Professional Documents
Culture Documents
the CPLP which also represents Timor to proceed with the seven-point is inevitably bound to differ to some
Leste in the UNESCO. Bilaterally, roadmap to democracy. degree, considering how strongly
Timor Leste has opened embassies in Timor Leste faces many challenges Brazil’s foreign policy was shaped by
Bangkok, Brazil, Brussels, Canberra, in our nation building effort, and Lula’s personality. In addition, Dilma
Cuba, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, whilst an important part of our focus Rousseff will face new international
Lisbon, Luanda, Manila, Maputo, will continue to be our national challenges that make merely
Pretoria, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, development, we are optimistic about copying her predecessor’s strategy
and Washington. In the near future, the future and our potential to make impossible. So what can the world
we will concentrate our efforts on a positive contribution regionally and expect from Brazil in the next years?
expanding our representation in the internationally. Timor Leste remains The fact that Dilma has never held
ASEAN countries, where Timor Leste fully committed to human rights elected office certainly makes
is lacking a presence. and the rule of law and democracy. predictions more difficult. Yet
On key international issues, Timor Human rights, gender equality and appointments to top jobs and early
Leste has consistently taken positions the empowerment of women are key statements made during the first
of principle and voiced its position issues in our foreign policy agenda. weeks of her presidency provide
publicly. The positions assumed by As we work towards consolidating a useful clues. Dilma’s decision to
Timor Leste have been based on a cooperation agenda that will bring keep Marco Aurélio Garcia as special
multitude of factors such as national development and prosperity for our foreign policy advisor is as much a
and strategic interest, local, regional people, we will not by any means sign of continuity as her appointment
and global security and stability, forget our responsibility to regional of Antônio Patriota as Foreign Minister.
international law and its historical and international security, stability Patriota, a seasoned diplomat who has
background. The following are some and peace. served as Brazilian ambassador to
examples: Washington D.C., has worked with his
Western Sahara – Timor Leste fully predecessor for over a decade, and is
supports the right to self-determination unlikely to pursue policies different
of the Saharawi people. Timor Leste from those in the Lula administration.
views this struggle as having the same We can therefore expect continuity on
historical background to the Timorese
struggle for independence. As we
Dilma Rousseff broad issues such as regional policy
and trade. Furthermore, Brazil will
enter the UN’s Second Decade for the
Eradication of Colonialism, Timor Leste
and Brazil’s continue to seek a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council.
remains concerned that so many Non-
Self Governing Territories are still not foreign policy: big Perfect continuity, however, is hardly
possible given the former President’s
free and have not exercised their right
to decide freely on their own future. shoes to fill unprecedented personal involvement
in foreign policy making. No other
Palestine – We support a two state President in Brazil’s history had
solution that provides for Israelis Oliver Stuenkel traveled as much as Lula, none
and Palestinians to live side by side Institute of International Relations, attended as many international
peacefully and in security. We also University of São Paulo conferences or was as visible
support the Quartet’s efforts and internationally as the former union
encourage the parties to conclude leader. Aside from Brazil’s economic
negotiations. If one word can summarize Dilma growth, it was also thanks to Lula’s
North Korea – Timor Leste condemns Rousseff’s promises during last charisma that Brazil emerged as a key
the development of weapons of mass year’s electoral campaign, it is international player with considerable
destruction and therefore calls upon ‘continuity’. A vote for Rousseff, weight. Rather than engaging in
nations developing nuclear material former President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ costly yet necessary political battles
to use it exclusively for peaceful da Silva famously declared on the on the domestic front – regarding for
purposes. campaign trail, was a vote for him. example pension and tax reform – Lula
Cuba – Timor Leste has publicly Lula, who enjoyed approval ratings preferred to ride the wave of growth-
condemned the economic embargo of more than 70% until his last day in fuelled popularity, leaving the task of
imposed by the US on Cuba. Timor office, thus succeeded in transferring confronting Brazilians with potentially
Leste has always voted in favor of the his popularity to his handpicked difficult truths to his successor.
UN resolutions condemning it. successor and former chief of staff. In contrast, Dilma is far from
Myanmar – Timor Leste favors an Yet while domestic policies are indeed charismatic and unlikely to ever
active dialogue and engagement that unlikely to change under President develop Lula’s personal star power
encourages Myanmar authorities Rousseff, her foreign policy strategy around which Brazil’s visibility was
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |3
Portuguese governments in the last be thought of in an international, the international community that the
15 years. It has not always been that cooperative framework. time for Timor Leste’s independence
way: in the aftermath of the First That participation has been had arrived. Largely for historical
World War, Portugal adopted a policy instrumental in the promotion of and emotional reasons, Timor Leste
of neutrality and non-interventionism some of Portugal’s key foreign policy will remain a priority for Portuguese
which lasted until it entered the objectives, particularly in areas of defense, foreign and aid policies.
European Community in 1986. national strategic interest, like Timor Portugal has also been involved in
According to the priorities established Leste, Africa and Latin America. the International Security Assistance
by the current government, Portugal Historically, three cases helped mould Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2002.
has participated in all major Portugal’s current peace efforts, The national contingent numbers
international military operations and and set priorities in the direction will rise to about 253 soldiers, the
missions of crisis management of of Portuguese-speaking countries: highest since the start of national
the UN, NATO and the EU. Currently, Angola, Mozambique and Timor commitment. Portugal is keeping its
Portuguese Armed Forces are Leste. After major involvements in pledge made at NATO’s summit in
involved in three major international Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese April 2009 to supply additional troops,
missions: Kosovo and Afghanistan governments have a clear preference to more than double its ISAF troop
in support of NATO, and in Lebanon, for conflict prevention in Africa, contribution, to oversee training for
supporting the UN. including through ESDP civilian the Afghan army and police mission
However, with the reduction of missions, rather than an involvement in view of the transition phase.
the Bosnia and Kosovo missions, in military crisis management Portugal has also been sustaining an
which are taking place against the operations. Engineering Company (146 elements)
background of a serious economic It is clear, when speaking of peace in Lebanon since October 2006, in
and financial crisis, the Portuguese missions, that one of the top priorities support of UNIFIL. The rationale for
government faces pressures to cut is helping the former colonies. this mission four years on has been
down its budget on defense. Facing a Keeping the peace in Portuguese- criticized by the opposition.
debt crisis, Lisbon looks set to slash speaking countries is not only a The greatest threat to peace operations
11.1% off its defense budget and moral duty, due to longstanding in the years ahead may not come
might cut back on important areas, ties, but is also an opportunity to from individual atrocities. Rather, a
like peacekeeping missions. As far preserve Portugal’s leverage in those mix of financial pressures and gaps
as Bosnia is concerned, Portugal has countries. in military resources may cut off the
steeply reduced its participation in Portuguese participation in operations money, troops and hardware peace
the EU military mission since 2007. in Africa reflects the priority that missions need. Costs with missions
In the peak period, between 1996 Portuguese foreign policy has always have risen sharply in 2009, reaching a
and 1997 Portugal had more than given to this region and represents an record-high 296.3 million. Costs have
900 troops there; now there are only area where Portugal has a say. This decreased by 21.2% in 2010, reaching
14. The mission in Bosnia, where ten is due mainly to Portugal’s successful 275 million. The government has
years ago Portugal had 8000 troops efforts over the years to mend fences already pledged that next year it will
deployed, was the oldest continuously with the former colonies and to maintain its commitment to peace
held deployment abroad. consolidate pragmatic and fruitful missions, an expenditure of about
As for NATO’s peacekeeping force in relations. It is also an asset in terms 2150 million. Defense budget cuts will
Kosovo, the reduction in Portuguese of Portugal’s standing in international be significant, but Defense Minister
troops follows NATO’s decision to relations. Augusto Santos Silva has stated that
slash its presence by half until next Another former Portuguese colony, these cuts will not apply to peace
spring. The decision marks the Timor Leste was Portugal’s most missions abroad. However, proposed
adaptation of KFOR to a deterrent significant involvement in any UN budgetary measures to keep tight
presence. The reduction is due to the peacekeeping mission. Timor was control on spending on defense
improvement of security conditions undoubtedly one of the largest are expected to restrict Portugal’s
and the fact that local institutions diplomatic struggles Portugal has involvement in future peace missions.
are increasingly capable of assuming ever been engaged in, assuming
responsibility for security tasks. a leading role in the fight for the
Portuguese participation in peace right to self-determination of
support operations is the result of the Timorese people. Against the
the changing security environment. A dominant political tide, Portugal
major argument advanced since the committed all its diplomatic efforts
1990s is that defense matters, and to keep the Timor Leste issue on the
above all international security must international agenda and persuade
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |5
Throughout the years, Guinea-Bissau has constantly the wider context of Guinea-Bissau’s apparently endless
proved itself to be the epitome of political and social cycle of uncertainty and instability.
instability, with the vulnerability of the state’s institutions
frequently exacerbated by the local military’s attempts The road reluctantly taken
to subvert the constitutional order and the rule of law. A few days after the half-successful coup of April 8th,
In that order, the events of April 1st 2010 were hardly when facts were still murky at best and the political
surprising. Indeed, the actions of Armed Forces Deputy scenario was far from stable, President Malam Bacai
Chief of Staff General António Indjai – including the Sanhá took his chances by traveling abroad. In this
incarceration of his superior, Armed Forces Chief of Staff context, any visit could come at a high price of forfeiting
General José Zamora Induta, the temporary arrest of his power while the coup evolved but in this particular
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and the release of case, it was certainly worth the risk. Indeed, Sanhá
former Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto travelled to Luanda where he met with his Angolan
– only appeared to reinforce a well-established notion of counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos, to whom he
how fragile the political-military situation remained in requested cooperation from the Angolan Armed Forces
Guinea-Bissau.1 to train – and hopefully discipline – Guinea-Bissau’s
Despite constant calls from the international community military, under the framework of the ongoing SSR
for a return to order, the following months proved that efforts. The significance of this encounter should not
stability would be hard to attain, especially since Indjai’s be underestimated. The message conveyed was simple
moves were subsequently consecrated by his promotion enough: Angola was being asked to play a central role
to Armed Forces Chief of Staff, basically confirming the in defusing the crisis at hand by exercising its political
perilous balance between the political and military class and military clout while helping a Lusophone peer. Eight
on the ground. But despite this fait accompli, the situation days later, these ties were again further reinforced when
was far from secure as tensions remained consistently Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva travelled to
high. In that order, the idea of a possible international Luanda, where together with his counterpart Cândido
stabilization mission – intended to provide some much Van Dúnem, both countries began to lay the ground for a
needed security and help reenergize the Security Sector cooperation agreement in the defense domain.
Reform (SSR) process – began to be floated around, On the other hand, ECOWAS was also not totally idle.
as an opportunity for the surrounding community Throughout May, the regional bloc dispatched a fact-
and interested partners – among them Angola, the finding mission to Bissau, composed by the Armed
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Forces Chiefs of Staff of Liberia, Togo, Ghana and Cape
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Verde, and meant to assess the country’s political
and the African Union (AU) clearly stood out – to get situation. However, as mentioned above, the crisis
involved with the fate of Guinea-Bissau. gained new contours when on June 25th President Sanhá
With recent reports indicating that such an undertaking confirmed Indjai in the Army’s top post. In the following
might finally materialize, the subject takes on renewed 28th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State
interest, regarding both the arduous path to its and Government on July 2nd in Sal Island, regional
implementation and its actual purpose and feasibility in leaders were swift to express “deep concern” over
such a move while urging the promotion of “favorable
1 F
or a complete analysis of the facts surrounding the coup attempt see Paulo
conditions that would enable ECOWAS to resume its
Gorjão, “Guinea-Bissau: The Inescapable Feeling of Déjà-Vu” (IPRIS Policy efforts at mobilizing bilateral and multilateral partners
Brief, No. 2, April 2010).
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |6
to support Guinea Bissau”.2 Above all, the surrounding the institutional weight of the CPLP behind the Bissau-
neighborhood sought to prevent further escalation Guinean civilian government, as the country timely
in tensions between political and military leaders, assumed the rotating presidency of the organization.
likely to affect nearby countries and instigate similar Following the intense pressure that emanated from
disturbances in their backyards. ECOWAS, the CPLP and the AU’s successive summits
Consequently, calls for a deeper involvement by the – the latter in Kampala on July 27th –, President Sanhá
international community began to reach new heights, finally convened the National Defense Council on August
as exemplified by the United Nations Secretary-General 1st. This time around, political and military authorities
Ban Ki-moon’s appeal “for strengthened engagement “agreed in principle” to welcome an international stability
by key partners, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, force. Although details were sketchy at first, a few days
CPLP and the European later, the Presidency clarified
Union”.3 By the end of July,
pressure was thus increasing
Angola remained the that such a mission would not
comprise a military detail but
on local civilian authorities most coveted partner as would rather consist of military-
to rein in their troublesome civilian experts, restricted to the
military, understood as the exemplified by the con- SSR process.
main obstacle to the country’s Indeed, urgent support to
peace and stability. Still, secutive visits of both continue the planned reforms
questions remained as to the was needed, especially after the
internal capacities to carry António Indjai and Prime EU decided on August 2nd not to
on such task – as previous
SSR attempts had repeatedly
Minister Carlos Gomes renew its own SSR mission, in
light of these unsettling internal
proved ineffectual – and in that Júnior to Luanda in early developments. More than
sense rumors concerning a ever, Guinea-Bissau needed
possible international mission September. The ability to convince the international
that could assist national community that it was
authorities in their intended to simultaneously – al- determined and willing to curb
reforms, increasingly began the excessive power that the
to take shape. though not jointly – at- local military exercised over the
The first concrete and
public proposal surfaced
tract opposing/conflict- country’s daily life.
To that end, on August 9th, a
on the eve of the CPLP’s VIII ing sides confirmed the CPLP delegation - including
Summit of Heads of State representatives from Angola,
and Government on July consensual status it Brazil, Cape Verde and Portugal
23rd in Luanda, regarding a - arrived in Bissau to assess the
possible common Lusophone continued to hold among possibility of the Community’s
intervention in Guinea-Bissau. involvement in the stabilization
Although Portuguese Foreign Bissau-Guinean elites. mission. On the 24th, President
Minister Luís Amado promptly Sanhá met with Cape Verde’s
expressed his opposition – Defense Minister Cristina Lima,
arguing that the ultimate responsibility and legitimacy and the next day with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
lied with the UN4 –, Angolan President José Eduardo ‘Lula’ da Silva. The main topic was one and the same:
dos Santos stated that no options should be excluded possible contributions to the stabilization mission.
in the process of supporting Guinea-Bissau, including Further contacts were also made on the margins of
a military one – although always strictly dependent on the United Nations 65th General Assembly. Mozambican
a formal request by national authorities.5 Again, Angola Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói, for example, explicitly
was seen as taking the lead in this matter by putting expressed his country’s willingness to participate in any
kind of undertaking that would help Guinea-Bissau deal
with its internal issues once and for all.6
2 E
COWAS Commission, “Final Communiqué” (28th Ordinary Session of the Still, Angola remained the most coveted partner as
Authority of Heads of State and Government, Sal, 2 July 2010).
exemplified by the consecutive visits of both Indjai and
3 U
N Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on developments
in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior to Luanda in early
Peacebuilding Office in that country” (24 June 2010).
4 “ CPLP: MNE português contra força de paz lusófona na Guiné-Bissau” (Lusa,
22 July 2010).
5 “ CPLP: José Eduardo dos Santos não exclui nenhuma hipótese para resolver
problema da Guiné-Bissau”(Lusa, 23 July 2010). 6 “Guiné-Bissau quer força de Estabilização” (O País, 6 October 2010).
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |7
September.7 The ability to simultaneously – although not meeting with President of the European Commission
jointly – attract opposing/conflicting sides confirmed the José Manuel Durão Barroso in Brussels, Prime Minister
consensual status it continued to hold among Bissau- Carlos Gomes Júnior stated once again that the
Guinean elites. The results soon followed. Angola’s Armed stabilization force already had a go-ahead by the official
Forces Chief of Staff General Francisco Pereira Furtado authorities,11 and a few days later President Sanhá
announced that he would send military and police officials endorsed a letter to President Jonathan officially asking
to Guinea-Bissau to evaluate the type of involvement for ECOWAS support and assistance in relaunching SSR
in the SSR process and identify Guinea-Bissau’s activities.12
needs.8 Furthermore, All these endeavors however
on September 10th, the were brought to a standstill
respective Defense Right from when it first when on October 7th Bubo
Ministers finally concluded Na Tchuto was reinstated
and signed a new Technical surfaced, the alleged by presidential decree, and
and Military Assistance under proposition from the
Protocol, heralding greater intervention force has government, as Navy Chief
cooperation in this area
between both countries.9
been consistently clouded of Staff. International uproar
soon followed, and again
On other front, ECOWAS in doubts as to its actual doubts arose regarding the
carried out an Extraordinary viability and the timeliness
Heads of State and purpose. Would it comprise of a hypothetical stabilization
Government Summit in mission. At least publicly,
Abuja on September 17th, military forces, aiming official talks about such a
specifically focused on project were then apparently
Guinea-Bissau’s situation. at providing protection to put on hold, symptomatic of
Probably aware of Angola’s
growing influence and
civilian leaders? Would it the visible rewarding of the
perpetrators of April’s turmoil.
wishing to ascertain the take a more advisory role, However, it was clear to all
region’s own resolution that a ‘foreign compromise’
capabilities, ECOWAS essentially taking on the would not be discarded that
Chairman and Nigerian easily.
President Goodluck responsibilities of the EU’s
Jonathan sought to assume A quick fix or the right
a greater leadership role in ill-fated SSR mission? Or prescription?
this matter by stating that
“the formal responsibility
would it imply a full ‘troops After such a myriad of official
visits and declarations, calls
for solving Guinea-Bissau’s on the ground’ solution as a for intervention and public
problem lies with us”.10 statements of support, one
However, the physical and way to finally circumvent the would think that nine months
logistical limitations were later, the cited international
notorious and therefore unsubordinated military? stabilization mission had
a full-blown military already met some progress in
stabilization mission was its implementation or at least
out of the question. ECOWAS opted instead to put its showed some signs of life. But as the international
institutional weight behind the SSR process: the ultimate community remained helpless to prevent Guinea-
goal would then be to cut 1.500 ranks from the Bissau- Bissau’s top officials from acknowledging the status
Guinean military, at a total cost of US$70 million. quo imposed by Indjai and Na Tchuto – in clear violation
Either way, international support appeared to be on of the country’s democratic and constitutional order
the rise for such a mission. On September 27th, while – it became clear that the dispatch of a joint force of
experts on SSR procedures would be the only possible
contribution that external partners could effectively give.
7 L
assana Cassamá, “Guiné-Bissau: Carlos Gomes Júnior e António Indjai em
Angola” (Jornal Digital, 10 September 2010).
Still, there was one final hurdle that the international
8 “ Angola envia missão técnica militar à Guiné Bissau” (Angop, 8 September
community would simply not accept to go on indefinitely:
2010).
9 G
arrido Fragoso, “Acordo garante apoio aos militares da Guiné” (Jornal de 11 “ Acordo da Guiné-Bissau para a presença de uma força de estabilização
Angola, 11 September 2010). internacional no país” (RFI, 27 September 2010).
10 “ ECOWAS extra-ordinary summit on Guinea Bissau opens” (Pana Press, 17 12 “ Presidente divulga carta à CEDEAO para esclarecer que não pediu missão
September 2010). militar” (Notícias Lusófonas, 1 October 2010).
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |8
the detention of now former Army Chief of Staff Zamora Such a daunting outcome, however, is always dependent
Induta. In late December, the EU even went as far on the level and the kind of commitment on the table,
as to announce the start of political consultations which leads to a second misunderstanding in this matter:
with Guinea-Bissau, under Article 96 of the Cotonou the actual composition of the cited stabilization mission.
Agreement – which allows the EU to partially or totally Right from when it first surfaced, the alleged intervention
suspend cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific force has been consistently clouded in doubts as to
(ACP) countries that are guilty of serious violations of its actual purpose. Would it comprise military forces,
democratic principles – as a aiming at providing protection to
way of further pressuring local civilian leaders? Would it take a
authorities.13 One way or the Ultimately, Bissau- more advisory role, essentially
other, it must have had some taking on the responsibilities of
kind of effect because days later, Guineans would the EU’s ill-fated SSR mission? Or
Induta was finally released after would it imply a full ‘troops on the
eight months in prison – although be wise not put ground’ solution as a way to finally
still prohibited from leaving the circumvent the unsubordinated
country.14 their absolute trust military? Doubtful declarations
Be as it may, this political gesture
of goodwill did not exactly resurrect
on a ‘miraculous made by the authorities and in
particular by President Sanhá did
the ‘stabilization mission panacea’ solution’. The idea of a little to help answer these queries
as its idea never really faded away. but currently, every indication
Indeed, from the start it was visible stabilization force has points that it is bound to focus on
that a great part of the international SSR support, helping to identify
community and certain sectors been frequently used entry-points to adjust and resize
of the Bissau-Guinean society Guinea-Bissau’s Armed Forces. In
fervently believed that any kind of as a stalling tactic by that sense, it is worth asking how
foreign presence on the streets
of Bissau would automatically
local politicians more this mission will differ from the
EU’s own efforts. Predicting that
entitle some sort of institutional interested in keeping this international mission will help
buffer between the vulnerable propel further reforms in Guinea-
political class and the disobedient the international Bissau’s security apparatus is
military officials. However, that presently nothing more than a
came down to nothing more than community attached to mirage, especially given all that
wishful thinking, at best. As it so took place the past year. At the
happened, this option had already the country’s fate than moment, nothing guarantees that
been adopted in the past, with
notoriously ineffectual results.
actually providing and this new endeavor would succeed
where the European Union failed.
After the 1998/1999 civil war and building the necessary But even if it indeed comes to life,
the Abuja Peace Agreements the success of any international
that followed – brokered by the conditions for a mission forces would also be contingent
CPLP and ECOWAS – an ECOMOG to their full acceptance by – at
(Economic Community of West of this sort. least – the majority of the political
African States Monitoring Group) and social spectrum of Guinea-
peacekeeping force was dispatched to Guinea-Bissau. Bissau’s society. Despite the official endorsement by the
Mainly composed of Togolese forces, it quickly proved ruling African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape
unfit and incapable of stopping the country from returning Verde (PAIGC), the remaining main political forces –
to conflict and violence.15 In other words, there is no the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) and the Republican
guarantee that this time around an international presence Party of Independence for Development (PRID) – have so
in Guinea-Bissau would prove any different. far clearly expressed their opposition to this proposal.
Furthermore, the PAIGC of both President Sanhá and
Prime Minister Gomes Júnior is hardly coherent in itself
13 “ Comissão Europeia propõe início de consultas com autoridades da Guiné as the political divergences between the two leaders
Bissau” (África 21, 20 December 2010). This proposal would be later confirmed
and enacted by the EU’s Foreign Ministers Council on January 31st 2011,
are sufficiently well known and documented. The events
although it fell short from applying individual sanctions to both Indjai and Na of 2010 bluntly brought these political animosities into
Tchuto. front display and therefore do not bode well for the
14 “G. Bissau ex-military chief released from prison” (AFP, 23 December 2010). supposedly unified ruling that a serious SSR mission
15 See Nelson Herbet, “Guiné-Bissau: Força de estabilização em terreno demands. Recent attempts to mend these ties may
movediço” (Novo Jornal, 8 August 2010).
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin |9
end up contributing to the evolution of this context but idea of a stabilization force has been frequently used
given the recent history, legitimate doubts are bound to as a stalling tactic by local politicians more interested
remain.16 in keeping the international community attached to the
country’s fate than actually providing and building the
Conclusion necessary conditions for a mission of this sort. Even
When taking every factor into consideration and with more, the experience of the EU’s two-year efforts should
no new developments on the ground, one would think serve as a constant reminder of how the best intentions,
that the idea of a stabilization mission had been quietly significantly funded and well designed, could easily
shelved and forgotten by an international community come to an end when not properly ‘nurtured’ at a local
entangled with more pressing crises. Indeed, despite basis. At the end of day, the facts remain: any outside
the flagrant powder keg that Guinea-Bissau constantly help will become insufficient and/or unsuccessful if not
represents, the last months of 2010 presented some dully supported by a visible and internal movement of
sort of tense stability for the local population; even the change. In that sense, Guinea-Bissau still has a long way
IMF and the World Bank agreed in December to pardon to go.
US$1.2 billion of the country’s total foreign debt.17
But on January 6th 2011, Guinea-Bissau grabbed
the spotlight once more when the AU’s Special
Representative Sebastião Isata announced that a joint
stabilization mission composed by the AU, ECOWAS and
the CPLP would finally arrive in February to the country.
Afterwards, he gave more details by stating that the
mission would comprise a military detail and would seek
to create a “republican, professional and democratic
Guinean army”. Furthermore, a team of Angolan and
Mozambican jurists would travel to the country to help
draft legislation on drug trafficking in particular, and on
the security sector in general. On top of that, he also left
the door open for the creation of a possible Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Guinea-Bissau,
based on the South-African experience.18
Still, even though the magnitude of this announcement
is not to be taken lightly, it continues to leave many
questions unanswered. The level of effective cooperation
and coordination between every cited organization or
the existence of internal conditions for the viability of a
useful TRC are just a few examples worth mentioning.19
Likewise, showcasing an almost traditional pattern of
official disconnection on these issues, Prime Minister
Gomes Júnior was equally quick to dismiss this news
by declaring that “there were never talks about any
stabilization force”.20 Not a very good omen, to say the
least. Especially when instead, he opted to highlight the
individual role reserved to Angola in this area, under the
defense agreement previously signed.
Ultimately, Bissau-Guineans would be wise not put
their absolute trust on a ‘miraculous solution’. The
Timeline of Events
20 January (Luanda): 28 January (Luanda): Argentina and Armenia, José Brito, Héctor
Kenyan Prime Minister and African Union President José Eduardo dos Santos received Timerman and Edward Nalbandian respectively.
mediator Raila Odinga was received by Laurent Gbagbo’s Defense and Security advisor
President José Eduardo dos Santos to discuss Kadet Bertin, who communicated Gbagbo’s 4 January (Rio de Janeiro):
the current crisis in Ivory Coast. Odinga availability to negotiate a peaceful solution to Brazil’s state-controlled oil company
defends the AU stance on the country, whereas the Ivory Coast crisis. Petrobrás confirmed it was in talks with its
José Eduardo dos Santos is seen as close to Italian counterpart ENI to buy its 33% stake in
Gbagbo’s camp. Odinga stated to the press that 30-31 January (Addis Ababa): Portuguese company Galp Energia.
both were committed to a peaceful solution for President José Eduardo dos Santos represented
Ivory Coast. Angola at the XVI African Union Ordinary 10 January (Buenos Aires):
Summit. Among others, José Eduardo dos Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota travelled
24 January (Brussels): Santos met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki- to Argentina where he met with his local
Human Rights Watch released its ‘World Report moon, who praised Angola’s efforts in solving counterpart Héctor Timerman and with
2011’, where it states oil producing countries, the Ivorian crisis, as well as its support to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.
and Angola in particular, are sheltered from Guinea-Bissau. Patriota’s goal was to lay the ground for an
international pressure thanks to their natural upcoming visit by President Dilma Rousseff in
resources. 31 January (Luanda): late January.
The Angolan Foreign Affairs Ministry called
24 January (Luanda): its first General Council in 15 years to review 10 January (Rio de Janeiro):
Carlos Saturnino, Sonangol’s head of internal reform measures and reshape its According to reports from the Daily Telegraph,
operations, confirmed Angola would start to diplomatic network. Brazil has for the first time ever refused docking
explore its offshore deepwater pre-salt block, privileges to a Royal Navy vessel, in this case
thought to be similar to Brazil’s. Some 11 blocks the HMS Clyde, bound to the disputed Falkland
were auctioned and in each one the Angolan Islands.
company maintained a 35% to 50% stake.
Portuguese company Galp was not given any
Brazil 11 January (Brasília):
rights, although persistent information links 1 January (Brasília): President Dilma Rousseff met with US Senators
Sonangol to a direct entry in the firm’s capital. Newly-elected Dilma Rousseff took office as John McCain and John Barrasso. Ethanol
cooperation and the lobbying for the purchase
President of Brazil, succeeding her mentor
25 January (Washington): Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. Several foreign
of 36 US F-18 Super Hornet fighters were high
The IMF approved the disbursement of a further leaders were in attendance, such as Venezuelan on the agenda.
US$178 million under the US$1.4 billion loan President Hugo Chávez, Uruguayan President
to Angola. This amount comes after a fourth José Mujica, Colombian President Juan Manuel 11 January (Brasília):
review of the program and brings the sum Santos, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, It was officially announced that Brazil’s regional
already granted to US$1 billion. membership of the Caribbean Development
Bissau-Guinean President Malam Bacai Sanhá,
Bank (CDB) was formally approved. Brazil will
Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates,
26 January (Oslo): Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe
thus able to acquire US$28 million of the Bank’s
Statoil confirmed it was awarded with Patrice Trovoada and US Secretary of State capital stock which will the be channeled to
operatorship’s and participation shares in a Hillary Clinton. In her acceptance speech, Dilma finance economic development projects to
total of five pre-salt deepwater Angolan blocks, reaffirmed that she will maintain the foreign decrease poverty and to foster cooperation and
which the company regards as potentially very policy guidelines of the previous government. integration in the Caribbean region.
profitable. Later on, António Patriota also took the oath of
12 January (Washington):
office as Brazil’s next Foreign Minister.
27-28 January (Luanda): Brazil ranked at 113th in the Heritage Foundation
President of Guinea-Conakry Alpha Condé paid and Wall Street Journal’s 2011 Index of
2 January (Brasília):
an official visit to Angola. After meeting Vice- Economic Freedom.
President Dilma Rousseff took the opportunity
President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos of her inauguration to meet with Spanish
‘Nandó’, Condé was received by President 16 January (Buenos Aires):
Filipe de Borbon y Grecia, Prince of Asturias,
José Eduardo dos Santos. The two discussed Defense Minister Nelson Jobim travelled to
Uruguayan President José Mujica, South Korean
bilateral relations, which were deemed positive, Buenos Aires where he met with his Argentinean
Prime Minister Kim Hwang-Sik, President of the
as well as the situation in Ivory Coast. Condé counterpart Arturo Puricelli.
Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, Cuban
praised Angola’s stance on the crisis as pushing Vice-President José Ramón Machado Ventura,
towards its peaceful resolution. 17 January (Asuncion):
former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with his
Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates.
Paraguayan counterpart Héctor Lacognata and
For his part, Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota
President Fernando Lugo. Bilateral relations
met with his counterparts from Cape Verde,
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 12
and cooperation within Mercosul and Unasul States and the European Union. He also joined be less than the US$110 million of the first
were high on the agenda. an informal meeting of leaders on the Rio+20 compact”.
Conference, and an informal Ministers’ Meeting,
18 January (Montevideo): at the invitation of the Swiss government to 7 January (Brussels):
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with address the Doha Round. Cape Verde and the EU have concluded a three-
his Uruguayan counterpart Luis Almagro year deal on fishing that will come into force on
and President José Mujica. The assessment 28 January (Brasília): September 1st, just after the expiration of their
of bilateral relations and further regional After the release of an IMF report stating that current agreement.
integration under Mercosul and Unasul, were the “deterioration in Brazil’s fiscal accounts
some of the topics covered. is particularly pronounced” and that the 12 January (Washington):
government is expected to miss its 2011 target Cape Verde ranked at 65th in the Heritage
19 January (Brasília): for a budgetary surplus by a“wide margin”, Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s 2011
The Common Market Council announced that Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega Index of Economic Freedom.
former Secretary-General to the Brazilian promptly dismissed it, by labeling it as “totally
Foreign Ministry Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro wrong” and “stupid”. 30-31 January (Addis Ababa):
Guimarães was appointed as Mercosul’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Jorge
High Representative for a three-year term. 31 January (Buenos Aires): Borges represented Cape Verde at the XVI
Guimarães will be in charge of coordinating President Dilma Rousseff, accompanied by African Union Ordinary Summit.
policies and articulating common proposals Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota, paid her
between all member-states. first official visit abroad to Argentina where she
met with her counterpart Cristina Fernandez
25 January (Brasílila): de Kirchner. The expansion of cooperation in
Defense Minister Nelson Jobim confirmed that the fields of electricity, nuclear energy, social
Guinea-Bissau
a decision on the multibillion-dollar fighter development projects, digital technology and 1 January (Brasília):
aircraft is to be postponed. mining, as well as the development of ongoing President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the
regional integration projects, were high on the swearing-in ceremony of Brazil’s new President
25 January (Washington): agenda. Dilma Rousseff.
In his yearly State of the Union speech, US
President Barack Obama announced that he 4 January (Bissau):
would visit Brazil, Chile and El Salvador in
Cape Verde
President Malam Bacai Sanhá received the
March. National Assembly’s traditional New Year
greetings. On the occasion, Sanhá defended
26 January (Brussels): 1-2 January (Brasília): the idea of creating a National Reconciliation
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with Foreign Minister José Brito represented Cape Commission to pacify the country.
President of the European Council Herman Verde in the ceremonies surrounding new
Van Rompuy, with the European Union’s High Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s oath of 6-11 January (Bissau):
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security office. The following day, Brito also took the Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Policy Catherine Ashton, and with President of opportunity to meet with the newly appointed Manuel Augusto visited Guinea-Bissau, where
the European Commission José Manuel Durão Brazilian Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota. President Malam Bacai Sanhá, Prime Minister
Barroso. The follow-up on the Action Plan of the Carlos Gomes Júnior and Defense Minister
Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership, the upcoming 2-3 January (Abidjan): Ocante da Silva received him. The Angolan
5th Brazil-EU Summit and negotiations towards Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires, alongside delegation confirmed that technical and
an Association Agreement between Mercosul President of Benin Boni Yayi, President of Sierra military assistance with Angola was under way,
and the European Union were high on the Leone Ernest Koroma – representing ECOWAS covering areas such as logistics, infrastructure,
agenda. – and Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, met communications and armament.
with Ivory Coast incumbent President Laurent
27-29 January (Davos): Gbagbo and UN recognized President Alassane 6 January (Bissau):
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota represented Ouattara The African Union’s representative in Guinea-
Brazil in the Annual Meeting of the World Bissau, the Angolan Sebastião Isata, confirmed
Economic Forum in Davos. Patriota took part 5 January (Washington): that an AU, ECOWAS and CPLP stabilization
in a round table on Haiti’s reconstruction The board of the Millennium Challenge force would arrive to Guinea-Bissau in February.
alongside the Presidents of the World Bank Corporation (MCC) officially announced that
and the Inter-American Development Bank, Cape Verde would receive a second aid package 7 January (Bissau):
and held bilateral meetings with officials from (compact) from the Millennium Challenge Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior rebuffed
South Africa, China, India, Australia, the United Account. According to Prime Minister José Sebastião Isata’s declarations and stated that
Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, the United Maria Neves “the amount received will never a “stabilization force” was never envisaged
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 13
for Guinea-Bissau and that his country was 18 January (Quebo): 29 January (Bissau):
negotiating military assistance only with In a public move against drug-traffickers, After calling an emergency council meeting,
Angola. This was stated after the Prime Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai the government considered the news indicating
Minister received Angolan Secretary of State for ordered military commanders in the country’s that the EU would impose sanctions on
Foreign Affairs Manuel Augusto. This statement southern and interior regions to shoot down any Guinea-Bissau under Article 96 of the Cotonou
was interpreted as a move to calm the military planes without clearance to land. In the same Agreement as “strange” and “biased”.
in Guinea-Bissau, although it revealed a clear announcement, Indjai also guaranteed that the
misunderstanding between the main actors in military would not topple the current political 30-31 January (Addis Ababa):
the country. forces. Guinea-Bissau’s situation was discussed
during the XVI African Union Ordinary Summit,
10 January (Bissau): 19 January (Bissau): in particular a possible ECOWAS/CPLP/AU
Portuguese Ambassador to Bissau António Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated mission to the country to prepare a future
Ricoca Freire stated that the Portuguese that his government would intensify the fight stabilization mission. Drug trafficking was
military authorities were reassessing their against drug trafficking. A so-called “mega- also under consideration, as well as the
technical military cooperation with Guinea- surveillance” plan will monitor airstrips establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Bissau. especially in the south and interior regions, and Commission.
some airfields such as the Cufar strip 300 km
10-14 January (Bissau): south of Bissau will become unusable. 31 January (Bissau):
An IMF mission led by Paulo Drummond visited Reacting to the news of possible EU sanctions,
Bissau following last month’s debt pardon 20 January (Bissau): President Malam Bacai Sanhá reacted by saying
announcement. The delegation was received by Foreign Affairs Minister Adelino Mano Queta he would not see his country’s name played
Economy Minister Helena Embaló and reviewed declared that his country needed some US$310 with.
the macroeconomics of the country, ongoing million to initiate the National Agricultural
reforms, the overall cooperation protocol with Investment Plan. The AU and ECOWAS pledged 31 January (Brussels):
Angola and also new forms of collaboration to support this initiative. The EU Council adjourned its decision to apply
with the Fund. Paulo Drummond stated Guinea- sanctions against individuals – like the current
Bissau’s debt pardon offered a “new starting 21 January (New York): Armed Forces Chief of Staff – involved in the
point” with more favorable economic bases for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed April 1st incidents. The Portuguese Foreign
growth while he urged the authorities to continue Gana Fofang of Cameroon to serve as his Minister Luís Amado played an important role
reforms, in particular to the fiscal system. The Deputy Special Representative in Guinea- in the postponement. Nonetheless, the Council
IMF will return to Guinea-Bissau in March. Bissau. Speaking to the UN Security Council, decided to open consultations with Guinea-
Ban Ki-moon stated that Guinea-Bissau’s Bissau under the Article 96 of the Cotonou
11-12 January (Conakry): political and social problems derive from its Agreement due to disrespect of democratic
President Malam Bacai Sanhá visited Guinea- weak institutions. principles, as well as suspend its support to
Conakry, where President Alpha Condé received the country in the field of budget assistance or
him. The two discussed how to tackle drug 26 January (Luanda): security sector reform programs.
trafficking in both countries, an issue perceived A Guinean military judicial delegation, led by
as a threat to the region. Chief Justice of the Military High Court Eduardo
Costa Sanhá travelled to Luanda to jointly
12 January (Washington):
Guinea-Bissau ranked at 159th in the Heritage
discuss the reinforcement of cooperation with
the Angolan government.
Mozambique
Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s 2011 Index
1 January (Sandy Lane):
of Economic Freedom. 27 January (Lisbon): The European Union’s Naval Force Somalia
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior visited – Operation Atalanta announced that Somali
13 January (Bissau): Lisbon, where he was received by Secretary of pirates seized a Mozambican trawler south-
Guinea-Bissau became the 74th country to State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João
west of the Comoro Islands. European officials
recognize Kosovo’s independence. Gomes Cravinho. said the ship was sighted between the Comoros
and Madagascar on the 31st of December but
13-21 January (Bissau): 29 January (Tunis): was only initially reported as missing.
A group of Chinese businessmen visited Guinea- Following a similar move by the IMF, the African
Bissau to identify areas of potential investment, Development Bank announced it would pardon 3 January (Maputo):
in particular in the agriculture, fisheries, energy Guinea-Bissau’s debt of US$60.4 million. Mozambique’s Ministry of Fisheries confirmed
and industry sectors. The head of the delegation, Guinea-Bissau remains eligible for a further that the “Vega 5” vessel had indeed disappeared
Michel Wang, announced China would buy up to US$131.4 million pardon. in its southern waters and it was presumed to
40 tons of fish per day and that it would supply
have been hijacked by Somali pirates.
fishing gear.
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 14
13 January (Budapest): 25-26 January (Lisbon): new sanctions to Guinean-Bissau’s top military
Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman visited officers, were among the topics covered. Amado
Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro
Portugal where he met with his counterpart Luís also took the opportunity to meet with his
Lourtie attended the informal meeting of the
Amado, President of Assembly Jaime Gama and Slovenian counterpart Samuel Zbogar and with
Ministers and State Secretaries for European
Prime Minister José Sócrates. The Middle East the EU’s Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht.
Affairs, with the implementation of the
peace process was high on the agenda.
“European Semester” and the preparations for
the upcoming European Council high on the
agenda.
IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 15
São Tomé
Foreign Minister Luís Amado, seeking to 14 January (Díli):
enhance bilateral ties. Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya met
and Príncipe
with President José Ramos-Horta, Prime
27 January (São Tomé): Minister Xanana Gusmão and President of the
São Tomé and Príncipe’s Minister of Finance National Parliament Fernando Araújo. Bilateral
1 January (Brasília): and International Cooperation Américo cooperation in the fields of technical assistance,
Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada attended Ramos announced that following a meeting fishery, education and energy, together with
the swearing-in ceremony of new Brazilian with representative Kamen Boughada, the Thailand’s support for Timor Leste’s candidacy
President Dilma Rousseff. Algerian government has decided to pardon the to ASEAN, were high on the agenda. Piromya
archipelago’s foreign debt of US$3.5 million. also took the opportunity to visit the UNMIT
12-15 January (Taipei): Headquarters where he met with the UN
Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada, accompanied Secretary-General’s Special Representative to
by Foreign Minister Manuel dos Ramos and Timor Leste, Ameerah Haq.
Development Minister Agostinho Fernandes,
paid an official four-day visit to Taiwan, seeking
Timor Leste 16 January (Jakarta):
to enhance bilateral ties between the important 3 January (Díli): During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat,
donor country and São Tomé and Príncipe. Timor Leste officials have rejected the draft Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa
Afterwards he also travelled to Malaysia to seek
Timor Leste Human Development Report 2010 was quoted as expressing support for Timor
private investment in the country and made a issued by the United Nations stating the report Leste’s bid to join the organization.
refueling stop in France where he also sought is politically biased, cites inaccurate data and
most of its conclusions are without a source. 20 January (Díli):
to attract private interest for the construction
of a deep-water port in Fernão Dias. The report makes reference to the country’s According to a statement from the State
opposition to pursuing the perpetrators of Secretariat for the Council of Ministers, Timor
12 January (Washington): war crimes and crimes against humanity, Leste amassed US$2.172 billion in oil revenues
São Tomé and Príncipe ranked at 150th in the a statement which was also condemned by with tax revenues from oil reaching almost
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s national authorities. US$1 billion.
2011 Index of Economic Freedom.
12 January (Washington): 27-28 January (Díli):
13 January (Lagos): Timor Leste ranked 170 in the Heritage Timor Leste hosted the fifth ASEAN Regional
th
President Fradique de Menezes, together with Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s 2011 Forum (ARF), in a bid to help the country push
eight prominent Nigerians, including Speaker Index of Economic Freedom. for full membership to ASEAN.
of the House of Representatives Dimeji Bankole
and three state governors, have won the 2010 12 January (Díli):
Zik Prize in Leadership award. While presenting the State Budget for 2011,
Prime Minister of Timor Leste José Alexandre
26-27 January (São Tomé): ‘Xanana Gusmão’ announced that there are
President Fradique de Menezes, Prime Minister plans to diversify the Oil Fund’s investment
Patrice Trovoada and Foreign Minister Manuel portfolio.
Salvador dos Ramos met with Portuguese