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Pier 1 Imports, Inc.

Information, Profile, and History

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Company Perspectives:
Pier 1 Imports offers distinct, casual home furnishings at a good value. Our
ever-changing collections are presented in a sensory environment that
encourages customers to have fun shopping for their homes. Pier 1 is a socially
conscious company that conducts business with personal and professional
integrity. We employ committed, caring associates whose first priority is
responding to the needs of our customers.
History of Pier 1 Imports, Inc.
Pier 1 Imports, Inc. is a leading specialty retailer, operating more than 800
casual home furnishing stores in 48 U.S. states, two Canadian provinces, and
in Mexico, Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The vast majority
operate under the Pier 1 Imports name, while the U.K. units are known as 'The
Pier' and the operations in Mexico and Puerto Rico consist of 'store within a
store' outlets in Sears stores. The U.S. and Canadian stores are typically
freestanding units of about 7,500 square feet located near major shopping
centers or malls. They offer a wide selection of merchandise, including more
than 5,000 items imported from more than 60 countries worldwide (the bulk
coming from Asia), with the principal categories consisting of furniture,
decorative accessories, dining and kitchen goods, bath and bedding
accessories, and seasonal items. Sales through the company's
proprietary credit card account for more than 28 percent of overall sales.
1960s: The Early Years
Charles Tandy and Luther Henderson opened the precursor to Pier 1 shops in
1962 under the name Cost Plus. Henderson was serving as treasurer for
Tandy's burgeoning Tandy Corporation, which became best known for its
Radio Shack chain. Pier 1 was inspired by the owner of a rattan furniture
importer and wholesaler in San Mateo, California, who was having credit
problems. To help liquidate costly inventory, the shop owner opened a
liquidation outlet in 1958 called Cost Plus. Impressed by the shop's success,
Tandy offered the owner of Cost Plus a loan to start a retail Cost Plus outlet. At
the same time, Tandy secured the rights to open and operate additional stores
under the Cost Plus name.
The concept behind Tandy's Cost Plus chain plan was relatively simple: a
strong U.S. dollar would allow him to import items, including rattan furniture,
brass candlesticks, specialty textiles, and other items, at rock bottom prices
from countries such as Mexico, India, and Thailand. Even with large markups
the goods would seem relatively cheap in the United States. Furthermore,
items that did not sell well could be easily liquidated by cutting their price to
near cost. Although most of the merchandise was second-rate in comparison
to U.S. or European-made goods, it was popular with the large baby-boom
generation, most of whom were first-time buyers of furnishings.
Tandy opened 16 Cost Plus retail outlets between 1962 and 1965. By 1966,
however, Tandy's growing Radio Shack enterprise began to take much of his
attention away from his Cost Plus venture. On February 10, 1966, a group of
30 investors led by Henderson bought Tandy's Cost Plus operation. They
changed the name to Pier 1 Imports to reflect the store's import emphasis and
embarked on a mission to expand the concept nationally. The original Cost
Plus outlet remained under separate ownership and eventually grew into the
nationwide Cost Plus chain of the early 21st century, one of Pier 1's
By 1967, Pier 1's sales had already reached $4.5 million annually, and growth
accelerated throughout the remainder of the decade. By 1969, the chain had
grown to 42 stores and demand for Pier 1's goods was increasing. Pier 1 went
public in 1970 to raise money for continued expansion. The company's stock
was initially listed on the American Stock Exchange, before moving to the New
York Stock Exchange two years later. Pier 1 had multiplied its chain to 123
stores, which represented sales growth of more than 100 percent since 1968.
Among Pier 1's shops were stores that had been opened in Australia and
England in 1971. During the following two years the chain also branched out
into France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Pier 1 prospered during the late 1960s and early 1970s by focusing on the baby
boom generation, members of whom were looking for interesting, exotic goods
such as love beads, incense, leather sandals, and serapes. 'You could
characterize a lot of our customers as flower children,' recounted Pier 1 chief
executive officer Clark Johnson in the Dallas-Fort
Worth Business Journal. 'Our stores had the look of an old grocery store ... and,
at that time, the appeal was heavily toward cost.' As the 'flower children'
rushed to Pier 1 to decorate their dormitory rooms, bedrooms, and
apartments, company sales rose to $68 million and earnings to $3.8 million
by 1973.
Mid-1970s to Early 1980s: Reorganizing and Restructuring
After an explosive decade of growth, Pier 1's fortunes began to change in the
mid-1970s. Importantly, global inflation and exchange rate fluctuations
exposed Pier 1's unique vulnerability to worldwide financial changes. Foreign
goods became much more expensive, thus diminishing Pier 1's important cost
advantage. Furthermore, other retail chains and department stores began to
vie for some of Pier 1's market share by offering many of the same imported
goods. To make matters worse, the core group of customers upon which Pier 1
had focused its energy was changing; baby boomers were becoming more
sophisticated by the mid- and late 1970s and were increasingly interested in
more mainstream goods. According to some critics, Pier 1 lost touch with its
patrons and failed to change its inventory to meet market demands.
In an attempt to buoy sales and profits, Pier 1 mounted several reorganization
campaigns and new marketing strategies during the mid-1970s. The company
even tested different types of stores, including specialty retail outlets, art
supply centers, rug stores, and fabric shops. Pier 1 also diversified into several
wholesale operations such as Singapore Candle Company, Southwestern Textile
Company, Rug Corporation of America, and Pasha Pillows. Many of its retail
and wholesale experiments languished, and Pier 1 eventually jettisoned most
of them.
Although the company failed to sustain the rampant growth it had achieved
during its first ten years, Pier 1's balance sheet had improved slightly by the
late 1970s. By 1979, the chain included approximately 300 stores worldwide,
while sales and profits had stabilized. Pier 1 merged with Cousins Mortgage
and Equity Investments (CMEI) in 1979 in an effort to boost its capital. Then,
in 1980, the board of directors brought in Robert Camp to help improve the
company's performance.
Camp had successfully operated his own chain of Pier 1 stores in Canada and
had a knack for retailing. Camp forced Pier 1 to reevaluate its buying
operations and store location strategies. He also focused on improving visual
merchandising techniques. During 1981 and 1982, Pier 1 consolidated its retail
import operations, closed marginal stores, opened larger outlets in more
profitable locations, and shifted from novelty items to higher quality goods.
Investors were impressed by Camp's initiatives. Within two years, sales
increased 41 percent to $165 million and operating income jumped 66
percent, to $6 million. Pier 1's stock price quickly rose from about $1 in 1980
to more than $7 by 1982.
Mid-to-Late 1980s: Refocus on the Customer
Just as Pier 1 began to build momentum under the direction of Camp, control
of the company changed hands. Under the leadership of Charles (Red) Scott,
La Jolla, California-based Intermark, Inc., a billion-dollar holding company
with a reputation for turning ailing companies around, bought a majority
interest in Pier 1. Camp eventually left, and Scott hired Clark Johnson to run
Pier 1 in 1985. Johnson, who was known as an aggressive and sociable
businessman, had a varied background that included experience in both the
furniture and sporting goods industries. He had also managed lumberyards
and had partnered with Jack Nicklaus to run MacGregor Golf Co. As president
of Wickes Furniture he had engineered the turnaround of that company
during the mid-1970s. Likewise, he boosted sales at MacGregor from $17
million to $50 million in just five years.
Like Camp, Johnson initiated numerous changes within the Pier 1
organization. He immediately sold Pier 1's two major subsidiaries, Sunbelt
Nursery Group Inc. and Ridgewood Properties Inc. He also jettisoned the
mail-order business, which lost more than $1 million in 1985 alone. In
addition, Johnson developed plans to modernize Pier 1's computer
information systems, upgrade advertising and marketing programs, and
consolidate its North American management offices. Furthermore, between
1985 and 1989 he closed more than 60 marginal stores and refurbished most
of the company's existing outlets at an average cost of $190,000 each. More
aggressive managers were brought in and given the freedom to make critical
Perhaps Johnson's most notable strategic contribution during the mid-1980s
was improving Pier 1's attentiveness to its customer base. 'It was clear that
there was a huge audience out there which had once felt a tremendous
allegiance to Pier 1,' recalled Johnson in Adweek's Marketing Week, adding 'I
believed we could rekindle that allegiance if we showed them that we were in
tune with their new values.' Johnson retained New York PR agency Makovsky
& Company to conduct what it termed 'the most comprehensive study of the
American home ever undertaken.'
The study was designed with two goals in mind: (1) to determine whether or
not Pier 1 was on track with the values it was emphasizing in its stores, and (2)
to generate publicity as the sponsor of the study. Among other statistics,
survey findings indicated that 92 percent of college-educated Americans were
satisfied with their homes; 86 percent decorated their homes themselves; 57
percent believed that their homes were nicer than what they had grown up in;
and an overwhelming majority described their home interior as casual. As
hoped, the media reported the survey's findings and brandished Pier 1's name
on the cover of major national newspapers and on television screens.
Confident of his strategy to win back Pier 1's customer base and reposition the
company, Johnson embarked on an aggressive program of growth in 1986. He
set a goal of doubling the total number of Pier 1 outlets by 1990 and increasing
the average floor space and annual sales of the stores. Pier 1 achieved its goal
one year early. By 1989 the company had doubled its chain to include more
than 550 outlets worldwide. In addition, profit margins increased and the
average ticket value of store items rose to $25 (from just $5 in the early
1980s), aided by the 1988 introduction of the Pier 1 Preferred Customer Card,
the chain's proprietary credit card. As a result, sales leapt from $173 million in
1985 to $517 million by 1990. More importantly, profits soared from $60
million to $210 million during the same time period.
Encouraged by Pier 1's success, Johnson boldly proposed expansion plans for
the next decade. 'The best way to predict the future is to create it,' Johnson
stated in Adweek's Marketing Week. He continued: 'Pier 1 Imports has a
vision of the kind of company it would like to become. By the year 2000 Pier 1
will operate more than 1,000 stores, producing more than $1.25 billion in
sales and serving more than 10 million customers.'
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Early 1990s: Stumbling Through the Recession

Despite these grand plans, Johnson was forced to slow Pier 1's pace in 1990
after seven years of expansion. Economic sluggishness in the United States
forced the slowdown. Although sales swelled to $562 million in 1991, net
income shrunk as retail markets became increasingly competitive. Pier 1
repurchased Sunbelt Nursery Group late in 1990 in an effort to diversify and
reduce its total dependence on retail markets. By early 1991, its chain included
more than 650 stores, but Johnson planned to open only a few new stores
during 1991 and to close several as part of a company consolidation plan. Pier
1 trimmed its home office staff, reorganized management, and brought its
advertising activities in-house to save money. Johnson explained that the
company was shifting its focus from growth to more acute management of its
existing operations.
Although it stumbled in the early 1990s, Pier 1 was the bright spot on its
parent's list of company holdings. Intermark's other major holdings consisted
of many different kinds of companies, including Dynamark (a manufacturer of
mag wheels), Liquor Barns (liquor stores), and Western Sizzlin (restaurants).
Intermark's stock price plunged during 1991 from $12 to $1.37 per share as the
company posted a loss of $67 million (on the heels of a $10 million loss in
1990). To avert disaster, CEO Scott was forced to sell Pier 1, making Pier 1 a
public company. Scott's responsibilities at Intermark were reduced as the
company slid into debt-induced jeopardy. Intermark would declare
bankruptcy in 1992, emerging in June 1993 as Triton Group Inc.
Economic sluggishness continued to hurt Pier 1 during 1992 and 1993.
Although its growth in comparison to the late 1980s was meager, the company
managed to sustain moderate revenue gains and to stabilize profits. Net
income surged to about $25 million annually during 1992 and 1993 as sales
climbed to $629 million. Unfortunately, Pier 1's long-term debt obligations
also increased, from about $92 million in 1990 to $147 million by 1993. As
part of a reorganization strategy, Pier 1 repositioned itself as 'The Place to
Discover' in 1992. It also decentralized operations to better serve its 600
stores. In an effort to generate capital, Pier 1 again sold its interests in Sunbelt
Although Johnson's efforts at Pier 1 were generally lauded by industry
observers, some critics characterized his management style as 'glad handling,'
while citing his salary as inflated. Moreover, some criticized Pier 1's financial
condition. Of concern to analysts was Pier 1's excessive debt, which had
multiplied fivefold since Johnson's arrival. In addition, Pier 1's operating costs
had increased, significantly reducing the company's overall profitability
compared to leaner retailers competing in the same market. Other criticisms
addressed Pier 1's selection of inventory and marketing strategy.
Buffeting criticism, however, was a history of strong growth and relatively
steady earnings. In addition, Pier 1 had boosted its image through charitable
donations, which included a $785,000 gift to UNICEF in 1992. Pier 1 had
started donating to UNICEF after Johnson's arrival in 1982 and had supplied
over $3.3 million to the organization between 1985 and 1992 from the sale of
greeting cards in Pier 1 outlets. The extremely successful fundraiser was
established by Marvin J. Girouard (pronounced 'Gerard'), a Pier 1 veteran who
was named president and chief operating officer of the company in 1988.
Mid-1990s and Beyond
Pier 1's sales surged to $685 million in 1994, an increase of about eight
percent over the previous year, which helped allay doubts about the company's
overall approach. Pier 1 opened 48 new stores and closed 17 during 1994,
bringing the total size of its international chain to 636. Pier 1's reach extended
into most of the United States, with an emphasis on Florida, California, New
York, Texas, and Ohio. It operated 30 stores in Canada and was active in
several joint ventures, particularly in Mexico and the United Kingdom.
Pier 1 continued to emphasize imports from low-cost producers in the mid-
1990s. China, its largest supplier, contributed about one-third of its inventory
in the early 1990s. Other major suppliers included India, Indonesia, Thailand,
and the Philippines. Sales of furniture and kitchen goods each represented
about one-quarter of the company's revenues in 1994. Textiles and jewelry
each comprised about 13 percent of sales, and the remainder was attributable
to miscellaneous gifts and accessories.
As revenues continued to increase in early 1995, Johnson reaffirmed his intent
to pursue the ambitious growth plans he had proffered in 1989. He still
wanted to build the Pier 1 chain to more than 1,000 stores by the turn of the
century and to push sales past the $1 billion mark. Toward that end, Pier 1 was
pursuing growth through a multifaceted strategy in the mid-1990s that
highlighted international expansion. Johnson hoped to open 100 foreign
stores by the end of the decade by buying into existing retail chains or setting
up joint ventures. Pier 1 was already operating two Pier 1 'stores within a store'
in Mexico through a joint venture with Sears de Mexico S.A. which was
launched in 1993. In addition, the company entered into a partnership with a
chain of ten retail import stores in the United Kingdom called 'The Pier,' a
venture that began in 1993.
Pier 1 was also striving to boost sales through its credit card, which was
reportedly used in about 14 percent of store purchases in 1994 (totaling $100
million), as well as through the creation of smaller, more conveniently located
stores. To that end, Pier 1 was bucking the retail trend toward giant warehouse
stores and was initiating a program of building multistore locations that
provided a better shopping experience (better parking and customer service,
and a more pleasant atmosphere). In addition, the company was
experimenting with new advertising media, including television, in an effort to
lure younger buyers. Pier 1 launched its first national television ads in July
Sales continued to increase in 1995 and 1996, reaching $810.7 million in the
latter year. Aiding the increase was further tinkering with the product mix,
most notably a cutting back on space devoted to the sluggish apparel category.
By 1996 apparel accounted for only six percent of overall sales, and the
following year the category was discontinued altogether. Management also
continued to push the chain's remaining product offerings upmarket, as the
household income of its average customer reached about $60,000 by 1996,
compared to $26,600 a decade earlier. As an example of the upscaling of Pier
1, Johnson told HFN in 1996 that the chain's most expensive basket sold for
$129, compared to $4.95 in 1985. The average customer ticket total in mid-
1996 was $44, a huge increase over the 1980 figure of $5.25.
Unfortunately, the earnings picture was not nearly as bright as that of
revenues. To wind down its investment in Sunbelt Nursery, Pier 1 was forced
to take writeoffs totaling $37.3 million, including a $14 million charge during
the 1996 fiscal year. That same year the company suffered a large trading loss.
Capital Insight, a firm Pier 1 had hired to invest its excess cash and short-term
funds, lost $19.3 million making risky futures investments that went sour.
Following 1995 net income of just $22.1 million, the financial setbacks led to a
decline to $10 million in net income the following year. The trading loss also
led to the firing of Pier 1's longtime CFO, Robert G. Herndon, who was
responsible for overseeing the investments. The company also pursued legal
action to attempt to recover its loss, and subsequently received an $11 million
settlement during the 1998 fiscal year.
International expansion continued in the late 1990s, although the company's
Mexican operations suffered from the devaluation of the peso. During fiscal
1996 Pier 1 entered into an agreement with Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc.
to develop Pier 1 'stores within a store' in Sears outlets located in Puerto Rico,
an arrangement similar to the one in Mexico. By early 1999 seven Sears Puerto
Rico stores were offering Pier 1 merchandise. In 1997 Pier 1 entered into a
joint venture with Akatsuki Printing Co., Ltd. and Skylark Group to open
stores in Japan. By early 1999 there were 18 Pier 1 stores in that country. Also
during this time, the company purchased an Omaha, Nebraska-based national
bank, which was soon renamed Pier 1 National Bank and which held the credit
card accounts for the company's proprietary card. The Pier 1 credit card was
responsible for 28 percent of sales by the end of the decade.
Pier 1's earnings decline appeared to be only temporary, as the company
rebounded by fiscal 1998 to post profits of $78 million on record sales of $1.08
billion. This also marked the first time sales had exceeded the $1 billion mark.
In June 1998 Girouard was appointed CEO, taking over from the retiring
Johnson. Girouard added the chairmanship as well in February of the
following year. Although sales grew again in 1999, reaching $1.14 billion, this
represented an increase of only 5.6 percent over the previous year, compared
to the 13 to 17 percent increases of the previous three years.
With markets for new Pier 1 stores in the United States at a minimum, and
with competition increasing from fast-growing discounters such as Cost Plus
and such upscale housewares chains as Pottery Barn and Crate and Barrel,
Pier 1 Imports appeared to be hitting a plateau, prompting Girouard to
investigate alternative avenues of growth. He first considered opening a
second chain which would offer discount merchandising, before deciding that
the upscale markets had more potential. In mid-1999 the company entered
negotiations to purchase the privately held Z Gallerie, a retail chain offering
high-end home furnishings. The deal, however, fell apart in August, leading to
the immediate departure of another CFO, Stephen F. Mangum, who had
championed the acquisition. In the aftermath, the company's stock plunged 33
percent in one day. Girouard subsequently abandoned plans to open or
acquire a second chain, deciding instead to concentrate on revitalizing the Pier
1 concept by cutting prices, opening stores in smaller markets, and
experimenting with larger formats. A 1,000-item online catalog was also being
Principal Subsidiaries: Pier 1 Assets, Inc.; Pier 1 Licensing, Inc.; Pier 1
Imports (U.S.), Inc.; Pier 1 Funding, Inc.; Pier Lease, Inc.; Pier-SNG, Inc.; PIR
Trading, Inc.; Pier International Limited (Hong Kong); Pier Alliance Ltd.
(Bermuda); The Pier Retail Group Limited (U.K.); The Pier (Retail) Limited
(U.K.); Pier Direct Limited (U.K.); Pier-FTW, Inc.; Pacific Industrial
Properties, Inc.; Pier Group, Inc.; Pier 1 Holdings, Inc.; Pier 1 Services
Company; Pier 1 National Bank.
Principal Competitors: The Bombay Company, Inc.; Cost Plus, Inc.;
Euromarket Designs Inc.; Garden Ridge Corporation; HomePlace of America
Inc.; IKEA International A/S; Lechters, Inc.; Michaels Stores, Inc.;
MJDesigns, Inc.; Spiegel, Inc.; Williams-Sonoma, Inc.
Related information about Pier
:For architectural piers, see Pier (architecture).

A pier is a raised walkway over water, supported by widely spread piles or

pillars. In Europe however, where ports have tended to use basins and river-
side quays rather than piers, the term is principally associated with the image
of a Victorian cast iron pleasure pier. An early example of an individual
working pier is Ryde Pier, opened in 1814 to serve ferries between the English
mainland and the Isle of Wight.

The other form of working pier, often called the finger pier, was built at ports
with smaller tidal ranges. Some major ports consisted of large numbers of
such piers lining the foreshore, classic examples being the Hudson River
frontage of New York, or the Embarcadero in San Francisco. Sometimes a pier
has two decks.

Early pleasure piers were of wooden construction, with iron structures being
introduced with the construction in 1855 of Margate Jetty, in Margate,
England. The longest wooden pier in the southern hemisphere.
• Williamstown, Victoria - See also: Gem Pier
• Port Melbourne, Victoria - See also: Station Pier
• Blankenberge
• Nieuwpoort
• Halifax, Nova Scotia - See also: Pier 21
• Hong Kong - See also: Star Ferry Pier and Tsim Sha Tsui Ferry Pier
• Copenhagen
• Yokohama - See also: Osanbashi Pier and Piers of Yokohama
• Palanga
• Scheveningen - has two decks, the upper one open air, the lower one closed
• Sopot
• Gda?sk-Brze?no
• Mi?dzyzdroje
• Singapore - See also: Clifford Pier
• Malm 旦
United Kingdom
The first recorded pier in the UK was Ryde Pier, opened in 1814 on the Isle of
Wight, as a working pier to allow ferries to and from the mainland to berth.
The most well known piers are perhaps the two at Brighton in East Sussex and
the three at Blackpool in Lancashire, while the longest is at Southend-on-Sea
in Essex at 1.34 miles (2158 metres) long. Two piers, Brighton's now derelict
West Pier and Clevedon Pier, are Grade 1 listed.

The National Piers Society gives a figure of 55 surviving seaside piers in

England and Wales. These include piers at:

• Aberystwyth
• Bangor
• Blackpool - See also: North Pier, Blackpool
• Bournemouth
• Brighton - See also: Brighton Palace Pier
• Burnham-on-Sea
• Cromer - See also: Cromer Pier
• Clacton
• Cleethorpes
• Clevedon - See also: Clevedon Pier
• Colwyn Bay
• Deal
• Eastbourne - See also: Eastbourne Pier
• Great Yarmouth
• Hastings - See also: Hastings Pier
• Hythe - See also: Hythe Pier
• Llandudno - See also: Llandudno Pier
• Lowestoft
• Mumbles
• Paignton
• Penarth
• Portsmouth
• Ryde - See also: Ryde Pier
• Sandown
• Saltburn-by-the-Sea
• Southend-on-Sea - See also: Southend Pier
• Southport - See also: Southport Pier
• Southwold - See also: Southwold Pier
• Swanage - See also: Swanage Pier
• Teignmouth
• Totland, Isle of Wight
• Weston-super-Mare - See also: Weston-super-Mare Grand Pier
• Worthing - See also: Worthing Pier
• Yarmouth
United States
• Asbury Park, New Jersey
• Avila Beach, California
• Berkeley, California - See also Berkeley Pier
• Cayucos, California
• Chicago, Illinois See also: Navy Pier
• Emerald Isle, North Carolina
• Huntington Beach, California - See also Huntington Beach Pier
• Naples, FL
• Newport Beach, California - See also Balboa Pier and Newport Pier
• New York City - See also Chelsea Piers
• Oakland, California
• Pacifica, California - See also: Pacifica Pier
• Pensacola Beach, Florida
• Pismo Beach, California
• Redondo Beach, California
• Saint Petersburg, Florida
• San Diego, California - See also: Crystal Pier
• San Francisco, California - See also: Pier 39
• Santa Barbara, California - See also: Stearns Wharf
• Santa Cruz, California
• Santa Monica, California - See also: Santa Monica Pier
• Venice, California
• Ventura, California
• Olympia, Washington
• Seattle, Washington
• Tacoma, Washington
• Tampa Bay, Florida - See also Skyway Fishing Pier
• The oldest cast iron pier in the world is Gravesend Town Pier, in Kent, UK.
• The longest pleasure pier in the world is Southend, with a length of 1.34
miles (2158 meters).
• The shortest UK pier is now Cleethorpes, at just 335ft.
• The UK pier with the biggest height above the sea is Weston Super Mare
See also

• Breakwater
• Dock
• Jetty
• List of United Kingdom topics
• Seaside resort
• Concrete & other Piers for Telescopes

Read more: Pier 1 Imports, Inc. Business Information, Profile, and History - Company,
Stores, Million, Sales, and Chain
Pier 1 Imports: Company Profile

• Report price : $ 350

• Publication date : June 2008
• Length : 25 pages
• Publisher : Koncept Analytics
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Pier 1 Imports: Company Profile

This company profile offers a comprehensive analysis of the organization, its business segments, and
competitors. It analyzes the business and marketing strategies adopted by the company, to gain a
competitive edge in the industry. The profile also evaluates the strengths of the company and the
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This profile is of immense help to management consultants, analysts, market research organizations and
corporate advisors.

The objective and scope of various sections of our company profile has been discussed below.

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corporate timeline of the company.

Company Analysis
It involves analysis of the company at three levels – segments, organizational structure and ownership
composition. Both business and geographic segments are analyzed alongwith their recent financial
performance. It further discusses the major subsidiaries of the company and the recent merger &

Business Developments
This section examines the significant developments that have taken place in the company. It is a form of
news analysis where the most critical company news is discussed.

Discussion of Business Strategies

This section talks about the current and future strategies of the company. All business, marketing,
financial and organizational strategies are discussed here.

Our SWOT Analysis is a valuable step in assessing your company's strengths, weaknesses,
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Financial Performance
It discusses the most recent financials of the company and also compares the historical sales & income
figures with the current and projected figures. The objective is to evaluate the financial health of the
company. The analyst opinion and stock performance help us in evaluating the performance of the
company from an investor’s viewpoint.

Competition Synopsis
This section compares the company with its peer group. The comparable analysis and stock movement
are aimed at giving an overview of the competitive landscape in the industry and the company’s
positioning in its peer group