Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

Page: TOC-1

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

Page: TOC-3

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

Page: TOC-3

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

Page: 4

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

1.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. and team management skills.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. and a series of role-plays. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. leadership and team management.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. 2 Modules Content 2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. assisted by the facilitator.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . 1.2. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. This will be delivered during the ground school phase.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).2.

6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.4 Leadership.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.

This includes everything from the design of a tool. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. and with other humans. skill and attitude.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. 3. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. This is due. home.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. Flight Crew Training Centre . Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. environment. knowledge. HPL. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. 3. to the design of a checklist. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. Despite improvements in technology. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. in part. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. design and engine reliability.

Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. J. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. especially on a long. encompassing the best of previous generations. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. 3.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. 1990. Flight Crew Training Centre . and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Most of these errors are small. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. In particular this means designing for error. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. 3.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. 3. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity.

8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. For example. In isolation it is insignificant. It was but it is not an isolated case. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. 3.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. but placed together they form a robust wall. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. Rather. Without assigning a principle cause.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. occurring years ago on the drawing board. Others were management failures. it snaps. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Occasionally. the holes will line up. Some were latent failures. Flight Crew Training Centre . the accident does not occur. of which the operating crew are the last link. the last line of defense. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Reason used Swiss cheese. If they can break the chain. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield.

e.e. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. the accident chain is broken.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.External influences Errors . 3. Threats and errors are unavoidable. performing a checklist from memory. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. Engineering. Management. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures.) Threats . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. at any level. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. because despite the risks. safe operations are the norm.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. the start of an accident chain.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. and it is up to us to break the chain. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. 3. but as long as the holes do not line up. (Errors made by other people ATC. Flight Crew Training Centre . external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation.

However. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. 3. Trap.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. These have been termed warning flags. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. nine common factors existed. such as an unstabilized approach.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though.12 Avoid. 3. However in all cases. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed.

the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. Power Distance. 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. such as organizational. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. 4. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. Again. (which are predominantly male). The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. versus its opposite. On the collectivist side. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. often extended families (with uncles. professional and safety culture. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. collectivism. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. not to the state. cohesive in-groups. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. 4. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. regarding all societies in the world.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. Uncertainty Avoidance.

6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. surprising. but some are more unequal than others. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Power and inequality. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. but defined from below. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. and motivated by inner nervous energy. Unstructured situations are novel. It suggests that the followers. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. unknown. The opposite type. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. they try to have as few rules as possible. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules.   4. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . This represents inequality (more versus less). as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. and different from usual.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. safety and security measures. of course. not from above. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. uncertainty accepting cultures. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.

1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. such as pilots.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. either physical or cognitive. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. In particular. (Norbert Wiener) 5. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. or an organizational culture can prevail. there can be anomalies where a professional group. by a machine function. against a conflicting trend.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. navigators and flight engineers. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. not what we thought we told them to do. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. including radio operators. 5. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. Furthermore. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues.

it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. accuracy and reduced costs. In particular. In practice this does not always happen. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. not to mention the human (social) effects. Flight Crew Training Centre . There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. The latter will not be discussed here. 5.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage.

subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. narrow range. Spine. fast. slow. J & George. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. difficult to re. M. Good quantitative assessment. 1986. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. accurate. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel.” (Good. Rather. detecting messages in noise. P. Poor spoken material. Poor program.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need.Good inductive. T. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. Whiteside. inaccurate. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. easy to re program. slow communication Better for principles and strategies.

Pilots will dynamically move between levels. Overall result is reduced workload. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. 5. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. There is a reduced cognitive load. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. an area of weakness in interface design. Although in some systems. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . In the aviation scenario. according to any change in tactical goal. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. – This is a high workload situation. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. resulting in further reduced workload. with different cognitive skills required. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task.

Unfortunately.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. will disengage or will revert to another mode. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. communications and monitoring. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. For this new knowledge and skills are required. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. Cali.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. In particular.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. 5. Habsheim etc). Flight Crew Training Centre . The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. 5.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that.

11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive .9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. easy-to-use systems. A lack of.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Consequently. but not replace. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. 5. or subtle. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.

An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. the Captain is the designated “leader”. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. Through the use of example and persuasion. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. In the flight-deck environment. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. 6. which is assigned. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. 5. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. Humans are capable of devising strategies. which is acquired. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. Flight Crew Training Centre . and authority.

and a duty. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. In fact. The leader must balance the demands of the task.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. 6.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. Action. will power. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. with use of the Assess. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . initiative and integrity. and be able to maintain team morale. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. In addition. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. 6. to decide on a course of action. and Manage Decision-Making Model. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. the team and the individual. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. Personal qualities required are those of courage.

5 Task To achieve the task.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. With a wide variety of background. manage and direct the flow of information. suggestions Giving opinions. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.8. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.

there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. In between.8. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.8.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.8. Flight Crew Training Centre . how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.

“VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. using information available at that time. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. For most effective leadership. Together. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. but not if things are going wrong. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well.

9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. 6. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. since there are a number of nationalities. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. RE. 1997. R & Curphy. active/uncritical and active/critical. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. Hughes. The optimum gradient. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. and followership is a skill in its own right. Flight Crew Training Centre . Followers are a vital part of a team. For successful team performance.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. cited by Kern. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. Ginnett. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. While this might be an individual’s view. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. passive/critical. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. T. supportive followers are as important as a leader. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. along with good communication skills. 1988. R. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. 6. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. The role is much like that of a chairman. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. G2. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. G (Eds). An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability.

completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Sheep are akin to human automatons. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Making a good first impression is vital. unless identified and brought “back onside”. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. 6. Survivors are the Company men. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. because they actively support without thinking. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Flight Crew Training Centre . The only way to ensure this is.

and very rarely are raised voices heard. However. along with methods of eliminating them.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. While modern flight decks are well insulated. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. 7. degrading language. as much as 90%. Between a Captain and a First Officer. So. the words used tend to be very important.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. in communication within a crew. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. noise is still a factor. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . rank could impinge on communication as well. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. In the case of Jade Cargo International. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. insulting. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck.e. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. culture plays a large part. Barriers to communication are also identified. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. 7. This chapter describes the principles of communication.

7.4. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. aggressive. Flight Crew Training Centre . Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. supportive and submissive. whether on the needs of others or your own. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). and the manner. 7. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. two aspects of the message content will be considered. the focus. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. assertive.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced.

7.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. not recommended but part of life. Therefore. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. In a non-critical situation. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. They put themselves down. This is a “no-go” area for us at work.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. such as during training or non-normal situations. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language.downs. However.4. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. It is unlikely to motivate the team. and will likely isolate the aggressor. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. Flight Crew Training Centre .4.4. Referring to the matrix. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. However this may change depending on circumstances. are avoided at all times. 7. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role.

Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. If the other person is submissive. be supportive. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. If someone is submissive. Each individual and in fact every team. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. An assertive response might also be effective. will find a style that works well for them. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. Flight Crew Training Centre . Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. their needs will be overlooked. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. it is likely communication that will break down completely. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. In other words.

6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. Assertive and cooperative. actions and situations. trust and support will deteriorate. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. collaborate or compromise. If conflict does occur. No one makes major concessions. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior.favorable versus unfavorable. Unwillingness to work through issues. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. When conflict is dealt with constructively. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. Differing expectations of outcomes . Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. High respect for mutual support.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. the stage is set for potential conflict. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. which will lead to better results. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. When sides are chosen. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. objectives and values. productivity will diminish or stop. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. the results may be positive or negative. words. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. Flight Crew Training Centre . but unfortunately does occur a great deal. test their position and beliefs. Differences in perceiving motives. communications may breakdown. and stretch their imagination. You must give to get. 7. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. No one person or idea is perfect.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. There is more than one way to do anything. Animosities can develop.

8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. It is not which model that is used that is important. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. Advocacy. once in a while. Conflict Resolution. However. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. or good or bad outcomes. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. rather that a model is used.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. Action and Critique. either for routine or novel situations. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Flight Crew Training Centre . however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. It is the end result that we are interested in.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. 8. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model.

Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. further modification to the RMM was required. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). as well as the appropriate CRM principals. 8.2.2. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. Flight Crew Training Centre . Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. 8.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International.

it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is.Information seeking. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. Flight Crew Training Centre . immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. This does not always produce the best solution. there are two typical responses. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. its implications and how much time is available. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. to make sure we fully understand the implications. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). By staying below the line as much as possible. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . seeking more information about it. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. the problem and the solution. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action.

4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. 8. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. others may be less time dependent. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision.solving resource. A solution in the form of a question however. may at best get a query in response. Once a time frame has been established. Open questions allow more options.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. is a valuable problem. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. when there is little available. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?].   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . but will probably be accepted. EFIS architecture. losing vital feedback. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. In the latter case. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). On the other hand. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. In all cases. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE].Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. immediate action is required. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). critical. available and required. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. Time can be considered as. this limits the opportunity for assessment. using a traffic light system. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS.

Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. seek information.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Good teamwork needs good communication. test understanding.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. test understanding propose. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. prioritize. Flight Crew Training Centre . build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. NAVIGATE. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. propose. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. 8. test understanding. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. prioritize. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. the Captain must manage.

“Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. 8. An important point here is that you do not rush. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. When the process is complete.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. It is a circular or iterative process.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. including the navigation away from terrain. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. Once this is under control. the team and the individual. it is time to manage. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. the task need is paramount. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. For example in the first stages of a diversion. obstacles and weather. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. 8.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. Once the Group is informed and placated. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. However. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. all the circles are the same size. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Flight Crew Training Centre .

Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. output functions and an internal processing function. In the same way. 9. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. but functionally can be quite accurate. these are known as “mental models”. do something with that information and then act on it. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. Flight Crew Training Centre . we receive information.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system.

sight. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. Perception is incredibly powerful. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. touch. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). This is quite normal. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise.4.4 Input functions 9.4. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. sound and touch. so much that. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. 9. During a busy.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. sound. smell and taste. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. even though they do not have the loudest voice. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. if we miss-perceive an event. but it is not being ignored completely. are actually switching from one to the other. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. not all of them get through to the processing stage. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. 9.4. 9. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight.

We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.6. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. 9.72”. expect 150 by xxx. 9.6. the original message has been replayed by the mind. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. descend 180. you have as little as 0.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. short-term and long-term. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. which really belongs with the input functions. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. and retained by conscious attention. and contact 119. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. 9. unless it is consciously being dealt with. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. speed 310. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost.6.6 Processing Functions 9. Another type of memory is sensory memory.

manageable by most.6. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. For example.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. However the problem is not with forgetting. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. 9. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost.. 9. and Mitigate). It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. long after the event. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. even if the correct data has never been learned. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. patterns or mini theories.6. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. but it is top secret. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. Trap. such as ATM (Avoid. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. Flight Crew Training Centre .

the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. in particular responses to RTO. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. 9. as they are referred to by the date itself. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. 9. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. this is when the action has become a learned routine. The events of September 11. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. It can only deal with one issue at a time. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre .6. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. however it is a single channel device.6.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.

It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Our interest is human performance.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. stress and fatigue produce similar results. In this respect. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. including workload and circadian rhythms. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. Performance varies with a number of factors. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. others mental strains. This chapter covers the effects of stress.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . 9. some a combination of both. Some of these place physical strains on the body.

10. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. performance improves. largely impossible. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. After a certain point. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types.3. tension headaches. Too little stress causes complacency. is exhilarating early in the day. such as take-off and landing. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. as stress increases. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. require the crew to be at optimal performance. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. 10. Flight Crew Training Centre . for example. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. performance actually peaks. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. By the same token. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. Critical phases of flight. but too much is exhausting. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. into the optimum performance range (shaded).stimulation.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. acute and chronic. Initially. The right side shows over stimulation. In the diagram above. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. upset stomach. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. and then falls away.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. from being somewhat dormant.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. As stress increases further. consider that arousal refers to stress. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. and other symptoms.

most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. and tense. back pain. it does. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. have too many irons in the fire. Often. shorttempered. chest pain. muscular problems including tension headache. They're always in a rush. and heart disease. constipation. anxious. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. shortness of breath. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. cold hands or feet." Always in a hurry. the three stress emotions. and chest pain. Because it is short term. diarrhea. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. dizziness. their child's occasional problems at school. and irritable bowel syndrome. they tend to be abrupt. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. If something can go wrong. and depression. irritable. acid stomach. who suffer acute stress frequently. and it is highly treatable and manageable. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. rapid heartbeat. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems.3.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. anxiety. generally requiring professional help. jaw pain. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. a deadline they're rushing to meet. heart palpitations. migraine headaches. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. flatulence. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. sweaty palms.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. hypertension. however. migraines. and so on. stomach. They take on too much. Flight Crew Training Centre . but always late. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. 10. the loss of an important contract. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches.

perhaps. environmental and cognitive. More precisely. which exhibits as either a physical response e. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. People wear down to a final. 10. Chronic stress destroys bodies. With no hope. 10. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. sweating. Chronic stress kills through suicide. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. the individual gives up searching for solutions. chronic stress is not. almost comfortable. or a mental response such as irritability. This could come in many different forms. stroke. year after year. hyperventilation. They blame their woes on other people and external events. violence.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors.e. They forget it's there. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career..3. Generally. Frequently. and sometimes. tremors. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. It's the stress of poverty. they see their lifestyle. heart arrhythmia. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. minds and lives. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. fatal breakdown. Flight Crew Training Centre . lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. of dysfunctional families. change in job or responsibilities (i.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. Some examples are: marriage or divorce.3. promotion to Captain). 10. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. their patterns of interacting with others. familiar. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. and. heart attack. even cancer.g.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting.3.

this will be covered later in the chapter. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. When workload is high. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties.deck.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual.3. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. However.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Two common examples could be heat and noise. 10.3. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. and mismanage priorities. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. In the long-term. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). 10. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. either on the apron. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. but with a dissimilar function. Noise arouses the individual. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. especially when it involves an operating pilot. or in the flight. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety.

This might be due to time since awake. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. For example. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. or state of awake ness. thereby inducing further errors.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. with an inability to sleep further. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. 10. After some time of being awake. when workload is at an absolute minimum.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. the range of optimal performance is reached. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. they may become bogged down in processing the data. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. this continues to improve performance until. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. Although this can be an effective strategy. However. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. after reaching a peak. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. Typically.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. workload (physical exertion). Response time. As in the case of stress. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. Immediately after awakening. self. It cannot be stored. 10. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Depending on the individual. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . On a night flight. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep.

Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. 10. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. sleep is deeper rather than longer. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. which extend the operating day. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. However. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. on the wrong time zone. This is known as jet-lag. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other.

2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. Managing stress and sleep effectively. 10. the Flight Crew Training Centre . computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. As any medical practitioner will verify. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. It is another warning flag. is the duty of every crewmember.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. Others prefer mental stimulation.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. 11 Situational Awareness 11.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. In accidents involving human error. 10. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. when conducted in a structured fashion. This chapter will explain what it is. providing awareness and in need of management. 11. this is a potentially dangerous practice. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. In the modern world. However it is often quoted without really being explained.

why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. Flight Crew Training Centre . The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. In addition to three levels of SA. systems. 11. one must understand and think ahead. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. and Communicate. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. Navigate. It is not just enough to notice a situation. crew. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow.” This is quite complex. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). passengers and company). there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. which mitigates part of the problem. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. fuel and time). automation modes.

Trap. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . fuel burn. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . fixation and confusion. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. minimums.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.vague or incomplete statements 11. Flight Crew Training Centre . A three-stage model “Avoid.descent and leads up to the approach. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. The trapping phase begins at top-of. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . After descent initiation.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . Results from observations at several different airlines. Prior to descent. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. there is much to be concerned about here. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. fixation and confusion exist. during the take-off and landing phases. if potential problems can be identified in time.

identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around.e.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. unstabilized approach. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. and use the speed brake if necessary. too high. attention-sharing. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. 11. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA].” Flight Crew Training Centre . there is very little time left to correct it. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. too fast etc) must be avoided. scan patterns and checklist use. Finally.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. communications. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Skills relating to spatial ability. so that we can take action to improve it. task management and prioritization. 11. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. contingency planning. Human error is inevitable. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. an undesired aircraft state (i. However. 11. Should such a state occur. self-monitoring.

Project ahead and consider contingencies. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Flight Crew Training Centre . Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. dispatch. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. maintenance.don't fixate. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. etc. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . ATC.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA.

Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues.C.C. J. stress.. what is it? (Error. & Sherman. 1.. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. New Zealand.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich.. Sydney.R. & Helmreich. 1997. Helmreich... A. April-May. (1996). Merritt.. A. A. Colombus.0 (International) & 2. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. & Merritt. & Merritt. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1991).. Merritt. A.. Columbus: Ohio State University. 1997.L.. Helmreich. (1996). T. Jakarta. (1996). R. & Helmreich. Auckland. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. (1997)..J.C. CRM: I hate it.L. Cultural influences on flight operations. (1997). CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. A. R. Ohio.L. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. (1995).C.R. Cultural issues in crew resource management.C. April 23-25.L. Colombus. Ohio. A.C. W. Wilhelm. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Merritt. 1996. April. R. P. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. April-May.. Guangzhou. 1991. & Helmreich. (1995).C.A.L. May 1995. 1996. A. Ooi.C.C.L. R. Indonesia.. 8-12. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. April).. Merritt. P. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. CRM Advocate. November 26-28. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. Merritt. R. (1995).. Flight Crew Training Centre . Merritt. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. (1996.S.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4).. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Taggart. R. A. 1995. November 20-24.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful