Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. leadership and team management.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).2.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. The candidates will conduct their own debrief.2. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. and team management skills.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. assisted by the facilitator. and a series of role-plays. 1. This will be delivered during the ground school phase.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses. 1. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. 2 Modules Content 2.2.

4 Leadership.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .

Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. 3. This includes everything from the design of a tool. HPL. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. design and engine reliability. This is due. knowledge.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. to the design of a checklist. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. Despite improvements in technology. 3. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. Flight Crew Training Centre . with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. in part. and with other humans. home. to the brightness required of an electronic display. environment.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. skill and attitude. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.

Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. 3. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. especially on a long. Flight Crew Training Centre . which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. In particular this means designing for error.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. 1990. 3. Most of these errors are small.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. 3. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. J. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. encompassing the best of previous generations. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity.

occurring years ago on the drawing board. If they can break the chain. 3. Without assigning a principle cause. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Flight Crew Training Centre . Rather. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. but placed together they form a robust wall. Some were latent failures. possibly as early as the design stage of a product.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. it snaps. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. the holes will line up. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. In isolation it is insignificant. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. of which the operating crew are the last link. For example. the last line of defense. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Reason used Swiss cheese. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. Others were management failures. Occasionally. It was but it is not an isolated case. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. the accident does not occur.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario.

Engineering. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential.e. Regulators etc are threats to the crew.e. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. 3. 3.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. but as long as the holes do not line up. (Errors made by other people ATC. the start of an accident chain. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. because despite the risks.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. and it is up to us to break the chain. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. the accident chain is broken. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. Flight Crew Training Centre .External influences Errors . Management.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. performing a checklist from memory. safe operations are the norm.) Threats . Threats and errors are unavoidable. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. at any level. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.

However. These have been termed warning flags. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . 3. such as an unstabilized approach. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. However in all cases. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities.12 Avoid. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. 3. nine common factors existed. Trap. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable.

The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. cohesive in-groups.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. professional and safety culture. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. On the collectivist side. collectivism. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . not to the state. regarding all societies in the world. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. Again. 4. Uncertainty Avoidance. 4. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Power Distance. versus its opposite. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. such as organizational. 4. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. (which are predominantly male). the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. often extended families (with uncles. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity.

The opposite type. It suggests that the followers. they try to have as few rules as possible. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. This represents inequality (more versus less). Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . but defined from below. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Power and inequality.   4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. but some are more unequal than others. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. unknown. surprising. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. of course. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. safety and security measures. uncertainty accepting cultures. and motivated by inner nervous energy. not from above. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. and different from usual. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Unstructured situations are novel.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.

Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. such as pilots. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. either physical or cognitive. In particular. by a machine function. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. not what we thought we told them to do. (Norbert Wiener) 5. against a conflicting trend. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. there can be anomalies where a professional group. Flight Crew Training Centre . navigators and flight engineers. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. including radio operators. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. Furthermore.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. or an organizational culture can prevail. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. 5.

often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. not to mention the human (social) effects. Flight Crew Training Centre .” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. The latter will not be discussed here. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. 5. In particular. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. accuracy and reduced costs. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. In practice this does not always happen. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate.

Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. Good quantitative assessment. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. Poor spoken material. fast. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. 1986. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. Rather.” (Good.Good inductive. Poor program. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. inaccurate.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. Whiteside. difficult to re. slow. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. detecting messages in noise. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . T. J & George. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. M. accurate. Spine. P. narrow range. easy to re program. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. Poor at at detecting messages in noise.

Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. resulting in further reduced workload. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. There is a reduced cognitive load. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. 5. Overall result is reduced workload. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. – This is a high workload situation.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. according to any change in tactical goal. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Although in some systems. an area of weakness in interface design. vigilance and complacency may become issues. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. with different cognitive skills required. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. In the aviation scenario.

the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. 5. Flight Crew Training Centre . communications and monitoring. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. In particular. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. 5. Unfortunately. Habsheim etc). The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. For this new knowledge and skills are required. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. Cali.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. will disengage or will revert to another mode.

9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . or subtle. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. Consequently. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. but not replace.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. 5. easy-to-use systems. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. A lack of. 5.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5.

Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. the Captain is the designated “leader”. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. 6. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. 5. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. Through the use of example and persuasion. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. which is acquired. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Humans are capable of devising strategies.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. Flight Crew Training Centre . which is assigned.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. In the flight-deck environment. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. and authority. We must guard against the threats posed by automation.

An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. Personal qualities required are those of courage. will power. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. and Manage Decision-Making Model. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . 6. The leader must balance the demands of the task. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. with use of the Assess. In addition. Action.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. the team and the individual. to decide on a course of action. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. 6. and a duty.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. In fact. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. initiative and integrity. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. and be able to maintain team morale.

ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. manage and direct the flow of information.5 Task To achieve the task. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre . suggestions Giving opinions.8.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. With a wide variety of background.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.

In between. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. Flight Crew Training Centre . there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.8.8.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.8.

This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. but not if things are going wrong. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. using information available at that time.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. a different style is adopted according to the situation. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Together. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. For most effective leadership. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group.

Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. 1997.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. since there are a number of nationalities. Hughes. cited by Kern. For successful team performance.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. The optimum gradient. 6. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. RE. G (Eds). A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. T. passive/critical. Ginnett. 6. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. Flight Crew Training Centre . Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. active/uncritical and active/critical. While this might be an individual’s view. along with good communication skills. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. R & Curphy.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. Followers are a vital part of a team. and followership is a skill in its own right. The role is much like that of a chairman. 1988. supportive followers are as important as a leader. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. R. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. G2. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two.

An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. The only way to ensure this is. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. because they actively support without thinking. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Flight Crew Training Centre . they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. Sheep are akin to human automatons. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. Survivors are the Company men. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. 6. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. Making a good first impression is vital. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. unless identified and brought “back onside”.

rank could impinge on communication as well. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. In the case of Jade Cargo International. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. However. Barriers to communication are also identified. 7. and very rarely are raised voices heard. While modern flight decks are well insulated. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. insulting. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. 7.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. in communication within a crew. as much as 90%. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. the words used tend to be very important. Between a Captain and a First Officer. noise is still a factor. along with methods of eliminating them. culture plays a large part. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . So.e. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. This chapter describes the principles of communication. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. degrading language. The actual words used accounting for about 10%.

whether on the needs of others or your own. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. 7. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. and the manner. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. two aspects of the message content will be considered. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. supportive and submissive. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. the focus. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. aggressive. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others.4. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. assertive. 7.

However. are avoided at all times.4. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. 7.4. and will likely isolate the aggressor.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. 7. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. In a non-critical situation. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”.downs. Flight Crew Training Centre .4. such as during training or non-normal situations. not recommended but part of life.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. It is unlikely to motivate the team.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. However this may change depending on circumstances. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. Therefore. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. Referring to the matrix.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. They put themselves down.

In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. be supportive. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. In other words. An assertive response might also be effective. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. Flight Crew Training Centre . Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. If the other person is submissive. it is likely communication that will break down completely. their needs will be overlooked. If someone is submissive. will find a style that works well for them. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. Dealing with aggression is not easy. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. Each individual and in fact every team. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time.

No one person or idea is perfect.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. There is more than one way to do anything. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. When conflict is dealt with constructively. and stretch their imagination. If conflict does occur. You must give to get.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. When sides are chosen. productivity will diminish or stop. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. Flight Crew Training Centre . Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Animosities can develop. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. No one makes major concessions. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. the results may be positive or negative. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. Assertive and cooperative. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. the stage is set for potential conflict. test their position and beliefs. objectives and values. actions and situations. Unwillingness to work through issues. Differences in perceiving motives. trust and support will deteriorate. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. 7. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. which will lead to better results. collaborate or compromise. High respect for mutual support. and the damage is usually difficult to repair.favorable versus unfavorable. depending on how those involved choose to approach it.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. words. Differing expectations of outcomes . communications may breakdown.

however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. However. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Conflict Resolution. Advocacy. or good or bad outcomes. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. rather that a model is used. Action and Critique. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. 8. Flight Crew Training Centre . GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. once in a while. It is the end result that we are interested in. It is not which model that is used that is important. either for routine or novel situations.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.

8.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.2.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM. further modification to the RMM was required. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. Flight Crew Training Centre .2. 8. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.

3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. the problem and the solution. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. to make sure we fully understand the implications.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). This does not always produce the best solution. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. there are two typical responses. seeking more information about it. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. its implications and how much time is available. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. By staying below the line as much as possible. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution.Information seeking. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . Flight Crew Training Centre . Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. Whenever a problem is encountered at work.

  The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. Open questions allow more options. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. but will probably be accepted. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). In all cases. In the latter case. when there is little available. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . others may be less time dependent. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum.solving resource. is a valuable problem. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. EFIS architecture.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). this limits the opportunity for assessment. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. immediate action is required. critical. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Time can be considered as. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. using a traffic light system. On the other hand. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. 8. A solution in the form of a question however. losing vital feedback. may at best get a query in response. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. Once a time frame has been established. available and required.

Flight Crew Training Centre .5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. prioritize. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. test understanding. test understanding propose. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. test understanding. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. NAVIGATE. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. prioritize. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. seek information. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. Good teamwork needs good communication. 8. propose. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. the Captain must manage. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking.

Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. it is time to manage. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. obstacles and weather. Flight Crew Training Centre . With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. including the navigation away from terrain.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. An important point here is that you do not rush. Once this is under control. 8. Once the Group is informed and placated. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. It is a circular or iterative process. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. However. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. the task need is paramount. When the process is complete. For example in the first stages of a diversion. the team and the individual. all the circles are the same size. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. 8. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore.

Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. 9.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. these are known as “mental models”. do something with that information and then act on it. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. but functionally can be quite accurate. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. In the same way. Flight Crew Training Centre . An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. output functions and an internal processing function. we receive information.

noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. 9. so much that. sight. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. sound and touch. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name).3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9.4. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. During a busy. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise.4. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. sound. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal. Perception is incredibly powerful. but it is not being ignored completely. 9.4 Input functions 9. if we miss-perceive an event. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . touch. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. 9.4.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. smell and taste. even though they do not have the loudest voice. This is quite normal. not all of them get through to the processing stage. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. are actually switching from one to the other.

9.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. short-term and long-term. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. you have as little as 0. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. and retained by conscious attention. descend 180. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. unless it is consciously being dealt with.72”. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. Another type of memory is sensory memory. 9.6. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. which really belongs with the input functions. speed 310.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. 9. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. and contact 119. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds.6. Flight Crew Training Centre . expect 150 by xxx.6. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.6 Processing Functions 9. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. the original message has been replayed by the mind. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.

even if the correct data has never been learned. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. manageable by most. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. but it is top secret.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever.6. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. and Mitigate). For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. However the problem is not with forgetting.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage.. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. patterns or mini theories. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. 9. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. For example. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. 9. long after the event. such as ATM (Avoid.6. Trap. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. Flight Crew Training Centre .

however it is a single channel device. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. this is when the action has become a learned routine. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. 9. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach.6. The events of September 11. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. 9.6. as they are referred to by the date itself. It can only deal with one issue at a time. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. in particular responses to RTO.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is.

Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. Our interest is human performance.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. stress and fatigue produce similar results. This chapter covers the effects of stress. some a combination of both. others mental strains. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. 9. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . In this respect. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. Some of these place physical strains on the body. including workload and circadian rhythms. Performance varies with a number of factors.

performance actually peaks.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function.3. require the crew to be at optimal performance. but too much is exhausting. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. 10. and then falls away. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. 10. largely impossible. As stress increases further. performance improves. as stress increases. Flight Crew Training Centre . upset stomach. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future.stimulation. and other symptoms. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. Critical phases of flight. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. is exhilarating early in the day. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. tension headaches. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. acute and chronic. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. Initially. such as take-off and landing.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. In the diagram above. for example. The right side shows over stimulation. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. consider that arousal refers to stress. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. By the same token. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. After a certain point. from being somewhat dormant.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. into the optimum performance range (shaded). Too little stress causes complacency.

diarrhea. constipation.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. flatulence. and irritable bowel syndrome. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. Because it is short term. it does. they tend to be abrupt. have too many irons in the fire. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. They're always in a rush. and heart disease. 10. stomach. anxiety. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. a deadline they're rushing to meet. back pain. heart palpitations. the three stress emotions. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. migraine headaches.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. their child's occasional problems at school. anxious. and so on. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. Flight Crew Training Centre . generally requiring professional help. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. however. muscular problems including tension headache. hypertension. shortness of breath. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. who suffer acute stress frequently. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. shorttempered. and tense. dizziness. If something can go wrong. Often. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. They take on too much. jaw pain. rapid heartbeat.3. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. acid stomach. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. and depression. but always late. and chest pain. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. migraines.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. the loss of an important contract. sweaty palms. cold hands or feet. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. irritable. and it is highly treatable and manageable." Always in a hurry. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. chest pain.

Frequently.. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. and sometimes. violence. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. minds and lives. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. hyperventilation. Generally. promotion to Captain). Some examples are: marriage or divorce. chronic stress is not. perhaps. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. Chronic stress kills through suicide. or a mental response such as irritability. More precisely. stroke. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. environmental and cognitive. Flight Crew Training Centre . heart attack. which exhibits as either a physical response e. With no hope. familiar.3. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. they see their lifestyle. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. the individual gives up searching for solutions. It's the stress of poverty. People wear down to a final. and.3.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. year after year.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. tremors. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. of dysfunctional families. This could come in many different forms. even cancer.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. their patterns of interacting with others. 10. fatal breakdown.g. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. sweating. change in job or responsibilities (i. almost comfortable. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. Chronic stress destroys bodies. 10. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time.e. 10. They blame their woes on other people and external events. They forget it's there. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation.3. heart arrhythmia. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it.

Noise arouses the individual. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). either on the apron. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. but with a dissimilar function. In the long-term. or in the flight. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. When workload is high. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. this will be covered later in the chapter. Two common examples could be heat and noise.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. 10. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors.3. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. 10. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. and mismanage priorities. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss.deck. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress.3. However. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.

leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. As in the case of stress. the range of optimal performance is reached. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. Typically. This might be due to time since awake. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. or state of awake ness. On a night flight. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. For example. with an inability to sleep further. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. self. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. After some time of being awake. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. thereby inducing further errors. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. However. 10. Response time. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. It cannot be stored.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. this continues to improve performance until. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. workload (physical exertion). the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. Depending on the individual. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. they may become bogged down in processing the data. when workload is at an absolute minimum. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM).5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. 10. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Immediately after awakening. Although this can be an effective strategy. after reaching a peak. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep.

will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. on the wrong time zone. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . inattentive and has an increased reaction time. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. 10. sleep is deeper rather than longer. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. which extend the operating day. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. However. This is known as jet-lag. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment.

11 Situational Awareness 11. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. when conducted in a structured fashion. In accidents involving human error. It is another warning flag. 10. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. providing awareness and in need of management. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. Managing stress and sleep effectively. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. However it is often quoted without really being explained. 10. As any medical practitioner will verify. this is a potentially dangerous practice. Others prefer mental stimulation. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. 11. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. is the duty of every crewmember. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. In the modern world. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. the Flight Crew Training Centre . This chapter will explain what it is.

which mitigates part of the problem. systems. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. It is not just enough to notice a situation. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. one must understand and think ahead. Navigate. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. 11.” This is quite complex. Flight Crew Training Centre . passengers and company). then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. crew. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. and Communicate. In addition to three levels of SA. automation modes. fuel and time). those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot.

information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Flight Crew Training Centre . Results from observations at several different airlines. if potential problems can be identified in time. fuel burn. The trapping phase begins at top-of. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. After descent initiation. Prior to descent. fixation and confusion exist.Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. fixation and confusion.vague or incomplete statements 11.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. there is much to be concerned about here. during the take-off and landing phases. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.descent and leads up to the approach. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. Trap. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. minimums. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . A three-stage model “Avoid.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground.

6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable.” Flight Crew Training Centre . Finally. communications. an undesired aircraft state (i. Skills relating to spatial ability. too high. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. self-monitoring. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. Human error is inevitable. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. there is very little time left to correct it. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. too fast etc) must be avoided.e. unstabilized approach. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. 11. Should such a state occur. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. scan patterns and checklist use.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. 11. so that we can take action to improve it. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. task management and prioritization. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. attention-sharing. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. 11. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. However. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. and use the speed brake if necessary. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. contingency planning. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid.

Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Flight Crew Training Centre .don't fixate. ATC. Project ahead and consider contingencies. dispatch. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. maintenance. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. etc.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Speak up when you see SA breaking down.

& Helmreich. Merritt.. Guangzhou. & Merritt.. 8-12. P. Columbus: Ohio State University.. Jakarta. 1991. Ooi. R.J.. Merritt. A. (1997). Auckland. A. 1996.L.. A.S. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. Flight Crew Training Centre .. A. & Merritt.R. Merritt.L. November 26-28. & Sherman. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. (1995).C. (1996)..C....L.A. A. New Zealand. A. R. Cultural issues in crew resource management. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. 1996. 1995. CRM Advocate. J. Wilhelm. April-May.C. Helmreich. April 23-25.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. R. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C. 1.L. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. W. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. (1997).. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar.. A. (1996). Merritt. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. Merritt. P.C. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. April). Colombus.. stress. R. Sydney. Cultural influences on flight operations. Taggart. & Helmreich. 1997. Merritt. Helmreich. (1996. & Helmreich.C. November 20-24. Ohio.C.. 1997.L. (1991).R.C. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1996). T. Ohio. R.L. Colombus. May 1995.C. CRM: I hate it. R. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. April. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). (1995). what is it? (Error. (1995). April-May.0 (International) & 2. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Indonesia. A..