Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . This will be delivered during the ground school phase.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. leadership and team management.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. and team management skills. assisted by the facilitator.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. 1. and a series of role-plays. 2 Modules Content 2.2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. 1.2. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking.

Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.4 Leadership.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.

Despite improvements in technology. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. HPL. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. to the brightness required of an electronic display. and with other humans. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Flight Crew Training Centre . environment. skill and attitude.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. design and engine reliability.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. This is due. knowledge. This includes everything from the design of a tool. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. 3. to the design of a checklist. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. home. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. 3. in part. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories.

Flight Crew Training Centre . 1990.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. In particular this means designing for error.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. J. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. especially on a long. Most of these errors are small. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. 3. encompassing the best of previous generations. 3.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. 3.

Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. the accident does not occur. Occasionally. Some were latent failures. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. Others were management failures. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. For example. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. the holes will line up.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. the last line of defense. of which the operating crew are the last link. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. but placed together they form a robust wall. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Reason used Swiss cheese. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. It was but it is not an isolated case. If they can break the chain. Rather.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. it snaps. Without assigning a principle cause. occurring years ago on the drawing board. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. In isolation it is insignificant. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats.

Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. safe operations are the norm.e. the start of an accident chain. Threats and errors are unavoidable.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.External influences Errors . Flight Crew Training Centre . but as long as the holes do not line up. and it is up to us to break the chain. Engineering.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. the accident chain is broken. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. because despite the risks. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. performing a checklist from memory. 3. 3.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. Management. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential.e.e. (Errors made by other people ATC. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. at any level.) Threats . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.

3. However in all cases. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. such as an unstabilized approach. These have been termed warning flags. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. However. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. Trap. 3. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. nine common factors existed.12 Avoid.

we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Again. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. collectivism. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. such as organizational. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. 4. On the collectivist side. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. cohesive in-groups. 4. regarding all societies in the world. Power Distance. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. (which are predominantly male). Uncertainty Avoidance. 4. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. not to the state. versus its opposite. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. often extended families (with uncles. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. professional and safety culture. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.

Power and inequality. The opposite type. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. uncertainty accepting cultures. unknown. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. they try to have as few rules as possible.   4.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. safety and security measures. and motivated by inner nervous energy.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. It suggests that the followers. but some are more unequal than others. not from above. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. surprising. but defined from below. and different from usual. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. This represents inequality (more versus less). it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. Unstructured situations are novel.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. of course.

5. or an organizational culture can prevail.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. there can be anomalies where a professional group. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. by a machine function. navigators and flight engineers. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. such as pilots. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. In particular. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. Flight Crew Training Centre . against a conflicting trend. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. (Norbert Wiener) 5. either physical or cognitive. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. not what we thought we told them to do. Furthermore.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. including radio operators.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4.

The latter will not be discussed here.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. not to mention the human (social) effects. In practice this does not always happen. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. In particular.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. accuracy and reduced costs. 5. Flight Crew Training Centre . it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice.

Poor program. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Poor spoken material. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Whiteside. accurate. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. easy to re program.Good inductive. fast. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. Spine. J & George. Rather. M. slow. difficult to re.” (Good. T. P. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. 1986. narrow range. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. detecting messages in noise. Good quantitative assessment. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. inaccurate. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre .

such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. resulting in further reduced workload. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . so the overall workload is drastically reduced. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. an area of weakness in interface design. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. – This is a high workload situation. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. 5. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. according to any change in tactical goal. In the aviation scenario. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. Overall result is reduced workload. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. There is a reduced cognitive load. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. with different cognitive skills required. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Although in some systems. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime.

communications and monitoring. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. Habsheim etc). The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. Flight Crew Training Centre . If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. 5.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. 5. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. In particular. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. Unfortunately. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Cali. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. will disengage or will revert to another mode. For this new knowledge and skills are required.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified.

The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. easy-to-use systems.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Consequently. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. or subtle. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. A lack of.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . but not replace. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. 5. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.

either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. which is assigned. In the flight-deck environment. 6. 5. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. Humans are capable of devising strategies. Through the use of example and persuasion. which is acquired. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. the Captain is the designated “leader”.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. Flight Crew Training Centre . and authority. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group.

and Manage Decision-Making Model. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. 6. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. to decide on a course of action.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. In fact. Personal qualities required are those of courage. The leader must balance the demands of the task. 6. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. initiative and integrity. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. will power. with use of the Assess. In addition. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Action. and a duty. and be able to maintain team morale. the team and the individual.

With a wide variety of background. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. suggestions Giving opinions. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.5 Task To achieve the task. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.8. manage and direct the flow of information. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.

It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.8. In between.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.8.8. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.

getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Together.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. a different style is adopted according to the situation. while monitoring to assure necessary performance.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. using information available at that time. but not if things are going wrong. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. For most effective leadership. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    .

R. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. 6. cited by Kern. Flight Crew Training Centre . Followers are a vital part of a team. Ginnett. and followership is a skill in its own right. The role is much like that of a chairman. 1997. For successful team performance. Hughes. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. 6. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. since there are a number of nationalities. passive/critical. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. G2. T.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. While this might be an individual’s view. along with good communication skills. active/uncritical and active/critical.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. RE. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. 1988. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. The optimum gradient. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. G (Eds). The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. supportive followers are as important as a leader. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. R & Curphy.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility.

Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. unless identified and brought “back onside”. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Making a good first impression is vital. The only way to ensure this is. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Flight Crew Training Centre . Sheep are akin to human automatons. 6. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. because they actively support without thinking. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. Survivors are the Company men. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. They are also the foundation for teambuilding.

the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. While modern flight decks are well insulated. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. In the case of Jade Cargo International. along with methods of eliminating them. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. So. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. noise is still a factor. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. degrading language.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. This chapter describes the principles of communication. and very rarely are raised voices heard. as much as 90%.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. culture plays a large part. However. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. 7. rank could impinge on communication as well. insulting.e. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. the words used tend to be very important. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. 7.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. in communication within a crew. Between a Captain and a First Officer. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. Barriers to communication are also identified. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . The actual words used accounting for about 10%. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language.

whether on the needs of others or your own. 7. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. 7. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. supportive and submissive. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. two aspects of the message content will be considered.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications.4. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. aggressive.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. the focus. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). and the manner. Flight Crew Training Centre . assertive. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced.

4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. 7. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.4. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. Referring to the matrix. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.4. not recommended but part of life. 7. However this may change depending on circumstances. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. are avoided at all times.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Flight Crew Training Centre . It is unlikely to motivate the team. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. Therefore.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. They put themselves down. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. such as during training or non-normal situations. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.downs. In a non-critical situation. and will likely isolate the aggressor. However.

In other words. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. If the other person is submissive. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. it is likely communication that will break down completely. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. will find a style that works well for them. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. be supportive. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. their needs will be overlooked. Flight Crew Training Centre . These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. Each individual and in fact every team. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. If someone is submissive. An assertive response might also be effective.

Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Differences in perceiving motives. You must give to get. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. No one person or idea is perfect. No one makes major concessions. Animosities can develop.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship.favorable versus unfavorable. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. the results may be positive or negative. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. objectives and values. which will lead to better results. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. Assertive and cooperative. When sides are chosen. collaborate or compromise. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. 7. the stage is set for potential conflict. trust and support will deteriorate. communications may breakdown. High respect for mutual support. words.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. productivity will diminish or stop. but unfortunately does occur a great deal.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. There is more than one way to do anything. Flight Crew Training Centre . people can be stimulated to greater creativity. actions and situations. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. test their position and beliefs. Differing expectations of outcomes . Unwillingness to work through issues. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. and stretch their imagination. If conflict does occur.

8. Action and Critique. rather that a model is used. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. or good or bad outcomes. It is the end result that we are interested in. Advocacy. Flight Crew Training Centre . Conflict Resolution. either for routine or novel situations.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. once in a while. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. It is not which model that is used that is important. However.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8.

Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. Flight Crew Training Centre . Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). 8. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”.2. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. further modification to the RMM was required. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International.2. 8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied.

its implications and how much time is available. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.Information seeking. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. seeking more information about it. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). to make sure we fully understand the implications. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. By staying below the line as much as possible. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. The situation can be considered in two separate domains.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. there are two typical responses. Flight Crew Training Centre . the problem and the solution. This does not always produce the best solution. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] .

others may be less time dependent. In the latter case. Open questions allow more options. is a valuable problem. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). A solution in the form of a question however. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. may at best get a query in response. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. available and required. but will probably be accepted. Once a time frame has been established. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. immediate action is required. In all cases. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. 8. On the other hand. using a traffic light system. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . this limits the opportunity for assessment. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). Time can be considered as. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. EFIS architecture. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well).solving resource. when there is little available. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. critical. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. losing vital feedback. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS.

the Captain must manage. NAVIGATE. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. propose. Good teamwork needs good communication. test understanding propose. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. seek information. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. 8. test understanding. test understanding. prioritize. Flight Crew Training Centre . An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. delegation] Remember that in complex situations.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. prioritize.

The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. For example in the first stages of a diversion.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. all the circles are the same size. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. Once the Group is informed and placated. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. It is a circular or iterative process. Once this is under control. 8. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. When the process is complete.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. including the navigation away from terrain. However. Flight Crew Training Centre . 8.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. An important point here is that you do not rush. it is time to manage. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. the team and the individual. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. the task need is paramount. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. obstacles and weather. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore.

A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. do something with that information and then act on it. Flight Crew Training Centre . The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. we receive information. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. output functions and an internal processing function. but functionally can be quite accurate. 9. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. these are known as “mental models”. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. In the same way.

Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. are actually switching from one to the other.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. even though they do not have the loudest voice. sound. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms.4.4. so much that. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. 9. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. sight. 9. not all of them get through to the processing stage. if we miss-perceive an event. Perception is incredibly powerful. 9. smell and taste. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). This is quite normal. but it is not being ignored completely.4. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal.4 Input functions 9. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. touch. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. During a busy.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. sound and touch. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre .

for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. expect 150 by xxx.6. which really belongs with the input functions. 9.72”.6. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. the original message has been replayed by the mind. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. you have as little as 0. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. unless it is consciously being dealt with. Another type of memory is sensory memory. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. descend 180.6 Processing Functions 9.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. short-term and long-term.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. 9. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. speed 310. and contact 119.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. Sensory memory data is lost by decay.6. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. 9. Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. and retained by conscious attention. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.

4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition.6. However the problem is not with forgetting. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. long after the event. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. and Mitigate). you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. manageable by most. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. such as ATM (Avoid. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. but it is top secret. Flight Crew Training Centre . but becomes irretrievable due to interference. For example. patterns or mini theories.6. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. even if the correct data has never been learned. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events.. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. 9. Trap.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. 9. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. but with inability to retrieve or access the information.

This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. however it is a single channel device. this is when the action has become a learned routine. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.6. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. in particular responses to RTO. the assassination of JFK [November 1963].Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. as they are referred to by the date itself. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. The events of September 11. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000].6. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. 9. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. 9. It can only deal with one issue at a time.

In this respect. This chapter covers the effects of stress. Our interest is human performance. stress and fatigue produce similar results.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. Performance varies with a number of factors. 9. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Some of these place physical strains on the body.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. including workload and circadian rhythms.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . others mental strains. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. some a combination of both.

largely impossible. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. require the crew to be at optimal performance. 10. as stress increases.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. Flight Crew Training Centre . The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. A fast run down a challenging ski slope.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. but too much is exhausting. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. upset stomach. Initially. and then falls away. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. In the diagram above.3. As stress increases further. acute and chronic. performance improves. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future.stimulation. After a certain point. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. consider that arousal refers to stress. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. for example. Critical phases of flight. Too little stress causes complacency. from being somewhat dormant. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. and other symptoms. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. such as take-off and landing. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. By the same token. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. The right side shows over stimulation. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. tension headaches. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. is exhilarating early in the day. into the optimum performance range (shaded). The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. 10. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. performance actually peaks.

The work becomes a very stressful place for them. back pain. and so on. constipation. and chest pain. cold hands or feet. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. If something can go wrong. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. it does. and depression.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. shorttempered. rapid heartbeat. generally requiring professional help. and irritable bowel syndrome. anxiety. and heart disease. flatulence. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. have too many irons in the fire. a deadline they're rushing to meet. and it is highly treatable and manageable. anxious. 10. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. the loss of an important contract. shortness of breath. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. They're always in a rush. They take on too much. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. jaw pain. their child's occasional problems at school. and tense.3. chest pain. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. diarrhea. Flight Crew Training Centre . dizziness. irritable.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. however. migraines. muscular problems including tension headache. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility." Always in a hurry. who suffer acute stress frequently. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. but always late. the three stress emotions. heart palpitations. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. sweaty palms. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. stomach. Often. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. they tend to be abrupt. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. hypertension. acid stomach. migraine headaches. Because it is short term.

promotion to Captain). fatal breakdown. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. change in job or responsibilities (i. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. violence. their patterns of interacting with others. 10. or a mental response such as irritability.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress.3. they see their lifestyle. 10. Frequently.3. heart arrhythmia. even cancer. 10. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition.. This could come in many different forms. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. Chronic stress destroys bodies. heart attack. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. There are three broad sources of stressor: life.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. More precisely. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. Chronic stress kills through suicide. year after year.g. They blame their woes on other people and external events. and. sweating. minds and lives. Generally. the individual gives up searching for solutions.3. almost comfortable. perhaps. stroke.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. chronic stress is not. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. It's the stress of poverty. Flight Crew Training Centre . which exhibits as either a physical response e. and sometimes. tremors. hyperventilation. environmental and cognitive.e. People wear down to a final. They forget it's there. of dysfunctional families. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. With no hope. familiar.

High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. Two common examples could be heat and noise. However. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). When workload is high. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans.deck. this will be covered later in the chapter. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task.3. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. and mismanage priorities. Noise arouses the individual. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. In the long-term. but with a dissimilar function. or in the flight. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.3. either on the apron. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. 10. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. 10. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information.

the range of optimal performance is reached. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. After some time of being awake. For example. with an inability to sleep further. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Depending on the individual. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. It cannot be stored. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. after reaching a peak.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. thereby inducing further errors.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Immediately after awakening. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. self. However. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. or state of awake ness. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Response time. This might be due to time since awake. On a night flight. workload (physical exertion). Although this can be an effective strategy. 10. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . this continues to improve performance until. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. Typically. As in the case of stress. when workload is at an absolute minimum. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. 10.

Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. This is known as jet-lag. 10. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. which extend the operating day.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. sleep is deeper rather than longer. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. However. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. on the wrong time zone. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other.

10. 11. 10. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. the Flight Crew Training Centre . In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. Managing stress and sleep effectively. 11 Situational Awareness 11. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. It is another warning flag. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. Others prefer mental stimulation. In accidents involving human error. As any medical practitioner will verify. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. this is a potentially dangerous practice. is the duty of every crewmember.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. when conducted in a structured fashion.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. This chapter will explain what it is. providing awareness and in need of management. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. In the modern world. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. However it is often quoted without really being explained.

Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. one must understand and think ahead. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. Flight Crew Training Centre . and Communicate. passengers and company). In addition to three levels of SA. systems. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). 11. Navigate. which mitigates part of the problem. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. crew. It is not just enough to notice a situation. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. fuel and time). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path.” This is quite complex. automation modes.

clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.vague or incomplete statements 11. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.descent and leads up to the approach. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. during the take-off and landing phases. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Avoiding error is the initial course of action. if potential problems can be identified in time. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. minimums. Prior to descent. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. A three-stage model “Avoid. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. there is much to be concerned about here. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . Trap. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Results from observations at several different airlines.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. Flight Crew Training Centre .4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . The trapping phase begins at top-of. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . fixation and confusion. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. fixation and confusion exist. After descent initiation. fuel burn.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA.

11. there is very little time left to correct it. 11. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. communications. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. Finally. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember.e. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. too fast etc) must be avoided.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. so that we can take action to improve it.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. 11. self-monitoring. Skills relating to spatial ability. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. an undesired aircraft state (i. too high. task management and prioritization. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology.” Flight Crew Training Centre . Human error is inevitable. Should such a state occur. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. However.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. and use the speed brake if necessary. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. unstabilized approach. attention-sharing. scan patterns and checklist use. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. contingency planning. By analyzing how we deal with the problem.

Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Project ahead and consider contingencies.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Flight Crew Training Centre . ATC. maintenance.don't fixate. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. dispatch. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. etc.

Colombus. Indonesia. (1996). Cultural influences on flight operations. W.C.R.. A.L. Guangzhou. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture.. (1995). Colombus.L. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. P.L. Columbus: Ohio State University. A. November 20-24. April-May. A. April 23-25.A. 1995. CRM: I hate it..C..C. Flight Crew Training Centre . Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.. Auckland. New Zealand.C. A. A. November 26-28. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. (1995).0 (International) & 2. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. R. (1991). Merritt.S. & Sherman. April... (1995).L. & Merritt. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Helmreich.. 1996. Merritt. Merritt. (1997). CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Wilhelm. R. Jakarta. R.. 1997. & Merritt. (1997). Taggart..R. Merritt. 1997. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. 1. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China.C. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. stress. Merritt. A. & Helmreich. May 1995.C.C. (1996. A. CRM Advocate. & Helmreich. P. R. R. Ohio. J. what is it? (Error. Merritt. 8-12. (1996).. & Helmreich.L. T. Sydney. 1991. Cultural issues in crew resource management. A..L..C. April-May. April).Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich.J. (1996). R. Ooi. Ohio.. 1996.C. Helmreich.

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