Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

2.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. 1. assisted by the facilitator. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. 1. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.2. and a series of role-plays. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. and team management skills. leadership and team management.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). This will be delivered during the ground school phase.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. 2 Modules Content 2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre .

7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.4 Leadership.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.

MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. skill and attitude. Despite improvements in technology. knowledge. to the brightness required of an electronic display. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. HPL. 3. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. to the design of a checklist. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. in part. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. and with other humans. Flight Crew Training Centre . MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. design and engine reliability. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. This includes everything from the design of a tool. home. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. environment. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. 3. This is due.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories.

which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. J. encompassing the best of previous generations. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. especially on a long.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. 3. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. 3. 1990. 3. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Flight Crew Training Centre .4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Most of these errors are small.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. In particular this means designing for error. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur.

existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. the last line of defense. Reason used Swiss cheese. Rather. Flight Crew Training Centre . The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Without assigning a principle cause. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. it snaps. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. 3. the holes will line up. the accident does not occur. Some were latent failures. possibly as early as the design stage of a product.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. but placed together they form a robust wall. If they can break the chain. of which the operating crew are the last link. In isolation it is insignificant. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. Others were management failures. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. occurring years ago on the drawing board. It was but it is not an isolated case. For example. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Occasionally. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese.

3. performing a checklist from memory. the accident chain is broken. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i.External influences Errors . (Errors made by other people ATC. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. because despite the risks. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. and it is up to us to break the chain. Flight Crew Training Centre . but as long as the holes do not line up. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. Threats and errors are unavoidable. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. 3.) Threats .Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. at any level. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation.e. Engineering. Management.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential.e. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. the start of an accident chain. safe operations are the norm.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.

11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors.12 Avoid. 3. nine common factors existed. 3. Trap. However. such as an unstabilized approach. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . However in all cases. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. These have been termed warning flags. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though.

Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. On the collectivist side. such as organizational. Uncertainty Avoidance. often extended families (with uncles. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. 4. 4. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. professional and safety culture. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. not to the state. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. collectivism. cohesive in-groups.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. versus its opposite.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. 4. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. Again. (which are predominantly male). aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . Power Distance. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. regarding all societies in the world. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program.

and different from usual. they try to have as few rules as possible.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. safety and security measures. surprising.   4. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. unknown. uncertainty accepting cultures. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. It suggests that the followers. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. Unstructured situations are novel. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. Power and inequality. This represents inequality (more versus less). but defined from below.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. not from above. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. The opposite type. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. but some are more unequal than others. and motivated by inner nervous energy.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. of course. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to.

5. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. by a machine function. Flight Crew Training Centre . This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. such as pilots. Furthermore.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. there can be anomalies where a professional group. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. not what we thought we told them to do. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. navigators and flight engineers.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. or an organizational culture can prevail. against a conflicting trend. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. either physical or cognitive. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. In particular. (Norbert Wiener) 5. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. including radio operators. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned.

roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. Flight Crew Training Centre . The latter will not be discussed here. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. 5. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. accuracy and reduced costs. In particular. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. In practice this does not always happen. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. not to mention the human (social) effects. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job.

User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. fast. Good quantitative assessment. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. T. easy to re program. slow. Whiteside. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. accurate.” (Good. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. J & George. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. Rather.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. Poor program. P. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. difficult to re. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. slow communication Better for principles and strategies.Good inductive. inaccurate. Spine. M. Poor spoken material. narrow range. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. detecting messages in noise. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . 1986.

according to any change in tactical goal. – This is a high workload situation. an area of weakness in interface design. 5. Although in some systems. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. In the aviation scenario. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. There is a reduced cognitive load. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. resulting in further reduced workload. vigilance and complacency may become issues. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. with different cognitive skills required. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. Overall result is reduced workload.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation.

the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. 5. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. Habsheim etc). Unfortunately. For this new knowledge and skills are required. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. In particular.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Flight Crew Training Centre . 5. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. Cali. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. communications and monitoring.

The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. easy-to-use systems. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre .10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . 5. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. or subtle. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. A lack of. but not replace. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Consequently. 5.

Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. 5. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. Humans are capable of devising strategies. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. which is assigned. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. In the flight-deck environment.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. the Captain is the designated “leader”. and authority. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. 6. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Through the use of example and persuasion. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. There is a fundamental difference between leadership.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. which is acquired. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group.

initiative and integrity. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. 6. Action. to decide on a course of action. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. with use of the Assess. and a duty.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. and Manage Decision-Making Model. The leader must balance the demands of the task. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. In fact. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. In addition. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. Personal qualities required are those of courage. and be able to maintain team morale. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. 6. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. the team and the individual. will power.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation.

many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. manage and direct the flow of information.5 Task To achieve the task.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. suggestions Giving opinions. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.8.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. With a wide variety of background.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.

8. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. Flight Crew Training Centre . coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. In between. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.8. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.8.

Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. using information available at that time. but not if things are going wrong. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Together. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. For most effective leadership. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. a different style is adopted according to the situation.

The optimum gradient. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. G (Eds). A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. Hughes. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. The role is much like that of a chairman. along with good communication skills. Flight Crew Training Centre . Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. since there are a number of nationalities. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. 6. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. 1988. While this might be an individual’s view.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Ginnett.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. RE. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. 6. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. For successful team performance. active/uncritical and active/critical. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. R. cited by Kern. T. R & Curphy. and followership is a skill in its own right.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. supportive followers are as important as a leader. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. 1997. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. G2. passive/critical.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. Followers are a vital part of a team.

Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Survivors are the Company men. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. Making a good first impression is vital. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. because they actively support without thinking. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. The only way to ensure this is.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. Flight Crew Training Centre . and actively supportive without being “yes men”. unless identified and brought “back onside”. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. 6. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. Sheep are akin to human automatons. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation.

as much as 90%. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. 7. In the case of Jade Cargo International. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. noise is still a factor. So.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. degrading language. in communication within a crew. rank could impinge on communication as well. Between a Captain and a First Officer.e. the words used tend to be very important. 7.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. along with methods of eliminating them. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. However.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. insulting. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. culture plays a large part.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. While modern flight decks are well insulated. This chapter describes the principles of communication. and very rarely are raised voices heard. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. Barriers to communication are also identified.

4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. 7. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. Flight Crew Training Centre . The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. 7. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. aggressive. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. the focus.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. assertive. and the manner. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. whether on the needs of others or your own. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). two aspects of the message content will be considered. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. supportive and submissive. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter.

and will likely isolate the aggressor.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”.4. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. Therefore.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.4. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. Referring to the matrix. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. It is unlikely to motivate the team. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.4. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. are avoided at all times.downs.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. 7. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. Flight Crew Training Centre . A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. They put themselves down. However this may change depending on circumstances. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. In a non-critical situation. 7. However. not recommended but part of life. such as during training or non-normal situations. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.

and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. In other words. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. An assertive response might also be effective. their needs will be overlooked. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Each individual and in fact every team. be supportive. it is likely communication that will break down completely. will find a style that works well for them. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. If the other person is submissive. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. Flight Crew Training Centre .5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. If someone is submissive. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. but leads to good understanding when accomplished.

Animosities can develop. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. which will lead to better results. 7. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. and the damage is usually difficult to repair.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. trust and support will deteriorate. objectives and values. If conflict does occur. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. communications may breakdown. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. the stage is set for potential conflict. No one makes major concessions. test their position and beliefs.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. Differing expectations of outcomes . actions and situations. When sides are chosen. There is more than one way to do anything. productivity will diminish or stop. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. You must give to get.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. words. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. High respect for mutual support. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. collaborate or compromise. Differences in perceiving motives. Unwillingness to work through issues. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Flight Crew Training Centre . Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. No one person or idea is perfect. and stretch their imagination. Assertive and cooperative. the results may be positive or negative.favorable versus unfavorable.

However. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. Advocacy. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. It is not which model that is used that is important. 8. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. Conflict Resolution. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. It is the end result that we are interested in. rather that a model is used. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. either for routine or novel situations.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Action and Critique. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. or good or bad outcomes. Flight Crew Training Centre . once in a while. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model.

During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.2. further modification to the RMM was required. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP).1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. 8. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. 8. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. Flight Crew Training Centre . This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However.

Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. This does not always produce the best solution. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. Flight Crew Training Centre . The situation can be considered in two separate domains. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. its implications and how much time is available. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry.Information seeking. By staying below the line as much as possible. there are two typical responses. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. the problem and the solution.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. seeking more information about it. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . to make sure we fully understand the implications.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action.

A solution in the form of a question however. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. immediate action is required. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). this limits the opportunity for assessment. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. In all cases. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM).  Time Critical situations require immediate action. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Once a time frame has been established. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. but will probably be accepted. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. Time can be considered as. is a valuable problem. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. using a traffic light system. may at best get a query in response. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. critical.solving resource. when there is little available. others may be less time dependent. On the other hand. In the latter case. available and required. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. EFIS architecture. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. losing vital feedback.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. Open questions allow more options. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. 8.

test understanding. Good teamwork needs good communication. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. prioritize. 8. the Captain must manage. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. propose. Flight Crew Training Centre . QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. NAVIGATE. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. test understanding propose. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. seek information. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. prioritize. test understanding. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. delegation] Remember that in complex situations.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE.

With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. An important point here is that you do not rush. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. it is time to manage. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. 8. Once this is under control.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. including the navigation away from terrain. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. the task need is paramount. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Flight Crew Training Centre . obstacles and weather. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. all the circles are the same size. Once the Group is informed and placated. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. For example in the first stages of a diversion. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. the team and the individual. However. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. It is a circular or iterative process. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. When the process is complete. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. 8.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques.

Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. In the same way. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. we receive information. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. output functions and an internal processing function. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. these are known as “mental models”. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. but functionally can be quite accurate.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. do something with that information and then act on it. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. 9. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system.

This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. not all of them get through to the processing stage. touch. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone.4 Input functions 9. sound. sound and touch.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. sight.4. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). During a busy.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. This is quite normal.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre .4. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. Perception is incredibly powerful. even though they do not have the loudest voice. 9. smell and taste. 9. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. 9. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. if we miss-perceive an event. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. so much that. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. are actually switching from one to the other. but it is not being ignored completely.4.

9. short-term and long-term. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. Flight Crew Training Centre . We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. you have as little as 0. Sensory memory data is lost by decay.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. expect 150 by xxx. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.6. and retained by conscious attention.72”. unless it is consciously being dealt with. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. which really belongs with the input functions.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost.6. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. 9. speed 310.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. descend 180. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. and contact 119. 9. the original message has been replayed by the mind. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears.6 Processing Functions 9. Another type of memory is sensory memory.6. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.

9.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. manageable by most. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. long after the event.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. such as ATM (Avoid. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. but it is top secret.6. Flight Crew Training Centre . some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”.. even if the correct data has never been learned. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. For example. Trap. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. and Mitigate). Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. patterns or mini theories.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. However the problem is not with forgetting. 9. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace.6.

as they are referred to by the date itself. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. The events of September 11. 9. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. It can only deal with one issue at a time. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence.6. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. 2001 are slightly different in this respect.6. this is when the action has become a learned routine. 9. in particular responses to RTO. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. however it is a single channel device.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines.

This chapter covers the effects of stress. 9.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. In this respect. Some of these place physical strains on the body. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. some a combination of both. others mental strains. Our interest is human performance. stress and fatigue produce similar results. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. including workload and circadian rhythms. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Performance varies with a number of factors.

1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. and then falls away.3. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. upset stomach. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. tension headaches. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. but too much is exhausting. The right side shows over stimulation. into the optimum performance range (shaded).3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. require the crew to be at optimal performance. performance actually peaks. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. Initially. As stress increases further. for example. 10.stimulation. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. In the diagram above. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. largely impossible. from being somewhat dormant. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. By the same token. such as take-off and landing. After a certain point. Too little stress causes complacency. 10. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. is exhilarating early in the day. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. consider that arousal refers to stress. Flight Crew Training Centre . That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. acute and chronic. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. Critical phases of flight. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. performance improves. and other symptoms. as stress increases.

constipation.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. a deadline they're rushing to meet. If something can go wrong. anxiety. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. dizziness. migraines. and depression. their child's occasional problems at school. they tend to be abrupt. acid stomach. muscular problems including tension headache. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. but always late. heart palpitations. shortness of breath. chest pain. stomach. 10. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. They take on too much. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. the loss of an important contract. and irritable bowel syndrome. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. hypertension. sweaty palms. anxious. irritable. rapid heartbeat. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. back pain. They're always in a rush. flatulence. and so on. however. jaw pain.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. diarrhea.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. migraine headaches.3. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. generally requiring professional help. Often. and it is highly treatable and manageable. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. Because it is short term. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn." Always in a hurry. cold hands or feet. shorttempered. and chest pain. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. who suffer acute stress frequently. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. it does. and tense. have too many irons in the fire. and heart disease. Flight Crew Training Centre . most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. the three stress emotions.

4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. They blame their woes on other people and external events. environmental and cognitive. Chronic stress destroys bodies.3. heart arrhythmia. With no hope. perhaps. minds and lives. It's the stress of poverty. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. This could come in many different forms. they see their lifestyle. promotion to Captain).3.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. tremors. sweating.. and sometimes. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. year after year. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. violence. heart attack. and. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. of dysfunctional families. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition.3. the individual gives up searching for solutions.e.g. 10. which exhibits as either a physical response e. Generally. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. change in job or responsibilities (i. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. even cancer. Frequently. chronic stress is not. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. hyperventilation. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. They forget it's there. or a mental response such as irritability. stroke.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. More precisely. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. almost comfortable. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. familiar. 10. their patterns of interacting with others. Flight Crew Training Centre . People wear down to a final. 10. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. fatal breakdown. Chronic stress kills through suicide.

3. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. When workload is high. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents.deck. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. and mismanage priorities. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. 10. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans.3. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. or in the flight. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. Noise arouses the individual. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. this will be covered later in the chapter. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. In the long-term. Two common examples could be heat and noise. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. either on the apron. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. but with a dissimilar function. 10. However.

Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Depending on the individual. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. This might be due to time since awake. Although this can be an effective strategy. when workload is at an absolute minimum. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. humans will trade off speed against accuracy.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. It cannot be stored. or state of awake ness. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. 10. with an inability to sleep further. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. After some time of being awake. Typically. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). after reaching a peak. 10. thereby inducing further errors. workload (physical exertion). Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. the range of optimal performance is reached. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. Immediately after awakening. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Response time.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). However. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. As in the case of stress. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. self. For example. this continues to improve performance until. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. they may become bogged down in processing the data. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. On a night flight. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue.

rather than eastbound which compresses the day. 10. This is known as jet-lag.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. which extend the operating day. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. on the wrong time zone. However. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. sleep is deeper rather than longer. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary.

It is another warning flag.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. 10. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. Managing stress and sleep effectively. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. this is a potentially dangerous practice. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. 11 Situational Awareness 11. However it is often quoted without really being explained. 10. the Flight Crew Training Centre . 11.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. In the modern world. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. As any medical practitioner will verify. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. In accidents involving human error. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. is the duty of every crewmember.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. This chapter will explain what it is. Others prefer mental stimulation. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. providing awareness and in need of management. when conducted in a structured fashion.

3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. automation modes. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. In addition to three levels of SA. crew.” This is quite complex. Flight Crew Training Centre . Navigate. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. passengers and company). those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. 11. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. and Communicate.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. It is not just enough to notice a situation. which mitigates part of the problem. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. one must understand and think ahead. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. fuel and time). systems.

In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. if potential problems can be identified in time. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. fixation and confusion exist.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Flight Crew Training Centre .4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. Prior to descent. minimums. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . fuel burn. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Trap. during the take-off and landing phases.descent and leads up to the approach. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. there is much to be concerned about here. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively .Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming.vague or incomplete statements 11.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . Results from observations at several different airlines.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. A three-stage model “Avoid. fixation and confusion. After descent initiation.

The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. Should such a state occur. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. too high.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. so that we can take action to improve it. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.” Flight Crew Training Centre . too fast etc) must be avoided. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. an undesired aircraft state (i. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. attention-sharing. 11. However. unstabilized approach.e. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). self-monitoring. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. there is very little time left to correct it. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. Skills relating to spatial ability. task management and prioritization. communications. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. scan patterns and checklist use.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. Finally. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. 11. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. Human error is inevitable. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. and use the speed brake if necessary. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. 11. contingency planning.

The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.don't fixate. Project ahead and consider contingencies. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. dispatch. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . etc. Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. ATC. maintenance.

C.L. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology..C. (1997). & Helmreich.. Helmreich.C.L.C. R.. W. May 1995.C.. R.L. 1991.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. Merritt.L.. CRM Advocate. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. (1991). April-May. A. 1995.C. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium.. A. (1996). & Helmreich. Colombus. Jakarta. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. A. (1996). (1995). Merritt. New Zealand. (1996). April 23-25.R. Cultural influences on flight operations. Auckland... Merritt. A. (1995). April. P. 1997. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. April-May. Guangzhou. T. Colombus. Cultural issues in crew resource management. (1995). CRM: I hate it. November 20-24. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance.. Merritt. A. 1.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). R. A.0 (International) & 2. Columbus: Ohio State University. & Merritt. Wilhelm.L. April).A. 1997. R. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. R.C. Flight Crew Training Centre . Merritt. A.. (1997).C.S. & Merritt. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Sydney.J. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. J. what is it? (Error. Ohio. Ohio. (1996. Indonesia. Taggart. & Sherman.C...R. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium.L. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Ooi. 1996.. stress.. R. A. Merritt. Helmreich. P. & Helmreich. November 26-28. 8-12.. 1996.