Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. 2 Modules Content 2.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre . The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. 1. and team management skills.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC).6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.2. assisted by the facilitator. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.2.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1. leadership and team management. and a series of role-plays.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. 1. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.

Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.4 Leadership.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.

This includes everything from the design of a tool. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. This is due. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. knowledge.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. Flight Crew Training Centre . Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. HPL. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. environment. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. design and engine reliability. 3. and with other humans. home. 3. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. to the design of a checklist. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. in part. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. Despite improvements in technology. to the brightness required of an electronic display. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. skill and attitude.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft.

Flight Crew Training Centre . focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. In particular this means designing for error. J. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. 3.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. Most of these errors are small.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. 3. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. 3. 1990. encompassing the best of previous generations. especially on a long.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.

Some were latent failures. the accident does not occur. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. it snaps. of which the operating crew are the last link. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. Occasionally.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. but placed together they form a robust wall. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. the holes will line up. the last line of defense. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. 3. In isolation it is insignificant.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. For example. Rather. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. Flight Crew Training Centre . Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. Without assigning a principle cause. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. Others were management failures. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. Reason used Swiss cheese. If they can break the chain. It was but it is not an isolated case. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. occurring years ago on the drawing board. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation.

the accident chain is broken. at any level.e. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Management. Engineering.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. (Errors made by other people ATC. performing a checklist from memory.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense.e.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. because despite the risks. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. but as long as the holes do not line up. 3. Flight Crew Training Centre . Regulators etc are threats to the crew. Threats and errors are unavoidable. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i.External influences Errors .) Threats . in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew. and it is up to us to break the chain.e. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. the start of an accident chain. safe operations are the norm. 3. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i.

Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. However. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . These have been termed warning flags. nine common factors existed. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. However in all cases. such as an unstabilized approach. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. Trap. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist. 3. 3.12 Avoid. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing.

the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. regarding all societies in the world. Power Distance. Uncertainty Avoidance. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. Again. 4. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. 4. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. such as organizational. cohesive in-groups. often extended families (with uncles. (which are predominantly male). On the collectivist side. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . professional and safety culture.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. 4. not to the state. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. versus its opposite. collectivism. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism.Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4.

Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. but defined from below. surprising. of course. not from above. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. and motivated by inner nervous energy.   4. but some are more unequal than others. The opposite type. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. Unstructured situations are novel. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less). and not expected by their environment to express emotions. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Power and inequality. they try to have as few rules as possible. It suggests that the followers. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. safety and security measures. uncertainty accepting cultures. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. unknown. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. and different from usual. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.

Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. there can be anomalies where a professional group. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. including radio operators. not what we thought we told them to do. Flight Crew Training Centre . either physical or cognitive. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. In particular. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. navigators and flight engineers. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. (Norbert Wiener) 5. 5. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. against a conflicting trend. Furthermore. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. by a machine function. such as pilots. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. or an organizational culture can prevail.

it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation. accuracy and reduced costs. In particular. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. In practice this does not always happen. 5. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort.3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. Flight Crew Training Centre . not to mention the human (social) effects. The latter will not be discussed here. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story.

accurate. 1986. P. Whiteside. T.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. detecting messages in noise.” (Good. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. inaccurate. Poor program. Spine. difficult to re. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. M.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. easy to re program.Good inductive. Good quantitative assessment. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. Poor spoken material. fast. Rather. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. slow. J & George. narrow range. error correction Good at error correction Specialized.

In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. 5. an area of weakness in interface design. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. with different cognitive skills required. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. There is a reduced cognitive load. Overall result is reduced workload. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. according to any change in tactical goal. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. Although in some systems. resulting in further reduced workload. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. In the aviation scenario. – This is a high workload situation.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited.

the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. For this new knowledge and skills are required. 5. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. will disengage or will revert to another mode. Habsheim etc). The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. 5. In particular. Cali.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Flight Crew Training Centre . Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. communications and monitoring.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. Unfortunately.

Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . 5. 5. easy-to-use systems.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. but not replace. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. A lack of. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. or subtle. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. Consequently. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.

and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. Humans are capable of devising strategies.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Through the use of example and persuasion. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. Flight Crew Training Centre . the leader becomes a means of change and influence.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. which is acquired. 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. which is assigned. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. and authority. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. 6. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. the Captain is the designated “leader”. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. 5. In the flight-deck environment.

3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. In addition. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. will power. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. Action. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. with use of the Assess. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . In fact. and a duty. 6. Personal qualities required are those of courage.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. 6. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. The leader must balance the demands of the task. initiative and integrity. to decide on a course of action. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. and Manage Decision-Making Model. the team and the individual. and be able to maintain team morale. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills.

suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .8.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.5 Task To achieve the task. manage and direct the flow of information. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead. suggestions Giving opinions. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. With a wide variety of background. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6.

there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.8.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.8. Flight Crew Training Centre .8. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”. In between.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader.

Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. but not if things are going wrong. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. For most effective leadership. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . Together. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. using information available at that time. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude.

10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position. The role is much like that of a chairman. G2. Followers are a vital part of a team. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. T. For successful team performance. Hughes. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. 1997. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. since there are a number of nationalities. active/uncritical and active/critical. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. R. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. along with good communication skills. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. R & Curphy. RE. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. supportive followers are as important as a leader. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. 6. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. The optimum gradient. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. While this might be an individual’s view. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. cited by Kern. and followership is a skill in its own right. passive/critical. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. 1988. Ginnett. G (Eds). that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. 6.

Sheep are akin to human automatons. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. unless identified and brought “back onside”. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. 6. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. Survivors are the Company men. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. because they actively support without thinking. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Making a good first impression is vital. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. The only way to ensure this is. airlines form new teams for practically every duty.

The actual words used accounting for about 10%. In the case of Jade Cargo International.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. noise is still a factor. degrading language. insulting. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. as much as 90%.e. Barriers to communication are also identified. This chapter describes the principles of communication. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. culture plays a large part. So. in communication within a crew.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. along with methods of eliminating them. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. While modern flight decks are well insulated. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . 7. 7. as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. However. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. and very rarely are raised voices heard. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. Between a Captain and a First Officer.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. the words used tend to be very important. rank could impinge on communication as well.

supportive and submissive. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter.4. two aspects of the message content will be considered. and the manner. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. whether on the needs of others or your own. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. 7.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). aggressive. 7. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. the focus. assertive. Flight Crew Training Centre .4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications.

downs. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.4. 7. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. However. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. Referring to the matrix. 7. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. However this may change depending on circumstances. Therefore. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. This is a “no-go” area for us at work.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7.4. In a non-critical situation. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. It is unlikely to motivate the team.4. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. such as during training or non-normal situations.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. not recommended but part of life. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. Flight Crew Training Centre . are avoided at all times. They put themselves down. and will likely isolate the aggressor.

it is likely communication that will break down completely.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. will find a style that works well for them. their needs will be overlooked. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person. If someone is submissive. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. In other words. Each individual and in fact every team. be supportive. Flight Crew Training Centre . Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. If the other person is submissive. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. An assertive response might also be effective. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. Dealing with aggression is not easy. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation.

productivity will diminish or stop.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. communications may breakdown. Unwillingness to work through issues. Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. and stretch their imagination. collaborate or compromise. objectives and values. High respect for mutual support. If conflict does occur. trust and support will deteriorate. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. No one makes major concessions. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. the stage is set for potential conflict. which will lead to better results. No one person or idea is perfect. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. When conflict is dealt with constructively. Assertive and cooperative. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. Animosities can develop. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. the results may be positive or negative. test their position and beliefs. There is more than one way to do anything. actions and situations. 7. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. words. Differing expectations of outcomes . When sides are chosen.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. Differences in perceiving motives. You must give to get.favorable versus unfavorable.

Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. However. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. either for routine or novel situations. 8. It is the end result that we are interested in. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. Flight Crew Training Centre . The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. or good or bad outcomes. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. Conflict Resolution. Action and Critique. rather that a model is used. It is not which model that is used that is important. once in a while.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. Advocacy. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry.

8. further modification to the RMM was required. 8.2. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. Flight Crew Training Centre . This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. as well as the appropriate CRM principals.2.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following.

it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is. seeking more information about it. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. the problem and the solution. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. This does not always produce the best solution.Information seeking. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. there are two typical responses. to make sure we fully understand the implications. Flight Crew Training Centre . its implications and how much time is available. By staying below the line as much as possible. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). The situation can be considered in two separate domains. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] .

Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). this limits the opportunity for assessment. Open questions allow more options. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE].Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. others may be less time dependent. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?].4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. critical. available and required. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . Time can be considered as. EFIS architecture. losing vital feedback. A solution in the form of a question however. In all cases. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. when there is little available. using a traffic light system. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). In the latter case.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. Once a time frame has been established. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. immediate action is required. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. On the other hand. 8. may at best get a query in response. is a valuable problem. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. but will probably be accepted.solving resource.

QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. test understanding. test understanding. 8. propose. Flight Crew Training Centre . keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. Good teamwork needs good communication. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. prioritize. seek information. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. the Captain must manage. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. prioritize. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. test understanding propose. NAVIGATE.

Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. 8. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. Once the Group is informed and placated.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. Once this is under control. the team and the individual. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. However. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. An important point here is that you do not rush. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. It is a circular or iterative process. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. it is time to manage.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. all the circles are the same size. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. For example in the first stages of a diversion. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. 8. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. When the process is complete. obstacles and weather. the task need is paramount.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. including the navigation away from terrain. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Flight Crew Training Centre .

9. individuals create internal representations of how systems work.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . we receive information. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. these are known as “mental models”. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. do something with that information and then act on it. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. In the same way. output functions and an internal processing function.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. but functionally can be quite accurate. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations.

9. Perception is incredibly powerful. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. even though they do not have the loudest voice. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. are actually switching from one to the other.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre .5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. sound. During a busy. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. 9. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. smell and taste. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone.4. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. if we miss-perceive an event.4.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. but it is not being ignored completely. touch. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this.4. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). 9. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. so much that. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. sight.4 Input functions 9. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. This is quite normal. not all of them get through to the processing stage. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. sound and touch. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation.

72”. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. 9. the original message has been replayed by the mind. which really belongs with the input functions. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. expect 150 by xxx.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory.6. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.6. speed 310. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. short-term and long-term. you have as little as 0. descend 180. unless it is consciously being dealt with. and retained by conscious attention. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285.6. Another type of memory is sensory memory. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.6 Processing Functions 9. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. and contact 119. 9. 9.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. Flight Crew Training Centre . The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions.

some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. 9. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. such as ATM (Avoid. patterns or mini theories.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. even if the correct data has never been learned. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. However the problem is not with forgetting.6. and Mitigate). Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. 9. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Trap. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. but it is top secret..6. For example. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. manageable by most. Flight Crew Training Centre . you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. long after the event.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events.

9. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. 9. the assassination of JFK [November 1963].6.6. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. in particular responses to RTO. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. It can only deal with one issue at a time.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. The events of September 11. however it is a single channel device. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. as they are referred to by the date itself. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. this is when the action has become a learned routine. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks.

sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. others mental strains. 9.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. Performance varies with a number of factors.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. some a combination of both. stress and fatigue produce similar results. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. In this respect. Our interest is human performance. Some of these place physical strains on the body. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. This chapter covers the effects of stress. including workload and circadian rhythms.

Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. tension headaches. such as take-off and landing. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. After a certain point. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. performance improves. but too much is exhausting. upset stomach. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. Critical phases of flight. 10. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. In the diagram above. consider that arousal refers to stress. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. By the same token. acute and chronic. As stress increases further.stimulation. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. and then falls away. 10.3. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. Initially. is exhilarating early in the day. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. largely impossible. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Flight Crew Training Centre . Too little stress causes complacency. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. and other symptoms. into the optimum performance range (shaded). The right side shows over stimulation. from being somewhat dormant. require the crew to be at optimal performance. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. as stress increases. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. for example. performance actually peaks.

Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. and tense. sweaty palms. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. diarrhea.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. a deadline they're rushing to meet. back pain. irritable. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. If something can go wrong. They're always in a rush. rapid heartbeat. who suffer acute stress frequently. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender." Always in a hurry. generally requiring professional help. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. their child's occasional problems at school. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. they tend to be abrupt. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. muscular problems including tension headache. and it is highly treatable and manageable. anxiety. heart palpitations. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. migraines. Because it is short term. acid stomach. chest pain.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. the loss of an important contract. jaw pain. constipation. Flight Crew Training Centre . shorttempered. anxious. stomach. cold hands or feet. however.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. dizziness. 10. flatulence. Often.3. and depression. and so on. the three stress emotions. have too many irons in the fire. hypertension. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. migraine headaches. They take on too much. it does. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. and heart disease. shortness of breath. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and irritable bowel syndrome. but always late. and chest pain. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability.

and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. Chronic stress destroys bodies.e. which exhibits as either a physical response e. environmental and cognitive. stroke. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. Frequently. It's the stress of poverty.3. There are three broad sources of stressor: life.3. year after year.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle.3. People wear down to a final. sweating. heart attack. This could come in many different forms. and sometimes. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. fatal breakdown. 10. familiar. 10. heart arrhythmia. Generally.. With no hope. More precisely.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. or a mental response such as irritability. Chronic stress kills through suicide. tremors. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. almost comfortable. even cancer. chronic stress is not. 10. they see their lifestyle. change in job or responsibilities (i. perhaps. They forget it's there. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. minds and lives. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. promotion to Captain). hyperventilation. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress.g. violence. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. of dysfunctional families. their patterns of interacting with others. They blame their woes on other people and external events.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. and. the individual gives up searching for solutions. Flight Crew Training Centre . Some examples are: marriage or divorce. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition.

10. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. Noise arouses the individual. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. or in the flight. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. However. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. In the long-term. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. When workload is high. but with a dissimilar function.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . Two common examples could be heat and noise. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. either on the apron.3. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. this will be covered later in the chapter. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress.deck. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. 10. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG.3. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. and mismanage priorities. especially when it involves an operating pilot. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.

Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. 10. workload (physical exertion). or state of awake ness.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. As in the case of stress. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. It cannot be stored. the range of optimal performance is reached.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. However. this continues to improve performance until. Typically. Depending on the individual. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. After some time of being awake. On a night flight. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Although this can be an effective strategy. Immediately after awakening. This might be due to time since awake. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. when workload is at an absolute minimum. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. self. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. with an inability to sleep further. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). 10. Response time. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. after reaching a peak. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. For example. thereby inducing further errors. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms.

the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. However. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . 10. which extend the operating day. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. sleep is deeper rather than longer. rather than eastbound which compresses the day. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. on the wrong time zone. This is known as jet-lag.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. inattentive and has an increased reaction time.

It is another warning flag. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. is the duty of every crewmember. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. 10. 10. In accidents involving human error. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. 11. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. Others prefer mental stimulation. this is a potentially dangerous practice. In the modern world. However it is often quoted without really being explained. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. 11 Situational Awareness 11. when conducted in a structured fashion.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. the Flight Crew Training Centre . providing awareness and in need of management.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. Managing stress and sleep effectively. As any medical practitioner will verify.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. This chapter will explain what it is. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations.

why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. In addition to three levels of SA. which mitigates part of the problem. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection.” This is quite complex. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. Flight Crew Training Centre . The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. fuel and time). but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. It is not just enough to notice a situation. systems. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. 11. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot.Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. Navigate. one must understand and think ahead. automation modes. passengers and company). The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. crew. and Communicate.

Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. if potential problems can be identified in time. fixation and confusion exist. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”.descent and leads up to the approach. fixation and confusion.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation .uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. minimums. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. A three-stage model “Avoid.vague or incomplete statements 11.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . less time is available for noticing and avoiding. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. Results from observations at several different airlines. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies .Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. there is much to be concerned about here. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity . The trapping phase begins at top-of. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations. during the take-off and landing phases. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase. fuel burn. Flight Crew Training Centre . Trap. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively .4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this. After descent initiation. Prior to descent.

I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Should such a state occur. task management and prioritization. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. so that we can take action to improve it.” Flight Crew Training Centre . otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. there is very little time left to correct it. attention-sharing. Human error is inevitable. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. an undesired aircraft state (i. Skills relating to spatial ability.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. self-monitoring. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. too fast etc) must be avoided. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. 11. 11. contingency planning. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. unstabilized approach. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. However. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. Finally. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). too high. scan patterns and checklist use. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. communications. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA].5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. and use the speed brake if necessary.e. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA].

Flight Crew Training Centre . dispatch. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Focus on the details and scan the big picture.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. Project ahead and consider contingencies.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Speak up when you see SA breaking down.don't fixate. maintenance. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. ATC. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . etc.

CRM: I hate it. Ohio.C. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues.L. Merritt. (1997).1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. (1996).L. CRM Advocate. & Merritt. Wilhelm.C.R. April-May. & Merritt.. Merritt. A.L. November 20-24.0 (International) & 2.. 1997.C. Merritt. & Helmreich. (1996). Merritt. Auckland. A. & Helmreich. (1991). 8-12.A. April 23-25... (1996.. 1996. P. Jakarta. Ooi. 1991.L. Cultural influences on flight operations. (1997).. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. (1995). A.. A.. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. (1996).C..C. & Sherman. April).. Colombus. May 1995. R. T. stress. R. November 26-28. 1995. 1997. 1. April-May. R. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Flight Crew Training Centre . Merritt. A. A. Colombus. (1995). Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries.R... Cultural issues in crew resource management. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Columbus: Ohio State University. Taggart. R. Indonesia. R. 1996. W.L. New Zealand. Merritt. Helmreich. A. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. what is it? (Error. April..J.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. Helmreich. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. A. Sydney. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. Guangzhou. J. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.C.L...C. P. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. (1995). & Helmreich.C. Ohio.S. R.

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