The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.

© AREVA 2011

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011

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The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Plant Design Accident Progression Radiological releases Spent fuel pools Sources of Information

Matthias Braun PEPA4-G, AREVA–NP GmbH
Matthias.Braun@AREVA.com

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011

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The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident
1. Plant Design of Unit 1-4
Fukushima Daiichi (Plant I)
 Unit I
• General Electric BWR3 (439 MW) • Containment MARK I • Operating since 1971

 Unit II-III
• General Electric BWR4 (760 MW) • Containment MARK I • Operating since 1974

 Unit IV
• Outage for regular inspection

 Unit V-VI
• Outage for regular inspection

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011

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The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.

AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Matthias Braun . . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Plant Design of Unit 1-4 Reactor Service Floor (Steel Construction) Concrete Reactor Building (secondary Containment) Spent Fuel Pool Fresh Steam line Main Feedwater Reactor Core Reactor Pressure Vessel Containment (Dry well) Containment (Wet Well) / Condensation Chamber The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.4 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.

AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1.5 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Plant Design of Unit 1-4 Emergency Core Cooling Systems 1) Residual Heat Removal System 2) Low-Pressure Core Spray (for LOCA) 3) High-Pressure Core Injection (for LOCA) 4) Reactor Core isolation cooling (Unit 2. Matthias Braun .3 [BWR4]) 5) Isolation Condenser (Unit 1 [BWR3]) 6) Borating System (4) (2) (1) (5) (3) (6) The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. .

7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Matthias Braun . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Accident progression 11.Earthquake  Magnitude 9  Power grid in northern Japan fails  Reactors itself are mainly undamaged SCRAM  Power generation due to Fission of Uranium stops  Heat generation due to radioactive Decay of Fission Products • After Scram • After 1 Day • After 5 Days ~6% ~1% ~0.3. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.6 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.5% The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.2011 14:46 . .

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. . a large early release of fission products is highly unlikely Diesel generators start  Emergency Core cooling systems are supplied Plant is in a stable save state The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Matthias Braun . Accident progression Containment Isolation  Closing of all non-safety related Penetrations of the containment  Cuts off Machine hall  Due to successful containment isolation. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.7 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Matthias Braun . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.8 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Accident progression Usual course of action:  Cooling reactor by Residual Heat Removal Systems  Active spend fuel pool cooling  Active containment heat removal Necessary  Electricity for pumps  Heat sink outside Reactor building (Service Water) The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. .

3. 15:01(?) Tsunami hits plant  Plant Design for Tsunami height of up to 5.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.3. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Matthias Braun .9 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. . 15:41 Station Blackout  Common cause failure of the power supply  Only Batteries are still available  Failure of all but one Emergency core cooling system The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.5m  Actual Tsunami height 7-11m  Flooding of • • • • Diesel and/or Switchgear building and/or Fuel Tanks and/or Essential service water buildings 11.7-6. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Accident progression 11.

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.10 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. pumping Water from the Wet-Well in reactor  Necessary: • Battery power • Wet-Well Temperature < 100°C  No heat removal from the buildings The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Accident progression Fukushima I -Unit 1  Isolation Condenser • Steam enters heat exchanger • Condensate drains back to RPV • Secondary steam released from plant Unit 2 & 3 Unit 1  Need Pumps for Water supply  Can’t replace water in Reactor Fukushima I Unit 2 & 3  Reactor Core Isolation Pump • Steam from Reactor drives Turbine • Steam gets condensed in Wet-Well • Turbine drives a Pump.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Matthias Braun .

The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Accident progression 11. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. 16:36 in Unit 1  Isolation condenser stops  Tank empty(?) 13.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. 2:44 in Unit 3  Reactor Isolation pump stops  Batteries empty 14.11 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.3. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.3. . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 13:25 in Unit 2  Reactor Isolation pump stops  Pump failure Consecutively. all reactors are cut of from any kind of heat removal The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun .3.

12 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. . Accident progression Decay Heat produces still steam in Reactor pressure Vessel  Pressure rising Opening the steam relieve valves  Discharge Steam into the Wet-Well Descending of the Liquid Level in the Reactor pressure vessel The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Matthias Braun .

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Accident progression Decay Heat produces still steam in Reactor pressure Vessel  Pressure rising Opening the steam relieve valves  Discharge Steam into the Wet-Well Descending of the Liquid Level in the Reactor pressure vessel The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Matthias Braun . . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.13 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.14 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. Matthias Braun . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Accident progression Decay Heat produces still steam in Reactor pressure Vessel  Pressure rising Opening the steam relieve valves  Discharge Steam into the Wet-Well Descending of the Liquid Level in the Reactor pressure vessel The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.

. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Matthias Braun .The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Accident progression Decay Heat produces still steam in Reactor pressure Vessel  Pressure rising Opening the steam relieve valves  Discharge Steam into the Wet-Well Descending of the Liquid Level in the Reactor pressure vessel The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.15 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. . Accident progression ~50% of the core exposed  Cladding temperatures rise. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.16 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. The actual liquid level lies higher due to the steam bubbles in the liquid) The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. but still no significant core damage ~2/3 of the core exposed  Cladding temperature exceeds ~900°C  Balooning / Breaking of the cladding  Release of fission products from the fuel rod gaps (Measured levels are collapsed level.

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Accident progression ~3/4 of the core exposed  Cladding exceeds ~1200°C  Zirconium in the cladding starts to burn under steam atmosphere  Zr + 2H20 ->ZrO2 + 2H2  Exothermal reaction further heats the core  Estimated masses hydrogen • Unit 1: 300-600kg • Unit 2/3: 300-1000kg  Hydrogen gets pushed via the wet-well and the wet-well vacuum breakers into the dry-well The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.17 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

3. 20:33 (7h w.18 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.3.o. 9:38 (7h w. Matthias Braun . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.3. .3]  Melting of the Cladding  Melting of the steel structures at ~2500°C [expected Unit 1.2.o. water)  Unit 3: 13. 20:20 (27h w. water)  Unit 2: 14.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.o.2]  Breaking of the fuel rods  debris bed inside the core at ~2700°C [maybe Unit 1]  Significant melting of Uranium- Zirconium-oxides Restoration of the water supply stops accident in all 3 Units  Unit 1: 12. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. water) The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Accident progression at ~1800°C [expected Unit 1.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.

Matthias Braun . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.…  Uranium/Plutonium remain in core  Fission products condensate to airborne Aerosols Discharge through valves into water of the condensation chamber  Pool scrubbing binds a fraction of Aerosols in the water Xenon and remaining aerosols enter the Dry-Well  Deposition of aerosols on surfaces further decontaminates air The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Iodine.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Accident progression Release of fission products during melt down  Xenon. .19 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Cesium. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.

. Matthias Braun .The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. 4:00  Unit 2: 13. 8.3 00:00  Unit 3: 13.20 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.41 The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Accident progression Containment  Last barrier between Fission Products and Environment  Wall thickness ~3cm  Design Pressure 4-5bar Actual pressure up to 8 bars  Normal inert gas filling (Nitrogen)  Hydrogen from core oxidation  Boiling condensation chamber (like a pressure cooker) First depressurization of the containment  Unit 1: 12.3. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.3. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Accident progression Positive und negative Aspects of depressurizing the containment  Removes Energy from the Reactor building (only way left)  Reducing the pressure to ~4 bar  Release of small amounts of Aerosols (Iodine. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Matthias Braun . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Cesium…)  Release of all noble gases  Release of Hydrogen Release of unfiltered venting? Gas is released into the reactor service floor  Hydrogen is flammable The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. .21 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Matthias Braun . expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.22 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Accident progression Unit 1 and 3  Hydrogen burn inside the reactor service floor  Destruction of the steel- frame roof  Reinforced concrete reactor building seems undamaged  Spectacular but minor safety relevant The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. .

product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.23 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Accident progression Unit 2  Probably Hydrogen leakage of the condensation chamber (actual pressure exceeds design pressure)  Burn inside the reactor building in proximity to the wet-well  Damage to the condensation chamber  Uncontrolled release of • Gas • highly contaminated water • Aerosols of fission products  Temporal evacuation of the plant  High local dose rates on the plant site due to wreckage hinder further recovery work The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. . expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Matthias Braun . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.

expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. Accident progression Current status of the Reactors  Core Damage in Unit 1. Matthias Braun .7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.24 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. 3  Building damage due to various burns Unit 1-4  Reactor pressure vessels flooded in all Units with mobile pumps  At least containment in Unit 1 flooded Further cooling of the Reactors  Unit 1: by Isolation Condensers  Unit 2&3: by releasing steam Only small further releases of fission products can be expected from Unit 2 and 3 The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.2.

. Radiological releases Its not Chernobyl-like Directly on the plant site  Before Explosion in Unit 2 • Below 2mSv / h • Mainly due to released radioactive noble gases • Measuring posts on west side. Matthias Braun . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Maybe too small values measured due to wind  After Explosion in Unit 2 (Damage of the Containment) • • • • Temporal peak values 12mSv / h (Origins not entirely clear) Local peak values on site up to 400mSv /h (wreckage / Wet-Well inventory) Currently stable dose on site at 5mSv /h Inside the buildings a lot more  Limiting time of exposure of the workers necessary The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.25 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 3. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.

26 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. Matthias Braun . product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Radiological releases 14000 north of Main Building 12000 Main Gate west Gate 10000 8000 uSv/h 6000 4000 2000 0 3/11/11 3/12/11 3/13/11 3/14/11 3/15/11 3/16/11 3/17/11 3/18/11 3/19/11 3/20/11 3/21/11 3/22/11 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. . expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 3. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.

None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Matthias Braun .7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.27 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. . Radiological releases 14000 north of Main Building 12000 Main Gate west Gate 10000 8000 uSv/h Before Containment Damage in Unit 2 6000 After Containment Damage in Unit 2 4000 2000 0 3/11/11 3/12/11 3/13/11 3/14/11 3/15/11 3/16/11 3/17/11 3/18/11 3/19/11 3/20/11 3/21/11 3/22/11 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 3.

7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. . AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. Matthias Braun . expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 3. Radiological releases 14000 north of Main Building 12000 Main Gate west Gate 10000 8000 uSv/h Before Containment Damage in Unit 2 6000 After Containment Damage in Unit 2 4000 2000 Increasing Background due to on-site deposited radionuclide 0 3/11/11 3/12/11 3/13/11 3/14/11 3/15/11 3/16/11 3/17/11 3/18/11 3/19/11 3/20/11 3/21/11 3/22/11 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 12:00 AM The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.28 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.

product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. no usage recommended yet (Pills can interfere with heart medicine) The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 3. so no local high contamination of soil ~20km around the plant  Evacuations were adequate  Measured dose up to 0. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.3mSv/h for short times  Maybe destruction of crops / dairy products this year  Probably no permanent evacuation of land necessary ~50km around the plant  Control of Crop / Dairy products  Distribution of Iodine pills. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. . Matthias Braun . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Radiological releases Outside the Plant site  Reactor building mostly intact => reduced release of Aerosols  Fission product release in steam => fast Aerosol growth  Large fraction of Aerosols deposited in close proximity of plant  Main contribution to dose outside plant are the radioactive noble gases => No „Fall-out“ of the noble gases.29 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.

product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. Spend fuel pools Spend fuel stored in Pool on Reactor service floor  Due to maintenance in Unit 4 entire core stored in Fuel pool  Dry-out of the pools • Unit 4: in 10 days • Unit 1-3. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Matthias Braun .6 in few weeks  Leakage of the pools due to Earthquake? Consequences  Core melt „on fresh air “  Nearly no retention of fission products  Large release The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind.5.30 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. .The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 4.

6 in few weeks  Leakage of the pools due to Earthquake? Consequences  Core melt „on fresh air “  Nearly no retention of fission products  Large release The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 4. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.31 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors. . None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. Spend fuel pools Spend fuel stored in Pool on Reactor service floor  Due to maintenance in Unit 4 entire core stored in Fuel pool  Dry-out of the pools • Unit 4: in 10 days • Unit 1-3.5. Matthias Braun .

Spend fuel pools Spend fuel stored in Pool on Reactor service floor  Due to maintenance in Unit 4 entire core stored in Fuel pool  Dry-out of the pools • Unit 4: in 10 days • Unit 1-3. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 4. Matthias Braun . .32 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes.6 in few weeks  Leakage of the pools due to Earthquake? Consequences  Core melt „on fresh air “  Nearly no retention of fission products  Large release The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.5. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 It is currently unclear if release from fuel pool already happened p.

None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind. Sources of Information Good sources of Information  Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit [GRS. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.or.co.7 April 2011 © AREVA 2011 p.The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 5.33 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors.jp] • Radiological measurements published • Status of the recovery work • Casualties The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr.de] • Up to date • Radiological measurements presented • German translation of Japanese / English web pages  Japan Atomic Industrial Forum [jaif. product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. . Matthias Braun .jp/english/] • Current Status of the plants • Measurement values of the reactors (pressure liquid level)  Tokyo Electric Power Company [Tepco.

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