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Slale 01 c.II!_ PETE WILSON MARINE MINING 2000-APAIL 5·10. 1992 211
SANTA BARBARA P·C REGION......... .. ,214
DIpIrIIf*'Il 01 eoo-_ EDWARD G HEIDlG BOOK REviEWS..... . 215


AIMlaIII T«:hncI EdiloI'

.....tam EdotDr
Graphics arod Onogl'l COVER PHOTO: Loma Pneta earthquake damage. 1989
Side VIew ot support column tal lure and collapsed upper deCk
P,...... ~ote..-al s..- ot the Cypress Viaduct. t- 880. Oakland, California, The 7.1
0!tI0I 01 SUIe Pt,nt"'ll magnitude earthquake's epicenter was about 60 miles to the
south PholobyHowardG Wilshire. U.S GeologICa/Survey,
o.-~ "'6_Slt.-"-'o ,)01'
s.a- CA 1511.
" f-.U5.- .1:25
~_--,()Il ...
t6Q8en;u: 0.- Sacr_ CA 9511" 0131
PIIDIo:: 916-"5 $11& Geologic Remote Sensing
t.o.".,.... 0ffie8 107 Sout!IBroadwIY· ~ 10M
La. ~ _ CA 00012·"0,2 "The Erwlronmencal Research Institute of Michigan is sponsoring the Nmth
Thematic Conference on Geologic Remote Sensing; Exploration. Environ·
81y_~~ It.S_SIr.- ment. and EngUleeling_ The conference wUI be held on February 11.
.5IIro FranoICIII CA 8ol1 Q,). 'S13
"i!>-551-1!OO 1993 in Pasadena. California
monf'IIro,."~olCol_._' ~01""''''' For infonnatlOn. contact:
_ Geology The ~ c::Jllu 11.1 10S9 V.,. SIrMI, s.....
103 s.c.'menIO,o.95III' cIaa PM. II paoclal Nancy J Wallman
Sacr......rno, CA PoIImuret Stndllddtesscna"O"lO CAli·
FOl'INkAGEOlOGYIUSPS350&40 1loJr29llO. S K t _ ERIM
CA \lS812 29ICI PO Box 134001
_ _ _ _ _ _ 10 ... a.oklgyprCIfICII
_ _ .. __ Ann Arbcw. MI 48113-3234

313·994-1200. ext: 3234'
~ - ~ ... ",.IftIO&t.... e-.lluMd_
oliCllOO'CIhI ....... - . . . - .


"'ENT OF CONSERVATION The 9th Annual Dredging & Placer Mining Conference & Short Course
Co._ _ al/lOllidt. _ _ IOe- CAlIFOA on New Technology for?\acer Land Reclamatoo Planning wiD be hekl at
NlA GEOlOGY, Mel IlIrQlt Onve S - - C/o 151" John Ascuaga's Nugget. Sparks. evada on May 17·20. 1992
So' • ..... "0001*'"
s.r.d.-cr-. __ ~ a I
~ _ Sl~.-dL ~

For infonnation. contact,

IllCALFORNlAGEOlOGYP 0 1loJr2llllO S - - CA Dr Philip M Bennett
Dr Yung Sam Kim or
Conference Director Program Director
Nevada Institute of Technology Department of Engineering
P.O_ Box 8894 Campus Station Professional Development
September 1991NoIume 44 Number 9 Reno. NV 89507 UniveTSiry of Wisconsin. Madison
702-6734466 432 N Lake Street
CGEQA 44 (9) 193·216 (1991)
Madison. WI 53706
608-263-4705·.. .

Preparation and Use of
Earthquake Planning Scenarios
Division of Mines and Geology

Dr. Glenn Borchardt is a contributing author Thus much of the damage to lifelines One practical and effective methoo is
01 four published Division of Mines and caused by the magnitude 7.1 Lorna Prieta to develop earthquake planning scenarios,
Geology earthquake planning scenarios. He earthquake of October 1989 was hypothetical yet realistic assessments of
is a recognized expert In the determination
of amount and age of faull displacement
expected {Photos 1-4 and 7-8) and much lifeline performance for particular earth-
through interpretation of soil was not (Photos 5-6). The knowledge quakes. Scientific- and engineering-based
characlerislics...edilor. gained from each earthquake helps us earthquake planning scenarios are
prepare for the next. How should we important tools for planners because:
organize such (1) they approximate the effects of
INTRODUCTION hard-won earthquakes on lifelines: (2) they provide
alifomians can expect information? important insight for use in earthquake
C the nexl fev.. decades to
produce several major earthquakes in
How should
we put it into
preparedness planning by emergency-
response agencies and for law enforce-
large urban areas along the San Andreas action? ment. fire fighting, medicaL and search-
fault system (VJGCEP, 1990). Destructive and-rescue services; and (3) they are used
in response exercises which simulate
as these events may be. there are
numerous ways to reduce their effects. emergency decision-making.
Slate residents have learned to build with
weed and steel instead of stone or bricks.
They boh their houses to foundations and Development of an earthquake scenario
their bookshelves 10 walls. Public agencies for emergency planning in a specific area
are also preparing lor the inevitable. incorporates vast amounts of data from
Advanced planning by State and local various disciplines. The ability of a
agencies will be critical in reducing the lifeline structure to withstand the
death. injury, and destruction. effects of earthquake shaking,
fault rupture, liquefaction.
The infrastructure consists of "life- landsliding, and associ-
lines, critical public facilities such as
ated ground failure
highways, bridges. railroads, airports, N largely depends on the
hospitals, marine installations. electrical site geology and the
transmission systems. and pipelines for intensity of earthquake
water. natural gas and other petroleum
products. [f we could predict which
\ shaking, as well as the
design and engineering
lifelines will survive, we could prepare characteristics of the
emergency plans to cope with those that structure,
will not. Search and rescue efforts
implemented during the critical first hours
Figure I. Areas of DMG earthquake planning scenariOS: (1) Special Publication 60:
will be smoother if we have some idea of
Earthquake planning scenario for a magnilude 8.3 earthquake on the San Andreas fault
what to expect. in southern California: (2) Special Publicafion 61: Earthquake planning scenario for a
magl1llude 8.3 earthquake on the San Andreas fault In the San Francisco Bay area; (3)
Each earthquake teaches us a lesson. Special Publication 78: Earthquake planning scenario lor a magnitude 7,5 earthquake on
pointing out with stark realism the the Hayward fault zone In the San FranCISCO Bay area: (4) Special Publication 99:
vulnerabilities of the infrastructure. Planning scenario for a major earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault zone: (5)
Special Publication 100: Planning scenariO for a major earthquake. San Diego-Tijuana
metropolitan area.


.. PhOIO I. Lique'ac!lon damage to railroad tracks due to lateral
spreadmg at the Port of Oakland. Damage was caused by
shaking 'rom the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Photo by author.

Photo 2. Close·up of damage in Photo 1. Photo byaufhor

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There are two phases in the development of an earthquake

planning scenario. Phase I is the preparation of a Seismic
Intensity Distribution (5[0) map showing the relative degree of
shaking and the areas of ground breakage. Phase lJ is the
preparation of lifeline maps annotated 10 show the hypothetical
status of the infrastructure dUring the first 3 days after the
earthquake. Only 3 days are addressed because the effectiveness
of search-and-rescue operations diminishes after a day or two. DISTRIBUTION MAP
Inevitably. postdisaster reality supplants predisaster hypothesis
as alternative lifelines become established and well-known. Earthquake SCenano Selecllon

DMG Scenarios The first phase of scenario development includes choosing an

earthquake-prone urban area based on its earthquake history
Five scenarios have been published by the Division of Mines (Toppozada and others. 1986: WGCEP. 1990). Although there
and Geology (DMGI for expected ma}oT earthquakes in densely is extensive historic documentation of earthquakes in California
urbanized regions of California (rlgure l) (Davis and others. during the past 200 years. additional data are required to select
1982a. 1982b; Steinbrugge and others. 1987: Toppozada and a likely event. Paleoseismology. a recently developed branch of
others. 1988: Reichle and others. 1990). Each DMG scenario seismology. includes various methods of investigaling lhe
includes maps showing the expected distribution of earthquake movement along major fault zones over geologic time. Fault slip
damage to lifeline facl1illes based on seismology. geology. and rates. the amOWlt of displacemenl from specific earthquake
engineering considerations. The two phases 01 the development events. and the recurrence interval of earthquakes have been
and preparation of a scenario are described below. detennined for some fault segments in Califomia.


1836. In comparison. the magnitude 71
L..oma Prieta earthcf,Jake resulted in 6.5
feet of slip in 1989 (P\afker and GalJo-

Developing SID Maps

Once the location and magninde of a

seismic event are decided. a SID map is
prepared. Planning areas. usually
centered on the fault. include the densest
population and the most significant
lifelines. If a major earthquake occurred
previously in the scenario area. its
characteristics are incorporated into the
study. If no events of equivalent magni-
tude have occurred in the area. data
from other areas are used to choose the
fault rupture length and amount of
surface displacement. For example. a
magnitude 7.0 event typically causes up
Photo 3. Collapsed porIJOfI 01 State HJghway 101 over Struve Slough, PaJ3ro Valley. near to 3 feet of ground displacement along a
Watsonville. santa Cruz County. Damage was caused by strong ground shaking and
liquelaetlon oj over deposIts dunng the Loma Pneta earthquake. Photo by DaVId Montgomery.
fauh segment over a distance of at least
20 miles.

In his classic sndy. Sieh (1984) was

able 10 dale offset peat and sediment
layers. obtaining a detailed record of the
last dozen events on the southern San
Andreas fauh. Magnitude 8 events. like
the 1857 Fan Tejon eaTttxtuake. seem to
occur at intervals of 145± 8 years. Other
faults. particularly those in the eastern
part of the State. have event recurrence
intervals that are ten times longer. For
example. investigations of offset soils and
volcanic ash along the Honey Lake fault
in northeastern California showed that
only four magnitude 7 events occurred
there dUring the last 7.800 years (Wills
and Borchardt. 1990).

Even where fine stratigraphic detail is

unavailable. infonnalion about the slip
rate and relative movement along fauhs
over geologic rime can sometimes be
determined. For example. cooperative
studies by Division of Mines and <::iedogy
and U.S. GeoklgicaI Survey scientists
show that the H~rd fauh had a slip
rate of between 5.5 and 9mmIyr during
the last 9.000 years (Borchardt and oth-
ers. 1987: Borchardt. 1988a: 1988b:
These investigations infer that up to 4.6
feet of strain may have developed at Photo 4. Close-up 01 damage in Photo 3 shoWing columnar supports pierCing the highway.
depth along the northern part of the fault Photo by MIChael Manson.
since the last major earthquake there in


Developing a SID map begins with a computer-generated
isoseismal contour map centered on the scenario fault rupture
(Evemden and Thomson. 1985). Each contour on an isoseismal
map shows the area that would undergo the same amount of
earthquake shaking intensity. Assuming perfectly uniform
bedrock geology. shaking will decrease with distance. Successive
contours from the proposed fault rupture zone indicate areas
that hypothetically undergo progressively less shaking.

Geologic Map

An accurate geologic map is essential to scenario prepara-

tion. The geology of an area is never unifonn. For most
structures. earthquake damage is usually greater on soft sedi-
ments than on hard bedrock. In developing an intensity map. it
is estimated that structures on young unconsolidated sediments.
lor example. will incur damage described by intensities two units



Rock types and their respective correction factors illustrate

how the underlying geology affects earthquake shaking. These
correction foctors are added to seismic intensities calculated for
well·consoiidated unweathered bedrock
Correction Factor for
Rock Type Seismic Intensity
lnstrusive igneous and metamorphic rocks 0.0
Photo 5. Collapsed upper section of the San Francisco-Oak-land Bay Volcanic rocks 0.3
Bridge between Verba Buena Island and Oak-land. The collapse MiOCene nonmarine sediments 1.3
caused the death of one person. The canfilever design was Miocene maline sediments 1.5
engineered to have the upper section rest on vertical steel suppon P1ioce11€ ond Pleistocene sediments 18
towers. During the tremor. one such tower swayed, snapped off the Holocene sediments 2.0
2·inch bolts that anached the upper bridge span. and allowed a 50·
foot section to crash onlO the lower deck-.
It took- 1 month to restore service 10 this
important bridge. Photo by Howard Wilshire,
courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.

Unfortunately. the estimation of

regional patterns of seismic intensity is
not yet as accurate as scientists and engi·
neers would like. Each type of structure
responds in a unique way to seismic mo-
tion. At present. it is not practical to de-
velop the necessary intensity scale for
each type. Nevertheless. researchers have
found that the Modified Mercalli Intensity
(MMI) scale is an effective 1001 for gener-
alizing earthquake intensity at any loca-
tion (see page 203).

Scenario SID maps display intensity, Photo 6. Collapsed steel rebar and concrete column of the Cypress 1·880 treeway structure.
fault rupture. and ground failure informa- Oak-land. California. A t-mile length of thiS double·decked reinforced·concrete Viaduct
collapsed onto commuter traffic k-illing 41 and mjuring many others during the Loma Prieta
tion. Some features are developed earthquake. The failed column in the foreground supported the top deck. Built in the 1950s.
especially for the scenario and others the columns had venical steel remforclng rods but lacked the spiral reinforcing rods used in
depend on earlier studies. modern construction. Photo by Michael Rymer. courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.


Newpon Beach N
pI' C
o 5
Figure 2. seismIC intensity distnbution predicted fOf a magnitude 7 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood lau1l, southern California.
Modified from Toppozada and others (1988).

higher than those on intrusive ingneous rocks (see table. p.1981.

TI1erefore. within 5 miles of the fault rupture of a magnitude 7
earthquake. the MMI ;s estimated to be VII in well-consolklated
bedrock and IX in soft sediments.

The isoseismal contour map is typically developed by DMG at

a scale of 1: 100.000. A composite geologic map al this scale is
used to modify the isoseismal contour map to account for
differences in the geology. The completed SID map (P19ure 2)
also shows areas likely to suffer permanent ground breakage
such as fault rupture, liquefaction. and landslides. 1llese areas
will produce MMls up to Xli that cannot be predicted by the
computer program that generates the isoseismaJ contour map.

Fault Rupture: The scenario postulates a specific rupture

along mapped fault traces shown on the l:24,OOQ-scale maps
that are produced as part of DMGs Alquist-Priolo Special
Studies Zones fault mapping project (Hart. 1988).

liquefaction: Three conditions are present in areas where

liquefaction is shown on scenario maps: (1) presence of a high
water table; (2) layers of loose sand: and (3) earthquake shaking
of sufficient intensity and duration. Flat·lying areas having
shaking intensities greater than VI generally satisfy the third
criterion. Alluvium with groundwater within 10 feet of the
surface is highly susceptible to liquefaction, while alluvium with
groundwater deeper than 30 feet below the surface is not.

Landslides: Because few existing maps delineate areas

sub.iect to seismically induced 1ancIsiiding (SILJ. maps showing
areas of general susceptibility to climatically. as well as Photo 7. Damage trom liquefaction and slumping of fine·
seismically. induced landslides are used in scenario preparation. grained, well-sorted sand fill at the PM of Oakland.
Where landslide maps are not available. topographic maps are Photo by David Montgomery.


used to delineate areas of weak rock ELECTRICAL POWER FACILITIES
having slopes greater than 30 percent.
Future scenarios will subdivide SIL into at - - Major TransmiSSion Routes
least two categories: falls and slides. Falls oTransmission §>ubstatlon
dominate on slopes greater than 70 oPower Plant
percent. whereas slides dominate on Damage
slopes between 30 and 70 percent. The
distinction is important because falls Pasadena
oo Shut down
damage lifelines from above and slides o • Shut down more
damage them from below. • than 3 days
los Angeles
The second phase of scenario
development involves the preparation of
separate maps showing the likely effects
of the event on each significant type of
lifeline. This phase involves: (I) compar-
ing the SID map with maps showing
lifelines: (2) assessing the damage
expected at the vulnerable points of
specific lifelines: and (3) projecting the
performance and operational use of each
lifeline system during the first 3 days
following an earthquake. a
For example. in DMGs southern
California Newport-Inglewood earthquake
planning scenario. some electrical
facilities are expected to be inoperative
(or at least 3 days following a major "I
earthquake (Figure 3). These facilities are
in areas of high liquefaction potential
within the MMIIX region of the SID map.
Certain types of modem electrical !o,,",.-i5~MllES 111111111111I11111 NEWPORT - INGLEWOOD
substations are highly vulnerable 10 SCALE FAULTZQNE
shaking even when liquefaction does 001 CAUFOANIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
occur (Photos 9 and 10).
Figure 3. Predicted e!lact on electrical facilities following a major earthquake on
Lifeline Damage Assessments the NewporHnglewood taull zone. Modified from TOpPOzada andolhers (1988).

Scenario damage assessments rely on

observations of damage to similar lifelines
exposed to comparable shaking or SCENARIO USES failure. Emergency plans develop contin-
ground breakage during previous gencies based on important facts brought
earthquakes. Lifeline repair times are also Earthquake planning scenarios are to tight in the scenarios.
estimated from previous experience. designed to give a realistic image of an
anticipated earthquake. They teach us an The scenarios show that major earth-
Structural engineers develop the important lesson: some lifeline facilities quakes in densely populated areas produce
damage estimates in collaboration with will be damaged and others will not. By abundant synergistic effects. Lifeline
DMG earth scientists. The managers of pinpointing the areas where extensive managers must be aware of v.>eaknesses
lifelines included in the scenario are asked damage is likely, scenarios highlight within their CMIIl systems. and know how
to review the estimates using their locations where lifeline facililies need damage to Olher lifelines will impact their
expertise and knowledge of specific special anenlion from emergency systems. Pre-earthquake planning can be
lifelines. The combined background and planners. public offjcials. and engineers. especially effecttve where two or more
experience of professionals from various lifelines interact (such as a City water main.
disciplines significantly augment our Scenarios identify locations v.mere a State highway. and a private pov.!er line),
understanding of earthquake damage lifelines are vulnerable so that emergency causing normal jurisdictional lines to
expected for facilities. operations can cope with probable lifeline become obscure.


Scenarios have stimulated site-specific
geotechnical revie\.vs of existing Meline
facilities, For example, Berryman Resen.-oir,
bJilt in the Haoyward fault lOIle, was re-
examined by geotechnical 8Tl31neers after its
failtre was hypothesized in the Hayward
""""". H<Mng ~ tho _«hn<aJ
review. Berryman Resen.uir's I-.;potheticaI
failure no longer can be used for FUJXlSeS
of disaster response planning.

Another example of action taken partly

as a result of the pre-eanhquake planning
promp(ed by the scenarios is the deaberate
kJ.vering of the water table in the dly of San
Bernardino. It has been b.vered to 10 feel
bOOw the surl"", and \ong-rnnge """'
invo/ve k:Jo.vering it pennanently to 30 feet
bOOw the surl"", - the _ boyood um<h
l;q.,eloction. ~~.

Photo 8. Landslide blocking the northbound lanes of Highway 17 through the Santa Cruz "These hypothetical scenarios provide
MountaJns. Photo by Tom Holzer, courtesy of the U.S. GeoJogical Survey. examples of typical problems, It is up to
lifeline managers to open communication links and establish
political arrangements that will facilitate a swift arK! smooth
response. Well-rehearsed managers and personnel can save
'/' many lives during the critical first hours after an earthquake.
• "

Photo 9. Damaged electrical insulators caused by ground shaking

by the magnitude 5.9 North Palm Springs earthquake July 8,
1986, The tall porcelaln·glass insulators with lO-foot·high perches
were constructed With very linle lateral support and most add·on
earthquake braces 'ailed, Over $3.5 million in damage was caused
at the Southern California Edison Company's Devers substation,
Coachella Valley. The Devers substalion is within 1 mile ot the
epicenter o! lhe earthquake thaI occurred on the San Andreas faull.
Photo by author,

Photo 10. Damaged Devers substation insulators, Transrrussion ..

substations are particularly vulnerable to earthquake shaking.
However, studies are underway to improve the seismic performance
01 massive trans'ormers and high·voltage porcelain insulators at
substations, The unexpected heavy damage 10 electricallranstorm·
ers and insulators at the Devers substation urged improvements in
earthquake-Iesistant design 'or handling high voltage requirements.
Although such damage is unlortunate, il prOVides valuable lessons
for reevalua\lllg the design al'ld construction ot other electrical
substations Iocaled near active tauIts. Photo byau/hor.


CONCLUSIONS DaVIS. J.F.. Bennett. JH.. Borchardt, Glenn. Sleh. K.E.. 1984, Lateral ollsets and revIsed
Kahle, J.E., Rice. S.J. and Silva. M A., dates of large prehistoric earthquakes at
The data presented in eanhquake 1982b. Earthquake plannlf'lg scenano for Pallet Creek, California: Journal of
planning scenarios assist planners and a magnitude 8.3 earthquake on the San Geophysical Research. v. 89, p. 7641·
emergency response agencies in rOOucing Andreas fault in the San Franosco Bay 7670.
California earthcpJake losses. Scenarios area: California Division of Mines and Sleinbrugge. K.V., Bennett, J.H.. Lagono.
Geology Special Publication 61, 160 p.
contain SID maps that show how various H.J.. DaVIS. J.F., Borchardt. Glenn.
geologic units respco:i to eanhquake Evernden, J.F.. and Thomson, J.M" 1985. Toppozada. TR. Oegenkolb. H.J..
PredICting seismIC Intensi\les. in Ziony. Laverty, G.L" and McCarty, J.E" 1987.
""""" and ground breakage. Map; J.I.. editOf, Evaluating earthquake Earthquake planning scenario lor a
sh<;:r.virg critical ~feline SIfilel1lS are superim- hazards In the Los Angeles region: An magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the
posed on a SID map to highlight facilities earth science perspec\IYe: U.S Geologl' Hayward fault in the San Francisco Bay
likely to trdergo the IT'lC6t damage in the cal Survey ProfeSSional Paper 1360. area: California DIVISion of Mines and
_ "'''''''''''''. klenti"""
that v..'iII be unusable follolMng a major
"1_ p,151·202.
Hart. E.W.. 1988. Faull-rupture hazard zones
Geology Special PublicatIon 78, 243 p.
Toppozada. T.R.. Benrl8tt. J.H.. Borchardt,
in Califorma (revised): DIVision of Mmes Glenn. saul, A., DaVIS, J.F., Johnson,
~ hclp; ~ and """"""'" and Geology Special Publication 42. 24 p. C.B.. Lagorio, H.J.. and Steinbrugge, K.
response agencies Jessen the impact.
Lienkaemper. J.J.. and Borchardl, Glenn, V.. 1988. Planning scenario for a majOr
earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood
Scenarios stimulate geotechnical review.> 1991. Holocene slip rate of the Hayward
fault zone: Division of Mines and
fault at Union CUy, California: Geological
and etlCOUl'CIge the upgrading of certain Geology Special Publication 99. 207 p.
Society 01 America Program With
critical structures. In crl:Iition to providing a Abstracts. Cordilleran SeclJon. v 23. Toppozada. T.A.. Real, CR. and Par1<.e.
focus lor ernergeT"Cy planners. earthcp...lake no. 2. p.73. D.L. 1986, Earthquake hlslory of
planning scenarios are becoming an Plalker. G.. and Galloway, J.P.. editors. California, CatifOfnla Geology v. 39.
important tool for infonning the p.hIic of 1989. Lessons learned trom the Loma no. 2. p. 27-33.
",ticipotro domag;",~. Priela. California earthquake 01 October WGCEP (Working Group on California
17. 1989: U.S. Geological Survey Circular Earthquake PrObabilities). 1990.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1045.48 p. Probabilities of large earthquakes
occurnng in the San FrancISCO Bay
Reichle. M.S.. Kahle. J.E.. Atkinson. T.G..
Numerous scientists and engineers as well Johnson. E.H.. Olson, A.A .. Lagono. H.J..
region. California: U.S. GeologICal
as hurdreds of piliic ofOCials have contrib- StelObfugge, K.V., Cluff, L.S.. Haney. Survey Circular 1053, 51 p.
uted to these scenarios. This methcxI of T,P., and Powers, J.E., 1990. Planning Wills. C.J.. and Borchardt, Glenn, 1990.
preparing them is the cubnination of k:Jeas scenario for a malor earthquake San Holocene slip rate and earthquake
firs!: advanced by J.F. Davis, California State DiegO-Tijuana metropolitan area: DiviSion recurrence on the Honey Lake fault
of Mmes and Geology Special Publication zone. northeastern California: EOS
Gedogist. The manuscript was revilaved by
100. 182p Transactions. American Geophysical
T.R. T~. M.S. _ . and J.F. UniOn. v. 71, no. 43, p. 1608:-'
Davis of the Qio...;sion of Mines and Geology.


Borchardt. Glenn. editor. 1988a. Soil

development and displacement along lhe DMG Earthquake Planning Scenarios
Hayward fault: Fremont, California:
DIVISIon of Mines and Geology Open-File Ave Division of Mmes and Geology SPECIAL PUBUCAllON 78: Eanh-
Report DMG QFR 88-12. Final technical earthquake planning scenalio5 are available quake ~nning scenario lor a magnitude
report for the U.S. Geological Survey for purchar.e and prepaid mail order at DMG 7.5 earthquake on the Hayv.;ard fault zone
National Earthquake Hazards Program, ollices in Sacramento. San Francisco, and in the S<m Francisco Bay area. By K V
v. 1, 124 p. Los Angeles. AD prlces include shipping and Steinbngge. J.H Bennett. H.J.I...agofio.
Borchardt, Glenn, editor, 1988b, Soil handbng. Make checks payable to, Divisioo JF. Davis. Glenn Borchardt. and TR
development and displacement along the of Mu'les and Geology. Send to: Toppozada, 1987 242 p. $30.00.
Hayward fault: Point Pinole. California:
Division of Mines and Geology Open File Division of Mil'leS and Geology SPECIAL PUBUCAllON 99, Planning
Report DMG QFR 88-13, Final technICal PO, Box 2980 scenario for a major earthquake on the
report for the U.S. Geological Survey Sacramento. CA 95812-2980 Newpon-lnglev..'OOd fault zone. ByTR
NatIonal Earthquake Hazards Reduction ToppoZ<tda. JH Bennett. Glenn
Program, v. 2. 233 p. Borchardt. R Saul. and J.E Davis 1988
quake planmng scenario for a magnitude 200 p. $22 00,
Borchardt. Glenn. Uenkaemper. J.J.. and 83 earthquake on the San Andreas fault in
Schwartz. D.P., 1987, Holocene slip rate southem California ByJ,F Davis. JH SPECIAL PUBUCAnON 100
of the Hayward fault at Fremont,
CalifornIa: EOS, Transactions 01 the
Bennen. Glenn Borchardt. JE Kahle. SJ P1<lnning sc('nario for a major earthquake.
Amencan Geophysical Union. v. 68,
Rice.andMA Silv<! 1982. 128p.$1200. S<m Diego-lljuana metropolitan ar('a By
no. 44, p. 1506. MS, Reichle, J E. Kahle. TG. Atkinson.
EH Johnson. RA Olson. H.J.Lagotio.
Davis. J.F.. Bennett, J.H .. Borchardt, Glenn, quake planning scenario lor a magnitude KV Steinbrugge. LS ChJff. TP. Haney,
Kahle, J.E., Rice, S.J., and Sliva. M.A., 8.3 earthquake on the S<m Andreas fault In and J,E. PcMoers. 1990. 182 p, $22.00. )0.'
1982a. Earthquake plannlf'lg scenario for the San Francisco Bay area By J. F. Davis,
a magnitude 8.3 earthquake on the San J.H Bennett. Glenn Borchardt. J E. Kahle,
Andreas fault in southern California: S.J. RICe. and MA Silva 1982.160 p.
California DiviSion of Mines and Geology $12.00
SpecIal Publication 50, 128 p.


The severity of an earthquake is described by the Modified Mercalli Intensity scaJe introduced in 1931 by American
seismologists Harry Wcxxl and Frank Neumann. They established 12 categories of intensity. The follO\.ving is a con-
densed version-
Not felt except by a very few Wlder favorable VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures:
circumstances. considerable in ordinary substantial buikfings. Panel
walls thrOVJl1 OUt of frame structures. Chimneys.
IT Felt only by a few persons at rest. especially on the factory stacks. monuments, walls. and columns fall.
upper floors of buildings. Suspended ob.iecls may Heavy furniture overturned and damaged. Changes in
swing. \Nell water. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts.
Persons driving cars are disturbed.
III Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper
floors of buildings. but not necessarily recognized as IX Damage conslderable in specially designed structures:
an earthquake. Standing cars may rock slightly. v.oeU-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb:
Vibration similar to that of a paSSing truck. great damage in substantial buildings. which suffer
partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.
IV If during the day, felt indoors by many: outdoors by
ground noticeably cracked, underground pipes
lew. If at night, few awakened Dishes. windows.
and doors rattle. walls creak. A sensation such as a broken.
heavy truck striking the building. Standing cars rock
X Some well-built Vo'OClden structures destroyed. most
masonry structures destroyed. foundations ruined.
v Felt by nearly everyone. many awakened. Some ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Considerable
dishes and windol.vs broken. some plaster cracked. landslides from steep slopes and river banks. Water
unstable objects overturned. Disturbance of trees. splashed over banks. Shifted sand and mud.
poles. and other taU objects. Pendulum clocks may
stop. XI Few. if any. masonry structures remain standing.
Bridges destroyed. Broad fissures in ground. Under-
VI Felt by aU. many people run outdoors. Fallen ground pipes out of service Earth slumps and land
plaster. minor chimney damage. Movement of slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly,
m<X!erately heavy fumiture.
Xli Total damage. Waves seen on ground surfaces. lJnes
VlI Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in of sight and \evel are distorted. Objects thrown into
buildings of good design and construction. slight to the air.">/'
moderate in well-built ordinary structures: consider-
able in p<Xlrly built or badly designed structures, Wood. H.O.• and Neumann, Frank, 1931, ModIfied Mercalii IntenSIty
Some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving scale of 1931: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,
v.20, p, 277·283.


For the San Diego-Tijuana Area
Division 01 Mines and Geology

ThIs is a summary of the DIvISIOn 01 Mines

and Geology Special Publication 100.
Planning SCenario for a Major Earthquake. SEISMIC INTENSITY
San Diego·Tijuana Metropolitan Area, DISTRIBUTION
published last year. A workshop was held in
December 1990 lor emergency response INTENSITY (MM) []]!]
planners for the city and county of San Diego
and lor private industry and utilities. The
workshop prOVIde<:! an opportUnity to diSCUSS
the Intended uses and potenllal misuses of HIGH LIQUEFACTION
the scenano and to examine its conlents In
detall The vanous officials thaI attended are
working wIth others and incorporating what
they learned Into thelf p1anrung efforts In
order 10 reduce losses In the event of a
destructJVe earthquake....editor.


istoricaUy. the San Diego area has
H been rclatively free from the effects
of damaging earthcf.Jakes. Earthquakes

occurring offshore and beneath the

mountains and deserts to the east have
inflicted only minor damage on San
Diego. Stooies by Toppozada and others
(1981) and T oppozada and Parke (1982)
list 13 eanhquakes that inflicted at least ~l
Mcx!ified MercaUi Intensity (MMi) VI on
San Diego since 1800 (see page 203).
It cannol be assumed. however. that this \
historic quiescence will continue indefi-
o \
nitely. The Rose Canyon fault zone (which
includes the Silver Strand fault). the La .....
•• ----_ .
Nadon fault. the Coronado Bank fault. \
the Vallecitos fault (San Miguel fault zone).
and myriad smaIJer faults pass through. or
ck>se to. the San Diego metropolitan area.
Of these. the Rose Canyon is probably
the most hazardous. foDowed by the
'".,.... \
ltighly """'" Comn"do Bank ard the San
Miguel fault zone.

The seismic hazard in the San Diego };>

~o £
area is diffICult
cultural to quantify.
development and a Extensive
lack of well- Q \

dated Quaternary deposits have limited

both the quantity and quality of the data
relating to the more recent geologic 0
, 5 MIlES
Figure 1. Seismic intensity diSlributlon. ..


damage assessments of the lX)Stu1al:ed IMPACT ON
history of the area's faults. Critical TRANSPORTATION LIFELINES
parameters. such as geologic rate and earthquake are genercilly confinod 10 U.S.
sense of movement along local faults. facilities and lifelines. MalOf Freewa~ Routes
recurrence timeS of damaging earth-
The maJOr conidors 01 highway traffic:
quakes. and recency of faulting are TlOI For the scenano earthquahe. surface in tho San Diego <)rca are illustrated .,
\l.'eD-knoY.n. The recent evidence of faultl\lplUu (rJgUl"c 1) el'lends from the
FIgure 2 They incltde:
earthquake aeti\ity on the Rose Canyon douinlCJI,A." San Dego area approximately
fault within the last several thousand years 24 m:Ics along the ~l to !he MlUlh.
• Th-ee major north-south routes,
Il-md-..n <rodome... 19901 _ _, thaI tenninatmg approximalely 16 miles south
Inllml.ates 5. 805. and 15
It wcUd be prudent to asstI1lli!: that of the intcmalionaf bordeT. Potentially
damaging eanhquakes oouId OCCll' in the damagmg shaking contnues 'or 10 to 15 • T\\.'0 mapl' easl--\l,'eSt routes:
San Otego area at al'1!l- time scc:onds .....'ithin 12 miles of the ';:auk. 1-8 and Highway 94
Frecpml af:ershocks cootlJVJl!: for several

To assist kxaI and State emergency ~ induding events of magnitude 50 interstate highways 5 and 15 lead into
response planners in their preparahon for the area from the oorth. b1terstate 5
a da."TlilIgirg~. the Division of Ieacb 10 the MexiCMt txxder on the south
Mmes and Geology has pub.ished an Areas subtect to shaking of MMllX and pa!'JSCS ~' both Mission Bay and San
earthquake p0rming scenan:> for the San (F"J9UTe 1). indude those areM of re«mt Diego Bay. Intersta:e 8 is the prlmar~;
"""'" area (ReKhIe and ome... 19901 (l-Iokxene) alIuvilJl1 and amfria1 fill access 10 points ea!t. Interstate 805
This information is intended for those ~ tN:> TIa.Lana River Valley provides an alernaliYe north-soulh
v.OO have responsIbUIl:es for emergency California portion) and dou."lOlA-'n San corridc>f to the area ea5I of 1-5 There are
response. and 10 facilltale both kx:aI and """"'ICornnado several akematNe surface streets which
internat)onal efforts 10 prepare for such c.1n be used 10 bypass sections of the
an occurr6lCe· The scenario does noI I\rros subJect 10 shiWng of MMI VlII freeways. but prirnCYy access to the
predlct detailed paUem5 of damage lhal extend from below Rosanto 10 Dei Mar secnon of the city \\.'eSl of 1-5 in the
win fobt the occurrence of the postu- along the c~. and as Iar as 23 mile, Mission and San Diego Bay areas is
lated ea~ke An assessment of the hland for poorest ground conditions. limited 10 a fe.v mlral corridors. There
degree and Iypes of damage [0 exJ$ling nlUition and the damage distributlom are sorre citymaintained bOOges ~
lifelines and Olhel'" structures is placed in a from histoncal cnfomia earthquakes these cntlcal corridors.
regiooal context for ge'lCJ'al response suggest that areas 01 firmer ground tsuch
pLannmg purposes The damage as Pt. Lama and Hillcrest) .....ill shake Damage 10 the freeway syslem in the
assessments contained in the olf!erQrlt[y than areas of rccent alluvium San Diego area will result primarily from
scenario are intended for emer- or fill (such as Mission Bay). Less damage ground failure due to liquefaction in areas
gency planning purposes only, and Ylould occur on firmer ground than on of artlfloal fill and recent aDuvial deposits.
are not to be construed as site- looser ground even lh0t9h both lie WIthin aTd also from failure of built-up embank-
specific engineering evaluations. the area of intensity V111 ments for road beds and onloff ramps.
Interstate 5 will be dosed from Balboa
The data discussed in the scenario Areas with high <;uscepllbilily to Avenue on the north to Palm Avenue on
ref1ec:t condItions in San DiegO in the hquefac:tion are also shown in Flgure I the south. Both 1-5 and old Route 101
mid-1980s. Ana~ were conducted Secondarv ground fl'lilurp<; re<;uhing from wlJI also be closed \\.here they cross each
with the cooperation of the various hquefaction are expected to be common. of the coastal lagoons soulh of Oceanside.
lifeline opercuors This article summarizes particUarly in areas of hydraulic fill in Illlen.tal\! hlylways 305. 15. MIl 8. Mel
the scenano Mission Bay. l..om3 Portal. and along the highways 163. 94. and 117 will be open
margins of San Diego Bay. Also. areas of except wh~le they join 1-5. Long delays
THE SCENARIO EARTHOUAKE recent aBlNium. particularly along m<er wi'l occur along Interstate 8 and Highway
channels. such as the western reaches of 163. res.dting from dAln",ge 10 theil
The ~eMrio ~ribes lhe regional Mission Valley and the lla Juana and interchange. The Coronado Bridge will be
panem of shakirg intensity. ground Otay River valleys. wiD experience cmed. I'tae5s to Coronado on Highloloay
fo!llilure. lind impllCts on lifelino of a moderate to 5e\ICre liquefaction effects. 75 along the Silver Strand wiD be severely
l1"la9nitude 6.8 on the Silver restricled. Although:sornewhi:lt ob-
Strand fault. which lies immediately Seismica~ indu::ed lancbbdes pose an slJUeted. ma;or routes intO and out of the
offshore of the San Diego waterfroot additional threat in those geologic grrotcr San DIego arelI will be llVlllloble
(Hgurc I). PcrOOp5 ~ hll-zord0u5lllUlts conditions lMlcfe both ancient and However. emergency YChi:1e nansporIa-
exist. and could have been used for a modem slides have been mapped. Area50 rion into and out of :he ITIOSI ~viIy
rl29k:lna1 planning scenario. H~, this .....nere 1andsI.des could pose particular damaged areas along the coast from
scenario ",'as devdoped for a particular probkmls irrlJde the north sde of PaciHc Beach to Imperial Beach Iolo;D be
uw' inlQmationai respooso p;anning. Mission Va1k!y. Mu-phy ean.,.oo. MI hampered by closures of all main artene5
assunmg an earthquake tnfliets signifICant Soledad. Torrey Phes Mesa. lhe canyons VJhere they cross areas 01 unstable
damage on both IN San Diego and of Otay Mesa. and portJoos of La Mesa ground.
T~ rnetroPOltan areas. HOWC\<er.


for automobiles (normally 16 of 24
HIGHWAYS AND AIRPORTS primary inspection lanes aTe used). Truck
MAJOR traffic is primarily handled at the Glay
COMMERICAL border crossing.
&. MlllTARY
BuildingS at the border station win be
seYeTety tJamagro. Unreinforced masonry
AIRPORTS walls of the Old Pon of Entry Building wiD
suffer major structural damage or collapse

._---' and the building will be evacuated. For

planning purposes. the pedestrian bridge
that spans the trafflc lanes will be
clamaged and out of service for 6 months.
Loss of electric poIAIef from the San
IMgo e;" & EJ.ctric Oxnpany ISDG&Ej
\\liD occur. Emergency power generators
Sao on the Site ""ill not function. Umite::i
Diego power supply \\Iill not be reslored for 72

The San Ysidro Border Station VJiIi be

closed for at least 3 clays for all but emer-
gency use because of severe damage to
buildings. restricted access problems due
to damaged freev.tay bridges, lack of
power and utility services. and kiss of
back-up emergency electric power.
Imperial Damage assessment and clean-up will
Beach ~Brown take 10 days to complete at the site. after
NAS Field

.---- .- _.,
_ _.-
which the border station VJili function at
50 percent capacity for 6 months and
80 percent for 8 months before full
operation is restore::i,
o Tijuana

The major commercial ail'JX>11S in the

planning area are sho<M1 in Figure 2.
They are:

San Diego International

IUndOOgh P"'~I

Tijuana International
Secondary domestic airpons inClude:
•, , MILES
Brown Field
Gillespie Fiekl
McClelland - Palomar
Montgomery Reid
san DIegO Border CrQSSIng The San Ysidra Border Station houses Oceanside Municipal
U.S. CUSloms. U.S. Irmnigralion. the Ramona
1he border station at San Ysidro.
Department of Agriculture. the U.S. Na"'Y
California is the busiest port of entry in Military airports are:
Shore Patrol. the U.S. Drug Enforcement
the world. It operates in conjunction with
Agency. and the International Boundary Naval Air Station, Miramar
the recently constructed border station al
and Waler Commission. II is the principal
Otay. located 5 mlles to the east. TIle Naval Air Station, Nonh Island
port of entry from Mexico for pedestrian
building and related facilities are main- Naval Air Station, lmpertal Beach
and automobile traffic. The station
tained by the General Servk:es Adminis-
presently operates at 70 percent capacity


San Diego International Airport is
located 2 miles from the center of the ELECTRICAL POWER
downtown business distlict. On its north.
east. and west sides it is surrounded by
densely populated military. commercial.
_ 230-287 KILOVOLTS
and residential development. Its south .._ _.. 138 KILOVOLTS
skle faces San Diego Bay. It is owned and
operated by the San Diego Unified Port • POWER PLANT
District. This airport handles approxi~
mately II million passengers per year.
averaging 30.000 passengers per day.
Usually 50 commercial passenger planes
are parked overnight at the airport.
Brown Aekl Municipal Airport. ov""ed
by the City of San Diego. is planning for

,} .
intensive emergency use in the event that
Undbergh F'tekl is out of commission for ~
an extended period. Brown Field is
located 18 miles by freeway south and
east of the central San Diego business
district. It is approximately 1·1/2 miles <,
directly north of the Mexican border and
2 miles directly north of Tijuana Interna-
tional Airport.
For planning purposes. San Diego
\ • National CtlV

• Chula I£ifta
International Airport will be closed for all
but emergency operations for 2 weeks
due to liquefaction affecting runways.
access. electric power supply. and the
• Imperial Beach

East Terminal building. Accessibility by

way of Harbor Drive and the overpass
.--'- .. --- -----
..---_ ..
entrance to the airport will be impaired • • TIJUANA
for 72 hours because of ground failure.
Alternate access routes will have to be
8ectric power to the airport will be
unavailable for 10 days because of
damage due to ground failure along the
feeder line routes. Impaired electric
power will affect the pumping of aircraft
fuel from underground storage tanks. For
planning purposes. two of the fiw
storage tanks will be out of service so it
\l,111 be necessary to bring in fuel by tank
truck to fuel airplanes directly.
Four airports In the planning area
prO\lide the 5.000 feet of runway
necessary for the landing of C-130 and
,, •

Figufe 3. Electric power.

C·141 aircraft. Twe of the four. namely
San Diego International Airport and
Naval Air Station. North Island are in
zones of heavy damage and potential operations. Performance of the lifeline Railroads
liquefaction. The other two (Brown Hekl systems for airport operations will be
and avaf Air Station. Miramar) are critical. The success of air operations will Only the Atchison. Topeka. and Santa
located in areas not subject to liquefaction depend more upon the availability of Fe Railroad (ATSF) serves San Diego. The
and where predicted shaking will produce electric power and fueL and the survival San Diego and Imperial Valley Railroad
minimal damage. [n general. only these of crilical buildings. than upon the (SDM formerly extended from downtown
two can handle emergency response condition of the runways. San Diego through Tijuana to EI Centro.


Supp~es can be off-loaded at Oceanside
WATER AND WASTE WATER or Escondido and trucked south. although
FACILITIES travel win be disrupted on major fr€€Ways
• Del Mar due to damaged bridges blocking through-
_ _ MAJOR AOUEDUCT traffic.
• WASTE WATER TREATMENT The San Diego and Imperial Valley
Railroad and the San Diego T Tolley cross
• PUMP STATION areas of high and very high liquefaction
susceptibility along San Diego Bay and in
the ria Juana River Valley. Roadbed
damage will prevent use 01 the Unes from
downtown San Diego to the international
border for about 3 weeks.
• EI CalOn
In additk>n to the liquefaction-induced
failures. landslides along coastal bluffs or
in the steeply cut roadbed between
• LelT1Of'l Grove Oceanside and Mission Bay may inhibit
rail traffic for 72 hours or. at worst. take
out the tracks. For planning purposes. the
line will be out of use for 7 days due to
damage by landslides.

1be effects of the scenario earthquakes

on tenninal facilities in downtown San
Diego will be serious. Those tenninals
serving marine facilities on the east side of
San Diego Bay are located in areas that
VJill experience severe ground shaking.

Marine Facilities (POfIS)

1be port area under the jurisdiction 01

o the San Diego Unified Port District
"'" includes portions 01 the cities 01 San
Diego. Chula Vista. Coronado. National
'"" Oty. and Imperial Beach. Approximately
2-1/3 miles of nonmilitary berths are
available at the port facilities. lhey are
\ located at three principal sites: B Street
and Broadway piers. Tenth Avenue
·· Marine Tenninal. and National City

Marine Tenninal. Virtually the entire port
of San Diego is built on artificial fiU.
Extensive liquefaction-induced lateral
,, 5 MllES
spreading is possible all along the bay
front. This VJill affect structures built
~" behind quay walls and also approaches
(road and rail) to the dock area.
Figure 4. Water and waste water laclhlJes.
1be B Street Pier was constructed in
the early 1920s in several phases. 1be
The line has been out of seMce from the ity. Service along the ATSF line from Los Transit Shed No.2 on the B Street Pier
border toWn of Tecate eastward for many Angeles can be expected 10 be disrupted has been renovated to serve as a cruise
years lh!: to the loss of a major bri:Ige south of Oceanside. Tracks are subject to ship tenninal. Uquefactk>n will damage
stnx:ture. rot is stiD open from San Diego to landslide damage or dislocation due to the B Street Pier. Pile-supported docks
Tecale. a distance of about 25 miles. liquefaction where they cross me coastal and piers. with the exception 01 the B
sloughs. and along Mission Bay. For Street Pier. should fare well. but access
Rail lines to San Diego cross areas 01 planning purposes. service will not be problems may preclLKle their use dUring
high 10 very high liquefaction susceptibil- restored for 3 weeks after the earthquake. the initial post-€<lrthquake period. For


response planning purposes, it is police dispatch and the City emergency adequate supply of water is critical during
reasonable to assume that the port operations center. These are located in emergencies. not only for drinking
facilities will not be fully usable (a fairly an area of high ground shaking (MMI purposes and fire fighting. but also for
conselVative assumption) for 3 days. The VllO. While damage to the buildings may the operation of other utilities, such as
loss of port facilities will have only not be severe enough to cause collapse. waste-water treatment.
minimal impact on public welfare. severe nonstructural damage may be
The San Diego County Water
sufficient to cause functional impainnent.
Authority. which encompasses a
Electric Power 1.412.5-square-mile area. serves a
Communications population of approximately 2,106.000.
The San Diego Gas and Electric
This section deals with Emergency It receives its supply of water from the
Company (SDG&E.l distributes practically
Broadcasting System (ESS) stations and all of the electrical power throughout San Metropolitan Water District of Southern
inter-governmental communication Diego County. The actual selVice California (MWDJ within San Diego
centers that are vital to emergency territory. which includes southwestern County. approximately 6 miles south of
selVices. Both the City and County of San the Riverside!San Diego county line. The
Orange County. covers 4.100 square
Diego operate communication facilities miles (double the size of the state of MWD is the sole source of the nonnal
and supplemental water for San Diego
for use as emergency operation centers. Delaware). and it includes over 940.000
The San Diego County Communications County accounting for 90 percent of the
customers. Major transmission lines.
total water supply to the county (see
Center is located at the Overland Avenue power stations, and principal substations
Rgure 4). The amount of water storage
County Operations Center in a part of are shown in Figure 3. Two operating
in San Diego County varies significantly
the city called Kearny Mesa. The facility is power plants (Encina and South Bay) are
among the different districts. The supply
housed in a mcxlified warehouse of tilt-up included in the planning area.
will last from 3 days to several years.
concrete wall and steel frame. metal deck
roof construction. The center is operated Transmission substations are essential For planning purposes. it is projected
by the San Diego County Sheriffs to the routing of locally generated power that one of the five San Diego County
Department, The County Office of and of power available from outside the Water Authority aqueducts in the north
Disaster Preparedness has its primary region affected by the earthquake. These will fail with an estimated selVice outage
communications center in this facility. major substations. which contain banks of of 1~ 112 months. One member agency
The City Operations Building in down- switches, cireui! breakers. and massive with only a 3-day supply of water will
town San Diego contains the fire, police transformers. are particularly vulnerable quickly become dependent on outside
dispatch. and emergency operations to damage by earthquake shaking. In sources of potable water.
center in the basement. addition to the major transmission
Facility operations dependent on
substations through which high voltage
water. such as the Point Loma Waste-
The county communications system (greater than 230 kilovolts) is routed.
water Treatment Plant (l-day supply of
for departments other than the Sheriff many small local substations provide the
tvater storage) and the SDG&.E South
(roads. utilities. etc.l operates out of the vital links in the electrical power distribu-
Bay Power Plant (2- to 5-day supply of
County Operations Center in Kearny tion network.
water storage capacity). will be function-
Mesa. Although the facility is located in
Transmission towers and lines are ally impaired due to the lack of water.
an area of MMI VII. consoles rest on a
raised floor and on desks with no principally subject to damage through For the scenario earthquake. the areas
anchorage against lateral forces. The secondary effects. such as landslides and of the water distribution system most
Office of Disaster Preparedness' commu- other ground failures. Conductor lines vulnerable to damage are those bordering
nication system operates as part of (usually distribution lines) swinging Mission Bay and San Diego Bay. coastal
"Station x." which includes the VHF two- together could cause many "bum downs." areas. western Mission Valley. and the
way system to the EBS stations KKLQ Otay (ria Juana River) Valley. Mains
The scenario earthquake will have a (both primary and secondary) passing
and KCBQ. This broadcast equipment for
definite impact on local power-generating through these areas of recent alluvium
the EBS is similarly desk-mounted with no
anchorage against lateral forces. capabilities. In particular. damage or and artificial fill will suffer several breaks
disruption to the waler supply to the per mile of pipe. Landslides in the Mt.
It may be assumed that the microwave power stations will have a critical effect Soledad area. coastal regions of La Jolla.
system will be out of use due to the on the power generation capabilities. For the north wall of Mission Valley. and the
effects of ground shaking on the align- planning purposes. the South Bay Power edges of Otay Mesa may also damage
ment of the antennae. For purposes of Plant should be considered inoperative for facilities and distribution mains. As a
the scenario. the microwave system will 3 days and significantly reduced in result, several of the above-mentioned
be no more than 20 percent effective. capacity for 1~ 112 weeks following the areas will be without water for up to 4
and it will not be fully effective for 3 days scenario earthquake. weeks following the scenario event. For
following the earthquake. planning purposes, we also assume that
Water Supply
parts of La Jolla. Pacific Beach. Ocean
The City of San Diego Administration San Diego County is a semi-arid Beach. and Mission Beach will be without
and Operations buildings are in down- region and depends almost entirely on water for up to 4 weeks following the
town San Diego. They house fire and water imported from other areas. An scenario earthquake.


NATURAL GAS FACILITIES Mexican border and east as lar as Spring

, AND Valley and Alpine. The principal compo-

.Oel Mar , PETROLEUM FUELS nents of the system are illustrated in
Rgure 4. The system collects. transports.
, I
pumps. treats. and disposes of liquid waste
from the cities 01 Chula Vista. Coronado.
\ I
I •
8 CajOn. Imperial Beach. La Mesa.
National City. and San Diego. and from
the Lemon Grove. Montgomery. and
.,_ ........o----'F"'A"'C,,'Le-1T'-'y -j Orlando. and from Spring Valley Sanitation
I -.. .... districts. The city also has an "emergency"
.La Jolla
• TANK FARM • EI Cajon
connection to Tijuana. The total now of
waste liquid. all of which is treated at the
plant on Point Lorna. is currently about
180 million gallons per day.

For planning purposes. the flow

.lemon Grove capacity 01 the collection system carrying
waste water to the sewer system will be
reduced by 50 percent, and 50 percent
of the service area will be nonfunctional.
The main sewer line along San Diego
• National City Bay will be out 01 service for 6 weeks.
Rupture of the tunnel below the streets of

downtown San Diego will take it out of
.Chula Vista
service for 4 months, during which time
raw sewage will discharge into San Diego
Bay. Pumping Station No.2. the most

..••.. • Imperial Beach

---- ----' .
vital spot in the entire system. will be
functionally impaired lor 45 days.

_.---_ .. -_.--- ---- .---

As a result of the anticipated damage
.TIJUANA to the San Diego metropolitan sewer
o system described abov€. the waste-water
'".,. \. connector line from Tijuana will be
interrupted for 60 days before nonnal
Z service is restored.

Natural Gas
Three transmission pipelines convey
natural gas to the San Diego area from

the north (Figure 5). T we are located
inland. running along the mesas. These
will not be seriously affected by the
,, 5 MILES scenario earthquake. The third runs along
the coast and crosses several areas of
""" high to very high Iiquelaction susceptibil·
ity. This pipeline will be damaged by
Figure 5. Natural gas tacilities and petroleum luels. lateral spreading at Soledad (Sorrento)
Valley and by landslides along Torrey
Pines grade. and will be out 01 service for
Waste Water more than 72 hours.
Because of failures in local water
distribution systems. segments of the
The metropolitan sewer system selVeS The primary impact of the scenario
population will be asked to use emer-
gency supplies. boil their water. or take virtually all 01 the populated metropolitan earthquake will be on the gas-distribution
area of San Diego and adjacent commu- system where it crosses areas of high
other measures against contamination lor
nities south 01 Del Mar. extending to the intensity and ground failure. [n Pacific
1 to 4 days.


Beach. POG'\t L..oma. and downtown. The Na~ fuel pipeline to Point L..oma RetchIe. M.S.. Kahle, JE.. AIIunson, T G,
repairs WID be completed WIthin 72 hours. will be damaged where It crosses the Johnson, E.H., Olson. A.A.. Lagooo.
but complete service restorat)oo \l,iB take Mission Bay. Lorna Portal area of high to H.J. StelnbllJgge, K.V., Cluff. LS..
2 v..'eeks. Coronado could be Haney. T,P" and Powers, J.E.. 1990.
up to very high liquefaction susceplibihly. The
Planning scenario lor a major earth-
without service for 2 to 4 months. until a 10th Avenue Marine Terminal fuel pier quake, san Dleoo-Tijuana metropolitan
new pipe Is installed across Ihe bay. wiD SUSlain heavy damage from lateral area: California Department of Conserva·
spreading of the liquefJed fiJI along the hon. DMsion 01 Mines and Geology
Pelro!eum Products margins of San Diego Bay. Access to the Special PubflCation 100, 181 p.

The """'*'"'" _~ P;peIine. like

most of the utilities transmission facilines
fuel teonlna! and to the damaged
portiOnS of the Nav:i pipehne wiD be
Toppozada, T.R., and Parke. D.L. 1982.
Areas damaged by GDlorna earth-
quakes. 1900-1949. Annual Technical
difficUl and &mlted. dclaying repairs for
from the north.• routoo
pnmoriIy oJong Report 10 the U.S GeologICal Survey'
Cali10rna 0Msl0n ol M,nes and Geology
the mJond '"""" (Rgwe 51. and >hook! be """'"" days
Open-File Report 82·17SAC, 65 P
operational the event The tank REFERENCES
farm is located on liquefiable alluvium Toppozada. T.R" Real. C.R., and Palke,
D.L, 1981. Preparation of 150SelsmaJ
near the nonh v.:alJ of Mission Valley. Lindvall. SC. Rockwell. T K" and Llndval,
maps and summaries 01 reported etlects
Because of lIs distance from the earth- C.E., 1990, The seismic hazard of san
lor pre-1900 California eaJ1hquakes,
Diego revised: New evidence for
quake source, damage to the tank farm Annual Technical Repon to the U.S.
magnitude 6+ Holocene earthquakes on
should not be severe, Fires may result GeologtcaJ Survey Caldornia DIVISIOfl 01
the Rose Canyon faull zone. In Proceed-
Mines and Geology Open·File Report 81-
where lines break al their junctions WIth Ings of lhe 4th US Conlerence on
the tanks, The tanks themselves may be Earthquake Engmeemg, v 1 Earth·
damoged by .Jo.hmg !;quid< quake El'IQlneenrlg Research InstJtute. 8
GemIO. Caldorl'll3. P 679-688

Marine Mining 2000 - April 5 • 10, 1992

The f.nglneenog FOl.IflWllon If\ c0opera- • 1'tv re. e llll upd;ne on kntMn EngIneering Fomdbbon conferences were
tion IoWh the Uruversaty 01 Haw.. s Manne <V1d cVItl(!pllted re5OUJ'Cti established in 1962 to pnMde a forum lor
MlOefab Teclvdogy Cen!er, and the Manne • Mmeral exploration USing remote ~ problems and issues relevant to engineers
Tochnology Sodely's CommJltee on M;?arine • MLneral <iep0lt sampling from many disCIplines. The conference
MlI'leral Resources. announce 1I confcrence • MIning system!> for the continental shelf provides momlng and evening sessions In
on Marine Mining 2000 to be held ;?at the • Environmental hazards and Impacts \\.-tlich major presentations are made. It
Keauhou Beach HOle!. Kooa, H;?awaii The coastal Sites ancIudes lime duTing lhe ahemoons for lid hoc
conference ch<tlr IS "1lChael J CIUickWnk, • Mining ¥lems for the deep wabeds se!'Slons and informal dscussioos
and the CO'ChaIr IS Charles L Morgan. both deep 0CNfI mu'Iing
from thr UflM.>rslty 01 Hawaa • Eno.vorwnmktl hazards and mpacts For infonnanon. Cl:lI'Ud
• Madding technologiCal ~,...
Th~ conference will exal'T'llnt and updato!
• ~tradaho,laI ccra-pls for manne 0lar1es V. FreimaIf\. Director
tret'llb Ul exploratKWI and exploltahon ~"' Ellgq ......:1 iI og Foundalion
technology for marine mineral deposits AD conference manbers are encouraged 10 345 ~ 47th Street
COIlCerrung their economic and ecological· cOlltnbute papers IOf poster sessions or New York. NY 10017
wstainable development. The follCNoing abstracts lor dJSCU5SlOrI al the time of 212·705-7835'
nIne sessions will provide an overview of appilcatlOll. ProceedIngS for the conference
the current ;?activities and prospects In this wiD be publl<Jwd In a special edItion of Marine
relatively ne\olo'disciphne MinJng


A Page for Teachers

The following bibliography was compiled by the National Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research. State University of New York at Buffalo.

Selected References for Selected Books for Grades

Teachers K-3
Alexander. T.. Plate Tectonics Gere, J.M .. & Shah, H.e. Terra Baker. K.. The Magic Fan
Has a Lot To Tell Us About the Non Firma: Understanding and (Harcourt. Brace. Jovanovich,
Present and Future Earth Preparing for Earthquakes. 1989)
(5m;thson;an. 5(11). 38-47, 1975) (W.H. Freeman; 1984) Berger. M.. Jigsaw Continents
Alexander. T" Revolution Called Golden. F.. The Trembling (Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan.
Plate Tectonics Has Given Us a Earth: Probing and Predicting 1977)
Whole New Earth (Smithsonian, Quakes (Scribner's: 1983) Challand. H.J .. Earthquakes
5(10).30-40, 1975) Hanif. M.. As the Earth (Children's. 1982)
American Red Cross Safety and Quakes...What Happens? Curran. E., Mountains and
Survival in an Earthquake. Los (Science and Children, 27(4). 36- Volcanoes: What do You See?
Angeles Chapter (Los Angeles. CA: 39, 1990) (Troll Associates, 1985)
American Red Cross. 1982) Hanks. T.e., The National Kaufman. J .. Joe Kaufman's
Anderson. D.L. The San Earthquake Hazards Reduction About the Big Sky, About the
Andreas Fault (Scientific Ameri- Program-Scientific Status (U.S. High Hills (Golden Press. 1978)
can. 225(5).52-68,1971) Government Printing Office. U.S.
Geological Survey Bulletin 1659: Lambert. D.. Earthquakes
Ballard, RD., Window on Earth's (Franklin Watts. 1982)
Interior (National Geographic, 1985)
150. 228-249, 1976) Hodgson. J.H .. Earthquakes and Larson. N.. Why do We Have
Earth Structure (Prentice-Hall; Earthquakes? (Creative Education.
Boll. B.A.. Earthquakes: A 1982)
Primer (W.H. Freeman, 1978) 1964)
lacopi. R.. Earthquake Country: Mallhews. A., Earthquake
Bolt, B.A., Earthquakes (W.H. (Ballantine. 1986)
Freeman. 1988) How. Why and Where Earth·
quakes Strike in California May, J .. Why the Earth Quakes
Boore, D.M., Seismology (Lane, 1974) (Holiday. 1969)
(Geohmes. 22(1). 40-41, 1977)
Miller, M.M .. Our Restless Earth Merrians, D.. I Can Read About
Brown. B.. & Brown W. Historical (National Geographic. 126, 140- Earthquakes and Volcanoes
Catastrophes (Addison-Wesley, 141; 1964) [froll Associates, 1975)
Mogi. Earthquake Prediction Radlauer, RS .. Earthquakes
Canby. T.Y .. Can We Predict (Academic Press: 1985) (Children 's, 1987)
Earthquakes? (National Geo-
9,aphk. 149.830-835,1976) Tufty. B. 1001 Questions An- Simon. S.. Danger From Below:
swered about Earthquakes. Earthquakes Past. Present, and
Canby, T.Y .. & Baire, J. Avalanches. Floods, and other Future, (Four Winds. 1979)
California's San Andreas Fault Natural Disasters (Dover Publica-
(National Geographic. 143.38-52; tions: 1969) Stein, Re.. The Story of the San
1973) Francisco Earthquake
Walker. B.. & the editors of Time- (Children's, 1983)
FEMA Guidebook for Develop- Life Books. Planet Earth: Earth-
ing a School Earthquake Safety Winner. P.. Earthquakes (Silver.
quake \fime-Life: 1981) 1986)
Pmg<am (FEMA 88, 1985)
Yanev. P.. Peace of Mind in
Earthquake Country, How to
Save your Home and Life (San
Francisco. CA: Chronicle: 1974)


Selected Books for Selected Books for Grades
Grades 4-6 7-9
Asimov. I.. How Did We Find Levine. E., If You Lived at the Asimov, L How Did We Find
Out About Earthquakes? Time of the Great San Fran- Out About Earthquakes?
(Walker. 1978) cisco Earthquake (Scholastic. (Walker, 1978)
Aylesworth. T.. Geologic Disas- Brandreth, G., Amazing Facts
ters: Earthquakes and Volca- Markle. S .. Digging Deeper About Our Earth (Doubleday,
noes (Franklin Watts. 1979) (Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1987) 1981)
Baker, K .. The Magic Fan Merrians. D., I Can Read About Challand. H.J., Activities in the
(Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich. Earthquakes and Volcanoes Earth Sciences (Children's. 1982)
1989) [froll Associates, 1975) Fodor, R.V .. Earth in Motion:
Berger. M.. Jigsaw Continents Navarra, J.G.. Earthquake! The Concept of Plate Tectonics
(Coward. McCann & Geoghegan. (Doubleday, 19801 (William Morrow. 1978)
1977) Nixon, H.. & Nixon. J.L, Earth- Fradin. 0.8., Disaster! Earth-
Cazeau. c.J.. Earthquakes quakes: Nature in Motion quakes (Children '5. 1982)
(Follett. 1974) (Dodd. Mead. 1981) Gilfond, H., Disastrous Earth-
Cole. J .. The Magic School Bus Paananen, E., Tremor Earth- quakes (Franklin Watts. 1981)
Inside the Earth (Scholastic, quake Technology in the Space
Jones, P.. The Forces of Nature
1987) Age (Julian Essner. 1982) (Children·s.1981)
Dudman. J .. The San Francisco Rutland, J .. The Violent Earth Lauber, P., Earthquakes: New
Earthquake (Wayland. 1988) (Random House, 1987) Scientific Ideas About How and
Fodor. R.V .. What Does a Geolo· Simon. S.. Danger From Below: Why the Earth Shakes (Random
gist Do? (Dodd. Mead. 1977) Earthquakes Past. Present, and House, 1972)
Future (Four Winds, 1979)
lacopi. R.. Earthquake Country Raymo, C.. The Crust of Our
(Lane, 1971) Sullivan, Earthquake 2099 Earth (Prentice Hall. 1983)
(fiction) (Dutton. 1982) Rossbacher, LA., Recent Revolu-
Kiefer. I.. Global Jigsaw Puzzle,
Story of Continental Drift Williamson, T., Understanding tions in Geology (Franklin Watts,
(Atheneum. 1978) the Earth (Silver Burdett. 1984) 1986)
Larson. N.. Why Do We Have Tributsch, H.. When the Snakes
Earthquakes? (Creative Education. Awake: Animals and Earth-
1982) quake Prediction (MIT. 1982) X


• • • • • DMG Release • • • • •

MINERAL lAND CLASSlACATION I) the location of Pee· grade aggre- SMARA mandates that !Pdelines for
Portland cement concrete aggregale and gate resources. classifkation and designation be deYef..-
active mines of all other mineral com- oped by the State MlI'ling and Geoklgy
mochues in the San Luis Obispo-Santa 2) the quantIty of PCC-grade aggre- Boam The BoanI originally adoptoo
Barbara production-consumption regK:ln_ gate v.ithin those depostlS: formalSMARA guidelines 00 June 30.
By Russel V, Miller. Judy WK!denheft 1978. SectjQO I. la of those guidelines
Cole. and John P Oinkenbean:l, 1991 3) the Iocalion of aft actIVe mines reqares the Stale Geologist to classify
37. $2500 \l,.ithin the regiOn prodocing specified areas into Mineral Resource
commodities other than fill, Zones (MHZ). Classifx:ation is the process
SpedaI Report 162 provides informa- of identifying lands containing signifM:ar'lI
tiOn on the estimated availability of. and 4) the demand lor aggregate v.,thm mineral deposits. based solely on geologic
demand for. portland cement concrete the regK:ln for the next 50 years faetOB \l,lthout regard 10 presenlland lbe
(PCQ-grade aggregale resources WIthin or CMor.ership. The Board recogruzes thai
the San Luis ObIspo-Santa Barbara This study "!as concb::lro as speofied consIrucbon materials (sand. gravel. and
Pn:xIuction-ConsumptiOn (poQ Region. by the Surface MlOmg and Redamalion crushed stone) are produced regionally.
The study area COVl."f$ 2.062 square miles At::t (SMARA) of 1975. s,\1ARA was are used in every urban area of the Slate.
and includes major portions of l4'eStem passed by the California Stale I..egtsIature and require spec:ial classilication data.
San Luis Obtspo and Santa Barbara to: (I) respond 10 the kY..s of sigrulicant Section 1.3 of the guidelines reqwres that
counties. Approximateiy 40 percent of mineral resources due 10 urban expan- classification repoftS pertaining to
San Luis Obispo County and 45 percent sion; (2) obtain current information deposIts of constTuCtion aggregale
of Santa Barbara County have been concerning the location and ~uty of materials the informa·
irrl.Jded within the P-C region and have essential rnineraI deposits; and (3) ensure 1m (I) the location and estimated Iotal
been claSSIfied for PCC-grade aggregate. adequate mined-land reclamation. To ~tlty of construction aggregale
In this area. as in any urbaniZing area. address mineral resource conservalion. available for mining; (2) limits of the
importanl Iand-use decisions should be SMARA mandated a two-phase process market {consumptionJ region lhat these
made \l..ith fuU recognition of the region's called dassincation-designatK>n. The potential resources wouJd supply; arxl
natural resources, This Is particularly objecliw: of lhe classifkation-designatlOn (3) an estimate 01 the total quantity of
important \/Jith regard to resources of pnxess is to ensure. through appropriate aggregate malerial that will be needed to
high-grade construction aggregate used in local lead agency poOCies and procedures. supply the consumption region lor the
portland cement concrete. PCC-grade that raw material is available when next 50 years. This information will assrst
aggregate is an Indispensable building needed and does not become inaccessible the Board in detennining the statewide or
material !hat is costly to lranspon. This as a result of inadequate information regional significance of these typeS of
classification report documents lor the during the land·use decision-making deposits:'"
San Luis Obispo-Santa Barbara area: process.

Coast Rock Products. Inc aggregate plant on the SIsquoc Rrver