Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.2.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. 1. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). and team management skills.2.2.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The candidates will conduct their own debrief.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. 1. and a series of role-plays. 2 Modules Content 2.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. assisted by the facilitator. leadership and team management.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor.

5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .4 Leadership.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.

in part. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. to the design of a checklist. 3. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Despite improvements in technology. environment. knowledge. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. This is due. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. and with other humans. design and engine reliability. skill and attitude. home.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. This includes everything from the design of a tool. Flight Crew Training Centre . Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. 3. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. HPL.

Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. 3. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. 1990.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Flight Crew Training Centre . but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. encompassing the best of previous generations. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. In particular this means designing for error. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. J. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. especially on a long. 3. 3. Most of these errors are small.

existing conditions that might remain dormant for years.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. occurring years ago on the drawing board. Occasionally. Rather. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. Some were latent failures. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. If they can break the chain. In isolation it is insignificant. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. the holes will line up. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. Others were management failures.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. For example. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. of which the operating crew are the last link. It was but it is not an isolated case. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. the last line of defense. Reason used Swiss cheese. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. Flight Crew Training Centre . 3. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. Without assigning a principle cause. it snaps. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. but placed together they form a robust wall. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. the accident does not occur. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”.

and it is up to us to break the chain.e. Engineering.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. at any level. because despite the risks. safe operations are the norm.) Threats . the start of an accident chain. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. the accident chain is broken.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. Flight Crew Training Centre . (Errors made by other people ATC. Threats and errors are unavoidable. performing a checklist from memory. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. 3. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. Regulators etc are threats to the crew.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. 3.External influences Errors . A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. but as long as the holes do not line up. Management. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i.e.

However in all cases. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. 3. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry.12 Avoid. These have been termed warning flags. such as an unstabilized approach. Trap. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. However. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. nine common factors existed. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. 3.

On the collectivist side. often extended families (with uncles. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. such as organizational. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. 4. Uncertainty Avoidance. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . Again. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. (which are predominantly male). “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. professional and safety culture.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. cohesive in-groups. regarding all societies in the world. Power Distance. 4. collectivism. 4. versus its opposite. not to the state.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side.

“there can only be one Truth and we have it”. unknown. of course. and motivated by inner nervous energy. but defined from below.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. It suggests that the followers. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. Unstructured situations are novel. and different from usual.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. but some are more unequal than others. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. uncertainty accepting cultures. surprising. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. not from above. The opposite type. Power and inequality. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . and not expected by their environment to express emotions. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. they try to have as few rules as possible. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. safety and security measures.   4. This represents inequality (more versus less).

though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. either physical or cognitive. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. not what we thought we told them to do. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. against a conflicting trend. there can be anomalies where a professional group. navigators and flight engineers. such as pilots. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. or an organizational culture can prevail. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. Flight Crew Training Centre . it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. 5. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. including radio operators. by a machine function. Furthermore. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. In particular. (Norbert Wiener) 5.

roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. In particular. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. accuracy and reduced costs. Flight Crew Training Centre . not to mention the human (social) effects. 5. In practice this does not always happen. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. The latter will not be discussed here. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface.

Poor program. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. difficult to re. narrow range. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. slow. Poor spoken material.” (Good. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . Good quantitative assessment. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. fast. easy to re program. T. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. inaccurate. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. J & George. detecting messages in noise. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. M. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. 1986. error correction Good at error correction Specialized.Good inductive.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Spine. Rather. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. accurate. Whiteside. P.

In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. according to any change in tactical goal.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. Overall result is reduced workload. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . vigilance and complacency may become issues. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. resulting in further reduced workload. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. 5. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. There is a reduced cognitive load. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. Although in some systems. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. In the aviation scenario. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. an area of weakness in interface design. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. with different cognitive skills required. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. – This is a high workload situation.

having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. For this new knowledge and skills are required.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. will disengage or will revert to another mode. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. communications and monitoring. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. 5. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. Unfortunately. Cali. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. Habsheim etc). The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. Flight Crew Training Centre . 5. In particular.

Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. easy-to-use systems. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. 5. A lack of. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. 5. or subtle. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Consequently. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . but not replace. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat.

An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. the Captain is the designated “leader”. and authority. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. which is acquired. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. 5. which is assigned. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. 6.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Through the use of example and persuasion. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. In the flight-deck environment. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. Humans are capable of devising strategies. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. There is a fundamental difference between leadership.

Personal qualities required are those of courage. the team and the individual.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. initiative and integrity. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. and be able to maintain team morale. 6. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. 6. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. In addition. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. to decide on a course of action. Action. and Manage Decision-Making Model. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. In fact. with use of the Assess. The leader must balance the demands of the task. will power. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. and a duty.

With a wide variety of background. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.5 Task To achieve the task. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. manage and direct the flow of information. suggestions Giving opinions.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8.

3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.8. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. Flight Crew Training Centre . In between. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.8.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.8. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.

a different style is adopted according to the situation.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. using information available at that time. while monitoring to assure necessary performance.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. Together. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . but not if things are going wrong. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. For most effective leadership. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above.

the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. 1997. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. 6.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Followers are a vital part of a team. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. RE. cited by Kern. and followership is a skill in its own right. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. While this might be an individual’s view. For successful team performance. R. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. The optimum gradient. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. since there are a number of nationalities. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. Hughes. T. passive/critical. 1988.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. G (Eds). active/uncritical and active/critical. Flight Crew Training Centre . An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. The role is much like that of a chairman. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. G2. R & Curphy. supportive followers are as important as a leader. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. along with good communication skills. Ginnett. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. 6. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions.

Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Survivors are the Company men. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. 6. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. because they actively support without thinking. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Sheep are akin to human automatons. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. The only way to ensure this is. unless identified and brought “back onside”. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Making a good first impression is vital.

This can be verbal or non-verbal information. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. along with methods of eliminating them. insulting. the words used tend to be very important. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. In the case of Jade Cargo International. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. noise is still a factor. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. as much as 90%. This chapter describes the principles of communication. degrading language. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation.e. Between a Captain and a First Officer. and very rarely are raised voices heard. However.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. Barriers to communication are also identified. culture plays a large part. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . 7. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. While modern flight decks are well insulated.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. rank could impinge on communication as well.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. 7. in communication within a crew. So.

While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. 7. two aspects of the message content will be considered.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. 7. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. whether on the needs of others or your own. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). the focus. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. assertive. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. aggressive. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. and the manner. supportive and submissive. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. Flight Crew Training Centre .4.

Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. and will likely isolate the aggressor. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. However. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team.4. In a non-critical situation. It is unlikely to motivate the team. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. However this may change depending on circumstances. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. 7. 7. Flight Crew Training Centre . The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. are avoided at all times.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”.downs. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. such as during training or non-normal situations. Referring to the matrix. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. Therefore. not recommended but part of life.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves.4. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive.4. They put themselves down. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors.

An assertive response might also be effective. it is likely communication that will break down completely. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. If someone is submissive. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. be supportive. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. In other words. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Each individual and in fact every team.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. their needs will be overlooked. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. If the other person is submissive.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. Flight Crew Training Centre . In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. will find a style that works well for them.

Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Differing expectations of outcomes . and the damage is usually difficult to repair.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. When sides are chosen. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. trust and support will deteriorate. Assertive and cooperative. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. depending on how those involved choose to approach it.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. collaborate or compromise. test their position and beliefs. communications may breakdown. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. words. Differences in perceiving motives. No one makes major concessions. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. which will lead to better results. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. productivity will diminish or stop. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. There is more than one way to do anything. objectives and values. 7. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Flight Crew Training Centre . and stretch their imagination. Unwillingness to work through issues. the stage is set for potential conflict. No one person or idea is perfect. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. the results may be positive or negative. Animosities can develop. You must give to get. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. High respect for mutual support. If conflict does occur.favorable versus unfavorable. actions and situations.

This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Action and Critique. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. It is the end result that we are interested in. Flight Crew Training Centre . The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. 8. once in a while. However. either for routine or novel situations. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Conflict Resolution. Advocacy.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. rather that a model is used. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. or good or bad outcomes. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. It is not which model that is used that is important.

The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. as well as the appropriate CRM principals.2. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents.2. 8. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. 8. Flight Crew Training Centre .1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. further modification to the RMM was required.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International.

By staying below the line as much as possible. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. there are two typical responses.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . The situation can be considered in two separate domains. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. to make sure we fully understand the implications. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. This does not always produce the best solution. the problem and the solution. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available.Information seeking. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. seeking more information about it.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. its implications and how much time is available. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). Flight Crew Training Centre .

immediate action is required. In all cases. but will probably be accepted. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. when there is little available. EFIS architecture.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. 8. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. may at best get a query in response. Once a time frame has been established. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. is a valuable problem. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS.solving resource. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. others may be less time dependent.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. In the latter case. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. Time can be considered as. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS).  Time Critical situations require immediate action. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. On the other hand. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. this limits the opportunity for assessment. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Open questions allow more options.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. available and required. losing vital feedback. critical. using a traffic light system. A solution in the form of a question however.

test understanding propose. the Captain must manage. test understanding. test understanding. Flight Crew Training Centre . delegation] Remember that in complex situations. NAVIGATE. Good teamwork needs good communication. 8. prioritize.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. seek information.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. prioritize. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. propose. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork.

Once this is under control. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. For example in the first stages of a diversion. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. including the navigation away from terrain. 8. When the process is complete.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. However. Flight Crew Training Centre . Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. the task need is paramount. An important point here is that you do not rush. it is time to manage. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. all the circles are the same size. Once the Group is informed and placated. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. It is a circular or iterative process. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. the team and the individual. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. 8. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. obstacles and weather. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required.

Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. but functionally can be quite accurate. In the same way.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. Flight Crew Training Centre . they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. these are known as “mental models”. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. 9. we receive information. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. individuals create internal representations of how systems work.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. do something with that information and then act on it.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. output functions and an internal processing function.

Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. 9.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. so much that. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. Perception is incredibly powerful. During a busy. even though they do not have the loudest voice. sound and touch. sound. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation.4.4.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. are actually switching from one to the other. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). 9. 9. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. but it is not being ignored completely.4.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. not all of them get through to the processing stage. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. if we miss-perceive an event. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. This is quite normal. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. sight. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.4 Input functions 9. smell and taste. touch.

The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. 9. speed 310. and retained by conscious attention.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.6.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain.6 Processing Functions 9.72”. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible.6. which really belongs with the input functions. expect 150 by xxx. short-term and long-term. you have as little as 0.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. and contact 119. unless it is consciously being dealt with. 9. descend 180. Another type of memory is sensory memory. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. 9. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions.6. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. the original message has been replayed by the mind. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. Flight Crew Training Centre . typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.

long after the event. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. Trap.6. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. such as ATM (Avoid. 9. but it is top secret. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. However the problem is not with forgetting. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. For example. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. 9. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. and Mitigate).5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. even if the correct data has never been learned. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. patterns or mini theories. manageable by most.6.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition.. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. but becomes irretrievable due to interference.

Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. 9. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . in particular responses to RTO. 2001 are slightly different in this respect.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category.6. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. 9. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. The events of September 11. It can only deal with one issue at a time. the assassination of JFK [November 1963].6. this is when the action has become a learned routine. as they are referred to by the date itself. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. however it is a single channel device.

others mental strains. Some of these place physical strains on the body.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. In this respect. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Performance varies with a number of factors. some a combination of both. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. including workload and circadian rhythms. stress and fatigue produce similar results. Our interest is human performance. This chapter covers the effects of stress. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. 9. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.

Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. acute and chronic. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. for example. Critical phases of flight.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. consider that arousal refers to stress. largely impossible. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. and other symptoms. require the crew to be at optimal performance. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. performance actually peaks. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. 10. In the diagram above. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. into the optimum performance range (shaded). upset stomach. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. After a certain point. but too much is exhausting. such as take-off and landing. tension headaches. 10. as stress increases. The right side shows over stimulation. Flight Crew Training Centre . Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. is exhilarating early in the day. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise.3.stimulation. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. from being somewhat dormant. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. As stress increases further. Initially. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. and then falls away. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. Too little stress causes complacency. By the same token. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. performance improves. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter.

their child's occasional problems at school. Because it is short term. and chest pain. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. however. Often. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. They take on too much. and so on. rapid heartbeat. but always late. they tend to be abrupt. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. Flight Crew Training Centre .3. anxiety. 10. dizziness. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. jaw pain. and tense. flatulence. chest pain.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. and irritable bowel syndrome. stomach. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. who suffer acute stress frequently.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. acid stomach. muscular problems including tension headache. generally requiring professional help. and depression. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. have too many irons in the fire. diarrhea. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. back pain. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. heart palpitations. cold hands or feet. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. hypertension. and heart disease. the loss of an important contract. migraines. shortness of breath. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility." Always in a hurry. anxious. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. constipation. shorttempered. the three stress emotions. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. it does. migraine headaches. irritable. They're always in a rush. and it is highly treatable and manageable. a deadline they're rushing to meet. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. If something can go wrong. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. sweaty palms.

which exhibits as either a physical response e. promotion to Captain). There are three broad sources of stressor: life. of dysfunctional families. Chronic stress kills through suicide. People wear down to a final. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. Flight Crew Training Centre . It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. they see their lifestyle. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. Generally. minds and lives. fatal breakdown. hyperventilation. they ignore chronic stress because it is old.3. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors.3. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. It's the stress of poverty. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. More precisely. environmental and cognitive. Chronic stress destroys bodies. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. stroke. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day.g. and. year after year.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. perhaps. or a mental response such as irritability. This could come in many different forms.. They blame their woes on other people and external events.e. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. and sometimes. heart attack. They forget it's there. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. 10. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. chronic stress is not. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new.3. 10. their patterns of interacting with others. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. 10. change in job or responsibilities (i.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. almost comfortable. violence. sweating. heart arrhythmia. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. tremors. even cancer. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. Frequently. the individual gives up searching for solutions. familiar. With no hope.

but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. and mismanage priorities. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans.deck. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG.3. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. Two common examples could be heat and noise. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. In the long-term. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. either on the apron. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. or in the flight. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. Noise arouses the individual. but with a dissimilar function. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind.3. However. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. 10.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. When workload is high. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. 10. this will be covered later in the chapter. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress.

but conversely a sleep debt can build up. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. As in the case of stress. when workload is at an absolute minimum. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). Response time. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. thereby inducing further errors. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Typically.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Depending on the individual. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. workload (physical exertion). The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. It cannot be stored. the range of optimal performance is reached. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. self. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. this can have a negative effect during the cruise.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. after reaching a peak. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Immediately after awakening. This might be due to time since awake. However. Although this can be an effective strategy. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. For example. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. After some time of being awake. 10.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. On a night flight. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). or state of awake ness. this continues to improve performance until. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. with an inability to sleep further. 10.

This is known as jet-lag. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. sleep is deeper rather than longer. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. 10. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. on the wrong time zone.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. which extend the operating day. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. However. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. rather than eastbound which compresses the day.

The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. This chapter will explain what it is. 10.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. Others prefer mental stimulation. this is a potentially dangerous practice. providing awareness and in need of management. In the modern world. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. However it is often quoted without really being explained. In accidents involving human error. is the duty of every crewmember. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. It is another warning flag. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. 10. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. 11. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. 11 Situational Awareness 11. the Flight Crew Training Centre . when conducted in a structured fashion. As any medical practitioner will verify. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. Managing stress and sleep effectively.

one must understand and think ahead.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. fuel and time). passengers and company). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. In addition to three levels of SA. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC.” This is quite complex. It is not just enough to notice a situation. which mitigates part of the problem. and Communicate. Flight Crew Training Centre . Navigate. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. 11. automation modes. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. crew. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. systems. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness.

regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies .uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. After descent initiation. fuel burn. A three-stage model “Avoid. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. if potential problems can be identified in time.descent and leads up to the approach. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. minimums. Flight Crew Training Centre . The trapping phase begins at top-of.vague or incomplete statements 11. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. Prior to descent. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. less time is available for noticing and avoiding.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . during the take-off and landing phases. there is much to be concerned about here.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. fixation and confusion. Results from observations at several different airlines.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. fixation and confusion exist. Trap. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Mitigate” is one solution to the problem.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . Avoiding error is the initial course of action.

this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. 11. 11. too fast etc) must be avoided. attention-sharing. self-monitoring.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. and use the speed brake if necessary. task management and prioritization. scan patterns and checklist use. there is very little time left to correct it. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. too high. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid.” Flight Crew Training Centre . Finally. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. an undesired aircraft state (i.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. However.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). so that we can take action to improve it. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. unstabilized approach. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA.e. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Human error is inevitable. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. 11.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. Skills relating to spatial ability. Should such a state occur. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. communications. contingency planning.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.

dispatch. Project ahead and consider contingencies. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Flight Crew Training Centre . maintenance. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Speak up when you see SA breaking down.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. ATC. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. etc. Rotate attention from plane to path to people .don't fixate. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Focus on the details and scan the big picture.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11.

Helmreich.. Jakarta. 8-12. 1997. 1996. Merritt. R. & Helmreich. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.. CRM: I hate it.. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.. R. P. R. Guangzhou.C..R.L. Taggart. J.. Merritt. & Helmreich.C. Cultural issues in crew resource management. April-May.. Ohio.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). R. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar.L.. stress.0 (International) & 2.C. & Merritt. 1997.C. 1996. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. Ohio. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. A. & Sherman.L. Colombus. A.L. A. 1995. (1996.C..Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich.C. CRM Advocate. & Helmreich. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. Auckland. 1. (1995). (1995). what is it? (Error. Colombus. April. (1995). W.C. Merritt. Flight Crew Training Centre . (1997). April-May. April). A. Wilhelm.S. (1996).R. (1997). Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C. Merritt. New Zealand.C. May 1995. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar.. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. A.. A. R. Merritt. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries.. A. Indonesia. A.L. Ooi. P. (1996). Helmreich. Cultural influences on flight operations. & Merritt..L. April 23-25. (1996). In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. T.J. November 26-28.A. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Merritt. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. November 20-24. Columbus: Ohio State University. (1991).. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. Sydney. R.. 1991.

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