Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

This will be delivered during the ground school phase.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. 2 Modules Content 2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. assisted by the facilitator. and team management skills.2. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . 1. 1. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.2. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. leadership and team management.2. and a series of role-plays.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.

8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.4 Leadership.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.

This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. This is due. HPL. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. 3. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. This includes everything from the design of a tool. design and engine reliability. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. environment.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Despite improvements in technology. and with other humans.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. to the design of a checklist. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. skill and attitude. home. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. in part. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. to the brightness required of an electronic display. knowledge. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element.

Flight Crew Training Centre . Not only is this more predictable and measurable. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. encompassing the best of previous generations. 3. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. Most of these errors are small. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. In particular this means designing for error.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. 3.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. 3. especially on a long.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. 1990. J.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.

Flight Crew Training Centre . A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. the holes will line up. In isolation it is insignificant. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. Rather. but placed together they form a robust wall.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. of which the operating crew are the last link. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Without assigning a principle cause. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. If they can break the chain. It was but it is not an isolated case. Others were management failures. For example. occurring years ago on the drawing board. Occasionally. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. it snaps. Some were latent failures. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. the accident does not occur. the last line of defense. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. 3. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Reason used Swiss cheese. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. but when the mouse tries to take the bait.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation.

Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. Management. and it is up to us to break the chain. because despite the risks.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. at any level. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising.e.e. safe operations are the norm. performing a checklist from memory.) Threats . flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. but as long as the holes do not line up. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard.External influences Errors . (Errors made by other people ATC. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Engineering. the accident chain is broken.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. Threats and errors are unavoidable. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. the start of an accident chain. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. 3.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. Flight Crew Training Centre . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. 3.

Trap. These have been termed warning flags. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. nine common factors existed.12 Avoid. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. 3. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. such as an unstabilized approach. However in all cases. However.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. 3. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though.

The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. collectivism. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . often extended families (with uncles. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Again. Power Distance. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. 4. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. regarding all societies in the world. cohesive in-groups. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. versus its opposite. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. 4. such as organizational. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. Uncertainty Avoidance. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. professional and safety culture.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. (which are predominantly male). aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. On the collectivist side. not to the state.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. 4.

“A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. Unstructured situations are novel. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient.   4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. they try to have as few rules as possible.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. unknown. uncertainty accepting cultures. The opposite type. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It suggests that the followers. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. safety and security measures. but defined from below. but some are more unequal than others. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. of course. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. Power and inequality. and motivated by inner nervous energy. not from above. This represents inequality (more versus less). Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . surprising. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. and different from usual. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to.

including radio operators. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. not what we thought we told them to do. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. by a machine function. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. against a conflicting trend. In particular. Furthermore. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. such as pilots.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. or an organizational culture can prevail. either physical or cognitive. 5. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. navigators and flight engineers. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. (Norbert Wiener) 5. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. there can be anomalies where a professional group. Flight Crew Training Centre . Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck.

The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. 5. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. In particular. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. In practice this does not always happen. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. not to mention the human (social) effects. The latter will not be discussed here. accuracy and reduced costs.

detecting messages in noise. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Poor at at detecting messages in noise.Good inductive.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. Spine. accurate. T. fast. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . Good quantitative assessment. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. Whiteside. narrow range. Poor program. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. inaccurate. J & George. slow communication Better for principles and strategies.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources.” (Good. difficult to re. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. M. Rather. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. 1986. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. P. Poor spoken material. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. slow. easy to re program.

The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. 5. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Although in some systems. with different cognitive skills required. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. – This is a high workload situation. There is a reduced cognitive load. according to any change in tactical goal. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. Overall result is reduced workload.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. In the aviation scenario. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. so the overall workload is drastically reduced.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. vigilance and complacency may become issues. resulting in further reduced workload. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. an area of weakness in interface design. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation.

The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. 5.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Flight Crew Training Centre . 5. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. For this new knowledge and skills are required. In particular. Cali. Habsheim etc). The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. Unfortunately. communications and monitoring. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation.

but not replace.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. or subtle. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. A lack of. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . easy-to-use systems. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. 5. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Consequently. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.

5. Through the use of example and persuasion.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Humans are capable of devising strategies. which is acquired. 6. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. which is assigned. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. and authority. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. In the flight-deck environment. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Flight Crew Training Centre . We must guard against the threats posed by automation.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. the Captain is the designated “leader”. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader.

Personal qualities required are those of courage. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. and a duty. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. with use of the Assess. 6. and be able to maintain team morale. the team and the individual. In addition. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . and Manage Decision-Making Model. 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. will power. initiative and integrity. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. Action. to decide on a course of action. The leader must balance the demands of the task. In fact. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems.

manage and direct the flow of information. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .8. suggestions Giving opinions.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.5 Task To achieve the task. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. With a wide variety of background.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck.

It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. Flight Crew Training Centre . there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. In between.8.8. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.

This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. Together. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. a different style is adopted according to the situation.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. using information available at that time. but not if things are going wrong. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. For most effective leadership.

G (Eds). Ginnett. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. Followers are a vital part of a team.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. since there are a number of nationalities.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. and followership is a skill in its own right. Hughes.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. supportive followers are as important as a leader. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. Flight Crew Training Centre .10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. R. cited by Kern. While this might be an individual’s view. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. The optimum gradient. R & Curphy. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. T. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. active/uncritical and active/critical. For successful team performance. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. RE. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. along with good communication skills. passive/critical. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. 6. The role is much like that of a chairman. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. G2. 6. 1988. 1997.

because they actively support without thinking. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. Flight Crew Training Centre . The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. unless identified and brought “back onside”. The only way to ensure this is.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. 6. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. Sheep are akin to human automatons. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. Making a good first impression is vital. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. Survivors are the Company men. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up.

So. as much as 90%.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . culture plays a large part.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. 7. the words used tend to be very important. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. rank could impinge on communication as well.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. and very rarely are raised voices heard. Barriers to communication are also identified. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. In the case of Jade Cargo International. While modern flight decks are well insulated. along with methods of eliminating them. This chapter describes the principles of communication. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. noise is still a factor.e. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. Between a Captain and a First Officer. insulting. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. in communication within a crew. However. degrading language. 7.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7.

This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. and the manner. whether on the needs of others or your own. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. the focus. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. aggressive. Flight Crew Training Centre . 7. 7. assertive. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others.4. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. supportive and submissive.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. two aspects of the message content will be considered. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced.

When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.downs. 7. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”.4. and will likely isolate the aggressor. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. However. not recommended but part of life. In a non-critical situation.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. such as during training or non-normal situations. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. are avoided at all times. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.4. Flight Crew Training Centre . They put themselves down. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. Therefore. It is unlikely to motivate the team. 7. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. However this may change depending on circumstances. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. Referring to the matrix.

and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. If someone is submissive. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. If the other person is submissive. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Flight Crew Training Centre . An assertive response might also be effective.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. Dealing with aggression is not easy. but leads to good understanding when accomplished.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. it is likely communication that will break down completely. their needs will be overlooked. In other words. will find a style that works well for them. be supportive. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. Each individual and in fact every team.

Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. which will lead to better results. Differences in perceiving motives.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. No one makes major concessions. collaborate or compromise. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Animosities can develop. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. There is more than one way to do anything. trust and support will deteriorate. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. Flight Crew Training Centre . Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. test their position and beliefs. If conflict does occur. When conflict is dealt with constructively. High respect for mutual support. actions and situations.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. words. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. When sides are chosen. 7. Unwillingness to work through issues. the results may be positive or negative. and stretch their imagination. No one person or idea is perfect. objectives and values. You must give to get. Assertive and cooperative. the stage is set for potential conflict. productivity will diminish or stop. Differing expectations of outcomes . communications may breakdown.favorable versus unfavorable.

Advocacy. Flight Crew Training Centre . and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. 8. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. However. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Conflict Resolution. It is not which model that is used that is important. once in a while. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. or good or bad outcomes. Action and Critique. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. either for routine or novel situations. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. It is the end result that we are interested in. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. rather that a model is used.

2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. further modification to the RMM was required.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. 8. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. 8. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. as well as the appropriate CRM principals.2.2. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. Flight Crew Training Centre . During each of the phases specific guidance is provided. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit.

questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . seeking more information about it. its implications and how much time is available. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. By staying below the line as much as possible. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line).Information seeking. the problem and the solution.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. there are two typical responses. Flight Crew Training Centre . to make sure we fully understand the implications. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. This does not always produce the best solution. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.

The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. On the other hand. is a valuable problem. Time can be considered as. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. EFIS architecture. In all cases. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). immediate action is required. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. may at best get a query in response. critical.solving resource. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Once a time frame has been established. this limits the opportunity for assessment. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. but will probably be accepted. available and required. when there is little available.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE].  Time Critical situations require immediate action. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. others may be less time dependent. 8. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. using a traffic light system. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. In the latter case. A solution in the form of a question however. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. Open questions allow more options.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. losing vital feedback. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum.

propose. prioritize. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. test understanding. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. Good teamwork needs good communication. the Captain must manage.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. 8. prioritize. test understanding propose. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. test understanding. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. NAVIGATE. seek information. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. Flight Crew Training Centre . This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying.

When the process is complete. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. However. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. all the circles are the same size. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. the task need is paramount. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. including the navigation away from terrain. For example in the first stages of a diversion. Once this is under control. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. Once the Group is informed and placated. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. It is a circular or iterative process. Flight Crew Training Centre . the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. obstacles and weather. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. An important point here is that you do not rush. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. 8. the team and the individual. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. it is time to manage.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. 8.

This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. output functions and an internal processing function.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. 9. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. but functionally can be quite accurate. these are known as “mental models”. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. Flight Crew Training Centre . do something with that information and then act on it. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. we receive information. In the same way. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works.

sound. even though they do not have the loudest voice. 9. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. smell and taste. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task.4. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. if we miss-perceive an event.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. but it is not being ignored completely. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. 9. so much that. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name).4.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. sound and touch. During a busy. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. This is quite normal. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . Perception is incredibly powerful. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. are actually switching from one to the other. sight. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. 9. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this.4 Input functions 9. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. not all of them get through to the processing stage. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. touch.4.

The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. 9. expect 150 by xxx. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information.6. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. the original message has been replayed by the mind. you have as little as 0. Flight Crew Training Centre . for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. 9. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. speed 310. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. descend 180. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem.6.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. Another type of memory is sensory memory. short-term and long-term. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. which really belongs with the input functions. unless it is consciously being dealt with.6. and contact 119.6 Processing Functions 9. and retained by conscious attention. 9. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. Sensory memory data is lost by decay.72”.

whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. However the problem is not with forgetting.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. long after the event..4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. For example. 9. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. manageable by most. such as ATM (Avoid. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. even if the correct data has never been learned. Trap. and Mitigate). Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. but it is top secret. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory.6. 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. patterns or mini theories. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available.6. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver ….

as they are referred to by the date itself. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. It can only deal with one issue at a time. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. 9.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence.6. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. in particular responses to RTO. 9. 2001 are slightly different in this respect.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. The events of September 11.6. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. this is when the action has become a learned routine. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. however it is a single channel device. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially.

Our interest is human performance. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Performance varies with a number of factors. some a combination of both. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. others mental strains. This chapter covers the effects of stress. 9.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Some of these place physical strains on the body. including workload and circadian rhythms. In this respect. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. stress and fatigue produce similar results.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre .

is exhilarating early in the day. but too much is exhausting. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. Flight Crew Training Centre . as stress increases. performance improves. such as take-off and landing. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. After a certain point. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. 10. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Critical phases of flight. into the optimum performance range (shaded). As stress increases further. and then falls away. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short.3. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. 10. Initially. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. upset stomach. from being somewhat dormant. performance actually peaks. require the crew to be at optimal performance. largely impossible. acute and chronic. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human.stimulation. Too little stress causes complacency. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. for example. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. In the diagram above.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. By the same token.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. and other symptoms. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. tension headaches. The right side shows over stimulation. consider that arousal refers to stress.

they tend to be abrupt. Flight Crew Training Centre . most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. anxious.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. muscular problems including tension headache. Because it is short term. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. and chest pain. Often. jaw pain. cold hands or feet. and it is highly treatable and manageable. rapid heartbeat. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. constipation.3. chest pain.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. They're always in a rush. acid stomach. and tense. 10. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and irritable bowel syndrome. irritable. generally requiring professional help. migraine headaches. If something can go wrong. dizziness. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. however. shorttempered. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. shortness of breath. anxiety. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. and depression. and so on. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability." Always in a hurry. diarrhea. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. who suffer acute stress frequently. the loss of an important contract. a deadline they're rushing to meet. have too many irons in the fire.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. migraines. heart palpitations. the three stress emotions. hypertension. and heart disease. their child's occasional problems at school. back pain. flatulence. stomach. They take on too much. sweaty palms. but always late. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. it does.

Generally. They forget it's there. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. change in job or responsibilities (i. tremors. chronic stress is not. and. year after year.3.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. the individual gives up searching for solutions. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. familiar. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. fatal breakdown. or a mental response such as irritability. sweating. almost comfortable. hyperventilation. 10. their patterns of interacting with others. Chronic stress destroys bodies.3. they see their lifestyle. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. violence. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. promotion to Captain).e. With no hope. 10.. and sometimes. This could come in many different forms. More precisely. which exhibits as either a physical response e. heart attack. Chronic stress kills through suicide.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. even cancer. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. heart arrhythmia. stroke. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. of dysfunctional families. People wear down to a final. Frequently. environmental and cognitive. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. perhaps. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management.g. It's the stress of poverty. minds and lives.3. They blame their woes on other people and external events. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. 10. Flight Crew Training Centre . This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it.

Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. In the long-term. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. or in the flight. 10. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. 10. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. However. Noise arouses the individual. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. this will be covered later in the chapter. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. but with a dissimilar function. Two common examples could be heat and noise. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. either on the apron.deck. When workload is high.3. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). or the selecting SPD instead of HDG.3. and mismanage priorities. especially when it involves an operating pilot.

Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. this continues to improve performance until. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. 10. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Immediately after awakening. As in the case of stress.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. This might be due to time since awake. when workload is at an absolute minimum. but conversely a sleep debt can build up.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. For example.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. Response time. After some time of being awake. thereby inducing further errors. On a night flight. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . after reaching a peak. 10. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. self. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). this can have a negative effect during the cruise. the range of optimal performance is reached. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. Depending on the individual. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. Although this can be an effective strategy. Typically. However. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. with an inability to sleep further. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. workload (physical exertion).Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. or state of awake ness. It cannot be stored.

6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . inattentive and has an increased reaction time. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. However. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. sleep is deeper rather than longer. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. on the wrong time zone. This is known as jet-lag. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. which extend the operating day. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. 10. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. rather than eastbound which compresses the day.

computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. As any medical practitioner will verify. 10. In the modern world. This chapter will explain what it is.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. 11 Situational Awareness 11. the Flight Crew Training Centre . This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. Managing stress and sleep effectively.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. is the duty of every crewmember. providing awareness and in need of management. It is another warning flag. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. Others prefer mental stimulation.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. when conducted in a structured fashion. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. 11. However it is often quoted without really being explained. 10. this is a potentially dangerous practice.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. In accidents involving human error.

the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. In a well-known phrase: Aviate.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. It is not just enough to notice a situation. one must understand and think ahead. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. Navigate. fuel and time). and Communicate. systems.” This is quite complex. crew. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. passengers and company). those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. 11. Flight Crew Training Centre . automation modes. In addition to three levels of SA. which mitigates part of the problem. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.

contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively .descent and leads up to the approach. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. minimums. fixation and confusion exist.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . if potential problems can be identified in time. Flight Crew Training Centre .information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Prior to descent. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. After descent initiation. fixation and confusion.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. Trap. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. there is much to be concerned about here.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. A three-stage model “Avoid. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . during the take-off and landing phases. fuel burn. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. The trapping phase begins at top-of. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress.vague or incomplete statements 11. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. Results from observations at several different airlines.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.

Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA].e. Finally.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. unstabilized approach. an undesired aircraft state (i. there is very little time left to correct it. task management and prioritization. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. scan patterns and checklist use. too high. 11.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. Human error is inevitable. attention-sharing. However. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. and use the speed brake if necessary. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. Should such a state occur. contingency planning. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. 11. 11. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. self-monitoring. Skills relating to spatial ability. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].” Flight Crew Training Centre . if mitigation seems to be the key factor. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. so that we can take action to improve it. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. too fast etc) must be avoided. communications. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles.

maintenance. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. etc. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Speak up when you see SA breaking down.don't fixate. ATC. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Flight Crew Training Centre . Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Project ahead and consider contingencies.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. dispatch. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin.

(1996).L. April-May. 1997. A. what is it? (Error.L. Indonesia.C. Merritt.. April. R. Cultural issues in crew resource management.J..C.. & Sherman. Columbus: Ohio State University. Ooi. R. R. & Merritt.. 1996. Taggart.. Ohio. A.C. T. (1995). and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar.L. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. 1991.S. April-May. (1991). April 23-25.A.. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. & Helmreich. R.C. stress. R.C. (1997). Merritt.R. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Colombus.0 (International) & 2. Cultural influences on flight operations. Sydney. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.. & Merritt.C.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. New Zealand. A.R. Guangzhou. Merritt. P. P. CRM Advocate. November 26-28. May 1995. A. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.. (1996). Colombus. Ohio.C.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4).C.C. 1997. W.L. (1996. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium.. 1995.. & Helmreich. Auckland. A. Helmreich. Jakarta. (1996). University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. A. Flight Crew Training Centre . Merritt. A. (1995). R. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. J... 8-12. & Helmreich. (1995). Merritt. Helmreich. (1997). Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China.. 1. 1996. Wilhelm.L. Merritt. November 20-24. April).. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. CRM: I hate it. A. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries..L.

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