Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. assisted by the facilitator.2. 1.2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. and a series of role-plays.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. and team management skills. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. leadership and team management. 2 Modules Content 2. 1.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.2.

7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.4 Leadership.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .

Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. This includes everything from the design of a tool.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. home. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. HPL. to the design of a checklist. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. Despite improvements in technology. in part.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. Flight Crew Training Centre . Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. and with other humans. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. environment. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. knowledge. 3. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. This is due. design and engine reliability. skill and attitude. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. 3.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element.

especially on a long. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. 3. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. J.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. 1990. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. encompassing the best of previous generations. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. 3. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . Most of these errors are small.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. In particular this means designing for error.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.

leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. but placed together they form a robust wall. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. These are what Reason call “latent threats”.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. of which the operating crew are the last link. Some were latent failures. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. In isolation it is insignificant. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Occasionally. If they can break the chain. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. occurring years ago on the drawing board. For example. Others were management failures. Without assigning a principle cause. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Reason used Swiss cheese. the holes will line up. It was but it is not an isolated case. Flight Crew Training Centre . the accident does not occur. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. it snaps. 3. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Rather. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. the last line of defense.

Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. because despite the risks.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. Management. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. (Errors made by other people ATC. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.e.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. 3. Engineering. safe operations are the norm.e. the accident chain is broken. performing a checklist from memory. 3. Threats and errors are unavoidable.) Threats . Regulators etc are threats to the crew. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. at any level. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one.e. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. the start of an accident chain.External influences Errors . and it is up to us to break the chain.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. Flight Crew Training Centre . but as long as the holes do not line up.

great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. nine common factors existed.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. Trap.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. However.12 Avoid. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. 3. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. such as an unstabilized approach. However in all cases. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. These have been termed warning flags. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. 3. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable.

4. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . versus its opposite. such as organizational. not to the state. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. collectivism. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. 4. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 4. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Again. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. On the collectivist side.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. (which are predominantly male). Uncertainty Avoidance. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. professional and safety culture. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. cohesive in-groups. often extended families (with uncles. Power Distance.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. regarding all societies in the world.

uncertainty accepting cultures. and different from usual. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown.   4. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. surprising. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. The opposite type. This represents inequality (more versus less). are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. they try to have as few rules as possible. of course. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. but some are more unequal than others. safety and security measures. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. It suggests that the followers.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. but defined from below.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. and motivated by inner nervous energy. Unstructured situations are novel. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. unknown. not from above. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . and not expected by their environment to express emotions. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. Power and inequality.

by a machine function.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. (Norbert Wiener) 5. or an organizational culture can prevail. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. navigators and flight engineers. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. In particular. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. 5. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. Furthermore.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. Flight Crew Training Centre . there can be anomalies where a professional group. either physical or cognitive. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. including radio operators.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. against a conflicting trend. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. not what we thought we told them to do. such as pilots. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew.

it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. 5. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. The latter will not be discussed here.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. In practice this does not always happen. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. Flight Crew Training Centre . accuracy and reduced costs.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. In particular. not to mention the human (social) effects.

fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. narrow range. slow communication Better for principles and strategies.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Poor spoken material. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. Poor program. Whiteside. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. inaccurate. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Spine. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. easy to re program. slow. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. fast.” (Good. difficult to re. detecting messages in noise. Rather. Good quantitative assessment. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . M. accurate. 1986. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. P. J & George. T.Good inductive.

Although in some systems. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. In the aviation scenario. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. 5.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. an area of weakness in interface design. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. according to any change in tactical goal. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . so the overall workload is drastically reduced. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. resulting in further reduced workload. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. vigilance and complacency may become issues. with different cognitive skills required. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. – This is a high workload situation. There is a reduced cognitive load. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. Overall result is reduced workload. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above.

Flight Crew Training Centre . Unfortunately. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. In particular. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Habsheim etc). For this new knowledge and skills are required. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. Cali. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. 5. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. 5. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. communications and monitoring.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.

11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . or subtle. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Consequently.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . 5. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. but not replace. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. easy-to-use systems. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. A lack of. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. 5.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness.

Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. the Captain is the designated “leader”. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. Through the use of example and persuasion. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. which is acquired. Flight Crew Training Centre . and authority. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. which is assigned. 6. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. Humans are capable of devising strategies. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. In the flight-deck environment. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. There is a fundamental difference between leadership.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. 5. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership.

Personal qualities required are those of courage. will power. The leader must balance the demands of the task. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. the team and the individual. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. 6. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. and be able to maintain team morale. to decide on a course of action. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. Action. In fact. and Manage Decision-Making Model. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. In addition. and a duty. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. 6.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. initiative and integrity. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . with use of the Assess.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals.

To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. suggestions Giving opinions.5 Task To achieve the task. manage and direct the flow of information. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. With a wide variety of background. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.8.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.

8. Flight Crew Training Centre . In between.8. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.

and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. while monitoring to assure necessary performance.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. For most effective leadership. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . using information available at that time. but not if things are going wrong. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. Together.

6. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. Ginnett. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. G (Eds). along with good communication skills. Hughes. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. passive/critical. Followers are a vital part of a team.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. R & Curphy. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. since there are a number of nationalities. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. R. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. supportive followers are as important as a leader. cited by Kern. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. 6. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. Flight Crew Training Centre . T. RE. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. and followership is a skill in its own right. For successful team performance. The role is much like that of a chairman.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. 1988. active/uncritical and active/critical. G2. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. 1997. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. The optimum gradient. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. which may differ between individuals and national cultures.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. While this might be an individual’s view.

to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. because they actively support without thinking. Making a good first impression is vital. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. unless identified and brought “back onside”. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. Survivors are the Company men. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. Flight Crew Training Centre .11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. The only way to ensure this is. 6. Sheep are akin to human automatons.

This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. While modern flight decks are well insulated. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. as much as 90%. Barriers to communication are also identified. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre .e.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. degrading language.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. insulting. Between a Captain and a First Officer. noise is still a factor. in communication within a crew. rank could impinge on communication as well.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. 7. along with methods of eliminating them. and very rarely are raised voices heard. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. the words used tend to be very important. culture plays a large part. In the case of Jade Cargo International. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. This chapter describes the principles of communication. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. So. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. However. 7.

1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. 7. the focus. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. 7. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. two aspects of the message content will be considered. whether on the needs of others or your own. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. aggressive. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). supportive and submissive.4. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. and the manner. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. assertive. Flight Crew Training Centre .

are avoided at all times. Therefore.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive.downs. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. such as during training or non-normal situations.4. not recommended but part of life. and will likely isolate the aggressor. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. However. Flight Crew Training Centre .4. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. It is unlikely to motivate the team. 7. In a non-critical situation. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. Referring to the matrix. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. 7. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. They put themselves down. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.4. However this may change depending on circumstances. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.

Flight Crew Training Centre . provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. it is likely communication that will break down completely. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. If someone is submissive.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. be supportive. their needs will be overlooked. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. If the other person is submissive. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. An assertive response might also be effective. In other words. will find a style that works well for them. Each individual and in fact every team. Dealing with aggression is not easy. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person.

test their position and beliefs. trust and support will deteriorate. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. actions and situations. Differing expectations of outcomes . Animosities can develop. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. Unwillingness to work through issues. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Differences in perceiving motives. Assertive and cooperative.favorable versus unfavorable. communications may breakdown. the stage is set for potential conflict. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. Flight Crew Training Centre . collaborate or compromise.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. No one person or idea is perfect. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. and stretch their imagination.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. No one makes major concessions. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. productivity will diminish or stop. words. which will lead to better results. When sides are chosen. the results may be positive or negative. 7. High respect for mutual support. You must give to get. If conflict does occur. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. objectives and values. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. There is more than one way to do anything.

Flight Crew Training Centre . GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. Advocacy. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. or good or bad outcomes. either for routine or novel situations. Conflict Resolution. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Action and Critique. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. rather that a model is used. It is not which model that is used that is important. 8. once in a while. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. It is the end result that we are interested in. However. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter.

according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. 8.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. Flight Crew Training Centre . The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.2. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However.2. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. 8. further modification to the RMM was required.

Information seeking. seeking more information about it.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Flight Crew Training Centre . Whenever a problem is encountered at work. there are two typical responses. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. This does not always produce the best solution. its implications and how much time is available. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. to make sure we fully understand the implications. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. the problem and the solution. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. By staying below the line as much as possible. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.

but will probably be accepted. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. On the other hand. immediate action is required. Once a time frame has been established. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. may at best get a query in response. others may be less time dependent. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. when there is little available. losing vital feedback. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . A fast decision may not always be the correct one. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. EFIS architecture. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. Time can be considered as. Open questions allow more options. In the latter case. critical. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM).solving resource. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. using a traffic light system. In all cases. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. A solution in the form of a question however. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. is a valuable problem. 8. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. this limits the opportunity for assessment. available and required.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time.

8. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. Good teamwork needs good communication. prioritize. propose. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. Flight Crew Training Centre . prioritize. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. test understanding propose. NAVIGATE. seek information.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. the Captain must manage. test understanding. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. test understanding.

all the circles are the same size. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. including the navigation away from terrain. Once the Group is informed and placated. Flight Crew Training Centre . Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. the team and the individual. When the process is complete. 8. However. Once this is under control. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. 8. obstacles and weather. It is a circular or iterative process. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. the task need is paramount. it is time to manage. An important point here is that you do not rush. For example in the first stages of a diversion.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to.

2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. but functionally can be quite accurate. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. we receive information. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. output functions and an internal processing function. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. In the same way. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. do something with that information and then act on it. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. these are known as “mental models”. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. Flight Crew Training Centre . 9. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. individuals create internal representations of how systems work.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows.

but it is not being ignored completely. 9.4. even though they do not have the loudest voice.4. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. if we miss-perceive an event. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . smell and taste. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. 9. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. touch.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. sight. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. During a busy. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. not all of them get through to the processing stage. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. 9. so much that. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone.4. are actually switching from one to the other.4 Input functions 9. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. Perception is incredibly powerful. sound. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. sound and touch. This is quite normal.

5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. Another type of memory is sensory memory. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. 9. 9. which really belongs with the input functions. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. and contact 119. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. descend 180. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits.6.72”. the original message has been replayed by the mind. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. 9. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.6. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. short-term and long-term. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. unless it is consciously being dealt with.6 Processing Functions 9.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. speed 310.6. and retained by conscious attention. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. expect 150 by xxx. you have as little as 0.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem.

9. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. even if the correct data has never been learned. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. Trap. such as ATM (Avoid. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information..6. long after the event. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. 9. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. manageable by most. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. and Mitigate). but with inability to retrieve or access the information. but it is top secret.6. For example. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. However the problem is not with forgetting. patterns or mini theories. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver ….

or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . It can only deal with one issue at a time. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. in particular responses to RTO. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000].6. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. this is when the action has become a learned routine. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. however it is a single channel device. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. 9. The events of September 11. as they are referred to by the date itself. 9. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them.6.

Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. 9. In this respect. Some of these place physical strains on the body. some a combination of both. stress and fatigue produce similar results. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. others mental strains. including workload and circadian rhythms.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. Our interest is human performance. This chapter covers the effects of stress.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. Performance varies with a number of factors. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified.

A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. 10. and then falls away. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. but too much is exhausting. Flight Crew Training Centre . The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. from being somewhat dormant. require the crew to be at optimal performance. into the optimum performance range (shaded). Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. such as take-off and landing.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger.stimulation. Initially. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. By the same token. is exhilarating early in the day. consider that arousal refers to stress. Too little stress causes complacency. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human.3. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. largely impossible. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. The right side shows over stimulation. and other symptoms. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. for example. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. as stress increases. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. After a certain point. As stress increases further. In the diagram above. 10. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. upset stomach. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. tension headaches.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. acute and chronic. Critical phases of flight. performance improves. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. performance actually peaks. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing.

chest pain.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. it does. muscular problems including tension headache. 10. If something can go wrong. stomach. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. hypertension. They're always in a rush. heart palpitations. back pain. generally requiring professional help. but always late. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. Often. cold hands or feet. who suffer acute stress frequently. They take on too much. jaw pain. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. irritable. have too many irons in the fire. and tense. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. shorttempered. the loss of an important contract. and chest pain. dizziness." Always in a hurry. sweaty palms.3. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and it is highly treatable and manageable. rapid heartbeat. diarrhea. Because it is short term. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. shortness of breath. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. their child's occasional problems at school. anxious. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. flatulence. the three stress emotions. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. a deadline they're rushing to meet. and depression. and irritable bowel syndrome. acid stomach. constipation. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. and so on. migraine headaches.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. they tend to be abrupt. Flight Crew Training Centre . however.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. anxiety. and heart disease. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. migraines. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels.

Flight Crew Training Centre . the illness or death of a close relative or friend. More precisely. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. 10. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. promotion to Captain). The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. year after year. or a mental response such as irritability.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. the individual gives up searching for solutions. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. they see their lifestyle. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. familiar. Generally. tremors. chronic stress is not. With no hope. hyperventilation. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. stroke. violence. and. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. even cancer. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. heart attack.e.g.3. They forget it's there. Chronic stress destroys bodies. 10. 10. perhaps.3. and sometimes. environmental and cognitive. Frequently. Chronic stress kills through suicide. sweating. fatal breakdown. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. almost comfortable. It's the stress of poverty. which exhibits as either a physical response e. minds and lives. of dysfunctional families.3.. heart arrhythmia. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. People wear down to a final.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. This could come in many different forms. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. change in job or responsibilities (i. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. They blame their woes on other people and external events. their patterns of interacting with others. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress.

or in the flight. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. but with a dissimilar function. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. 10. either on the apron.3. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. In the long-term.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person.deck. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. When workload is high. and mismanage priorities. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. 10. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. this will be covered later in the chapter. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. However. Two common examples could be heat and noise. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident.3. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. Noise arouses the individual. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual.

or state of awake ness. after reaching a peak. After some time of being awake.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. the range of optimal performance is reached. 10. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. this continues to improve performance until. with an inability to sleep further. Typically. It cannot be stored. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. This might be due to time since awake. On a night flight. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. However. Depending on the individual.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. Although this can be an effective strategy. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. As in the case of stress. 10. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. For example. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. they may become bogged down in processing the data. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). Immediately after awakening. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Response time. workload (physical exertion). thereby inducing further errors. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . when workload is at an absolute minimum. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. self.

Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. This is known as jet-lag. which extend the operating day. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. sleep is deeper rather than longer. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. on the wrong time zone. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. 10. However. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. inattentive and has an increased reaction time.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss.

It is another warning flag. 10. In the modern world. 11. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. Others prefer mental stimulation.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. Managing stress and sleep effectively. However it is often quoted without really being explained. is the duty of every crewmember. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. 10.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. In accidents involving human error. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. the Flight Crew Training Centre . This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. As any medical practitioner will verify. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. this is a potentially dangerous practice. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. 11 Situational Awareness 11.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. providing awareness and in need of management. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. when conducted in a structured fashion. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. This chapter will explain what it is.

why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. which mitigates part of the problem. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. In addition to three levels of SA. Navigate. Flight Crew Training Centre . Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required.” This is quite complex. passengers and company). automation modes. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. and Communicate. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). It is not just enough to notice a situation. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. systems. 11. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. fuel and time). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. crew. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. one must understand and think ahead. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC.

there is much to be concerned about here. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Prior to descent. A three-stage model “Avoid. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. fixation and confusion exist. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. if potential problems can be identified in time. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Results from observations at several different airlines. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . After descent initiation.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. fixation and confusion.vague or incomplete statements 11.descent and leads up to the approach. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. fuel burn. minimums. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. Trap. Flight Crew Training Centre .information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. during the take-off and landing phases. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. Avoiding error is the initial course of action.

attention-sharing. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. communications. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. However. scan patterns and checklist use. and use the speed brake if necessary. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. 11. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.” Flight Crew Training Centre . too fast etc) must be avoided. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. if mitigation seems to be the key factor.e. self-monitoring. contingency planning. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. too high. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. there is very little time left to correct it. unstabilized approach. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL).6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. Finally. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. 11. Skills relating to spatial ability. an undesired aircraft state (i. task management and prioritization. 11.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Human error is inevitable. so that we can take action to improve it.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. Should such a state occur. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at.

Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. maintenance. Project ahead and consider contingencies. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. ATC. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. dispatch. etc.don't fixate. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. Rotate attention from plane to path to people .

Guangzhou. April-May. (1996). A. R. Colombus.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. Indonesia. CRM: I hate it.C.L. April-May. 1997. New Zealand.C. CRM Advocate. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. Auckland..0 (International) & 2.. 1.C.C. Jakarta.A.L.. Colombus.L. A. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology..S. Helmreich. 1991.J. Merritt. 1997. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1995).R. & Helmreich. what is it? (Error. W. April.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). Taggart. A.. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. (1996). A. 1995. Ooi. Merritt.L. R. R. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance.C. R.C. Flight Crew Training Centre . Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China.L. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. November 26-28. & Merritt. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. Ohio.C. J. & Helmreich. Wilhelm. P. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. & Sherman... Merritt. R. & Merritt.L. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. P. Helmreich. A.. (1996. November 20-24. 1996. Merritt..C. stress. Sydney.. (1995). T. Ohio.. Columbus: Ohio State University. April 23-25. R. & Helmreich. A. 8-12. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. (1995). Merritt. (1996).C. A. (1997).. (1991). A. May 1995. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium.R. Cultural influences on flight operations. Cultural issues in crew resource management. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. April). Merritt. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2... (1997). 1996.

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