Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

The course consists of a review of decisionmaking. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor. and team management skills. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. assisted by the facilitator.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. leadership and team management.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course. 2 Modules Content 2.2.6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.2. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. and a series of role-plays.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre .2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). 1. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. 1.

5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.4 Leadership.

with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. This includes everything from the design of a tool. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. HPL. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. 3. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. and with other humans. knowledge. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. in part. This is due. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. to the design of a checklist. environment. skill and attitude. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. 3. to the brightness required of an electronic display. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. Flight Crew Training Centre . MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations. design and engine reliability.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. home. Despite improvements in technology.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3.

4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance. 3. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur. J. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. encompassing the best of previous generations.5 Human Error Reason (Reason.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance. In particular this means designing for error. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. Most of these errors are small. 3.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. especially on a long. Flight Crew Training Centre . 3. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. 1990. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training.

the last line of defense. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. the accident does not occur. Some were latent failures. Occasionally. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. Others were management failures. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. Rather. It was but it is not an isolated case. If they can break the chain. it snaps. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. but placed together they form a robust wall. For example. occurring years ago on the drawing board. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats. This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. of which the operating crew are the last link. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. Reason used Swiss cheese. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. Without assigning a principle cause. the holes will line up. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. In isolation it is insignificant. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider. Flight Crew Training Centre .7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. 3.

Management. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. safe operations are the norm. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. Engineering. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. and it is up to us to break the chain.External influences Errors . performing a checklist from memory. the start of an accident chain. the accident chain is broken. Flight Crew Training Centre . Threats and errors are unavoidable.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances.e. because despite the risks. at any level.e. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. but as long as the holes do not line up. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew.e. 3.) Threats . 3. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. (Errors made by other people ATC.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors.

The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. 3. However in all cases. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. Trap. These have been termed warning flags. such as an unstabilized approach. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. 3. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors.12 Avoid. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. nine common factors existed.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . However. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing.

Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . versus its opposite. Power Distance. 4. On the collectivist side. often extended families (with uncles. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Again.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Uncertainty Avoidance. (which are predominantly male). having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. cohesive in-groups. 4. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. 4.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. professional and safety culture.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. not to the state. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. collectivism. such as organizational. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. regarding all societies in the world.

People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal. but defined from below. they try to have as few rules as possible. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. Unstructured situations are novel. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. safety and security measures. uncertainty accepting cultures. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . unknown. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.   4. This represents inequality (more versus less). it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. of course. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. Power and inequality. but some are more unequal than others. and not expected by their environment to express emotions. The opposite type. not from above. surprising.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4. and motivated by inner nervous energy. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. and different from usual. It suggests that the followers.

it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. either physical or cognitive. (Norbert Wiener) 5. navigators and flight engineers. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. such as pilots. Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. Furthermore.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. by a machine function. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. 5. against a conflicting trend.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. In particular. including radio operators. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. not what we thought we told them to do. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. or an organizational culture can prevail. there can be anomalies where a professional group. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. 5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do.

3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. Flight Crew Training Centre . it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. accuracy and reduced costs. often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. In practice this does not always happen. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. not to mention the human (social) effects. In particular. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. 5. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. The latter will not be discussed here. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation.

” (Good. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. Good quantitative assessment. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Spine. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. inaccurate. difficult to re. subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. M. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. easy to re program. J & George. narrow range. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. accurate. P. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. Whiteside. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need. 1986. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. T. detecting messages in noise. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better. Poor spoken material. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. fast. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. Rather. Poor program. slow.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s.Good inductive.

so the overall workload is drastically reduced. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. – This is a high workload situation. Overall result is reduced workload. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. Pilots will dynamically move between levels. an area of weakness in interface design. In the aviation scenario. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. according to any change in tactical goal. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . such as nuclear power-plant control rooms. 5. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. resulting in further reduced workload. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels. with different cognitive skills required. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. There is a reduced cognitive load.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. Although in some systems.

In particular. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness. Flight Crew Training Centre . the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance. communications and monitoring. it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. 5. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. Unfortunately. will disengage or will revert to another mode. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Cali. It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. Habsheim etc). The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. For this new knowledge and skills are required.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. 5.

Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. Consequently. A lack of. Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. or subtle. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre .9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback. 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive. but not replace. easy-to-use systems. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight.11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.

the leader becomes a means of change and influence. 6. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Through the use of example and persuasion. the Captain is the designated “leader”.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. which is acquired. In the flight-deck environment. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. Humans are capable of devising strategies. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. which is assigned. Flight Crew Training Centre . 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. and authority. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. 5. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses.

This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. 6. Personal qualities required are those of courage.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. and be able to maintain team morale. Action. will power. the team and the individual. and Manage Decision-Making Model. 6. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . initiative and integrity. to decide on a course of action.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. In addition. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided. The leader must balance the demands of the task. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. In fact. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. and a duty. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. with use of the Assess. An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills.

Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.5 Task To achieve the task. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. manage and direct the flow of information. With a wide variety of background.8. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. suggestions Giving opinions.

It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.8. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative. In between.8. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.8.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. Flight Crew Training Centre .

Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude. For most effective leadership. but not if things are going wrong. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Together. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. using information available at that time. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. a different style is adopted according to the situation. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone.

Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. Flight Crew Training Centre . Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. cited by Kern. 6. 1988. levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. The optimum gradient. R. G2.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. along with good communication skills. While this might be an individual’s view. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. G (Eds). 6. RE. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. Hughes. Followers are a vital part of a team. supportive followers are as important as a leader. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate. and followership is a skill in its own right. For successful team performance. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. T. passive/critical. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. 1997. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. The role is much like that of a chairman. active/uncritical and active/critical.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. R & Curphy. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. since there are a number of nationalities. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. Ginnett. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position.

unless identified and brought “back onside”. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. because they actively support without thinking. They are also the foundation for teambuilding.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Making a good first impression is vital. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. Flight Crew Training Centre . and actively supportive without being “yes men”. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. The only way to ensure this is.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. Survivors are the Company men. Sheep are akin to human automatons. 6. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well.

as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. This chapter describes the principles of communication. In the case of Jade Cargo International. 7. the words used tend to be very important. in communication within a crew. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. degrading language. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. So. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. as much as 90%. culture plays a large part. and very rarely are raised voices heard. 7.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. rank could impinge on communication as well. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction. However. along with methods of eliminating them. While modern flight decks are well insulated. insulting. noise is still a factor. Between a Captain and a First Officer. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft.e. Barriers to communication are also identified.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. This can be verbal or non-verbal information.

supportive and submissive. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. the focus.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people.4.4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). aggressive. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. assertive. Flight Crew Training Centre . From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. 7. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. whether on the needs of others or your own. The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. 7.1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. and the manner. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”. two aspects of the message content will be considered. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication.

A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one.4. are avoided at all times. not recommended but part of life. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. This is a “no-go” area for us at work.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”.downs. However. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. 7. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. such as during training or non-normal situations. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. and will likely isolate the aggressor. Referring to the matrix. Flight Crew Training Centre . A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. It is unlikely to motivate the team. They put themselves down.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves. However this may change depending on circumstances.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive.4.4. In a non-critical situation. 7. Therefore. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth.

will find a style that works well for them. If someone is submissive. An assertive response might also be effective. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. Dealing with aggression is not easy. Flight Crew Training Centre . The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult. provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. it is likely communication that will break down completely. their needs will be overlooked.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. In other words. Each individual and in fact every team. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. be supportive. If the other person is submissive. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. but leads to good understanding when accomplished.

but unfortunately does occur a great deal.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. the stage is set for potential conflict. If conflict does occur. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. Unwillingness to work through issues. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. actions and situations. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. communications may breakdown. 7. trust and support will deteriorate. productivity will diminish or stop. words. test their position and beliefs. No one makes major concessions. High respect for mutual support. When conflict is dealt with constructively. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. Differences in perceiving motives. the results may be positive or negative. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. When sides are chosen.6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis.favorable versus unfavorable. objectives and values. and stretch their imagination. There is more than one way to do anything.Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Differing expectations of outcomes . Animosities can develop. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. collaborate or compromise. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. You must give to get. Flight Crew Training Centre . No one person or idea is perfect. which will lead to better results. Assertive and cooperative.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important.

Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. It is not which model that is used that is important. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. either for routine or novel situations. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. 8.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. Action and Critique. Conflict Resolution. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. Advocacy. or good or bad outcomes. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. However. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. rather that a model is used. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. It is the end result that we are interested in. once in a while.

Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.2. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied. 8. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. 8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.2.1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. further modification to the RMM was required.

to make sure we fully understand the implications. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. By staying below the line as much as possible. its implications and how much time is available. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. This does not always produce the best solution. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution. the problem and the solution. Flight Crew Training Centre . The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line).Information seeking. seeking more information about it. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . The situation can be considered in two separate domains. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. there are two typical responses. Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is.

time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. A solution in the form of a question however. 8.solving resource. when there is little available. but will probably be accepted. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. In all cases. immediate action is required. critical.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. using a traffic light system. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. EFIS architecture. Time can be considered as. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. losing vital feedback. this limits the opportunity for assessment. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. A fast decision may not always be the correct one. They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. is a valuable problem. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM).  Time Critical situations require immediate action. Open questions allow more options.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response. On the other hand. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. Once a time frame has been established. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. may at best get a query in response. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. others may be less time dependent. available and required. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. In the latter case.

NAVIGATE. the Captain must manage. test understanding. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation. Good teamwork needs good communication. seek information. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. test understanding.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. 8. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. test understanding propose. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. delegation] Remember that in complex situations. prioritize. Flight Crew Training Centre . An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. prioritize. propose.

Once this is under control. the task need is paramount. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore. Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. all the circles are the same size. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. It is a circular or iterative process. it is time to manage. When the process is complete. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. Once the Group is informed and placated. An important point here is that you do not rush. For example in the first stages of a diversion. Flight Crew Training Centre . Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. the team and the individual. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. including the navigation away from terrain. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. 8. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. 8.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. obstacles and weather. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. However.

but functionally can be quite accurate. Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result. In the same way. we receive information. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations. output functions and an internal processing function. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. 9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. individuals create internal representations of how systems work. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. do something with that information and then act on it. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving.1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. these are known as “mental models”.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works.

are actually switching from one to the other. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . 9. touch. sound and touch. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. 9. sight. but only a limited signal can be conveyed. so much that. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function.4 Input functions 9. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. if we miss-perceive an event. even though they do not have the loudest voice. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone.4. but it is not being ignored completely. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name). Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. not all of them get through to the processing stage. This is quite normal. During a busy.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. at some point they will lose part of one or other signal.4.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. smell and taste. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms.4. 9. sound. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. Perception is incredibly powerful. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us.

6. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory. you have as little as 0.6. Another type of memory is sensory memory. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. descend 180.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. Flight Crew Training Centre . Sensory memory data is lost by decay.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. and retained by conscious attention. which really belongs with the input functions. and contact 119. speed 310. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. the original message has been replayed by the mind. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. expect 150 by xxx. 9.72”. 9. short-term and long-term. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.6. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness.6 Processing Functions 9. unless it is consciously being dealt with. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. 9. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory.

6. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events.6. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. long after the event. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. and Mitigate). One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory. 9. However the problem is not with forgetting.4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition..5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. Flight Crew Training Centre . such as ATM (Avoid. even if the correct data has never been learned. but it is top secret. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. For example. patterns or mini theories. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. Trap. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. manageable by most. you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. 9. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately.

the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines. Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. 2001 are slightly different in this respect.6. this is when the action has become a learned routine. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. 9.6. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. 9. as they are referred to by the date itself. however it is a single channel device. It can only deal with one issue at a time. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. The events of September 11. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000].7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. in particular responses to RTO. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre .

This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. 9. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre . your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. some a combination of both. including workload and circadian rhythms. Some of these place physical strains on the body.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. others mental strains. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. In this respect.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Our interest is human performance. stress and fatigue produce similar results. This chapter covers the effects of stress. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. Performance varies with a number of factors.

That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short.stimulation. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. performance actually peaks. as stress increases. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. upset stomach. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. The right side shows over stimulation. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. performance improves.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. such as take-off and landing. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. After a certain point. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. tension headaches. Initially. is exhilarating early in the day. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter. but too much is exhausting. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. acute and chronic. require the crew to be at optimal performance. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. from being somewhat dormant. 10. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. for example. and then falls away. consider that arousal refers to stress. 10. Critical phases of flight. into the optimum performance range (shaded). within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. As stress increases further. largely impossible. It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. which differs according to individuals and within individuals. Too little stress causes complacency. By the same token. and other symptoms. Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. In the diagram above.3. Flight Crew Training Centre .

transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. hypertension. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. chest pain. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. 10. Because it is short term. and depression. jaw pain. however. and irritable bowel syndrome. dizziness. If something can go wrong. have too many irons in the fire. They take on too much. they tend to be abrupt. generally requiring professional help. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused. anxiety. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. their child's occasional problems at school. and tense. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. Often. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis.Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. a deadline they're rushing to meet. back pain. stomach. rapid heartbeat. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. shorttempered. and it is highly treatable and manageable. acid stomach. anxious. muscular problems including tension headache. but always late.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. migraine headaches. diarrhea. cold hands or feet. heart palpitations. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. constipation. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. and chest pain.3. Flight Crew Training Centre . They're always in a rush. sweaty palms.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. it does. who suffer acute stress frequently. migraines. the loss of an important contract." Always in a hurry. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. irritable. shortness of breath. the three stress emotions. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches. flatulence. and so on. and heart disease. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility.

They blame their woes on other people and external events. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. their patterns of interacting with others. They forget it's there. 10. of dysfunctional families. 10. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. promotion to Captain). It's the stress of poverty. heart arrhythmia. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives.g. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. violence.3. Generally. familiar. 10. sweating. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. This could come in many different forms.3.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. the individual gives up searching for solutions. change in job or responsibilities (i.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often.e. People wear down to a final. year after year. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. they see their lifestyle. With no hope. and. Chronic stress kills through suicide. fatal breakdown. Chronic stress destroys bodies.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. Flight Crew Training Centre . almost comfortable. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. or a mental response such as irritability.. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. There are three broad sources of stressor: life. and sometimes. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time. which exhibits as either a physical response e. Frequently. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. tremors. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. More precisely. perhaps. heart attack. stroke. chronic stress is not. minds and lives. hyperventilation.3. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new.5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. environmental and cognitive. even cancer.

His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. In the long-term. However.3. or in the flight. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual.3. this will be covered later in the chapter. 10. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. 10. especially when it involves an operating pilot. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. but with a dissimilar function. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). When workload is high. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. Noise arouses the individual. and mismanage priorities. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. either on the apron. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties.deck. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. Two common examples could be heat and noise. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since.

On a night flight. Response time. As in the case of stress. 10. After some time of being awake. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. For example. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. but conversely a sleep debt can build up.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. after reaching a peak.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. when workload is at an absolute minimum. they may become bogged down in processing the data. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). thereby inducing further errors. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. This might be due to time since awake. self. this continues to improve performance until.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. with an inability to sleep further. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. Immediately after awakening. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. or state of awake ness. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . However. Depending on the individual. It cannot be stored. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. the range of optimal performance is reached. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Although this can be an effective strategy. Typically. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning. workload (physical exertion). 10. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep.

inattentive and has an increased reaction time. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. 10. on the wrong time zone. which extend the operating day. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. This is known as jet-lag. rather than eastbound which compresses the day.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. However. Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. sleep is deeper rather than longer. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag.

when conducted in a structured fashion. 10. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. It is another warning flag. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. 10.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. However it is often quoted without really being explained.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. This chapter will explain what it is. Others prefer mental stimulation. 11 Situational Awareness 11. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. is the duty of every crewmember. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. this is a potentially dangerous practice. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. the Flight Crew Training Centre . In the modern world. providing awareness and in need of management. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. Managing stress and sleep effectively. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. 11. with dire consequences in the aviation industry. As any medical practitioner will verify.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. In accidents involving human error. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others.

there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. It is not just enough to notice a situation. one must understand and think ahead. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. In a well-known phrase: Aviate. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection. crew. and Communicate.” This is quite complex. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. 11. automation modes. which mitigates part of the problem.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. passengers and company).Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future. In addition to three levels of SA. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. fuel and time). The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. Navigate. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. systems. Flight Crew Training Centre .

Prior to descent. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. After descent initiation. The trapping phase begins at top-of. fixation and confusion exist. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase. Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. A three-stage model “Avoid. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations.vague or incomplete statements 11. minimums. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”.4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity .Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA. fixation and confusion. Trap. Results from observations at several different airlines. Flight Crew Training Centre . regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . if potential problems can be identified in time. there is much to be concerned about here. less time is available for noticing and avoiding. during the take-off and landing phases.descent and leads up to the approach. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. fuel burn. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity.

Finally.e. so that we can take action to improve it. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. unstabilized approach. However. 11.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA].” Flight Crew Training Centre . contingency planning. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. Skills relating to spatial ability. attention-sharing. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA].5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. self-monitoring.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA. too fast etc) must be avoided. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. Should such a state occur. task management and prioritization. Human error is inevitable. and use the speed brake if necessary. scan patterns and checklist use. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. there is very little time left to correct it. communications. too high. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. 11. an undesired aircraft state (i. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. 11. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL).6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.

etc. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Project ahead and consider contingencies. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. maintenance.don't fixate.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Flight Crew Training Centre . but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. dispatch. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. ATC. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.

.. April. A. & Merritt.. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar.. Colombus. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Merritt.L. A. Merritt. A. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. Columbus: Ohio State University. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues.R. W. A. J. what is it? (Error. & Merritt.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. 1991. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. Helmreich. (1997). Merritt.L. & Sherman. Merritt. R. CRM: I hate it. R. 1.C.C.C.R..L. Cultural influences on flight operations. Taggart. Cultural issues in crew resource management. & Helmreich. Ohio.. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference.. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. November 26-28. Indonesia. May 1995. Ohio. (1995). CRM Advocate.. (1995).. A..C. R. April). 8-12. Flight Crew Training Centre .C. stress.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. April-May. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. (1996). Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. R. Merritt. R.L.. & Helmreich. P.S. Colombus. (1991). April 23-25. 1996.C.. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. & Helmreich. Auckland. (1997).C... (1996).L. 1996. (1996). (1995).A. Merritt. November 20-24. Wilhelm.C. Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. A. Ooi. Guangzhou.L.J. New Zealand. Sydney. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. (1996. A. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project.0 (International) & 2. P. 1995. R.C.. 1997. Jakarta. T. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. 1997. Helmreich. April-May. A.

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