Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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BPS 4-1
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a Central European country and member of the
European Union, G8, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It maintains a network of 229 diplomatic
missions abroad and holds relations with more than 190 countries. As one of the world's leading
industrialized countries it is recognized as a major power in European and global affairs.
The Federal Foreign Office is led by Guido Westerwelle, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Next in line are the two Ministers of State Werner Hoyer and Cornelia Pieper, as well as the
State Secretaries Wolf-Ruthart Born, Peter Ammon und Martin Johannes Biesel.
The Ministers of State assist the Federal Foreign Minister in his government tasks, assuming
mainly political functions. As the highest-ranking civil servants, the State Secretaries represent
the Minister at the helm of the Foreign Service as a whole. They direct the sections assigned to
them in headquarters and monitor the foreign missions. Every day, there is a Director's meeting
under the chair of the State Secretaries with all the Director-Generals of the Federal Foreign
Office to discuss current global developments as well as the conclusions to be drawn.
Both within Germany and abroad, the Federal Foreign Office is increasingly developing into a
sought-after service provider. One example of this is in the realm of tourism. On the ground,
consular officials ensure that the consequences of mishaps, misfortune, illnesses and other
incidents are kept within reasonable limits.
The global network of 228 diplomatic missions (in 2008), not only serves diplomatic relations,
the analysis of developments in various nations and regions which government policy must
respond to. It is also concerned with economic promotion. After all, even in the age of the
Internet, intergovernmental agreements and assistance in initiating contacts remain
indispensable. Germany is a nation which depends heavily on its exports. In this regard, thanks
to its global presence, the services it offers German companies, and its work in identifying
foreign investors, the Federal Foreign Office makes an important contribution to securing
Germany’s future prosperity.
With their approval of German unification, its former victims and opponents not only honored
the German catharsis of the previous forty years, they also associated with it the hope that the
efforts the Germans had channeled into reconstruction and integration in this period would build
a viable bridge for the future. The fact that this realignment was successful was due not least of
all to the manner in which German foreign policy had developed and established itself since the
founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. The reaching of a broad-based consensus
with regard to foreign policy and certain areas of continuity was and indeed still is one of the
most salient characteristics of its political culture. These include, since the era of Konrad
Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor (1949–1963), the transatlantic partnership and European
integration, and the desire for good neighborly relations – primarily with France, which German
foreign policy was striving for in the early 1950s – just as much as the difficult process of
reconciliation with Israel, which it began early on.
That may sound a matter of course, though given German politics and warmongering in the first
half of the 20th century, and in view of the rigid constellations of the Cold War, it in fact
represented a considerable challenge.
The bedrock of German foreign policy, as steadily created by all the different Federal
Governments, has been the country’s comprehensive integration into multilateral cooperation.
This was fostered after the experience of two world wars by the unequivocal will of the country’s
neighbors to include and control it, and thus deter the Germans from breaking out or going it
alone; and it was also fostered by the Germans’ elementary need for peace, security, prosperity
and democracy, as well as the recognition that the integration of their country formed the basis
for its unification.
In the 1990s an era of extraordinary challenges began for the now united Germany. On the one
hand the new domestic situation had to be mastered, while on the other the Germans saw
themselves confronted with a new, unfamiliar role in foreign policy. That is the one side of the
coin. There is another: German reunification contrasts significantly with the general trend of
dissolution, decay and destruction in the world. The end of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia, and the dismantling of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, perpetrated in some cases
internally, in others from outside the country – to mention just a few examples – led to a rapid
increase in the number of players, even though these were not in all cases recognized states, and
at the same time to a swift rise in complex problem situations.
Being the result of different conflict constellations, these represented hitherto unknown
challenges for German foreign, security, economic, financial, development, and environmental
policy: Ethnic and religious conflicts, border and resources issues, food and hygiene emergencies
are frequently connected and create a complex that can no longer be solved without outside aid.
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century Africa alone has 16 million refugees and
internally displaced persons. In solving the problem the Germans are particularly called upon,
because Germany is not only a wealthy country, in comparison with other European states it only
has a short tradition as a colonial power, one that as abandoned shortly after WW I. As such
Germany is an in-demand partner with regard to economic cooperation and development. Annual
payments of almost US$ 14 billion make it the second biggest international donor – after the
USA and in front of Great Britain, France, and Japan.
It was the commitment of the German chancellors that ultimately helped secure the signing of
the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon. It was also Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel who
emphatically and indeed successfully championed the appropriate representation of the new
eastern European states, specifically neighboring Poland, in the committees of the European
Union. In terms of foreign policy this commitment remains important, if only because there were
considerable worries about the collaboration between Germany and Russia, for which there were
good historical reasons. In fact this strategic partnership is aimed against no one, rather it is
expressly geared to pan-European interests. This also applies to the energy relations, the nucleus
of the partnership. Germany is poor in natural resources and procures 41 percent of its natural
gas, 34 percent of its oil and 21 percent of its coal from Russia, while also serving as a transit
country. The fact that even during the Cold War German-Soviet economic and energy relations
continued and were expanded without any noteworthy interruptions is an indication that they are
a sound basis for a strategic partnership. And because this is not a one-way street, there are
further political opportunities – for both sides. Something similar applies to the still young
energy partnership with Central Asia.
This is an indication of how Berlin expects dealings among partners to be. It is not a rejection of
the transatlantic relationship in general and NATO in particular, nor does it signal the
announcement of a withdrawal from international and military commitments. With it Germany
has, however, moved closer to the limitations of what is possible. For this reason, in its coalition
agreement the Federal Government made up of CDU/CSU and FDP, which has been in power
since October 2009, agreed on a “culture of restraint”, which is traditional in German foreign and
security policy. Nonetheless, since the turn of the century up to 10,000 Bundeswehr soldiers
have been deployed worldwide at all times, and since 1999 in combat missions against
aggressors, terrorists and pirates as well. Germany participates directly as well as part of the EU
and NATO in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. In the case of NATO and EU
operations under UN mandate the focus of military and police involvement is on the Balkans
(KFOR, EUFOR, ALTHEA, EULEX) and in Afghanistan as part of the difficult ISAF mission.
As the third largest financial contributor to the regular UN peacekeeping budget Germany also
plays a significant role in financing the “blue helmet” missions.
German foreign policy also promotes expanding civil society structures; it is committed to
helping overcome natural disasters, asserting democratic and human rights, and champions
dialog among equals.
The fact that Germany can live this role stems from the trust carefully nurtured over the decades.
German politics is today measured not against the yardstick of the destructive apparatus of the
Third Reich, but against its achievements in development and integration. Reunited Germany has
demonstrated that it can handle international responsibility and open up other perspectives.
Twenty years after the collapse of the old world order the states and peoples on Earth are
beginning to adapt to the conditions in the new, globalized world. For all the competition, they
will only achieve this if they see each other as partners. The Germans, whose country is
integrated in the international communities to an extent hardly any other can boast, are well
aware of the opportunities this offers.
It is in Germany’s interest for Europe to be a vibrant continent, in economic terms as well. The
integration process has proved to be a suitable basis for ensuring peace, prosperity and security.
In 1957 the signing of the Treaty of Rome on establishing a European Economic Community
spelled the beginning of the success story of European integration. It focused on developing the
economies of Western Europe by strengthening and deepening cooperation and promoting trade
among the founder nations.
Without wanting to play down how important it is that Europe grow together politically, we
should no doubt consider the economic dynamism triggered by integration and the attractiveness
of the major market to be the key driving force prompting other European states to accede. This
applies to the accession of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland in the 1970s, that of Greece,
Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, and of Austria, Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. Likewise, it
also applies to the magnetic appeal which in 2004 and 2007 the EU had on the new democracies
in the emerging market economies of Eastern Central Europe and South-East Europe. Just as was
the case for the fledgling Federal Republic, the young democracies in the south and east of
Europe rightly see accession to the EU as due recognition and assurance of the political
achievements they have made in overcoming dictatorship and despotism.
The coming into power of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 saw the intensive negotiations
come round full circle. German European policy played a pivotal role at all stages of this
process: It was the concept of a European union initiated by Germany that in addition to an
economic and currency union had as its goal an extended Political Union that was capable of
acting. The Treaty of Maastricht was a major political step forward and put the first binding
pillar in place; for the most part, however, the Political Union remained a vision. In the ensuing
period it became clear that it would have to be created in stages, steps, and on another basis. For
this reason, in the negotiations on the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, as well as in the
European Convention Germany championed a gradual adaptation and advancement of the
institutional structure, the clarification of areas of responsibility and the corresponding expansion
of the democratic quality of EU decisions.
With the process having ground to a halt in 2007, under the German Presidency of the EU
success was scored in coming up with new grounds for a consensus on a Treaty reform. The
results reflect important German concerns: The expansion of qualified majority decision making
in the Council and EU Parliament co-decision making, the integration of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the introduction of citizens’ initiatives are important steps in the
strengthening of the EU’s decision-making capabilities and in securing democratic involvement.
With the “High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy”, who chairs the Council of
Foreign Ministers, the establishment of a “European Foreign Service” and the associated
combining of foreign policy duties of the Commission and Council of the EU the Lisbon Treaty
considerably strengthens the international presence and role of the EU.
German European policy has unconditionally supported the ever-deeper integration process, its
extension to the North, South and East as well as the establishment of the relevant institutions.
The strength of German foreign policy has laid in ensuring Franco-German relations were firmly
aligned to EU policy, on the one hand, and the close ties specifically to the smaller member
states, on the other.
The Germans desire a Europe that is capable of acting, democratic and transparent, with a
strengthened European Parliament, and clearly defined areas of responsibility. Incidentally, in
line with their country’s gross domestic product, the Germans provide some 20 percent of the EU
budget.
Europe is not the place for small ideas. Without the European Union, welfare and security, those
elementary services provided by the state, would no longer be possible. As such the policy of
integration, the processes and the institutions are all part of Europe’s political fabric and not
mere frills.
Any major theme concerning European societies also addresses the EU’s contribution to the
issue, as there is hardly any issue that does not involve the European level.