efforts to recruit sources from ArabAmerican communities. Was this the real reason or was the FBI informant¶s true allegiance to Allah? After 9/11, Abdussattar Shaikh told the FBI the two Brothers were good, religious Muslims. They did not work, yet they always seemed to have money. Although they did not fit the profile of rich Saudis, Abdussattar Shaikh never questioned them about finances. They did not act in a peculiar manner and did nothing to arouse his suspicions although they often would go outside when using their cellular telephones. Shaikh said he identified the two only by their first names to the FBI. Later he said that he had not mentioned them at all. These Brothers living in Abdussattar Shaikh's home were in a position to put Shaikh and the information he supplied to the FBI in jeopardy. Therefore, prudence and operational security would suggest that information about persons living with the asset should have been sought by the FBI, at least to the extent of learning and documenting their names, and perhaps running a records check on them. This was not done. During one of their last contacts, Nawaf al-Hazmi advised Abdussattar Shaikh that he was moving to Arizona to attend flight training, but Shaikh did not advise the FBI of this information until after the September 11th attacks. Abdussattar Shaikh claimed Nawaf al-Hazmi never mentioned flight training he received while living in San Diego yet he told San Diego Magazine36 ³They said they were old friends from Saudi Arabia who were here to study and become pilots. But they didn¶t have any anger, or temper. Believe me, if I had known they were on some sort of terrorist list, I would have immediately informed authorities. I¶ve lived in this country 42 years. What happened last year was horrible, and I hope and pray nothing like that ever happens again.´ Which side was Shaikh on, Allah¶s or the Evil Doers? Only his God knows for sure! The fools of the Joint Committee on Intelligence wondered about this and other strange events: ³First, while there are several indications suggesting that future hijacker Hani Hanjour had contact with Shaikh in December 2000, Shaikh has repeatedly advised the FBI that he does not recognize photos of Hanjour. Second, Shaikh told the FBI that the hijackers did nothing to arouse his suspicion, but Shaikh also acknowledged that Nawaf al-Hazmi had contacts with at least four individuals Shaikh knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom Shaikh had previously reported to the
FBI. Third, Shaikh has made numerous inconsistent statements to the FBI during the course of interviews after September 11, 2001. Fourth, Shaikh¶s responses during an FBI polygraph examination to very specific questions about his advance knowledge of the September 11th plot were judged by the FBI to be inconclusive, although the FBI asserts that this type of result is not unusual for such individuals in such circumstances.´ Shaikh asked for immunity from prosecution if he was called to testify under oath and commented, ³I don¶t know why I have been accused. I think I¶m going to ask them [the FBI].´ Shaikh denied he was an FBI informant and said he was shocked by the suggestion. Initially Shaikh was not paid. In July 2003, Shaikh was given a $100,000 payment and closed as an asset. EDWAR SALAMAH There were other clues as to our presence in San Diego. Edwar Salamah, a Palestinian-born U.S. citizen and manager of Sam's Star Mart gas station in La Mesa, who was at the time being investigated by the FBI, hired Nawaf al-Hazmi to work for him briefly, after receiving a call from a mutual friend at the Ar-Ribat al-Islami Mosque in La Mesa. In January 2000, before Nawaf al-Hazmi¶s employment at Sam's Star Mart gas station, the FBI Los Angeles field office initiated an investigation of Salamah after a person whom the FBI was surveilling entered Salamah¶s car in a mosque parking lot. That person was the brother of a bin Laden operative. Salamah was under FBI investigation when he hired Nawaf al-Hazmi. OSAMA "SAM" MUSTAFA The owner of Sam¶s Star Mart, Osama ³Sam´ Mustafa37 cheered upon learning of the September 11th Raids and had been investigated by the FBI numerous times. The first investigation was opened in August 1991 upon receipt of reports from the San Diego Police Department that, during a traffic stop, Mustafa had stated that the United States needed another Pan Am 103 attack and that he could be the one to carry it out. Pan Am Flight 103, en route to New York from London, exploded in the air over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers, among them 189 Americans, and 11 people on the ground. Libya has taken responsibility for this action. Mustafa also said that all Americans should be killed for what they did to Iraqis. During the investigation, the FBI developed information that Mustafa was associated with members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in San Diego and Chicago. In 1994, San Diego police also received an anonymous call stating that Mustafa was a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine member.38 The FBI received information in 1994 that
. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20030725-9999_1n25report.html . In 1967 Wadi Haddad formed the Marxist PFLP that advocated the liberation of Palestine by acts of violence against the Zionist entity. The PFLP kidnapped OPEC leaders in Vienna in 1975 and also commandeered a Lufthansa airliner going to Mogadishu in 1977. ³Carlos the Jackal´ carried out these attacks as a Haddad operative. The PFLP hijacked an Air France airliner enroute to Entebbe in 1976 where they met a warm welcome from Idi Amin, a convert to Islam and a historical revisionist, who killed the Zionist Dora Bloch, as she faked illness in a local hospital. Amin would be granted asylum in Saudi Arabia, where he died in August 2003. In March 1978 Wadi Haddad, aged only forty-nine, died from suspected leukemia in an East German hospital ± the same hospital where Abu Nidal had been treated for leukemia. The Mossad was responsible for the leukemia that struck him down. In Baghdad of 1977, fine chocolates were rare. The Mossad, working with a Palestinian who had become close to Haddad, secretly gave him Belgian chocolate laced with poison over six months, Mossad agent and Time Magazine Jerusalem correspondant Arron Klein told the media in the course of promoting his book Striking Back. (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-israel-
Mustafa had threatened to kill a former Israeli intelligence officer who resided in San Diego. Mustafa informed the Israeli that he was a member of the PLO and that the orders to kill him had come from the PLO. The FBI closed its investigation of Mustafa, but reopened it in 1997 when it received information tying him to a possible plot based in North Carolina. In 1996 the FBI began Operation Smokescreen, after a number of Muslims were seen buying large quantities of cigarettes from wholesalers in North Carolina. In 1997 Bassam Youssef Hamood, of Charlotte, North Carolina, was arrested for cigarette smuggling. It was believed that his profits were being donated to the Hizb¶allah.39 Hizb¶allah earned an estimated profit of $1.5 million between 1996 and 2000 by purchasing cigarettes in a low tax state for a lower price and selling them in a high tax state at a higher price.40 In July 2000 Hamood was charged with the same offense. Although the media reported that the profits from this enterprise were again funneled to our Brothers in the Hizb¶allah he was not charged with giving the Hizb¶allah material support until after the September 11th Raids. Hamood was convicted by a jury verdict on June 21, 2002, for providing material support to a designated terrorist organization, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, and immigration fraud. On February 28, 2003, he was sentenced to 155 years in prison. It is not clear if this is the plot Mustafa was tied to. In February 2001, a stockbroker called the FBI to say that Mustafa had closed his account, explaining that he was sending the money to freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Mustafa now resides in Riverside, California. ANWAR AL-AWLAKI In addition, Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki of the Masjid Ar-Ribat Al-Islam, who was the subject of an FBI counterterrorism inquiry for part of the time that the future Shaheeds Midhar & Hazmi were in San Diego, served as their spiritual advisor there. Born and raised in the U.S., Awlaki obtained B.S. in Civil Engineering from Colorado State University, M.A. in Education Leadership from San Diego State University and studied for a PhD in Human Resource Development at George Washington University, where he served as the Muslim Chaplin.41 The FBI opened a ³counterterrorism´ inquiry into Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki's activities in June 1999. During the inquiry the FBI discovered that the Imam was in contact with a number of other persons of investigative interest. In early 2000, a subject of a Los Angeles investigation closely associated with Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman visited the Imam (probably Firas Jandali,42 part of the Sami Al-Arian Defense Committee). The FBI closed its inquiry into the activities of the Imam in March 2000, approximately two months after al-Hazmi and al-Midhar arrived in San Diego. In
killing-by-chocolate,1,4872993.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines). Haddad died in March 1978, showing only symptoms of leukemia but no signs of poisoning. There are many well-documented cases of radiation-induced leukemia in humans. The early scientists who worked with x-rays and radioactive substances did not realize the risk. Marie Curie who first isolated radium from uranium ore died of leukemia, as did her daughter-assistant. 39 . http://www.tobacco.org/news/96217.html 40 . GAO Report ³Terrorist Financing´ November 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf 41 . http://www.usrah.co.uk/anwar_awlarki_profile.htm 42 Telephone - 510.919.6440
the case-closing memorandum, the agent asserted that the Imam had been ³fully identified and does not meet the criterion for [further] investigation.´ The investigation was closed despite the Imam¶s contacts with other subjects of ³counterterrorism´ investigations and reports concerning the Imam¶s connection to suspect organizations. Mohadar Mohamed Abdoulah, who also worshipped at the Masjid Ar-Ribat Al-Islam, provided some help with air reservations and finding a flight training school for Brother al-Hazmi and Hanjour.43 When Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki moved to one of the largest Muslim communities in the country at the Dar Al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hanjour followed and began attending that mosque.44 After the September 11th Raids this holy man said: ³Islam does not approve of this. There is no way that the people who did this could be Muslim, and if they claim to be Muslim, then they have perverted their religion« Now, to what extent [Osama bin Laden] has any coordination or relationship with the Taliban is not known. But I think that the reason the Taliban is defending him is that not only do they think that he didn't do this, but also in their tribal customs² remember that the Taliban are predominantly Pashtun²it is a shame to hand over somebody who sought your protection. These are tribal rules that go back centuries. If someone comes to you and says, "I want to be under your protection," you do not give that person up even if you end up sacrificing your life. So it's a tribal custom that they have. So this is how this alliance came about, but it's something that is fairly recent. Plus, I think they're grateful to him for his assistance in the war against the Russians. The Taliban themselves, as a movement, they have come out very strongly in their condemnation of what happened in the U.S. They do not approve of this terrorism. But the issue here is that they cannot give up this person who sought their protection. It's not that they approve of what he is doing. But I think that Osama bin Laden did approve of what happened, and reports that I've heard are that he said, "I did not do it, but I'm not against it." So you can see that there's a difference of opinion. They're not really in alliance.´45 Brother Al-Awlaki left the United States in September 2002, returned briefly to clear up some unfinished business then moved to Yemen where he now resides.46 In January 2003 Al-Awlaki visited England and exhorted the faithful at the Masjid atTawhid mosque in London to become shaheeds, and die in the sake of Allah [subhanahu wa ta¶ala].47 The September 11th Commission concluded that Al-Awalki had provided aid to the Brothers but was aware of their intentions. OSAMA AWADALLAH Osama Awadallah, a Jordanian student, was also accused of helping the September 11th Shaheeds while they were in San Diego. FBI agents found a scrap of paper with the words ³Osama 589-5316´ inside a car abandoned by Nawaf Al-Hazmi at Washington Dulles International Airport on the afternoon of September 11th 2001. The
. James Sterngold ³Muslims in San Diego Waver on Bail Pledge´ New York Times December 9, 2001 . Kelly Thornton ³Chance to Foil 9/11 Plot Lost Here, Report Finds,´ San Diego Tribune July 25, 2003. . http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/09/0927_imampart1.html 46 . Telephone conversation with Dar Al-Hijrah Mosque October 12, 2003 703-536-1030 47 . Steven Emerson tape provided to World Net Daily September 11, 2003.
FBI subsequently matched this number to a phone at a residence where Osama Awadallah had briefly lived nearly two years earlier. A consent search of Osama Awadallah¶s apartment uncovered a box-cutter and several computer-generated photographs of Usama bin Laden along with a tape entitled ³Martyrs of Bosnia´ a documentary of the activity of the Mujahadeen in Bosnia, replete with armed masked Religious Holy Warriors, charred corpses and guerilla combat. This film was a translation by Azzam Publications of original material produced by the Mojahedin Regiment of Bosnia. The FBI came to his home to question him but at this time Osama Awadallah had to prepare himself for afternoon prayers. He had to urinate, and he needed to wash his body. But when he entered his bathroom and closed the bathroom door, an agent opened the door and forcibly kept it open with his foot. Awadallah explained to the agent that it was against his religion to urinate with people watching him, but the agent said that the door had to be open. Osama Awadallah was so scared that although he needed to urinate, he was unable to. Agent Reilly described Awadallah as ³uncomfortable with having the door open while using the restroom.´ Agent Weston testified that Awadallah actually urinated. The government in a memorandum speculated that perhaps Awadallah didn't really need to urinate. When, as part of his pre-prayer washing ritual, Mr. Awadallah wiped water on the tops of his socks, the agents watched and laughed and said, ³Look he put water on his socks!´48 Despite this ugly treatment Osama Awadallah agreed to accompany the agents to the San Diego FBI Field Office where he underwent a polygraph exam, which began around 7:30 a.m. Osama Awadallah was advised of his rights and he signed an adviceof-rights form. Agent Antonio Falcon conducted a polygraph examination for two hours during which FBI Agent Falcone left the room for a few minutes and then returned to complete the test. Agent Falcon returned ten minutes later and told Awadallah that the polygraph showed that he had lied on the following two questions: (a) Did you know beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets, on September 11, 2001? Answer - No. (b) Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks against U.S. targets, on September 11, 2001? Answer - No. While confronting Osama Awadallah, Agent Falcon repeatedly intimidated him, warning that he could be sentenced to prison for five years if lied. After twenty minutes, the FBI agents who had brought him to the Field Office came into the room and told Osama Awadallah that he was ³one of the terrorists´ and he knew about the September 11th attacks in advance. The agents also told Osama Awadallah that nobody could hurt him except them. Awadallah attempted to stand up, but the agents ordered him: ³Sit down and don¶t move.´ Awadallah saw that things were ³going wrong,´ and he ³feared that they were going to do something to him.´ Osama Awadallah said he wanted to call his lawyer and his brother, but the agents refused his request. The agents continued to question Awadallah, who repeated four or five times that he had to leave for Friday prayer. The conversation became heated and the agents told Awadallah that if he continued to lie, he could go to prison and be deported. The agents informed Awadallah that he was
. USDC SDNY 02CR1269-SAS Tr. 88 Tr. 913 Tr. 160
going to miss Friday prayer and instead they were going to fly him to New York and detain him ³for one year´ so that they could ³find out´ more about him. Osama Awadallah was arrested and held as a material witness.49 Awadallah was represented by two lawyers, Randall Hamud, who had no federal criminal trial experience, and Abdeen Jabara, who did. Before either defense attorney could say a single word, the Government moved Mr. Hamud's admission to this court pro hac vice,50 and Judge Mukasey granted it. The Government then immediately moved to ³excuse´ Jabara, arguing only that the fact that he had previously represented Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman created a conflict which was not necessary to explain, and that Jabara ³was only appearing here as co-counsel´ and that Awadallah had Hamud. When Hamud objected, stating that he was not familiar with the nuances of the Southern District, Judge Mukasey asked Mr. Hamud the unanswerable question, ³Which nuances are you not familiar with?´ When Mr. Hamud said that because his practice was not in New York, it was appropriate for him to have local counsel, Judge Mukasey asked, ³Then what is the point of admitting you pro hac vice?´ and ordered Mr. Jabara excluded.51 Osama Awadallah was called before a Grand Jury and presented with an essay he had composed in an English as a second language class in which stated that he had met ³Khalid´ and ³Nawaf,´ the first names of two of the September 11th Shaheeds. When confronted with this he said, ³This handwriting is not my handwriting. All of them is my handwriting except µhis name Khalid.¶ I wouldn't write Khalid like that.´ He said the same thing about the word ³Nawaf.´ It never occurred to him that the FBI could not have written these names in his essay, as there was not enough space between the words to insert them. After being tortured for 83 days in numerous federal prisons, Awadallah was released on a half a million dollars bail. While at MDC he was beaten while being transferred from cell to cell. When William Kunstler¶s wife asked for a copy of the surveillance tape of this she was told that a high-ranking correction officer had reviewed it, found no evidence of brutality, and then recycled it. Awadallah¶s trial before Judge Shira Scheindlin began in April 2006 and ended in a mistrial thanks to a Jewish subway worker turned male nurse (the Learned Elders of Islam know what that means) named David Lipschultz, who hammered another nail in his and all the Jews coffins. Awadallah was a sympathizer as evidenced by the media from Azzam Publications, but not a member or affiliate of our organization. The FBI made an example out of him ± sending a message to others Muslims that if they lie to the FBI about al-Qaeda they will be put on trial then go to prison then be deported. HARRY SAMIT AND ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI Our entire plan could have unraveled and al-Qaeda could have been prevented from carrying out most or all of the September 11th Mission if the work of a FBI Field
. USDC SDNY 01 CR 1026 Second Order and Opinion Shira A. Scheindlin . For This Occasion 51 . USDC SDNY 02CR1269-SAS Tr. 785; Minutes of 10/2/01, p. 4
Agent named Harry Samit had been taken seriously by FBI officials in Washington, D.C. Samit put together most of the September 11th 2001 puzzle pieces in August 2001 but was prevented from obtaining certain key puzzle pieces by FBI officials at the J. Edgar Hoover Building. Zacarias Moussaoui was the weakest link in the jihadi chain as he refused to follow orders. Samit was a Lieutenant commander in the United States Navy from May 1990 until joining the FBI in January 1999 specializing in intelligence. After Moussaoui was arrested by the INS in Minneapolis, Minnesota in August 2001 on immigration violations Moussaoui began his first of two interviews by stating he was highly suspicious of immigration authorities in general because of a problem he had in the UK in 1993 while traveling on his identity card provided by the French Consulate in London. Moussaoui indicated that he was questioned extensively by UK immigration authorities who believed he was Algerian, despite his possession of valid French documents. Moussaoui related that he was saved from this difficulty only through a friend's acquaintance with a French Senator who interceded in his behalf, but whose name he could not recall.´52 On October 24, 1993 three French consular officials in Algeria were abducted. The French newspaper Le Soir reported a French magistrate traveled to London to investigate the case with information that a ³Zacarias´ living in London was involved. Le Soir also reported Moussaoui had been in contact with an Algerian Islamic militant, Farid Melouk, who is now serving a nine-year sentence in a Brussels prison. Melouk was a member of the Armed Islamic Group, and was arrested in 1998 after a shootout with police who raided his home in Brussels. By 1998 Zacarias Moussaoui left Europe and met with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Afghanistan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was impressed by the work that Moussaoui had carried out on behalf of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and Moussaoui swore bayat to al-Qaeda. Later Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in an attempt to save Moussaoui¶s life, would say that he had many qualms about using Zacarias as an operative because Zacarias evidenced mental instability. He was problematic and unstable. But he was admitted into al-Qaeda circles none-the-less. Mohamed Atta¶s handwriting was found on a document in Moussaoui¶s possession. At the crash scene in Pennsylvania, the FBI found a business card with the name of the uncle of Zaid Jarrah, (one of the September 11th Shaheeds) on it. On the back of this card was found an address in Germany, 14 A Bilstedderhaupt. A telephone number connected to this address was found in Moussaoui¶s notebook.53 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed tried to convince the CIA that Moussaoui was marginal and that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had punished him by enrolling him in a reform school in Qandahar, Afghanistan after which al-Qaeda leadership considered him reformed, however, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated he was not convinced. No such Al-Qaeda reform school was known to exist.
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 692 . USA v. Moussaoui United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 03-4792 December 3, 2003, Transcript of CIPA proceedings
In September 2000 Zacarias Moussaoui flew to Malaysia on Kahlid Sheikh Mohammed¶s instructions. Hambali went to Malaysia to meet Moussaoui and brought him to Kuala Lumpur. Hambali put Moussaoui up in Yazid Sufaat's condominium. Hambali learned that the purpose of Moussaoui's visit was to enroll in flight school and take flight training at the Malaysian Flying Academy in Malacca. Yazid assisted Moussaoui in looking for flight schools and Hambali recalled seeing Moussaoui reading a flight school brochure, although he could not remember from which flight school. Later, Moussaoui complained that training was difficult in Malaysia because of the constant rain. Hambali believed that Moussaoui was not diligent about his mission, as he never actually enrolled in a flight school. Hambali described Moussaoui to his CIA interrogators as very troubled, not right in the head, and as having a bad character. He told them that while in Malaysia Moussaoui insisted on going outside when any sensitive information was discussed yet he talked freely in Brother Faiz Bafana¶s home about a dream he had to fly an airplane into the White House and that Moussaoui managed to annoy everyone he came in contact with. Hambali had many arguments with Moussaoui because he was criticizing Jemaah Islamiah for sitting around and reading the Qu¶ran instead of conducting operations. He said Moussaoui was constantly suggesting operations that the rest of them thought were ridiculous, such as kidnapping local Chinese businessmen and holding them for ransom, and robbing motorists. Hambali told Moussaoui that if he wanted to do such things, he should do it in Europe, and not cause trouble in Jemaah Islamiah's neighborhood, as there were plenty of activists there already.54 Moussaoui¶s desire to make Jihad and not just talk about it was the cause of Yazid¶s arrest - instead of getting flight training soon after arriving, Moussaoui told Yazid Sufaat and Hambali that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had instructed him to buy 40 tons of ammonium nitrate for a mission. He would not tell Yazid or Hambali what the mission was, but since the instructions came from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, they believed they needed to assist Moussaoui. Hambali said they thought Moussaoui must have been mistaken as to the amount of ammonium nitrate needed, as 40 tons was a tremendous amount, and they did not have enough money to purchase that much. Instead, they purchased four tons, hoping that was the actual amount requested. Yazid Sufaat and Moussaoui purchased the ammonium nitrate for approximately 8,000 Malaysian Ringets (approximately $1580 in July 2000). Hambali said he was not involved in the purchase and did not know the name of the company from which they bought it. They purchased the ammonium nitrate under the guise that it was for Yazid's lab, the Green Lab. Hambali said that even four tons of ammonium nitrate was a huge amount, and they were very concerned about where to store it. When Moussaoui left, his hosts were stuck with the ammonium nitrate and the bill. Hambali said he was puzzled and angered by this. When they later asked Sheikh Mohammed what they should do with the ammonium nitrate, Sheikh Mohammed professed ignorance, and said he had never told
. Hambali was an associate of Jemaah Islamiah leader Abu Bakar Bashir, 64, who was put on trial in Indonesia for an action against an outpost of Western ³culture´ if you want to dignify it by calling it that - a discotheque in Bali. Bashir faced 15 years in prison for treason - trying to set up an Islamic state. Prosecutors also claimed he gave final approval for the bombing of several churches on Christmas Eve 2000 during which more than 30 kuffar died. Bashir was sentenced to 30 months in jail for being part of an "evil conspiracy" in 2003 but was cleared of leading Jemaah Islamiyyah and was released in April 2004 shortly after Indonesia's parliamentary polls. Under U.S. pressure the police immediately rearrested this frail old man. Much to the dismay of Bashir bashers, Bashir was released in June 2006 after serving about one year in prison.
Moussaoui to buy ammonium nitrate, let alone 40 tons of it. Sufaat had to do something with the fertilizer so he gave it to a Jemaah Islamiah cell that was penetrated by Malaysian intelligence and ended up in prison. In September 2000 Moussaoui contacted Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma about flight training. In December 2000, he flew from London, England to Pakistan then returned to London on February 7, 2001. Then, on February 23, 2001, Moussaoui flew from London to Chicago, Illinois, declaring approximately $35,000 cash to U.S. Customs when he entered the country. He then flew to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and thereafter traveled to Norman, Oklahoma where he opened a bank account depositing $32,000. Moussaoui attended the Norman Mosque regularly and just as he was instructed not to do, called attention to himself by being very outspoken about his feelings regarding the incompatibility of practicing the Islamic faith while living in the United States. He tore down posters he found offensive. On May 23, 2001, Moussaoui e-mailed the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Miami, Florida to find out about attending its flight simulator school. In August 2001, Moussaoui drove with his co-religionist, potential jihadi and roommate Hussein al-Attas from Oklahoma to Eagan Minnesota to attend Pan Am International Flight Academy¶s Minnesota facility. Moussaoui had initially written to Matthew Tierney at the Pan Am International Flight Academy in May 2001, using a Hotmail account with the name email@example.com. ± Hello, Mrs. Matt. I am Mrs. Zacarias. I contacted you today by phone. Basically I need to know if you can help to achieve my goal, my dream. I would like to fly in a professional like manner one of the big airliners. I have to made my mind which of the following: Boeing 747, 757, 767, or 777 and/or Airbus 300 (it will depend on the cost and which one is easiest to learn). The level that I would like to achieve is to be able to take off and land, to handle communication with ATC, [Air Traffic Control] to be able to successfully navigate from A to B, JFK to Heathrow, for example, in a sense to be able to pilot one of these big bird, even if I am not a real professional pilot. I am ready to take instrument course to achieve some basic understanding. I have around 55 hours of flying and a 152, [a singleengine Cessna] and I passed my written PPL last month. I know it could be better but I am sure that you can do something. After all, we are in America, and everything is possible. Have a nice day, waiting for a positive fly. Thanks you, Zac.55 Moussaoui was accepted as a student and began his ³crash course´ in aviation. MOUSSAOUI¶S BUST
. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2564 Also USA v Moussaoui Sentencing Phase
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA that by August 2001 he had already begun to think about the need to get Moussaoui out of the U.S. before he was caught because there was no telling what Moussaoui might say or do. This was a fabrication since no steps were ever taken to do so. On August 16, 2001 INS and Joint Terrorism Task Force FBI agents in Minnesota arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, after a Pan American flight school instructor became suspicious of his wish to learn to fly a commercial jet despite his having no prior aviation experience.56 Moussaoui said he wanted to learn to fly because it was ³an ego boosting thing´ and was interested in the operation of cabin doors. Later it was said that Moussaoui asked about the possibility of the pilot shutting off oxygen to the passengers.57 Timothy Nelson an instructor at the Pan American Flight School in Minneapolis called the FBI after Moussaoui indicated he only wished to learn to take off and land a commercial jet aircraft and paid for his training in cash. Moussaoui told the flight instructors that he was not Muslim and his agitated demeanor did not fit the profile of a pilot. Moussaoui was picked up for overstaying his visa waiver58 and was placed under arrest without incident. During a search of his person, agents discovered a short dagger with a scabbard in one of his pockets. A subsequent consensual search of AlAtta¶s vehicle revealed an additional folding knife under the driver's seat that Moussaoui admitted was his. After Moussaoui was removed from the scene to the INS District Office for processing, [his friend] Al-Attas was accompanied back to the room to retrieve documents proving he was still enrolled as a student. Al-Attas, who had a key to the room and advised that he was staying there with Moussaoui, gave written consent to search the room. This was done in the interest of Agent safety and included searches for weapons of bags and cases within Al-Attas¶ reach. Upon opening several bags and a small metal suitcase that AI-Attas indicated were Moussaoui¶s, a laptop computer, numerous aviation study materials, a cellular telephone and one small walkie-talkie-type radio were discovered. No additional weapons were found and Moussaoui¶s effects were not searched beyond the above described check for weapons and other dangerous items. Moussaoui denied consent to search his room and effects but agreed to have his possessions transported to the INS office and placed in storage. Samit began to grill Moussaoui who indicated that on his completion of training at Pan Am, he and Al-Attas planned to travel to New York City to see ³sites´ including the ³Statue of Liberty,´ the
56. John Solomon ³An FBI Memo Sought Flight School Probe´ Associated Press May 4, 2002. http://www.freep.com/news/nw/probe4_20020504.htm 57 . http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2564 58 . Travelers visiting the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are not subject to the same degree of screening as travelers with visas because a consular officer need not interview them before arriving at a U.S. port of entry. Citizens of France may enter the country without a visa for 90 days. In September 2006 the General Accountability Office reported that France is responsible for more illegal attempted entries to the U.S. than any other country in the program. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06854.pdf
³Empire State´ and the ³White House.´ These were ³sites´ alright, if you define the word as ³targets.´ Samit noted that Moussaoui had no convincing explanations about the flight training, who was financing it and his foreign travel. When interviewed a second time one day later (August 17, 2001) Moussaoui denied that he was an extremist intent on using his aviation training in furtherance of a terrorist goal and, instead, reiterated that he merely sought flight training for personal enjoyment. MOUSSAOUI AND BIN LADEN MOUSSAOUI¶S RICH SAUDI COUSIN Moussaoui told Samit ³that he earns some income from relatives Saudi Arabia. When asked in what capacity this occurs, Moussaoui indicated that it is ³absolutely legal, but private.´ When asked how a business venture could be private, Moussaoui began describing his family connections in Saudi Arabia without attempting to answer the question.´59 When Agent Samit heard this the name Usama bin Laden, who was known as the al-Qaeda financier, crossed his mind. MOUSSAOUI¶S MYSTERY SHEIKH In a sworn affidavit Hussein al-Attas stated that Moussaoui «has refused to reveal his Sheikh to me for fear that I would not like the Sheikh because of the Sheikh¶s belief or country of origin«(alAttas was born in Saudi Arabia where Usama bin Laden was unpopular in certain circles)«When asked if he was speaking about Usama bin Laden, Al-Attas advised that he did not believe this was the case. He indicated that the only reference he has seen Moussaoui make to bin Laden occurred when the two were watching CNN on television and his picture appeared. Al-Attas indicated that Moussaoui called his attention to bin Laden, but did not comment further on him. In addition to the unidentified Sheikh, Al-Attas gave several other examples of quotations from Islamic prophets that Moussaoui draws upon as justifications for his beliefs and actions. Al-Attas stated that Moussaoui quoted Omar Ibn Al Khattar, referred to as the companion prophet: ³teach your children how to swim, ride a horse and know how to fight.´ He indicated that Moussaoui used this as justification for his physical training and preparation for fighting. In referring to Moussaoui¶s dislike of living in any country which does not follow strict Islamic Law, he quoted the Prophet Mohammad in saying, ³If he does something good in Islam, love him that much. If he does something bad in Islam, hate him that much.´ Al-Attas indicated that Moussaoui¶s dislike of countries not adhering to Islamic Law extends to secular Muslim states. Al-Attas related that in arguing his beliefs, Moussaoui has referred to Fatwas, or religious orders written by various Islamic scholars. Al-Attas advised that he has seen him reading various fatwas on the Internet. One such scholar whose name Al-Attas can recall
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 692
is Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz, a Saudi who wrote a fatwa in which Moussaoui was interested. A check of ACS (Automated Case Support System) indices for Bin Baz revealed one entry which is believed to be identical in 265C-DE 79386 Serial 82 regarding Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz in Taef, Saudi Arabia. The late Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was a hafiz before the age of puberty and studied with the scholars in his homeland before traveling to seek knowledge in other countries. He completely lost his eyesight at the age 19 because of illness. Although he parroted the official Saudi line it must be said that Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was a supporter of the Al-Haramain Charitable Foundation and as a result, the Bin Baz Foundation was established in his honor.60 Sheik Ibn Baz fatwas drew sharp criticism from Usama bin Laden who pointed out that during the preceding two decades, the Saudi regime enlarged his role because of what it knows of his weakness and flexibility: The government began to strike with the cane of Bin Baz, every corrective program which the honest scholars put forward, further, it extracted a fatwa to hand over Palestine to the Jews, and before this, to permit entry into the country of the two sacred mosques to the modern day Crusaders under the rule of necessity, then it relied on a letter from him to the Minister for Internal Affairs and placed the honest scholars in the goals. The confidence of the people and the youth in Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was therefore shaken, however the price was very high, whilst the confidence of the people in the working scholars, particularly those in the prisons had been increased. Through the Advice and Reform Committee, al-Qaeda published an open letter to King Fahd in August 1995: 1. Corruption has spread, and Ulema have been complicit in sanctioning usury (charging interest for bank loans, which is considered haram by some Muslims). Osama bin Laden states that the Sheikh has deceived the people by not making a distinction ³between rulers who merely tolerate usury and rulers who legitimize and legalize usury.´ Those who legitimize usury are apostates and infidels, but Bi Sheik Ibn Baz continues to praise the regime. The current economic struggles are a punishment from God for allowing usury. 2. King Fahd wore a cross, and Sheik Ibn Baz justified this action, although it is clearly apostasy. The king¶s poor health is clear indication that this was infidelity. 3. Sheik Ibn Baz issued a fatwa permitting the Crusader-Jewish alliance that occupied the country in the name of liberating Kuwait. This was an abominable action that insulted the honor of the Umma, sullied its dignity, and defiled the holy places.
4. Sheik Ibn Baz kept silent when the Saudi regime aided the communists in Yemen, considering them to be fellow Muslims. Osama bin Laden writes, ³When were the communists ever Muslims? Aren¶t you the one who previously issued a fatwa on their apostasy and the necessity of killing them in Afghanistan? Or is there a difference between Yemeni communists and Afghan communists?´ 5. Sheik Ibn Baz wrote a fatwa allowing the ³attacks and maltreatment´ of the Ulema that resulted in the arrest and detention of Salman al-¶Awdah and Safar al-Hawali.61 Samit: Moussaoui became very agitated when asked, if on the basis of his religious beliefs, there are any particular Islamic scholars. He claimed that ³things are very clear for him´ and that he is able to think for himself. Moussaoui indicated he follows the Islamic practice of praying five times per day and of helping his Muslim Brothers. He indicated that in regard to studying fatwas, he is unable to read Arabic, only to speak it, and that this precludes his ability to understand them. MOUSSAOUI¶S SUSPICIOUS TRAVEL Moussaoui told agent Samit He has traveled to Morocco and all over Europe. He also advised that in connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture, he visited Malaysia for approximately three weeks, Indonesia for approximately one week and Pakistan for two months. He indicated that he was in Pakistan approximately six months ago and at first claimed that he was there in connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture. When asked why the Malaysian and Indonesian visits were much shorter than his trip to Pakistan, he explained that his reasons for being there were both connected to the business venture as well as personal. After being pressed to provide a reason, Moussaoui indicated that he was there attempting to get married, but that did not work out. Moussaoui stated that he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and that he stayed at hotels in that city the entire time. When asked who he contacted in Pakistan, he indicated that he was in touch with the brother of a close friend of Pakistani origin who resided in London. Although he was unable to recall the brother¶s name, he stated that his friend¶s nickname was Talil. When asked for something more descriptive, Moussaoui stated that he could not recall his friends last name but his first was Achmed. When asked if he traveled outside Pakistan to another country during his trip or if he had visited any
other cities in Pakistan, Moussaoui did not answer directly, but instead claimed that he was aware of what the interviewing agents were trying to accuse him of as a result of his having watched television. This line of questioning caused him to become extremely agitated and he refused to discuss the matter further. A previous examination of Moussaoui¶s French Passport showed that he entered Pakistan on December 9, 2000 and exited on February 7, 2001«There were no entry or exit stamps for Indonesia or Malaysia and no visas to enter these countries in Moussaoui¶s passport, which was issued by the French Consulate in London on October 31, 2000. When asked why these stamps did not appear, he indicated that this document was a recently issued replacement for one which had gone through the washing machine. Later in the interview Moussaoui also disclosed that he has traveled to Saudi Arabia in September 1996 for Umrah«He also advised that he planned to travel to Denver to do some unspecified business with United Airlines. (August 16, 2001) FBI agent Harry Samit later testified that Moussaoui Informed me that [the visas] had been carried in a previously issued passport, which had been accidentally destroyed by going through the washing machine. I was aware that frequently terrorists to mask suspicious travel or frequent travel, that couldn't be explained by their job or by their nationality, would regularly destroy passports accidentally or report them stolen in order to mask that travel, so they weren't carrying incriminating entry and exit stamps. Samit suspected that Moussaoui traveled to Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden: ³Moussaoui was unable to convincingly explain a trip to Pakistan lasting from December 2000 until February 2001, initially informing agents that this was for µpersonal reasons.¶ He later indicated that he was in Pakistan attempting to find a wife. Recipients will note that Moussaoui arrived in the U.S. only 15 days after leaving Pakistan, a country determined through other Minneapolis investigations to be a conduit for persons traveling to Afghanistan in order to provide or receive terrorist training and indoctrination (two paragraphs deleted).´62 With all these links to bin Laden Samit was asked by Moussaoui¶s lawyer, Q. Okay. So instead of going to the Usama bin Laden Unit, you said you went to the what unit? A. To the Radical Fundamentalist Unit. Q. And why is this that you went to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit?
. FBI LHM August 24, 200l Minn Minn
A. We knew that Mr. Moussaoui was a Sunni Muslim, he was an extremist, and we believed he was involved in an ongoing plot. The Radical Fundamentalist Unit was the logical unit. Q. Why did you go to the Iran unit then? A. Because before speaking with Mr. Moussaoui, FBI database checks indicated that his name might be connected to Iran [the first traces on Moussaoui linked him to the Hizb¶allah]. Q. Okay. And what happened when your Electronic Communication got to Iran? Did you get kicked over to the RFU unit? A. We did. By then there had been enough of a delay, the interviews had occurred, and we were well aware that it was not under the purview of the Iran unit but in fact the Radical Fundamentalist Unit. Q. So when -- so you never got kicked over to the Usama bin Laden Unit, though; is that right? A. That's correct«63 THE SECOND MOUSSAOUI INTERVIEW Although Moussaoui began this second interview in a very subdued manner, in an attempt to appear cooperative, as the questions began to touch on the gaps in his financial beliefs, he became increasingly angry. He was again unable to convincingly explain his source of income, now indicating that the money came from friends in the UK. When asked their names, he indicated that Talil, whose true name he had been unable to recall the day before, had provided him money. He added that Talil¶s full name was Ahmed Atif (phonetic) and that he worked as an executive for a large Dutch Company whose name he could not recall. Automated Case Support System indices were negative for Atif. When pressed for names of other people who have provided him financial support, he indicated there was a Habib (LNU) in Germany as well. Moussaoui was unable to name the city where Habib lives, his place of employment, a telephone number or even a means by which they met or contact one another. In continuing to attempt to explain his presence in the U.S. and at Minneapolis, Moussaoui indicated that he was simply interested in learning to fly. He gave as an example of this the names of several other flight training facilities in the U.S. including Flight Safety International and the University of Minnesota flying program. He further stated that all of these schools advertised on the Internet, he could show interviewing agents if allowed access to a computer. He was then asked if such
materials were on his laptop computer, to which he quickly replied in the negative. In writer¶s opinion the suggestion that the FBI might access his laptop provoked an extremely strong reaction. For information, a subsequent internet check of Minnesota Aviation Educational Institutions provided by the Minnesota Department of Transportation revealed that the University of Minnesota Twin Cities campus does not have a flight training program [however the University of Minnesota at Crookston offered a course in crop dusting]. Moussaoui was then confronted with the information that he was known to be an extremist intent on using his past and future aviation training in furtherance of a terrorist goal. He was asked to provide the name of his group, the religious scholars, the religious scholars whom they followed, and to describe his plan in detail. Moussaoui was visibly surprised at the mention that he was a member of a group and that the FBI/INS were aware that he subscribed to fundamentalist beliefs. He began repeating his earlier claims that he was here to enjoy the 747-400 simulator and that this was all that interested him. A short time after this he invoked his right to ³an immigration lawyer´ and questioning was halted. THE AL-ATTAS STORY Like Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas was arrested in Eagan, Minnesota on August 16, 2001 for immigration violations. Al-Attas was charged with having worked at the Norman Mosque when he possessed only a student visa and having overstayed that visa. In an FBI interview before his arrest, Al-Attas said that Moussaoui Believes that it is acceptable to kill civilians who harm Muslims and that he approves of martyrs. Al-Attas was also asked if he had ever heard Moussaoui make a plan to kill those who harm Muslims and in doing so become a martyr. Al-Attas admitted that he may have heard him do so, but because it is not in his own heart to carry out acts of this nature, he claimed that he kept himself from actually hearing and understanding.´ AlAttas said that Moussaoui believes that it is the highest level of duty of Muslims everywhere to know of the suffering of Muslims in lands where they are oppressed. Al-Attas cited specific examples of the Philippines, China, the Kashmir, Kosovo, Macedonia, Palestine and Bosnia as areas where Moussaoui stated this is occurring. But when Harry Samit asked Moussaoui how he felt about the situation in Israel regarding their treatment of the Palestinians, Moussaoui indicated that this makes him sad. He stated that µseeing a six year old child shot in the head¶ and watching Israel µtake Arab land¶ makes him sad but denied that any of this makes him angry. When asked if he has ever been so sad that he spoke openly about hurting people in retaliation, he stated that he must think about the answer to this question,
ultimately refusing to give one«He indicated that he had no weapons training of any kind, but that he shot handguns once or twice in France with friends whose names he could not recall. Moussaoui stated he would like to learn to use weapons as he is curious about them, but repeated that he has never previously been taught to use one. Minneapolis opines that Moussaoui was being deceptive in stating that he has never been trained in the use of weapons based on his reaction to the questions. Al-Attas: Moussaoui considers the U.S. full of unbelievers, making it not a fit place for Muslims to reside. He made this argument to many people at the Anur Mosque in Oklahoma City, causing them to consider him very extreme.´ But when Moussaoui was asked why he resides in the UK, he indicated ³that he was educated there and likes the qualities of the British people.´ WILLIAM D. WEBB The report of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into the September 11th Raids reported that Suhaib Web, the Imam at the Muslim Islamic Center in Oklahoma City attempted to post bond for Hussein al-Attas, had been the subject of a full-field FBI international ³terrorism´ investigation in the Oklahoma City Field Office. According to FBI reports, this individual was a Vice President of Overseas Operations and Recruiting for al-Fatah and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was also a close associate of the Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki and Rahman unindicted co-conspirator Siraj Wahhaj. Agent Samit and the head of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit both testified that neither of them knew that the individual who had attempted to post bond for Moussaoui¶s roommate was the subject of a terrorism investigation before the September 11th Raids although information about Suhaib Web that may have contradicted this has been deleted from Samit¶s August 22, 2001 FBI report. This information most likely concerns the reason the Brother¶s bail money was turned down. Suhaib Web was born William D. Webb in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in 1972. Webb has had a criminal past and a troubled youth with drugs, violence, gangsterism, etc. He was a rap DJ known as ³wax-master´ Will. Webb is white and converted to Islam in 1992. Currently, he studies at Al-Azhar University in Cairo Egypt. Imam Webb has been a very popular speaker at conferences sponsored by CAIR. Mufid Abdul Qader was one of the incorporators of the Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City. Qader is currently under Federal indictment in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case. MAJAHID ABDUL-QUAADIR MENEPTA Majahid Abdulquaadir Menepta, a former roommate of al-Attas' and a friend of Moussaoui's, traveled to Minneapolis after the arrests and posted a $5,000 bond for al-Attas. Norman Mosque leader Abdul-Quaadir Menepta was born in Missouri as Melvin Lattimore. Lattimore was a star
football player at Soldan high school in the 1960's. After high school he went on to become an activist in the black liberation struggle. Menepta was convicted in 1971 in Colorado Springs, Colorado of a felony -- aggravated robbery and spent three years in prison. He converted to Islam, changed his name in 1989, and visited Pakistan, where he made his way to Afghanistan. In the 1990's he became an Imam at two St. Louis Mosques, Masjid At-Taqwa Wa-Jihad and the Islamic Institute of Learning. After 9/11 the Islamic Institute was investigated for its charitable contributions to Palestinians. Menepta was arrested in 1997 during a demonstration in St. Louis and was put on probation for carrying a concealed weapon. While in Norman in the late 1990¶s he announced that any policeman who entered the prayer area of his Mosque would be shot. Menepta told the FBI ³he had never heard Moussaoui discuss violence in any way. He characterized Moussaoui as µa pain in the butt¶ who chose to quibble over points of procedure at the Mosque. He advised that no one in group espoused violence and that the imam would not tolerate such talk as he was committed to peaceful study. Menepta he had been to Pakistan once in 1989 (the FBI found he had applied for a tourist visa to Pakistan in April 1990).´ After the 9/11 Victory he was held as a material witness and his home was searched. Several weapons were uncovered. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) Agent Jeffrey Whitney told the court that some telephone numbers connected with cell phones seized in a search of Menepta's home were associated with continuing criminal investigations in Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Detroit, El Paso and Kansas City, Missouri. These involved organized crime, drugs and money laundering. Agent Jeffrey Whitney testified that in 1995 an informer told federal agents that Brother Menepta had belonged to an Islamist group in Norman and St. Louis, whose leaders advocated Jihad. Agent Jeffrey Whitney also told the court that Menepta had said the Secret Service told him that one of the ³terrorists´ who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 had used his visa credit card number. Agent Jeffrey Whitney said he could not confirm Menepta's account. The Brother was sentenced to 15 months in prison.64 In an FBI interview after the September 11th Raids, a maintenance man recalled doing repair work in Menepta's former apartment on April 30, 2001. The repairman said September 11th Shaheed Nawaf al-Hazmi, whom he identified from photos, was present.65 Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma and on April 1, 2001 received a speeding ticket on Interstate Highway 40 near Clifton, Oklahoma. The FBI discounted this story otherwise the Brother would have received more than 15 months. AL-ATTAS¶ ALOCUTION Agent Samit was convinced Al-Attas was a potential Brother after he found a will in which al-Attas wrote, ³I don¶t want to elaborate for death has approached.´ During a conversation from jail with Imam Elhadj Ndiaye al-Attas was asked, ³I heard you want to go in Jihad´ and he replied, ³Sheikh, do not talk about it now.´ Al-Attas told the FBI that he wished to participate in Jihad in the future.66 After September 11th al-Attas was
. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fr/669338/posts . Greg Gordon Star Tribune Washington Bureau December 1, 2002. http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/projects/attacks/story/5440104p-6425421c.html 66 . USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 40
arrested on a material witness warrant and swooped off to New York. He made this statement upon sentencing regarding his prior statements to the FBI: On August 17, 2001 I was interviewed in Minnesota by FBI agents who asked me questions about myself and Moussaoui. During that interview I made a number of false statements. For example, the agents asked me about application I had with me for a visa to travel to Pakistan. I told them falsely that I wanted to go there to look into possible medical care for a sick relative. The real reason was that Moussaoui had convinced me to go to Pakistan to speak with Islamist scholars and others who hold the belief that Islamic religion favors participation in Jihad. During the interview the agents asked me if I knew µShaqil's¶ real name. He had never referred to himself by any name other than Shaqil but I had noticed the name Zacarias Moussaoui on one of his luggage tags. When the agents asked me if I knew his real name I lied and I said I did not. The truth is that because I had seen the luggage tag I believe his real name was Zacarias Moussaoui. Eventually, I gave Shaqil a ride to Minnesota. In September 11, 2001, FBI agents arrested me in Norman, Oklahoma, and asked me more questions about my brief association with Shaqil. I lied in this interview. First, I told the agents that I did not have any knowledge of Shaqil's desire to participate in Jihad. The truth is that on several occasions during the short time I knew him Shaqil had expressed a general desire to participate in Jihad. So my statement to the contrary was false. This was not what had happened, ³Al-Attas was also asked if he had ever heard Moussaoui make a plan to kill those who harm Muslims and in doing so become a martyr. Al-Attas admitted that he may have heard him do so, but because it is not in his own heart to carry out acts of this nature, he claimed that he kept himself from actually hearing and understanding.´ This is how al-Attas was told to testify to please the Justice Department and the FBI. Al-Attas had told Samit Moussaoui was into Jihad, but higher FBI officials just shrugged. I also told the agents that I had not made any plans to travel to New York with Shaqil after he finished his class in Minnesota. The truth is that I had planned to travel with him to visit New York, Colorado and possibly Los Angeles before returning to Norman to pick up my things for the planned trip to Pakistan. Eventually, while in Minnesota we dropped plans to go to Colorado and Los Angeles. Since we never ended up making these trips I sought to create the false impression that I had not even intended to make them. So, I told the agents that I had always planned to register for fall semester classes at the University of Oklahoma when Shaqil finished his classes in Minnesota. The truth is that I had already decided not to register for fall semester by the time I left for Minnesota because I was planning to go to Pakistan. The agents asked me about other people
Shaqil might know in Norman. They specifically asked me about a person I knew had been a classmate of Shaqil at the American school -- at the Airman Flight School in Norman. When they asked me about this person though they mispronounced his name. I know exactly who they meant and I knew Shaqil knew him. But I did not want to say anything that would cause problems for anyone else, so I misled the agents by saying Shaqil did not know anyone by the mispronounced name.67 Al-Attas was sentenced to time served then held as a material witness in the case against Moussaoui. He was deposed on videotape in June 2004 then deported. SAMIT: A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS On August 21, 2001 Samit sent an e-mail to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit supervisory agent at FBI Headquarters stating: ³[It is] imperative that the [U.S. Secret Service] be apprised of this threat potential indicated by the evidence. If [Moussaoui] seizes an aircraft flying from Heathrow to NYC, it will have the fuel on board to reach D.C.´68 FBI Agent Samit wrote FBI Minneapolis opines that Moussaoui and al-Attas were, at the time of their arrest, involved in preparing for a terrorist attack involving a Boeing747 aircraft at the direction of an as yet unknown international radical fundamentalist group«Moussaoui is in the U.S. in preparation for an act of international terrorism and this was interrupted by his arrest.69 This was the truth. A tabloid newspaper reported the existence of an FBI memo about Moussaoui stating that there was a handwritten notation from Harry Samit that Moussouai might be planning to fly a plane into the World Trade Center!70 The CIA warned its stations around the world that Moussaoui was a ³suspect airline suicide attacker,´ who might be ³involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the U.S«´ FBI agent Harry Samit testified under oath that he told his superiors at FBI headquarters that he believed Brother Moussaoui had been planning to hijack a plane traveling from London to New York and that "if he seizes the aircraft, it will have enough fuel to reach D.C." Samit said he urged the FBI to warn the Secret Service, but that FBI officials refused and ordered him not to contact the Secret Service or Federal Aviation Administration. Samit believed Brother Moussaoui had ³terrorist´ written all over him! Even Al-Attas agreed. Moussaoui Defense attorney Edward B. MacMahon Jr. asked Michael E. Rolince the retired head of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section, whether he knew that agent Harry Samit had warned in an August 18, 2001 memo to his office that Moussaoui was a potential terrorist. "No," he answered at
. USDC SDNY USA v Al-Attas 824. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 738 69 . USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 327 70. Brian Blomquist ³FBI Man's Chilling 9/11 µPrediction'´ New York Post May 9, 2002.
Moussaoui's death penalty trial.71 Rolince claimed to have never seen Samit¶s report and anyway believed the report to be ³suppositions, hunches and suspicions.´ Michael E. Rolince earned a B.A. in Mathematics from the State University of New York, and joined the FBI after he graduated in 1974. He was assigned to a specialized surveillance component in the San Francisco office (counter-surveillance against the Soviets) then was assigned to the New Orleans office where he worked Bank Robbery and Fugitive investigations. In August 1988 Rolince was designated as a Supervisory Special Agent within the Boston division, charged with managing a Russian counterintelligence squad. In 1992 the FBI reported 4 ³terrorist´ incidents within the United States. That figure rose to 12 in 1993. In October 1993 Rolince was transferred to the Washington Field Office where he was specialized in Espionage and Counterintelligence cases. When the incidents of ³terrorism´ dropped to 0 in 1995 Rolince was promoted and assigned to the National Security Division at FBI Headquarters. In February 1996 he was promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence and Counter terrorism programs. After September 11th 2001 Rolince was intent on not making the same mistake he made in August 2001 and was a player in the roundup and detention of Arabs based purely on ethnic considerations. For example Ali al-Maqtari was detained when authorities found two box cutters in his car, along with postcards of New York City, as he drove to Fort Campbell, Kentucky where his wife was reporting for Army duty on September 15, 2001. Although an immigration judge asked the government to present more solid evidence for holding Maqtari, the government declined to do so, saying only that he might be part of a larger terrorist "mosaic." "What may seem trivial to some may appear of great moment to those within the FBI or the intelligence community," wrote Rolince in an October 11, 2001 affidavit justifying Maqtari's detention. He added that the bureau was unable to rule out the possibility he was linked to the September 11th attacks.72 Rolince is now a defendant in lawsuits brought by former MDC detainees. In August 2002 Rolince was accepted into the Senior Executive Service within the United States government (members of the SES serve in the key positions just below the top Presidential appointees) and he assumed the position of Section Chief of the FBI¶s International Terrorism Operations Section.73 Rolince retired in October 2005.
FRENCH INTELLIGENCE ON BROTHER MOUSSAOUI
. Jerry Markon and Timothy Dwyer Moussaoui Memo Unseen, Court Told Ex-FBI Official Was Unaware of Agent's Warning Washington Post Staff Writers Wednesday, March 22, 2006; A07 72 .http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/articles/Swept%20Up%20in%20a%20Dragnet,%20Hundreds%20Sit%20in%20Custody %20and%20Ask,%20'Why'.htm 73 . http://ifpafletchercambridge.info/oldsite/speakers/rolince.htm
French Intelligence reported in on Moussaoui,
On September 28, 2000 our service (deleted) had an interview with Abd-Samad Moussaoui regarding the Mujahideen and Masood Al-Benin who was killed in Chechnya during April 2000. Learning of the death of Masood Al-Benin, Abd-Samad Moussaoui spontaneously accused his brother Zacarias Moussaoui (DOB May 30, 1968 at Saint Jean De Luz ± the FBI had the same information) of being responsible for the death of their common friend. Masood Al-Benin was apparently a friend to both brothers. Abd-Samad Moussaoui affirmed that it was well known that it was his brother Zacarias who introduced Masood Al-Benin to the doctrine of Radical Fundamentalism while they worked together on a BTS [t.n. technical degree] (technical commercial) at Perpignan, France (Department 66). Masood Al-Benin rejoined Moussaoui in Great Britain where he obtained his diploma. Abd-Samad Moussaoui described Masood Al-Benin as an individual with superior intelligence and he brilliantly obtained his Masters degree at the University of Cambridge. It was in London that Moussaoui was taken in hand and initiated by the fundamentalists of µBackstreet¶ and µFinnsbury Park¶ [t.n. probably refers to radical mosques at these locations, i.e. Baker Street and Finsbury Park]. According to Abd-Samad Moussaoui this is the same group that also recruited and converted Masood Al-Benin to the extremist doctrine, when he arrived in Great Britain. He noted he had not seen Masood Al-Benin since 1995, when Moussaoui returned to France to visit his family and friends. It was during the course of this visit that Moussaoui revealed that he had become completely enlightened on religious matters. In spite of the force of the certain conviction characterized by Abd-Samad Moussaoui himself schooled by the µhabachi¶74 Imam Khaled El Zahz, his intellectual guide, all his attempts to orient Masood Al-Benin towards an Islam of tolerance and moderation which Abd-Samad Moussaoui himself follows, were done in vain. Moussaoui, wholly convinced of Jihad, maintained his radical convictions. According to his brother Moussaoui had been arrested by Moroccan police upon his arrival in Morocco in 1997. That same year Moussaoui went to Norborne, France (Department 11). His ardent and emotional preaching in favor of Jihad agitated a large number of his childhood friends who he had not seen since his departure to Great Britain. Abd-Samad Moussaoui informed of the trip by (deleted) to the region of Norborne himself (deleted) being situated in Morocco, had advised local Muslim community representatives of the moral danger that Moussaoui could represent for a number of young Muslims loosing their religious bearings and social placement. In this regard Moussaoui was driven from at-risk urban areas by his co-religionists for propagating his message of intolerance and hatred. Abd-Samad Moussaoui, who hasn¶t had any direct news from Moussaoui since 1997, knows only that he has traveled to Kuwait, Turkey and Afghanistan. Abd-Samad Moussaoui
. Deviationist sect of Islam founded by the Ethiopian Abdoullah Al Habachi and condemned by Sheikh Ibn Bin Baz.
described Moussaoui as in individual who is extremely cynical, completely devoted to the Wahabist cause and concerned with progressing that cause. He depicted him as a cold stubborn man, capable of nurturing a plan over several months, or even years, and of committing himself to this task in all elements of his life. Implacable, Moussaoui is a strategist that Abd-Samad Moussaoui qualified as potentially being very dangerous and against who should be surveiled by French authorities should he decide to return to France. Completely upset and unable to find any excuses for his brother Abd-Samad Moussaoui emphasized he would make sure to notify us (deleted) of any indication that Moussaoui would return to France, stating that where ever Moussaoui, he will try hard to put his competencies and intelligence to the service of subversion. According to Abd-Samad Moussaoui, Zacarias and Masood Al-Benin were inseparable, one was the head and the other was the armed hand of the same monster. The French advised they would require that Moussaoui be accompanied by a law enforcement entity of the United States (FBI preferred but not required) during transport to France. Furthermore they will request that Moussaoui¶s computer, mobile telephone and any other pertinent evidence suitable for examination not be returned to Moussaoui during this trip. They would request that such materials be transported by the escorting law enforcement official and handed over to French authorities upon arrival in France to better facilitate their exploitation of the evidence.´75 Samit summarized this report, Information provided by [deleted of French Intelligence] indicated that he/she is aware of Moussaoui through his association with a Masood Al-Benin in 1971 at Bassas [da India ± a island possession of] France (Department 33). Masood Al-Benin¶s mother was French and his father is from the country of Benin. Masood AlBenin died on April 12, 2000 in Chechnya fighting with the Mujahideen. While in Chechnya Masood Al-Benin was a computer expert working for Emir Ibn AlKhattab, aka Al Sooueilem Samer, a Saudi known as the Black Arabian and a Mujahideen leader in Chechnya. After Masood Al-Benin¶s death, Abd-Samad Moussaoui was told by (deleted) that Moussaoui recruited Masood Al-Benin to go to Chechnya. Abd-Samad Moussaoui advised that Masood Al-Benin stated that Moussaoui was µthe dangerous one.¶ (Deleted) was contacted regarding these individuals and indicated that Ibn Al-Khattab is well known to be the leader of the
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 59B
Chechen Mujahideen Movement. In addition he is known to be an associate of Usama bin Ladin from past who shared involvement in combat. (Deleted) was also aware that a Masood Al-Benin was in fact a fighter for Al-Khattab who perished in Chechnya in April 2000 as reported by (deleted).76 AZZAM PUBLICATIONS What was missing from this report was this most important and easily ascertainable fact: Masood Al-Benin was a correspondent for azzam.com, the Internet website of Al-Qaeda run by Azzam Publishers, the in house press of Al-Qaeda. Azzam Publications ³was set up to propagate the call for Jihad, among the Muslims who are sitting down, ignorant of this vital duty«Thus the purpose of Azzam Publications is to 'Incite the believers' and also secondly to raise some money for the brothers. Obviously the best way of helping Jihad and the Mujahideen is by actually going to the lands of Jihad and physically fighting.´ www.azzam.com site published Usama bin Laden¶s 1996 ³Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.´ Azzam was the media propaganda outfit for Mujahideen Field Commander Ibn Khattab, Moussaoui¶s role model. Azzam Publications produced the definitive Khattab video in 2000 and it was available on the Azzam websites in 2001 and the Maktabah Al Ansaar Bookshop in Birmingham, England. At the end of the video, Khattab stated: The Brothers in Britain, May Allah Reward them, have put much efforts to publicize the Jihad. There is an organization by the name of Azzam Publications, which is run by Brothers who are known to us and maintain regular contact with us. So anyone who wishes to support us or requires any further information about the situation here, they should contact this organization. So the brothers at Azzam Publications, may Allah preserve them, are cooperating with us in media efforts. They have made commendable efforts to publicize the Jihad, so if you make contact with them and support them, Ishallah, it will be very beneficial.´ An email message was also received by Azzam Publications from Chechen Mujahideen Commander Shamil Basayev through the email address firstname.lastname@example.org which stated: ³Did you forget Cahar Dudayev,77 Salman Raduyev,78 Hamza Halidov«We want their profiles in your site. What happened to µalonewolfs.¶ 21st April is Dudayev¶s death time. Please write his profiles«Chechens of Turkey.´ On May 7, 2001, the response from Qoqaz.net was ³Send us their profiles, in English, and we¶ll include them on our site.79
. FBI LHM August 24, 2001 Minneapolis, Minnesota . Soviet General Chechen Cahar Dudayev began fighting in 1990 for Chechens independence. Dudayev was killed in 1995. 78 . Salman was a Chechen freedom fighter noted chiefly for a spectacular operation in 1996 that propelled him on to television screen and the front pages of newspapers across the world when he led a band of 300 of his ³Lone Wolf´ guerrilla fighters in the seizure of a hospital in Kizlyar in Dagestan, taking more than 1,000 hostages. The aim was to force the Russians to sue for peace in their war against Chechen separatists. In March 2000 he was arrested at his home in Novogroznensky by the Russians and put on trial on 18 different charges including murder and terrorism. He was found guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Russian killed him in 2002. http://www.salaam.co.uk/knowledge/biography/viewentry.php?id=2007 79 . http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Documents/AHMAD%20extradition%20affidavit.pdf
U.S. officials believe Azzam.com encrypted messages in the images on their Web site, and European officials believe a known al-Qaeda operative, Said Bahaji, a member of the Hamburg cell believed to have been instrumental in planning the September 11th Raids, had accessed the site. LOOSE ISLAMIST LIPS SINK SHIPS: U.S.S. BENFOLD In August 2004 Babar Ahmad, the owner of Azzam.com was arrested in London and charged with aiding terrorists. This is what the American Government accused him of in its Request for Extradition. Babar Ahmad was in possession of a document which concerned authentic battle group plans of a U.S. naval battlegroup operating in the Straits of Hormuz in April, 2001. The document was seized from Ahmad in December 2003, by British authorities. The document specifically describes the battle-group's vulnerability to a terrorist attack, and provides specific examples on how the ships might be attacked«This file discusses a U.S. Navy battle group, each of its member ships (including the U.S.S. Benfold), the specifications and assignments of each ship, the battle group¶s planned movements, and a drawing of the group¶s formation when it was to pass through the Straits of Hormuz. The document specifically notes that the battle group was tasked with enforcing sanctions against Iraq and conducting operations against Afghanistan and Al Qaida. Navy officials have confirmed the battle group composition; the dates and location of the movements of this battle group in the documents are accurate and were classified at the time this document appears to have been written. The document states that the battle group was scheduled to pass through the Straits on April 29, 2001, at night, under a communications blackout, and explicitly describes the group¶s vulnerability to a terrorist attack: Weakness: ³They have nothing to stop a small craft with RPG etc, except their Seals' stinger missile.´ Several of the e-mail exchanges between late 2000 through 2001 are with an individual who described himself as an enlistee in the United States Navy on active duty in the middle east; the e-mail header information indicates that the individual was communicating from the U.S.S. Benfold at the time, one of the ships listed in the diagram described above found on a floppy disk in Babar Ahmad¶s room. One of the e-mails, sent in July 2001, describes the reaction of officers and other enlistees to a briefing given on the ship. The e-mail indicates that the briefing was provided to help Naval personnel protect against terrorist attacks similar to the March 2001 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Voicing enmity towards the "American enemies" and strong support for the "Mujahideen Feesabilillah," [jihadi fighting in the way of Allah] the e-mail praises those who attacked the U.S.S. Cole and "the men
who have brought honor this week to the Ummah in the lands of Jihad Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, etc." The response sent from the Azzam Publications e-mail account praised the enlistee¶s comments and encouraged the enlistee to "Keep up with the Da¶wah and the psychological warefare [sic]." The Azzam Publications reply email was sent on July 19, 2001. DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM AHMAD A search of the bedroom at 42a Fountain Road in London in December 2003, uncovered approximately 25 to 30 pages of correspondence between Babar Ahmad and various export companies from mid-1997 through early 1998, in which Ahmad sought to purchase up to 5,000 tons of sulfur / phosphate based fertilizers and large amounts of several chemicals, on behalf of a third party. A purchase order from one of the companies that Babar Ahmad contacted reflects a shipment of ³miscellaneous items´ on or about June 12, 1997, to a purported company in Pakistan. A July 1, 1997, letter to Babar Ahmad from that company enclosed a bank check for the exact same amount of the purchase. Agents continue to investigate the significance of this as well as this computer file, «Quite a number of years ago, I worked in Turkey with a fellow«who claimed to be a hell of an urban trapper«[He] claimed he waited two weeks one time for a neighborhood deli owner to walk down a set of stairs from an overpass onto an elevated subway platform in Chicago. At just the right moment, [he] threw several packages . . . onto the subway stairs. The deli owner then slipped and fell down the last few steps and fell over onto the train tracks, where he was crushed by an oncoming train.´ What was absent from the information on Moussaoui supplied by French Intelligence was the story of the French Magistrate¶s trip to London to question Moussaoui. When Moussaoui was questioned on August 17, 2001 he indicated that he had no criminal record in France and that his ³file is clear.´ Moussaoui stated that he has never been in jail in France or questioned by any security or police authorities. He stated that he is aware his father has been in trouble with the law, and indicated that his father is a builder who undercut projects and built buildings ³not to standard.´ Although he gave the name of his brother, Abdsamed Moussaoui (phonetic) who is an engineering professor in Montpelier, France, he would not explain why they are estranged stating that it is a personal matter. ACS indices were negative for Abdsamed Moussaoui.´ WHAT THE FBI KNEW ABOUT KHATTAB IN EARLY 2000 In linking Brother Arnaout and the Benevolence International Foundation to Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, FBI Agent Robert Walker wrote,
In or about early 2000, a website (www.aoaaz.net) [azzam.net] dedicated to the cause of Chechen mujahideen identified the leaders of the military fight in Chechnya as including Ibn al Khattab and included pictures of mujahideen training as well as killed mujahideen. CW-1 has identified Ibn al Khattab as a well-known mujahideen leader with links to Usama bin Laden. Similarly, CS has described Ibn al Khattab as another leader of the mujahideen who joined the Jihad in Chechnya in 1994, after participating in the Afghani Jihad. According to CS, once in Chechnya, Ibn al Khattab sent word that he did not need any more fighters but instead needed financial support. The website sought doctors to travel to Chechnya to link up with Ibn al Khattab and provide medical services at the front. The website indicated that those wishing to donate money for the Chechnyan mujahideen should save their money and not donate it until a trustworthy aid organization was identified in the website which was to take place on or before February 2000«The same website urged those wishing to go Chechnya to fight to get training in Afghanistan and noted: Anyone interested in going to fight (if they are trained) or in going to train should contact members of their own communities and countries who are known to have been for Jihad, You will know these people and they will know you. In these cases, you should, only speak in confidence to those whom you trust, rather than speaking to everyone. Qoqaz web-sites [website with similar stories and layout to Azzam that Masood Al-Benin worked for]80 trust and recommend the people to give their donations to. The website urged doctors and medical supplies to "make their way to Chechnya through the aid organizations and join the fighting units of Ibn al Khattab." The website condemned America for its alleged secret financial support for the Russians fighting in Chechnya and elsewhere on the site indicated that "on the other hand, as for those fighting the Muslims and those who support this fight with money, words or actions, the Muslims consider them all as enemies and in the same group. The website also indicated that the news reports on its site were received from correspondents traveling with the fighting units of Ibn al Khattab and that the reports were checked by "Field Commander Khattab´ before being posted on the site. The website also indicated that large news organizations desiring to interview Khattab (or a Chechen military leader with whom he worked) could e-mail questions to the site "and we can try without promising to have those questions answered by them.81 IBN Al-KHATTAB AND BASAYEV HAD POSSESSED CESIUM In November 1995, Field Commander Shamil Basayev, leader of a group of Islamist rebels from Chechnya, planted a container of
. http://www.cromwell-intl.com/security/nu/ru.html; http://www.islamic.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/Biographies/bio_1.htm . Case 1:02-cr-00414 Document 1 Filed 04/29/2002 Page 27 of 36 United States District Court Northern District of Illionois Eastern Division 1:02CR414 JBG
cesium-137 in Moscow¶s Izmailovsky Park to demonstrate Russia¶s vulnerability.82 Police found a vial of cesium buried near a footpath after Basayev directed a Russian TV crew to the site. In early August 1999, Basayev, together with fellow field commander Ibn Al-Khattab, launched the ill-fated incursions into neighboring Dagestan that impelled the Russian leadership to embark on war. Shamil Basayev played a key role in the resistance throughout this second war, despite incurring serious injuries in February 2000 during the retreat from Grozny that necessitated the amputation of one leg. On October 15, 2002 Russian border guards detained Chechnyan Ilyasdavlet Murzaliyev carrying a container attached to his chest and neck. The Russian news agency Itar-Tass described the container as lead and weighing about 2.2 pounds. The smuggled substance was an alloy of plutonium and osmium, a metallic element more often associated with industrial catalysts, perfect fuel for an RDD.83 Before he was killed in July 2006 by a missile that homed in on his phone ± the method used to kill Chechen separatist President Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1996 - Basayev served as coordinator and commander of the various groups of resistance fighters across the North Caucasus, and claimed responsibility for a string of acts, including a car-bomb attack on the Chechen government building in Grozny in December 2003, the killing of pro-Moscow Chechen administration head Akhmad-hadji Kadyrov in May 2004, and the Beslan Movie Theatre hostage crisis in September 2004, in which more than 320 people were killed.
APRIL (DELETED) 2001 MEMO TO FBI DIRECTOR FREEH RE: IBN KHATTAB AND USAMA BIN LADEN This note is to advise you of recent threat reporting deemed significant and urgent to the Intelligence Community. (deleted) The U.S. Government has received information indicating that serious operational planning has been underway since late 2000, with an intended culmination in late Spring 2001. Sunni extremists are undertaking these plans with links to Ibn al-Khattab, an extremist leader in Chechnya, and to Usama bin Laden. There are several planning channels, some with connections to Afghanistan, all within a large shared mujahideen recruitment network. It is not known whether there are several different parallel plans or whether all activity centers on one major operation, since all the players are heavily intertwined. The spark, which appears to have ignited interest in pursuing a terrorist operation, was the renewal of the Palestinian intifada in September 2000. In October 2000 Ibn al-Khattab issued his strongest statement to date in favor of the Palestinian Jihad. He then devised a plan to train mujahideen. In late 2000, a Usama bin Laden lieutenant and mujahideen facilitator had also turned his attention to the Palestinian
82. OMRI Daily Digest, November 27, 1995. 83 . ³Chechen Caught With Radioactive Package Smuggler Carrying Material That Could be Used for 'Dirty Bomb.¶´ UPI Moscow, October15, 2002. http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/NBC/021017.Chechen.caught.radi.html
cause and he was in charge of preparations for operational activity. He sought financiers for the operation, which was close to completion. Additionally, another mujahideen facilitator with ties to the Usama bin Laden lieutenant was stepping up his activity in March and also was pursuing funds to expedite matters because something was going to happen. (paragraph deleted) Multiple sources also suggest that Usama bin Laden's organization is planning a terrorist attack against US interests (deleted). The reporting involves movement of terrorists from (deleted) following training there, and the smuggling of explosives and arms into (deleted) for the use against the US and / or Western targets.´ The International Terrorism Operations Section responded, ³The Usama bin Laden Unit is preparing an Electronic Communication for all FBI field offices and Legats, advising of the heightened threat environment. Field Offices will be requested to utilize all resources, including electronic databases and human sources, for the supplemental information to be reported to FBIHQ. Those offices with Usama bin Laden FISAs will be asked to conduct a review of recent technical cuts in light of threat information. In addition (deleted) is being provided detailed information on (deleted) current operational activities, to assist possible investigation (deleted) ± Dale Watson.84 Watson was dangerous to al-Qaeda but was ignored. His father was a World War II Navy veteran. Dale Watson attended Florida State then joined the military. He joined the FBI in 1978 and seven years later he was assigned a field supervisory desk at the Washington field office. From there he became head of the counter-terrorism branch of the National Security Division. In 1991 he became chief of the Iran Unit, Counterterrorism Section of the International Terrorism Section. After a stint as the FBI's first representative to the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, he became Chief of the International Terrorism Operations Section.85 Watson took the blame for our First World Trade Center Event and in 1995 he was demoted to second in charge of the Kansas City field division. In 1995, as second in charge of the Kansas City field division, he played a key role in the investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing. In 1999 he became first Assistant Director for the Counter-terrorism Division with responsibility for overall direction and management of the international and domestic terrorism programs including the National Infrastructure Protection Center. In March 2001 Watson said he ³fell off [his] chair´ when he learned that Ashcroft had failed to list combating terrorism as one of department¶s priorities in a department-wide memo. Watson was totally demoralized when on September 10, 2001 USAG Ashcroft's office rejected a proposed $58-million increase to pay for the FBI's counterterrorism programs.86 But drug use had to wiped out in American despite the fact the ³crack epidemic´ had subsided. In a deposition taken on Dec. 8, 2004, former FBI Agent Bassem Youssef¶s lawyer Stephen Kohn asked Watson: ³Do you know who Osama bin Laden's spiritual
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 792 .http://www.fsu.edu/~fstime/FS-Times/volume8/aug02web/7aug02.html http://www.nd.edu/~ndjlepp/symposia/watson.doc 86 . http://www-tech.mit.edu/V124/PDF/N19.pdf
leader was?" He answered, ³Can't recall.´ And do you know the differences in the religion between Shiite and Sunni Muslims? He responded, ³Not technically, no.´ Al-Khattab was killed on March 20, 2002, when a Dagestani messenger hired by the Russian Federal Security Bureau gave Khattab a poisoned letter (the assassin was later tracked down and shot dead in Azerbaijan). He has been succeeded in his role as financier-mediator by Amir Abu al-Walid, who was killed in 2004. About the importance of Chechnya Zawahiri the Elder had this to say, ³If the Chechens and other Caucasian mujahideen reach the shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, the only thing that will separate them from Afghanistan will be the neutral state of Turkmenistan. This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahideen movements in Kashmir. The belt will be linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic to the Muslims of Central Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the Muslim Caucasus and allow it to communicate with the Islamic world in general. Furthermore the liberation of the Muslim Caucasus will lead to the fragmentation of the Russian Federation and will help escalate the Jihad movements that already exist in the republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose governments get Russian backing against those jihadist movements. The fragmentation of the Russian Federation on the rock of the fundamentalist movement and at the hands of the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia will topple a basic ally of the United States in its battle against the Islamic jihadist reawakening. For this reason the United States chose to begin by crushing the Chechens by providing Western financing for the Russian Army so that when this brutal campaign against the Chechen mujahideen is completed, the campaign can move southwards to Afghanistan either by the action of former Soviet republics that are US agents or with the participation of US troops under the guise of combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and the claims about liberating that region's women.´ THE FISA On August 24, 2001 FBI Agent Samit had asked for a FISA warrant based on the fact that he was in possession Of intelligence indicating that Moussaoui is connected to a radical fundamentalist group operating in Chechnya, whose leader has ties to Usama bin Laden. For this reason it is imperative that his effects be searched in order to gather intelligence relating to these connections and to any plans for terrorist attacks against the United States or United States persons to which he may be a party.87 Bells should have tolled when this information reached the FBI Radical Fundamentalist Unit. Why didn¶t they? FBI officials were terrified that their previous reporting that bin Laden¶s targets were U.S. interests overseas was dead wrong. If the Moussaoui information were correct than they would have to awaken from the state of
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 330
complacency that the RFU had lulled itself into. From the FBI point of view there had been no terrorist incidents by Islamists within in the United States since 1993. The Kasi CIA attack, EgyptAir 990, and TWA Flight 800 were not considered part of the Islamist pattern. Additionally, the FBI knew that having a terrorist in one¶s midst was like having ³mouse´ instead of mice. You can never have just one! So the FBI wanted no part of this report and did not even put it though the FBI system to see if it meshed with any other reports. There was no doubt that Moussaoui fit the term ³Agent of a Foreign Power´ as defined by FISA: (1) A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; (2) A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments; (4) A group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; (5) A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. God is Great! Washington FBI lawyers repeatedly declined Samit¶s requests to seek a special warrant under the FISA authorizing a search of Moussaoui¶s belongings. The 26-page Electronic Communication from the Minneapolis Division had information that an FBI agent working today would have concluded in a heartbeat was sufficient to obtain a FISA warrant. As a result of these donkeys stubbornness the excuses started coming in from FBI Headquarters in Washington. Samit was asked if he was sure this was not a case of mistaken identity despite the fact that Zacarias Moussaoui was not a common name.88 On August 24, 2001 FBI Agent Samit asked the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, ³Is there anything you have that establishes Ibn al-Khatab's connection to Usama bin Laden / Al-Qaeda other than their past association? We're trying to close the wiggle room for FBIHQ to claim that there's no connection to a foreign power. Since al-Qaeda is a designated group, anything that you have which indicates an Al-Qaeda connection to Moussaoui via Ibn Khatab would help. Thanks, Harry.´ Why was the FBI brass looking for an excuse to weasel out of investigating the presence of a man who was clearly a member of ³a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore?´ How could the Radical Fundamentalist Unit believe Moussaoui was not acting on behalf of a named group or country when it was obvious he had visited Afghanistan via Pakistan?
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 332
FBI Agent Charles Frahm responded, Many thanks for this information. French information also was highly interesting - am not sure why this is not enough to firmly link Moussaoui to a terrorist group - Ibn Al-Khattab is well known to be the leader of the Mujahideen Movement and to be a close buddy with Usama bin Ladin from their earlier fighting days. From a read of French information, Moussaoui is a recruiter for Khattab. I can confirm from our own information that in fact the dead guy was a fighter for Khattab who perished in Chechnya in April 2000.89 In 1991 Charles Frahm was at the FBI New York Office and was a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. In 1997, he was promoted to supervisor and started the National Infrastructure Protection Squad in New York, to protect America¶s cyber-based systems. In 1999, Frahm was appointed Coordinating Supervisor of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. In 2000, when he generated this Electronic Communication regarding Moussaoui, he was Deputy Group Chief at the CIA's Counterintelligence Center in Langley, Virginia. Frahm is now the Acting Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI¶s Counterterrorism Division.90 The RFU also provided no new information on Moussaoui. ONE ROTTEN DATE CAN SPOIL THE WHOLE BARREL On September 10, 2001 Samit was informed, ³ITO S/RFU SSA Michael Maltbie has determined that we do not have enough for either a criminal search warrant or a FISA search warrant of Moussaoui¶s computer. We did not pursue this matter further because they have directed that this is an INS matter and that the µFBI does not have a dog in this fight.¶ Of course I strongly disagree.´ Michael Maltbie was a CIA agent91 on temporary assignment with the FBI. Samit was convinced Moussaoui was dangerous. If Moussaoui was deported, Samit wanted to accompany him to France and be present when the French authorities searched Moussaoui¶s hard-drive. FBI SA Catherine Kiser commented on this state of affairs that same day ± ³thanks for the update. Very sorry that this matter was handled the way it was, but you fought the good fight. God Help us all if the next terrorist incident involves the same type of plane.´92 In 1984 FBI agent Coleen Rowley was assigned to the New York Office where, for more than 6 years, she worked on Italian organized crime and Sicilian heroin drug investigations. In 1990, Coleen was transferred to Minneapolis where she assumed the duties of Principal Legal Advisor (which later became "Chief Division Counsel"). After
. USA v Moussaoui Ex 500 . http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/052402.htm 91 . The FBI and the CIA routinely detail senior-level officers to the counterterrorism office of their counterpart. The Deputy Chief of the CIA¶s Counterterrorist Center is an FBI official, while the Deputy Section Chief in the FBI¶s Counterterrorism Division is a CIA official. Additionally, the staff of the newly instituted Office of Intelligence at the FBI is headed by a CIA official and includes staff on detail from the CIA. 92 . USA v Moussaoui Ex. 334
9/11 Rowley complained to the United States Congress about the FISA fiasco. She charged that RFU team members Michael Maltbie, and his boss, David Frasca, tried to make the application not viable, by playing down information obtained from French intelligence sources about Moussaoui¶s links to foreign terrorist organizations.93 She said Supervising Special Agent (SSA) Michael Maltbie removed certain information before making a presentation of questionable accuracy and length to the National Security Law Unit. Michael Maltbie was convinced that Moussaoui was a harmless nut, ³Please bear in mind there is no indication that either of these two [Moussaoui and Attas] had plans for nefarious activity, as was apparently indicated in an earlier communication.´94 Her allegations were substantiated by email traffic: On August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ which suggested that SSA Michael Maltbie had deliberately further undercut the FISA efforts, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the National Security Law Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui¶s connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis FBI personnel are still unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ SSA Michael Maltbie to the National Security Law Unit or whether anyone in the National Security Law Unit ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the Minneapolis Division, the CIA, and French Intelligence. Had they done so 9/11 might have been averted. MARION ³SPIKE´ BOWMAN SPIKES THE FISA APPLICATION Verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis-characterization and error, however, Deputy General Counsel Marion ³Spike´ Bowman, who handled the FISA matter for the FBI¶s National Security Law Unit said he concurred with SSA Maltbie that there was insufficient evidence to move forward with the FISA warrant application. When Deputy General Counsel Marion Bowman was made aware of the information that had been removed from the application, he maintained that even with that information the application still should not have gone forward. Bowman tended to err on the side of caution ± in the Wen Ho Lee espionage case Bowman was reticent about searching Ho¶s computer despite the suspicion of the FBI that Ho created TAR Archive files containing very sensitive documents about atomic weapons and transferred them to an unrestricted computer. Spike Bowman told him [the agent requesting the FISA] that as a rule, there was an expectation of privacy on the part of government employees despite the fact that they are using government computers. (Deleted July 16, 1999). According to (Deleted) he was told by Bowman that unless there was a banner on the computer, a warrant would be required, and that even a banner might not be enough to permit the FBI, as opposed to the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory system administrator, to search Lee¶s computer. In addition to talking to Bowman (Deleted) µthumbed through¶
93. , ³FBI Denial Of Search Warrant´ New York Times June 7, 2002 - also ³Crucial Terror Data Did Exist´ The New York Times News Service. 94 . USA v Moussaoui Defendant¶s Exhibit 639
some materials from the Computer Crime Section of the DOJ¶s Criminal Division. Ultimately, (Deleted) concluded, since he had been told by FBI Albuquerque that there was no banner on the computer at Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, that the computer user had an expectation of privacy. If there was no banner (Deleted) therefore told SSA (Deleted) he would need to get a warrant? No one in the National Security Law Unit, however, considered whether the facts specific to Wen Lee Ho¶s Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory office or the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory computer system might reveal that Lee Ho had no cognizable expectation of privacy in the first place. Bowman¶s judgment was also questioned in a footnote, According to Bowman, he not only asked (Deleted) if there was a banner on Wen Ho Lee¶s but also whether Lee had signed a waiver. (Bowman August 11, 1999). Bowman said he told (Deleted) that unless there was some fair notice to Lee of possible monitoring, a warrant would be required to search the computer. Thus, there is a significant discrepancy between (Deleted) and Bowman¶s recollection of this conversation. If Bowman¶s recollection of what he told (Deleted) is correct, this µfair notice¶ advice did not get imparted to FBI Albuquerque.95 It must be said that Bowman had not seen the Kenneth Williams Memo about Arabs in flight schools so could not put it together with Moussaoui¶s interest in aviation. It is the totality of information that makes up an intelligence picture, not one isolated bit or piece. Additionally like any other organization where lives were at stake, FBI officials protected each other. A United States Senate report found the FBI supervisors and lawyers aggressively blocked the search warrant.96 Michael Maltbie was moved out of the counter terrorism division at bureau headquarters to the Cleveland office, where he now works as a field supervisor keeping an eye on the ³international terrorist mecca´ of Ohio! In January 2003 Marion Bowman received a meritorious service award and a large cash bonus!97 After 9/11 Bowman was questioned by the United States Senate about his actions in regard to Moussaoui, ³While I cannot discuss specific cases in a public hearing, the FBI has encountered individuals who cannot be sufficiently linked to a terrorist group or organization as required by FISA.´98 Senator Jon Kyle believed him, ³Although Moussaoui was found to have some associations with Chechen terrorists, the evidence was inadequate to show that he served as an agent of that group--or that he had any links to Al Qaeda. Thus, as the FBI's Deputy General Counsel has confirmed, it
. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows9a.pdf Philip Shenon 96. ³Senate Report on Pre-9/11 Failures Tells of Bungling at FBI´ New York Times August 28, 2002. . http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ps/guiawards.htm; Senator Charles Grassely Press Release January 9, 2003 http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/p03r01-09a.htm 98 . http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/bowman073102.htm
was the strength of Moussaoui's connection to the Chechens--not a misunderstanding of whether the Chechens constituted a recognized foreign power for FISA purposes that ultimately prevented the issuance of a warrant.´ Even the isolated piece of the mosaic indicated that Moussaoui was a recruiter for the Brothers in Chechnya, an association on a leadership level, so this statement was as real as mirage in the Sahara. At the time of Moussaoui¶s arrest the FBI claimed it was wary of making any surveillance requests to the special FISA court after its judges complained bitterly the year before that they were being seriously misled by the bureau in FBI affidavits requesting surveillance of Hamas. Then there was the ³wall´ excuse, which seemed to hold more water since the onus was upon the Clinton Administration, if not for one thing ± former Attorney General Ashcroft failed to tear down ³the wall´ after he came to power. The ³wall´ was thrown up after U.S. President Nixon used the CIA and FBI to spy on his political enemies as well as those opposed to the Vietnam War. The Jew Seymour Hersh revealed this activity in the New York Times just as he had exposed other events that cast America in bad light such as the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. As a result, National Security Intelligence could not be used by the President to get information of criminal wrongdoing on his enemies in a democracy. The President could not use the CIA and FBI and NSA as a secret police force. As a result a FISA court was established to prevent the Intelligence Community from being used in this fashion. But as it turned out, it approved more than 12,000 Justice Department applications for the FBI, rejected only one in the more than two decades of its existence99 and was no more than a rubber stamp for the Intelligence Community. No doubt it would have approved the Moussaoui FISA request. THE GREED OF THE JEW GORELICK TIES THE HANDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Then, is it to be expected of you, if ye were put in authority, that ye will do mischief, in the land, and break your ties of kith and kin? - Muhammad 47 22 Then, Praise Allah, the evil and greed of the Jew entered the FISA picture embodied in Jamie S. Gorelick, a Jewish Assistant United States Attorney with limitless ambitions of greed. Gorelick has to be one of the strangest creatures that the religion of apes and pigs ever produced. As an attorney from 1975 to 1979 and again from 1980 to 1993 (she was an assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Energy from 1979 to 1980) with the law firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin in Washington, D.C., Gorelick represented major U.S. companies on behalf of the Zionist entity. Nathan Lewin, the most prominent member of this firm, is a Judaist and Kahanist. Lewin represents other Judaists and even represented the bearded bag of camel dung Jewish Supremacist Leader Rabbi Kahane.100
99. Greg Gordon ³FAA security took no action against Moussaoui´ Star Tribune January 13, 2002. http://www.startribune.com/stories/1576/1028069.html 100 . ³Kahane Citzenship Trial to Go Before Pollard Judge´ The Jewish Press June 1, 1990.
Lewin has called for the death of small Muslim children in a form of collective punishment reminiscent of the German National Socialists, a tactic that would deter alQaeda from accomplishing its goals but make out-and-out Nazis out of the Jews. Lewin wrote: Studies of Palestinian suicide bombers and of those who, knowing their death was imminent, carried out the September 11th horror indicate that most were closely knit to their families - to parents, brothers, and sisters. Indeed, these family members routinely give press briefings extolling the suicide killers, and they are the recipients of financial bounties from supportive Muslim charities and governmental organizations. What if Israel and the United States announced that henceforth the perpetrators of all suicide attacks would be treated as if they had brought their parents and brothers and sisters with them to the site of the explosion? Suicide killers should know that they will take the lives of not only themselves and the many people they don¶t know (but nonetheless hate) in the crowd that surrounds them when they squeeze the button that detonates their bomb, but also the lives of their parents, brothers, and sisters.´101 What about Arab babies who have not yet learned to speak, not yet learned of Zionist oppression? Should they be put to death? The FBI¶s October Plan called for, ³aggressive ± even obvious ± surveillance´ techniques to be used on a short list of people suspected of being terrorist sympathizers, but who have not committed a crime. Other ³persons of interest,´ including their family members, may also be brought for questioning«102 Lewin represented Rabbi Chiam Berger, who was extradited from occupied Palestine, to the United States, after it was alleged that the New Square Hasidic community was persuaded to vote for Hillary Clinton in return for reduction of their coreligionists prison sentences for fraud.103 In 1993, Gorelick was the Vice Chair of the Task Force on the Audit, Inspection and Investigation Components of the Department of Defense. Then Gorelick became General Counsel for the Department of Defense. There, she structured the Department's involvement in the consolidation of the defense industry in the 1990s, and was awarded the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Medal for her outstanding service to the Department. After she left government the military industrial complex rewarded her by making her a Board Member of the defense and aerospace giant United Technologies with 220,000 employees (2005) (67% of these are based outside the United States) where she serves on its Finance and Public Issues Review Committees.
101. Nathan Lewin Sh¶ma.com - ³Detering Suicide Killers.´ http://www.shma.com/may02/nathan.htm 102 . http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aadc/aadcdhs101706cmp1.html 103. When Rabbi Berger was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, inmate Ari Unger prepared special kosher meals for Rabbi Berger. Nonetheless, members of the Satmar community called the Bureau of Prisons to complain that Unger used a non-kosher microwave to heat up Berger¶s food. For his kindness Unger was almost thrown in ³the hole.´
In March 1994 Gorelick became the Justice Department's number two official, the Department's chief operating officer, provided overall supervision of the Department, and functioned as the direct manager of its law enforcement components. It was there that she decided to tap into Saudi money by making it harder to stop Islamic Fundamentalists from operating in the United States under the guise of preserving ³civil liberties.´ She did it in a way in which the new rules she laid down were so convoluted many FBI-types were unsure of their meaning and erred on the side of caution. THE GORELICK MEMORANDUM [March 1995] The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI have been conducting criminal investigations of certain terrorist acts, including the bombing of the World Trade Center, and potential obstruction of the indicted case of United States v. Rahman, et al. During the course of those investigations significant counterintelligence information has been developed related to the activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, including previously unknown connections between separate terrorist groups [al-Qaeda]. Although information and evidence relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions is still being sought, it has become overwhelmingly apparent that there is a compelling need to further develop and expand that foreign counterintelligence information. Consequently, the FBI has initiated a separate full field counterintelligence investigation. This makes it seem as if as a result of our activities, the FBI has gained knowledge of the infrastructure we have established in America and its connection to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and is determined to root out our cells, and the Justice Department is on board, gung-ho and ready to act. ³Although the counterintelligence investigation may result in the incidental collection of information relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions, the primary purpose of the counterintelligence investigation will be to collect foreign counterintelligence information. Because the counterintelligence investigation will involve the use of surveillance techniques authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) against targets that, in some instances, had been subject to surveillance under Title III, [Criminal Wiretap Statutes] and because it will involve some of the same sources and targets as the criminal investigation, we believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These go beyond what is legally required, and will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation. Where was the problem? Who made the charge that the power of the Intelligence Community was being misused? If anything by American standards, it was not used
enough in the case of the first World Trade Center Event. The phrase beyond what is legally required has been repeated over and over again to show that the FBI hand¶s were tied by Democrats who controlled the Justice Department. (1) The focus of the Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) investigation will be on preventing future terrorist acts and obtaining foreign counterintelligence information about the individuals and groups engaging in, or preparing to engage in, terrorist activities in the United States and abroad. (2) The criminal investigations will focus on the indicted cases of United States v. Yousef. et al. and United States v. Rahman, et al., and the potential obstruction of the Rahman case. The criminal investigations will also focus on the conspiracy to bomb United States airlines recently uncovered in the Philippines and the bombing of a Philippine airliner. (3) No "pro-active" investigative efforts or technical coverages are presently contemplated in any of the ongoing criminal investigations, which primarily focus on past criminal conduct, with the exception of the obstruction investigation. The list of Rahman¶s unindicted co-conspirators would not be acted upon and the policy of the Justice Department would be, ³Let sleeper Islamists lie.´ The Justice Department never revealed any details about the potential obstruction of the Rahman case. If in the future, the criminal investigations develop information requiring "pro-active" efforts or technical coverages, the United States Attorneys Office (USAO) and the criminal agents will consult with the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and the Foreign CounterIntelligence agents before undertaking such efforts, absent exigent circumstances, in order to determine the impact, if any, on the Foreign Counter-Intelligence investigation. The FBI had to get permission from the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and from the Foreign Counter-Intelligence agents before starting a so-call ³Criminal Terrorist´ investigation, as if monitoring our infrastructure was more important that stopping our activities. (4) The subjects, who are presently under pen register surveillance in the criminal Investigation, will be investigated as Foreign Counter-Intelligence subjects under the foreign counterintelligence investigation guidelines using all available techniques, including FISA, without any direction or control by the USAO, Southern District of New York or the Criminal Division, Department of Justice. The current pen registers will be discontinued before any FISA-authorized surveillances are initiated.
The members of the Brooklyn-Jersey City cell, whose incoming and outgoing calls are being recorded as far as their destination and origin, but whose phones are not tapped, will no longer be investigated as criminals and are no longer of interest to the Southern District of New York or the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, so phone numbers connected to them will no longer be recorded. (5) (Redacted) FBI memoranda and investigative reports, including 302's from (redacted) will be prepared as follows: all information relating to the aforementioned indicted cases and investigations, including the obstruction case will be segregated into separate reports which will be provided to the United States Attorney¶s Office, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Criminal Division. All foreign counterintelligence information (including all foreign counterintelligence relating to future terrorist activities) will be in classified reports which will be provided to Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, but will not be provided either to the criminal agents, the United States Attorney¶s Office, or the Criminal Division, without Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review concurrence. The FBI agent [Anticev] responsible for handling the (redacted) will remain involved in the on-going trial of United States v. Rahman, but will otherwise be assigned to the foreign counterintelligence investigation and report to foreign counterintelligence supervisors. (6) Foreign counterintelligence collected during the course of the foreign counterintelligence investigation will be disseminated pursuant to FBI guidelines and FISA. If, in the case of the foreign counterintelligence investigation, facts or circumstances are developed that reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed, the FBI and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review are each independently responsible for notifying the United States Attorney¶s Office and the Criminal Division. Notice shall include the facts and circumstances developed during the PCI [Potential Criminal Information] investigation that supplied the indication of significant federal criminal activity, whether or not such activity relates to the indicted cases or criminal investigations referred to in subparagraph (2) above. It seemed as if the Justice Department is getting very picky about ³terrorists´ and are only interested in those who took part in the Rahman Bridge and Tunnel Event or the First WTC Strike. An Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) from the Southern District of New York who has knowledge of, but no active involvement in, the on-going criminal investigations, will continue to be assigned to work with Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and the Foreign Counterintelligence agents to review such foreign intelligence information to ensure that evidence that might be exculpatory to any defendants
currently under indictment is promptly considered for dissemination to criminal investigative personnel, the United States Attorney¶s Office, and the Criminal Division. This Assistant United States Attorney will also serve to ensure, in conjunction with the FBI and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, that information which reasonably indicates that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed is appropriately disseminated to criminal investigative personnel, the United States Attorney¶s Office, and the Criminal Division pursuant to the procedures set forth above. That Assistant United States Attorney will continue to be "walled off" from participation in the on-going criminal investigations and cases and will continue to abide by all FISA dissemination provisions and guidelines.104 This was on many agents¶ minds, the blurry line between intelligence and criminal intelligence a distinction unknown to the Learned Elders of Islam as for alQaeda it is a distinction between planning to make a bomb and making one. In the course of a very superficial investigation of Shaheeds Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf alHazmi on September 10, 2001 FBI Agent Robert Fuller, new to counter-Islamism noted, ³The following contains information (deleted). This information is not cleared for review by agents working Usama bin Laden criminal matters. Prior approval from FBIHQ must be obtained before forwarding this information to any agent working Usama bin Laden criminal case.´105 Gorelick left the Justice Department in January 1997 and by Allah in 2002 she became a member of the Schlumberger Board of Directors, an oil field machinery firm with close financial connections to the Saudis. This was her reward for tying the hands of the FBI so a variation on Wahabist Islam could strike. Gorelick served as Vice Chairman of the scandal-ridden Federal National Mortgage Association (FannieMae) from 1997 to 2003 where she legally received millions in dollars in stock options.106 Since she was responsible for quashing an investigation that might have prevented our September 11th Raids she was appointed to the Blue Ribbon 9/11 Commission so that she could cover-up her political party¶s culpability. In July 2003 Gorelick became a partner in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Door LLP, an international law firm with close connections to the Democratic Party. Gorelick's firm has agreed to represent Prince Mohammed al-Faisal in the suit by the 9/11 families. The families contend that al-Faisal has legal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. When the Israeli spies Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman from AIPAC were apprehended and AIPAC double-crossed them by pulling out of an agreement to pay their legal fees, Gorelick was hired by AIPAC to get the two disgruntled spies off AIPAC¶s back. Gorelick¶s credentials are impeccable and no one dares say she works on our behalf. Her husband Richard Waldhorn is an analyst at Pittsburgh University's Center for Biosecurity. She is beyond reproach.
. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf USA v Moussaoui Defendants Exhibit 471 106 . http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/f3jg03312003.pdf
On August 25, 2001 FBI Agent Samit completed the Minneapolis FBI's formal FISA request, which consisted of a 6 page Letter Head Memorandum and e-mailed it to FBI Headquarters. The Letter Head Memorandum stated that the Minneapolis FBI was requesting a FISA search warrant on an emergency basis and that: "Minneapolis wish[ed] to emphasize the urgency of this matter in reminding recipients that Moussaoui is in INS Custody pending deportation.´ Attorney General Ashcroft could have obtained an emergency FISA that allowed him without prior approval of the FISA Court to authorize the execution of a search warrant or electronic surveillance if he determined that "an emergency situation existed" and there was a "the factual basis for issuance of an order" in accordance with the statute. The government was required to present an application to the FISA Court with respect to any such warrantless search or electronic surveillance within 24 hours of the execution of the search or surveillance. But the information on Moussaoui was not taken seriously enough to reach his desk and this type of emergency FISA rarely was used before September 11, 2001.107 The FBI's Assistant Legal Attaché in London first contacted the British authorities by telephone and in a written communication dated August 21, 2001. The Assistant Legal Attaché summarized the status of the FBI's investigation of Moussaoui, provided a document describing the results of the investigation at that time, and asked for traces to be conducted on Moussaoui and all of the individuals listed in his communication...The Assistant Legal Attaché told the Office of the Inspector General of the Justice Department that he had had several meetings and telephone calls with the British authorities in which Moussaoui was discussed. He said that the British were well aware of the importance of the matter. In addition, he said that on September 5, 2001 he provided the British with the additional information about Moussaoui that the FBI had received from the French authorities. The Assistant Legal Attaché told the Office of the Inspector General that he did not know why the British authorities failed to provide the information about Moussaoui sooner. However, he said that 10 to 15 days to respond to a request for information from the FBI was normal. On September 11, 2001 after the attacks, the London Legat again requested information about Moussaoui from the British. According to British reports that the FBI reviewed on September 12, 2001 Moussaoui had attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. The information from the British was not provided to the FBI until after the September 11th Raids because al-Qaeda was not a major British priority and its front groups operated openly in Londonstan. WHAT IF? Had the warrant been issued the FBI would have found that Brother Moussaoui¶s laptop computer contained a letter of employment from Infocus Tech, a Malaysian computer firm that Yazid Sufaat owned signed by Yazid Sufaat, a suspect in the Cole Operation due to the meeting held at his safehouse. When Moussaoui was arrested in September 2001, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed assumed that Moussaoui had used Sufaat's name and address to create a cover story. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that for security purposes, he should not have used the true name and address of a brother
in order to do this. The letter stated Moussaoui was Infocus Tech¶s overseas sales representative. Under interrogation by the CIA Hambali said Yazid Sufaat was surprised when Moussaoui was arrested and was concerned for his own safety because Yazid Sufaat said Moussaoui had a letter from him written on stationary with the letterhead of Yazid Sufaat's company. Had this letter been recovered and traced back to Sufaat, Sufaat could have been linked to Bojinga and the reason for Moussaoui¶s enrollment in flight school would have become apparent. The September 11th Raids might have been stopped, but this was not the will of Allah! Khalid Shaikh Mohammed recalled learning from the news that Sufaat¶s home address was found with Moussaoui, which he said resulted in Sufaat being a wanted man and raising scrutiny of travelers from Malaysia direct from Pakistan. Traces of communications to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed might have been recovered by the FBI had they copied and analyzed Moussaoui¶s computers hard drive: Before sending Moussaoui to the U.S., Khalid Shaikh Mohammed instructed him about the need for strict operational security, telling him that under no circumstances should he mention aircraft in any communications. Shortly after Moussaoui reached the U.S., however, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed received an email from Moussaoui in which he detailed his attempts to get flight training on various aircraft. Exasperated, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed instructed Ramzi Bin al-Shibh to send Moussaoui money from Germany because he felt it was safer to send Moussaoui money from there and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said he was disgusted and did not want to deal with Moussaoui any longer - in fact he claimed he instructed Ramzi Bin al-Shibh to break off contact with Moussaoui after the money transfer because Moussaoui was problematic, unpredictable and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed thought it was a better move to cut ties with him while he was still taking his flight training. After September 11th Ramzi bin al-Shibh¶s name was found on Moussaoui¶s laptop. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told his CIA interrogators that Moussaoui Had a different state of mind than other operatives because he had been raised in the West. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed explained that Moussaoui had a high level of self-confidence, and because of this he had a hard time taking instructions from other Brothers that were from non-Western countries, particularly on matters of operational security. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated that Westerners have a different point of view because of their freedom. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said he believed that Moussaoui's confidence caused him to practice lax operational security, adding that if an operative was too confident he would not be careful in his emails, phone calls, or discussions with friends. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated that his low regard for security was Moussaoui's main flaw. MOUSSAOUI: A SECOND WAVE OPERATIVE In May 2006 Usama bin Laden commented on the status of Brother Moussaoui,
I begin by talking about the honorable Brother Zacarias Moussaoui. The truth is that he has no connection whatsoever with the events of Sept 11th, and I am certain of what I say, because I was responsible for entrusting the 19 brothers -- Allah have mercy upon them -- with those raids, and I did not assign Brother Zacarias to be with them on that mission. And his confession that he was assigned to participate in those raids is a false confession, which no intelligent person doubts is a result of the pressure put upon him for the past four and a half years. And were this pressure lifted from him for him to return to his normal state, he would state the fact I mentioned. And among the things that confirm this fact is that the participants in Sept 11th were two groups: pilots and support teams for each pilot in order to control the aircraft. And since Zacarias Moussaoui was learning how to fly, it follows that he was not component number 20 from the teams which helped to control the airplanes, as your government previously claimed, and your government knows this fact with certainty. And if Moussaoui was studying aviation to become a pilot of one of the planes, then let him tell us the names of those assigned to help him control the plane. But he won't be able to tell us their names, for a simple reason: that in fact they don't exist. This is from one perspective, and from another perspective, the Brother Moussaoui was arrested two weeks before the events, and had he known anything -- however little -- about the Sept 11th group, we would have told the Brother Commander Mohamed Atta and his Brothers -- Allah have mercy upon them -- to leave America immediately before their affair was exposed. And with this it becomes clear to even the novice investigator, not to mention the seasoned one, that there is no connection between him and the events of Sept 11th. Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh told interrogators that Moussaoui was an untrusted backup pilot for September 11th.108 Moussaoui: Millions of people have watched the brave Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh explain how our dear Brother Mohammad Atta and others have planned this extraordinary Jihad operation. You must give me this tape. It is proof that this is a conspiracy to murder me by you. The U.S. government has organized a complete blackout on information about Ramzi bin al-Shibh because they know they must stop him speaking out about my nonparticipation in the operation 9/11. After his capture, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told interrogators that Moussaoui was not part of the September 11th cell, but was in the United States for a second wave attack.109 Under CIA interrogation Khalid Shaikh Mohammed explained that the second wave attack entailed taking the same steps as the September 11th raiders: getting flight lessons, purchasing knives, etc. During another CIA interrogation "second wave"
. Saint Petersburg Times March 2, 2003 ³Raid Snares Key 9/11 Suspect.´ http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/02/Worldandnation/Raid_snares_key_911_s.shtml 109 . Brian Blomquist ³Moussaoui Part of Second Terror Wave´ New York Post March 18, 2003. http://www.intellnet.org/news/2003/03/18/18105-1.htm
referred to any plans for attacks in the United States slated to follow 9/11, whether a sequel of aerial attacks or something entirely different like subway strikes, poisoning of reservoirs, demolition of bridges, etc. To clarify Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was told by his CIA interrogators that if he chose to continue using the phrase "second wave" in this discussion, he had to be absolutely clear about its meaning. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed took the point and explained his intended meaning. He indicated that "second wave" refers to efforts begun in parallel with the 9/11 plot to identify and train pilots and muscle for additional 9/11-style strikes in the United States. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated that the second wave was not completely planned or ready for execution, but was on the "back burner." He said he had no idea that the damage of the first attack would be as catastrophic as it was, and he did not plan on the U.S. responding to the attacks as fiercely as they did, which led to the next phase being postponed. In its attempt to portray Moussaoui as the 20th Hijacker the United States Department of Justice offered this specious argument, ³As late as August 2001, al-Qaeda was still trying to insert new hijackers into the September 11th attacks suggests an operation much more in flux than the defense theory that the targets and the players were in place by July 2001 when Atta and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh met in Spain.´110 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA ³he was impressed by the security measures implemented in the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Based on the U.S. reaction to the attacks and future plots to the U.S., he assessed at least for the short term that the prospects for a second round of hijacking attacks in the U.S. were dismal.´ Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that he was not even aware of Moussaoui's arrest until after 9/11 and he did not worry about not having heard from Moussaoui in the weeks before the 9/11 Operation because Moussaoui was supposed to be in flight school and was not supposed to be in contact with him or anyone until after graduating. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that Moussaoui did not know Atta and there was never any contact between the two of them. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed pointed out that the 9/11 operation proceeded on schedule after Moussaoui's arrest, noting that if Moussaoui was part of the plot, there should have been some disruption or change of plans. MOUSSAOUI THE DEMENTED? Moussaoui has been characterized as a madman by the American media. But he was sane enough to earn a degree from a business school in the United Kingdom, sane enough to be part of other Islamist operations, and as you have seen from his FBI file, Moussaoui was completely coherent when he spoke with Agent Samit. After he was accused in the September 11th Events he appreciated the gravity of the situation and decided to feign insanity however Moussaoui said he would not undergo a psychiatric examination because he would ³not participate in an obscene Jewish science.´ Moussaoui was familiar with the symptoms of mental illness - his sister Nadia suffered depression and numerous suicide attempts. Nadia¶s delusions took the form of Zionism
. United State Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit No. 03-4742 Brief for the United States filed October 31, 2002 http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss102403gbrf.pdf
and love of the Jewish people. Her younger sister was also mentally ill.111 Moussaoui began to file a series of motions that seemed to indicate he was insane. IN THE NAME OF ALLAH Open Filed 15 July. Zacarias Moussaoui, Muslim. v. Godless U.S. Moussaoui is crazy because he wanted to get married when he arrived in Norman. (OK). Motion to stop Leonie Brinkema to undermine my chance to live by her smearing campaign. ALLAHU AKBAR! In their constant effort to remove me from my defense Brinkema and her lawyer have produced an interview of an Imam in Oklahoma. If the FBI report is to be believed, the American Imam pondered about my state of mind because I asked him to help me get married. Maybe it is strange for a muslin to go an ask the imam for marital help in America but in the entire Muslim world it is the first person a man will go to get married. That the kind of ³histarical´ psychiatric information they standby is Frankenstein doctor will use to declare me crazy. Having left Britain on an unsuccessful attempt to get married it is possible that I was a bit in a hurry when I ask this Imam to help me when I just arrived in Norman Oklahoma. After all even Muslim have a heart. Of course the FBI did not want to declassified this interview because it confirm that I intended (and still intend) to have a familly. A Jury might find a bit difficult to believe that even a Muslim fundamentalist will marry one day and kill himself the next. So yes when you want to get marry in the Muslim community you ask the Imam. Again Leonie Brinkema is trying to exploit ignorance and prejudice. IN THE NAME OF ALLAH Open Filed 15 July Zacarias Moussaoui Muslim v. U.S. Godless gov. My fan was in the apartment. Attas and Mukhram will testify to this. Motion to Stop the FBI to Tamper with Evidence and to have Hussein al-Attas and Ali Mukhram Called as Witness. Immediate hearing. ALLAHU AKBAR. The FBI now is hidding concrete evidence of their cover up operation before September 11 against me and the 19th hijacker: the bugged electric fan planted by the FBI. This bugged electric fan was in the apartment 209 1A Wadsack, Norman, I brought it there when I moved in with Attas and Hussein. Hussein Al-Attas used it a lot because the apartment was badly ventilated. Hussein Al-Attas (May ALLAH help him) and Ali Mukaram (May ALLAH make it easy) know that I brought this bugged electric fan into the house at 209 1A Wadsack. Now the FBI refuse to give it to me so it will be examined by electronic forensic expert to uncover the FBI bug. The FBI must give me the bugged fan. In their usual conning and lying exercise the FBI will claim that the fan belong to Ali Mukhram and that he was not part
. Susan Dominus ³Everybody Has A Mother´ New York Times Magazine February 9, 2003.
of the investigation on ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI. Leonie Brinkema, know that, as I explain it in my first motion on the Fan but she always let the FBI go away with crime. Leonie Brinkema must order that absolutely all item seized should be provided. SHE MUST ASK THE FBI FOR THE BUGGED FAN. Slave of ALLAH /s/ Zacarias Moussaoui ALLAH U AKBAR, AND THE FIGHT GO ON, ALLAH U AKBAR. Bugged electric fan? The Brother was not trying to cop an insanity plea but trying to avoid the death penalty. Moussaoui¶s motions became even more bizarre: ³20th HIJACKER GOD CURSE THE QUEEN. Title: Little Bitch of Buckingham. Original United Best Lyric UK Release Soon!!! The DJ Must submit order to force the FBI to disclose their affairs with Her Machavelic MI-5, 6, 7 etc. of the United Killer (AKA UK).´ Judge Brinkema would have no part of this and threatened to withhold Moussaoui¶s rantings from the public. Moussaoui responded, Zacarias Moussaoui v. US Muslim v. Kafir DEATH TO UNTIED SATAN DEMONCRACY MOUSSAOUI ATTACK ON THE WTC September 11th is much more than simply the collapse of the World Trade Center, it is the death of the WTC, World Tyrant Constitution. In an Under Seal letter to Death Judge Leonie Brinkerna, the Fascist Bureau of Inquisition and the US government asked: "we now submit that the continuous stream of pleading not be presumptively publicly disseminated" August 22, 2002. What about "Express Yourself?" Bearing in mind that the SAM is no more than Special Assassination of Moussaoui and the World Tyrant Constitution has received double impact (like the WTC). Not to forget the New Home Spy scheme of Ascroft who makes the Homo Founder of the FBI, Hoover look like a left wing softy. (Homo, of course.)... So when the government of the United Satan say "the defendant has no right to file so called pleading that may be harmful to the public´ (US of course) they are absolutely right, I have no right but the obligation, the duty to harm the United Satan by any means possible and imaginable. As ALLAH order me. "KILL THE DISBELIEVER WHEREVER YOU FIND THEM AND BESIEGE THEM AND LIE IN WAIT FOR THEM IN EACH AND EVERY AMBUSH.´ ALLAH order me, "Urge the believer to fight" So I, Zacarias Mossaoui urge, incite, encourage, solicit Muslim to kill American, civilian or military, anywhere around the world until all our children will get revenge and that all American troops and civilians leave Muslim lands. Kill Americans, anywhere, anyhow, anytime until they get the point out of the Holy Land. "THEN FIGHT IN THE CAUSE OF ALLAH
YOU ARE NOT HELD RESPONSIBLE EXCEPT FOR YOURSELF AND INCITE THE BELIEVER TO FIGHT ALONG WITH YOU. IT MAY BE THAT ALLAH WILL RESTRAIN THE EVIL MIGHT OF THE DISBELIEVERS. AND ALLAH IS STRONGER IN MIGHT AN STRONGER IN PUNISHING. MOUSSAOUI¶S LEGAL REPRESENTATION Moussaoui believed that his defense team were: ³Jewish zealots«I pray to Allah, Al Shadeed Al Y Rikab, the severe in punishment for the destruction of the Jewish people and states and for the liberation of Palestine by the Muslim, for the Muslim. O, pray to Allah the protector for the destruction of the United States of America.´ Moussaoui said he had stopped shaking the hands of the lawyers on his ³blood-sucking death team´ because ³I find them so repulsive as unbelievers.´112 In reality only one of Moussaoui¶s lawyers was Jewish, none-the-less Islamic law dictated that his attorney be a Muslim, as he related: This is from the Qu¶ran: µIn the name of Allah, Oh you who believe, take not your bitanah113 outside of your religion, since they will not fail to do their best to corrupt you. They desire to harm you severely. Hatred has already appeared from their mouth. But what their breast conceals in far worse.¶114 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman also quoted this verse: "Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them. Moussaoui continued, Allah, forgive me for I failed to fully understand. Under the cover of assistance of defense counsel, the legal version of humanitarian assistance, the United States is orchestrating my being sent to the safe haven, Bosnia style. What they have done is a sophisticated version of the Troy Horse or the kiss of death. Dead, injured judge, investigator, and the so-called defender are all federal employees. I can¶t wait for the jury. They appointed, imposed the dream team. The game is deception. My lawyers say we can go to the judge and say that you are a bit paranoid. The government might agree because in the U.S. we do execute mentally retarded people, Mr. Moussaoui. Moussaoui requested a Muslim lawyer, Charles Freeman, who he could relate to.115 Freeman, in a filing entitled, ³Is this how Alexandria
112. Philip Shenon ³In Motion Defendant Declares he is Hostile to Jews and U.S.´ New York Times June 18, 2002 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B12FD34580C7B8DDDAF0894DA404482 113. Entourage, advisors, consultants, helpers - In Saudi Arabia Fifth graders learn "It is forbidden for a Muslim to be a loyal friend to someone who does not believe in God and his prophet, or someone who fights the religion of Islam." 114. Qu¶ran Sura Al-i±Imram, Number 3, Ayat 118 115. Charles Freeman, P.O. Box 52818 Houston, Texas Born 1948; Admitted 1985; Lamar University, B.A.; University of Houston, J.D.
Division treats its guests?´ asked why he was ³being threatened´ for giving Moussaoui ³out-of-court legal assistance solely on federal law.´ Freeman said in the filing that he would not serve as ³so-called stand-by counsel because I refuse to be a toothless tiger amounting to no counsel at all!´ Although he wanted to be in charge of the case Judge Brinkema disqualified him because he was not licensed to practice law in the State of Virginia. Sadiq Reza, Legal Services Department, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, also agreed to defend Moussaoui. Raza shared a platform with Abdeen Jabara at a lecture entitled ³Current Legal Threats to Muslims in the United States.´ Moussaoui wished that Sadiq Kahn, a lawyer for Louis Farrakhan, who fought against Farrakhan¶s exclusion from Britain since 1986 on the basis of fears he would stir up racial tensions if allowed in, could help him with his case. Despite all these candidates Moussaoui ended up with Gerald Zerkin, the Jew that he hated, as his counsel. By July 2002 Moussaoui was demoralized and offered to plead guilty: I, Moussaoui Zacarias, I want to enter a plea today of guilty, because this will ensure to save my life, because this is conspiracy law. It¶s much more complicated than what you want to make people believe, because even if I plead guilty, I will be able to prove that I have certain knowledge about September 11th and I know exactly who done it. I know which group, who participated, when it was decided. I have many information. But it will ensure me to save my life; because the jury will be able to evaluate how much responsibility I have in this. But by carrying on with this farcical justice, I will be put aside soon, because already the standby counsel are speaking in my behalf in open court, where they are here only for protocol and procedure«I will certainly be gagged during trial, and you will carry on your so-called justice, and the jury will be inflamed, because September 11th, it¶s a very serious affair, and they will, they will pronounce my death. I Moussaoui Zacarias, in the interests to preserve my life, enter with full conscience a plea of guilty, because I have knowledge and participated in al-Qaeda. In the interests to preserve my life, enter with full conscience a plea of guilty, because I have knowledge and participated in al-Qaeda. I am a member of al-Qaeda, I pledge bayat to Usama bin Laden«I was sent to the U.S. to take flight training to fly a plane into a building in the U.S. bin Laden personally approved my participation in the attack.´ [Judge Brinkema called the Marshalls] So today the world should know that Moussaoui Zacarias have entered formally a guilty plea fully and completely, and he want to have the trial as soon as possible to be able to, to show the extent of his guilt. That¶s only what matter now. I am guilty. Now the question is how much. Judge Brinkema told Moussaoui that she would give him one more week to make up his mind that he wished to plead guilty. ³Bet on me, I will,´ he said. On July 25, 2002 Brother Moussaoui withdrew his guilty plea. ³Dictated by my obligation to my creator, Allah, and to save and defend my life, I withdraw my guilty plea. I was not directly involved with these people.´ In March 2006 undermining his own case, Moussaoui said
that he and Richard Reid were part of the first wave of attacks and were assigned the task of flying a plane into the White House.116 There was no telling what the Brother might do next! MOHAMMED WARSAME Mohammed Warsame was arrested in December 2003 as a material witness in the Zacarias Moussaoui case yet he was never directly linked in any manner shape or form to Moussaoui. Warsame was born in Somalia and sought refugee status in Canada in 1989. He became a naturalized Canadian citizen and moved to Minneapolis in 2002. At the time of his arrest, he was a student at Minneapolis Community and Technical College. In January 2004, Warsame was indicted and charged with conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda. Warsame has admitted attending an al-Qaeda training camp in 2000 and 2001 and receiving military training (weapons, martial arts). He attended lectures given by bin Ladin and even sat next to him at a meal during the same time al-Qaeda attacked the U.S.S. Cole while anchored at a harbor in Yemen. Moreover, he fought with the Taliban and provided financial assistance to alQaeda members in Pakistan once he had returned to the United States. The name Mohamed Warsama was listed on a Kenyan business card seized in 1997 from Wadih el-Hage117 however, there is an attorney in Kenya named Mohamed Warsama.118 In January 2004 a federal indictment was handed down in Minnesota charging Warsame with one count of supplying material to al-Qaeda beginning in March 2000 and ending after his arrest.119 The Government relied upon CS-1 and CS-2 to show that Warsame attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, that he received training in firearms and explosives, and that he fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The Government also relied upon the confidential sources for the proposition that Warsame¶s travel back to Canada was paid for by al-Qaeda, and that Warsame remained in contact with al-Qaeda after he returned to Canada.120 Warsame was released on January 30, 2004.121 USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE U.S. JUDICIAL SYSTEM BRINKEMASHIP The Moussaoui indictment identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and charged that he was a key member of a cell in Hamburg, Germany, that carried out the September 11th Raids. It said that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh wired $14,000 to Moussaoui from Germany in August 2001. The capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh created a dilemma for prosecutors, since the Defense Department and CIA refused to make him available for defense interviews even though that could mean scuttling the case against Moussaoui, because
. Neil Lewis Moussoui, Underminding Case, Now Ties Himself to 9/11 Plot New York Times March 28, 2006. . Dan Eggen and Jerry Markon ³Canadian Probed for Al Qaeda Ties´ Washington Post December 13, 2003. 118 . Daily Nation Kenya November 26, 2003. 119 . Susan Schmidt ³Canadian Held For Alleged Al Qaeda Ties U.S. Accuses Man of Plotting To Provide Aid to Terrorists´ Washington Post January 22, 2004; Page A03. 120 . Stewart Bell, ³Canadian Arrested in US linked to 9/11 Suspect´ National Post December 12, 2003. FBI Agent Donnachie¶s Affidavit in support of Arrest Warrant at paragraphs 6 and 7 121 Mohammed Abdullah Warsame 11355-041
Moussaoui had a constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Moussaoui also wanted to call Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as a defense witness. Judge Brinkema ruled on the Defendant¶s ³Emergency Motion to Force Ashcroft and the FBI to produce [Khalid] Mohammed statement that Zacarias Moussaoui was not part of the 9/11 Mujahid operations´ and subsequently ordered the Justice Department to provide defense lawyers with any statement made by captured leaders of al-Qaeda that would tend to exonerate Moussaoui and ruled that Moussaoui¶s rights could not be negated by America¶s right to conduct a war. Judge Brinkema also ruled that the testimony of other Brothers could possibly mitigate the death penalty being sought by the Government. A Federal Appeals Court ruled that prosecutors can introduce evidence of the 9/11 attacks at trial and seek the death penalty against the Brother while Moussaoui may subpoena enemy combatants for his defense.122 In November 2002 the White House weighed a proposal to abandon the Justice Department¶s prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui in a federal court, remove him from the United States and place him before a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay (now ruled illegal by the United States Supreme Court), Cuba because Judge Brinkema was upset when the evidence against the Brother was presented at a secret hearing: ³The Court, too, is disturbed by the extent to which the United States¶ intelligence officials have classified the pleadings, orders and memorandum opinions in this case; and further agrees with the defendant¶s skepticism of the Government¶s ability to prosecute this case in open court in light of the shroud of secrecy under which it seeks to proceed.´ Much legal maneuvering occurred123 but the point became moot after Moussaoui pleaded guilty. This ³right to confront and cross-examine witnesses´ tactic worked for Mounir elMotassadeq124 a Moroccan who came to Germany125 in 1993 to study engineering who was tried in Hamburg for involvement in the September 11th Raids and sentenced to seven years in prison but allowed to remain free while his case was appealed: By August 29, 1998 el-Motassadeq was under surveillance by German authorities when he and Mohamed Haydar Zammar, who had already been identified by police as a suspected Brother, met at the Hamburg home of Said Bahaji. Bahaji later moved in with Mohammed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh at 54 Marienstrasse in Hamburg. Transcripts
. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss42204opn.pdf . USDC Eastern District Virginia Criminal No. 01 445-A Filed October 2, 2002 Memorandum Opinion http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss100203opn.pdf Judge Brinkema granted a request by Moussaoui¶s lawyers that they be allowed to question Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Two appellate hearings on this matter, one unclassified, the other classified, were scheduled for June 3, 2003. Moussaoui was not allowed to attend one of these hearings, and declined to attend another, during which the government presented its objections to bringing Ramzi bin al-Shibh to America to testify on the Brother¶s behalf. The court ruled that Moussaoui could call the witness in his behalf but the Government, after it was denied a re-hearing, refused to abide by this decision. Prosecutors then asked Brinkema to drop the charges against the Brother so that they could re-instate them before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit but she refused. 124. Desmond Butler ³Saying U.S. Hinders Its Case Defense Seeks End to German Trial´ New York Times December 4, 2002 http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/international/europe/04HAMB.html 125 . During the first trial of Mounir el-Motassadeq witness Shahid Nickels, who was a member of Mohammed Atta's core group between 1998 and 2000, said the following: ³Atta's weltanschauung was based on a National Socialist way of thinking. He was convinced that µthe Jews¶ are determined to achieve world domination. He considered New York City to be the center of world Jewry that was, in his opinion, Enemy Number One. He was convinced that Jews control the American government as well as the media and the economy of the United States.´ Ralf Götsche who lived in the same student dormitory as Motassadeq, recalled, ³Motassadeq once said: µWhat Hitler did to the Jews was not at all bad.¶´ Dr. Matthias Küntzel Islamic Anti-Semitism And Its Nazi Roots.
of tapped calls contain conversations between Bahaji and World Trade Center Shaheed Marwan al-Shehhi. In March 1999, German intelligence officials gave the CIA the first name and telephone number of Marwan al-Shehhi, and asked the Americans to track him.126 Again, the FBI had other priorities in 1999 when 46 percent of the 1,532,200 total arrests for drug abuse violations were for marijuana. After the September 11th Raids Mounir Motassadeq was convicted of more than 3,000 counts of murder and was sentenced to the maximum 15 years in prison, however the verdict was overturned and he was granted a new trial at which the Americans turned over exculpatory evidence from some of our Brothers they held as prisoners who they warned might be, ³intentionally withholding information and employing counter-interrogation techniques.´ Mounir Motassadeq was convicted of a lesser crime ± belonging to our organization - and in August 2005 sentenced to five to seven years in prison, but in February 2006 he was released on bail pending appeal. An appeals court overturned that ruling, saying he had played a direct role in plotting the event. FATWA OKAYS MASS MURDER OF KUFFAR As an after word it should be noted that a few members of our own faith would say that the 3,000 casualties that came about as a result of the September 11th Events constituted mass murder. Sheik Ali bin Khdheir presented his fatwa that explained: The weeping, the sorrow, and the pain over the [American] victims among those termed µinnocent¶ are strange. Those victims were unbelieving Americans who must not be sorrowed over, because the unbelieving American is considered an enemy combatant due to his connection to his government, or because he supports it with money or opinion or counsel, as is customary in their political regime, may Allah not multiply such regimes...It is permissible to kill the combatants among them, as well as those who are non-combatants, for example the aged man, the blind man, and the dhimmi, as the clerics agree.127 Allah said, ³The only reward of those who make war upon Allah and His messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet and alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled out of the land.´128
MOUSSAOUI AND THE SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN
. Risen and Lichtblau ³C.I.A. Was Given Data on Hijacker Long Before 9/11´ New York Times February 24, 2004. . MEMRI Report January 18, 2002, ³The Role of Fatwas in Incitement to Terrorism.´ http://www.standwithus.com/actions/011702.asp 128 . Surat al-Maidah 33, 34
Moussaoui pleaded guilty to six counts of conspiracy to commit the September 11 Raids and was subsequently put on trial to determine whether he should live or die. After pleading guilty on April 22, 2005 Moussaoui stated,
I came to the United States of America to be part, okay, okay, of a conspiracy to use airplane as a weapon of mass destruction...but this conspiracy was a different conspiracy than 9/11. My conspiracy has for aim to free Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheik, who is held in Florence, Colorado, okay, and we wanted to use the 747 because it is a long-distance plane who could reach Afghanistan without any stopover to give a chance to special forces to storm the plane. So I am guilty of a broad conspiracy to use weapon of mass destruction to hit the White House if the American government refuse to negotiate, okay.129 The defense strategy for Brother Moussaoui was based on the assumption that even without a confession from Moussaoui the FBI should have known about our September 11th plans. The jury spared Moussaoui and he was sentenced to life in solitary confinement. MOUSSAOUI¶S MISSION The American mass media reported that a cropduster manual was found in the possession of Zacarias Moussouai but as you have observed from early FBI reports this was not the case, for something of that nature would not have escaped Agent Samit. The original indictment handed down against Moussaoui in December 2001 said that among possessions seized from Moussaoui was a computer disk containing information related to the aerial application of pesticides. The indictment read: ³On or about June 2001, in Norman, Oklahoma, Zacarias Moussaoui made inquiries about starting a crop dusting company.´130 His inquiries about hiring a cropduster plane were seen as evidence of a plot to spread chemical, biological or radioactive material in an American city.´131 On June 23, 2002 the United States Just-ice Department altered the indictment, dropping indications that he was implicated in planning attacks with crop-dusting planes. There was no official explanation for the change.132 None-the-less the Marine Corps¶ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force guarded Moussaoui¶s preliminary hearings in Virginia. Cropdusters played a recurrent theme in the plans of Al-Qaeda. Barely two weeks before his arrest Moussaoui inquired about the University of Minnesota's crop-dusting program, a move suggesting the he considered staying in
. New York Times Neil A Lewis February 6, 2006 http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2005/images/04/23/moussaoui.plea.transcript.pdf 130. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm 131. ³Moussaoui 'Slipped Through Net'´ B B C D e c e m b
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1706000/1706326.stm D r o p s C r 132. ³I n d i c t m e n t Miami Herald Wire Services Posted on June 21, 2002. M e n t i o n ´ http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/3513250.htm
Minnesota for a year or more. Moussaoui e-mailed the university's Crookston, Minnesota, campus on July 31, 2001. From: zulaman tangotango [email@example.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2001 10:19 AM To: Leake, Larry Subject: to become a crop duster Hello, my name is Zacarias and I am french and I currently in the US to train to become a Commercial pilot and then open a business of Crop Dusting in Morocco (where I am from originally) or may be France. I would like to have detail information about two main thing. First, what time of short course you offer to become a crop duster (6 month, 1 years max) price etc, Second do you offer advice on how to run a small medium size crop dusting business. I am interested to know what type of aircraft, material equipment, something in detail, a kind of business plan. I have in mind to come to visit you by the end of august, will it be possible? Thank in advance for your help. PS do you know any book that can help me in this matter. Moussaoui made a fleeting reference to the e-mail in a court filing in July 2002 in Alexandria and told Samit that he was interested in an aviation related course at the University of Minnesota. Essam al-Ridi was the first al-Qaeda cooperator, to mention the word ³cropduster´ to the Americans. Al-Ridi, an Egyptian-American pilot, helped prosecutors penetrate al-Qaeda long before the September 11th Raids. His testimony was crucial in convicting Wadih el-Hage for conspiring in the 1998 plot to bomb two American Embassies in East Africa. Al-Ridi told the FBI that he had taken classes and taught other Brothers at the now-defunct Ed Boardman Aviation School in Fort Worth. Essam Al-Ridi also said that in the mid-1990s he purchased a used Saber-40 aircraft on bin Laden¶s behalf for $210,000 in Tucson, Arizona. Usama bin Laden had asked al-Ridi to start a crop-dusting business in the Sudan. Q. Your understanding was that Mr. Bin Laden wanted you to be available to not only fly an airplane if he wanted to travel but also for crop dusting for the farming companies owned by Mr. Bin Laden, is that right? A. The crop dusting came very later after that, when we went back to Sudan, they wanted to have somebody who has already the license and he can fly crop dusting«When I first came to Nairobi, it was just to fly Mr. Bin Laden¶s personal plane, but then later on it was expanded to include crop dusting of the farms. In 1999 al-Ridi wrote a report about this but the understaffed FBI International Terrorism components never asked him for it until after the September 11th Raids, when
agents suddenly recalled that several of jihadi had inquired about crop-dusting planes.133 The Justice Department was supposed to protect al-Ridi from our revenge, but when al-Ridi entered Egypt he was detained, kicked and held incommunicado as retribution for his previous association with bin Laden. When the United States sought his help again after September 11th Raids, Qatar Airways concluded he was a security risk and fired him.134 At a September 2000 meeting with FBI agents, L¶Houssaine Kherchtou reported that he had been sent to flight school by Usama bin Laden so he could operate cropdusters allegedly caring for al-Qaeda¶s crops in Sudan. Cropdusters reappear in our mythology in June 2000; shortly after Shaheed Mohammad Atta entered the U.S. Atta visited Johnell Bryant, a loan officer at a U.S. Department of Agriculture office in Homestead, Florida. He told her he had just arrived from Afghanistan and hoped to get his pilot¶s license and buy a plane to use for charter flights and for crop-dusting. She told no one of this visit until years later, when she confessed to the FBI and the news media, of her stupidity: It wasn¶t actually a crop-duster in itself that he was wanting to finance. He wanted to finance a twin-engine, six-passenger aircraft that he could use for charter flights and remove the seats. And he said he was an engineer, and he wanted to build a chemical tank that would fit inside the aircraft, and take up every available square inch of the aircraft, except for where the pilot would be sitting. And run the spray nozzles along the wingspan. And use it as both a crop-duster plane, and as a charter plane by building a specially made chemical tank to put into the aircraft to hold the chemicals for crop-dusting, and yet remove that when he, when he needed to, and replace the seats for, in, for charter type, plane. He mentioned that he could get a larger tank in a twin-engine plane than what he could, than the chemical capacity of a regular crop-duster plane, which he said that he could use it, to stay up in the air longer while he¶s spraying sugar cane, out in the Broward County area.135 When ABC newsman Bryant Ross asked her: ³And, when did you first meet someone who you say is Mohamed Atta?´ she responded: ³I met him somewhere between the end of April, around the third week of April to the third week of May 2000.´136 Atta¶s first entry into the United States was June 3, 2000, Newark, New Jersey.137 This is why women are kept in a subordinate position in Islam. Atta then tried to get a loan at the Community Bank of Florida so that he could purchase a cropduster,
133. Judith Miller ³A Witness Against Al-Qaeda Says The U.S. Let Him Down´ New York Times June 3, 2002. . Phil Hirshkorn ³Key terrorism witness looking to U.S. for help´ CNN.com August 16, 2002 http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/02/al.qaeda.witness/ 135. Associated Press ± Court TV ± September 25, 2002 ³Virginia Man Charged with Helping Hijackers Get ID¶s.´ http://www.courttv.com/assault_on_america/0925_hijackers_fakeids_ap.html th 136. Transcript - Brian Ross' interview with government worker who encountered a September 11 terrorist. http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/WNT_ross-bryant_transcript1.html 137. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/2002_05/fullreport.pdf
but with no success. The Florida bank president said that one of his loan officers remembered getting a request by telephone for financing to buy a crop-duster or cropdusting company. Robert Epling president of Community Bank of Florida in Homestead said the officer could not identify the caller as Atta, and that the caller never submitted a loan application. But Epling said the loan officer remembered the call because there is little crop-dusting in the area, and few requests to finance that business. In August 2001, Mohammad Atta began to make repeated trips to rural airports, trying to learn everything he could about cropdusters. He said he was interested in starting a crop dusting business. D. ³Will´ Lee, 62, general manager of South Florida Crop Care in Belle Glade, said that groups of two or three Middle Eastern men came by almost every weekend for six or eight weeks before the so called terrorist attacks, including the weekend just before the assaults. Lee said a co-worker, James Lester, positively identified one of the hijacking suspects as Atta. Atta was a persistent questioner. ³The guy kept trying to get in the airplane.´ The ground crew chief had to order him away from one of the planes at one point because he kept trying to climb onto the wing and into the cockpit. He asked questions about the capabilities of crop-dusters, including how big a load of chemicals they could carry. The 9/11 Commission reported, "In February 2001, Atta and Shehhi traveled to Virginia Beach, Virginia, where they opened a mailbox account. A crop duster pilot in Belle Glade, Florida identified Atta as inquiring about the purchase and operation of crop dusters while Atta was living in the Atlanta area."138 In October 2001 the Americans discovered computer programs on how to use cropduster aircraft to spread pesticide when they raided the offices of the Saudi High Commissioner to Bosnia. ATTA EXAMINES CROPDUSTER NOZZLE In October 2001, pharmacist and farmer Gregg Chatterton of Huber Drugs in Delray Beach, just north of Fort Lauderdale, told the FBI that in late August 2001 Mohamed Atta, accompanied by September 11th Shaheed Marwan Al-Shehhi, bought medication for his hands, both of which were red from the wrist down. Chatterton did know what to make of the Brothers. Atta was well dressed, told the American he dealt in computers, but would not say what area he specialized in, yet he seemed to have been around some industrial chemicals that were basic, like lye. Chatterton thought that the men worked at a nearby cement plant. He wondered if one of them had failed to wear his gloves and his hands had become irritated from a chemical used there. He sold Atta a 1-ounce tube of Acid Mantle for $5.49 to restore the natural ph balance of his skin: I asked him if he ever came in contact with toluene which is used to produce TNT. He wouldn¶t tell me what he got it from and he kept avoiding me. He would not make eye contact with me. I told him that he had to tell me how his hands got messed up. If it was a result of a fungus you have to treat it with an anti-fungal, if it was chemical he had to be treated with a cream.
. Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 -- By The House Permanent Selected Committee on Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee p137
He put his hand on me, pushed me to get my attention and said my friend has a cough and got feverish at night. He said just wanted to stop the cough so I told him to take Robitussin AC. The cough that the other man demonstrated sounded flu-like and bothersome. I thought his friend came back with a prescription for some medication but I couldn¶t find it. I looked all through my file. These guys were definitely suspicious characters, I thought they might have been manufacturing free base cocaine. After the post September 11th anthrax mailings, Chatterton had been told that Atta had crawled into a cropduster and tried to undo one of the sprayer nozzles so that he could see if it would spray another noxious agent. The nozzle had chemical residue on it that contaminated his hands. The reason I believed the cropduster planes were touched or a fitting may have been attempted to be removed for later changes (for proper dispersement) is that the chemicals used in spraying the fields may have been irritating and that Atta was out at the field on several occasions showing different groups the cropdusters. I got the impression that Atta had been cleaning something, because there were clear demarcations. The both sides of his hands were affected showing that he didn¶t simply touch something. He was evasive and did not wish to express the reason his hands were red. His own words were devoid [of reference to] any caustic agent or bio-terroristic agent. The other fellow could barely talk, so Atta had do much of the talking and made the purchase from a pocket full of cash.139 The FBI tested the dwellings of the September 11th raiders for anthrax and chemical agents but found none. Clearly, the Al-Qaeda Second Wave Attack Plan involved cropdusters. Moussaoui and Atta¶s interest in cropdusters could not have been two co-incidental rogue operations. The jihadi believed that even after a first wave of attacks they could still operate within the United States. They were going to either obtain dangerous chemicals from truck drivers who had Hazardous Material Licenses or from associates who owned chemical plants. If this did not work they would spay the Jewish insects with conventional pesticide. Brother Abu Jihad called the Florida Department of Agriculture and questioned them about obtaining dangerous pesticides. He was told, What we deal with in this office is restricted-use pesticides. If you own the property you would need to get a private license. To do this you must pass a written examination. Contact your local county extension office and set up an examination time and order study material or sometimes they have training sessions before exams. There are fifty questions - multiple choice. I don¶t know of any criminal check or background check. They need your
. Recorded telephone conversation with Gregg Chatterton.
home address Social Security number and you will fill out a form. We have to know where you are spraying, how the chemicals are going to be used. If you have a corporation you would need a commercial license especially if you have a cropduster and you are going to be contracting out work. We just have to know the name of the business and you employer and where you are spraying and all that. You must choose a category. With a commercial license there are many different categories. There is the Agrocrop category. Aquatic category if you are going to spray ponds. Then you must pass the General Standards core examination. Once this license was obtained all that remained was to fill out an application and send in a fee of $250 per brand along with the label of the pesticide.140 Ah, the best laid plans of Muslims and men are often doomed to failure. After the September 11th Raids the FBI grounded all flights of cropdusters and airtankers. Had we succeeded in starting a cropdusting firm near Miami, we would have dusted thousands of plants in Miami or Fort Lauderdale ± beginning with each and every Wandering Jew. The rich, complacent yehudi that inhabit these retirement areas would have realized that their wealth was no defense against our determination to finish where Hitler had left off. Allah Akbar, they would scurry like rats from homes and synagogues. WE SHOULD HAVE BOMBED A NUCLEAR REACTOR We have focused on the failures of American intelligence enough to choke a camel. Now it is time to examine the only failure of the September 11th Victory - the premature crash of United Airlines Flight 93 that was willed by God as we chose the wrong target. If al-Qaeda would have known how difficult it would be to attack the American homeland after September 11th Raids and how infrequently al-Qaeda would be able to strike we would have targeted a nuclear reactor. In September 2002 Yemenborn Ramzi bin al-Shaibah, a coordinator of Islamist activities who was based in Germany and shared an apartment with Mohammed Atta in Hamburg, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed head of the al-Qaeda military committee, said the initial plan for the September 11th raiders had been to crash planes into nuclear power plants in the United States: ³About two and a half years before the holy raids on Washington and New York, the military committee held a meeting during which we decided to start planning for a martyrdom operation inside America. As we were discussing targets, we first thought of striking at a couple of nuclear facilities but decided against it for fear it would go out of control. It was eventually decided to leave out nuclear targets for now,´141 and the Capitol Building had been targeted. We do not fear an attack ³getting out of control´ because its target is a nuclear plant. If this was the case why was so much effort expended by al-Qaeda to obtain enriched uranium? What difference does it make if we cause an explosion and spread deadly radioactivity by exploding a bomb or by targeting a reactor? We were showing the infidels mercy, and that was a mistake.
. Telephone conversation with Florida Dept. of Agriculture recorded November 2003. . Yosri Fouda ³We Left Out Nuclear Targets for Now´ The Guardian March 4, 2003. http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4617629-111026,00.html
Later Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told his American interrogators that in early 2001, our leaders discussed attacking gasoline stations in New York as well as a nuclear reactor, but decided against it and that Usama bin Laden gave Mohammed Atta a list of targets that included the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the United States Capitol, the White House, the Israeli Embassy in Washington and the Sears Tower in Chicago.142 PEACH BOTTOM AND HOPE CREEK REACTORS We suppose Flight 93 and its full tank of fuel could have collided with the containment building of operative Three Mile Island Unit 1, located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, at a speed of 450 miles per hour. But Three Mile Island had one of the most robust containment buildings of any nuclear reactor, with three feet of concrete and six inches of steel protecting the reactor, due to the fact that it was located in the flight path of planes landing at Harrisburg Airport.143 In September 2002 nineteen prominent nuclear experts concluded that a reactor containment building could withstand a jetliner crash. A test was performed in 1988 by mounting an unmanned plane on rails and ³flying´ it at about 480 M.P.H. into a test wall.144 The engines penetrated only about two inches and the fuselage even less. The International Atomic Energy Agency, however, had to admit that no commercial reactor in the world was designed to withstand the impact of a large jetliner at high speed with a full load of fuel. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reluctantly was forced to say the same. It was not our mission to settle this dispute ± we should have hit a ³softer´ target such as the spent fuel rods at the Peachbottom or Hope reactors. Built in 1968 on a 620-acre site on the banks of the Susquehanna River, just north of the Maryland state line the Peach Bottom Nuclear Facility had its spent fuel rods stored on top of the reactor: Certain types of reactors, called Mk. 1 and Mk. 2, keep their spent fuel five stories above the reactors. This is a particularly vulnerable situation and at Peach Bottom there was nothing between the spent-fuel pool and a direct hit from an airliner except for corrugated steel.145 Once the water escapes from the fuel pool, the spent fuel rods will become red hot since the fuel rods still generate heat, even years after being
. ³Al-Qaeda: Bin Laden Chose September 11 Targets Rejected Nuclear Plant Attack´ NTI Global Security Newswire March 20, 2003. http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/thisweek/2003_3_25_terr.html 143 . In September 2002 a cooler holding metal containers linked with the Three Mile Island nuclear plant was found at the Flight 93 crash site, spurring an FBI investigation. Investigators weren¶t sure what to make of it and said they discovered no explosives, radiation or other threats. It was reported the FBI summoned a hazardous-materials unit from Philadelphia to further examine the cooler that held two stainless-steel containers roughly the size of a coffee cup that in some way indicated that they were from Three Mile Island but police would not say exactly how they made that connection. When the Philadelphia Hazmet people were contacted they denied having been dispatched. The containers have not yet been opened. Police said it¶s possible that anything could be inside ± including a forgetful visitor¶s stale coffee. ³We don¶t know if someone left it here as a prank, or whether it¶s misplaced property.´ 144 . Matthew Wald ³Experts say Nuclear Plant can Survive Jetliner Crash.´New York Times September 20, 2002. 145 . Faye Flam ³Scientists Debate Terror Risk At US Reactors´ Phillynews.com September 20, 2002 http://www.ecopravda.km.ru/nute/nn21s.htm
removed from a reactor and the water is needed to prevent meltdown. Water also provides radiation shielding. But the pool requires additional systems: heat exchangers to keep the water from boiling away, and filtration systems to pick out the radioactive material that builds up in the water. A jet airliner¶s fuel, once ignited, will put an abrupt end to the fuel pools functionality. The NRC has never performance tested a power plants ability to protect spent fuel pools from an aerial attack. In October 2000, the NRC started to recognize the problem of spent fuel fires in a study of the effects of accidents. However, in over 100 pages of analysis, they never considered a jetliner filled with fuel flying into it. The spent fuel pools are so dangerous that a jihadi with a knapsack filled with explosives could attack it. This would allow him to blow a sizeable hole in the reinforced concrete bottom or wall of a spent fuel pool. At nuclear plants that have boiling water reactors (like Peach Bottom and Hope Creek) things could be even better for us. In these cases where the spent fuel pools are above ground and not inside the containment building, a certain kind of explosive could be launched from outside the fence line into the side of the pool ± the Brother would not even have to enter the secured area. According to an unclassified study by Brookhaven National Lab, under certain conditions the pool would start draining immediately.146 This could result in the immediate release of high levels of radiation, quickly turning into an uncontrolled radioactive fire, and the plant could do nothing effective to stop it. This report found that a severe fire in the spent fuel pool could render about 188 square miles uninhabitable, cause as many as 28,000 cancer fatalities, and cost $59 billion in damage. It could also destroy the containment building underneath it, cause a nuclear meltdown and result in the formation of a radioactive cloud. Following our airbourne commando attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC commissioned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to examine potential effects of sabotage directed at spent fuel pools. The Corps conducted several computer-based analyses of the potential effects of armor-piercing weapons and high explosives on typical spent fuel pools. The analyses found that the penetration of armor-piercing weapons and high explosives could vary considerably, depending, among other things, on the size of the weapon or explosive and the sophistication of the attacker.147 The neat grid of 3,819 spaces at the bottom of the pool where the Peach Bottom plant stores its spent fuel has steadily filled with fuel rods. New Jersey State Assemblyman Gary Guear said he received information from a reliable National Guard source that a map of the Hope Creek plant was found by U.S. military forces inside a cave in Afghanistan.148 The Hope Creek is a General Electric Mk. 1 boiling water reactor, where the spent fuel pool is situated above the main reactor ± outside of the main containment area²in the upper third of the reactor¶s building.
. Danielle Brian ³Nuclear Plants and Terrorism´ Counterpunch June 5, 2002. http://www.counterpunch.org/brian0605.html 147 . GAO Report July 2003 ³Spent Nuclear Fuel ± Options to Further Enhance Security.´ http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03426.pdf 148 . Dennis Thompson and Adam Taylor ³Lawmaker Stirs Up Nuclear Plant Worries´ Wilmington Delaware News Journal April 5, 2002. http://126.96.36.199/focus/f-news/660146/posts
Though Public Service Electric and Gas Nuclear Power Company nuclear spokesmen say the spent fuel pool are protected by hardened concrete and steel-reinforced structures, they are not fortified to the same extent as the main reactors. Since the pool lounges above ground, it is easier to drain. The Commander and Chief of the United States¶ Zionist-Crusaders said this in his State of the Union Message ³And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants [in their safehouses].´149 Had al-Qaeda targeted Peach Bottom, it would have caused the greatest panic America had ever seen. Millions of people would have had to leave the Washington, Maryland, Virginia area, government employees such as FBI and CIA would have been dislocated, the American economy would have collapsed, cancer rates in all of America would soon have increased rapidly and the revenge of the Palestinians and other Muslims would never be forgotten. There were nuclear reactors that were closer Washington like Calvert, but Calvert¶s was not a Mk. 1 or Mk. 2 type reactor. One day, by Allah, this will happen! We will not make the same mistake again.
THE PRECEDENTS FOR AN ATTACK ON AN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FACILITY Attacks on nuclear facilities have figured into many of our communiqués. The Liberation Army Fifth Battalion, the group of imprisoned martyrs who carried out the first World Trade Center Event, had this to say: If our demands are not met, all our functional groups in the army will continue to execute our missions against military and civilian targets in and out the United States. This also will include some potential nuclear targets. For your own information, our army has more than 150 suicidal soldiers ready to go ahead. A communiqué found on the hard-drive of Brother Ayyad¶s computer, read: We will attack Swedish targets for granting asylum to two women who denounced Islam and Muslims. This action by Sweden made it become an unfavorable country against Islam, Muslims and their prophet. This is a warning to the American Government in the event it does not stop its assistance to Israel they will suffer the consequences of revenge inside and outside of America. The consequences will include attacks on nuclear facilities«150 When the FBI interviewed Ramzi Yousef he said:
149. Jim Garamone ³The Price of Freedom Is High, but Never too High´ American Forces Press Service February 1, 2002 15:05:21 ± 0800 150. USA v Ramzi Yousef Lab# 50120018 D BY Q1
I came to the United States in September 1992 to obtain an American passport and look for targets. I wanted an American passport so that I could freely travel in and out of the U.S. The targets are possible bombing sites in the U.S. and I looked at potential bombing targets in New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and New Jersey. My goal was to select a bombing site and return to Pakistan to recruit funds for the bombing operation. This message was found on the hard drive of Brother Yousef¶s computer: All people who support the U.S. government are our targets in our future plans and that is because all those people are responsible for their government¶s actions and they support the U.S. foreign policy and are satisfied with it. We will hit all U.S. nuclear targets. If the U.S. government keeps supporting Israel, then we will continue to carry out operations inside and outside the United States to include« The text ended here. During the Bojinga trial FBI Agent Pellegrino stated that Ramzi Yousef and Murad had talked about possibly bombing a nuclear facility in the United States: MS. BARRETT: Your Honor, I have an objection to certain testimony that was just given by Agent Pellegrino about alleged plans by Mr. Murad to bomb nuclear facility and Northwest Airlines ± I believe that was the testimony. Those are evidence of uncharged crimes and it is also 404(b) material that I don¶t remember receiving any notice with respect to plans to bomb a nuclear facility in America... THE COURT: I was surprised that nobody objected at the time it came out, but it is a little late to object now. If I tell the jury to take it out of their minds it will be like telling them to go sit in a corner and not think of pink elephants or white elephants or whatever the hell that is. So I am going to let it stand. MR. GREENFIELD: My problem particularly is with the nuclear facility. I had a hard time hearing. It was something about nuclear. Objecting to something like that in front of the jury is also a problem. You bring it to the jury¶s attention. We discussed it after it happened and we all had the same feeling. It certainly was something I was going to object to. THE COURT: Unfortunately, or fortunately, the rules provide that you are supposed to object at or about the time, not now.
The jihadi who were part of the Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¶s Gama¶a cell in New York City and New Jersey had cased Three Mile Island after having tested a bomb151 in the vicinity of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Siddig: Do you remember the garbage bags? Salem: What? Siddig: Garbage bags (UI) we go out at night, all dark, I am showing you what I have, I dress (UI) I have a janitor uniform (UI) and the other one for night operations, it is called re-con (UI) you bring information and you come back from behind the enemy line, we use to go out, Emad (UI) Emad in New York, I mean Harrisburg Pennsylvania,152 there was an electric power station, three times the size of this building, it was guarded by soldiers. It was under heavy protection they said today, we are going to conduct reconnaissance, God, we want to get good reconnaissance report, everything. Between our lease and its location are 18 kilometers. There are fields between us and station, and valleys. And trees, spiders and crawling animals. Snakes, there are narrow streets, people ride cars, like this, they gave us exactly to reach it, fifty minutes you reach it, they told us that we will return by car. (UI) our man, our commander, is a Marine; he is still in the marines. He said that he is a Marine, see how the Marines going to be. On God¶s blessing he outbursted, dark, you can¶t see, they are creators in what? Because at night it is dark, so the outfit must be black-grey, they took the outfits and dyed them, so that it won¶t be like this (UI) do you know who was with them? Abdul-Rahman Haggag. Also there was Hamdi Ali«I use to direct all the people, the most important thing, we got there then, when a car use to pass by, the area was a military zone. Salem: Yeah. Siddig: All of it is Aryan Nation, white, KKK who wears white robes. Salem: Of course! Siddig: When a car goes by everybody hits the ground on the street, ha, the car passes by, we conducted this reconnaissance 4-5 times Sheik and we executed the operation means if we had something to place it there ha (UI) whispering. Salem: What? Siddig: No God, but God.
John Miller The Cell 152. USA v Rahman TT 1598
Salem: You could have hunted them? Siddig: We could have done a catastrophe. Salem: Huh. Siddig: We reached the guard, Sheik, there was between me and him this much, we were crawling, (UI) there was somebody with him (UI) I will have to meet him, (UI) of the Hambaka too.153 During a meeting in Spain, Shaheed Mohamed Atta mentioned that he had considered targeting a nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near New York - a target they referred to as "electrical engineering." According to Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the other pilots did not like the idea. They thought a nuclear target would be difficult because the airspace around it was restricted, making reconnaissance flights impossible and increasing the likelihood that any plane would be shot down before impact. Moreover, unlike the approved targets, this alternative had not been discussed with senior Al-Qaeda leaders and therefore did not have the requisite blessing. Nor would a nuclear facility have particular symbolic value. Atta did not ask Ramzi bin al-Shibh to pass this idea on to bin Ladin, Atef, or Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and bin al-Shibh says he did not mention it to them until after September 11th Raids. KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED¶S DISINFORMATION The transcripts of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed¶s interrogation are prefaced with a warning that Mohammed ³has been known to withhold information or deliberately mislead.´154 In an assessment of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed¶s reporting, the CIA concluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part" of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's resistance efforts. For example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed provided the less than satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open ³new email accounts.´ This according to CIA report, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad¶s Threat Reporting-Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," April 3, 2003. Although Khalid Shaikh Mohammed gave up a number of Brothers he deliberately misled the Americans in regard to our interest in striking a nuclear reactor so that America would remain off guard and not place surface-to-air missiles around them. Even in 2006 the United States General Accountability Office reported, ³The Design Basis Threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage applied to nuclear power plants identifies the terrorist capabilities (or ³adversary characteristics´) that sites are required to defend against. The adversary characteristics generally describe the components of a ground assault and include the number of attackers; the size of a vehicle bomb; and
153. USA v. Rahman June 23, 1993 CM-62 154 . http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040330-120655-9785r.htm
the weapons, equipment, and tactics that could be used in an attack. Other threats in the Design Basis Threat include a waterborne assault and the threat of an insider. The Design Basis Threat does not include the threat of an airborne attack. However, according to Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials, Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations do require nuclear power plants to implement readily available measures to mitigate against the potential consequences of such an attack.´155 MI-5 Thanks to the so-called ³free-press´ of the West, word of our intention to target a reactor did leak out after the FBI sent a report to the British Intelligence Agency MI-5 saying that a ³credible source´ had said that the ³terrorists´ might have been planning to hit a nuclear plant. This was based on their analysis that Pittsburgh is near several power stations including Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, Hope Creek in New Jersey, and Peach Bottom in Maryland156 for they had no credible source within our organization at that time. Later, a right-thinking Brother named Salahuddin Khaled, jailed in Afghanistan, said that the September 11th Raiders should have flown into a U.S. nuclear power plant.157 Nizar Trabelsi boasted in a radio interview that he had intended to bomb an air base that is believed to house American nuclear weapons.158 In November 2003 the news media in Australia carried reports that al-Qaeda operative Willie Brigitte may have been plotting attacks against Sydney's Lucas Heights nuclear reactor. Brigitte's interest in nuclear sites was discussed at length at a government hearing. In March 1999, Brigitte was charged and imprisoned in Yemen for his involvement in an attempted kidnapping of a Western diplomat but was released three weeks later and deported to France.159 The French became aware of his connections to al-Qaeda when two Brothers suspected of masterminding the bombing of a synagogue in Tunisia gave him up under torture. Brigitte fled to Australia where he married Melanie Brown, an Arabic interpreter for the Australian military and an Anglican convert to Judaism and presumably a lesbian (she belonged to a group of Jewish degenerates) before turning to the Muslim faith.160 ³I am not a terrorist. I am not a criminal. I never prepare a terrorist action against a nuclear place in Australia. The media and the Australian Government lie on me for justifying my arrest for extradition or expulsion. I am innocent. May Allah help you and protect you.´ THE WHITE HOUSE VERSUS THE CAPITOL American intelligence agencies claimed, ³The plotters argued about everything, including whether to target the White House or the Capitol. The conflict apparently wasn¶t resolved before 9/11 when the fourth hijacked jet, headed for Washington
. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06388.pdf 156. Nicholas Rufford, David Leppard and Paul Eddy ³Terrorism Mission Aborted: The Downed Plane's Flight Path Took It Close To Five Nuclear Plants Nuclear Mystery: Crashed Plane's Target May Have Been Reactor´ The London Times October 21, 2001. 157 . ³Terrorist Says Go For The Nukes´ Washington Post October 30, 2001. 158. Desmond Bulter New York Times November 16, 2002 ³From Belgium Jail Man Brags About His Plot to Bomb Air Base.´ 159 . Martin Chulov, ³Brigitte's N-reactor bomb plot´ The Advertiser November 10, 2003. The Advertiser November 8, 2003 ³The butcher who became a terrorist.´ 160 . Charles Miranda, ³Synagogue bombing led French to Brigitte´ The Daily Telegraph November 13, 2003
crashed«´161 The 9/11 Commission reported, ³Bin Ladin told Ramzi bin al-Shibh to instruct Atta and the others to focus on their security and that of the operation, and to advise Atta to proceed as planned with the targets discussed before Atta left Afghanistan in early 2000 - the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House, and the Capitol.´ According to Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh, bin Ladin said he preferred the White House to the Capitol, asking bin al-Shibh to confirm that Atta understood this preference. Destroy the White House? It is a two-story building surrounded by much taller buildings filled with many Jack Abramoff¶s and would have been a very difficult target. Brother bin al-Shibh told his captors that bin Ladin had given the same message to Shaheed Mohlad Alshehri for conveyance to Atta earlier that spring. When Atta received these messages he said he understood bin Ladin's interest in striking the White House. Atta said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked Brothers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hanjour to evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their answer. Atta said that the two jihadi had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights near the Pentagon. Atta explained that Hanjour was assigned to attack the Pentagon, Jarrah the Capitol, and that both Atta and Shehhi would hit the World Trade Center. If any pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash the plane. If Atta could not strike the World Trade Center, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into the streets of New York. Atta told Ramzi bin al-Shibh that each pilot had volunteered for his assigned target, and that the assignments were subject to change. On August 3, 2001 Atta and bin al-Shibh discussed several matters, such as the best way for the jihadi to purchase plane tickets and the assignment of ³muscle´ hijackers to individual teams. Atta and bin al-Shibh also revisited the question of whether to target the White House. They discussed targets in coded language, pretending to be students discussing various fields of study: "architecture" referred to the World Trade Center, "arts" the Pentagon, "law" the Capitol, and "politics" the White House. Ramzi bin al-Shibh reminded Atta that bin Ladin wanted to target the White House. Atta again cautioned that this would be difficult. When bin al-Shibh persisted, Atta agreed to include the White House but suggested they keep the Capitol as an alternate target in case the White House proved too difficult. Atta also suggested that the attacks would not happen until after the first week in September, when Congress reconvened. Abu Zubaydah told investigators the intended target of United Airlines Flight 93 was the White House. THE AMERICAN TALIBAN¶S REPORT John Walker Lindh, once a mere Taliban foot soldier told the American military that the word in the lower ranks of our army was that: ³The original plan was separated into three phases totaling twenty different attacks.´ The first phase ³consisted of five attacks,´ but he cited only four; two on the World Trade Center, one on the Pentagon and one aimed at the White House. Usama bin Laden¶s associate, Hakeen At-Taizzi,
. New York Post Vincent Morris, Andy Geller June 17, 2004
told Lindh that, ³there should have been five planes used´ on September 11th, ³the fifth targeting the White House.´162 Lindh: The second phase of attacks could involve the use of unspecified biological agents, possible attack on natural gas resources, or nuclear weapons facilities in the United States. (Field Comment: Source was making assumptions and conjectures based on talk among his colleagues.) The second phase was supposed to make the United States forget about the first phase. And the third phase would finish the U.S.´ Lindh said that and that he had heard that fifty al-Qaeda jihadis were sent to commit twenty suicide operations, and that ³fifteen more operations were pending. We wish this were so! KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED 1999 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed repeatedly visited Hamburg in 1999, and planning began for the September 11th Raids. Mohammed slipped into Germany without raising any alert, even though he had been identified as early as 1995 by the United States as a suspect in ³terrorist´ attacks, because America failed to share this information with Germany. The New York Times reported that the CIA failed to adequately scrutinize information it received before September 11th about the growing threat he posed. A joint Congressional committee issued a report that included a cryptic reference to a ³key alQaeda leader´ that the United States intelligence community had identified as early as 1995. The report was critical of the failure to ³recognize his growing importance to alQaeda´ and said the intelligence community ³did not anticipate his involvement in a terrorist attack of September 11th¶s magnitude,´ even though information about him had been collected for at least six years. When the FBI asked Ramzi Yousef if he knew of any plans for future airline bombings, or any plans for other types of terrorist attacks he told them that although he did not know of any such plans, ³There are many committed people in the world with sufficient knowledge to carry out attacks against United States targets. Four people, including myself were involved in Bojinga, and I had personally trained the others, and they are still capable of carrying out the operation. I refuse to further identify these Brothers.´ KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED 2000 On January 4, 2000 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed¶s Saudi passport, which contained a visa for travel to the United States was photocopied and forwarded to CIA headquarters. This passport came from a foreign intelligence source. The Learned Elders of Islam know that this source was the Saudis, who allowed Khalid Shaikh Mohammed free passage although Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was a fugitive. This information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001.
. US Army memo regarding Lynd interrogation JPWL-000391
In September 2000, a CIA source had reported that an individual named Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was a key lieutenant in al-Qaeda. Al-Ballushi means "from Balochistan." It was known from Bojinga that Ramzi Yousef was originally from Balochistan and that he was related to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The intelligence community was aware that a ³Khallad´ had recruited players in the African American Embassies Operation and even though this was a different ³Khallad´ is still should have aroused suspicion because of the similarity of names, if not description. Late May 2001 brought reports to the Americans of a possible hostage plot against its citizens abroad to force the release of the "Blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman." The reporting noted that jihadi might opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. It led to an Federal Aviation Administration information circular to airlines noting the potential for "an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States." Another airline-targeting operation and another clue. In June 2001 the CIA disseminated a report that a Mukhtar had traveled to the United States in May 2001 and was sending recruits to there to meet colleagues already in the country and routinely told others that he could arrange their entry into the United States as well.163 The CIA did not know who Mukhtar was at the time - only that he associated with Al-Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah and that, based on the nature of the information, he was evidently involved in planning possible jihadi activities on behalf of Al-Qaeda. On June 12, 2001, a CIA report said that "Khaled" was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out ³terrorist-related´ activities for us. CIA headquarters presumed from the details of the reporting that this person was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. In July 2001, the same source who supplied the information for the June 12, 2001 report was shown a series of photographs and identified a photograph of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as the Khaled he had previously discussed. That recruiter profile dovetailed with the Muktar report, but still Mukhtar was not identified as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. On July 23, 2001 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed obtained a visa to visit the United States by using the third party Express Visa System.164 During the summer of 2001 the NSA intercepted phone calls between Sheik Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta and on September 10, 2001, the US monitored a call from Atta to Mohammed who was in Afghanistan.165 In May 2001, Michael Scheuer, the former Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit, who by that time was detailed to International Terrorism Operations Section in FBI Headquarters, had continuing concerns about the Malaysia meetings especially whether they had any nexus to the Cole attack. CIA records show that on May 15, 2001 Michael Scheuer accessed the March 2000 cable stating that Mihdhar, Hazmi, and another person had traveled to Bangkok from Malaysia on January 8, 2000. Around this same time in May, Michael Scheuer began inquiring about the Malaysia meetings with a Counter Terrorism Center analyst at CIA Headquarters. Michael Scheuer said he knew that the Counter Terrorism Center analyst had been down in the weeds, and knew the nuts and bolts of the Cole investigation because he had been assigned to prepare a Counter Terrorism Center report on who was responsible for the Cole attack. Michael
. Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001 ± By The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee On Intelligence 164 . Reuters January 26, 2004 citing National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 165 . Independent UK September 15, 2002.
Scheuer told him "something bad was definitely up." The Counter Terrorism Center analyst replied in an e-mail dated May 18, 2001 "My head is spinning over this East Asia travel. Do you know if anyone in [the CIA's Bin Laden Unit] or FBI mapped this?" THE FBI¶s USAMA BIN LADEN UNIT The FBI¶s now disbanded Usama bin Laden Unit166 had only vague reports on our activity. On June 13, 2001 an FBI Alert was sent to all Field Offices from Counterterrorism / Usama bin Laden Unit / SIOC Cat A Contact Unit Chief Deborah Stafford,167 Special Supervisory Agent Rodney D. Middleton and Special Supervisory Agent Kevin A. Cassidy Approved by Dale L. Watson, Thomas Pickard, Michael Rolince, Deborah Stafford and Drafted by Rodney Middleton, Frederick Stremmel, John Salata and Jennifer Maitner. To advise all SACs of continued aggressive and pro-active efforts to counter Usama bin Laden (UBL) related threats, as evidenced by recent pre-operational planning of key Usama bin Laden lieutenant and mujahideen operator, (deleted probably Khalid Shaikh Mohammed) Details: The Intelligence Community, in a coordinated Community Advisory, estimates that there is a heightened threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities, personnel and other interests in coming weeks by Sunni extremists associated with Usama bin Laden. Reporting strongly suggests an increased level of planning and activity may be underway which may presage one or more attacks. Indications of terrorist planning and (deleted) preparation in recent weeks seem to focus on (deleted ± probably Saudi Arabia) and (deleted ± probably Israel possibly Pakistan) as possible target locations. U.S. interests in (deleted ± Saudi Arabia) particularly (deleted ± it¶s oil industry) remain Usama bin Laden¶s preferred target. Al-Qaeda associated personnel also are reported to be stepping up efforts to conduct possible attacks in (deleted Pakistan or Israel - Abu Mus¶ab al-Zarqawi got money from Al Qaeda in 2001 to organize his own terrorist unit with possible operations in Israel).168 The reporting available on Al-Qaeda operations possibly being planned for (deleted ± Pakistan or Israel) contains no information on specific targets. The current reporting suggesting the increased level of threat warning is a compilation of (deleted). The Al-Qaeda organization and associated extremists are known to be searching worldwide for security vulnerabilities, which might enable a successful attack against U.S. facilities or personnel. Lack of reporting is not indicative of reduced risk, as in addition to the areas discussed above Sunni extremists are known to have associates located in many areas worldwide. As demonstrated by the attack on the USS Cole
. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F70D15FC39540C778CDDAE0894DE404482 . SA Stafford served as the first SSA of the Washington Field Office¶s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has the responsibility for terrorism cases in Washington, D.C. and Northern Virginia. She is currently the SSA of the JTTF in Kansas City, responsible for the investigation of international terrorism cases, assuming there are any in Kansas. 168 . http://188.8.131.52/search?q=cache:t620ki-WAeQJ:www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp%3Fpage%3Dstory_22-102004_pg3_5+%22Navidul+Islam+Trust%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2
they are capable of long-term surveillance and planning in a target area that enables them to recognize and exploit vulnerabilities, including those that have a limited window of opportunity. Historically, attack planning and execution have taken at least several months. Notably, reporting has indicated that Al-Qaeda operatives (deleted) have been involved in operational planning in several different geographic locations. Reporting noted the continued movement of personnel and material between (deleted ± Afghanistan) and (deleted - Pakistan) as well as between (Afghanistan) and (deleted - Iran). Additionally, reporting implied that (deleted) activities must be completed in the next few weeks, but did address specific dates. (Deleted) Usama bin Laden¶s organization may be in the advanced planning stages of a terrorist attack against U.S. interests in (deleted ± Saudi Arabia). The reporting involves movement of terrorists from Afghanistan following training there. Furthermore explosives and arms were smuggled into (deleted ± Saudi Arabia) for use against U.S. and Western targets. However the intelligence community has been unable to narrow the list of potential targets. It should be noted that targets could include (deleted). Other possible targets could include (deleted) which could be prominently identified as American. Several Islamic jihadi have had a heightened interest in targeting (deleted) since (deleted). In (deleted) March 2001, a (deleted) extremist (deleted) made plans to expedite work on a suspicious (deleted) the need for haste as travel was planned (deleted). Also in (deleted) March engaged in apparent operational preparation with (deleted) One limiting factor which seems to be evident is funding. Intelligence suggests that preparation is slowed down by the lack of funding to support the operations.169 The FBI knew about as much about us as the Rabbis of Jerusalem know about Jesus and used deletion to protect their image. The FBI had no idea that we were going to strike within the United States again, and was not pointed in that direction by the Justice Department who regarded our first World Trade Center attack as an aberration unworthy of proactive investigation. With this mindset a lot of information was misinterpreted or garbled. FBI Official Thomas Pickard told the Kean Commission investigating our September 11th Raids "that although he initially briefed the attorney general (Ashcroft) regarding these threats, after two such briefings the attorney general told him he did not want to hear this information anymore."170 It would not have mattered had Ashcroft listened because the information was ³way off base´ in regard to AlQaeda. It was not until August 28, 2001 that a cable arrived reporting that Khalid the Elder¶s nom-de-guerre was Mukhtar. What took so long to make this connection? Was the attention of the intelligence community still focused on drug cartels? Cold cases? This connection might also have underscored concern about the June 2001 reporting that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United
. USA v Moussaoui Defendant¶s Exhibit 428 . Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau ³F.B.I. Is Assailed for Its Handling of Terror Risks´ New York Times April 14, 2004.
States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Mukhtar / Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had communicated with a phone that was used by Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and that Ramzi bin al-Shibh had used the same phone to communicate with Brother Moussaoui. These connections could never have been made, not because it was beyond human ability, but because it was God¶s will that they remained a mystery.171 THE FALL OF KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED Khalid Shaikh Mohammed narrowly avoided capture in September 2002. Pakistani authorities say they had information, based on utility records that a senior alQaeda leader might be in an apartment just outside of Karachi. Instead, they found three children, two women and a man. One of the women was a caretaker, and one child was hers. The other woman was a ³foster mother´ of sorts to the other two children, and the man her husband. The two boys, ages 7 and 9, were named Omar and Abdullah. Their father was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Pakistan¶s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency has had Mohammed¶s two young sons in custody since then and there is still no word on their fate. This was not the only time Americans and their surrogates resorted to kidnapping innocents: Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, aka ³Abu Bakr,´ the al-Qaeda field commander for Saudi Arabia surrendered on June 26, 2003 in exchange for his wife's freedom. This hostage taking tells the Elder¶s that our enemies are not much different from us, and our targeting of so-called civilians is not only justified by God but by the laws of man. After the people the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency captured were threatened they told the Pakistani traitors about a group of Arabs living at another address in the Defense Apartment Complex, the authorities hurried across town. The police and the agents and the army all gathered for a massacre at the Defense Apartment Complex. ³Our officers moved immediately,´ said a senior Pakistani official. ³No, we didn¶t know that he was there. But from the interviews and surveillance we knew there was something big going on. The number of people there, the weapons, and the intelligence we gathered. Then it was a free-for-all. We fired at the windowpanes, put in tear gas and stormed them.´ Two Brothers were murdered and would-be September 11th pilot Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured.
RAHMAN¶S SON BECOMES A TRAITOR OR WHO KILLED KHALID ROBIN? On February 14, 2003 police conducted a raid in the frontier town of Quetta, Pakistan looking for two foreigners - one of them Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - said to be there. Greedy aged neighbors had grown suspicious and tipped off police in hopes of a reward. But Khalid ³the brain´ Mohammed was gone by the time authorities arrived. Police did arrest an Egyptian man who, after telling many different stories, eventually
. The 9/11 Commission Report p276
gave his name as Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman. At first ³Rahman admitted there was someone else with him, but he never said anything about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,´ said a top police officer. Then what happened next must never be told to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, least his remaining years, or months or days in prison be turned to worse sorrow than they already are. The worst-case scenario has Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman, that son of a Blind Sheikh, offering to help capture Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and split the reward with the Pakistani police officials. Another scenario is that under Pakistani style interrogation, he told police that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had also lived at the address then broke down, began to cry like a simpering wimp and agreed to help snare Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The ³Sword of Islam´ turned out to be a toothpick in the hands of the Americans. If he roomed with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed then he was trusted with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed¶s whereabouts. THE ³PERSUADED´ INFORMANT VERSION Newsweek Magazine reported, An Egyptian, who was arrested in a raid of an al-Qaeda safehouse in Pakistan¶s border town of Quetta, made a deal with the USA to reveal Khalid¶s whereabouts in exchange for money, a Middle-East intelligence official is quoted as saying. The Guardian reported, Pakistani intelligence sources said the real breakthrough had come when the FBI had managed to persuade an al-Qaeda operative arrested earlier to reveal the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden or his close associates. The man was arrested in Quetta, capital of Balochistan province, but his identity was never made public. These sources say the Pakistani officials were kept in the dark about the real identity of this man, or the deal that the American had cut with him. The sources said it was only a few hours before the raid on Mohammed's hideout in Rawalpindi that the FBI had informed Pakistani intelligence, and had asked it to carry out the raid without the help of the local police or the civilian intelligence services. Though the FBI was not directly involved in the raid to seize Mohammed, it observed the operation from a distance, and got immediately involved in the interrogation process, the sources said. The Pakistani press reported that Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman was the only one arrested in that safehouse. A BBC article went on to quote a Quetta policeman as saying, ³We got some information about two foreigners who were in the neighborhood. When we went there we found only one.´172
The British tabloid The Sun reported the informant was ³an Egyptian father-offour and a suspected Taliban officer173 who was tracked down by the CIA and arrested in the Pakistani border town of Quetta on February 14, 2003. The man was offered a new identity, and had asked to move with his family to the central English town of Leicester, which has a large Muslim population, because a friend lives nearby, the Sun reported. A security source told the tabloid: µHe was given no choice but to co-operate and wisely decided it would be stupid to turn down a life of guaranteed luxury.¶´ The Sun added that Usama bin Laden had now put a £500,000 price on the informer's head. The informant apparently demanded and received an extra two million pounds to relocate with his family to England. February 14, 2003 was the same day Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman was arrested. THE SURVEILLANCE VERSION The semi-official Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported, ³According to one version, police in Quetta discovered Mohamed Abdel-Rahman. They trailed him for a few days, and traced phone calls which led to his arrest. Some of the calls were to a house in Nisar Road in Rawalpindi. Surveillance and phone monitoring of that house led police to uncover Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.174 THE PHONE CALLS, EMAIL AND COOPERATION VERSION The BBC reported, ³FBI officials allegedly managed to persuade an Al-Qaeda operative captured in Quetta to reveal the whereabouts of Sheikh "They got information from the man they picked up in Quetta and from phone calls until they tracked him down to Rawalpindi." The same story reported, ³an e-mail from the younger Abdel Rahman to Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman eventually led investigators to the address in Rawalpindi.´175 THE CIA MOLE STORY In February 2004 director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet said a CIA spy turned in Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. A senior American intelligence official said that the capture of Mr. Mohammed "was entirely the result of excellent human operations. The FBI, CIA and I.S.I. did not arrest Khalid Shaikh Mohammed immediately but put him under surveillance for almost a month before capturing him.´ 176 AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN NEEDED MONEY
. Al-harm published another version of events that described the source as a low-ranking Al-Qaeda member. . http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/630/int2.htm . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2818245.stm 176 . Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler ³How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web´ New York Times March 4, 2004
One can see from the Sattar transcripts that in December 2000 Sattar spoke with Ahmed Abdel Rahman regarding the need for Sattar to transfer money to him in Afghanistan. Al-Sirri agreed to help in this matter. Ahmed Abdel Rahman did receive this money. In June 2003 lawyers for Sattar, who believed that Ahmed Abdel Rahman was being held at Guantanamo Bay with other detainees asked permission to question him about what use this money was put to. The United State Attorney, James B. Comey refused to provide any information about this Brother and did not acknowledge whether the Blind Sheik Rahman¶s son was even in custody. Like his Brother Mohamed AbdelRahman was involved in funneling money to Al-Qaeda and might have said, along with the lure of a contribution, that he had a letter from his father to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN WAS A JIHADI Montassar al-Zayyet had this to say about Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Bin Laden and Zawahiri had talked during a press conference in Afghanistan about Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and convinced his son Mohamed to deliver a speech about his father. Ever since, the security authorities across the world have considered the Sheikh's sons Mohamed and Ahmed to be members of Al-Qaeda, although they were never wanted by any country, including Egypt. The Egyptian authorities never mentioned any role for the sheikh's sons in any of the many court cases against the Gama'a al-Islamiyya«The Americans hyped up Muhammed Omar AbdelRahman¶s arrest as if they had captured a prominent Al-Qaeda figure to convince the American public that the campaign against Afghanistan was fruitful. We all know that the two sons, who had been in Afghanistan for more than ten years, had never worked for Al-Qaeda or Islamic Jihad. Of course one must remember that al-Zayyet would be hesitant to incriminate Brothers. THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT On the other hand there are conflicting news stories to the effect that Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman is a ghost prisoner rumored to have been incarcerated in Poland, North Africa, Guantánamo Bay in the custody of the CIA. If we are to believe a list of Gitmo prisoners released by the American Military on May 15, 2006, Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman is not at Gitmo.177 But there is no way to be certain that he is not free and living under a different identity. WHO RECEIVED THE REWARD? Then there is the question of the reward and to whom it was paid that arose at a State Department news conference on March 5 2003:
Question: Well, are you giving the $25 million to Mr. Musharraf, or to who? (Laughter.) Mr. Boucher: The possible rewards for information leading to the arrest and capture are not for government officials who are doing this as a matter of national policy in performance of their duties and national interests, but I don't know. It would be -- whether there was some private individual who might qualify or not, I don't know. Question: You don't know if anyone has applied for the ± Mr. Boucher: I wouldn't be able to talk about it at this stage anyway, unless we actually entertained an application and decided on it. Question: Oh, really? You can't say that -- it has to be decided ± Mr. Boucher: Yes. That's normally been what it is, yeah. Question: How much -- you know, but a case -- a big fish like this, how much is he worth, if someone were to apply? Mr. Boucher: It's not a bounty for an individual. It's an appreciation for the quality of evidence and information that's provided so ± Question: Pretty good, wasn't it? Mr. Boucher: I don't know that any individual provided this information. Perhaps it was just diligent work by law enforcement authorities and a good result produced by conscientious government officials, which does happen from time to time, I have to point out.178 LIKE SON, LIKE FATHER? The Americans circulated a tape of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in the course of the USA v Sattar trial that implied that the Sheik considered becoming an American agent: ABDEL RAHMAN: Ask her if she believes that the American government desires that I become its agent. Yousry: Do you think that the American government thinks or wants that, uh, use me as an agent for it in the Middle East? Stewart: Eh, I don¶t think they would go that far.
Yousry: The word ³agent-´ Stewart: I don't think so. Yousry: Sir, eh, what does the word ³agent´ mean? ABDEL RAHMAN: It means, one who carries out its orders, like they buy me. Yousry: You think that they want to buy me, or that they think that they want to use their influence to buy me, to buy my co-operation with them? Stewart: I don¶t know. You know there are some people that - whose image is irreproachable and that they understand they, they could not uhm, it, it would- well let me put it this way, in the, well in some ways, they are responsible for your image as far as that's concerned here, and there, so, eh, eh, I don¶t, I don't know that answer, they are capable of almost anything. Yousry: She says, Sir, that she doesn¶t know the answer to this question. But you must bear in mind that what is now said about you, you are (UI), you are an important person and (UI) against their policy, is all made by them. They know, more than anybody else, that you, Sir, being here eh, eh, as a major enemy to them, at the same time, your return to Egypt can be useful to them. ABDEL RAHMAN: In what way can it be useful to them? Yousry: How would the Americans uh, benefit from uh, me being here and keeping me here? Stewart: By, they keep the Egyptian people from having a focus, a focal point, a way to push their Movement into uh, a personality who would seize the reins of power, right, and eh.... Yousry: Ah, in other words, in other word, muscles, no brains. Stewart: Yeah. Yousry: She says, Sir, that being here is very beneficial to them because even if your Movement, the Islamic Movement in Egypt, a major and a strong Movement, if you seize its driving power which is the brain, you paralyze it. So they are killing two birds with one stone, they know that the brains are here, they have Hosni Mubarak, the head of the Egyptian government in place, and at the same time they annihilate the Movement
with you, Sir, being here. In other words, they are controlling him and annihilating the Movement. Stewart: And uhYousry: Ah. There is uhStewart: And they hope that people will forget, that is their, that¶s why theyYousry: Of course, they hope that people will forget. Stewart: When the people forget, then, they have, they have won in a (UI). KHALID IS COLLARED On March 1, 2003, two weeks after Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman made his deal with the devil, for which he will never be forgiven in this world and the next, and after having been a fugitive for nine years, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested when some 18 to 20 policemen raided the house of Dr. Ahmad Abdul Qudoos, 78, in Rawalpindi, the old city adjacent to Islamabad, after the authorities first took away Qudoos¶ mentally retarded son, Aqeel Ahmed Abdul Qudoos. Dr. Qudoos lived with his wife Mahlaqa, a high profile Jamaat-e-Islami activist, their son Ahmed, 42, his wife and their two young children Dr. Abdul Qudoos is a former employee of the United Nations and a retired microbiologist who runs a respected cardiology institute. Dr. Qudoos and his wife were at a wedding in Lahore when the raid occurred. Members of Jamaat-e-Islami, the group to which the doctor and his wife belonged said: ³We condemn the raid during which the doctor¶s son, a simple and noble man, had been kidnapped without any legal justification.´ They also presented some official letters that had been issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and also produced a medical certificate, showing Aqeel Ahmed Abdul Qudoos as mentally deranged from lead poisoning. Jamaat-e-Islami woman activist Maluka Khatoon was arrested on October 4, 2002 and ³during the investigation, she confessed having relations with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and said that she had facilitated meetings between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and his son who was in Pakistan,´ said Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat. ³Maluka is running a trust called µNaveed Islam Trust¶ in Clifton and Shazia Sadique, an activist of the JI, is the chairperson of this trust.´179 Maluka Khatoon¶s arrest transpired in a house owned by JI associates of Dr. Ahmad Abdul Qadoos.
Jamaat-e-Islami is a main faction of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and has neither dissociated itself from its activists having links with Al-Qaeda network nor condemned their activities. The MMA alliance rules the Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan and opposes the military-backed Pakistan Muslim League central government in Punjab. Dr. Qudoos was charged with illegal possession of arms but will not be charged in a so-called terrorist court. As of March 28, 2003, he was in a hospital for a cardiac problem and had been granted "pre-arrest bail." Khalid Shaikh Mohammed did try to resist, and fired at least one round from an AK-47 assault rifle before surrendering to the authorities. An army colonel was hit in the foot, and recovered at a military hospital in Rawalpindi. A few days after his capture democracy-related sanctions were lifted against Pakistan. A few weeks later Pakistan and the United States signed an agreement that cancelled $1 billion debt owed by Islamabad to Washington. It was a great setback to al-Qaeda when Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested for his target was again New York City, and involved the revival of Sheik Rahman¶s bridge and tunnel plan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed no doubt underwent torture and was made to stand hooded, naked, his arms raised and chained to the ceiling, his feet shackled, unable to move for hours at a time, day and night only to be freed to eat, pray and go to the bathroom. He was kicked and shouted at to stop him from falling asleep. He was deprived of light and food, water and medical attention. He was beaten, and almost killed, as two Brothers were in Bagram Prison in December 2002. He might be driven to attempt suicide as twenty Brothers were in Guantanamo. The American media reported that the Pakistanis threatened Khalid Shaikh Mohammed¶s children if he did not divulge Usama bin Laden¶s whereabouts and our plans to them. They were told: ³The Sheikh is a hero of Islam and I am his tiny servant. Life, family, money, everything can be sacrificed for the Sheikh.´ The London Daily Telegraph reported that the children are in the custody of the CIA and are to be moved to the United States: ³We are handling them with kid gloves. After all, they are only little children,´ said one official, ³but we need to know as much about their father's recent activities as possible. We have child psychologists on hand at all times and they are given the best of care.´ The CIA told CAIR that this was untrue and Pakistan was not holding the children on its behalf. It has been reported that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed has talked. The members of any violent anti-American movement are aware every moment of their lives that it is only a matter of time before the tentacles of the Great Satan ensnare a Brother. Success is measured in how long this can be avoided. Once a Brother is apprehended he will come under great pressure to co-operate. Few can withstand this pressure and almost all imprisoned Brothers have given the Americans information. Therefore we instruct our leaders and rank and file jihadi to pretend to co-operate. This requires that they divulge a mixture of true and false information. ABU ZUBAYDAH COOPERATES
Abu Zubaydah is the second highest-ranking member of the Brotherhood of Islamists in U.S. custody. He was captured in March 2002 in Faisalabad Pakistan was held in Thailand. Zubaydah¶s whereabouts in Pakistan had been determined in part through intercepted Internet communications, but for days after his capture his identity was in doubt. He had surgically altered his appearance and was using an alias. But when agents used a nickname for Zubaydah, he acknowledged his true identity, which was confirmed through analysis of his voice, facial structure and DNA tests. Zubaydah¶s condition was rapidly deteriorating when he arrived in Thailand. Zubaydah nearly died of his infected wounds. He was covertly rushed to a hospital after C.I.A. medical officers warned that he might not survive if he did not receive more extensive medical treatment. Zubaydah, still weak from his wounds, was stripped and placed in a cell without a bunk or blankets. He stood or lay on the bare floor, sometimes with air-conditioning adjusted so that Zubaydah seemed to turn blue. The interrogators piped in deafening blasts of music by groups like the Red Hot Chili Peppers.180 Zubaydah was arrested after an email or a call was traced to Dr. Ahmed Khawaja¶s number, a noted physician who had treated Zubaydah¶s wife. Zubaydah became an unwilling collaborator after he was subjected to torture. This caused al-Qaeda grave problems, as he was the person in charge of the training camps. He received young men from all countries. He accepted them or rejected them. He took care of the expenses of the camps. He made arrangements for the Brothers when they traveled coming in or leaving. It was only after the September 11th Raids that he involved himself in the operational side of our international organization. The information that Abu Zubaydah gave up dovetailed with the information provided by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: Zubaydah was the source of warnings of attacks on the Statue of Liberty. He also divulged the existence of the Brooklyn Bridge attack that never materialized. Zubaydah was the key source for the information that alQaeda was threatening to attack banks in the northeastern United States, an operation that also failed to materialize. The FBI reported that Zubaydah later retracted this information. Zubaydah divulged that a plan had been devised to smuggle a RDD into the U.S.A., and the description of the person assigned to this task. Brother Muhajir (Jose Padilla) was subsequently arrested as a result of this information. Zubaydah gave the Americans much more information. In this regard our spokesman, Abu Gheith, gave him a warning when he made this statement on Al Jazeera television: ³We dare you to get anything useful from Abu Zubaydah.´181
. New York Times September 10, 2006 181. CNN June 25, 2002 Posted: 11:33 AM EDT (1533 GMT)
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