Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

2.2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . 1. assisted by the facilitator. and team management skills. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. leadership and team management.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. 2 Modules Content 2. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. 1.2. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. and a series of role-plays. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.

8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.4 Leadership.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.

This is due.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. in part.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. knowledge. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. and with other humans. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. 3. HPL. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. This includes everything from the design of a tool. Flight Crew Training Centre . 3. environment. skill and attitude. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. to the design of a checklist. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. design and engine reliability. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. home. Despite improvements in technology. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline.

especially on a long. Most of these errors are small. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. 3.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Not only is this more predictable and measurable.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Flight Crew Training Centre . Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. J. encompassing the best of previous generations. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. 3. In particular this means designing for error. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. 3. 1990. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.

a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Flight Crew Training Centre . leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. Reason used Swiss cheese. Rather. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. but placed together they form a robust wall. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. 3. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. it snaps.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. It was but it is not an isolated case. but when the mouse tries to take the bait.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. the last line of defense. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. Without assigning a principle cause. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Others were management failures. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. If they can break the chain. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. Some were latent failures. In isolation it is insignificant. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. For example. Occasionally.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. the accident does not occur. the holes will line up. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. occurring years ago on the drawing board. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. of which the operating crew are the last link. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years.

A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. performing a checklist from memory. (Errors made by other people ATC. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. safe operations are the norm. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. Engineering. Management. Flight Crew Training Centre . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. the accident chain is broken.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.e. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. the start of an accident chain. and it is up to us to break the chain. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events.e.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. 3. but as long as the holes do not line up. at any level. because despite the risks.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e. Threats and errors are unavoidable. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i.) Threats . external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. 3.External influences Errors . There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense.

12 Avoid. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. However in all cases. 3.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. These have been termed warning flags. nine common factors existed.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. Trap. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. 3. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. However. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. such as an unstabilized approach. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry.

we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. regarding all societies in the world. 4. Uncertainty Avoidance. 4. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. collectivism. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. versus its opposite. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. professional and safety culture.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. such as organizational.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. On the collectivist side. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. (which are predominantly male). the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. not to the state. Power Distance. Again. often extended families (with uncles. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. cohesive in-groups.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. 4.

and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. uncertainty accepting cultures. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. Power and inequality. they try to have as few rules as possible. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. and different from usual. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. not from above. of course. but defined from below. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. It suggests that the followers. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . safety and security measures. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. and motivated by inner nervous energy. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. but some are more unequal than others. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. The opposite type. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. This represents inequality (more versus less). surprising.   4.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. Unstructured situations are novel. unknown.

this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. such as pilots. navigators and flight engineers. including radio operators. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. or an organizational culture can prevail. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. there can be anomalies where a professional group. either physical or cognitive. 5. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. against a conflicting trend. Furthermore. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. Flight Crew Training Centre . it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. (Norbert Wiener) 5.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. by a machine function. not what we thought we told them to do. In particular.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues.

The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. In practice this does not always happen.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. The latter will not be discussed here.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. not to mention the human (social) effects. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. accuracy and reduced costs. Flight Crew Training Centre . same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. 5. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. In particular. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation.

Whiteside. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. Rather. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. accurate. J & George. M.Good inductive.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. 1986. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . easy to re program. fast. P. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. inaccurate. Spine. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel.” (Good. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Poor spoken material. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Good quantitative assessment. error correction Good at error correction Specialized.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. narrow range. Poor program. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. difficult to re. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. detecting messages in noise. slow. T.

Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. Overall result is reduced workload. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. – This is a high workload situation. 5. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. according to any change in tactical goal. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. an area of weakness in interface design. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. In the aviation scenario. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. vigilance and complacency may become issues. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. with different cognitive skills required.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. Although in some systems. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . There is a reduced cognitive load. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. resulting in further reduced workload. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation.

It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. will disengage or will revert to another mode. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. 5. Cali. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. For this new knowledge and skills are required. 5. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. In particular. communications and monitoring.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Unfortunately. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. Habsheim etc). the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified.

5. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. A lack of.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. easy-to-use systems. 5. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. but not replace. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . or subtle. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Consequently. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.

yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. 6. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. and authority. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. In the flight-deck environment. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. the Captain is the designated “leader”. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. There is a fundamental difference between leadership.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. which is acquired.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. 5. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. Flight Crew Training Centre . and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. which is assigned. Humans are capable of devising strategies. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Through the use of example and persuasion.

6. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. will power. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. the team and the individual. Personal qualities required are those of courage. In fact. and Manage Decision-Making Model. and be able to maintain team morale. initiative and integrity. 6.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . The leader must balance the demands of the task. Action. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. with use of the Assess. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. and a duty. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. to decide on a course of action. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. In addition.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals.

With a wide variety of background. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.8. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.5 Task To achieve the task. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. suggestions Giving opinions.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. manage and direct the flow of information. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.

coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.8. In between.8.8. Flight Crew Training Centre .3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.

Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. Together. but not if things are going wrong. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. a different style is adopted according to the situation. For most effective leadership. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. using information available at that time. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions.

active/uncritical and active/critical. 6. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. The optimum gradient. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. T. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. Ginnett.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. Followers are a vital part of a team. and followership is a skill in its own right.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. The role is much like that of a chairman. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. supportive followers are as important as a leader. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. passive/critical. For successful team performance. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. While this might be an individual’s view. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. Flight Crew Training Centre . encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. RE. 1988. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. cited by Kern. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. G2. G (Eds). “Kelly’s” (Kelly. 1997. R & Curphy. R. along with good communication skills. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. Hughes. since there are a number of nationalities. 6.

Survivors are the Company men. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. unless identified and brought “back onside”. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Making a good first impression is vital. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. because they actively support without thinking. 6.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Flight Crew Training Centre . Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Sheep are akin to human automatons. The only way to ensure this is. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll.

e. Between a Captain and a First Officer. the words used tend to be very important.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. While modern flight decks are well insulated.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. insulting. rank could impinge on communication as well. culture plays a large part. So. and very rarely are raised voices heard.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. degrading language.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. However. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. as much as 90%. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. Barriers to communication are also identified. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. along with methods of eliminating them. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. in communication within a crew. This chapter describes the principles of communication. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. In the case of Jade Cargo International. 7. noise is still a factor. 7.

The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. the focus. 7. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. assertive. and the manner. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. whether on the needs of others or your own. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. supportive and submissive. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. aggressive.4. two aspects of the message content will be considered. Flight Crew Training Centre . 7. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required.

When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. 7. not recommended but part of life. Flight Crew Training Centre . Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. 7. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony.4. and will likely isolate the aggressor. Therefore. In a non-critical situation. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. such as during training or non-normal situations. However this may change depending on circumstances. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. However. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. Referring to the matrix. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put.downs. It is unlikely to motivate the team. are avoided at all times.4. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves.4. They put themselves down.

will find a style that works well for them. their needs will be overlooked.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. Dealing with aggression is not easy. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. it is likely communication that will break down completely. be supportive.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. If the other person is submissive. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. In other words. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. If someone is submissive. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. Flight Crew Training Centre . The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Each individual and in fact every team. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. An assertive response might also be effective. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication.

and the damage is usually difficult to repair. Animosities can develop. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. words. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Differences in perceiving motives. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. When sides are chosen.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. No one person or idea is perfect. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. If conflict does occur. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. Differing expectations of outcomes . actions and situations.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. and stretch their imagination. There is more than one way to do anything.favorable versus unfavorable. No one makes major concessions. productivity will diminish or stop. the results may be positive or negative.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. trust and support will deteriorate. When conflict is dealt with constructively. collaborate or compromise. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. Unwillingness to work through issues. High respect for mutual support. objectives and values. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. test their position and beliefs. which will lead to better results. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. the stage is set for potential conflict. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. Assertive and cooperative. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. 7. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. Flight Crew Training Centre . communications may breakdown. You must give to get.

8. once in a while. or good or bad outcomes. Action and Critique.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. It is not which model that is used that is important. Flight Crew Training Centre . 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. rather that a model is used. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. Advocacy. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. It is the end result that we are interested in. Conflict Resolution. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. However. either for routine or novel situations.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world.

further modification to the RMM was required.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.2.2. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. 8.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. 8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures.

Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . Whenever a problem is encountered at work. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. By staying below the line as much as possible. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. its implications and how much time is available. there are two typical responses. Flight Crew Training Centre . Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. the problem and the solution. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action.Information seeking. to make sure we fully understand the implications. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). The situation can be considered in two separate domains. seeking more information about it. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. This does not always produce the best solution. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8.

critical. A solution in the form of a question however. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. Once a time frame has been established. when there is little available. Time can be considered as. is a valuable problem. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). In all cases. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. using a traffic light system. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time.solving resource. On the other hand. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. may at best get a query in response. this limits the opportunity for assessment. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . losing vital feedback.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. others may be less time dependent. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. A fast decision may not always be the correct one.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. Open questions allow more options. but will probably be accepted. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. In the latter case. 8. available and required. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. EFIS architecture. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). it is possible to prioritize accordingly. immediate action is required. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?].

QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. Flight Crew Training Centre . delegation] Remember that in complex situations. test understanding propose. 8. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. Good teamwork needs good communication. propose. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. NAVIGATE.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. prioritize. prioritize. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. test understanding. test understanding. seek information. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. the Captain must manage. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option.

the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Once the Group is informed and placated.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. 8. it is time to manage. obstacles and weather. the team and the individual. the task need is paramount.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. An important point here is that you do not rush. When the process is complete. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. For example in the first stages of a diversion. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. Once this is under control. all the circles are the same size. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Flight Crew Training Centre . including the navigation away from terrain. However. It is a circular or iterative process. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. 8.

An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. In the same way.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. 9. we receive information. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. do something with that information and then act on it. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. these are known as “mental models”. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. output functions and an internal processing function. Flight Crew Training Centre . but functionally can be quite accurate. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding.

sound. but only a limited signal can be conveyed.4 Input functions 9. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. During a busy.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. not all of them get through to the processing stage. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. 9. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. smell and taste. but it is not being ignored completely.4. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. Perception is incredibly powerful. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. so much that.4. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . sight.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. sound and touch. are actually switching from one to the other. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. touch. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). even though they do not have the loudest voice. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. if we miss-perceive an event.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. This is quite normal. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation.4. 9. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. 9.

6 Processing Functions 9. short-term and long-term. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information.6.72”.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. descend 180. speed 310. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. and retained by conscious attention. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. 9. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. unless it is consciously being dealt with. 9. the original message has been replayed by the mind. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. 9.6. Flight Crew Training Centre .6. which really belongs with the input functions. you have as little as 0. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. and contact 119. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. expect 150 by xxx. Another type of memory is sensory memory.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.

It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. 9. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. but it is top secret. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. However the problem is not with forgetting. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. Flight Crew Training Centre . Trap. For example. patterns or mini theories.6. even if the correct data has never been learned. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree.6. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. long after the event. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. but with inability to retrieve or access the information.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition.. 9. and Mitigate). Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. manageable by most. such as ATM (Avoid. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. but becomes irretrievable due to interference.

the assassination of JFK [November 1963].6. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. 9. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. this is when the action has become a learned routine. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. 9. in particular responses to RTO. It can only deal with one issue at a time. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. The events of September 11. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. however it is a single channel device. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially.6. as they are referred to by the date itself.

It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. some a combination of both. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. stress and fatigue produce similar results. others mental strains.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. including workload and circadian rhythms. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. 9. Our interest is human performance. In this respect.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. This chapter covers the effects of stress. Some of these place physical strains on the body. Performance varies with a number of factors.

A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. 10.stimulation. As stress increases further. After a certain point. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. such as take-off and landing. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under.3. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. consider that arousal refers to stress. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. By the same token. and other symptoms. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. 10. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. and then falls away. The right side shows over stimulation. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. but too much is exhausting. performance actually peaks. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. Critical phases of flight. In the diagram above. for example. Flight Crew Training Centre . is exhilarating early in the day. require the crew to be at optimal performance. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. acute and chronic. upset stomach. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. tension headaches. into the optimum performance range (shaded). overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. from being somewhat dormant. Initially. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. Too little stress causes complacency. as stress increases. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. largely impossible.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. performance improves. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger.

" Always in a hurry. Often. rapid heartbeat. muscular problems including tension headache. and irritable bowel syndrome. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. the loss of an important contract. sweaty palms. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. it does. anxiety. flatulence. jaw pain. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. stomach. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. heart palpitations. they tend to be abrupt. acid stomach. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. and it is highly treatable and manageable. back pain. 10. and depression. If something can go wrong. and so on. shorttempered. shortness of breath. and tense. who suffer acute stress frequently. migraines. anxious. constipation.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. and chest pain. however. their child's occasional problems at school. the three stress emotions.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. They're always in a rush. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. generally requiring professional help. but always late. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. chest pain. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. cold hands or feet. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. Because it is short term. They take on too much. diarrhea.3. a deadline they're rushing to meet. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. and heart disease. hypertension. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. irritable. migraine headaches. have too many irons in the fire. dizziness.

Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. the individual gives up searching for solutions. sweating. 10. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. change in job or responsibilities (i. More precisely. They blame their woes on other people and external events.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. With no hope. year after year.3. hyperventilation. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time.e. environmental and cognitive. Generally. heart attack.g.. Flight Crew Training Centre . heart arrhythmia. It's the stress of poverty.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. violence. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. or a mental response such as irritability. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. Frequently. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. and. tremors. 10. 10. stroke. perhaps. People wear down to a final. even cancer. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. promotion to Captain). chronic stress is not.3. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. of dysfunctional families. which exhibits as either a physical response e. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. Chronic stress kills through suicide. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. their patterns of interacting with others. Chronic stress destroys bodies. they see their lifestyle. minds and lives. They forget it's there. This could come in many different forms. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition.3. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. fatal breakdown. almost comfortable. and sometimes. familiar.

This is referred to as “tunnel vision”.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . or in the flight. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine).6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. but with a dissimilar function. 10. this will be covered later in the chapter. Noise arouses the individual.3. Two common examples could be heat and noise. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. In the long-term. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one.3. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation.deck. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. especially when it involves an operating pilot. and mismanage priorities. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. When workload is high. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. However. 10. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. either on the apron. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG.

Response time. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. It cannot be stored.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. they may become bogged down in processing the data. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. Depending on the individual. As in the case of stress.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. with an inability to sleep further. when workload is at an absolute minimum. For example. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). thereby inducing further errors. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. After some time of being awake. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. this continues to improve performance until. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. However. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. This might be due to time since awake. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. 10. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. 10. workload (physical exertion). Typically.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. or state of awake ness. Although this can be an effective strategy. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. the range of optimal performance is reached. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. self. Immediately after awakening. after reaching a peak. On a night flight. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM).

The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. 10. This is known as jet-lag. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. However.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. sleep is deeper rather than longer. on the wrong time zone. which extend the operating day. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal.

8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. when conducted in a structured fashion.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. However it is often quoted without really being explained. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. 11 Situational Awareness 11.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. It is another warning flag. this is a potentially dangerous practice. providing awareness and in need of management. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. In accidents involving human error. As any medical practitioner will verify. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. 10. Others prefer mental stimulation. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. 10. This chapter will explain what it is. In the modern world. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. is the duty of every crewmember. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. 11. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. Managing stress and sleep effectively. the Flight Crew Training Centre .

crew. passengers and company). Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. automation modes. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. Navigate. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection.” This is quite complex. systems. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. fuel and time). In a well-known phrase: Aviate. It is not just enough to notice a situation. Flight Crew Training Centre . those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. and Communicate. one must understand and think ahead. which mitigates part of the problem. 11. In addition to three levels of SA. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path.

A three-stage model “Avoid. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. fixation and confusion exist. if potential problems can be identified in time.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. there is much to be concerned about here. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . fixation and confusion. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.vague or incomplete statements 11. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Prior to descent. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . The trapping phase begins at top-of. fuel burn. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. After descent initiation. during the take-off and landing phases. Trap. Flight Crew Training Centre . less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.descent and leads up to the approach. minimums. Results from observations at several different airlines.

and use the speed brake if necessary. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. unstabilized approach.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. communications. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. However. self-monitoring. scan patterns and checklist use. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA.e. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. contingency planning. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. 11. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. too fast etc) must be avoided. task management and prioritization. attention-sharing. Skills relating to spatial ability. Finally. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. 11. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. too high. an undesired aircraft state (i. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. there is very little time left to correct it. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Human error is inevitable. 11. Should such a state occur. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.” Flight Crew Training Centre . so that we can take action to improve it. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.

Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . etc.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Project ahead and consider contingencies.don't fixate. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. maintenance. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. dispatch. Flight Crew Training Centre . ATC.

1997. A. Indonesia. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries.L. & Helmreich.C.R. April). April-May. Columbus: Ohio State University... Flight Crew Training Centre . R. May 1995.. & Merritt.. Merritt. & Merritt. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. W. A. & Helmreich. A. (1997). Cultural influences on flight operations.C. CRM Advocate. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. 1. 1995. Ooi.L.L. A. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium... 1996. November 20-24. Merritt. (1995). Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. 1997.L. (1996).C. R. R. Sydney. CRM: I hate it.A. (1995). University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. & Sherman.C. P. Helmreich. P. J.. Merritt.L. Jakarta.R..C. (1991).. (1995). R. Wilhelm. A.C. & Helmreich.C. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. November 26-28. April 23-25. New Zealand. R. Ohio. Merritt. 1991. Helmreich. Taggart. Auckland. 1996. what is it? (Error... and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. Colombus. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1996. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. Colombus.. (1996). April-May. A. (1997). Merritt. Ohio. R. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. 8-12. Cultural issues in crew resource management..C.S.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4)... A. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. (1996). Guangzhou. A.L. T.C.0 (International) & 2. April.J. Merritt. stress.