Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

2. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . This will be delivered during the ground school phase.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.2. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. and team management skills. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. and a series of role-plays.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. assisted by the facilitator. leadership and team management. 1. 1. 2 Modules Content 2.2.

8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.4 Leadership.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.

Flight Crew Training Centre . completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. environment. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. HPL. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. knowledge. skill and attitude. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. and with other humans. in part. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. home. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. This is due. This includes everything from the design of a tool. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. to the design of a checklist. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. 3.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. 3. design and engine reliability. Despite improvements in technology.

especially on a long.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Flight Crew Training Centre . J.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Most of these errors are small. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. 1990.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. 3. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. 3. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. In particular this means designing for error. 3. encompassing the best of previous generations.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback.

Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. the last line of defense. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. 3. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. occurring years ago on the drawing board. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. it snaps. For example. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. Without assigning a principle cause. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. but placed together they form a robust wall. but when the mouse tries to take the bait.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. the accident does not occur. Occasionally. Some were latent failures. Reason used Swiss cheese. of which the operating crew are the last link.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. It was but it is not an isolated case. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. In isolation it is insignificant. Rather. If they can break the chain. Flight Crew Training Centre . Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. the holes will line up. Others were management failures.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario.

A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events.External influences Errors . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. safe operations are the norm.e. Threats and errors are unavoidable. because despite the risks. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising.e. (Errors made by other people ATC.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. 3.) Threats . performing a checklist from memory. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. Flight Crew Training Centre . Engineering. but as long as the holes do not line up. and it is up to us to break the chain.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. the accident chain is broken.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. at any level. Management. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. 3. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. the start of an accident chain. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Regulators etc are threats to the crew.

Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. 3. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. However in all cases. These have been termed warning flags. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . such as an unstabilized approach. However.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. 3. Trap. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state.12 Avoid. nine common factors existed. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.

On the collectivist side. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. professional and safety culture. Uncertainty Avoidance. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. often extended families (with uncles. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Power Distance. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. collectivism. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. 4. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . such as organizational. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. 4. cohesive in-groups. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. 4. Again. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. (which are predominantly male).4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. not to the state.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. versus its opposite. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. regarding all societies in the world.

People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. safety and security measures. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. of course. not from above. Unstructured situations are novel. and motivated by inner nervous energy. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. This represents inequality (more versus less). Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. surprising. but defined from below. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. unknown. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. It suggests that the followers. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. but some are more unequal than others. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional.   4. uncertainty accepting cultures. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. they try to have as few rules as possible. The opposite type. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. and different from usual. Power and inequality.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation.

7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. either physical or cognitive. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. by a machine function. In particular. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. such as pilots. including radio operators. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. (Norbert Wiener) 5. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. not what we thought we told them to do. there can be anomalies where a professional group. against a conflicting trend.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. navigators and flight engineers. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. or an organizational culture can prevail. 5. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. Furthermore. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”.

3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. The latter will not be discussed here.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. In practice this does not always happen. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. 5. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. In particular. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. accuracy and reduced costs.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. not to mention the human (social) effects. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. Flight Crew Training Centre . roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results.

Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. detecting messages in noise. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. Spine. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. M. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Rather. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. 1986. T.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Poor spoken material. fast. easy to re program. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . narrow range. inaccurate. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better.” (Good. Poor program. slow. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. J & George. Whiteside. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. accurate. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel.Good inductive. P. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. Good quantitative assessment. difficult to re.

In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. an area of weakness in interface design. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. There is a reduced cognitive load. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Although in some systems. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. In the aviation scenario. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. according to any change in tactical goal. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Overall result is reduced workload.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. 5. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . with different cognitive skills required. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. – This is a high workload situation. resulting in further reduced workload.

communications and monitoring. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. Habsheim etc). 5. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. Flight Crew Training Centre . the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. 5.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. For this new knowledge and skills are required. will disengage or will revert to another mode. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. Cali. In particular. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. Unfortunately. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated.

10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. 5. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. A lack of.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. but not replace. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. easy-to-use systems. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . 5. or subtle. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. Consequently.

and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. Through the use of example and persuasion. Humans are capable of devising strategies. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. 6. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. which is assigned.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. which is acquired. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Flight Crew Training Centre . Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. 5. In the flight-deck environment. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. the Captain is the designated “leader”.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. and authority.

This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. will power. and a duty. the team and the individual.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. initiative and integrity. Personal qualities required are those of courage. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. with use of the Assess. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. 6. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. In addition. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. and be able to maintain team morale. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . and Manage Decision-Making Model. The leader must balance the demands of the task. 6. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. In fact. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. Action. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. to decide on a course of action.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations.

7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. With a wide variety of background. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.8.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. suggestions Giving opinions. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.5 Task To achieve the task. manage and direct the flow of information.

2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. In between. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader. Flight Crew Training Centre . how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.8.8.8.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.

using information available at that time. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . while monitoring to assure necessary performance. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. Together. For most effective leadership. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. but not if things are going wrong. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck.

levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. For successful team performance. RE. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. supportive followers are as important as a leader. along with good communication skills. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. T.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. active/uncritical and active/critical. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. Followers are a vital part of a team. R. and followership is a skill in its own right. Ginnett. since there are a number of nationalities. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. passive/critical. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. R & Curphy. G (Eds). Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. 6. cited by Kern. 1988. 1997. 6. The optimum gradient. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. The role is much like that of a chairman. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. Hughes. Flight Crew Training Centre .9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. While this might be an individual’s view. G2. “Kelly’s” (Kelly.

The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Sheep are akin to human automatons. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. because they actively support without thinking. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Making a good first impression is vital. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. The only way to ensure this is. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Survivors are the Company men. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. 6. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. unless identified and brought “back onside”. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Flight Crew Training Centre . Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important.

in communication within a crew. This chapter describes the principles of communication. rank could impinge on communication as well. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. the words used tend to be very important.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. However. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. 7. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. Between a Captain and a First Officer.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Barriers to communication are also identified. insulting. 7. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. culture plays a large part. In the case of Jade Cargo International. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . noise is still a factor. So. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication.e.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. While modern flight decks are well insulated. along with methods of eliminating them. degrading language. and very rarely are raised voices heard. as much as 90%.

the focus. aggressive.4. whether on the needs of others or your own. and the manner. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. supportive and submissive. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. 7. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. 7. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. Flight Crew Training Centre . It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. assertive. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. two aspects of the message content will be considered.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others.

2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. However this may change depending on circumstances. such as during training or non-normal situations. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. Referring to the matrix. not recommended but part of life.4.4. They put themselves down. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. In a non-critical situation.downs. 7. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. 7. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. are avoided at all times. Therefore.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. However. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. and will likely isolate the aggressor. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. It is unlikely to motivate the team. This is a “no-go” area for us at work.4. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony.

and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. it is likely communication that will break down completely. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. be supportive. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. their needs will be overlooked. In other words. will find a style that works well for them. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. Flight Crew Training Centre . Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. If someone is submissive.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. An assertive response might also be effective. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. If the other person is submissive. Each individual and in fact every team.

No one person or idea is perfect.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. productivity will diminish or stop. actions and situations. Differences in perceiving motives. test their position and beliefs.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. When sides are chosen. If conflict does occur.favorable versus unfavorable.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. Differing expectations of outcomes . Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. Assertive and cooperative. communications may breakdown. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. the stage is set for potential conflict. No one makes major concessions. collaborate or compromise. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. 7. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. There is more than one way to do anything. the results may be positive or negative. You must give to get. which will lead to better results. Unwillingness to work through issues. and stretch their imagination. words. Animosities can develop. Flight Crew Training Centre . High respect for mutual support. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. trust and support will deteriorate. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. objectives and values.

Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. It is not which model that is used that is important. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. However. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. Advocacy. either for routine or novel situations. or good or bad outcomes.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Flight Crew Training Centre . rather that a model is used. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. Action and Critique. It is the end result that we are interested in. Conflict Resolution. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. 8. once in a while.

Flight Crew Training Centre . indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. 8.2. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. further modification to the RMM was required. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. 8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA.2. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.

This does not always produce the best solution. the problem and the solution.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available.Information seeking.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. its implications and how much time is available. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. By staying below the line as much as possible. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . to make sure we fully understand the implications. Flight Crew Training Centre . questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. there are two typical responses. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. seeking more information about it.

The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. In all cases. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. On the other hand. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. available and required. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. using a traffic light system.solving resource.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. is a valuable problem. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Once a time frame has been established. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. 8. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. critical. immediate action is required.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. but will probably be accepted. others may be less time dependent. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. losing vital feedback. Time can be considered as. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. A solution in the form of a question however. when there is little available. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. EFIS architecture. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). this limits the opportunity for assessment. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). In the latter case. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Open questions allow more options.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. may at best get a query in response.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time.

test understanding. test understanding propose. test understanding. propose. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. 8. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. NAVIGATE.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. prioritize. Good teamwork needs good communication. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. seek information. prioritize. the Captain must manage. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation.

7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. When the process is complete. Once this is under control. obstacles and weather. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. 8. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. the task need is paramount. However. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. For example in the first stages of a diversion. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. it is time to manage. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. the team and the individual. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. Flight Crew Training Centre . 8. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. all the circles are the same size. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. including the navigation away from terrain. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. An important point here is that you do not rush. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. It is a circular or iterative process. Once the Group is informed and placated.

but functionally can be quite accurate. In the same way. output functions and an internal processing function. Flight Crew Training Centre . we receive information. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. 9. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. individuals create internal representations of how systems work.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. these are known as “mental models”. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. do something with that information and then act on it.

During a busy. sound and touch. even though they do not have the loudest voice. sound. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task.4. but it is not being ignored completely. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. This is quite normal. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. 9. 9. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. smell and taste. 9. so much that. are actually switching from one to the other. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms.4 Input functions 9. if we miss-perceive an event. sight.4. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. touch.4. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. Perception is incredibly powerful.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. not all of them get through to the processing stage.

typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.72”. and retained by conscious attention. and contact 119. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. speed 310. you have as little as 0. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. descend 180. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. Sensory memory data is lost by decay.6. 9. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. 9. expect 150 by xxx. the original message has been replayed by the mind. Another type of memory is sensory memory. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.6.6 Processing Functions 9. short-term and long-term. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.6. 9. which really belongs with the input functions. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. unless it is consciously being dealt with.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.

you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. 9. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. manageable by most.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. but it is top secret. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. However the problem is not with forgetting.. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. and Mitigate). Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition.6. Flight Crew Training Centre . Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. even if the correct data has never been learned. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory.6. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. 9. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. Trap. long after the event. For example. patterns or mini theories. such as ATM (Avoid.

human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. 2001 are slightly different in this respect.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks.6. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. The events of September 11.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986].6. 9. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. as they are referred to by the date itself. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. this is when the action has become a learned routine. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . 9. It can only deal with one issue at a time. in particular responses to RTO. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. however it is a single channel device. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach.

It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. 9. others mental strains. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. including workload and circadian rhythms. Performance varies with a number of factors. In this respect. Our interest is human performance. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. stress and fatigue produce similar results.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. Some of these place physical strains on the body. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . This chapter covers the effects of stress. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. some a combination of both.

The right side shows over stimulation. and other symptoms. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. as stress increases. Too little stress causes complacency. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. and then falls away. In the diagram above. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. After a certain point. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve.3. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. is exhilarating early in the day. tension headaches. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. from being somewhat dormant. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. require the crew to be at optimal performance. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. for example. into the optimum performance range (shaded). Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. 10. Critical phases of flight. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. Initially. consider that arousal refers to stress. 10. but too much is exhausting.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below.stimulation. As stress increases further. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. By the same token. upset stomach. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. such as take-off and landing. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. performance actually peaks. acute and chronic. largely impossible. performance improves. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function.

heart palpitations. hypertension. who suffer acute stress frequently. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. The work becomes a very stressful place for them." Always in a hurry. and heart disease. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. but always late. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. They take on too much. acid stomach. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. anxious. and tense. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. however. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. they tend to be abrupt. and depression. anxiety. They're always in a rush. migraines.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. 10. dizziness. jaw pain. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. rapid heartbeat. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. the three stress emotions. a deadline they're rushing to meet. the loss of an important contract. and it is highly treatable and manageable. and so on. migraine headaches. back pain. If something can go wrong. constipation. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. and chest pain. Often. irritable. diarrhea. chest pain. it does. Because it is short term. flatulence. generally requiring professional help. muscular problems including tension headache.3. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. shorttempered. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. cold hands or feet. sweaty palms. stomach. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. their child's occasional problems at school. have too many irons in the fire. and irritable bowel syndrome. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. shortness of breath. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. Flight Crew Training Centre .

10. More precisely. they see their lifestyle. This could come in many different forms. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. hyperventilation. the illness or death of a close relative or friend.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. they ignore chronic stress because it is old.e. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. They blame their woes on other people and external events. 10. With no hope. Some examples are: marriage or divorce.3. Flight Crew Training Centre . which exhibits as either a physical response e. Chronic stress destroys bodies. of dysfunctional families. Frequently. People wear down to a final. familiar. year after year. even cancer.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle.. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. heart attack. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. environmental and cognitive. stroke. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. violence. It's the stress of poverty. tremors. their patterns of interacting with others. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management.g. change in job or responsibilities (i. fatal breakdown. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time.3. Chronic stress kills through suicide. 10. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. minds and lives. heart arrhythmia.3. the individual gives up searching for solutions. almost comfortable. or a mental response such as irritability. sweating. chronic stress is not. perhaps. and sometimes. promotion to Captain). Generally. They forget it's there. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. and.

Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations.3. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. When workload is high. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. either on the apron. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. this will be covered later in the chapter. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. In the long-term. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. and mismanage priorities. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. 10. Noise arouses the individual.deck. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. 10. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”.3. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. However. but with a dissimilar function.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. or in the flight. Two common examples could be heat and noise. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress.

lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. workload (physical exertion). the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. For example. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. After some time of being awake. However. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. they may become bogged down in processing the data. 10.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. self. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. Although this can be an effective strategy. This might be due to time since awake. after reaching a peak. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. or state of awake ness. On a night flight. Response time. Immediately after awakening. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. this continues to improve performance until. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). 10. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. As in the case of stress. the range of optimal performance is reached.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. with an inability to sleep further. when workload is at an absolute minimum. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. thereby inducing further errors. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Typically.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. It cannot be stored. Depending on the individual.

The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. sleep is deeper rather than longer. However. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. on the wrong time zone. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. which extend the operating day. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. 10. This is known as jet-lag.

the Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. 10. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. when conducted in a structured fashion. This chapter will explain what it is. is the duty of every crewmember. 10. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. It is another warning flag. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. However it is often quoted without really being explained. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. Managing stress and sleep effectively. this is a potentially dangerous practice. In accidents involving human error. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. Others prefer mental stimulation.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. In the modern world. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. 11 Situational Awareness 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. providing awareness and in need of management. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. 11. As any medical practitioner will verify.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained.

crew. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. fuel and time). the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. In addition to three levels of SA. one must understand and think ahead. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. It is not just enough to notice a situation. which mitigates part of the problem. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. passengers and company).” This is quite complex. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. Navigate. and Communicate. Flight Crew Training Centre . 11. automation modes. systems.

information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . fixation and confusion exist. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. if potential problems can be identified in time. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Prior to descent. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. Results from observations at several different airlines. A three-stage model “Avoid.vague or incomplete statements 11. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . fuel burn. fixation and confusion. minimums. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. during the take-off and landing phases. After descent initiation. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. there is much to be concerned about here. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. Flight Crew Training Centre .descent and leads up to the approach.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. Avoiding error is the initial course of action.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Trap.

” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. attention-sharing. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. too high. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Skills relating to spatial ability. Finally. unstabilized approach. Should such a state occur. contingency planning. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. an undesired aircraft state (i. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. 11.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. However. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. scan patterns and checklist use. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. and use the speed brake if necessary. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are.” Flight Crew Training Centre . The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed.e. there is very little time left to correct it. communications. 11. too fast etc) must be avoided. Human error is inevitable. task management and prioritization.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. 11. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. self-monitoring. so that we can take action to improve it.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles.

The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin.don't fixate. Project ahead and consider contingencies. dispatch. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. etc. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Flight Crew Training Centre . but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. maintenance. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. ATC.

Ohio. (1997).. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1995). Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. Cultural issues in crew resource management..0 (International) & 2.. Merritt. Wilhelm.C. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. A. 1996. P. Flight Crew Training Centre . Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.L. & Helmreich. April-May. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. (1996). P.. Ohio.. A. 8-12..C. Colombus. A.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). A. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium.C. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Indonesia. & Merritt.C. & Helmreich.C. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. Colombus. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar.C.R. (1995). 1997... University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. Sydney.A. Merritt. & Sherman..C. New Zealand. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Merritt. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. stress. (1997). Taggart. Guangzhou. R. 1991.. CRM Advocate. 1995. Helmreich. 1.L.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich.L. Merritt. & Helmreich. Ooi. (1996).L. A.L. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. A. & Merritt.R. T. Merritt. Auckland... November 26-28. what is it? (Error. (1991).C. R. April). R. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. (1996. R. A. R.C. May 1995. November 20-24. Jakarta.. W. April-May. Cultural influences on flight operations. 1996. (1996). April.J. R.L. Merritt. (1995). April 23-25. Helmreich. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. CRM: I hate it.. J. Columbus: Ohio State University.S. 1997. A..

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