14.

773: Political Economy of Institutions and Development
Daron Acemoglu and Benjamin Olken January 29, 2010
This course is intended as an introduction to the newly emerging …eld of political economy of institutions and development. Its purpose is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the tools in the area. The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the …eld an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material with *’ in detail and also s discuss the material without *’ but in less detail. s, Grading: The course grade will be a combination of a …nal exam and approximately 6 problem sets, with 25% weight on problem sets. Course Information: Professors Daron Acemoglu: daron@mit.edu Benjamin Olken: bolken@mit.edu Teaching Assistant Samuel Pienknagura: spienk@mit.edu Lecture TTh 10:30-12, E51-151 Recitation F 9-10:30, E51-151 (tentative)

1

Motivation and Overview (DA. 31. (1998) “Law and Finance. 49. and Weingast. Florencio. Daron. Daron (2003) “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?”Journal of Comparative Economics. * Acemoglu. Chapters 1 and 2. Amsterdam. Lecture Notes. 2. Institutions are implicit or explicit in all economic models. James A. 1369-1401. Barry R. Robert W. (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. may be created by the initiative of private agents. 620-652. such as markets. Daron and Robinson. Douglass C. 4. 57. 1113-1155. 8. Some types of institutions. Allen.”Journal of Political Economy. (1982) “The E¢ ciency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures. politics is involved. 7.”American Economic Review. Simon and Robinson. 92. Acemoglu. *Acemoglu. Daron. The lectures discus some salient examples of institutions and emphasizes the element of collective choice in thinking about where economic institutions come from. * Demsetz. North-Holland. Philippe and Durlauf. 3. Andrei. 937-953. (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England. 02/02 and 02/04) These lectures will discuss di¤erent conceptions of “institutions” in economics and social science. 803-832. Journal of Economic History. and provide an introduction to the role of institutions in society and economy more generally. Rafael.”Economic Journal. James (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. * Acemoglu. Simon and Robinson. 1. Cambridge University Press. 6. Shleifer. 5. and Vishny. Aghion. 106. Steven. Chapters 1 and 2. Johnson. They will also review some of the evidence on the role of institutions and politics in economic development and begin the discussion of sources of institutional di¤erences. * North. Harold (1967) “Toward a Theory of Property Rights. 1. As a consequence. 2 .” American Economic Review. 91. Johnson. James (2006) “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”in Handbook of Economic Growth. eds. Daron.1 1.1 Introduction Introduction. * Acemoglu. Lopez-de-Silanes. 61-70. *La Porta. Robert C. 9. but nearly always their functioning rests on a structure of institutions which result from collective choices.5 lectures.

13. Johnson. and Perrson. Benjamin A. 1025-1048.edu/~rp269/website/papers/institutions_draft. 835-864. Davide Cantoni. Politics and Economic Growth: Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’ The Economic E¤ects of Constitutions. *Udry. s Department of Economics.yale. Markus (2005) “The Pro…ts of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana.econ. 02/09 and 02/11) This lecture will provide an introduction to models of collective choice and voting. 2 2. Torsten and Tabellini.”Unpublished. Pande. 1190-1213. (2005) “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II. XLIII. 18. * Acemoglu. Richard . Lecture Notes. 17. http://econ-www. 14. Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. Christopher (2005) “Institutions and Development: A View from Below. Daron. Abhijit and Iyer. * Acemoglu.5 lectures.edu/grad/mdell/papers 15. Blundell.W. Chapter 4.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.pdf 16.mit. 2. Simon and Robinson.econ.1 Collective Choices and Voting Static Models (DA. 11.”to appear in the Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Benjamin F. 107. Guido (2003) The Economic E¤ects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say? MIT Press.edu/~cru2/pdf/goldsteinudry. Christopher and Goldstein. * Acemoglu. 1.” http://www. Cambridge. * Dell. Daron.. 120.” American Economic Review. Rohini and Udry. 1231-1294.”Journal of s Economic Literature. Simon Johnson and James A Robinson (2009) “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. 12.10. Banerjee. James (2002) “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Torsten http://www.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. Melissa (2007) “The Persistent E¤ects of Peru’ Mining Mita. MIT. Daron (2005) “Constitutions.Newey.pdf forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy. Lakshmi (2005) “History. and Olken. * Jones.yale. * Acemoglu. 02/04. and will consider an application of voting with multidimensional policy spaces to the problem of clientelism in the context of development economics. 3 .”mimeo. * Persson. Daron. 95.

Chapters 4. Guido (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. * Acemoglu. Daron and Robinson. 02/23 and 02/25) This lecture provides a basic introduction of voting over a distributive policies in dynamic models. Lecture Notes. 2. 1. 3. 4.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4). 3 and 6. Daron. 5 and 13.3 Introduction to Dynamic Voting and Constitutional Choice (DA. di¤erences between Markov Perfect Equilibria and Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005) “A drawback of electoral competition. Je¤rey (1999) Positive Political Theory: Collective Preference. game-theoretic models. Levy. Cambridge. Daron (2008) Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. David and Banks. Appendix Chapter C. Jean (1991) Game Theory. *Lizzeri. Acemoglu. 6. 5. * Acemoglu. and Weibull. 2 lectures. 2. (1987) “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition. 02/18) This review lecture will go over the analysis of dynamic games. 1 lecture. * Lindbeck. 22 and 23. The MIT Press. Chapter 22. * Acemoglu. eds. We will focus on dynamic. Jorgen W. Gilat (2005) “The politics of public provision of education. Drew and Tirole. Chapters 2. 1. Cambridge University Press. Person. James. 3. Chapter 3. 1507-1534. Austen-Smith.”Public Choice 52: 273-297. and contrasts myopic versus non-myopic behavior by voters. University of Michigan Press. in particular. Cambridge. James (2006) “Chapter 4: Democratic Politics” and “Appendix to Chapter 4: Distribution of Power in Democracy” in Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lecture Notes. Assar. 7. 4 . Chapters 6. It will also introduce ideas related to endogenous institutions and laws. 1318-1348. their properties and how they can be computed in simple games. 2. * Fudenberg. * Acemoglu. Torsten and Tabellini. MIT Press. Daron. Daron (2008) Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Acemoglu.2 Review of Dynamic Games (SP.” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (4). Daron and Robinson. 8. 7.2. Ann Arbor.

3. Alberto and Rodrik. 03/02) This lecture will discuss the between voting. Benabou. and Gul.pdf 8. * Barbera.”Journal of Political Economy 108. Mailath. Thomas. 86: 408-424. Kjandetil and Zilibotti.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. * Fedderson. David (1991) “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters. 110: 551-584.2. Faruk (2000) “The Dynamics of Political Compromise. Daron. Salvador and Jackson. 531-568. 2. Avinash. 1011-1048. * Hassler Jon. 5 . Coalitions and Clubs”mimeo. Roland and Ok. 2. Quarterly Journal of Economics.nu¤. * Acemoglu. Michael and Tsyvinski. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution” . Efe. 1. Chapter 7. Golosov. * Dixit.ac. 10.econ. Fabrizio (2003) “Survival of the Welfare State. Austen-Smith. 119. * Acemoglu. 5. 75: 987-1009.” http://www.”http://www.” s American Economic Review. May. Egorov. Kim (2002) “The Swing Voter’ Curse: a Comment. information and learning. (1995) “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics. Egorov. Georgy and Sonin. Daron.edu/~sm326/authority. Sevi. 109: 465-490. George J. Kevin (2005) “Dynamic Voting in Clubs.”Review of Economic Studies. Morris. * Acemoglu. Matthew (2004) “Choosing How to Choose: SelfStable Majority Rules and Constitutions. 9. Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) “The Swing Voter’ Curse.”American Economic Review. 6. Daron. 4.”Economics and Politics. Mora. Konstantin (2008) “Coalition Formation in Nondemocratic Societies. Lecture Notes. Aleh (2010) “Power Fluctuations and the Structure of Taxation”mimeo. 2001. 11. Daron. 4. Mark and J. Grossman.yale. Dani (1994) “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1 lecture.” American s Economic Review. Konstantin (2008) “Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions.. 5. * Alesina. * Fey.4 Voting and Information (DA. Stephen and Postelwaite. Georgy and Sonin. * Piketty. 7. 92: 1264-1268. Storlesseten. * Roberts. Andrew (2001) “Laws and Authority. 87-112..ox. Gene M. Quarterly Journal of Economics.uk/Users/Robertsk/pap 3. 93. * Acemoglu. 3:73-92.

03/09) Failure of political accountability. Persson. Gene M.” Public Choice. Rangarajan (1998) “Optimal Retention in Agency Models. Bruno (2010) “Voting and Experimentation. 8. Persson. Gerard and Tabellini. 1 lecture. Timothy (2006) Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. Strulovici. lobbying. * Person.”forthcoming Econometrica. Daron. Lecture Notes. Dynamics of elections and control. 833-850 6 . Chapter 8.6.”Public Choice. * Acemoglu. Guido (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Lecture Notes. Roland. Partisan bias. 3 3. 2. 4. Barro. Guido (2000) “Comparative Politics and Public Finance.”Journal of Economic Theory. 1. and Helpman. Ferejohn. * Acemoglu. * Grossman. weakly-institutionalized polities. 1. Daron. 108. 3. Chapters 9 and 10. 2.1 Political Agency and Democratic Failure Democratic Control of Politicians (DA. John (1986) “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. Aleh (2008) “Political Economy of Mechanisms”Econometrica 76: 619-641. Michael and Tsyvinski. 82. Cambridge. 5.. Stationary versus nonstationary strategies. 50. 03/04) Elections as a method of control of politicians. Oxford University Press. 6. 9. Gerard and Tabellini.”Journal of Political Economy. Je¤rey and Sundaram. 293-323. 1163-1202. Daron. 7. * Acemoglu. Guido (1997) “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability”Quarterly Journal of Economics. Golosov. 3. The MIT Press. Banks. 19-42. Elhanan (1994) “Protection for Sale. Torsten. Robert (1973) “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. 1 lecture. 112.”American Economic Review 84. 1121-1161. 14. 5-25. * Besley. Torsten. Roland. Torsten and Tabellini.2 Failures of Electoral Control (DA.

Daron. Georgy and Sonin.php?id=1214 3. 7 .”forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics. Cambridge University Press. 03/11) This lecture presents some tractable models of the determination of economic institutions and policies when a particular group is in power. Lecture Notes. Daron (2008) Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Elhanan (1997) “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy” Journal of Po. 8. Grossman. Chapter 22. Daron. 1 lecture. Daron and Robinson. * Padro-i-Miguel. Gene M. Gene and Helpman. 1. * Acemoglu. http://econ-www. 4. Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings.” Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006.”Review of Economic Studies. 7.edu/faculty/download_pdf. Dixit.3. Chapter 11. Thierry (2004) “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. Acemoglu.. James (2006) “Appendix to Chapter 4: Distribution of Power in Democracy”in Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.”Review of Economic Studies 63. * Acemoglu. 162192. 4. Elhanan (1996) “Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics. Konstantin (2008) “A Theory of Bad Governments. Grossman. Gerard (2008) “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: Politics of Fear. * Acemoglu. James A. Robinson. Daron (2005) “Modelling Ine¢ cient Institutions. 5. The potential ine¢ ciencies that arise because of the desire of the group in power to extract rents is contrasted with policy determination in the classical public …nance approach. 6. 4 Modeling Institutions This part of the course will focus on using the insights from the previous part to develop political economy models of institutions where we study simultaneously the consequences and the origins of institutions. eds. Avinash. and Helpman. Daron and Robinson. James. 265-286. and Verdier. * Acemoglu. Daron. litical Economy. 2. Egorov.1 Economic Institutions under Elite Domination (DA. * Acemoglu. * Acemoglu.” The Alfred Marshall Lecture” ..mit. 2004.

New Haven and London.”American Political Science Review. 2006 February. Jose-Victor (1996). Princeton University Press. Blackwell. 6. 301-329. Olson. Lecture Notes. Joseph E. eds. Mancur (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth. 03/12) This lecture will discuss how democratic and oligarchic societies may generate di¤erent types of growth-enhancing and growth-retarding policies.” in P.”Review of Economic Studies 63. Cambridge MA. Chapters 14 and 15.2 The Role of the State and Di¤erent Political Regimes (DA. and Economic Rigidities. Daron (2008) Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton NJ. Capital and European States. (2000) States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 7. Je¤ery I. Yale University Press. D. Arrow and Intriligator. Daron (2005) “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States” Journal of Monetary Economics. AD 990-1990. Charles (1990) Coercion. Bringing the State Back In. It will also discuss the role of the state in fostering or preventing economic growth. McGraw-Hill. Daron (2008) “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies. and how ine¢ cient political systems may endogenously change or remain in place despite their adverse e¤ects. Charles (1985) “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth. Ellickson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Robert C. Acemoglu. 1 lecture. North-Holland.” Journal of European Economic Association 4. Chapter 23. 1985 6. Skocpol eds. * Acemoglu. 5. Mathematical Economics. Evans. 8. * Acemoglu. Part I Shasta County. Daron. * Acemoglu. (1991) Order Without Law. Tilly.4. Mirrlees. 3. * Acemoglu. Tilly. (2006) “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. Per and Rios-Rull. Cambridge University Press. 10. New York. Stag‡ation. 8 . James A. Anthony and Stiglitz. Vol. 2. Herbst. Daron and Robinson. 9. (1980) Lectures on Public Economics. Krusell. This will open the way for the later discussion of the endogenous emergence of (political) institutions. 1199-1226. 5. 1. 52. Rueschmeyer and T. Atkinson. James (1985) “The Theory of Optimum Taxation” in the Handbook of .III. Chapter 11 4.

William and Laguno¤. 1 lecture. Journal of Economic History. * Acemoglu.” http://www. and Weingast. Jack. 1. 1167-1199. Daron. Beacon Press. and the Franchise. Moore. 1155-1192. Roger (2006) “Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions”http://www. 2. 6. North. Journal of Economics.11. * Acemoglu. CXV. Robinson and Rafael Santos (2009) “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia”mimeo. 7. Barry R. It will then introduce the basic models of institutional change in the context of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic politics.”Department of Economics.” Sociological Forum. 1989). Daron and Robinson. Laguno¤. James A. Daron and Robinson. 18 and 20. Growth. 4. 803-832.georgetown. Robert J. 8.edu/faculty/laguno¤/ 9 . Lecture Notes.3 Institutional Change and Democratization (DA. * Laguno¤. Roger (2006) “Dynamic Stability and reform of Political Institutions.georgetown. 120. 5. 49. James (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Evans. Douglass C. Peter (1989) “Predatory.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. Roger (2003) “Dynamic Enfranchisement. 4. 3. 03/16) This lecture will …rst provide a basic model of nondemocratic politics and highlight central commitment problems involved in such interactions. (2000) “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth. Chapters 5 and 6. Cambridge University Press. James A. * Acemoglu. Chapters 17. Humberto and Oxoby. (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England. Barrington (1966) The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. (2005) “Partisan Competition. * Acemoglu. Daron. Llavador. Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State. Georgetown University. Boston MA. 12. Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective” Quarterly .edu/faculty/laguno¤/ 9. 4(4):561-587 (December.

Stephen E. Elites and Institutions. 1. 8. Arthur. Cambridge University Press. and Sokolo¤.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science. and Di¤erential Growth Paths among New World Economies”in How Latin America Fell Behind. 1989. Vol. 99(1).”Past and Present.”Economic Journal. 106-131. 1999. 5. 5.. 4/1) Do politicians represent the median voter? 1. Evidence from an India-wide Randomized Policy Experiement” Econometrica. Stephen Haber ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. *Chattopadhyay. 87-115.” American Economic Review. 1151.1 Politicians. Lecture Notes. Page. 72. pp. (1999) “Policy Persistence. Raghabendra and Du‡ Esther (2004) “Women as Policy Makers: o. the United States. 1. Kathleen (2004) How institutions evolve: the political economy of skills in Germany. Voters.4. Scott (2006) “Path Dependence. 1997. New York. (1989) “Competing Technologies. 03/18) This lecture expands on the analysis of dynamic models presented so far to show how institutional change can coexist with institutional persistence in di¤erent spheres. Daron. 3. Stephen and Morris. Thelen. Engerman. (2003) “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy In‡ uence for Disadvantaged Minorities” American Economic Review 93 (*4). 30-75. Brenner. Chapter 21. W. James A. 10 . 4. (2008) “Persistence of Power. 2. Institutions. *Acemoglu. 6. pp 1132. 70. Increasing Returns and Lock-In by Historical Events. 1327-1336. Stanley L. (1997) “Factor Endowments. Britain. Rohini. No. 5 5. * Acemoglu. 7. Daron and Robinson. pp. 1409-1443. and the Media Are politicians and voters well aligned in practice? (BO. and Japan. 1 lecture. Robert (1976) “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe. Coate. Kenneth L. 2. pp. Brian. 89(5).. . *Pande.”forthcoming American Economic Review.4 Modeling Persistence and Change in Institutions (DA. 2 lectures: 3/30.

Daniel Ortega. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru." APSR 102 (1). 14923 4. 86(3):425. Nichter. Party A¢ liation and Senator Ideology” American Economic Review. 4/6. 2. World Politics. Levitt. 2. 19-31. Djankov. Caralee McLiesh. McMillan." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18. pp. Tatiana Nenova. 69-92. Topalova (forthcoming). Steve." Journal of Political Economy 116 (2). 296 Do voters even know what they want? 1. Jackson. Lori. mimeo Oxford University. * Hsieh. NBER WP No. Frederico and Laura Schecter (2009) "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity?". "Vote Buying: General Elections. and Andrei Shleifer (2003). Eddie. 2 lectures. Leonard (2003). John and Pablo Zoido (2004). 11 . * Beaman. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay.2 Media and voter information (BO.(2008) "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?" QJE. 6. pp. Simeon. * Dekel.(1996) “How do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela’ Maisanta". *Mullainathan. Do voters vote the way they want? Vote buying and voter intimidation? 1. Matthew O. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes. Edward Miguel. Sendhil and Ebonya Washington (2009)." AEJ: Applied 1 (1). 3. 2. 441. Paul and Pedro Vicente (2009). pp 351-380. Simeon (2008). 4/8) Political in‡uence on media 1. 3. Finan. 399-422. and Francisco Rodriquez (2008).3. "Who Owns the Media?" Journal of Law and Economics 66. 86-111. 55. Centre for s the Study of African Economies. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. * Collier. Vicente. Pedro (2008). "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria". 5. "Is Vote Buying E¤ective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa?" 5. WP No. Chang-Tai. and Asher Wolinsky (2008). "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin". Wantchekon. Esther Du‡ Rohini Pande and Petia o.

Matthew and Jesse M. and U. 2. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. Matthew. Media Bias. Thomas and David Stromberg (2007). and David Stromberg (forthcoming). Vol 119 (1) s 189-221 5. Chun Fang.S. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability. 2. * Eisensee. Mullainathan. Shapiro (2009). James M.. 35-53. Media’ impact on policy s 1. 3. "News Droughts. Gentzkow.Media bias and voting 1. 3. and Brian Knight (2008)." JPE. Michael Sinkinson. * DellaVigna." QJE. Alan S. "The Market for News." American Economic Review 95. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U." QJE." NBER Working Paper #15544. s 6. 1415-1451. 1031-1053. Shapiro (2006). *Gentzkow. Stromberg. 4. "Media Bias and Reputation. * Durante. "The E¤ect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics. Daily Newspapers. Matthew and Jesse M. Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002). "Partisan Control. Stefano and Ethan Kaplan (2007). University of Chicago.S. "The Fox News E¤ect: Media Bias and Voting. Gentzkow. and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi’ Italy. 7. Dean Karlan. Ruben and Brian Knight (2009)." NBER Working Paper #14762. Vol 117 (4). Shapiro (2007)." QJE. * Chang. "Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the E¤ect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions. Disaster Relief. "Television and Voter Turnout." Journal of Political Economy 114. Matthew (2006). "Radio’ Impact on Public Spending." QJE." QJE. * Snyder. Gentzkow." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (2). 5. News Floods. and Jesse M. Vol 122 (2) 693-728 4." mimeo. "Media Bias and In‡ uence: Evidence from Newspaper Endorsements. Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer (2005). David (2004). Vol 121 (3) 931972 12 . * Besley. and Daniel Bergan (2009)." NBER Working Paper #14445. Gerber. 8.

(2007) "Obtaining a Driver’ License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying s Corruption. Michael. Chang-Tai and and Enrico Moretti (2006). pp 1278-1308. William (1905). Oriana. *Banerjee. Vol 110 (30). Ray. 91. 2. 6.4/27. Robert (1982). *Bertrand. Hanna. 5. 13. and F." QJE. Rema and Mullainathan. 1095-1102. Marianne. Wade. 681-712. Bribes. Reinikka." mimeo.1 Corruption (BO. "Corruption and Growth.4/22. 4/13. *Bandiera. Hammer.” American Economic Review. 5 lectures.6 6. Harvard University. "Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing.4/15.4/29) Magnitude and e¢ ciency costs 1. and Rakesh Khurana (2006). and the Oil for Food Program". Riordan. Jacob (2004) “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. "On the Waterfront: An Empirical Study of Corruption in Ports. and Tommaso Valletti (2009)." mimeo. 91-116. Muralidharan." QJE." mimeo. Halsey (2006). *Fisman. Ray and Wei. Paulo (1995). Journal of Political Economy. David Fisman. Rema Hanna. Sequiera." Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1). "Corruption. Ritva and Svennson.”Quarterly Journal of Economics.119. Mauro. Hsieh. Rogers." American Economic Review 99 (4). 3. 8. Shang-Jin "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from “Missing Imports”in China". Fisman. Sendhil. 10. Sandra and Simeon Djankov (2008). 7. Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics. Chaudhury. 9. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries. "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India" 13 . 112. Fisman. Je¤rey. 4. 679-705. Abhijit. Columbia. 12. Harvard. Kremer. Julia Galef. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. Karthik. Ray (2001) “Estimating the Value of Political Connections. Andrea Prat. "Estimating the value of connections to Vice-President Cheney. Djankov. Vol 122 (4) 1l639-1676. 11. Simeon. and Sendhil Mullainathan (2009). Quarterly Journal of Economics. Nazmul. 2004.

*Shleifer. Paul and Sandip Sukhtankar (2009).2 The corrupt o¢ cial’ decision problem: balancing risks." Journal of Law and Economics 46. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?". 4. Anh (2008). 14 . “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. 6. Mookerjee. (2008). Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System. rents. April-May." BREAD WP 223. Robert (1993) “Corruption. 3.” Journal of European Economic Association. ting Teachers to Come to School. Andrei and Vishny.”Journal of Political Economy." Journal of Legal Studies 3(1). Jacob (2003) “Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of …rms. Di Tella. pp 417-452. (2003) "The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires. Rachel. Rema. 6. Dilip and IPL Png (1995). Hanna. Benjamin and Barron. "Law Enforcement. New York: Basic Books. Economic Journal 105. 2. Klitgaard. 5. s and incentives 1. 5. Robert (1990). and Glennerster. George. Patrick (2009). Banerjee. Malfeasance. Journal of Political Economy 117 (3). "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh". “Monitoring Works: Geto. 3. 6. "Can Procurement Auctions Reduce Corruption? Evidence from the Internal Records of a Bribe-Paying Firm.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. Harvard University. pp 1-18. MIT Poverty Action Lab. Benjamin (2007). *Olken. Abhijit (1997) “A Theory of Misgovernance” Quarterly Journal of Economics. "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose E¤ect. Rafael and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 145-159 6. Svennson.2-3. 2. Tropical Gangsters.”Working Paper. 4. *Banerjee. 207-30. 269-292 7. 108 (3) 599-617. *Becker. Du‡ Esther. forthcoming. and Compensation of Enforcers.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118.112. Gary and Stigler. 1974. and Stephen Ryan (2007). Abhijit. “Putting a Bando.3 The IO of corruption 1. *Olken." mimeo. Tran. Proceedings. * Niehaus. *Du‡ Esther. 1289-1332.14.

Sheilfer. Kreuger.”Quarterly Journalof Economics. Murphy. *Shleifer. Menes. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market. 409-414. Kevin. 6. 291-303. The Logic of Collective Action. 5. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. "Limiting the Reach of the Grabbing Hand: Graft and Growth in American Cities. Robert (1994) “Politicians and Firms." QJE. 2325-2368. . 2. 109(4). Olson.”American Economic Review. Daron and Verdier. 995-1025. 108. Constraints on Collective Action: 15 . 95. Thierry (1998) “Property Rights. 1371-1411. Andrei and Vishny. 83. 1880 to 1930." in Edward Glaeser and Claudia Goldin (eds). Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach. 7. Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005) “Ethnic Diversity. *Khwaja. 2 lectures. Joan Maria (2001) “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox” American Political Science Review. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The E¤ects of Brazil’ Publicly Released Audits and Electoral Outcomes. 6." QJE. Asim and Atif Mian (2005). . “Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?" American Economic Review.4 Politics and General Equilibrium Implications Politicians and …rms 1.” Economic Journal. Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America’ Economic History. Aceomglu. and Public Goods in Kenya” Journal of Public Economics 89." AER.6 7 Collective Action (BO. Social Sanctions. 90. s General equilibrium implications 4. * Miguel. 703-745. 1381-1403. 2. * Ferraz. Claudio and Frederico Finan (2008). Acemoglu. 5/4. Mancur (1965). (1974). 3. * Ray. 2006. 3. Papers and Proceedings. Rebecca. Thierry (2000) “The Choice Between Corruption and Market Failures. Anne O. Andrei and Vishny. 663-672. 194-211. Daron and Verdier. Robert. University of s Chicago Press and NBER.6.5/6) 1. Debraj and Esteban.

Abhijit. 4. Reza Baqir and Caroline Hoxby. "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania". Abhijit et al. Journal of Political Economy." QJE 114. Putnam." mimeo. Benjamin A. World Politics . 7. * Alesina. University of Chicago Press. (200&) "The Political Economy of Public Goods in India" Journal of Development Economics. Asim (2008) “Can good projects succeed in bad communities?”working paper. Harvard University. "Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from three randomized experiments in education in India". Benjamin A. (2009). QJE. Chapter 4. pp. Alberto. 9. 1243-1284. 10. Jakob. 11. 82(2). 138– 190. Kaivan Munshi and Debraj Ray.(2001) "Inequality. Banerjee. 3. (1993): "Making democracy work: civic traditions" in Modern Italy. 16 . department of economics.4. Abhijit and Rohini Somanathan. Harvard University. Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. Alesina. Banerjee. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Gugerty. MIT. "Teacher Incentives and Local Participation. of Political Economy. 5. Martina and Svensson. 12. 6. Reza Baqir and William Easterly (1999). *Björkman. 8." mimeo. Control Rights and Rent-Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives In Maharashtra” Journal .. Michael Kremer. "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of a Citizen Report Card Project in Uganda".Volume 56. NBER Working Paper #14311. Joost. Olken. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. 2. and Monica Singhal (2009). Ted. "Do TV and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages. Vol. April.”American Journal of Political Science. Ijaz.”Journal of Political Economy. *Olken. Number 3. Miguel. forthcoming in Handbook of Development Economics. Robert D. (2004) "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogenous Communitues". MIT. "Informal Taxation. April 2004. Abhijit. 112(2). Paul ed. Princeton University Press. and Christel Vermeersch (2009). 327-362. Khwaja." mimeo. Michael (2008) “Outside Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in Community Organizations. de Laat. Promoting Collective Action 1. *Banerjee. (2008). Alberto. 109 (1). Banerjee. Olken. Feb. pages 348-396. Dilip Mookherjee. 287-314. vol. "Public Action for Public Goods". Benjamin (2007). Shultz. 5. 13. T. Mary Kay and Kremer.

Paul and Anke Hoe. Fearon." AER 97 (4). "Cooperation. Con‡ ict. 15." mimeo. "Contest success functions." working paper. Shelling. 563-573. AER 98 (5). ict 9. Esteban. 2 lectures. pp.8 Con‡ (BO. and Massimo Morelli (2007). LSE. 1:2. Empirics: 12. ict: 14. * Skaperdas. "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Con‡ Evidence from Colombia. "Political Bias and War. Stergios (1996). Ernesto and Pedro Dal Bo (2004)." AER 82 (4).. and Civil War. 4. The Strategy of Con‡ Harvard University Press. Laitin (2003). Joan and Debraj Ray (2008). pp." AEJ Macro. Collier. James (1995). Sylvain and Gerard Padro-I-Miguel (2008). 1353-1373. Francesco and John Coleman (2006).(1960). Benjamin F. 5. * Jones. and David D. 55– 87 13. Thomas C. * Powell. "The Ine¢ cient Use of Power: Costly Con‡ with Complete ict Information. UC Berkeley. 11. "On economic causes of civil war." American Political Science Review 98 (2). Harvard University. 2185-2202. "Con‡ and Deterrence Unict der Strategic Risk. May 2004." Economic Theory 7 (2). Olken (2009). "Workers. mimeo. * Dube. * Fearon. and Benjamin A." International Organization 49. Matthew O. 5/13) ict 1. Chassang." NBER Working Paper#13964. Insurgency. 17 . and Power in the Absence of Property Rights." mimeo. 8. Caselli. Warriors." American Political Science Review 97. ict. Dal Bo." Oxford Economic Papers 50. "On the Theory of Ethnic Con‡ ict. "The Logic of Mutual Fear: Escalation and Deterrence in Con‡ ict. pp 720-739.er (1998). Theory: 10. Robert (2004). 379-414. "On the Salience of Ethnic Con‡ ict". Oeindrila and Juan Vargas (2007). Baliga and Sjostrom (2008). and Criminals: Social Con‡ in General Equilibrium". 7. 5/11. Stergios (1992). James D. * Jackson. "Hit or Miss? The E¤ect of Assassinations on Institutions and War. "Ethnicity. 3. Skaperdas. 6. Northwestern University. 2. "Rationalist Explanations for War.

Miguel." mimeo. Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti (2004). 18." Journal of Political Econict: omy 112 (4). "The Economic E¤ects of Violent Con‡ icts: Evidence from Asset Market Reactions." American Economic Review 93. "The Economic Costs of Con‡ A ict: Case Study of the Basque Country. 18 . Edward. Massimo and Eliana La Ferrara (2007). Guidolin. 17. Alberto and Javier Garbeazabal (2003). Bocconi University.16. "Economic Shocks and Civil Con‡ An Instrumental Variables Approach. Abadie.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.