Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

Page: TOC-1

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

Page: TOC-3

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

Page: TOC-3

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

Page: 4

CRM Manual

Date: January 2008

1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.2. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. 1.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). assisted by the facilitator.2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.2. leadership and team management. 1.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. 2 Modules Content 2. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. and team management skills. and a series of role-plays.

4 Leadership. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.

3. in part. This includes everything from the design of a tool. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. to the brightness required of an electronic display. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. environment. to the design of a checklist. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. skill and attitude. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. design and engine reliability. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. 3. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. This is due. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. home. HPL.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. and with other humans. knowledge. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Despite improvements in technology. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills.

especially on a long. Not only is this more predictable and measurable.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. 1990. In particular this means designing for error. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. 3. 3.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. 3. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. J. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. encompassing the best of previous generations. Most of these errors are small. Flight Crew Training Centre . but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error.

the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. Others were management failures. If they can break the chain. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. For example. the last line of defense. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. Occasionally. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. Rather. In isolation it is insignificant. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. the holes will line up. 3. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. of which the operating crew are the last link. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Reason used Swiss cheese. Without assigning a principle cause. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. It was but it is not an isolated case. the accident does not occur. Some were latent failures. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. it snaps. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. occurring years ago on the drawing board. but placed together they form a robust wall. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense.

at any level.e. 3. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. and it is up to us to break the chain. Flight Crew Training Centre . A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. 3. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. Threats and errors are unavoidable.External influences Errors . The last layer of defense is the flight-crew.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. Engineering. safe operations are the norm. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. the start of an accident chain. because despite the risks. Management. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. (Errors made by other people ATC.) Threats . performing a checklist from memory. the accident chain is broken. but as long as the holes do not line up. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.e.

3. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. 3.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. Trap. These have been termed warning flags. nine common factors existed. However in all cases. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. such as an unstabilized approach.12 Avoid. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. However. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors.

having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. versus its opposite. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . collectivism. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. On the collectivist side. Again. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. regarding all societies in the world. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. (which are predominantly male). “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. 4. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. Power Distance. 4. often extended families (with uncles. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. 4. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. professional and safety culture. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. Uncertainty Avoidance. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. such as organizational. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. cohesive in-groups. not to the state.

Power and inequality. The opposite type. but defined from below. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. This represents inequality (more versus less). “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it.   4. they try to have as few rules as possible. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. uncertainty accepting cultures. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. Unstructured situations are novel. safety and security measures. and different from usual.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. of course. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. but some are more unequal than others. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . and not expected by their environment to express emotions. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. and motivated by inner nervous energy. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. not from above. unknown. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. It suggests that the followers. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. surprising.

2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. either physical or cognitive. Furthermore.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. such as pilots. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. not what we thought we told them to do. Flight Crew Training Centre . though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. In particular. (Norbert Wiener) 5. or an organizational culture can prevail. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. 5. against a conflicting trend. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. navigators and flight engineers. there can be anomalies where a professional group.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. including radio operators. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. by a machine function. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation.

5.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. In practice this does not always happen. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. In particular. not to mention the human (social) effects. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. The latter will not be discussed here. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. accuracy and reduced costs.

Good inductive. Rather. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. Poor program.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. narrow range.” (Good. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. easy to re program. Good quantitative assessment. T. fast. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. P. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. J & George. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. Whiteside. inaccurate. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. accurate. Poor spoken material. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Spine. M. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. difficult to re. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. 1986. slow.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. detecting messages in noise. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre .

In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. vigilance and complacency may become issues. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. Overall result is reduced workload. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. according to any change in tactical goal. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. with different cognitive skills required. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. an area of weakness in interface design. Pilots will dynamically move between levels.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. Although in some systems. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. resulting in further reduced workload. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . – This is a high workload situation. In the aviation scenario. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. 5. There is a reduced cognitive load. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting.

Cali. For this new knowledge and skills are required. Unfortunately. communications and monitoring. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. In particular.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Flight Crew Training Centre . having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. 5. 5. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. Habsheim etc).

These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . easy-to-use systems.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. 5.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. 5. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. A lack of. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. or subtle. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. but not replace. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. Consequently.

the Captain is the designated “leader”.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. which is acquired. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Humans are capable of devising strategies. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. which is assigned. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. 6. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. Through the use of example and persuasion. 5. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. In the flight-deck environment. Flight Crew Training Centre . Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. and authority. We must guard against the threats posed by automation.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers.

An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. Personal qualities required are those of courage. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . Action. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. 6. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. and a duty. 6. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. and Manage Decision-Making Model. The leader must balance the demands of the task. initiative and integrity. and be able to maintain team morale. In fact. In addition. with use of the Assess. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. will power. to decide on a course of action. the team and the individual. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility.

manage and direct the flow of information. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.5 Task To achieve the task.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . With a wide variety of background.8.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. suggestions Giving opinions.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.

how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.8.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.8.8. Flight Crew Training Centre . It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. In between.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.

Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. but not if things are going wrong. Together. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. using information available at that time. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. a different style is adopted according to the situation. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. For most effective leadership. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group.

which may differ between individuals and national cultures. For successful team performance. 6. R & Curphy. 1988. passive/critical. and followership is a skill in its own right. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. 6. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. since there are a number of nationalities. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. cited by Kern. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. along with good communication skills. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. Ginnett. supportive followers are as important as a leader. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. The optimum gradient. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. G (Eds). active/uncritical and active/critical. Hughes. Followers are a vital part of a team. G2.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. R. RE. T.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. Flight Crew Training Centre . While this might be an individual’s view. 1997. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. The role is much like that of a chairman.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution.

because they actively support without thinking. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. unless identified and brought “back onside”. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Survivors are the Company men. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. Making a good first impression is vital.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. The only way to ensure this is. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Sheep are akin to human automatons. Flight Crew Training Centre . They are also the foundation for teambuilding. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. 6. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation.

Barriers to communication are also identified. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. While modern flight decks are well insulated. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. 7.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. degrading language. insulting.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. the words used tend to be very important. culture plays a large part. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. along with methods of eliminating them. 7. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. and very rarely are raised voices heard. rank could impinge on communication as well. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. In the case of Jade Cargo International.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. Between a Captain and a First Officer. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. in communication within a crew. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. This chapter describes the principles of communication. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language.e. noise is still a factor. However. as much as 90%. So.

and the manner. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. whether on the needs of others or your own. 7. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. two aspects of the message content will be considered. assertive. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. the focus. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. aggressive.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. Flight Crew Training Centre . supportive and submissive.4. 7.

4. It is unlikely to motivate the team.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. not recommended but part of life. However this may change depending on circumstances. In a non-critical situation. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. Referring to the matrix. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. 7.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. 7.4. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. and will likely isolate the aggressor. Flight Crew Training Centre . Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. They put themselves down. However. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. such as during training or non-normal situations. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. Therefore. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. are avoided at all times.downs.

The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Flight Crew Training Centre . These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. it is likely communication that will break down completely. An assertive response might also be effective. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. their needs will be overlooked. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. If someone is submissive. In other words. Each individual and in fact every team. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. If the other person is submissive. be supportive.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. will find a style that works well for them.

Animosities can develop. 7. trust and support will deteriorate. Assertive and cooperative.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important.favorable versus unfavorable. Differing expectations of outcomes . No one person or idea is perfect. the stage is set for potential conflict. productivity will diminish or stop. When conflict is dealt with constructively.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. Differences in perceiving motives. collaborate or compromise. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. If conflict does occur.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. There is more than one way to do anything. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. Unwillingness to work through issues.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. and stretch their imagination. actions and situations. Flight Crew Training Centre . Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. which will lead to better results. the results may be positive or negative. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. communications may breakdown. High respect for mutual support. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. No one makes major concessions. When sides are chosen. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. You must give to get. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. words. test their position and beliefs. objectives and values.

or good or bad outcomes. It is not which model that is used that is important. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. Conflict Resolution. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. However. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. 8. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. once in a while. Flight Crew Training Centre . It is the end result that we are interested in. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. Advocacy. Action and Critique. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. rather that a model is used. either for routine or novel situations. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8.

8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided. Flight Crew Training Centre . “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. 8. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. further modification to the RMM was required.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents.2. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following.

questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. By staying below the line as much as possible. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . its implications and how much time is available. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. seeking more information about it. to make sure we fully understand the implications. The situation can be considered in two separate domains.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation.Information seeking. there are two typical responses. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. Flight Crew Training Centre . it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. the problem and the solution. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. This does not always produce the best solution. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8.

whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response.  Time Critical situations require immediate action.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. Time can be considered as. critical. 8. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . EFIS architecture. On the other hand. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. may at best get a query in response. this limits the opportunity for assessment. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. is a valuable problem. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM).solving resource. available and required. Once a time frame has been established. using a traffic light system. immediate action is required. but will probably be accepted. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). Open questions allow more options. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. A solution in the form of a question however. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. others may be less time dependent. losing vital feedback. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. In all cases. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. In the latter case. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. when there is little available. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. it is possible to prioritize accordingly.

This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. test understanding. Good teamwork needs good communication. Flight Crew Training Centre . Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. prioritize. 8. test understanding. the Captain must manage. test understanding propose. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. prioritize. NAVIGATE. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. seek information. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. propose. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK.

it is time to manage. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. However.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. When the process is complete. the team and the individual.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. It is a circular or iterative process. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. 8. Once this is under control. obstacles and weather. For example in the first stages of a diversion. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. Flight Crew Training Centre . Once the Group is informed and placated. including the navigation away from terrain.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. all the circles are the same size. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. the task need is paramount. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. An important point here is that you do not rush. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. 8.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8.

Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. we receive information. but functionally can be quite accurate. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. 9. In the same way.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. these are known as “mental models”.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. do something with that information and then act on it. output functions and an internal processing function. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. Flight Crew Training Centre .

We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. sight. but it is not being ignored completely. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. sound and touch. so much that.4. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. sound. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. During a busy. 9. are actually switching from one to the other. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. if we miss-perceive an event.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. touch. 9. This is quite normal. 9. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. smell and taste. but only a limited signal can be conveyed.4 Input functions 9. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. even though they do not have the loudest voice. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. Perception is incredibly powerful. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us.4. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. not all of them get through to the processing stage. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues.4.

which really belongs with the input functions. 9. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.6 Processing Functions 9. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. you have as little as 0.72”. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds.6. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. and contact 119.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. the original message has been replayed by the mind. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. short-term and long-term. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.6.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.6. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. descend 180. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. Flight Crew Training Centre . unless it is consciously being dealt with. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. speed 310. expect 150 by xxx. Another type of memory is sensory memory. 9.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. 9. and retained by conscious attention.

.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal.6. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. long after the event.6. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. such as ATM (Avoid. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. For example. patterns or mini theories. Trap. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. manageable by most. even if the correct data has never been learned. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. However the problem is not with forgetting.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. but it is top secret. 9. and Mitigate). some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. Flight Crew Training Centre . whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. 9.

There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. It can only deal with one issue at a time. however it is a single channel device. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. as they are referred to by the date itself. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. in particular responses to RTO. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . 9. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. 9. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.6.6. The events of September 11. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. this is when the action has become a learned routine. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are.

Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . Some of these place physical strains on the body. stress and fatigue produce similar results.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. including workload and circadian rhythms.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. others mental strains. Performance varies with a number of factors. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. some a combination of both. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. In this respect. Our interest is human performance. 9. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. This chapter covers the effects of stress.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified.

The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. for example. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. and other symptoms. 10. and then falls away. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. acute and chronic. require the crew to be at optimal performance. into the optimum performance range (shaded). As stress increases further. Flight Crew Training Centre . which differs according to individuals and within individuals. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. In the diagram above. such as take-off and landing. but too much is exhausting. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. tension headaches. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. Critical phases of flight. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. upset stomach.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. consider that arousal refers to stress.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. from being somewhat dormant. The right side shows over stimulation. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. 10. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. Too little stress causes complacency. performance improves. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger.stimulation. is exhilarating early in the day. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. By the same token. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. performance actually peaks. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. as stress increases. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. After a certain point.3. largely impossible. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. Initially.

   Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. but always late. anxiety. constipation. If something can go wrong. sweaty palms. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. acid stomach. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. hypertension. They take on too much. it does. chest pain. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. Flight Crew Training Centre . cold hands or feet. anxious. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and so on. dizziness. 10. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. and tense. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels.3." Always in a hurry. and depression. generally requiring professional help. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. who suffer acute stress frequently. and irritable bowel syndrome. and chest pain. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. muscular problems including tension headache. Often. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. jaw pain.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. they tend to be abrupt. They're always in a rush. their child's occasional problems at school. and heart disease. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. back pain. migraines. shortness of breath. diarrhea. and it is highly treatable and manageable. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. however. flatulence. have too many irons in the fire. migraine headaches. irritable. the three stress emotions. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. Because it is short term. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. the loss of an important contract. heart palpitations. a deadline they're rushing to meet.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. stomach. shorttempered. rapid heartbeat.

and sometimes. almost comfortable.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. Chronic stress kills through suicide. minds and lives. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. promotion to Captain). heart attack. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. year after year. People wear down to a final. It's the stress of poverty. chronic stress is not. the individual gives up searching for solutions. More precisely. violence. tremors. This could come in many different forms. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. There are three broad sources of stressor: life.3. They forget it's there..3. and. Flight Crew Training Centre . The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. perhaps. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. sweating. stroke. familiar. They blame their woes on other people and external events.e. or a mental response such as irritability. 10.g.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. they see their lifestyle. their patterns of interacting with others. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. Frequently. Chronic stress destroys bodies.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. Generally. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. With no hope. even cancer. heart arrhythmia. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. 10.3. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. hyperventilation. fatal breakdown. 10. change in job or responsibilities (i. which exhibits as either a physical response e. environmental and cognitive. of dysfunctional families.

who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.3. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. 10. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. this will be covered later in the chapter. and mismanage priorities. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress.3.deck. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. either on the apron. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. Noise arouses the individual. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. but with a dissimilar function. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. 10. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. In the long-term. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. or in the flight. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. When workload is high. Two common examples could be heat and noise. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . However.

Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Typically.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. with an inability to sleep further. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. It cannot be stored. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. this continues to improve performance until. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Immediately after awakening. after reaching a peak. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. self. For example. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. As in the case of stress. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). This might be due to time since awake. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). 10. or state of awake ness. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Depending on the individual. After some time of being awake. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. workload (physical exertion). this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. thereby inducing further errors. the range of optimal performance is reached. Response time. However. Although this can be an effective strategy. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. On a night flight. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. 10. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. when workload is at an absolute minimum.

Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. on the wrong time zone.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. sleep is deeper rather than longer. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. 10. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. This is known as jet-lag. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. However.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . which extend the operating day. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction.

It is another warning flag. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. However it is often quoted without really being explained. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. with dire consequences in the aviation industry.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. 11 Situational Awareness 11. This chapter will explain what it is. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. is the duty of every crewmember. 10. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. Others prefer mental stimulation. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. this is a potentially dangerous practice. when conducted in a structured fashion. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. As any medical practitioner will verify. 10. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. 11. the Flight Crew Training Centre . This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. In accidents involving human error. In the modern world. Managing stress and sleep effectively. providing awareness and in need of management. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief.

crew. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. Flight Crew Training Centre . systems. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. and Communicate. Navigate. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. automation modes. fuel and time). It is not just enough to notice a situation. 11. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. one must understand and think ahead.” This is quite complex.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. In addition to three levels of SA. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA).Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. which mitigates part of the problem. passengers and company). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is.

minimums. there is much to be concerned about here. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies .4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground.descent and leads up to the approach. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Flight Crew Training Centre . less time is available for noticing and avoiding. during the take-off and landing phases.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. fixation and confusion exist. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. After descent initiation. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . A three-stage model “Avoid. fuel burn.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. fixation and confusion.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Prior to descent. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. Results from observations at several different airlines. if potential problems can be identified in time. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Avoiding error is the initial course of action.vague or incomplete statements 11. Trap.

Advanced skills include pre-flight planning.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. scan patterns and checklist use. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. Human error is inevitable. However. too high. 11. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. task management and prioritization. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. self-monitoring. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. 11. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.” Flight Crew Training Centre . contingency planning. attention-sharing. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. and use the speed brake if necessary. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. too fast etc) must be avoided. there is very little time left to correct it. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. 11.e. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. so that we can take action to improve it. Finally. Should such a state occur. unstabilized approach. communications. an undesired aircraft state (i. Skills relating to spatial ability.

Speak up when you see SA breaking down. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. dispatch. Flight Crew Training Centre . Rotate attention from plane to path to people . Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. maintenance. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.don't fixate. Project ahead and consider contingencies. etc. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. ATC. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.

April 23-25. Indonesia. A. stress. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar.. Auckland. (1995).. 1997.. A. Merritt.. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. & Merritt. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. Ohio.L. J. Columbus: Ohio State University.. Merritt. 1996. November 26-28. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. R.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. P.L.J.. (1995). Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C.L. (1997).. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. A. 1997. R. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. & Helmreich.. Helmreich. Cultural issues in crew resource management. Jakarta. Merritt. Ooi. T. R.C. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. R.0 (International) & 2. New Zealand. Colombus. & Sherman. May 1995. Flight Crew Training Centre .L. Ohio.R.C.. 8-12. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. November 20-24.C. (1995). & Helmreich. Taggart.C. CRM: I hate it. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. A.L. Guangzhou. what is it? (Error. April. A.. A. P.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). (1996).S... CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. (1997). (1996).. 1995. 1.C. A. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. A. Colombus.R. Cultural influences on flight operations. CRM Advocate. (1996. Merritt. & Merritt..C.C. R. & Helmreich. Merritt. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. (1991). R. W. April-May. Helmreich.. 1996. 1991.L. (1996). April). Sydney. Merritt.A. April-May. Wilhelm.C.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful