Manual No.

: JCI-13

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd. Crew Resource Management MANUAL (January 2008) Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to Emirates and SAA

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CRM Manual

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Table of Contents 1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4 1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4 1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4 1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5 1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5 1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5 2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5 2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5 2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5 2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5 2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6 2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6 2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6 2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6 2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6 3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7 3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7 3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8 3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8 3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8 3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9 3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9 3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10 3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10 3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11 3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11 4 Culture............................................................................................................12 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12 4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12 4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13 4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13 4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14 5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14 5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14 5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15 5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16 5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17 5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18

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5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18 5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18 5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19 5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19 5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19 5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20 6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20 6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21 6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21 6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22 6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22 6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22 6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22 6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22 6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23 6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23 6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23 6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25 6.10 Followership........................................................................................25 6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26 7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27 7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27 7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27 7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27 7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28 7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28 7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29 7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29 7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29 7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30 7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31 7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31 7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32 8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32 8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32 8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33 8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33 8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34 8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35 8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36 8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37 8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37 8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37 9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38 9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38 9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre

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9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38 9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39 9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39 9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39 9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39 9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39 9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40 9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40 9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40 9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40 9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41 9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41 9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42 9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43 10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43 10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43 10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44 10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44 10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44 10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45 10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46 10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46 10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46 10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47 10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47 10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48 10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48 10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49 10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50 10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50 11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50 11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50 11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50 11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51 11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52 11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53 11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53 11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53 11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54 12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Flight Crew Training Centre

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CRM Manual

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1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual. CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets the requirements of other regulatory bodies.

1.2 Courses 1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the course is one day.

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course
The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC” approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not assessable. Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies successful completion of a course.

1.2.3 CRM Update Course
Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the cycle, a one day update course is conducted.
Flight Crew Training Centre

6 CRM Transition CRM Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition courses.2 Culture     The characteristics of National culture Influence of Professional & Organizational culture Defenses against multi-cultural threats Safety culture within Jade Cargo International 2. assisted by the facilitator. The course consists of a review of decisionmaking.2.2. and team management skills.2. 2 Modules Content 2.4 CRM Recurrent Training Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). 1. They will be conducted in a cockpit environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes. The candidates will conduct their own debrief. The course is tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type. 1. leadership and team management. and a series of role-plays. This has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decisionmaking tools. The content of this CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the CRM Instructor.Page: 5 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 1.3 Automation   Impact of automation Appropriate use of automation Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Threat and Error Management       Nature of human performance & error A model of human error Threat and error defined Latent threats Defenses Managing error 2.5 CRM Upgrade Training Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to receive an intensive CRM course.

8 Stress & Alertness Management    Types and sources of stress Fatigue & sleep management Jade Cargo International policy and procedures 2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)     Model for effective communication Source of Conflict Communication role-play Reference accidents with communication issues 2.7 Cognition      Overview of cognitive functions Perception Senses Memory Limitations 2. Followership & Team Dynamics     Command authority Leadership styles Team effectiveness Reference accidents with leadership issues 2.9 Situational Awareness     Types of situational awareness Skills affecting individual situational awareness Loss of situational awareness Reference accidents with situational awareness issues Flight Crew Training Centre .6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making     Problem identification Time management Company decision-making tool Reference accidents with decision-making issues 2.4 Leadership.Page: 6 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Reference accidents with automation issues 2.

Despite improvements in technology. Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. 3.3 Human Performance Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories.1 Introduction Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human interaction in the workplace. in part. which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and is not universally accepted by the pilot population. knowledge. to the amount of air recirculation that is required in a pressurized aircraft. completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for all phases of training. to the brightness required of an electronic display. because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. environment. 3. design and engine reliability. This includes everything from the design of a tool. Flight Crew Training Centre . This is due. with an understanding of the limitations of the human operator. home. who complains that it is all a waste of time and does not apply to him. Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. MCC and CRM is most easily described as one of specialization. The safe and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical knowledge and skills. This is a general overview and broadly theoretical. Regulators require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license issue. and with other humans. Every airline has the anecdotal CRM immune Captain. whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is normally a customized program. Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to human involvement in aircraft operations. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on attitude. to the design of a checklist. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew operations.Page: 7 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3 Threat and Error Management 3.2 CRM Training in Aviation The relationship between Human Factors. skill and attitude. Human Factors still have a critical influence on the accident rate. HPL.

3.5 Human Error Reason (Reason. Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Flight Crew Training Centre . 3. especially on a long. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error. Most of these errors are small. In particular this means designing for error.Page: 8 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change.term basis in the presence of contradictory influences. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance. focus on specific skills 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management This has now evolved into “threat and error” management. and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these errors. but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on attitudes. encompassing the best of previous generations. Human Error) has developed a model of human error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they occur.6 Human Factors In Design The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human performance.4 Evolution of CRM      1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style (Cockpit RM) 2nd Generation introduction of modular training. J. 1990. Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. 3. Not only is this more predictable and measurable. which cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry. Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by use of appropriate and timely feedback. with aviation focus (Crew RM) 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training. but pilots are predisposed to accept knowledge and tools with which to improve performance.

This does not mean that accidents can no longer occur. Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. of which the operating crew are the last link. it snaps. Some were latent failures. 3. Others were management failures. The accident is caused by the completion of a chain of events – the “error chain”. Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with additional factors to consider.7 The Error Chain The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic example of an error chain. These are what Reason call “latent threats”. In isolation it is insignificant. Each layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense. A simple example of a latent threat is a mousetrap. a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield. Without assigning a principle cause. Rather. the last line of defense.8 Swiss Cheese In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario. Reason used Swiss cheese. but when the mouse tries to take the bait. that the causes of most recent accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely from the operator who suffered the loss. Flight Crew Training Centre . For example. the holes will line up. some of the factors were as follows:         Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test Type certification granted Operator differences training approved Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified Engine malfunction during accident flight Incorrect identification of engine malfunction All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. It was but it is not an isolated case. leaving an opening in the defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen. There are similar events unfolding all around us in aviation. If they can break the chain. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident. possibly as early as the design stage of a product. the accident does not occur. existing conditions that might remain dormant for years. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer of defense. but placed together they form a robust wall. Occasionally. occurring years ago on the drawing board.Page: 9 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 3. In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats.

Engineering.Internal influences Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that cannot be completely eliminated.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm Violations – intentional non-compliance – i.Page: 10 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense.10 Threat and Error Threat is defined as an influence. the accident chain is broken. the start of an accident chain. and it is up to us to break the chain. in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.) Threats . Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are inconsequential. wrong altitude selection on MCP Communication – missing information or misinterpretation Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk – i. Errors made by the crew during normal and nonnormal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation arising. There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:      Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i. Management. The safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard. (Errors made by other people ATC. 3.e. at any level. safe operations are the norm. but as long as the holes do not line up. Flight Crew Training Centre .9 Threat and Error Management Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one.e. A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors. performing a checklist from memory. 3. Regulators etc are threats to the crew. Some examples of common threats are:      Adverse weather Terrain Airport conditions Aircraft malfunctions Automation events. The last layer of defense is the flight-crew. Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. but they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and balances. external to the flight-deck that requires action to ensure safe operation. because despite the risks.External influences Errors . Threats and errors are unavoidable. The latest statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures.

and correct them Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage Flight Crew Training Centre . The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors: Threats Captain flying Experience gradient First duty day Time since awake Operational stress Errors Procedural error Poor tactical decision Failure monitor/challenge Improper checklist use Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable.Page: 11 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Over 20% of the time though. such as an unstabilized approach. research has shown that flight-crew error led directly to an undesired aircraft state. presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the possibility of danger. great care should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors. Trap. Mitigate How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:    Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing. 3. The purpose of the NTSB review was to enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist.11 Warning Flags Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making additional errors. nine common factors existed.12 Avoid. We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry. However. The NTSB identified in 1994 that of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed. However in all cases. These have been termed warning flags. 3.

Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular sub-cultures. On the collectivist side. collectivism. The remaining three dimensions are discussed below. The five dimensions are Individualism/Collectivism. cohesive in-groups. such as organizational. He identified five dimensions where cultures differ. Power Distance. versus its opposite. we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong. Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. The last two do not typically apply to pilot groups.2 National Culture Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture. Again.1 Introduction Due to the diverse nature of the workforce. The word “collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group. A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe operation Flight Crew Training Centre . Long-term/ Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. Uncertainty Avoidance. 4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV) Individualism on the one side. 4. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. professional and safety culture. aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one. 4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors     High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities. having left their country of domicile for economic advantage. “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of personal inconvenience or benefit. often extended families (with uncles. not to the state. regarding all societies in the world. (which are predominantly male).Page: 12 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4 Culture 4. Jade Cargo International has identified that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM program. is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.

safety and security measures. and motivated by inner nervous energy. Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck. It suggests that the followers. uncertainty accepting cultures. unknown. “I know better than the people who wrote the books” style of operation. surprising. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules. and different from usual. not from above. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative. Unstructured situations are novel. they try to have as few rules as possible. as much as by the leaders endorse a society’s level of inequality. it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side.   4. Effects on crew behaviors:  High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional. of course. and not expected by their environment to express emotions.6 Power Distance (PDI) Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. but some are more unequal than others. Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient. This represents inequality (more versus less). but defined from below. Power and inequality. “A rule for every situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from SOPs even if the situation demands it. and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by the uncertain or unknown. Effects on crew behaviors:   High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a steep cockpit gradient Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final decision is made by the Captain Flight Crew Training Centre . Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. The opposite type. are extremely fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that all societies are unequal.Page: 13 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 4.

5 Automation The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do.Page: 14 CRM Manual Date: January 2008  Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal Input 4. including radio operators. Furthermore. not what we thought we told them to do. against a conflicting trend. Improvements in technology (automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew. (Norbert Wiener) 5. In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and efficient”.1 Introduction Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human factors issues.2 Flight Deck Automation Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck. though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors Reporting schemes. but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent. 5.7 Organizational and Professional Culture Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances. by a machine function. either physical or cognitive. Flight Crew Training Centre . there can be anomalies where a professional group. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers. An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to unnecessary pressure to compromise. Although there are numerous examples of the introduction of automated systems on the flight deck. It is not the policies themselves that are a potential problem. promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic. and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues. The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has remained at a manageable level. this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style. In particular. it is those automatic functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily concerned. such as pilots. navigators and flight engineers. This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation. or an organizational culture can prevail.

often at the wrong time Difficulties with Situation Awareness New knowledge and skills required New error associated with communication The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be achieved without additional effort. roles of humans change Creates more cognitive work. it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be automated. accuracy and reduced costs. In practice this does not always happen. In particular. The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the interface. 5.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole story. it would be a good idea to determine the comparative advantages of humans and machines. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of automation.Page: 15 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety. The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the job. Flight Crew Training Centre .3 What to Automate Prior to deciding on what to automate. The latter will not be discussed here. it is the understanding of the automation that causes concern. engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest is left for the human operator to manage. same system (substitution) Reduction in workload Focuses user attention Less knowledge required Reduces error Reality Transforms practice. “Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the real effect: Table 1: Benefit of Automation: Intended Benefit Better Results. not to mention the human (social) effects.

subject to learning and fatigue Single-channel. easy to re program.Good inductive. Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those where the human is better.Page: 16 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 “Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite resources. fast.” (Good. T. Spine. Poor program. detecting messages in noise. access versatile and innovative Reasoning Good deductive. access restricted and formal Human Comparatively slow Comparatively weak Unreliable. accurate. User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering) 5. J & George. 1986. Poor at pattern assessment Wide energy ranges. P. Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. Rather. fast communication Ideal for literal reproduction. slow. M. Good quantitative assessment. Poor spoken material. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today: Table 2: Fitts’ list3 Skill Speed Power Output Consistency Information Capacity Memory Machine Much superior Superior in level and consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Multi-channel. error correction Good at error correction Specialized. Poor at at detecting messages in noise. narrow range. Whiteside.4 Fitts’ List In the 1950s. some multi-function Sensing Perceiving Good at coping with Poor at coping with variation in variation in written & written & spoken material. slow communication Better for principles and strategies. difficult to re. The principle task allocated to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally Flight Crew Training Centre . inaccurate. engineering is the process of economically building a working system that fulfils a need.

Pilots will dynamically move between levels. The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task. vigilance and complacency may become issues. Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive load as he no longer has to interpret closing information. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the flights progress. 5. There is a reduced cognitive load. Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. including when to turn it off! Flight Crew Training Centre . Monitoring or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot.Page: 17 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 suited. this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual job of flying the aircraft. it is possible to differentiate seven distinct levels.5 The Automation Pyramid Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. but the system must be programmed to give the correct guidance. This refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument approach:  Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust accordingly. It also becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation. according to any change in tactical goal. an area of weakness in interface design. Overall result is reduced workload. – This is a high workload situation. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last minute changes. in practical aviation terms we have identified four levels of automation. so the overall workload is drastically reduced. although “fly-by-wire” will still be assisting. such as nuclear power-plant control rooms.    The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully automated regime. Although in some systems. but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight. In its current mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the situation. Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above. In the aviation scenario. resulting in further reduced workload. with different cognitive skills required.

It has already been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the pilot.Page: 18 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that reported in 1996. Unfortunately. will disengage or will revert to another mode. as routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking. 5. communications and monitoring. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance.8 Interfaces The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. In particular. Habsheim etc). it is important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide “clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle will or will not engage.6 The Irony of Automation The irony of automation is that. having been unable to completely replace the pilots with automation. Flight Crew Training Centre . 5. Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most common on advanced aircraft. For this new knowledge and skills are required. Cali. Using automation requires us to:    Understand each mode before selection Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya. the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when the automation cannot cope. The key issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation communicate.7 The Automation Issue Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified. The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of understanding. The report identified links between automation and situational awareness.

11 Ergonomic Design Principles The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a usable interface:        Intuitive . These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated. Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating. 5. A lack of. but not replace. feedback results in a reduction of situational awareness. These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all phases of automated and manual flight. 5. or subtle. The failing of the man-machine system is because the pilot is no longer “in the loop”. Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive.Page: 19 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 5. Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status change.Logical layout of controls and displays Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos) Minimal user memory load (prompt keys) Consistency Feedback Clear. the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane. easy-to-use systems. The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is designed to counter this threat. Understandable error messages Error prevention These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items. When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot? …or a video cassette recorder…? Flight Crew Training Centre . Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies more effective. Consequently.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer Appropriate degree of automation.9 Feedback “Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or inappropriate feedback.

Humans are capable of devising strategies. which is assigned. the leader becomes a means of change and influence. 6. We must guard against the threats posed by automation. and authority. 5. and an understanding of the goals and desires of the group. An optimal situation exists when leadership and authority are combined. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations. In fact it has generated the potential for a different type of human error.12 Conclusion Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership. Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of situations. In the flight-deck environment. Flight Crew Training Centre . 6 Leadership and Team Dynamics 6. An individual's position as captain does not automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader.1 Introduction There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the definition of leadership. by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and understanding of the automated systems. Aircraft accident and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. There is a fundamental difference between leadership. This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership and identify how styles of leadership vary. the Captain is the designated “leader”.2 Leadership A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the behavior of others. Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the threat it poses. Through the use of example and persuasion. either as an organization or as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect. which is acquired.Page: 20 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and flexible.

however the leader also has other areas of responsibility. from a practical view point the Captain has a right. The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically according to the situation. The leader must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate supporting systems. In fact. As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. the team and the individual.Page: 21 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation Regulations. Task Team Individuals Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership Flight Crew Training Centre . An effective leader must have both technical and personal skills. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital. 6. Action. and Manage Decision-Making Model.3 Leadership Theory Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. This implies a certain amount of discretion in choice of action. to decide on a course of action. initiative and integrity. and a duty. In addition. Some of this is relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. 6. Personal qualities required are those of courage. will power. and be able to maintain team morale.4 Action-Centred Leadership Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training support this function of leadership. with use of the Assess. any limitations of this knowledge must be identified. The leader must balance the demands of the task. along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the correct answer when provided.

ideas and suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources       Communicating flight information Asking for opinions.Page: 22 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6. experience and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist in promoting the individual’s needs:    Sensitivity to cultural needs Maintain an open environment by active listening Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations 6. manage and direct the flow of information. With a wide variety of background. suggestions Clarifying communication Providing feedback Regulating participation Flight Crew Training Centre .8. To enhance the sense of unity:     Use expertise within the team Briefing Co-ordination of effort Provide feedback 6. many of the considerations for the team also apply for managing an individual’s needs. Maintain situation awareness Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress 6. consider the following:      Planning Communication of intent Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.5 Task To achieve the task.6 Team Building and Maintenance Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task.1 Regulating Information Flow The leader must regulate.8 The Role of Leader The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four tasks that encompass the role of the leader: 6. suggestions Giving opinions.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction In the two-pilot flight deck.

8. Flight Crew Training Centre . It can range from the extreme of autocratic or dictatorial to “Laissez-faire”.4 Leadership Styles Having determined what is required of a leader. coordination and direction for group performance     Directing and coordinating crew activities Monitoring and assessing crew performance Providing planning and orientation Setting priorities 6.3 Motivating Crew Members The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member relations and to invite full participation in crew activities      Creating proper climate Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere Resolving/preventing angry conflict Maintain positive relations Providing non-punitive critique and feedback The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions      Assuming responsibility for decision making Gathering and evaluating information Formulating decisions Implementing decisions Providing feedback on action 6.Page: 23 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 6.8. how is this delivered in practice? Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the team during decision-making.8. In between.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation. there are differing degrees of participation such as democratic and participative.

Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when all goes well. Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting the information from them. rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions. regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight deck. collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. a different style is adopted according to the situation. “VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude. using information available at that time.Page: 24 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an appropriate attitude.   Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone. Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant subordinates individually. Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from subordinates. For most effective leadership. These definitions below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept. Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a group. getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. and then decides on the solution to the problem alone. generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to Flight Crew Training Centre    . The definition used here is “laissez-faire”. while monitoring to assure necessary performance. The role played by subordinates in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information. in this case the leader does not care whether the team performs well or not. but not if things are going wrong. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the subordinates’ influence. Then makes the decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence. Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. Together.

levels of experience and different cultural backgrounds among the workforce in the company. from the team perspective nothing could be further from the truth. encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge. which may differ between individuals and national cultures. avoids the Captains’ obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility. Nevertheless the duties and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this need. An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability. G (Eds). RE. “Kelly’s” (Kelly. passive/critical. Ginnett. Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient. cited by Kern. The optimum gradient.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient In addition to the style adopted by the Captain. since there are a number of nationalities. For successful team performance. While this might be an individual’s view. and a flat one reduces the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge. 1988. that of dependent/independent uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s performance. while respecting the Captain’s legal authority. predictability and an appropriate level of assertiveness. R & Curphy. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical. The role is much like that of a chairman. Redefining Airmanship) model of followership examines two dimensions. Followers are a vital part of a team. G2. A fifth group “Company men” is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate.10 Followership Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a leadership position.Page: 25 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. active/uncritical and active/critical. Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last. Hughes. along with good communication skills. A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. and followership is a skill in its own right. 6. 1997. supportive followers are as important as a leader. the interaction between the flightdeck members will define the authority gradient between the two.  Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire group. R. Flight Crew Training Centre . T. A steep gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot. 6.

Making a good first impression is vital.11 Team Dynamics Unlike military crews. They are also the foundation for teambuilding. unless identified and brought “back onside”. Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation. Their motivation is political rather than task/team oriented. Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation. airlines form new teams for practically every duty. They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness. 6. Using the first minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important.Page: 26 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Effective followers are essential to safe flight. The only way to ensure this is. to give the best possible impression during the crew brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the crew. The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the flight deck and the cabin. Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both leaders and followers. completing tasks in silence without adding to the team’s performance. Team building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to perform well. A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up. because they actively support without thinking. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of invincibility to the pilot-in-command. Flight Crew Training Centre . An airline crew needs to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. and actively supportive without being “yes men”. not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves. Survivors are the Company men. A poor first impression could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. they are typified by mediocre performance and shift quadrants. Sheep are akin to human automatons. not afraid to speak up when necessary and challenge a flawed decision.

Between a Captain and a First Officer. While modern flight decks are well insulated. There are many barriers to communication within a cockpit.2 Principles of Communication Human communication is the act of sharing information. Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:    Tone of voice Focusing on own/others’ needs The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i. insulting. noise is still a factor. the advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict resolution. The actual words used accounting for only about 10% The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck.Page: 27 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7 Communication 7. along with methods of eliminating them. verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction.3 Communication Barriers The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human communication. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft. Barriers to communication are also identified. It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships Flight Crew Training Centre . as does the fact that many of our pilots do not use English as their native language. Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important information. degrading language.1 Introduction One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to communicate. However. rank could impinge on communication as well. in communication within a crew. 7. and very rarely are raised voices heard. culture plays a large part.e. In the case of Jade Cargo International. the words used tend to be very important. 7. This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of multi crew operations. So. This can be verbal or non-verbal information. as much as 90%. The actual words used accounting for about 10%. This chapter describes the principles of communication.

1 Assertive Behavior [a1] An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse or dominate others. Being Assertive:    Heightens self esteem Makes other people take notice Establishes authority Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. and the manner. The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).4 Communication Styles To assist in analyzing effective communications.Page: 28 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 between people. whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs” are used. supportive and submissive. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter. two aspects of the message content will be considered. 7. Flight Crew Training Centre . The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when exchanging information or verifying facts is required. By adhering to these “standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced. aggressive. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others down. assertive. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight. This is especially in the flight deck from a person in a position of authority. the focus.4. From these two aspects the following model can be constructed: Table 1: Communication Styles “No put-downs” (1) Focus on own needs A Focus on needs of others S Assertive A1 Supportive S1 “Put-downs” (2) Aggressive A2 Submissive S2 Four communication styles can be determined from this model. whether on the needs of others or your own. 7. a lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting the tone”.

With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that diminishes their own worth. It is unlikely to motivate the team. A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve harmony. In a non-critical situation. and will likely isolate the aggressor. 7. the key here is the use of “put downs” or abusive language. Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. Flight Crew Training Centre .4. However this may change depending on circumstances.4.downs. They put themselves down. When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression. not recommended but part of life.Page: 29 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7.4. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties (particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one. It is important that “put downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such. are avoided at all times. The key to identifying aggression is the use of “put downs”. Therefore. A person being supportive will:    Show concern Not diminish their own or others’ worth Be willing to help and listen In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role.4 Submissive Behavior [s2] The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”. However. Referring to the matrix.3 Supportive Behavior [s1] A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade themselves.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2] This is when someone is being aggressive. Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. 7. A person using a submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated. it is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own needs and uses put. such as during training or non-normal situations.

provided that the intent is to stop the use of put-downs. If the other person is submissive. be supportive. In other words. The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. focusing on this usually helps in restoring harmony. and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis 7. the assumption might be that they have nothing to contribute.Page: 30 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or shouted at. will find a style that works well for them. These boundaries are not necessarily static or evenly divided. This brings the focus back to the task at hand and reduces conflict. but leads to good understanding when accomplished. If someone is submissive. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance and is a common need between all parties. it is likely communication that will break down completely. Being aware of this and expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good communication. In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior on the part of another person.5 Dealing with Aggression If aggression is met with aggressive behavior. Each individual and in fact every team. An assertive response might also be effective. their needs will be overlooked. Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most efficient communication. The best response is to focus on the other person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the perceived put-downs. Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:      Race Culture Nationality Age Seniority / Rank It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. Dealing with aggression is not easy. It may be necessary to vary the style of communication according to the situation. Flight Crew Training Centre . Establishing the position of the lines can be difficult.

Page: 31 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 7. Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. but unfortunately does occur a great deal. collaborate or compromise. Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. test their position and beliefs. The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are: 7. Differing expectations of outcomes .6 Conflict Resolution Any time two or more people are brought to work together. Flight Crew Training Centre . communications may breakdown.8 Compromising     Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship. High respect for mutual support.favorable versus unfavorable. Conflict is not a necessary component of human behavior. and the damage is usually difficult to repair. No one person or idea is perfect. productivity will diminish or stop. the results may be positive or negative. words. When conflict is dealt with constructively. When sides are chosen. actions and situations. Assertive and cooperative. which will lead to better results. people can be stimulated to greater creativity. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or approached on a win/ lose basis. Animosities can develop. 7. It is possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Conflict is usually present because of:     Differences in needs. and stretch their imagination. objectives and values. There is more than one way to do anything. Unwillingness to work through issues. depending on how those involved choose to approach it. You must give to get.7 Problem Solving     Needs of both parties are legitimate and important. No one makes major concessions. Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces the best results. Differences in perceiving motives. Reference to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing sources of differences. What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that safety is not compromised. trust and support will deteriorate. If conflict does occur. the stage is set for potential conflict. Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas.

However. and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment phase of the problem. a situation arises that is beyond our scope or experience. which provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making. Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a better outcome. Advocacy. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad decisions. 8 Problem Solving and Decision Making 8. GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF     Briefings Sharing the workload Planning for change Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:      Attitudes Failures of judgment Deviation from SOPs Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions Emotions overcoming good judgment Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. or good or bad outcomes. It is not which model that is used that is important. Most of them are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry. however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will reduce the risk of a poor outcome. Conflict Resolution. rather that a model is used. The importance of time management is also covered in this chapter. either for routine or novel situations. 8.Page: 32 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Provided these concepts are borne in mind. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision making.1 Introduction Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every day. It is the end result that we are interested in.2 Structured Decision Making Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly occurred. Flight Crew Training Centre . Action and Critique. it is possible for diverse personality types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure safe flight. once in a while.

Flight Crew Training Centre . This model was expanded to accommodate the following: Procedures to rectify / contain the problem Making a decision Implementing the decision However. “The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available resources”. The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the following. Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two man crew cockpit. as well as the appropriate CRM principals. 8. according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company procedures. 8.2. it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its own.2 Providing “Seamless Integration” To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced Qualification Program (AQP).1 The Model “Footprint” The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had been developed for the FAA. indicating when manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied.Page: 33 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The Jade Cargo International. it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.2. During each of the phases specific guidance is provided.     Handling skills (manual and auto-flight) Technical knowledge (Type specific) Procedures (Manufacturer and Company) Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions. further modification to the RMM was required. Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable throughout the application of the RMM.

Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of communication to best assist with resolving the situation. The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem (below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). there are two typical responses. This does not always produce the best solution. The situation can be considered in two separate domains. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the problem until these questions are answered. questions Problem Information [PI] – Analysis Information SI PI SE PE Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before developing a solution.3 A Problem-Solving Model Prior to deciding on a course of action. Flight Crew Training Centre . Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action.Information seeking. immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining it. Whenever a problem is encountered at work. to make sure we fully understand the implications. Enquiry Solution Problem Examples of each category are:     Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion Solution Information [SI] – Instruction Problem Enquiry [PE] . Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. By staying below the line as much as possible.Page: 34 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. seeking more information about it. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much time is available. Any communication relating to this issue can also be considered as either information about the problem/solution or an enquiry. the problem and the solution. a better understanding of the problem itself can be gained. its implications and how much time is available. it is essential to accurately determine what the exact nature of the problem is.

In many cases it assists with our assessment of time.Page: 35 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem within the available time. others may be less time dependent. A solution in the form of a question however. Open questions allow more options. The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. immediate action is required. time is available to consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. In the latter case. 8. On the other hand. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are coded red on EFIS displays. Once a time frame has been established. taking too much time to collect information and make a decision. critical. it is possible to prioritize accordingly. this limits the opportunity for assessment. However there will be some occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding pattern. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done with caution. all conversation tends to stop and the decision is implemented. is a valuable problem. Time spent “below the line” is kept to a minimum. might compound Flight Crew Training Centre . In all cases. when there is little available. Time can be considered as. both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM). They may be associated with immediate action drills (such as GPWS). A fast decision may not always be the correct one. losing vital feedback. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problemsolving. Consider the likely responses to these two questions:   Where do you think we should divert to? Or Do you think we should divert to Munich? The first question is an open question [PE?]. Caution level alerts are amber on EFIS. using a traffic light system.   The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with our assessment of time.  Time Critical situations require immediate action. Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be identified with color coding on EFIS. Time Available: Cautions require a timely response. The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line.solving resource. Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an instruction. whereas the second is almost a suggestion [SE]. may at best get a query in response. available and required. recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist (Fire Wheel Well). but will probably be accepted. EFIS architecture.4 Time Management Some situations require an immediate response.

test understanding propose. propose. summarize] CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES ● IDENTIFY DIAGNOSE: What is wrong? • VERIFY How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure ACTION PHASE [Monitor. Achieving the best solution demands good teamwork. prioritize. Open Participation)  Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment  Summaries  DECIDE[selling if required IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION  Satisfy TASK. delegation] Remember that in complex situations.Page: 36 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 difficulties. Good teamwork needs good communication. NAVIGATE. This means that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Flight Crew Training Centre . test understanding. COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY [Use Autopilot if available] ASSESSMENT PHASE [Seek information. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decisionmaking. QRH If needed: “stop the checklist” MANAGEMENT PHASE [summarize. the Captain must manage. seek information. GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs  MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment (PJ) [Participation.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL AVIATE. build] EVENT STATUS Making the Decision Consider: TASK NEEDS Aircraft performance EROPS AWOPS ATC DDM/MEL GROUP NEEDS crew company passengers INDIVIDUAL NEEDS control stress individual crew members passenger  Options(Itemize best option. 8. test understanding. prioritize. keep partner in the loop] PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS.

Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above the line. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a normal flight. Once the Group is informed and placated. Undue haste has led to more accidents than most people realize. Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM indications. An important point here is that you do not rush. Once this is under control. It is a circular or iterative process. obstacles and weather. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction. we must come back to summarizing our actions and again reflect and analyze our actions. However. For example in the first stages of a diversion.7 Action During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge combined with good communication and monitoring techniques. including the navigation away from terrain.8 Manage Once the action has been completed. the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft. The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of situation. individual needs (a cup of coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to. 8. When the process is complete. “Did the action solve the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself. all the circles are the same size. the team and the individual. it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the fore.Page: 37 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 8. a good commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the steps taken. it is time to manage. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be required. if there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase. Flight Crew Training Centre . Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task. the task need is paramount. It is only when you have to make decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles change.6 Assess The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time assessment. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or other manuals and will need to be clearly defined. 8.

Mental models are also a key component of situation awareness. individuals create internal representations of how systems work.Page: 38 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9 Cognition 9. we will consider the brain in terms of input functions. This chapter looks in particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that can occur as a result.2 Models Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something complex works. 9. but functionally can be quite accurate. these are known as “mental models”.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain As in most processing flows. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a system. INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow Very simply. do something with that information and then act on it. Flight Crew Training Centre .1 Introduction Cognition is all about how humans process information. they typically contain errors and contradictions They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…) 9. output functions and an internal processing function. Mental models are vital to users for controlling systems and problem-solving. The importance of the model is that it is effective in assisting understanding. we receive information. Some characteristics of mental models are:     They are incomplete and constantly evolving They are usually not completely accurate. In the same way. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce their impact on flight operations.

at some point they will lose part of one or other signal.4 Input functions 9. 9. warnings or “attention-getters” use audible alarms. Those who believe that they can monitor two channels simultaneously. Attention is believed to be a single-channel function.2 Attention Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals. The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the user as long as they are looking at the signal. touch. smell and taste.3 Divided Attention Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. The “cocktail party” syndrome provides a useful example of this. This is quite normal. are actually switching from one to the other.1 Senses We have five senses through which we receive information. as firstly you would detect this new signal and secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation. but it is not being ignored completely. sound and touch. noisy social function it is quite possible to sustain a conversation with someone. Routine (status) information is therefore conveyed by visual cues. even though they do not have the loudest voice. During a busy. it would become increasingly difficult to maintain the original conversation. It is only possible to concentrate on one signal at a time. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise.4.Page: 39 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 9. We are unable to effectively monitor our principle task.4. sound. This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it has seen before dealing with it. so much that. sight. Attention is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the overload of sensations all around us. not all of them get through to the processing stage. However the brain does have a mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. Perception is incredibly powerful. as many of the signals are neither intended for us nor relevant to us. 9. if we miss-perceive an event. 9. it is very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to Flight Crew Training Centre . Sound on the other hand is omnidirectional.5 Perception Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function. but only a limited signal can be conveyed.4. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of these – sight. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of interest to you (such as your name).

6. In this case the “echoic” memory (of the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds. you have as little as 0. 9. Flight Crew Training Centre . Another type of memory is sensory memory. The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or that appears to be impossible. The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. unless it is consciously being dealt with. An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation.1 Memory Memory is the storage area of the brain.3 Short-Term Memory Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. short-term and long-term. expect 150 by xxx.5 second to replay the stimulus before it is lost. the original message has been replayed by the mind. The processing function is considered to have two types of memory.Page: 40 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 deal with the problem. Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash.2 Sensory Memory Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it is consciously dealt with or lost.6. for instance if you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops up and disappears. descend 180. It has a capacity of approximately seven bits of information.72”. and retained by conscious attention. and contact 119. We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking” information.6. typically with the response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked. However it becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form – “Heading 285. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have numerous examples of such illusions. 9. New information received on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory. which really belongs with the input functions. speed 310. Sensory memory data is lost by decay. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational Awareness. 9.6 Processing Functions 9.

4 Long-Term Memory Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and repetition. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite accurately. 9. even if the correct data has never been learned. Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available.. This enables this “knowledgebase” to handle recurrent routines. but becomes irretrievable due to interference. some secret? Long-term memory data is not lost. long after the event. episodic memory gives an autobiographical view of events. 9. but with inability to retrieve or access the information. This enables the brain to come up with a “sensible wrong answer”. using “motor actions” without recourse to the conscious workspace. For example. such as ATM (Avoid. Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal. Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory.Page: 41 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information. whereas semantic memory stores similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics. manageable by most.5 Flashbulb Memory This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage. if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car. Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as one memory. Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the form of learned routines. and Mitigate). you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:     It has four wheels It has leather seats It has an amazing stereo It will be available in black and silver …. patterns or mini theories. Trap. However the problem is not with forgetting. Flight Crew Training Centre .6. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. but it is top secret.6.

as they are referred to by the date itself. human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may hinder optimal performance. 9. There may be occasions where it appears to be doing several tasks. however it is a single channel device. a response and is handled by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload and resulting inaction. in particular responses to RTO. 9. GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall into this category. the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July 2000]. but in fact it is just switching quickly between them.6.Page: 42 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are.7 Problems with Decision Making As powerful as it is. 2001 are slightly different in this respect. Overconfidence Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad” Wishful thinking Outguessing Randomness Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach. the assassination of JFK [November 1963]. There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time.6. It can only deal with one issue at a time.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful. or we press on Flight Crew Training Centre . Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:        Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position and rejecting contradictory evidence. Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to execute regardless of effectiveness. this is when the action has become a learned routine. The process tends to be dominated by vision and can only work sequentially. The events of September 11. the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986]. It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned routines.

including workload and circadian rhythms. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. sleeps loss and disruption on the body and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness.1 Introduction Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. some a combination of both. your brain knows how to deal with them… 10 Stress and Alertness 10. In this respect.Page: 43 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 towards a landing with significant issues not resolved.7 Conclusion The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been identified. The term arousal will be used as the generic term for both. Some of these place physical strains on the body. Our interest is human performance. Performance varies with a number of factors. 9. others mental strains. This chapter covers the effects of stress. stress and fatigue produce similar results. Optimum Stimulation Creativity Rationality Problem Solving Progress Under Stimulation Boredom Frustration Dissatisfaction Over Stimulation Overload Confusion Distress Flight Crew Training Centre .

Stress is also a factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.Page: 44 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue and these are covered below. tension headaches. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. Sustained operation in the shaded area is however. The right side shows over stimulation. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state of under. from being somewhat dormant. It is preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve. 10. for example. These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. By the same token. As stress increases further. but the time spent in these phases is relatively short. into the optimum performance range (shaded). consider that arousal refers to stress. Optimum human performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve.2 Stress Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. Initially. largely impossible. Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at optimum for a long period. The wellknown “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress. which differs according to individuals and within individuals.3. Skiing beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. and then falls away. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus and results in improved performance. 10. performance actually peaks. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses. and other symptoms. overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress. upset stomach. In the diagram above.3 Types of Stress Stress can be divided into two types. The American Psychological Association explains these as follows: 10. Flight Crew Training Centre . It comes from demands and pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Too little stress causes complacency. such as take-off and landing. After a certain point.stimulation. Critical phases of flight.1 Acute Stress Acute stress is the most common form of stress. require the crew to be at optimal performance. as stress increases. acute and chronic. A fast run down a challenging ski slope. within easy reach of peak performance if new demands arise. performance improves. but too much is exhausting. is exhilarating early in the day. performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a rapid decline thereafter.

rapid heartbeat. and tense. It's a laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled the car fender. transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure. Often. The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over arousal: persistent tension headaches.3. They seem perpetually in the clutches of acute stress. migraines. generally requiring professional help. they tend to be abrupt. diarrhea. who suffer acute stress frequently. and so on. whose lives are so disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. The work becomes a very stressful place for them. and depression. heart palpitations. and chest pain. they describe themselves as having "a lot of nervous energy. and the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and ligament problems. their child's occasional problems at school.    Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life. acid stomach. back pain. shorttempered. stomach.2 Episodic Acute Stress There are those. anxiety. muscular problems including tension headache. and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and pressures clamoring for their attention. constipation. flatulence. however. anxious. acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the extensive damage associated with long-term stress. hypertension. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number of levels. Interpersonal relationships deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. 10. dizziness. most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 45 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Fortunately. shortness of breath. and sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. migraine headaches. cold hands or feet. the loss of an important contract. They're always in a rush. sweaty palms. it does. Because it is short term. and it is highly treatable and manageable. chest pain. and irritable bowel syndrome. gut and bowel problems such as heartburn. a deadline they're rushing to meet. but always late. the three stress emotions. The most common symptoms are:    emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability. and heart disease. have too many irons in the fire. It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused." Always in a hurry. They take on too much. If something can go wrong. jaw pain. irritable.

5 Life Stress Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. the individual gives up searching for solutions. They forget it's there. 10. promotion to Captain). There are three broad sources of stressor: life. violence. year after year. It's the stress of poverty. sweating. chronic stress is not. Chronic stress destroys bodies.3 Chronic Stress While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly interminable periods of time.Page: 46 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Often. perhaps. stroke. change in job or responsibilities (i. the illness or death of a close relative or friend. They blame their woes on other people and external events. More precisely. With no hope. of being trapped in an unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career. familiar.3. and sometimes. which exhibits as either a physical response e. heart arrhythmia.3.3. hyperventilation. Generally. lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives. This is the grinding stress that wears people away day after day. almost comfortable. Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable situation. Flight Crew Training Centre .e. Chronic stress kills through suicide. their patterns of interacting with others. the symptoms of chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as behavioral treatment and stress management. 10. and. This could come in many different forms. The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it.g. It wreaks havoc through long-term attrition. environmental and cognitive.. Some examples are: marriage or divorce. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new. fatal breakdown.4 Sources of Stress A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. 10. stress is accepted as the human response to these stressors. even cancer. and their ways of perceiving the world as part and parcel of who and what they are. they ignore chronic stress because it is old. Frequently. a change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. Because physical and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition. heart attack. minds and lives. People wear down to a final. of dysfunctional families. or a mental response such as irritability. they see their lifestyle. tremors.

either on the apron. This is caused by the limited ability of humans to process information. but exposure for extended periods also causes a drop in performance.3. The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high workload situations. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large chunks of information in short periods. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”. and mismanage priorities. most pilots will experience some degree of hearing loss. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and engine). or in the flight. Noise arouses the individual.3. When workload is high. Two common examples could be heat and noise. or the selecting SPD instead of HDG. The original research was carried out by US Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since. as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of information. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans. Temperatures in the cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer. Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade accuracy for speed. but with a dissimilar function. However. humans tend to become victims of “intentional selectivity”.6 Environmental Stress Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an individual. In trying to complete a task and move to Flight Crew Training Centre . as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. who collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing.7 Cognitive Stress Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person.deck. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are termed “action slips”. this will be covered later in the chapter. 10. Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation. Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long sectors. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task. Suffice to say that life stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety. The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties.Page: 47 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life stress events and aircraft accidents. Sleep disturbance is also a source of environmental stress. In the long-term. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response and selects a control very similar to the desired one. 10. especially when it involves an operating pilot. His accident statement directly attributed the incident to his state of mind.

The tendency is to accept a less than optimum solution to a problem. Immediately after awakening.Page: 48 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 the next. this occurs during pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks. As in the case of stress. Depending on the individual. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts of information. thereby inducing further errors. On a night flight. the range of optimal performance is reached. This might be due to time since awake. but conversely a sleep debt can build up. Although this can be an effective strategy. Typically. they may become bogged down in processing the data. this can have a negative effect during the cruise. The consequences of sleepiness are:  Decreased physical and mental performance Flight Crew Training Centre . this continues to improve performance until. However.4 Alertness Consider that arousal now refers to alertness. when workload is at an absolute minimum. if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness. Response time. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise can be disrupted by mid-morning.5 Sleep Management Sleep is a vital physiological function. After some time of being awake. Better quality sleep is achieved during our natural night. Getting eight hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep. lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. it starts to decline as fatigue or weariness sets in. after reaching a peak. humans will trade off speed against accuracy. it may take some time before performance reaches an acceptable level. 10. workload (physical exertion). For example. Other factors affecting alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt). Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. The inevitable result is a slowdown in completing the task. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to those for combating fatigue. inactivity and a lack of interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss of vigilance. It cannot be stored. A loss of sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM). self. Jade Cargo International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most routine tasks. or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another possible symptom. or state of awake ness.discipline must be exercised to ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed. leading to withdrawal effects and further disrupted sleep. 10. a F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. with an inability to sleep further. Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock.

Internal refers to the different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. However. Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations. Longer term effects include depression and chronic fatigue. External refers to the body being “out of sync” with the environment. Shift-work has similar effects to jet-lag. not all body functions resynchronize at the same rate. The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is often irritable. Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. Following the disturbance of a time-zone change. which include:       Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep) Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness Decreased physical or mental performance Increased reports of fatigue More negative mood Gastrointestinal problems Flight Crew Training Centre . the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are more often than not. 10. this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember. It is kept synchronized on a daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction. The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on westbound routings. rather than eastbound which compresses the day.6 Circadian Rhythms A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms. This is known as jet-lag. neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms. inattentive and has an increased reaction time. sleep is deeper rather than longer. will have little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become necessary. which extend the operating day.Page: 49 CRM Manual Date: January 2008    Decreased positive and increased negative mood Increased vulnerability to performance decrements Following sleep loss. on the wrong time zone.

this is a potentially dangerous practice. It has proven that controlled rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness.Page: 50 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Circadian Rhythms As with the other threats that we face. 10. Managing stress and sleep effectively.7 Stress and Alertness Management The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty. is the duty of every crewmember. Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. Others prefer mental stimulation. who has it and the skills necessary for maintaining and sharing situational awareness. 10. providing awareness and in need of management. the Flight Crew Training Centre . with dire consequences in the aviation industry. The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of situational awareness. In accidents involving human error.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA) “Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. It is another warning flag. In the modern world. The use of card and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. This acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of alertness to be maintained. This practice is based on extensive research done by NASA among others. computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role.1 Introduction Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents. 11. The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. when conducted in a structured fashion. As any medical practitioner will verify. 11 Situational Awareness 11. circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient cause to cease operations. In extreme cases this can take the form of dangerous sports. However it is often quoted without really being explained. This chapter will explain what it is.

passengers and company). 11. If we are aware of all the relevant factors (good SA). automation modes. It is not just enough to notice a situation. the environment (terrain and weather) and the people (ATC. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path. Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required. there are different domains that must be monitored by the pilot. The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots failing to notice! Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness The key to situational awareness knows what comes next. one must understand and think ahead. which mitigates part of the problem. why is it so important? Situational awareness is considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. and Communicate. crew. The Importance of Situational Awareness Now that we know what SA is. In addition to three levels of SA. fuel and time). In a well-known phrase: Aviate. but what it means is that there are three levels of situational awareness. systems.” This is quite complex. those with normally high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA. Flight Crew Training Centre .Page: 51 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.3 Loss of Situational Awareness Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness. Navigate. then our decisions will be well founded and good performance will follow. but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection.

4 The Safety Window Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur close to the ground. When below 2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to troubleshoot an unresolved problem. Most accidents involving human error include at least four of the following:           Ambiguity .Page: 52 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity. regulations etc Failure to resolve discrepancies . clear briefings and good communication should take place to achieve this.uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety or uneasiness) Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities Failure to look outside: everyone heads down Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA.focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else Confusion . The trapping phase begins at top-of.descent and leads up to the approach. Results from observations at several different airlines. minimums.information from two or more sources that doesn't agree Fixation . Additional errors should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. A three-stage model “Avoid. identified that most of the consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing phase.vague or incomplete statements 11. fixation and confusion exist. After descent initiation. if potential problems can be identified in time. there is much to be concerned about here. In fact most are within seven miles of the airport. Trap. Prior to descent. Avoiding error is the initial course of action. fixation and confusion. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase.contradictory data or personal conflicts Failure to communicate fully and effectively . Mitigate” is one solution to the problem. fuel burn. Flight Crew Training Centre . less time is available for noticing and avoiding. so the emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. during the take-off and landing phases. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of the safety window where ambiguity. Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. etc Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures Failure to comply with limitations.

contingency planning. 11. 11. However. potential problems that are identified early allow the opportunity to avoid. too fast etc) must be avoided. this may indicate they are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. Skills relating to spatial ability. By analyzing how we deal with the problem. Should such a state occur.” Flight Crew Training Centre . The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the Safety Window (2000’ AGL). Finally. task management and prioritization. an undesired aircraft state (i. communications. too high.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management Using “Threat and Error” management principles. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors. we can make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at. if mitigation seems to be the key factor. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the problem by going-around. Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are. Information can be shared at all three levels of SA. I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed. attention-sharing. PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up. indicating that the crew is thinking ahead [Level 3 SA]. identified by the PM: PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach” This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem PF: “OK. otherwise crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach. Human error is inevitable. scan patterns and checklist use.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same airline. so that we can take action to improve it. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning. perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable. then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA]. self-monitoring. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better SA than those with the latest technology.” This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands. unstabilized approach. 11. there is very little time left to correct it.7 Communication Awareness and Shared Situational For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA.e. and use the speed brake if necessary.Page: 53 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 In the final stages of the approach.

8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management           Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight. Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan. Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks Watch for clues of degraded SA. Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking! 11. ATC.don't fixate. It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the perception level. Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication. Project ahead and consider contingencies. Focus on the details and scan the big picture. Speak up when you see SA breaking down. but for various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of offending the other pilot. etc. maintenance. Rotate attention from plane to path to people . Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and distractions.Page: 54 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead. Flight Crew Training Centre . dispatch.

Auckland. Taggart. (1997). 1995. R. May 1995. Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen countries. April-May. 8-12. P. R.S. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium. November 26-28. 1997. R. (1995).C. & Merritt. A. April). New Zealand. & Helmreich. Colombus.C. what is it? (Error. Paper presented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference. 1991... (1997).C. R. Merritt. A. CRM in 1995: Where to from here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium. Columbus: Ohio State University.L.C.0 (International) & 2. R. April 23-25... (1991). A. & Sherman. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Factors Seminar. Wilhelm. Jakarta. Helmreich.1 (USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). Ohio... Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. & Helmreich. 1996.C. 1996. R. In proceedings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. CRM Advocate. 1997.L.. Merritt. Indonesia. stress. A. 1. A..C. Designing culturally sensitive CRM training: CRM in China. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.Page: 55 CRM Manual Date: January 2008 12 Reference Notes Helmreich. Sydney. J. Flight Crew Training Centre . Creating and sustaining a Safety Culture. & Helmreich.. Cultural issues in crew resource management. (1996).C. November 20-24. April.. University of Texas: Aerospace Crew Research Project. P.. Guangzhou.C.J. A. Ohio.. (1995). Colombus. Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2. Helmreich.A. (1996). Ooi. A.R.R.. Merritt. Merritt.L. and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Association Air Safety Seminar. CRM: I hate it. Cultural influences on flight operations..C. (1995). (1996). W. A. T. (1996.L. Merritt. & Merritt. April-May. The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOSChecklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. Local solutions for global problems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues..L. Merritt.L.

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