Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).2.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.2. 2 Modules Content 2.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. and team management skills.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. and a series of role-plays. leadership and team management.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. assisted by the facilitator. 1.2. 1.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking.

Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.4 Leadership.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .

MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. to the design of a checklist. knowledge.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Despite improvements in technology. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. This is due. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. Flight Crew Training Centre . whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. and with other humans. design and engine reliability. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. skill and attitude. 3. This includes everything from the design of a tool. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. in part. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. HPL. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. home.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. 3. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. environment. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.

which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. In particular this means designing for error. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. especially on a long.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. Most of these errors are small. 3. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Flight Crew Training Centre . Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. encompassing the best of previous generations.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. 1990. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. J. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. 3. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. 3. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.

that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. the accident does not occur. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. Others were management failures. In isolation it is insignificant. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. occurring years ago on the drawing board. 3. For example. Reason used Swiss cheese.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. the last line of defense. Occasionally. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. If they can break the chain. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. the holes will line up. Some were latent failures. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. of which the operating crew are the last link. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Flight Crew Training Centre . There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. It was but it is not an isolated case. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. but placed together they form a robust wall. Rather. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. Without assigning a principle cause. it snaps. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield.

external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. Flight Crew Training Centre . A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. and it is up to us to break the chain. (Errors made by other people ATC. performing a checklist from memory. at any level. Threats and errors are unavoidable. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. Management.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. but as long as the holes do not line up. the accident chain is broken.e.e.) Threats . safe operations are the norm. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i.e.External influences Errors . the start of an accident chain. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. Engineering. because despite the risks.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. 3. 3. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.

and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. However in all cases.12 Avoid. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. However. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. nine common factors existed. 3.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. These have been termed warning flags. 3. such as an unstabilized approach. Trap. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities.

the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. often extended families (with uncles. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. 4.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre .2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. (which are predominantly male). is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. Again. professional and safety culture.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. versus its opposite. regarding all societies in the world. such as organizational. Power Distance. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. 4. cohesive in-groups. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. On the collectivist side. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Uncertainty Avoidance. collectivism. not to the state. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. 4.

Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4.   4. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. The opposite type. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. uncertainty accepting cultures. Power and inequality. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. and different from usual. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. This represents inequality (more versus less). of course.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. surprising. not from above. Unstructured situations are novel. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. safety and security measures.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. they try to have as few rules as possible. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. unknown. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. but some are more unequal than others. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. but defined from below. It suggests that the followers. and motivated by inner nervous energy.

navigators and flight engineers. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. (Norbert Wiener) 5. Furthermore. by a machine function. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. against a conflicting trend. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. or an organizational culture can prevail. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. 5. either physical or cognitive. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. including radio operators. In particular. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. Flight Crew Training Centre . this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. not what we thought we told them to do. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. such as pilots. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. there can be anomalies where a professional group. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function.

often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. 5. In practice this does not always happen.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. In particular. Flight Crew Training Centre . The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. accuracy and reduced costs.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. The latter will not be discussed here. not to mention the human (social) effects. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate.

The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. Poor spoken material. P.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s.Good inductive. detecting messages in noise. Spine. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. 1986. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Rather. easy to re program. fast. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. inaccurate. Whiteside. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need.” (Good. Poor program. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. M. J & George. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. Good quantitative assessment. narrow range. T.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. slow. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. accurate. difficult to re.

   The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. – This is a high workload situation. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. Although in some systems. 5. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. There is a reduced cognitive load. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. with different cognitive skills required. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre .5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. according to any change in tactical goal. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. an area of weakness in interface design. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. resulting in further reduced workload. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. In the aviation scenario. Overall result is reduced workload. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot.

The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. Habsheim etc). 5. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Cali. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. In particular. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. communications and monitoring. For this new knowledge and skills are required. 5.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. Unfortunately. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. Flight Crew Training Centre . having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.

feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. A lack of. or subtle. easy-to-use systems. Consequently.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. 5. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. 5. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. but not replace. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre .

by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. 5. and authority. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. 6. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Through the use of example and persuasion. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. which is acquired. Flight Crew Training Centre . In the flight-deck environment. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. which is assigned. the Captain is the designated “leader”. Humans are capable of devising strategies.

In addition. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. with use of the Assess. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. Personal qualities required are those of courage. 6. will power. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. initiative and integrity. and a duty. The leader must balance the demands of the task. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. to decide on a course of action.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. Action. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. and Manage Decision-Making Model. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. and be able to maintain team morale. 6. In fact. the team and the individual.

Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. With a wide variety of background.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. manage and direct the flow of information. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. suggestions Giving opinions. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .5 Task To achieve the task. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.8. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.

there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.8. Flight Crew Training Centre . In between.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.

This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Together. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. a different style is adopted according to the situation. For most effective leadership. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. using information available at that time. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    .   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. but not if things are going wrong. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group.

6. R & Curphy. active/uncritical and active/critical.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. The role is much like that of a chairman. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. supportive followers are as important as a leader. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. and followership is a skill in its own right. 1997. Ginnett. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. T. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. passive/critical. since there are a number of nationalities. RE. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. R. Hughes. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. G2. For successful team performance. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. Followers are a vital part of a team. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. Flight Crew Training Centre .9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. 1988. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. along with good communication skills. cited by Kern. The optimum gradient. G (Eds). Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. 6. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. While this might be an individual’s view.

The only way to ensure this is. 6. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Making a good first impression is vital. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. Survivors are the Company men. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. unless identified and brought “back onside”. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Flight Crew Training Centre . because they actively support without thinking. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. Sheep are akin to human automatons. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision.

the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. culture plays a large part. noise is still a factor. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. insulting. the words used tend to be very important. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i.e. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. Between a Captain and a First Officer.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. In the case of Jade Cargo International. So. However. and very rarely are raised voices heard. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. Barriers to communication are also identified.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. 7. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. 7. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. degrading language. While modern flight decks are well insulated. rank could impinge on communication as well.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. along with methods of eliminating them. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. as much as 90%. in communication within a crew. This chapter describes the principles of communication.

whether on the needs of others or your own. Flight Crew Training Centre . This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people.4. and the manner. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. 7.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. assertive. 7. two aspects of the message content will be considered. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. the focus. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. aggressive. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. supportive and submissive.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others.

are avoided at all times.4. and will likely isolate the aggressor. However this may change depending on circumstances. Flight Crew Training Centre . 7. not recommended but part of life.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. 7. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. In a non-critical situation. Referring to the matrix. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.4. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such.downs. However. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. They put themselves down. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. It is unlikely to motivate the team. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one.4. such as during training or non-normal situations. Therefore.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive.

If someone is submissive. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. will find a style that works well for them. If the other person is submissive. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. Each individual and in fact every team. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Dealing with aggression is not easy. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. In other words.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. Flight Crew Training Centre . The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. their needs will be overlooked. be supportive. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. An assertive response might also be effective.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. it is likely communication that will break down completely. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult.

Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. Unwillingness to work through issues. 7.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. High respect for mutual support. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. No one person or idea is perfect. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. trust and support will deteriorate. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. If conflict does occur. the results may be positive or negative. test their position and beliefs. collaborate or compromise. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. words. which will lead to better results. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. Animosities can develop. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. objectives and values.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. and stretch their imagination. You must give to get. When sides are chosen. Assertive and cooperative. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Flight Crew Training Centre . depending on how those involved choose to approach it. Differing expectations of outcomes .favorable versus unfavorable. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. the stage is set for potential conflict.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. communications may breakdown.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. No one makes major concessions. actions and situations. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. productivity will diminish or stop. Differences in perceiving motives. There is more than one way to do anything.

however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. 8. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. once in a while. rather that a model is used. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. or good or bad outcomes. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. It is not which model that is used that is important. Advocacy. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Action and Critique. However. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. It is the end result that we are interested in. either for routine or novel situations. Conflict Resolution. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred.

“The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. 8. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided. further modification to the RMM was required. Flight Crew Training Centre .2. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP).

This does not always produce the best solution. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. to make sure we fully understand the implications. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line).Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. The situation can be considered in two separate domains.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. seeking more information about it. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. the problem and the solution. By staying below the line as much as possible. Flight Crew Training Centre . Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Whenever a problem is encountered at work.Information seeking. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. its implications and how much time is available. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. there are two typical responses. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is.

both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. Time can be considered as. In all cases. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. losing vital feedback. using a traffic light system. this limits the opportunity for assessment. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). but will probably be accepted. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. when there is little available. Once a time frame has been established.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. is a valuable problem. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. 8. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. critical.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. available and required. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. Open questions allow more options. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. EFIS architecture. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. In the latter case.solving resource. others may be less time dependent. may at best get a query in response. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well).   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. immediate action is required. A solution in the form of a question however. On the other hand.

8. seek information. prioritize. the Captain must manage. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. propose. NAVIGATE. prioritize. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. Flight Crew Training Centre . GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. test understanding propose. Good teamwork needs good communication.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. test understanding.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. test understanding. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK.

8.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Flight Crew Training Centre . Once the Group is informed and placated. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. An important point here is that you do not rush. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. including the navigation away from terrain. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. 8. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. the task need is paramount. all the circles are the same size. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. It is a circular or iterative process. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. it is time to manage. When the process is complete. For example in the first stages of a diversion. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. Once this is under control. obstacles and weather. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. the team and the individual.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. However.

9. Flight Crew Training Centre . A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. output functions and an internal processing function. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. do something with that information and then act on it. In the same way. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. we receive information.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. but functionally can be quite accurate. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. these are known as “mental models”.

sound and touch. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. sound. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. 9. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. smell and taste. touch. sight. not all of them get through to the processing stage. This is quite normal. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. Perception is incredibly powerful. even though they do not have the loudest voice. so much that. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. 9.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name).Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . 9.4. are actually switching from one to the other. During a busy. if we miss-perceive an event.4. but it is not being ignored completely. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.4 Input functions 9.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. but only a limited signal can be conveyed.4. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues.

unless it is consciously being dealt with. Another type of memory is sensory memory. and retained by conscious attention. Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Processing Functions 9. you have as little as 0.72”. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. 9. and contact 119.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. short-term and long-term. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. 9.6. which really belongs with the input functions.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. descend 180. speed 310. the original message has been replayed by the mind. expect 150 by xxx.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem.6. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. 9.6.

patterns or mini theories. and Mitigate). if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory.6. For example. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree.. even if the correct data has never been learned. Trap. long after the event. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. 9. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. 9. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. Flight Crew Training Centre . It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. manageable by most. but it is top secret.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. However the problem is not with forgetting. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. such as ATM (Avoid.6. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory.

but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. as they are referred to by the date itself. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.6. The events of September 11. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. in particular responses to RTO. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. It can only deal with one issue at a time. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. 9. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence.6. this is when the action has become a learned routine. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. 9. however it is a single channel device.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre .

your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. In this respect. some a combination of both. others mental strains. 9. Our interest is human performance. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . including workload and circadian rhythms. Some of these place physical strains on the body. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. This chapter covers the effects of stress. stress and fatigue produce similar results.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. Performance varies with a number of factors.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body.

largely impossible. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. After a certain point. The right side shows over stimulation. for example. 10. from being somewhat dormant. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. upset stomach. and other symptoms. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. and then falls away. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Too little stress causes complacency. performance actually peaks. 10.3. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. Initially.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. As stress increases further. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. as stress increases. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. tension headaches. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. require the crew to be at optimal performance. By the same token. Critical phases of flight. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. is exhilarating early in the day. acute and chronic. but too much is exhausting.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. into the optimum performance range (shaded). The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.stimulation. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. performance improves. In the diagram above. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. Flight Crew Training Centre . consider that arousal refers to stress. such as take-off and landing. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing.

Flight Crew Training Centre . and depression. but always late. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. sweaty palms. back pain. If something can go wrong. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility.3. anxious. it does. cold hands or feet. the loss of an important contract. however. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. migraine headaches. shortness of breath.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. jaw pain. 10. the three stress emotions. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. muscular problems including tension headache. migraines. irritable. and so on. flatulence. and tense. and it is highly treatable and manageable. anxiety. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. hypertension. heart palpitations. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. and heart disease. who suffer acute stress frequently. rapid heartbeat.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. their child's occasional problems at school. They're always in a rush. and chest pain. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. have too many irons in the fire. stomach. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. shorttempered. and irritable bowel syndrome. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. diarrhea. they tend to be abrupt. a deadline they're rushing to meet. constipation. acid stomach.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. Because it is short term." Always in a hurry. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. dizziness. chest pain. They take on too much. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. Often. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. generally requiring professional help.

chronic stress is not. Flight Crew Training Centre . they see their lifestyle. sweating. promotion to Captain).. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. 10.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. change in job or responsibilities (i.3. the individual gives up searching for solutions. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management.e. People wear down to a final. hyperventilation. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. They blame their woes on other people and external events. Frequently. With no hope. stroke. environmental and cognitive. More precisely. familiar. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. violence. almost comfortable. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. of dysfunctional families. and sometimes.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. It's the stress of poverty.g. Generally.3. tremors. even cancer. They forget it's there. fatal breakdown. minds and lives. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. or a mental response such as irritability. their patterns of interacting with others. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. Chronic stress kills through suicide. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. Chronic stress destroys bodies. heart attack. heart arrhythmia. 10.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. This could come in many different forms. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. and. perhaps. year after year. which exhibits as either a physical response e.3. 10. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition.

In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Two common examples could be heat and noise. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. In the long-term.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. 10. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. When workload is high.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. but with a dissimilar function. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. especially when it involves an operating pilot. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. and mismanage priorities. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. either on the apron. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. Noise arouses the individual.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents.deck. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident.3. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. 10. or in the flight. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss.3. this will be covered later in the chapter. However. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.

lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. workload (physical exertion). Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. with an inability to sleep further. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. For example. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. thereby inducing further errors. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. It cannot be stored. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. or state of awake ness. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. 10. After some time of being awake. after reaching a peak. This might be due to time since awake. the range of optimal performance is reached. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. Typically. this continues to improve performance until. On a night flight. Depending on the individual. self.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Response time. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. As in the case of stress.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Immediately after awakening.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. when workload is at an absolute minimum. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. 10. Although this can be an effective strategy. However. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt).

However. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. on the wrong time zone. which extend the operating day. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. inattentive and has an increased reaction time.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. sleep is deeper rather than longer. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . This is known as jet-lag. 10. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings.

11. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. with dire consequences in the aviation industry.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. This chapter will explain what it is. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. As any medical practitioner will verify. In accidents involving human error.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. 11 Situational Awareness 11. In the modern world.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. However it is often quoted without really being explained. the Flight Crew Training Centre . Managing stress and sleep effectively. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. when conducted in a structured fashion. providing awareness and in need of management. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. Others prefer mental stimulation. 10. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. this is a potentially dangerous practice. 10. It is another warning flag. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. is the duty of every crewmember.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face.

3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. 11. systems. It is not just enough to notice a situation. automation modes. passengers and company). If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). one must understand and think ahead. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. crew. and Communicate. fuel and time). but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. Flight Crew Training Centre . but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. which mitigates part of the problem. Navigate.” This is quite complex. In addition to three levels of SA. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.

Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. during the take-off and landing phases. Results from observations at several different airlines.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. After descent initiation. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. Trap. The trapping phase begins at top-of. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. minimums. fuel burn.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase.vague or incomplete statements 11. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. A three-stage model “Avoid. if potential problems can be identified in time. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Prior to descent. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. Flight Crew Training Centre .focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion .uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur.descent and leads up to the approach. fixation and confusion. there is much to be concerned about here. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. fixation and confusion exist.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively .information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations.

then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. so that we can take action to improve it. 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. Should such a state occur. and use the speed brake if necessary. 11.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. an undesired aircraft state (i. Human error is inevitable. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. communications. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. Skills relating to spatial ability. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. too fast etc) must be avoided. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. scan patterns and checklist use. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. task management and prioritization. However. self-monitoring.” Flight Crew Training Centre . By analyzing how we deal with the problem. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].e. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. there is very little time left to correct it. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. contingency planning. 11. unstabilized approach. attention-sharing. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. Finally. too high. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA.

maintenance. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. etc. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Flight Crew Training Centre . Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Project ahead and consider contingencies. ATC.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. dispatch. Rotate attention from plane to path to people .don't fixate.

R. (1996). In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Ohio. A. Helmreich.. 8-12. Ohio. T. stress.0 (International) & 2. (1997). Ooi. Jakarta. A. (1995). & Merritt.C.L. Cultural influences on flight operations. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). 1997. A.L.C. (1995)... Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. W.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. R.. A..L. Merritt. (1991). Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture.L. (1997). Auckland. Taggart. & Sherman.. R.R. A. New Zealand. R. November 20-24. 1996.C. Merritt. CRM: I hate it..L. April).C. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. P. P. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. Colombus. CRM Advocate. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. & Helmreich. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. A. Columbus: Ohio State University.. April 23-25. 1997. Cultural issues in crew resource management.S. April.. Sydney. 1991..C.R. (1996). & Helmreich. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2.A. Merritt.J.C. 1. Merritt.C. Merritt. Helmreich. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance..C.C. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. 1996. & Merritt. (1995).L. Wilhelm. April-May. J. Flight Crew Training Centre .. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China.. 1995. May 1995. Guangzhou.. what is it? (Error. Merritt. & Helmreich. November 26-28. Indonesia. R.. A. (1996. April-May. R. Colombus. A. (1996). Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.

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