Cover photo courtesy of Salvatore Vuono, FreeDigitalPhotos.

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Northwest Mountain Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation

Transport Certification Update
From the Directorate Manager:
Keeping an eye on the future

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ver the past two years, we have introduced a series of organizational changes aimed at preparing for eventual implementation of Safety Management System within Aircraft Certification Service. We have created the Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), responsible for overseeing Boeing Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), the largest and by far the more complex delegated organization in the U.S. We also established an office called Oversight and Evaluations. This office is responsible for monitoring and measuring the performance of the Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) in accomplishing our safety mission. It provides the quality and safety assurance functions within TAD. Although organizational change may be necessary for the implementation of SMS, it won’t be sufficient without structured, data-driven, process-based methods like Monitor Safety Analyze Data (MSAD), one of our newly established processes and tools designed to help us with Continued Operational Safety oversight (see the MSAD article in this Edition). Reflecting back on these two years, I can report the change process has gone relatively well. There is no doubt that we have more to do, and more changes are coming our way. Although we’ve followed a change management process and walked through all the right

steps, it is clear now that more could have been done to communicate the vision with people affected. I’m not speaking of presenting a concept or idea to them, but rather helping with the understanding of what these organizational changes mean to them personally. The more people understand their roles, the more willing they are to embrace the change. Still, most of our colleagues kept the end objective in mind, trusting the process, demonstrating a tremendous degree of resilience and flexibility to achieve that objective. I am thankful for the great support of these very important activities. We are in the early stages of the SMS journey. The initial indicators show that we are on the right track. Much like a complex puzzle, pieces are beginning to fit very nicely together, and the emerging picture is an exciting future—a safer global aviation system with shared responsibilities. What we do today and how we prepare for the future will dictate the pace and the degree of success we can achieve. The stakes are high. Fortunately, we have the most important ingredient for success—dedicated and committed people. We have the right team to help us along the long and sometimes rough road ahead.

~ Ali Bahrami

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Transport Certification Update

Features
Safety Management System:
Risk-based safety decisions

By Suzanne Masterson and Phil Forde By Annette Kovite Walter Sippel and Patrick Safarian contributed to this article. By Nazih Khaouly and Dave Walen By Mina Mitchell

Page 3 Page 5

Widespread Fatigue Damage:
You can barely see it

Wi-Fi Onboard Profile of a CSTA:
Ann Azevedo

Page 8 Page 10

Departments
From the Directorate Manager:
Keeping an eye on the future

By Ali Bahrami Information compiled by James Wilborn

Page 1 Page 11

Regulatory Radar:
Regulations published in the Federal Register since the last edition

In memory:
A tribute to Jill Byington, Update Editor-in-Chief

Back cover

On the Web
Aircraft Certification (AIR) Web Site AIR Draft Docs. Open for Comment FAA Flight Plan Quarterly Report Federal Rulemaking Web Site Regulatory and Guidance Library Transport Airplane Directorate Web Site

Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) Organization
Contact Us: If there is a topic you would like to read about, if you would like to subscribe to the Transport Certification Update, or if you have a question or comment, please e-mail us: 9-ANM-TADUpdate@faa.gov

Ali Bahrami, Manager
Technical and Administrative Support Staff, John V. Barrett, Manager. Manufacturing Inspection Office, Christopher Spangenberg, Acting Manager. Transport Standards Staff, Mike Kaszycki, Manager. Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office, Angelos Xidias, Manager Transport Certification Update

KC Yanamura, Assistant Manager
Denver Aircraft Certification Office, Todd Dixon, Manager. Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Bob Breneman, Acting Manager. Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Kevin Hull, Manager Oversight and Evaluations Office, John Piccola, Manager Edition 29, Spring 2011 2

Transport Certification Update

Safety Management System:
Risk-based safety decisions

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afety is paramount to the FAA. Always has been, always will be. We have long had a system of establishing criteria and setting priorities to address unsafe conditions. But we lacked a precise, structured approach. There was no standard method to measure and compare the qualitative data we were using to make decisions on continued operational safety (COS). There was no standardized way to characterize or measure risk associated with a safety issue, or to apply that standardized risk assessment methodology across products.

for determining risk (within the MSAD tool as part of the record) in terms of the statistical probability of a fatal accident.

Another use for TARAM
Recently the Seattle ACO and Transport Standards Staff created a new use for the TARAM risk process. The Seattle ACO used TARAM to help address chem-mill cracking of fuselage skins in an older fleet following a decompression event. This new application goes beyond calculating just the safety risk and now can also predict the number of future events (i.e., decompressions) that would occur, based on each of three actions: replacing the skin, relying on inspections only, or doing nothing. This ability to predict possible future safety events is a first for structures. We shared this information with airplane operators at meetings to address the chem-mill issue, which helped operators to better understand what may be a very burdensome inspection program that will supersede four existing airworthiness directives. Using TARAM, it is now possible to calculate the effect of various inspection thresholds on the risk of a decompression event. This is groundbreaking work that is increasing FAA capabilities and fostering industry cooperation on safety issues.

TARAM: Our answer to MSAD
In 2002, the Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) chartered its own team to develop a risk analysis process specifically for transport airplanes. The result of that multi-year team development is the Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology, or TARAM. TARAM has evolved significantly from lessons learned, as well as from comments and suggestions from many sources.

MSAD: Continued operational safety through structure and standardization
The FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service recently established a process called “Monitor Safety/Analyze Data,” or MSAD, to standardize the procedures and approaches the Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs) use to make continued operational safety decisions. Across the service, MSAD standardizes the way we capture, classify, and store safety information. By providing a common tool and process with riskbased guidelines to evaluate information, MSAD will significantly enhance safety. The associated MSAD order, Order 8110.107 (an FAA employee directive), requires each aircraft certification directorate to develop product–specific, quantitative risk analysis methodology and guidelines

TARAM Handbook
The TARAM handbook was prototyped beginning in 2006 in some technical areas in the Seattle and Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs), and is now in use in all technical areas in each ACO that oversees transport category airplanes. Thanks to feedback received from users, we have further improved many areas such as the risk assessment guidance, the automation tools, and screening of safety issues. The Handbook is posted on the AVS Draft Document website, http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/ draft_docs/, available for public review. The comment period closed February 28, 2011. While the ACOs have been using TARAM as part of the MSAD process for risk analysis and risk management for transport category airplanes, this methodology may also be used by design approval holders, in whole or in part, by agreement with the responsible ACO.

Other safety-related teams
The TAD is also co-leading a subteam with industry under a joint Commercial Aviation Safety Team and International Civil Aviation
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Organization Common Taxonomy Team to develop improved taxonomies for use in data sharing. After a thorough analysis, the teams’ results will be incorporated into the MSAD program. A unique feature of MSAD is the requirement to include a reviewing board intended to improve safety through better decision making. The “CARB” (Corrective Action Review Board) is a cross-functional group that reviews safety issues and the proposed corrective actions; the goal is improved quality and consistency of safety decision making within the Aircraft Certification Service. Participating CARB members from the FAA’s manufacturing, operations, and maintenance counterparts in Aviation Safety bring valuable perspective to safety decisions. Efforts by the CARB, together with the use of objective risk measures, will produce better communicated and globally accepted safety decisions. Implementing TARAM involves a few key points: 1. TARAM encourages data-driven decision making. Through TARAM, the data associated with a particular safety issue, combined with the collective engineering judgment of the analysts, produce a best-effort, good-faith estimate of the actual risk involved. It is important that analysts base their best estimates on relevant data when developing the risk values. 2. TARAM guidelines aren’t based on a “go/no-go” threshold. The risk guidelines in TARAM are not thresholds or requirements and do not obligate the CARB to make safety decisions based only on the results of risk analysis. According to the MSAD Order, the CARB’s determination as to

whether an issue represents an unsafe condition requiring corrective action is based on all considerations relevant to the issue. 3. TARAM doesn’t override regulatory requirements for airworthiness directives (AD). When a regulation requires that ADs be written (such as the Widespread Fatigue Damage rule requirement for mandatory modifications to justify a limit of validity), TARAM results will not be used in making the decision to write an AD. The policy decision to write ADs in those cases was made during the course of rulemaking, and prevails over the TARAM risk guidelines. TARAM results can still be used to aid in setting compliance times in most cases.

TARAM training to all ACOs, which was followed by a Risk Assessment Workshop in October. We also provided training for a major transport airplane manufacturer in February 2011. We continue to offer individual support for transport airplane safety issues as needed. 

For more information ... • Forrest Keller— All transport airplane risk assessment issues except airframe structures (425-227-2790) • John Craycraft – Transport airplane structures risk assessment issues, and back-up for other risk assessment issues (425-227-1951) • Jim Voytilla – Technical support for Excel version of TARAM worksheets, and back-up for transport airplane risk assessment issues (425-227-1164)

TARAM training
In July through September 2010, we offered in-person and online

MSAD user testing participants have provided valuable feedback. From left to right: Kevin Rodriguez AQS-230;Anthony Flores, ACE-117C; Gregg Gullickson, IBM; Casey Garhart, IBM; Doug Pegors, ANM-100S; Chris Spinney, ANE-142; Brett Portwood, ANM130L; Barry Ballenger, ACE-110;Dan Kerman, ANE-180; Brennen Roberts, AIR-140; Ann Johnson, ACE-116W; Eric Barnett, ASW-112; Edwin Tait, Volpe Center; Mike Hemann, ASW-112; Rabah Belloula, Volpe/CSC; Phil Howells, Volpe/CSC

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Widespread fatigue damage:
You can barely see it
It was two days before Christmas. I was sitting in a 737 at 35,000 feet, on my way to a family gathering. I was using my favorite purple rollerball pen to pass the time with a crossword puzzle. As I was filling in the block for E3, I noticed something strange. A drop of purple ink had appeared at the tip of my pen and was growing bigger and rounder as I watched. When it reached “critical mass,” it splashed all over E3 and filled the box with purple ink. A new ink drop followed right behind it, growing larger in just the same way and dribbling all over my page. My pen was reacting to the change in air pressure since the airplane had left the ground. The air inside the pen was at ground-level air pressure because the pen had been manufactured at ground level. But by the time the pen reached cruising altitude inside the airplane, the surrounding pressure in the cabin was less than the pressure inside the pen. So the ink wanted to come out. The pressure inside the pen pushed the ink out until it spilled all over my newspaper.

The problem with pressure

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Properties of pressure
If the outside air is pressing on the airplane at 3.5 psi, and an 8.6-psi pressure differential is maintained, that means 12.1 psi of cabin air pressure must be generated within the airplane. The net effect of that pressure difference is that 8.6 psi then pushes out from the inside, against the fuselage skin. The pressure generated in the cabin to maintain the pressure differential changes as the airplane changes altitude—and as it lands and takes off. The 8.6-psi pressure differential keeps people in the airplane comfortable, but here’s the dilemma: The constant cycling of pressure over the life of the airplane—similar to the constant inflating and deflating of a balloon—eventually takes a toll on the airplane’s metallic airframe structure, such as the fuselage skin. And the effects of this stress appear at the most vulnerable places. Patrick Safarian, Damage Tolerance Technical Specialist for the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, explains that during each cycle, the fuselage skin reacts to the 8.6-psi differential pressure that is pushing out against it. The outside of an aluminum-skin airplane is composed of sheets of metal that may be 12.5 feet
Transport Certification Update

hanges in air pressure affect far more than pens, of course, and are a serious safety consideration to aviation engineers. The interior of an airplane must be pressurized to counteract outside pressure at cruising altitude for the safety and comfort of the passengers and crew. On the ground, we walk around experiencing an air pressure of 14.7 pounds per square inch (psi) (at sea level) pressing against our bodies. Our bodies were designed to function best under these conditions. But when an airplane is 35,000 feet in the air, the outside air pressure is roughly 3.5 psi. Passengers inside the airplane couldn’t tolerate such low pressures.

Regulating pressure
According to the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 25.841), cabins and compartments must be pressurized at a cabin pressure altitude of not more than 8,000 feet at the maximum operating altitude of the airplane. Manufacturers typically design airplanes to maintain a pressure differential of about 8.6 psi between the outside air pressure and the inside pressure at cruising altitude.

long and 5 feet tall. Since the fuselage of the airplane is essentially a large circular tube with a radius that can range from about 5.5 feet for the smallest narrow-body transport airplane to about 11.5 feet for the largest widebody, each section of skin is curved to cover its part of the circle. Then those sections are overlapped, much like roof shingles but on a rounded surface, and the overlap areas appear where the sections are joined to each other. These overlapping portions, typically joined together with three rows of hundreds of rivets, are called “lap joints” or “lap splices.” If you unfold a paperclip and bend and stretch it back and forth, eventually it will break under the stress. When pressure increases inside the fuselage and presses out against the aluminum skin, that stress is felt in the metal as a stretching and bending, especially around the fastener holes of the lap joints. Unlike a balloon, however, metals can be stretched only so many times before they begin to fail. Industry has developed, and continues to generate, data to determine when metals will fail under repeated stress cycles.

Effects of Pressure
Because the fuselage skin on different airplane models has been designed with different thicknesses, results of this stress will show up in different ways. If the
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fuselage skin is thicker (e.g., 0.040inch thickness or more), minute cracks might begin to occur around the edges of certain fastener holes of lap joints and at multiple locations. If the skin is less thick, the continual stretching may cause small cracks to form under the skin’s surface. Such subsurface cracks occur a little distance away from the fastener holes, but they too can occur at multiple locations. Cracking below the surface occurs because the thinner fuselage skin, which is not as stiff as the thicker skin, is actually trying to bow out to accommodate the pressure and the cracks are starting at the curve of the bow. Cracks that start this way can’t be seen until they’ve grown to an unsafe length. Because there typically might be only 1 inch between fastener holes, by the time such cracks reach the fastener holes and are reliably detectable, each crack is about 0.3 inch long and has reduced the structural integrity of the metal fuselage skin to below safe levels. Imagine a 1-inch section of metal fuselage skin between two fastener holes and two invisible cracks, 0.4 inch apart, growing beneath the skin—one towards each fastener. Each crack begins at a place 0.3 inch away from the fastener and grows towards it. By
Fuselage Lower Skin @ Lap Joint (Externally Hidden Detail)
Fuselage Lower Skin @ Lap Joint (Externally Hidden Detail)

Transport Certification Update

Frame Shear Tie
Frame Shear Tie

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structural elements, such as frames or stringers. This multi‑site cracking will not occur in composite (non-metallic) structure because its design and fabrication are different from that of metallic structure.

Up Up Aft Aft

First Initiation (Hole 9)
First Initiation (Hole 9) Externally Visible Portion of Crack

Externally Visible Portion of Crack

Fuselage lap splice cracking

the time the two cracks have reached the fastener holes and can be reliably detected, each is about 0.3 inch long. Now that 1-inch section of fuselage skin is composed of 0.6 inch of cracks and 0.4 inch of solid metal. This cracking scenario is repeated over many inches and at multiple fastener holes—potentially an unsafe condition.

One possible effect of pressure
Small, undetectable cracks like the ones described—cracks that develop simultaneously at multiple locations from years and years of pressurization cycles—can link up and grow very rapidly to bring about catastrophic failure of the metallic structure. This multisite cracking is called widespread fatigue damage (WFD). The likelihood of WFD increases in metallic structure as the airplane accumulates additional flight cycles. Although not discussed in this article, fatigue cracking can also simultaneously occur in similar adjacent

Body frame cracking

The Aloha incident
What WFD can do to an airplane was dramatically illustrated in April 1988 on a Boeing Model 737 airplane operated by Aloha Airlines en route from Hilo to Honolulu, Hawaii, when an 18-foot section of the upper fuselage flew off the airplane during flight. There was one fatality. “Because of that accident,” says Walter Sippel, Aerospace Engineer from the Transport Airplane Directorate, “we had to change our thinking. We have to decide how long an airplane can operate under a given structural maintenance program before we need more engineering data to determine whether that maintenance program needs to be changed. Because WFD is inevitable and will happen to every airplane (with metallic structure) eventually, we need to establish the limit of validity (LOV) of the engineering data that supports the structural maintenance program for each airplane. We need to be sure that WFD will not occur in airplanes,” says Sippel, pointing to a picture of the
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S-4 R Airplane center S-4 L New
S-4 Lap splice repair

splice

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Transport Certification Update

How widespread fatigue damage develops

Aloha airplane with the top of the fuselage gone and the seated passengers exposed, “or we may end up with another Aloha-type accident, but worse.”

Fuselage damage on Aloha Airlines Model 737 airplane. The Lessons Learned from Transport Airplanes web site describes several lessons learned from this accident, and explains that, “continued operational safety is dependent upon the development and implementation of an effective airplane maintenance and inspection program.” For more about this accident, see Aloha Airlines Flight 243, Boeing 737-200, N73711, on the Lessons Learned site.

Preventing WFD: Rulemaking and a Public Meeting
Walter Sippel is team lead for the WFD rulemaking project. The WFD final rule mandates that once the fatigue characteristics of an airplane model are

known and the LOV is established, airplanes must not fly beyond that point, unless additional engineering data are developed to support an extended LOV and any associated maintenance actions. Because of the Aloha Airlines accident, and because of aerospace engineers like Patrick Safarian and Walter Sippel, as well as many in industry who participated through the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, much time, thought, and effort have been put into developing a systemic solution to the WFD challenge and enhancing safety. Immediately after the Aloha accident, airworthiness directives were issued to require operators to inspect for WFD or, in some circumstances when inspections were determined to be unreliable, to replace parts. As discussed in Edition 25 of the Transport Certification Update (page 7), the FAA published a WFD notice of proposed rulemaking in 2006 that would have required design approval holders to establish operational limits on their transport category airplanes and determine if maintenance actions are needed to prevent WFD before an airplane reaches its operational limit.

The FAA received many comments about the WFD notice of proposed rulemaking. Based on our analyses of those comments, we revised the requirements and changed the assumptions made in our regulatory evaluation. Based on the comments received, in 2008, the FAA decided that it was necessary to give the public an opportunity to comment on those changes before finalizing a WFD rule. So we posted in the WFD rulemaking docket a technical document describing the changes. We also held a public meeting as an opportunity for members of industry who would be affected by this rulemaking to express their concerns and viewpoints in the meeting. It was clear from the comments made at the meeting that establishing a way to prevent WFD accidents was everyone’s goal, and that finding a cost-beneficial way to do so was the challenge. After the comment period WFD Rulemaking. The publicly available for the public Docket for the WFD meeting closed, Rulemaking contains the FAA the WFD notice of considered all proposed rulemaking comments as well as the final rule and all comments received on the received regarding technical the notice of document. The proposed rulemaking. final rule was published November 15, 2010, and became effective January 14, 2011.

A safer future
Through the proactive efforts of many individuals, we were able to come up with a rule that adequately addresses the concerns of industry, and still maintains the end goal of all these activities: preventing future accidents due to WFD. 
Many have expressed interest in classes related to WFD. We are aware of one class offered by one University of Washington professor. For more information about the class, contact Ms. Silva Bedoyan at 509-339-5158, fdtcourse@gmail.com.

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Transport Certification Update

Wi-Fi Onboard

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hen we board an airplane today, we expect a safe flight. Some day, perhaps soon, we will also be able to expect—and receive—instant, uninterrupted access to the Internet. But while we want to connect our portable electronic devices (PEDs) (our iPods, laptops, “smart” phones, and ebooks), and while some airlines do offer Wi‑Fi, most do not—yet. Because of this increasing passenger demand to use Wi‑Fi in flight, the FAA is investigating ways to standardize and certify installed systems that can be used by Wi-Fi-equipped PEDs.

airplanes include an installed Wi-Fi access point, which is wired to a radio system that communicates between the airplane and the ground network to provide a connection to the Internet. See some possibilities in Figure 1.

Why “Wi-Fi”?
The term “Wi-Fi” is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance, a nonprofit organization that sets worldwide standards for high-speed wireless local area networks (WLAN). The Wi-Fi Alliance has granted manufacturers the right to use this term to brand their certified products based on IEEE 802.11 standards. But “IEEE 802.11b Direct Sequence” wasn’t catchy enough to describe this emerging technology, and the term “Wi-Fi” was born. First used commercially in 1999, the term suggests wireless fidelity, and might be a play on words (think “Hi-Fi”—which some readers might remember), but it is also suspected that “Wi-Fi” might actually have no specific meaning. WiFi’s yin-yang logo seen in Figure 1 suggests the interoperability of products from different companies.

The current state of regulations
While safety concerns associated with permanently installed equipment are adequately addressed by part 25 regulations, there are no similar regulations or policy guidance for PEDs and Wi‑Fi in flight. Federal Aviation Regulations 14 CFR §25.1353 and §25.1431 address airplane system safety concerns related to interference (including electromagnetic interference) between permanently installed systems operating in the airplane, but these regulations do not address the possible interference from PEDs. As you might guess, the current airworthiness rules did not anticipate a cabin full of transmitters being used by passengers!

How does Wi-Fi work in flight?
Our PEDs commonly include Wi-Fi radio transmitters that are based on Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards. Wi‑Fi radio transmitters operate in the 2.4‑ and 5‑GHz radio bands. Many PEDs contain Wi-Fi radios that operate in both bands. Wi‑Fi radios in our PEDs can transmit to a nearby Wi-Fi access point. The Wi-Fi installations in

Figure 1. One possible configuration of a Wi‑Fi network installed on an airplane. Internet connectivity is provided through a satellite or a terrestrial radio. The PEDs communicate wirelessly to a cabin telecommunications router (CTR).

Satellite

High Power Amplifier/Low Noise Amplifier/

Cabin Telecommunications Router Satellite_Data_Link_WA LA

Satellite Radio

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WA Ethernet

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WA Terrestrial

PEDs using Wi‑Fi radio transmitters are mobile, and their electromagnetic emissions can potentially affect a wide range of equipment installed in an airplane. The regulations specifically addressing the onboard use of PEDs are found in operational rules, which require the pilot or airline to determine whether the use of PEDs in flight is acceptable—no longer a realistic expectation, considering the large number and variations of devices people bring onboard. The existing regulations in 14 CFR §§ 91.21, 121.306, 125.204, and 135.144 require that PEDs do not interfere with the aircraft’s navigation or communication systems. The proliferation of PEDs, including those with transmitters such as Wi-Fi radios, have resulted in additional concerns for potential interference to required equipment, or to equipment essential for safe operation such as smoke detectors or flight data recorders.
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FAA’s current criteria for using Wi‑Fi
The FAA has developed acceptable methods of compliance for Wi-Fi installations intended to connect PEDs to the internet. These methods of compliance are provided to applicants that want certification of installed systems that can be used by Wi-Fiequipped PEDs. We are focusing much of our effort on two issues. 1. Vulnerability of airplane systems to Wi-Fi radio transmitters in PEDs, when they are used with the installed Wi-Fi access point Applicants should submit a plan for detailed electromagnetic compatability (EMC) testing that explains how they will show that PEDs intended for use with the installed Wi-Fi system will not interfere with existing airplane equipment. The test results then must show that the PEDs can safely use the Wi-Fi system in all areas of the airplane. 2. Network security and access to airplane control and navigation systems via a wireless interface For any Wi‑Fi airplane network that interfaces with any airborne system’s networks, servers, routers, data buses, or electronic flight bags, the applicant should conduct a risk assessment of the potential vulnerability to worms, viruses, etc., due to connectivity problems or Wi-Fi users’ actions (inadvertent or intentional) that could result in corrupted airplane assets, degraded services, or other anomalies. Depending on the configuration and connectivity allowed, the FAA may need to impose additional requirements to ensure the security of airplane equipment from external entities.

Other approaches
The methods of compliance for certification of installed systems that can be used by Wi-Fi-equipped PEDs address only PEDs with radios that use the IEEE 802.11 protocol. It provides a way to show that this class of transmitting PEDs will not cause unacceptable interference. But Wi‑Fi represents just one type of PED radio transmitter on airplanes. For newer designs, it is much more effective and efficient to build an airplane that is immune to potential interference from many types of PEDs. Under such an approach, airplane systems are designed to tolerate both intended RF transmissions and unintended spurious emissions from PEDs. Both of these sources of radiated emissions can interfere with onboard systems essential to safety. The guidance developed in RTCA/DO‑307, “Aircraft Design and Certification for PED Tolerance,” outlines design approaches that will ensure that aircraft systems can tolerate all PEDs, without interference to aircraft systems. The approaches outlined in RTCA/ DO‑307 may not be practical for current production airplanes due to the cost of adding additional interference protection. But adding protection to airplane systems to tolerate on-board PEDs may be possible for new airplane designs. The guidance in RTCA/DO307 is accepted by the FAA in Aircraft Circular 20-164. One important note: The Wi-Fi guidance does not address in-flight cell phone use, which is subject to specific

Federal Communications Commission prohibitions. We have, however, developed guidance for specific airplane installation projects for in-flight cell phone systems that can be used outside the U.S.

The future of Wi‑Fi certification
We have received numerous applications to activate in-flight Wi‑Fi systems. We have been working closely with industry to ensure that these systems are properly implemented and meet current standards. We will continue these efforts as this technology evolves. Using guidance in RTCA/DO‑307, and based on experience gained through certification of airplane Wi‑Fi systems, the Transport Airplane Directorate plans to publish policy that will address certification of wireless equipment and systems onboard transport category airplanes. This should reduce the administrative burden on individual programs, as long as applicants follow the methods of compliance in the guidance. 

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CSTAs Chief Scientific and Technical Advisors
Profile of a CSTA: Ann Azevedo, CSTA for Aircraft Safety Analysis, Windsor Locks, CT
The FAA’s CSTAs are a select group of specialized technical experts at the forefront of the agency’s research and development efforts. CSTAs help design and develop aircraft, and apply regulatory policies and practices for certification of technology. They represent the best and brightest, and work in all fields and regions. For more information, see the CSTA website. In this edition we introduce you to another of these 15 experts: Ann Azevedo. AA’s CSTA for Aircraft Safety Analysis, Ann Azevedo, based in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, must stay on top of emerging and rapidly changing technology issues and trends in the challenging field of risk management—a monumental undertaking. Ms. Azevedo reports, “I ask myself what I can do to come up with the best work and the best answers. I always like to know what I can learn from other people.” In her position as the Aircraft Safety Analysis CSTA, Ms. Azevedo uses risk management principles and statistical reports to analyze aviation safety threats. For example, she helped develop FAA Order 8110.107, Monitor Safety/Analyze Data (MSAD), which was issued on March 12, 2010. [See the article on MSAD featured on page 3.] That order introduces a new process for FAA engineers, inspectors, certification offices, and standards staff personnel to use when they analyze continued operational safety data and monitor safety in aircraft fleets. Ms. Azevedo has been a valuable resource to FAA offices during implementation of this new process. Ms. Azevedo also works with the Joint Implementation Measurement and Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT) and the analytical segment of the

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Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which are cross-Government/ industry safety teams that address systemic problems in commercial aviation. The goal of these teams is to uncover problems before an aviation accident occurs. Both CAST and JIMDAT also work to identify emerging and changing threats. After new systems and equipment are put into service, these teams evaluate the safety enhancements to ensure they’re meeting their intended effects and not causing or contributing to new problems. Ms. Azevedo was recently recognized by former Senator Ted Kaufman (D-DE), former Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel in the U.S. federal government, for her contributions to aircraft safety and accident prevention. Senator Kaufman’s “Great Federal Employee Initiative” recognizes exemplary federal employees for their “hard work and unsung dedication in serving the American people.” Ms. Azevedo began her FAA career in 1997 as an engineer in the Engine and Propeller Directorate in Burlington, Massachusetts. She was promoted to CSTA in 2004. Before she came to the FAA, Ms. Azevedo spent 18 years as an engineer at the Western Electric Company and at Pratt & Whitney.
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Ms. Azevedo is a member of the American Statistical Association, Society for Risk Analysis, and System Safety Society. In addition, her industry and Government awards include the Arthur S. Flemming Award for Excellence in Government Service and the Distinguished Engineer of the Year Award from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Ms. Azevedo earned her Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and her Bachelor of Science degree in Systems Planning and Management (Applied Mathematics), with Honors, from Stevens Institute of Technology. 

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Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) Regulatory Radar
The following have been published in the Federal Register since the last issue of the Transport Certification Update. For full text of rulemaking and other actions see: regulations.gov. For full text of policies and advisory circulars, see http://rgl.faa.gov.
consolidates and standardizes definitions and regulations for flightcrew warning, caution, and advisory alerting systems. This action results in harmonized standards between the FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Aging Airplane Program: Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD). Docket No. FAA-2006-24281; FR issued 11/15/2010, effective 1/15/2011. Amendments 25-132, 26-5, 121-351, 129-48. This final rule amends FAA regulations pertaining to certification and operation of transport category airplanes to prevent WFD in those airplanes. For certain existing airplanes, the rule requires design approval holders to evaluate their airplanes to establish a limit of validity (LOV) of the engineering data that supports the structural maintenance program. For future airplanes, the rule requires all applicants for type certificates, after the effective date of the rule, to establish an LOV. Design approval holders and applicants must demonstrate the airplane will be free from WFD up to the LOV. The rule requires that operators of any affected airplane incorporate the LOV into the maintenance program for that airplane. Operators may not fly an airplane beyond its LOV unless an extended LOV is approved.

Current Rulemaking.
Final Rules (FRs):
Maneuvering Speed Limitation Statement. Docket No. FAA-20090810; FR issued 10/4/2010, effective 10/15/2010. Amendment No. 25-130. This final rule amends the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes to clarify that flying at or below the design maneuvering speed does not allow a pilot to make multiple large control inputs in one airplane axis or single full control inputs in more than one airplane axis at a time without endangering the airplane's structure. The FAA issued this final rule to prevent pilots from misunderstanding the meaning of an airplane's maneuvering speed, which could cause or contribute to a future accident. Flightcrew Alerting. Docket No. FAA2008-1292; FR issued 11/2/2010, effective 1/3/2011. Amendment 25131. This final rule revises the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes concerning flightcrew alerting. These standards update definitions, prioritization, color requirements, and performance for flightcrew alerting to reflect changes in technology and functionality. This amendment adds additional alerting functions, and

Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs):
Harmonization of Various Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes--Flight Rules. Docket No. FAA-2010-0310; Notice 1017. NPRM issued 11/5/2010. Comment period closed 2/17/2011. The proposed rule would harmonize the requirements for takeoff speeds, static lateral-directional stability, speed increase and recovery characteristics, and the stall warning margin for the landing configuration in icing conditions with EASA certification standards. Adopting these proposals would eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the U.S. and EASA, without affecting current industry design practices. Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes--Landing Gear Retracting Mechanisms and Pilot Compartment View. Docket No. FAA-2010-1193; Notice No. 10-19; NPRM issued 1/5/2011. Comment period closed 4/5/2011. The proposed rule would harmonize the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes on landing gear retracting mechanisms and the pilot compartment view with EASA certification standards. This proposal would adopt the 1-g stall speed as a reference stall speed instead of the
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minimum speed obtained in a stalling maneuver, and would add an additional requirement to keep the landing gear and doors in the correct retracted position in flight. This proposal would also revise the requirements for pilot compartment view in precipitation conditions. Adopting these proposals would eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the FAA and EASA, without affecting current industry design practices. Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew. Proposed rulemaking under consideration. The proposed rule would amend design requirements for transport category airplanes to minimize the occurrence of design-related flightcrew errors. The new requirements would enable a flightcrew to detect and manage their errors when using installed equipment and systems. Adopting this proposal would eliminate regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the FAA and those of EASA, without affecting current industry design practices. regulatory bodies to develop composite materials specifications and limited associated material allowables. Material specifications developed following the NCAMP procedures are compliant with 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27, and 29. Applicants who wish to use the NCAMP databases and allowables need to validate the applicability of the data to their project with a limited test program.

Transport Certification Update

of unsafe conditions and resulting corrective actions. Certification and Continued Airworthiness of Unbalanced and Mass Balanced Control Surfaces. Comment period closed 2/28/2011. The proposed policy clarifies FAA guidance for the design, certification analysis and testing, and continued airworthiness of control surfaces for transport category airplanes. These include all movable control surfaces and tabs that rely on retention of restraint stiffness or damping for flutter prevention. (Note that these control surfaces may be unbalanced or partially mass balanced). The proposed policy also addresses the maintenance actions necessary to ensure that mass balanced control surfaces remain within their balance limits while in service. This proposed policy statement would supersede Policy Statement ANM-05-115-019, dated November 16, 2007.

Draft Policies
Lithium Batteries Permanently Installed on Airplanes, ANM-113-10004. Comment period closed 10/28/2010. The proposed policy provides guidance on permanently installed (part of the type certificate or supplemental type certificate) rechargeable lithium batteries or rechargeable lithiumbattery systems and their protective circuitry used on transport category aircraft. Specifically, this policy addresses new batteries and batterysystems requirements not adequately addressed in 14 CFR 25.1353, and provides guidance to establish when special conditions are required and what the special conditions must address, and to provide a standardized approach on how to show compliance for these newly developed battery and battery systems including their installations. Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) Policy and Handbook. Comment period closed 2/28/2011. The proposed policy establishes the Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM). It outlines a process for calculating risk as it affects the transport airplane fleet and explains how to use such risk analysis calculations when making determinations

Final ACs Issued
AC 25.1322-1 Flightcrew Alerting. Issued 12/13/2010. This AC provides guidance for showing compliance with certain requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25, as amended by Amendment 25131, for the design approval of flightcrew alerting functions. This AC addresses the type of alert function elements that should be considered (including visual, aural, and tactile or haptic elements), alert management, interface or integration of alerts with other systems, and color standardization. The appendices to this AC also provide examples for including visual and aural system elements in an alerting system.

Policy and Advisory Circulars (ACs)
Final Policies
Acceptance of Composite Specifications and Design Values Developed using the National Center for Advanced Materials Performance (NCAMP) Process. Issued 9/20/2010. The policy memo provides clarification on the acceptability of material specifications and allowables developed by the NCAMP. NCAMP has published a standard operating procedures document detailing the organization, methods, and processes they will use to work with material suppliers, manufacturers, and

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AC 25.571-1D Damage Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure. Issued 1/13/2011. This AC provides guidance for compliance with the provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendment 25-132, pertaining to the requirements for damagetolerance and fatigue evaluation of transport category aircraft structure, including evaluation of WFD, and establishing an LOV of the engineering data that supports the structural maintenance program. This AC includes guidance pertaining to discrete source damage. AC 120-104 Establishing and Implementing Limit of Validity to Prevent Widespread Fatigue Damage. Issued 1/10/2011. This AC offers guidance on compliance with 14 CFR part 26, as amended by Amendment 26-5, part 121, as amended by Amendment 121-351, and part 129, as amended by Amendment 129-48. It tells design approval holders of transport category airplanes how to establish an LOV of the engineering data that supports the structural maintenance program for those airplanes. It also tells design approval holders how to address maintenance actions that have been determined necessary to support an LOV. It tells operators of those airplanes how to incorporate the LOV into their Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Programs. Finally, this AC provides guidance to anyone wishing to extend an established LOV. The actions described in this AC are meant to prevent WFD in the transport airplane fleet up to the LOV.

Transport Certification Update

Draft ACs Issued
AC 25.629-1X Aeroelastic Stability Substantiation of Transport Category Airplanes. Comment period closed 9/29/2010. This AC provides revised guidance for substantiation of aeroelastic stability requirements in consideration of changes proposed to icing certification requirements. The new icing requirements were published for public comment in the NPRM for Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions, Docket No. FAA-20100636, in June 2010 and were highlighted in the Summer 2010 Transport Certification Update newsletter, 28th Edition. AC 25-7A, Change 2, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes. Comment period closed 2/17/2011. This AC provides updated guidance material to ensure consistent application of various harmonized airworthiness requirements, as referenced in the NPRM for Harmonization of Various Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes--Flight Rules, Docket No. FAA2010-0310. AC 25-19X, Certification Maintenance Requirements. Comment period closed 3/25/2011. This AC provides guidance on the selection, documentation, and control of Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs). This AC also provides a rational basis for coordinating the Maintenance Review Board (MRB), if the MRB process is used, and CMR selection processes to ensure premises made in the system safety analysis supporting the compliance with the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1309, and other systems safety rules are protected in service. It also provides flexibility of operators' maintenance planning.
Transport Certification Update

AC 25.729-X Transport Airplane Landing Gear Retracting Mechanism. Comment period closed 4/5/2011. This AC provides updated guidance material to ensure consistent application of harmonized requirements for 14 CFR 25.729, as referenced in the NPRM for Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes—Landing Gear Retracting Mechanisms and Pilot Compartment View, Docket No. FAA-2010-1193. AC 25.1302, Installed Systems and Equipment for Flightcrew Use. Comment period closed April 4, 2011. This AC provides updated guidance material to ensure consistent application of the harmonized requirements of 14 CFR 25.1302, as referenced in the NPRM for Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew, Docket No. FAA-20101175. 

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Transport Certification Update

In memory: Jill Byington

This edition of the Update is dedicated to Jill Byington, Editor-in-Chief and our dear friend and respected colleague, who lost her valiant battle against metastatic breast cancer on December 8.

As Editor-in-Chief, Jill became known in aviation circles internationally and most recently held the position of Communications Specialist among a group of technical writer-editors in the Airworthiness and Technical Communications Branch of the Transport Airplane Directorate. Jill’s 30 years’ experience as a professional writer and editor was primarily in the aviation field. During her career, she was a respected lead writer who guided teams in meeting deadlines and achieving

corporate objectives. She was an experienced newsletter editor, successful freelance writer with articles published in national magazines, an innovative teacher and award-winning project manager. But none of her career achievements really capture the essence of Jill, described by her colleagues as “light hearted, with a wonderful wit” … “the most grown-up person I know” … “one of those extraordinary individuals who affect everyone they interact with” … “one of the most selfless women I’ve ever had the good fortune to call my friend.”

Although Jill achieved much in her career, her most cherished role in life was that of wife and mother. She was extremely proud of her family and spoke often to her colleagues of the joy and meaning they brought to her life. We extend our deepest sympathy to her family as we dedicate this edition of the Update to Jill Byington. 

The links in the Transport Certification Update are current at the time of publication, but they are subject to change at any time. The target documents may be moved to another location, or the links may not remain active due to other factors beyond our control. We regret any inconvenience this may cause.

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057 Produced by: Airworthiness and Technical Communications Branch, ANM-114, Transport Airplane Directorate Acting editor-in-chief: Marcia Walters Contributing editor: Rose Opland

We welcome comments and questions. We might edit letters for style and/or length. If we have more than one letter on the same topic, we will select one representative letter to publish. Because of our publishing schedules, responses might not appear for several issues. We do not print anonymous letters, but we do withhold names or send personal replies upon request. Send letters to the address above or e-mails to: 9-ANM-TAD-Update@faa.gov

The purpose of the Transport Certification Update is to provide the aviation community-at-large and designees with the latest information concerning regulations, guidance material, policy and procedure changes, and personnel activities involving the certification work accomplished within the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate's jurisdictional area. Although the information contained herein is the latest available at the time of publication, it should not be considered "authority approved," unless specifically stated; neither does it replace any previously approved manuals, special conditions, alternative methods of compliance, or other materials or documents. If you are in doubt about the status of any of the information addressed, please contact your cognizant Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO), or other appropriate FAA office.

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