Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). 1. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. assisted by the facilitator. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. and team management skills.2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.2. 2 Modules Content 2. and a series of role-plays.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. 1.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. leadership and team management.2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief.

7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.4 Leadership.

This is due.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. This includes everything from the design of a tool. HPL. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. 3. to the design of a checklist. knowledge. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. home. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. to the brightness required of an electronic display. skill and attitude. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. in part. 3. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Despite improvements in technology. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. design and engine reliability. and with other humans. environment. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. Flight Crew Training Centre .

Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. 3. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. 3. 1990. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. especially on a long.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. J. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. encompassing the best of previous generations.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. In particular this means designing for error. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . Most of these errors are small. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Not only is this more predictable and measurable.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.

a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. occurring years ago on the drawing board. It was but it is not an isolated case.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. the accident does not occur. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. it snaps. Others were management failures. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. of which the operating crew are the last link. Rather. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. Without assigning a principle cause. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Reason used Swiss cheese. Some were latent failures. Flight Crew Training Centre . The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. If they can break the chain. but when the mouse tries to take the bait.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. In isolation it is insignificant. the holes will line up. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. but placed together they form a robust wall. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Occasionally. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. For example. 3. the last line of defense. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap.

at any level. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard.External influences Errors .Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. performing a checklist from memory. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. because despite the risks. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances.) Threats . safe operations are the norm. Management.e. 3. Engineering. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. the start of an accident chain. 3. Threats and errors are unavoidable. Flight Crew Training Centre . the accident chain is broken. and it is up to us to break the chain. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. (Errors made by other people ATC.e. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. but as long as the holes do not line up. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.

These have been termed warning flags.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. However. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . such as an unstabilized approach. However in all cases. 3. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. Trap. nine common factors existed. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. 3.12 Avoid.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger.

not to the state. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. professional and safety culture. collectivism. versus its opposite. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. 4. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. 4. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. On the collectivist side. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 4. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Again. regarding all societies in the world.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. Uncertainty Avoidance. such as organizational. often extended families (with uncles. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. cohesive in-groups. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. (which are predominantly male). Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. Power Distance.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ.

as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. not from above. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. they try to have as few rules as possible. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured situations are novel. but defined from below. but some are more unequal than others. The opposite type. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. It suggests that the followers. Power and inequality. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre .   4. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. unknown. safety and security measures. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. and motivated by inner nervous energy. and different from usual. This represents inequality (more versus less). Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. surprising.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. uncertainty accepting cultures. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. of course.

This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. 5. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. Furthermore. such as pilots. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. against a conflicting trend. including radio operators. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. navigators and flight engineers.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. not what we thought we told them to do. or an organizational culture can prevail. there can be anomalies where a professional group. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. by a machine function. Flight Crew Training Centre . The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. either physical or cognitive. In particular.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. (Norbert Wiener) 5.

roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. In practice this does not always happen. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. The latter will not be discussed here. 5. not to mention the human (social) effects.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. accuracy and reduced costs. In particular. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. Flight Crew Training Centre . The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage.

Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. easy to re program. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. fast. Good quantitative assessment. Spine. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. 1986. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. difficult to re.Good inductive. Poor program. narrow range. detecting messages in noise. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre .” (Good. Whiteside. inaccurate. slow. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. Poor spoken material. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. J & George. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. P. accurate. Rather. M. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. T.

It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. In the aviation scenario. – This is a high workload situation. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . vigilance and complacency may become issues. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. an area of weakness in interface design. Overall result is reduced workload. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. resulting in further reduced workload. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. with different cognitive skills required. Although in some systems. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. 5. There is a reduced cognitive load. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. Pilots will dynamically move between levels.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. according to any change in tactical goal.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime.

The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. 5. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. will disengage or will revert to another mode.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. communications and monitoring.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. Cali. In particular. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. Unfortunately. For this new knowledge and skills are required. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. Flight Crew Training Centre . the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. Habsheim etc). Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. 5. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.

Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. easy-to-use systems. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. A lack of. 5. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. but not replace. 5. or subtle. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. Consequently.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation.

and authority. 5. which is assigned. Humans are capable of devising strategies.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Flight Crew Training Centre . 6. In the flight-deck environment. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. the Captain is the designated “leader”. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. Through the use of example and persuasion. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. which is acquired.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. There is a fundamental difference between leadership.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations.

from a practical view point the Captain has a right. 6. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. and Manage Decision-Making Model. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. In addition.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. initiative and integrity. the team and the individual. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. will power. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. The leader must balance the demands of the task. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. In fact. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. 6.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. Personal qualities required are those of courage. with use of the Assess. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . to decide on a course of action. and be able to maintain team morale. Action. and a duty.

6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. manage and direct the flow of information. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.8. With a wide variety of background.5 Task To achieve the task.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. suggestions Giving opinions. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .

2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.8.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. In between.8.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. Flight Crew Training Centre .4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.8. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.

generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. using information available at that time. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. For most effective leadership. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Together. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. but not if things are going wrong.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates.

avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. along with good communication skills. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. cited by Kern. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. 6. R. The role is much like that of a chairman. Hughes. Followers are a vital part of a team.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. active/uncritical and active/critical. 1988. and followership is a skill in its own right. 1997. supportive followers are as important as a leader. While this might be an individual’s view. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. 6.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. Flight Crew Training Centre . For successful team performance. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. R & Curphy. G (Eds). Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. T. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. passive/critical. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. since there are a number of nationalities. The optimum gradient. Ginnett. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. G2. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. RE. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience.

They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. 6. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. unless identified and brought “back onside”. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. and actively supportive without being “yes men”.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. Sheep are akin to human automatons. Flight Crew Training Centre . Making a good first impression is vital. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. because they actively support without thinking. Survivors are the Company men. They are also the foundation for teambuilding.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. The only way to ensure this is. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll.

and very rarely are raised voices heard. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. along with methods of eliminating them. 7. in communication within a crew. as much as 90%. This chapter describes the principles of communication.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. 7. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. Barriers to communication are also identified. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7.e. rank could impinge on communication as well. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. So. While modern flight decks are well insulated. noise is still a factor. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. culture plays a large part. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . However. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Between a Captain and a First Officer. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. degrading language. the words used tend to be very important. insulting.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. In the case of Jade Cargo International.

It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. the focus.4. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. 7. two aspects of the message content will be considered. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. 7. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. assertive.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. whether on the needs of others or your own. Flight Crew Training Centre . supportive and submissive. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. aggressive. and the manner. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.

The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. 7.4. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. Flight Crew Training Centre .downs. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. They put themselves down. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. However this may change depending on circumstances. such as during training or non-normal situations.4. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. However. Referring to the matrix. In a non-critical situation. are avoided at all times. and will likely isolate the aggressor. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. It is unlikely to motivate the team.4. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. 7. not recommended but part of life. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. Therefore.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.

but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. their needs will be overlooked. Flight Crew Training Centre . If someone is submissive. An assertive response might also be effective. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. will find a style that works well for them. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. If the other person is submissive.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. Each individual and in fact every team.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. Dealing with aggression is not easy. In other words. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. it is likely communication that will break down completely. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. be supportive.

No one person or idea is perfect. the stage is set for potential conflict. When conflict is dealt with constructively. No one makes major concessions. If conflict does occur. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas.favorable versus unfavorable. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Flight Crew Training Centre . words. Differing expectations of outcomes . which will lead to better results. objectives and values. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Differences in perceiving motives. actions and situations. Animosities can develop. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. collaborate or compromise. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. 7. the results may be positive or negative. communications may breakdown. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. trust and support will deteriorate. There is more than one way to do anything. When sides are chosen. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. productivity will diminish or stop. Assertive and cooperative. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. test their position and beliefs. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. Unwillingness to work through issues.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. High respect for mutual support.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. You must give to get. and stretch their imagination.

Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. rather that a model is used. It is the end result that we are interested in. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. It is not which model that is used that is important. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. either for routine or novel situations. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. However.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. 8. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. Advocacy. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Flight Crew Training Centre . however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. or good or bad outcomes. once in a while. Action and Critique. Conflict Resolution.

2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA.2. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. further modification to the RMM was required. Flight Crew Training Centre . 8.2. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. 8. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International.

By staying below the line as much as possible. seeking more information about it. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. the problem and the solution.Information seeking. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. This does not always produce the best solution. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. to make sure we fully understand the implications. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. there are two typical responses. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. its implications and how much time is available.

is a valuable problem. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. In the latter case. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well).solving resource. others may be less time dependent. On the other hand. but will probably be accepted. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. when there is little available. using a traffic light system. may at best get a query in response. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. 8. immediate action is required. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. critical. A solution in the form of a question however. Open questions allow more options. In all cases. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. available and required. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. losing vital feedback. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. Time can be considered as. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. this limits the opportunity for assessment. Once a time frame has been established.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . EFIS architecture. it is possible to prioritize accordingly.

test understanding propose. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. Flight Crew Training Centre . Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. NAVIGATE. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. the Captain must manage. prioritize. prioritize. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. delegation] Remember that in complex situations.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. seek information. test understanding. Good teamwork needs good communication. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. 8. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. propose. test understanding.

Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. 8. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. For example in the first stages of a diversion.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Once this is under control. An important point here is that you do not rush. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. However. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. obstacles and weather. It is a circular or iterative process.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. When the process is complete. it is time to manage. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. all the circles are the same size.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Once the Group is informed and placated. the task need is paramount. 8. Flight Crew Training Centre . including the navigation away from terrain. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. the team and the individual.

we receive information. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. 9. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. In the same way.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. but functionally can be quite accurate. output functions and an internal processing function. do something with that information and then act on it. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. Flight Crew Training Centre . Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. these are known as “mental models”.

so much that. This is quite normal.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. 9. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . sound. touch. sight. but only a limited signal can be conveyed.4 Input functions 9. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. but it is not being ignored completely. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. smell and taste. sound and touch. Perception is incredibly powerful. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. 9. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us.4.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. even though they do not have the loudest voice. not all of them get through to the processing stage. are actually switching from one to the other.4. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. if we miss-perceive an event. 9.4. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. During a busy. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional.

6. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. 9.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. and retained by conscious attention. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. the original message has been replayed by the mind.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. Another type of memory is sensory memory. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory.6. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. descend 180.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. you have as little as 0.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. which really belongs with the input functions. 9. 9. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. short-term and long-term. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. speed 310. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. expect 150 by xxx.6 Processing Functions 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.72”.6. unless it is consciously being dealt with. and contact 119. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible.

This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. such as ATM (Avoid. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver ….4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics.. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. 9.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. and Mitigate). Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. but with inability to retrieve or access the information.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. 9. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. manageable by most. patterns or mini theories. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Flight Crew Training Centre . For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. Trap. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. even if the correct data has never been learned. However the problem is not with forgetting. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. but it is top secret. For example. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. long after the event. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost.6.6.

GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category.6. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. The events of September 11. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. It can only deal with one issue at a time. however it is a single channel device. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. 9. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. as they are referred to by the date itself. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. in particular responses to RTO. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. 9. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.6. this is when the action has become a learned routine. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time.

your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. In this respect. This chapter covers the effects of stress. some a combination of both. Our interest is human performance. including workload and circadian rhythms. Performance varies with a number of factors. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . others mental strains.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. 9. stress and fatigue produce similar results. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Some of these place physical strains on the body. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved.

After a certain point. for example. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. such as take-off and landing. Flight Crew Training Centre . largely impossible. 10. As stress increases further.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. into the optimum performance range (shaded). and then falls away. In the diagram above. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Too little stress causes complacency. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. consider that arousal refers to stress. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. performance actually peaks. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. The right side shows over stimulation.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. as stress increases. but too much is exhausting. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. performance improves.stimulation. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise.3. acute and chronic. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. and other symptoms. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. 10. tension headaches.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. require the crew to be at optimal performance. from being somewhat dormant. By the same token. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. Initially. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Critical phases of flight. upset stomach. is exhilarating early in the day.

have too many irons in the fire. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. it does. diarrhea.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. They're always in a rush. back pain. irritable. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. jaw pain. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. but always late. and so on. and tense. however. dizziness. They take on too much. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. and irritable bowel syndrome. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. a deadline they're rushing to meet. the three stress emotions. who suffer acute stress frequently. the loss of an important contract. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. they tend to be abrupt. flatulence. anxiety. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. and depression. generally requiring professional help. shorttempered. Because it is short term. muscular problems including tension headache.3. shortness of breath. and chest pain." Always in a hurry. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. Flight Crew Training Centre . Often. cold hands or feet. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. their child's occasional problems at school. chest pain. migraine headaches. constipation. and it is highly treatable and manageable. heart palpitations. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. anxious. hypertension. migraines. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. and heart disease. rapid heartbeat. acid stomach. sweaty palms. 10.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. If something can go wrong. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. stomach. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis.

This could come in many different forms. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. 10. heart attack. change in job or responsibilities (i. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. They blame their woes on other people and external events. familiar. perhaps.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. Chronic stress kills through suicide. With no hope. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. of dysfunctional families. It's the stress of poverty. violence. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. hyperventilation. almost comfortable. 10. tremors.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. year after year. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time.3.e. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. their patterns of interacting with others. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. Generally.. the individual gives up searching for solutions. heart arrhythmia. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. and sometimes. More precisely.3. They forget it's there. Flight Crew Training Centre . or a mental response such as irritability. they see their lifestyle. 10. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. minds and lives. Frequently. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. environmental and cognitive. even cancer.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. People wear down to a final.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. which exhibits as either a physical response e. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. chronic stress is not. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. fatal breakdown. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition.g. they ignore chronic stress because it is old.3. Chronic stress destroys bodies. promotion to Captain). sweating. stroke. and. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are.

High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). However. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one.3. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. or in the flight. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. When workload is high. Noise arouses the individual.3.deck. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. but with a dissimilar function.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . and mismanage priorities. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. this will be covered later in the chapter. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. 10. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. 10. In the long-term. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. either on the apron. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Two common examples could be heat and noise.

a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. when workload is at an absolute minimum. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. This might be due to time since awake. For example. Depending on the individual. Typically. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. after reaching a peak. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. self. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. 10. However. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt).discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. workload (physical exertion). On a night flight. It cannot be stored. they may become bogged down in processing the data. After some time of being awake. Although this can be an effective strategy. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. this continues to improve performance until. Response time.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. with an inability to sleep further. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. thereby inducing further errors. or state of awake ness. Immediately after awakening. the range of optimal performance is reached. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. 10. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . As in the case of stress.

Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. However.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. This is known as jet-lag. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. on the wrong time zone. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. 10. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. which extend the operating day. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. sleep is deeper rather than longer. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other.

The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. This chapter will explain what it is. Managing stress and sleep effectively.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. It is another warning flag. In accidents involving human error. However it is often quoted without really being explained. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. is the duty of every crewmember.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. the Flight Crew Training Centre . 11 Situational Awareness 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. 10. providing awareness and in need of management. 11. this is a potentially dangerous practice.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. 10. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. Others prefer mental stimulation. As any medical practitioner will verify. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. In the modern world. when conducted in a structured fashion. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief.

11. which mitigates part of the problem. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. and Communicate.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. systems. one must understand and think ahead. passengers and company). In addition to three levels of SA. automation modes. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). It is not just enough to notice a situation. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. Navigate. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness.” This is quite complex. fuel and time). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. Flight Crew Training Centre . crew.

regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. Trap.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. A three-stage model “Avoid. fixation and confusion. fuel burn. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. during the take-off and landing phases. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. Results from observations at several different airlines. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations.descent and leads up to the approach. The trapping phase begins at top-of. minimums. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. if potential problems can be identified in time.vague or incomplete statements 11. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. there is much to be concerned about here.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. After descent initiation. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. fixation and confusion exist.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Prior to descent. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Flight Crew Training Centre . Mitigate” is one solution to the problem.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively .

perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. Human error is inevitable. However. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Finally. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent.” Flight Crew Training Centre . too high.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. 11. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. and use the speed brake if necessary. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. contingency planning. unstabilized approach.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA].” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. self-monitoring. attention-sharing. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. 11.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. task management and prioritization. Should such a state occur. an undesired aircraft state (i. scan patterns and checklist use. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. there is very little time left to correct it. Skills relating to spatial ability. so that we can take action to improve it. too fast etc) must be avoided. 11. communications. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around.e.

Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. dispatch. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . maintenance. Project ahead and consider contingencies. etc. ATC. Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight.don't fixate. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.

University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. 1997. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. Colombus. Ooi. April). Jakarta. Cultural issues in crew resource management.C.. R. A. Ohio. T. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues.C. 1996. Merritt. & Merritt.C. A. 1995. (1991). The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. P. J.L. November 26-28.C. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. Merritt. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.L. CRM: I hate it. Colombus. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Helmreich.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). (1995). Sydney. New Zealand. 1997. Wilhelm. Merritt. CRM Advocate..R. (1996. W. & Helmreich..... Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2.. 8-12.. (1995).L. Guangzhou. stress. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.J. A. R. (1996).. what is it? (Error. & Helmreich.C. 1. 1991.. April-May. (1995). A. A.S.L. P. R.. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. A. & Merritt. Auckland. Columbus: Ohio State University.C.C. Cultural influences on flight operations.. April-May. Indonesia. May 1995.. R. Flight Crew Training Centre . April.A. A. (1997). April 23-25. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C. Ohio. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar.0 (International) & 2.. (1997). Taggart. 1996. (1996). R. Helmreich. & Helmreich. (1996).Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. A.. R. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. Merritt.L. Merritt.R. November 20-24. Merritt.C.L. & Sherman.

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