Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

This will be delivered during the ground school phase. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. 1.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. 2 Modules Content 2. leadership and team management. assisted by the facilitator. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. 1. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.2.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. and team management skills.2. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).2.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. and a series of role-plays.

Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.4 Leadership.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.

This is due. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. and with other humans. home. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. design and engine reliability. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. 3. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. This includes everything from the design of a tool. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. knowledge.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. Flight Crew Training Centre . skill and attitude. in part. HPL. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. Despite improvements in technology. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. 3. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. environment. to the design of a checklist. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. to the brightness required of an electronic display.

but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. J. In particular this means designing for error. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. especially on a long.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. 1990. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. Most of these errors are small. encompassing the best of previous generations. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. 3. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. 3. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors.

The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. It was but it is not an isolated case. the accident does not occur. the holes will line up. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. Rather. If they can break the chain. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. Some were latent failures.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. occurring years ago on the drawing board. but placed together they form a robust wall. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. the last line of defense. Flight Crew Training Centre . A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. Others were management failures.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Without assigning a principle cause. of which the operating crew are the last link. For example. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. Reason used Swiss cheese. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. possibly as early as the design stage of a product.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. 3. In isolation it is insignificant. it snaps. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Occasionally. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur.

wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. at any level.e. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. 3.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. 3. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. Management. but as long as the holes do not line up. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation.External influences Errors . The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. performing a checklist from memory. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. Flight Crew Training Centre . and it is up to us to break the chain. the accident chain is broken. (Errors made by other people ATC. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. Threats and errors are unavoidable. Engineering.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. the start of an accident chain. safe operations are the norm. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. because despite the risks. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence.e.) Threats .e. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances.

3. Trap. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. nine common factors existed.12 Avoid. 3. However. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . These have been termed warning flags. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. such as an unstabilized approach. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. However in all cases. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state.

The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. versus its opposite. On the collectivist side. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. Power Distance. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . (which are predominantly male).1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. Again. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. cohesive in-groups. 4. collectivism. not to the state. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. 4. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. Uncertainty Avoidance. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 4. often extended families (with uncles.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. such as organizational. regarding all societies in the world. professional and safety culture. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program.

Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. and motivated by inner nervous energy.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Power and inequality. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. of course. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Unstructured situations are novel. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. unknown. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. surprising.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. safety and security measures. and different from usual. but defined from below. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. This represents inequality (more versus less).   4. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. not from above. but some are more unequal than others. they try to have as few rules as possible. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. It suggests that the followers. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. uncertainty accepting cultures.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. The opposite type.

this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. Flight Crew Training Centre . not what we thought we told them to do.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. there can be anomalies where a professional group. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. such as pilots. against a conflicting trend. by a machine function. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. 5.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. including radio operators. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. Furthermore. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. navigators and flight engineers. (Norbert Wiener) 5. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. or an organizational culture can prevail. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. either physical or cognitive. In particular.

5. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. not to mention the human (social) effects.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. In particular. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. accuracy and reduced costs. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. In practice this does not always happen. Flight Crew Training Centre . it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. The latter will not be discussed here. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage.

fast. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better.Good inductive. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s.” (Good. Poor spoken material. T. Poor program. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. inaccurate. easy to re program. slow. Rather. P. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. Whiteside. M. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. Spine. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. narrow range. Good quantitative assessment. accurate. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. detecting messages in noise. J & George. difficult to re. 1986. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . error correction Good at error correction Specialized.

in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. an area of weakness in interface design. vigilance and complacency may become issues. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. with different cognitive skills required. resulting in further reduced workload. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. There is a reduced cognitive load. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. 5. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. In the aviation scenario. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Although in some systems. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. Overall result is reduced workload. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. according to any change in tactical goal. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. – This is a high workload situation. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above.

For this new knowledge and skills are required. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. Flight Crew Training Centre . The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. 5. communications and monitoring. 5. In particular. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. Unfortunately. will disengage or will revert to another mode. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. Habsheim etc). as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Cali.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya.

feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. 5. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. but not replace. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. 5. Consequently.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. A lack of. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. or subtle. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. easy-to-use systems. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre .Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear.

12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. 5.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Humans are capable of devising strategies. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. 6. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. In the flight-deck environment. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. which is assigned. Flight Crew Training Centre . Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. Through the use of example and persuasion. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. the Captain is the designated “leader”. and authority. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. which is acquired.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others.

Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. and Manage Decision-Making Model. will power.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. 6. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. In fact. In addition. Action. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre .3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. with use of the Assess. initiative and integrity. and be able to maintain team morale. to decide on a course of action. 6. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. Personal qualities required are those of courage. and a duty. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. The leader must balance the demands of the task. the team and the individual. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability.

experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. suggestions Giving opinions. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.5 Task To achieve the task.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . manage and direct the flow of information.8. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. With a wide variety of background.

3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.8.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6. In between. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”. Flight Crew Training Centre .

Together. using information available at that time. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. For most effective leadership. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. but not if things are going wrong. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . a different style is adopted according to the situation. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone.

1997. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. The optimum gradient. supportive followers are as important as a leader. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. RE. active/uncritical and active/critical. Ginnett. G2. The role is much like that of a chairman. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. While this might be an individual’s view. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. Followers are a vital part of a team. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. T. For successful team performance. 1988. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. since there are a number of nationalities. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. G (Eds). along with good communication skills. and followership is a skill in its own right. Hughes. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. R & Curphy. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. R. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. Flight Crew Training Centre . avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. 6. cited by Kern. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. passive/critical.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. 6. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions.

The only way to ensure this is. because they actively support without thinking. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Flight Crew Training Centre .11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. 6. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. Making a good first impression is vital. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Sheep are akin to human automatons. unless identified and brought “back onside”. Survivors are the Company men.

the words used tend to be very important. in communication within a crew. 7. along with methods of eliminating them. In the case of Jade Cargo International. This chapter describes the principles of communication. as much as 90%. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. and very rarely are raised voices heard. insulting. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. degrading language. culture plays a large part. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. 7.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. While modern flight decks are well insulated.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. Between a Captain and a First Officer. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution.e. noise is still a factor.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. rank could impinge on communication as well. However. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . So. Barriers to communication are also identified. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations.

and the manner. the focus.4.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. aggressive. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. supportive and submissive. whether on the needs of others or your own. 7.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. two aspects of the message content will be considered. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. assertive. 7. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Flight Crew Training Centre . This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority.

Referring to the matrix.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. However this may change depending on circumstances.4. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. They put themselves down. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. In a non-critical situation. such as during training or non-normal situations. not recommended but part of life. 7.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. are avoided at all times.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. It is unlikely to motivate the team.downs. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.4. and will likely isolate the aggressor. 7. Therefore. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. Flight Crew Training Centre . It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. However. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.4.

Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. will find a style that works well for them. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. An assertive response might also be effective. Each individual and in fact every team. their needs will be overlooked. be supportive. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. Dealing with aggression is not easy. it is likely communication that will break down completely. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. Flight Crew Training Centre . These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. If the other person is submissive. If someone is submissive. In other words. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony.

Differing expectations of outcomes . Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Differences in perceiving motives. Assertive and cooperative.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. High respect for mutual support. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. the results may be positive or negative. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7.favorable versus unfavorable. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. productivity will diminish or stop. Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. communications may breakdown. You must give to get. No one person or idea is perfect. and stretch their imagination. test their position and beliefs. the stage is set for potential conflict. which will lead to better results. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. There is more than one way to do anything. Unwillingness to work through issues. objectives and values. No one makes major concessions. words. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. 7.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. When conflict is dealt with constructively. When sides are chosen. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. collaborate or compromise. trust and support will deteriorate. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. actions and situations. If conflict does occur. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. Animosities can develop.

This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. Action and Critique. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. once in a while.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. rather that a model is used. However. It is the end result that we are interested in. Advocacy. 8. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. or good or bad outcomes. Conflict Resolution. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. It is not which model that is used that is important. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. either for routine or novel situations. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry.

2. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. 8. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”.2. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. further modification to the RMM was required. 8.

Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. Flight Crew Training Centre . The situation can be considered in two separate domains. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. the problem and the solution. there are two typical responses.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8.Information seeking. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. seeking more information about it. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. By staying below the line as much as possible. its implications and how much time is available. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . This does not always produce the best solution. to make sure we fully understand the implications. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry.

Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. 8. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. In all cases. this limits the opportunity for assessment.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision.solving resource. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. others may be less time dependent. EFIS architecture. Open questions allow more options. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. Time can be considered as. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. available and required. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. when there is little available. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM).4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. In the latter case. A solution in the form of a question however. Once a time frame has been established. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). On the other hand. but will probably be accepted. is a valuable problem. critical. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. losing vital feedback. may at best get a query in response. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . using a traffic light system. immediate action is required.  Time Critical situations require immediate action.

8. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. Flight Crew Training Centre . keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. propose. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. prioritize. seek information. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. NAVIGATE. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. the Captain must manage. test understanding. prioritize. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. test understanding. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. test understanding propose. Good teamwork needs good communication.

Flight Crew Training Centre . if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. all the circles are the same size. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. 8. the team and the individual. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. it is time to manage.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. Once this is under control. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. including the navigation away from terrain. 8. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. An important point here is that you do not rush. Once the Group is informed and placated. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. It is a circular or iterative process. the task need is paramount. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. When the process is complete. However. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. obstacles and weather. For example in the first stages of a diversion.

but functionally can be quite accurate. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. In the same way. these are known as “mental models”. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. output functions and an internal processing function.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. we receive information. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. do something with that information and then act on it. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. 9. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. Flight Crew Training Centre . The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works.

touch.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone.4 Input functions 9. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional.4. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. sound and touch. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues.4. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. 9. sound. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. are actually switching from one to the other. not all of them get through to the processing stage. Perception is incredibly powerful. This is quite normal. so much that. 9. 9. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). During a busy.4. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. if we miss-perceive an event. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . but it is not being ignored completely. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. smell and taste. even though they do not have the loudest voice.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. sight.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us.

Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.6. and contact 119. descend 180. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. and retained by conscious attention.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. which really belongs with the input functions. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. expect 150 by xxx. Flight Crew Training Centre . unless it is consciously being dealt with.6.6. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. 9. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. you have as little as 0. Another type of memory is sensory memory. the original message has been replayed by the mind.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. short-term and long-term.6 Processing Functions 9. 9.72”. 9. speed 310. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears.

For example.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information..5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. even if the correct data has never been learned. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. Trap. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver ….4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. but it is top secret. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. Flight Crew Training Centre . patterns or mini theories. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. 9.6. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. long after the event. manageable by most. 9. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. and Mitigate). However the problem is not with forgetting. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics.6. such as ATM (Avoid. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”.

a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986].6. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. in particular responses to RTO. The events of September 11. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach.6. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. this is when the action has become a learned routine. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. It can only deal with one issue at a time. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. 9. 9. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. as they are referred to by the date itself.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. however it is a single channel device. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction.

Some of these place physical strains on the body. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. others mental strains. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Our interest is human performance. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. 9.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Performance varies with a number of factors. some a combination of both. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . This chapter covers the effects of stress.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. including workload and circadian rhythms.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. In this respect. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. stress and fatigue produce similar results. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified.

largely impossible. performance improves. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. as stress increases. Flight Crew Training Centre . and then falls away. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future.stimulation. consider that arousal refers to stress.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. 10. is exhilarating early in the day. The right side shows over stimulation. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. By the same token. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. but too much is exhausting. Critical phases of flight.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress.3. and other symptoms. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. such as take-off and landing.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. Initially. After a certain point. upset stomach. acute and chronic. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. for example. tension headaches. from being somewhat dormant. require the crew to be at optimal performance. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. 10. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. In the diagram above. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. Too little stress causes complacency. performance actually peaks. As stress increases further. into the optimum performance range (shaded).

have too many irons in the fire. shortness of breath. They take on too much. anxious. the three stress emotions. stomach. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. 10. heart palpitations. muscular problems including tension headache. it does. however. acid stomach. and chest pain. Often. They're always in a rush. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. hypertension. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. they tend to be abrupt.3. and irritable bowel syndrome. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy." Always in a hurry. their child's occasional problems at school. If something can go wrong. shorttempered. rapid heartbeat. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. and tense. who suffer acute stress frequently. and depression. and heart disease. migraines. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. cold hands or feet. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. constipation. Because it is short term. Flight Crew Training Centre .2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. but always late.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. and so on. chest pain. generally requiring professional help. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. jaw pain. anxiety. irritable. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. sweaty palms. the loss of an important contract. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. flatulence. dizziness. migraine headaches. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. diarrhea. and it is highly treatable and manageable. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. a deadline they're rushing to meet. back pain.

or a mental response such as irritability. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. tremors. Chronic stress destroys bodies. heart attack. With no hope. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. It's the stress of poverty. 10.3. and sometimes. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. Flight Crew Training Centre . sweating. They blame their woes on other people and external events. hyperventilation.3. they see their lifestyle.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. environmental and cognitive. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. violence. chronic stress is not.g. the individual gives up searching for solutions. which exhibits as either a physical response e. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. People wear down to a final. almost comfortable. stroke. Frequently. year after year. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. familiar. Some examples are: marriage or divorce.e. even cancer. 10. This could come in many different forms. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. the illness or death of a close relative or friend.3. Chronic stress kills through suicide.. heart arrhythmia.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. of dysfunctional families. fatal breakdown. promotion to Captain). of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. They forget it's there. 10. their patterns of interacting with others. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. and. More precisely.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. change in job or responsibilities (i. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. perhaps. Generally. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. minds and lives. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are.

either on the apron. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. and mismanage priorities.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. When workload is high.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. However. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. especially when it involves an operating pilot. or in the flight. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation.3. Two common examples could be heat and noise. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre .deck. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. this will be covered later in the chapter. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. 10. but with a dissimilar function. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. 10. Noise arouses the individual. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. In the long-term. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance.3.

this continues to improve performance until. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. thereby inducing further errors. 10. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Typically. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. For example. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. workload (physical exertion). This might be due to time since awake.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Immediately after awakening. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. when workload is at an absolute minimum. 10. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. However. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. or state of awake ness.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. the range of optimal performance is reached. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. Depending on the individual.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. On a night flight. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Response time. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). After some time of being awake. Although this can be an effective strategy. after reaching a peak. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. As in the case of stress. they may become bogged down in processing the data. It cannot be stored. with an inability to sleep further. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. self.

Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. 10. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. However. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. which extend the operating day. on the wrong time zone. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. sleep is deeper rather than longer. This is known as jet-lag. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag.

Managing stress and sleep effectively.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. As any medical practitioner will verify.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. In accidents involving human error.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. 11. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. when conducted in a structured fashion. In the modern world. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. It is another warning flag. This chapter will explain what it is. this is a potentially dangerous practice. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. providing awareness and in need of management. Others prefer mental stimulation. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. However it is often quoted without really being explained. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. is the duty of every crewmember. 10. 11 Situational Awareness 11. 10. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. the Flight Crew Training Centre .

The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. In addition to three levels of SA. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. and Communicate. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. systems. fuel and time). but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. one must understand and think ahead. automation modes. passengers and company). It is not just enough to notice a situation. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. which mitigates part of the problem.” This is quite complex. 11. Flight Crew Training Centre . The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. Navigate.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. crew.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot.

identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.vague or incomplete statements 11. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Results from observations at several different airlines. fixation and confusion. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. fuel burn. during the take-off and landing phases. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Trap.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. there is much to be concerned about here.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . Prior to descent. minimums.descent and leads up to the approach. After descent initiation. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Flight Crew Training Centre . Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . Avoiding error is the initial course of action. A three-stage model “Avoid. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. fixation and confusion exist. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. if potential problems can be identified in time. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.

self-monitoring. too high. scan patterns and checklist use. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL).” Flight Crew Training Centre .e. there is very little time left to correct it. an undesired aircraft state (i. too fast etc) must be avoided. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. unstabilized approach. Should such a state occur. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. task management and prioritization. if mitigation seems to be the key factor.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. and use the speed brake if necessary. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. However. communications. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. Finally. 11. Skills relating to spatial ability. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. Human error is inevitable. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. 11. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. contingency planning. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. attention-sharing. 11. so that we can take action to improve it. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid.

Rotate attention from plane to path to people .don't fixate. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Flight Crew Training Centre . Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. ATC. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. maintenance. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. dispatch. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. etc. Project ahead and consider contingencies.

R. Helmreich. T. Cultural influences on flight operations. Ohio. Columbus: Ohio State University. CRM Advocate. April-May. & Helmreich. & Sherman. & Merritt. (1995).L. Indonesia. 1991.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. R. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2.C.. 1997. Colombus.. (1991).C. A. R.L. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. 1995.S. 1996. Merritt. R..L. Taggart. (1996). In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Sydney.R. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. R. A. (1996). Helmreich. & Merritt.A.C. 1996.C. Merritt.. (1997). what is it? (Error... (1996. (1996). Ohio. November 20-24. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.C. November 26-28. April. 1. Merritt. April). 1997. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. A...J. & Helmreich. J. Merritt. Guangzhou.. April-May. A. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). A.C. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Colombus. Auckland. Ooi. R. A.. Cultural issues in crew resource management. P. W. April 23-25.. May 1995. (1997).C. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. P. Merritt.R. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. New Zealand.L.. Jakarta. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. A. Flight Crew Training Centre . (1995). (1995).L.. 8-12.L. & Helmreich. Wilhelm.0 (International) & 2. CRM: I hate it.. stress.C. A.C. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Merritt.. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries.

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