525 N.E.2d 1028 171 Ill.App.3d 867, 525 N.E.2d 1028, 121 Ill.Dec. 721, Prod.Liab.

Rep. (CCH) P 11,883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.App.3d 867, 525 N.E.2d 1028, 121 Ill.Dec. 721)

Page 1

[1] Workers' Compensation 413 Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division. U.S. BANK, a Corporation, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Willie Taylor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Harold LINDSEY and Carmichael Leasing Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. No. 1-07-2606. Dec. 7, 2009. Background: Estate of truck unloader killed when truck backed into him brought negligence action against truck driver and truck leasing company. The Circuit Court of Cook County, James P. Flannery, J., entered judgment on a jury verdict for estate, and truck leasing company appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Patti, J., held that: (1) truck leasing company, which was a common carrier licensed under the Interstate Commerce Act, was not under co-employee immunity provision of Workers' Compensation Act immune from vicarious liability; (2) truck driver and truck unloader were not statutory employees of truck leasing company, for purposes of co-employee immunity; (3) truck unloader was a member of the traveling public intended to be protected by the logo liability doctrine under the Act; (4) evidence was sufficient to establish that truck unloader was the father of 14 children claimed to be beneficiaries of his estate; (5) trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony from motor fleet safety expert that accident was preventable; (6) testimony by pharmacologist, that high levels of morphine in truck unloader's postmortem blood samples was conclusive proof he was a chronic heroin abuser, was inadmissible; and (7) any error in excluding testimony that truck unloader was a chronic heroin abuser was not reversible error. Affirmed. West Headnotes

2168.1(2)

413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2168.1 Agents of Employer of Injured Person 413k2168.1(2) k. Co-workers. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 413k2168) An individual working within the scope of his employment may not sue a fellow employee for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a tort; rather, his sole remedy is a claim for benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. S.H.A. 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. [2] Workers' Compensation 413 2161

413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2161 k. In general. Most Cited Cases Truck leasing company was not, under coemployee immunity provision of Workers' Compensation Act, immune from vicarious liability for negligence of truck driver who backed into and killed truck unloader, in negligence action brought by truck unloader's estate; though truck driver and truck unloader were co-employees and truck driver under the Act was immune from liability arising out of his negligence, truck leasing company was a common carrier licensed to operate under the Interstate Commerce Act, company leased the truck involved in accident, truck bore company's ICC

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

A. 204(e).2d 1028 171 Ill. [6] Automobiles 48A 192(6) 413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2168.S. Works. Most Cited Cases “Logo liability” or “placard liability” under the Interstate Commerce Act operates to hold federally authorized carriers.304(e). 49 U. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. 49 U.2d 1028.S. vicariously liable for the negligence of drivers operating under a lease.2d 1028.. §§ 301 et seq. Borrower or hirer. or Use of Highway 48AV(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 48Ak183 Persons Liable 48Ak192 Owner's Liability for Acts of Third Person in General 48Ak192(6) k. §§ 301 et seq.H. Interstate Commerce Act.525 N. S.C.1 Agents of Employer of Injured Person 413k2168. (CCH) P 11. or Use of Highway 48AV(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 48Ak183 Persons Liable 48Ak192 Owner's Liability for Acts of Third Person in General 48Ak192(1) k.Rep.. and that purpose would be blunted if the cost of those accidents was shifted from one employee to another within the industry. and the immunity of driver's and unloader's employer under the Act did not extend to truck leasing company. company was vicariously liable for driver's negligence under the “logo liability” doctrine.1(1) 48A Automobiles 48AV Injuries from Operation.C. S. 525 N. 121 Ill.1(1) k. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 413k2168) Co-employee immunity is integral to a basic purpose of the workers' compensation system... that are licensed by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) and display their USDOT certificate number on their trucks.1(1) (Formerly 413k2168) The immunity granted to co-employees under the workers' compensation system is not merely gratuitous. In general. 121 Ill. Most Cited Cases 48A Automobiles 48AV Injuries from Operation. 820 ILCS 305/5(a). 820 ILCS 305/5(a).C. Interstate Commerce Act. © 2011 Thomson Reuters.A.App.E. which is to place the cost of industrial accidents upon the industry.. . 49 U.A. §§ 201 et seq. §§ 201 et seq. 820 ILCS 305/5(a.E. §§ 201 et seq.H.Dec. 204(e). b).304(e). Interstate Commerce Act.A. [3] Workers' Compensation 413 2168.A. [5] Automobiles 48A 192(1) 413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2168. Most Cited Cases The overarching purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to protect members of the public injured by trucks operating on public roadways by dispensing with issues of agency and scope of employment. In general. Prod.. company had not paid for the applicable workers' compensation coverage. but is tied to a basic purpose of workers' compensation. 721) Page 2 number and company's corporate name. In general. 721.App.E. §§ 301 et seq.Liab.S. 204(e).1(1) k. 525 N.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.3d 867.3d 867.H.304(e).Dec.1 Agents of Employer of Injured Person 413k2168. S. [4] Workers' Compensation 413 2168. and instead fixing and placing full vicarious responsibility on the carrier for the negligent operations of its vehicles.A.

. S.2d 1028. and instead was employed by food service company which delivered food for children.E. Most Cited Cases The ultimate goal of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICC) and the implementing regulations is to make a carrier under the Act liable for those injuries caused to the traveling public which arise out of the negligent operation of any vehicle leased to it and operated under its ICC permit. 204(e). [9] Automobiles 48A 192(6) 48A Automobiles 48AV Injuries from Operation.App. Most Cited Cases Workers' Compensation 413 2168.1 Agents of Employer of Injured Person 413k2168.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. No Claim to Orig.. nor was effected by.1(2) 48A Automobiles 48AV Injuries from Operation..304(e).C. 49 U. Hirer or borrower. 204(e). Interstate Commerce Act. §§ 201 et seq. 121 Ill.F. Prod.1(2) k. Interstate Commerce Act. Interstate Commerce Act. 49 C. In general. §§ 301 et seq.Dec. §§ 201 et seq.C. §§ 201 et seq.E.5. [8] Workers' Compensation 413 2161 413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2161 k. US Gov. . the Workers' Compensation Act. 525 N. where truck unloader was not an employee of leasing company. though truck leasing company was the statutory employer of truck driver under the Interstate Commerce Act and regulations adopted thereunder.Dec.App.2d 1028 171 Ill.304(e).Rep.. © 2011 Thomson Reuters.. Borrower or hirer.A.E. employee relationship between leasing company and truck driver via the logo liability doctrine was a legal fiction that had no effect on. 721) Page 3 [7] Automobiles 48A 197(3) Most Cited Cases (Formerly 413k2168) Truck driver and truck unloader were not statutory employees of truck leasing company for purposes of co-employee immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act. 121 Ill. was not a co-driver of the truck..C. 525 N. 49 U.3d 867.R. or Use of Highway 48AV(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 48Ak183 Persons Liable 48Ak192 Owner's Liability for Acts of Third Person in General 48Ak192(6) k. [10] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H 76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 6 413 Workers' Compensation 413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or Common-Law Rights of Action and Defenses 413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General for Employee's Injury or Death 413XX(C)1 Right of Action of Employee or Representative Generally 413k2160 What Persons Liable as Third Persons 413k2168. when determining whether truck leasing company was vicariously liable for negligence of truck driver when driver backed into and killed truck unloader.A.3d 867.S.S. Most Cited Cases Truck unloader was a member of the traveling public intended to be protected by the logo liability doctrine under the Interstate Commerce Act. 721.304(e). §§ 301 et seq.2d 1028. § 390. disabled persons and housing authority.H. 204(e). 820 ILCS 305/5(a). Co-workers.525 N. Works. (CCH) P 11.A.A.Liab. 49 U.S. or Use of Highway 48AV(A) Nature and Grounds of Liability 48Ak183 Persons Liable 48Ak197 Persons Other Than Owners or Operators in General 48Ak197(3) k. §§ 301 et seq. for purposes of negligence action brought by estate of truck unloader alleging truck leasing company was vicariously liable for negligence of truck driver who backed into and killed truck unloader.

525 N. [11] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H 6 76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76HI Status in General 76Hk8 Formalization of Parental Relation in General. Offer. Most Cited Cases Evidence was sufficient to establish. [14] Appeal and Error 30 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 970(2) 76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76HI Status in General 76Hk2 Evidence 76Hk3 k. US Gov. Most Cited Cases The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of a trial court.3d 867.A. children's mother testified that she and truck unloader lived together as husband and wife for 20 years. by consent or by judicial determination. 740 ILCS 180/2 et seq. S. Most Cited Cases The burden of proof applied to a litigant in establishing parentage is clear and convincing evidence.A. Admission of evidence in general. Most Cited Cases Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H 13 76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76HI Status in General 76Hk8 Formalization of Parental Relation in General. Most Cited Cases Under the Parentage Act. principal of school testified that truck unloader was listed on school records as the children's father and assumed all responsibility for the children as their father. [12] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H 3 388 Trial 388IV Reception of Evidence 388IV(A) Introduction. 525 N.2d 1028.App. and Admission of Evidence in General 388k43 k.. 750 ILCS 45/3.E. S.3d 867.525 N.App. In general. a father-child relationship may be established in a number of ways. 121 Ill.Rep. that truck unloader was the father of 14 children whom the estate claimed were beneficiaries of truck unloader's estate. and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Most Cited Cases Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H 12 © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. Recognition or acknowledgment. 750 ILCS 45/3.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. S. Most Cited Cases Trial 388 43 76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76HI Status in General 76Hk2 Evidence 76Hk6 k.2d 1028. Judicial proceedings.E.Dec. in trial of wrongful death action brought by estate of deceased truck unloader against truck leasing company.H.E. Legitimation 76Hk13 k. though truck unloader had never married the children's mother.A. Most Cited Cases Death 117 75 117 Death 117III Actions for Causing Death 117III(G) Evidence 117k74 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 117k75 k. estate submitted valid signed order of heirship from probate court.H. Legitimation 76Hk12 k.2d 1028 171 Ill. 121 Ill. 721. . (CCH) P 11. Prod.Dec. Works. Sufficiency. Presumptions. 750 ILCS 45/3. by presumption.H. Sufficiency.Liab. Rulings on admissibility of evidence in general. 721) Page 4 76HI Status in General 76Hk2 Evidence 76Hk6 k. and no evidence was introduced to rebut the evidence of parentage. [13] Appeal and Error 30 970(2) 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 30k970 Reception of Evidence 30k970(2) k.

Rulings on admissibility of evidence in general. 121 Ill. 721.1 Evidence in General 30k1050. Most Cited Cases An abuse of discretion occurs in the admission of evidence when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. 721) Page 5 30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 30k970 Reception of Evidence 30k970(2) k. the judgment or decree will not be disturbed. 121 Ill.Dec.E. Most 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)10 Admission of Evidence 30k1051. or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done. US Gov. Most Cited Cases Any error of trial court by admitting testimony from motor fleet safety expert stating that accident was preventable.E. Most Cited Cases Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony from motor fleet safety expert that accident was preventable and that truck driver did not have a commercial driver's license (CDL) as required by federal regulations. Most Cited Cases Not every error requires reversal. Particular cases. Nature.1(2) k. 525 N.3d 867.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. .Dec. [16] Evidence 157 519 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)1 In General 30k1025 Prejudice to Rights of Party as Ground of Review 30k1026 k. Errors not affecting result. in wrongful death action against © 2011 Thomson Reuters. and relation of objects.1(1) 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)1 In General 30k1025 Prejudice to Rights of Party as Ground of Review 30k1027 k. In general.2d 1028.2d 1028.App. (CCH) P 11. Most Cited Cases Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below. Prod. in wrongful death action against truck leasing company brought by estate of truck unloader who was killed when truck backed into him.3d 867.2d 1028 171 Ill. condition.Liab. Works. 525 N.1 Same or Similar Evidence Otherwise Admitted 30k1051.E. [18] Appeal and Error 30 1026 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)8 Reception of Evidence 30k1047 Rulings as to Evidence in General 30k1047(1) k.1(1) k. In general. [20] Appeal and Error 30 1051. In general. No Claim to Orig.Rep.App. [15] Appeal and Error 30 1047(1) Cited Cases The erroneous admission of testimony does not constitute grounds for reversal where there was sufficient competent evidence to support the ruling. [19] Appeal and Error 30 1027 157 Evidence 157XII Opinion Evidence 157XII(B) Subjects of Expert Testimony 157k519 k. [17] Appeal and Error 30 1050.525 N.1(2) 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)10 Admission of Evidence 30k1050 Prejudicial Effect in General 30k1050. Most Cited Cases A party is not entitled to a reversal based upon rulings on evidence unless the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the outcome of the trial.

3d 867.Dec.3(1) 30 Appeal and Error 30XII Briefs 30k758 Specification of Errors 30k758. Points and arguments. and thus was inadmissible. 721) Page 6 truck leasing company brought by estate of truck unloader who was killed when truck backed into him. did not constitute grounds for reversal.Rules. jury was free to draw the conclusion that truck unloader was contributorily negligent due to his ingestion of morphine and that the economic value of his life was diminished as a result. Works. nor is it the obligation of the reviewing court to act as an advocate or seek error in the record. [23] Appeal and Error 30 756 157 Evidence 157XII Opinion Evidence 157XII(D) Examination of Experts 157k555 Basis of Opinion 157k555.Dec.2d 1028. Most Cited Cases Appeal and Error 30 758.10 k.Ct. No Claim to Orig.3 Requisites and Sufficiency 30k758.3(1) k.525 N. in wrongful death action brought against truck leasing company by estate of truck unloader killed when truck backed into him. Most Cited Cases A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments. [25] Appeal and Error 30 1079 © 2011 Thomson Reuters.10 returned a verdict finding that truck unloader was 50% contributorily negligent.E. and report made no mention of any evidence of drug abuse. US Gov. Most Cited Cases Appeal and Error 30 761 30 Appeal and Error 30XII Briefs 30k761 k. that high levels of morphine in truck unloader's postmortem blood samples was conclusive proof that he was a chronic heroin abuser.2d 1028. 525 N. in wrongful death action brought against truck leasing company by estate of truck unloader killed when truck backed into him. . Sup.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.E.3d 867. Insufficient discussion of objections. Sup.2d 1028 171 Ill. as pharmacologist was permitted to testify that somehow truck unloader ingested morphine prior to his death. 721. Medical testimony. 525 N.App.App.Liab. [24] Appeal and Error 30 1079 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(J) Harmless Error 30XVI(J)11 Exclusion of Evidence 30k1058 Same or Similar Evidence Otherwise Admitted 30k1058(2) k. it is not merely a repository into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research. lacked foundation and highly prejudicial. Rule 341. Other testimony of same witness. was not reversible error. where pharmacologist did not perform his own analysis. 121 Ill. Most Cited Cases Any error of trial court. 121 Ill.E. as the evidence of truck driver's negligence was overwhelming. (CCH) P 11. by excluding testimony from pharmacologist that based on postmortem blood samples truck unloader was a chronic heroin abuser. pharmacologist was relying on autopsy report. [21] Evidence 157 555. Form and requisites in general. In general.Rep. was speculative.Rules.Ct. and jury 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court 30k1079 k. Most Cited Cases The consequence of not complying with rule requiring appellants to clearly set out issues raised and legal support is waiver of those issues on appeal. Most Cited Cases Testimony by pharmacologist. Rule 341. Prod. [22] Appeal and Error 30 1058(2) 30 Appeal and Error 30XII Briefs 30k756 k.

that Lindsey acted negligently when he drove a truck leased from Carmichael which struck decedent and resulted in his *440 death.Rules. 2003. (West 2002)). decedent. Kralovec. Kahan. Williams guided Lindsey back toward the area where decedent was unloading. IL. Lindsey testified that on July 28. among other things.Ct. 121 Ill. IL. 525 N. (Carmichael). Jerry Williams was assigned to work as decedent's partner on July 28. pinned decedent between it and another truck crushing his rib cage. Most Cited Cases Truck leasing company waived on appeal argument that it was entitled to reversal based on cumulative error. however. 525 N. in wrongful death action brought by estate of truck unloader killed when truck backed into him.2d 1028 171 Ill.Rep. US Gov.E. Williams testified that he saw Lindsey driving a truck that was heading westbound before he stopped and began backing up in the area where decedent was working. (2) plaintiff failed as a matter of law to establish that decedent was the biological father of the beneficiaries. The truck initially stopped. **519 Shimon B. Michael J. (5) it was error for the circuit court to bar evidence of decedent's alleged chronic heroin use.Dec.2d 1028. BACKGROUND Defendant Lindsey and decedent worked for Open Kitchens. 721) Page 7 30 Appeal and Error 30XVI Review 30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court 30k1079 k. he was working as a truck driver for Open Kitchens and at the time of the incident he was approaching the delivery dock from his usual route. Meenan. decedent was employed as a helper for Open Kitchens loading and unloading trucks that were delivering milk when Lindsey accidentally backed his truck into decedent.E. . it suddenly began rolling back. Lindsey was working as a truck driver for Open Kitchens on the day of the accident and the truck he was driving was leased to Open Kitchens from Carmichael. The matter was tried before a jury and a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for $3 million and reduced by 50% based on decedent's contributory negligence. Sup.Liab. he noticed that a road was closed for a neighborhood festival. for Appellee. When the truck was situated where it could be unloaded. Bank. Chicago. the independent administrator of the estate of Willie Taylor. As Lindsey arrived near the dock. claiming that it was vicariously liable for the actions of Lindsey. Insufficient discussion of objections. No Claim to Orig. For the reasons that follow. where company's brief did not identify any specific error. although they were both working for Open Kitchens at its location in Chicago. Illinois. O'Neill & Miller. Decedent was working in the dock area unloading another truck before Lindsey backed into him. Rule 341. alleging. 2003. and (6) the effect of cumulative error merits a new trial. filed suit against defendants Harold Lindsey and Carmichael Leasing Company. Inc.E. Studnicka. Williams was able to move away from the truck's path. crushing him against another truck.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.S. people with disabilities***311 **520 and the Chicago Housing Authority's breakfast and lunch programs. Williams shouted and motioned for Lindsey to stop.3d 867.3d 867. Kahan. ultimately resulting in his death. however. 121 Ill. Justice PATTI delivered the opinion of the court: *439 ***310 Plaintiff U. (4) it was an abuse of discretion to allow testimony that the accident at issue was preventable.2d 1028. Prod. we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. or explain what prejudice was suffered. Plaintiff alleged negligence against Carmichael under the “logo liability” doctrine. On July 28. Lindsey took a © 2011 Thomson Reuters.525 N. or offer any examples of unfairness in such portion of its argument. 2003. Defendants appeal the judgment of the circuit court alleging that: (1) the circuit court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict based on immunity under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. LLC. for Appellant. (3) the circuit court erred in allowing evidence of Lindsey's failure to obtain a commercial driver's license and lack of experience.App.App. Lindsey and decedent were not working together in the same truck that day. a company that delivers food for children. Williams did not notice anything different or strange about decedent on that day and testified that he performed his duties without any difficulty. LLP. Kralovec.Dec. Williams testified that he observed decedent carrying out his duties that morning which included lifting heavy boxes and entering and exiting trucks. Haynes. Works. but he was struck on his arm and thrown to the ground. (CCH) P 11. Lindsey's*441 truck. Chicago. unloading milk crates from a truck that was facing eastbound. 721. which owned the vehicle.

E. 121 Ill. Robinson testified that Lindsey said. that the amount of morphine found in decedent was equivalent to approximately 100 milligrams of heroin. whoa. was prohibited from testifying that decedent was a heroin abuser based on the evidence of morphine in his blood. at the time leading up to his death. my foot slipped. although he admitted on cross-examination that the paramedic who responded to the accident carried morphine and decedent was alive upon arrival at the emergency room. 525 N. Lindsey exited the truck and discovered that decedent had been struck by the Carmichael truck he was driving and was crushed between it and the eastbound-facing truck. 721) Page 8 different route that required him to back up toward another parked truck where Williams and decedent were unloading milk crates. “Oh my God. Atkinson testified that the Carmichael truck was subject to federal regulations that required Lindsey to be qualified and trained to possess a commercial driver's license (CDL). however. He stated that he saw Williams and used him as a spotter to guide his truck into the proper location for unloading. Atkinson further testified that Lindsey did not meet the minimum training requirements nor did he possess the necessary technical knowledge to properly maintain his vehicle or to safely operate it. He stopped his truck upon hearing the shouting and moved the vehicle forward.2d 1028 171 Ill.App.525 N. O'Donnell testified that decedent had between and 10 and 20 times the amount of morphine in his blood that would customarily be administered to a patient in moderate pain. 121 Ill. 721. a pharmacologist. he began to back up. O'Donnell's opinion regarding indications of heroin abuse based on the presence of morphine in decedent's blood following his death. O'Donnell's testimony and permitted him to testify to an opinion that decedent was impaired based on the presence of morphine in his blood at the time of his death. Atkinson stated *442 that had Lindsey avoided backing up altogether by planning a better route or exiting the truck. Plaintiff further asserted that Dr. Dr. began work at 3:30 a. was stacking crates in a milk truck when he heard shouting. Dr. inspecting the area behind the truck before backing up or simply waiting for the parked truck to leave before backing and unloading. and generally impaired cognitive and motor ability. O'Donnell. an Open Kitchens helper. Defendant Carmichael sought to admit expert testimony from Dr.Rep. Payton immediately phoned 911.Dec.E. the accident would have been prevented. morphine or Dr. Robinson was riding in the truck with Lindsey and asleep in the passenger seat when she felt the truck jerk in a manner that woke her up. disorientation. At the conclusion of Dr. specifically heroin.Dec. also an employee of Open Kitchens.” It would cause confusion. on the day of decedent's death. Finally. Plaintiff alleged that any reference to morphine or heroin would be unduly prejudicial and irrelevant in the absence of evidence that decedent was intoxicated or impaired. pharmacist and nutritionist to support one of its affirmative defenses. O'Donnell's testimony. O'Donnell's theory was speculative and lacked a proper foundation for purposes of admissibility.” Melvin Payton.App. which would be an overdose in © 2011 Thomson Reuters.E. When Lindsey “got the OK” from Williams. Plaintiff offered Arthur Atkinson as an expert in motor fleet safety. Prior to trial. react to and judge danger. . resulting in decedent's diminished ability to perceive.3d 867. I don't know what I did. No Claim to Orig. She testified that she was a helper assigned to work with Lindsey on the day at issue. the defense made an offer of proof that he would have testified that heroin is metabolized in the blood to morphine. Carmichael alleged that decedent was under the influence of narcotics. Prod. He turned to look in the direction of the eastbound-facing truck that decedent was unloading and observed Lindsey's truck back into decedent and crush him between the ***312 **521 two trucks.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.2d 1028. O'Donnell testified that there were no records or other indications that decedent was administered morphine by the paramedics or by anyone else at the hospital prior to his death. 525 N. He described the effect of such an amount of morphine as “molasses on your brain. O'Donnell.Liab. plaintiff moved to bar Dr. O'Donnell from making any references to heroin. He testified to the minimum safety standards. The circuit court denied plaintiff's motion to bar Dr. Santana Robinson.2d 1028. (CCH) P 11.3d 867. Works. Lindsey testified that Williams yelled at him to continue backing up and that he stopped when he thought he was close enough. federal regulations and industry standards.m. did your foot slip off the brake?” Lindsey denied that his foot slipped off the brake or that his truck lurched back toward the parked truck. US Gov. He stated that he heard someone yelling “whoa.

121 Ill.2d 1028.Rep.2d 1028 171 Ill. Sean Taylor and Angel Logan. Malachy Parish in Chicago and had known decedent and his family for over 15 years from the neighborhood and from decedent's bringing the children to and picking them up from school. Sandra testified that decedent wanted a big family because his parents and four of his five siblings had died. decedent would pick them up and walk them home from school. 525 N. Both Angel and Sean testified that decedent would wake them in the morning. however. No Claim to Orig.2d 1028. After dating for a short period.525 N. He was 23 years old and she was 18 years old. At the end of the day. talk and generally function. he attended school meetings regarding the children's progress and he volunteered at the school. Malachy's and returning to pick them up from school in the afternoon. Works. and that she had know him for 15 years. Miller observed decedent's taking the children to school every day and picking them up from school and characterized him as a very involved parent who was attentive to any problems that arose with his children at school and took a significant interest in his children's education.Dec. and that decedent's tolerance to that amount. Josephine McCord testified that she was a pastoral associate at St. proved that he was an “every day chronic heroin addict.Dec. respectively. testified that decedent was their father. the two began to live together. **523 ***314 Principal Deborah Bonner testified that decedent enrolled some of the beneficiaries in Dett Elementary School. testified that she and decedent met in August 1983. the mother of the beneficiaries. no one other than decedent claimed to be his father and decedent acted like his father every day and raised him and all of his brothers and sisters. make them breakfast and prepare them for school. 721) Page 9 the average person.” Decedent assisted them with problems they were having and they celebrated holidays together and attended church as a family.” The circuit court rejected Carmichael's offer of proof. US Gov. The girls took Sandra's last name and the boys took decedent's last name. evidenced by his ability to walk. Sandra Logan. 121 Ill. they continued living together continuously until decedent's death in 2003. The circuit court ruled that any testimony from Dr.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. organized the household chores and the one to check in with the children's teachers when a problem arose. and although they never married.3d 867. Sean and Angel testified that decedent encouraged them to stay in school. 721.3d 867. She stated that decedent joined St. McCord testified that she saw decedent with the children almost every day and knew him to *444 be a loving father to all of his children. Malachy's parish and enrolled some of his children in the school in 1997. Over the years. Bridget Miller testified that she was the principal of St.Liab. holding that the issue before the jury was whether decedent was impaired and *443 thus contributorily negligent.App. Miller testified that decedent was listed as the father of the children on all of the school documents. 525 N. who were 17 and 20 years of age. Bonner further testified that decedent was very involved and never declined a request to assist the school with fund-raising © 2011 Thomson Reuters. the one who made sure the children made it to school.” Sean and Antwon testified that decedent played with them on a regular basis and that Friday night was “family night. Logan explained that decedent was not listed on the birth certificates of the children because he was either babysitting or did not make it to the hospital in time.E. he went to court to sign papers acknowledging that the children they were raising were his children and all of their children lived with her and decedent all of their lives. the first child died as an infant. age nine. Bonner described decedent as a person in charge of his family.E. where she was principal. Antwon Taylor. She also testified that decedent wanted all of his children to be baptized and brought them in groups to St. .E.App. Sean testified that decedent lived in the family home all of his life. (CCH) P 11. She further testified that no other man ever acted as the children's father. Sandra testified that decedent acknowledged paternity to public aid agencies. O'Donnell with respect to his opinion that decedent***313 **522 became impaired as a result of chronic heroin abuse was more prejudicial than probative and barred him from testifying as such. testified that his father was decedent and that he called his father “Bill. decedent represented himself to her and others as the children's father and there was never a doubt in her mind that decedent was the father of the children in question. The jury heard testimony regarding the impairing qualities of morphine and the quantity thereof in decedent's blood. She observed decedent bringing his children to Dett School and to St. Malachy school for 28 years. Prod. Malachy's to be baptized. Sandra and decedent had 13 children.

v. 541. in pertinent part: “No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer * * * or the agents or employees of any * * * [employer] for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee.E. The circuit court admitted the heirship order into evidence allowing the jury to consider the order as well at the forgoing testimony for purposes of determining paternity of the 14 children.Liab. 266 Ill. Ramsey. in the alternative. [3][4] It is well-settled law in Illinois that section 5(a) of the Act operates to make workers' compensation benefits the exclusive remedy of an injured employee against a negligent co-employee acting in the course of his or her employment.Dec. other than the compensation herein provided. 76 Ill. citing Fregeau.App. We reject each of Carmichael's theories advanced for avoiding liability and hold that the circuit court properly denied its motion for directed verdict and judgment n.3d 609. Rowley Interstate Transportation Co. Inc.2d 618.2d 1304. a new trial.E. it argues that this fact has no bearing on Carmichael's vicarious liability. however. 100.2d 7. He was elected to the Dett Local School Council as an advisory board member to assist the principal in making suggestions about instructional programs and to approve the budget.3d 867.E. 368 N. (West 2002)).2d at 486. It further found that decedent was also contributorily negligent and reduced the award by 50%.C. Plaintiff offered into evidence a certified copy of an heirship order entered by the probate division of the circuit court on September 19. the legal representatives of his estate. Inc. or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury. Following the conclusion of defendants' case-inchief. 394 N. Bonner stated that the most important thing in decedent's life was his children.S. No Claim to Orig.E.2d 1304 (1997). Augustine. Angel Logan. We agree with plaintiff.Dec. (CCH) P 11. 222 Ill. thus. 451 N. Plaintiff concedes that decedent and Lindsey were coemployees of Open Kitchens.E.2d at 224..2d 1380 (1994). In support of its proposition that Carmichael is immune from liability. US Gov. his sole remedy is a claim for benefits pursuant to the Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act. 96 Ill. 639 N. Jordan Taylor. 175 Ill. 802.2d 812 (1959).E.Dec. Gillespie. Matrell Taylor. Carrie Taylor. 175 Ill. Juray Taylor.E.2d 1028. Kreider Truck Service. 68 Ill.E. Antwon Taylor.Dec.” 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2002).E.2d 1028 171 Ill. (2000) and. which is imposed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act and embraced in Illinois Supreme and Appellate Court authority. 525 N. 17 Ill.Dec.2d 218.2d 479.Dec.E. the jury returned a verdict for $3 million in favor of plaintiff. ANALYSIS Vicarious Liability.2d 870 (1983). 721) Page 10 activities or programs. 11 Ill. 2003. Terra Cotta Truck Service.Dec.App. and (3) decedent was not a member of the public intended to benefit from the Interstate Commerce Act.. (2) decedent and Lindsey were considered coemployees of Carmichael under the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. v. Defendant Carmichael filed this timely appeal. The circuit court denied all motions and entered judgment on the jury's verdict. Essence Taylor. William Taylor. 716. Rather. [1][2] Carmichael first contends that Lindsey and decedent were co-employees of Open Kitchens and it is well-settled law in Illinois that an individual working within the scope of his employment may not sue a fellow employee for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a tort.Dec. 676 N.2d 1028. 96 Ill. 451 N. Duan Taylor. 676 N. 203 Ill. to any one wholly or partially dependent *446 upon him. 161 N. 71 Ill. Fulton v. Morrison. 121 Ill. Chicago Short Line Ry. Fregeau v. 31 Ill. 716. 121 Ill.2d 1287 (1977). Co. Sean Logan.App. Prod. 525 N.525 N. Section 5(a) of the Act states.Rep.Dec. the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act prohibited recovery in tort from Carmichael. and ***315**524Rylander v. 71 Ill. Works.E. it cites to Ramsey v.2d 535. the Interstate Commerce and Workers' Compensation Acts Defendant Carmichael contends that it was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because: (1) Lindsey was immune from liability for his negligence by operation of the Workers' Compensation Act and. Carmichael could not be vicariously liable for decedent's injury and death. § 101 et seq. 721.. Defendants filed posttrial motions seeking a judgment *445 notwithstanding the verdict or.2d 1179 (1979). See Schedler v. . 561.3d 867. 100. 222 Ill.2d 870 (finding that section © 2011 Thomson Reuters. The order identified decedent as the father of Dominique Logan.o. Willie Taylor and Diante Taylor. Kia Logan. therefore.

31 Ill.3d 867.E. 802.E.E.2d 1101 (2000).Dec. *447 Section 5(b) was enacted in order to allow both the employer and employee “ ‘an opportunity to reach the true offender while preventing the employee from obtaining a double recovery. 68 Ill. 11 Ill.E.E. Kreider.Liab.2d at 227-28.2d 535.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. 76 Ill. (CCH) P 11.2d 1028. [5][6] Illinois also has a well-established line of authority holding that interstate carriers operating pursuant to a grant of authority evidenced by an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) license number and a company name displayed on a truck are vicariously liable for the negligent actions of their drivers. 191 Ill. Kreider. It states.E. 676 N. this does not mean that Lindsey was not negligent or that another may not also be responsible for his negligence. 721. 266 Ill. See Schedler.2d 1028. 121 Ill. 368 N. 112. that are licensed by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) and display their USDOT certificate number on their trucks. then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer's payment of or liability to pay compensation under this Act.3d 609. 100. but also by anyone wholly or partially dependent upon him or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury): Rylander.Dec.E. 246 Ill. relevant to our analysis here. 721) Page 11 5(a) of the Act operates not only to prohibit an action by the employee. 266 Ill. No Claim to Orig. the Workmen's Compensation Act eliminated fault as a basis of liability. 17 Ill. 203 Ill. vicariously liable for the negligence of drivers operating under a lease.2d at 628. Kreider. is to protect members of the public injured by trucks operating on public roadways by dispensing with issues of agency and scope of employment. 161 N. . The immunity granted to co-employees under the workers' compensation system is not merely gratuitous.2d 535.525 N. 730 N. such as Carmichael. 68 Ill. Simmons Co. 483 N.” Rylander. 31 Ill. 561.3d 609.3d 867.App.Dec.” 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2002). but is tied to a basic purpose of workers' compensation. 108 Ill.Dec. “[T]he basic purpose of workmen's compensation [is] to place the cost of industrial accidents upon the industry. Section 5(b) of the Act permits an injured employee to seek recovery for damages from another when compensation is required under the Act. 525 N.Dec.2d 1287. 541. 368 N. 203 Ill. So far as persons within the industry are concerned. Fulton.E.2d at 541-42. Fulton. quoting J.Dec.E. 541. 394 N. Ramsey.2d 1179.2d 1380. Hartford Insurance Group v. Prod. 368 N.Dec. 31 Ill.Dec.Dec.App. 76 Ill.2d 1028 171 Ill.. 121 Ill. That purpose would be blunted if the cost of those accidents was shifted from one employee to another within the industry. 331-32. in pertinent part: **525 ***316 “Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some person other than his employer to pay damages. 222 Ill. 394 N.Dec.2d 1304.Rep.Dec.E. Although Lindsey is immune under section 5(a) of the Act for any negligent conduct.2d at 628. The overarching purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act. 17 Ill. It is also clear from the facts that Open Kitchens is also entitled to the immunity benefits of the Act with regard to Lindsey's negligence. See also Schedler.2d 1179. Schedler.2d 1179.2d 326. 68 Ill. Co-employee immunity is integral to a basic purpose of our workers' compensation system.E.App. 639 N.E.L. 76 Ill.E.Dec. and instead fixing and placing full vicarious responsibility on the carrier for the negligent operations of its vehicles. 394 N.E. 541.E. 11 Ill.’ ” In re Estate of Dierkes. Works. there is no doubt that defendant Lindsey is immune from liability arising out of his negligence with respect to the performance of his duties for Open Kitchens pursuant to the Act. This is commonly referred to as “logo liability” or “placard liability” and operates to hold federally authorized carriers. 955. [7] The Interstate Commerce Act and the corresponding regulations were created in order to correct widespread abuses by authorized interstate carriers that would immunize themselves from © 2011 Thomson Reuters. 636.2d 1287. 525 N.2d 7. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. and plaintiff may not recover damages from him.2d 812.E.2d 273 (1985).Dec.2d at 12-13. 161 N. 802.App.2d 1380. 90 Ill.2d 106.2d 812 (holding that the Act bars any action by injured employees against co-employees based on a co-employee's negligence in the course of his or her employment). US Gov. 639 N.2d 1287 (finding that was the purpose of the regulatory scheme that the carrier-lessee be vicariously responsible to the public for the negligent operation of the leased vehicle without regard to whether at the time in question it was being used in the business of the lessee). 11 Ill. 561. ex rel. 802. Under the circumstances presented here. 175 Ill.2d 7.

however.E.E. and to assume full control and responsibility for the operation. although Carmichael is not the lessee here. 561.S. it is not disputed that Carmichael is a common carrier licensed to operate under the Interstate Commerce Act. . 150 Ill. in our view. Furthermore. 721. 78. 368 N.3d 609. 523. 298.E. It did not have an employer-employee relationship with either individual or any relationship with Open Kitchens other than the lease agreement that was in effect at the time of the accident. 96 S. 344 U.3d 867. do not require the lessee itself to operate the equipment. 73 S.2d 1028. 104 Ill. Inc.Ed. US Gov. 11 Ill. v. Inc. 502 N. the plaintiff was a “loaned employee” of the defendant within the meaning of the Act and barred personal injury action by the plaintiff against the defendant).Dec. 74 Ill.2d 664 (1978) (finding that the Act allows one injured while working for a special or borrowing employer is entitled to receive workmen's compensation benefits from that special employer if that employee is under the direction or control of the borrowing employer). 303. 203 Ill. We agree with the circuit court that the situation here is one in which the Interstate Commerce Act applies and that it functions to impose vicarious liability upon the carrier for the negligence of the driver.Dec. Roebuck & Co.2d at 176.Ed. such as Open Kitchens or an employer who borrows an employee from another employer.S. United States. But the lessee must assume the responsibility for the shipment and have full authority to control it. (CCH) P 11.3d 845.Dec. will benefit from the immunity afforded under the Act.. 525 N. the lessor may perform that task by furnishing the driver with the equipment. 97 L. Inc. 92 Ill. contemplates that the employer that pays for workers' compensation coverage.. which provided workers' compensation benefits. at 36. 76 Ill. 307.2d 1028 171 Ill. 394 N. Brada Miller Freight Systems. 525 N. 849. 423 U.Rep. Fulton. 46 L. Further. Kreider. however. to compensate the lessor on an established basis. v.2d 1287. 235 N. 46 L.” Transamerican Freight. 221. 352 (1953). 266 Ill.. 229. 121 Ill. it is also undisputed that Carmichael owned the truck that Lindsey operated on the day of the accident and it bore Carmichael's ICC number and corporate name. Contrary.2d 341 (1986) (holding that borrowing employer's temporary right to control work activities and right to dismiss claimant from his temporary job and direct him back to lending*449 employer created an employeremployee relationship and afforded immunity to the borrowing employer under the Act).Dec.E. 31 Ill. Prod.2d 1028.Ct..525 N.2d 214. Abbott Products Inc. In Walker v. at 233. See Schedler.3d 867.2d 535. 385 N. and upon which the costs of workplace injuries fall. Illinois case law or the Interstate Commerce Act to support Carmichael's theory that it should enjoy the immunity afforded to employers and co-workers of negligent employees through the Act.E. Lindsey. 802.E. In the instant case. 96 S.Ct.App. Carmichael does not and cannot articulate a logical explanation supporting its conclusion that because Lindsey is immune for liability for damages as a co-employee of decedent and employee of Open Kitchens. Highway Insurance Co. 121 Ill.E. 721) Page 12 liability to the public by leasing trucks from third parties. Carmichael did not pay premiums for workers' compensation coverage for either Lindsey or decedent.2d 309 (1968) (ruling that where business supplying temporary labor to various firms had resigned full control of the plaintiff for time being and the plaintiff was doing all his work under direction and control of the defendant***318 **527 who had right to terminate the relationship and to direct the plaintiff to report back to business supplying labor. 639 N. the court stated: “[T]he Commission has developed and designed its responsibility-and-control regulations in order to prevent a sharing of operating *448 authority under the guise of ***317 **526 a lease of equipment. Saldana v. 68 Ill. See Evans v.App.E.Dec. Sears. With only special exceptions. 311.App. 541. No Claim to Orig.Liab. the cases upon which Carmichael relies are inapposite because each of those cases deals with claims against an employer of coemployees. Works.2d 7. to Carmichael's assertion. Midwest © 2011 Thomson Reuters.2d 1179. In Transamerican Freight. * * * The regulations.Ct. we find nothing in the Act. the regulations require the lessee to ship under its own bill of lading. 28. The Act. 24 Ill.E.App.Ed. It is clear that the ultimate goal of the federal statute and the implementing regulations is to make a carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act liable for those injuries caused to the traveling public which arise out of the negligent operation of any vehicle leased to it and operated under its ICC permit. v.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.Dec. 423 U. that it should also enjoy the same immunity.Dec.App. See Transamerican Freight Lines.2d 169 (1975). 337.S.2d 379. American Trucking Associations.2d 1380. to inspect the equipment. Wirtz Cartage Co.

Robinson and Williams were all freight handlers and engaged***319 **528 in activity directly affecting commercial motor vehicle safety. 78 Ill. 266. 525 N.525 N.Dec.5 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations defines an employee. 11 Ill. 394 N. No Claim to Orig. 76 Ill. Essentially. We do not interpret section 5(a) of the Act to bar recovery from anyone and everyone who may be liable for the negligent conduct of someone who happens to be a co-employee of the injured party.E.F. 525 N. Walker. thereby making them all employees of Carmichael. Works. the carrier was subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and displayed their business names and ICC numbers on the vehicle.2d 1028 171 Ill.App. 78 Ill. There was no evidence that Carmichael paid for workers' compensation insurance coverage for decedent or Lindsey and no evidence that decedent knew that Open Kitchens leased trucks from Carmichael or that Carmichael even existed. which is to make the carriers liable for the negligence of drivers. we find that Carmichael is not immune from liability because the Act does not offer immunity to third parties who are vicariously liable for an otherwise immune coemployee's negligent conduct. 53.3d 867.Liab. § 390. He had no employment obligations to Carmichael and Carmichael had no obligations to him as an employer. the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act. 266 Ill.2d 1028.App. 119 Ill.Dec.5 (2008). . and a freight handler. § 390.E.2d 1373.2d 1179. Moreover.2d 1373.3d 609.App. 431 N. 351. 59 Ill. Section 390. Further. an employee relationship was said to have existed if the interstate carrier had a lease agreement in place with operators or owneroperators. 639 N.F. Prod. dissenting)).3d 433.Dec. 266.R. 68 Ill. 266. the purpose of the Act would be violated by allowing Carmichael to take advantage of the immunity offered to employers *450 and coemployees where Carmichael did not have an employee-employer relationship with decedent and did not undertake to provide workers' compensation coverage for decedent or Lindsey as an employee.E. other than an employer. plaintiff's ability to recover from third parties is cut off and the immunity afforded by the Act reaches to non-employers such as Carmichael. in relevant part: “Employee means any individual. social security tax and to award the plaintiff seniority rights.E.2d 74 (1976) (Dixon.E.E.3d 640.E. 561.App. 103 Ill.5.. 461 N. 121 Ill. As a result. there is nothing to suggest that this vicarious liability concept was intended to effect the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees under the Act. 541.2d 7. Hershberger v. J.App.E. 721) Page 13 Emery Freight Systems.Dec.App. 646.2d 72 (1982). it would be immune from an action in under section 5(a) of the Act based on the regulations because decedent.3d at 646. Payton.2d 535.3d at 646. who is employed by an employer and who in the course of his or her employment directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety.R. According to Carmichael. a mechanic.Dec. Schedler v.E.. would not be advanced if we were to hold that section 5(a) of the Act prohibits plaintiff from seeking damages from a licensed carrier under these circumstances.2d 1028. We find no reason to apply the benefits to which employers and co-employees are entitled under the Act to an unrelated common carrier such as Carmichael. US Gov.. 119 Ill.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. 119 Ill. 802. this court held that a truck driver who claimed to be an independent contractor for the defendant was in fact an employee based on the facts which included the defendant's right to control the plaintiff truck driver. 368 N. This is especially true here because decedent was a complete stranger to Carmichael. 203 Ill. 346 N.” 49 C. 439.2d © 2011 Thomson Reuters. 121 Ill. 721.Rep. 461 N. 78 Ill. 461 N. Such term includes a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle).3d 867.2d 1287. Kreider. Home Transport Co.App.App.E.Dec. Carmichael claims that because decedent was injured while at work by a coemployee. Although Illinois courts have held that entities subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and its rules would be required to assume responsibility for the negligence of the drivers of vehicles based on lease agreements “as if those drivers were employees” (see generally Walker. 37 Ill.2d 1373 (1983). In those instances where vicarious liability was applied.Dec. Schedler. 31 Ill.Dec.Dec. Fulton.3d 348. (CCH) P 11.E. to have exclusive use and possession of the equipment and the obligation to pay for unemployment tax. Rowley Interstate Transportation Co. We disagree. [8] Carmichael next argues that it is entitled to immunity under the Act because decedent and Lindsey are considered “statutory employees” of Carmichael pursuant to the definition of employee in 49 C.

3d at 126. 78 Ill. 530 F. Fourth Circuit.2d 89 (4th Cir. Despite the fact that the interstate carrier would be vicariously liable for the driver's negligence just as if she were its employee. 119 Ill.1974). 594 N.E. defendants claim that even if section 5(a) of the Act does not prohibit plaintiff from pursuing his negligence claim. as a motor carrier. by Bales. In the federal district court.” Walker. 189 (S. Prod.Dec.3d at 646-47.E. (CCH) P 11. pursuant to the lease agreement. 721) Page 14 1380. Bales had hired the plaintiff as an assistant driver of the leased truck. finding that “such a view is consistent with the purposes sought to be achieved by © 2011 Thomson Reuters. Inc.2d at 91. The trial court held that decedent was a member of the traveling public as a matter of law and that United was not eligible to seek immunity under the Ohio workers' compensation statutes. 72 Ohio App.1982). 72 Ohio App.. the court emphasized that the plaintiff had not been the owner of the vehicle and had no contractual relationship with Colonial.E. Miller Brothers Paving. we have also stated “that any employee status resulting *451 solely from the statutory requirements is a fiction which exists only to insure the [interstate carrier's] responsibility to shippers and members of the general public and not to create an employment relationship for workers' compensation programs.3d at 128.E. 494 F. [9] Next. The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff “was as much a stranger to Colonial as a shipper or *452 a member of the traveling public. Carmichael notes that no Illinois case has addressed the facts before us or has decided whether a freight handler like decedent and a co-employee of the negligent driver is a member of the traveling public for purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act.App. No Claim to Orig. 494 F. is simply a designation by virtue of the Interstate Commerce Act for purposes of protecting the public. The United States Court of Appeals. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the decedent's estate and United appealed alleging that decedent was not a member of the traveling public and thus not contemplated as an individual protected under the Interstate Commerce Act. 594 N. 494 F.2d 1373. The decedent's widow brought suit against United alleging negligence based a theory that liability was statutorily imposed against it as an interstate carrier permit holder and. 525 N. Proctor. the truck was involved in a collision with another truck. Although Colonial argued that its statutory liability did not extend to the plaintiff. 461 N. In Proctor.2d 1028 171 Ill. 266.E. The circuit court. and its progeny. Inc. Carmichael cannot be liable because decedent was not a member of the traveling public intended to be protected under the Interstate Commerce Act.2d at 97. the decedent who was a helper on a truck that was driven by Tong was killed in a collision between the truck in which he was a passenger and an unoccupied dump truck.2d at 97. who had been injured while acting as an employee for the lessor Bales. citing Riddle v. an interstate carrier. there are four sister jurisdictions that have also considered this issue and have adopted the reasoning articulated by the court in Proctor.App. which killed Bales and seriously injured the plaintiff.525 N. the owner-operator of the truck. concluded that decedent was indeed a member of the traveling public and plaintiff urges us to adopt the reasoning of the federal court in Proctor v.Liab. Carmichael's assertion that it is immune from liability because decedent was a “statutory employee” must therefore fail.Dec. .D. and to deny him recovery upon the independent contractor theory would undercut the primary purpose of the regulatory design. 121 Ill. Works. The Ohio Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the decedent was a member of the public as a matter of law. 121 Ill. Proctor.2d 1028.2d at 92. We hold that under the fact of this case that the employee relationship referred to between Lindsey and Carmichael. however.Supp. Stonerock. While transporting Colonial's items. rather.Rep. reversed and held that federal law eliminated the concepts of independent contractors and required Colonial to assume responsibility for the negligence of Bales as the driver of the leased vehicle.2d 1028. Stonerock. In Stonerock v.E. US Gov.3d 867. is a legal fiction that neither has an effect on nor is affected by the Act but.. via logo liability. the plaintiff there was injured while riding as a passenger in a truck that had been leased to Colonial.App.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. it was responsible for the negligence of the personnel furnished by the agent from whom the carrier leased the truck at issue. 72 Ohio App. 494 F.3d 123.E.Dec.2d 94 (1991). In addition. 721.3d 867. 525 N. Trans-Cold Express.Ill. Colonial Refrigerated Transportation. 186.. 594 N.2d at 90. Inc. Tong operated the truck pursuant to a lease agreement between Trowbridge Storage Company and United Van Lines.” Proctor. the jury found that Bales was an independent contractor***320 **529 at the time of the accident and returned a verdict in favor of Colonial.

883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. US Gov. 721. 93 N. 511.W.] In acknowledgment of that purpose.E.App. Zero Refrigerated Lines.2d 1380.E. he was a member of the public intended to be benefitted by the vicarious liability provisions of federal law. Jordan would provide transportation to the plaintiff so that he could reach a destination convenient to him.1979). Inc. 68 Ill. 268 N.Super. 721) Page 15 the federal law” based on Proctor and the intent of the Interstate Commerce Act. as lessor.2d 547 (Minn. 266 Ill.W.M.2d 7.E. 368 N. Fulton. had leased the truck to Allied Van Lines. The New Mexico Appellate Court held that the lessee was liable for the resulting damages caused when an employee of the lessor was killed while riding in the leased truck. 521 A. While plaintiff was working as a helper. The plaintiff had been hired by Jordan to act as a helper whose responsibilities were to load and unload trucks and.2d 1287.Dec.2d 1028. is entitled to the same protection under the ICC regulations. decedent was not an employee of defendant Carmichael. Stonerock. an accident occurred that caused serious injury to the plaintiff. as the Wilkerson court found.” Matkins. 360 Pa. 541.2d 1028. 602 P. as such. Wilkerson had no direct relationship with the carrier and no ownership interest in the leased vehicle.3d 867. Prod. [Citation. He was a member of the public within the intendment of federal law. 268 N. 121 Ill. 11 Ill. Inc. *454 We find. In the case sub judice. the New Mexico court held: “One of the principal goals of the ICC regulation imposing responsibility on the carrier was to provide the public with financially responsible carriers. Allied Van Lines. that the Proctor approach is consistent with and true to the intent of the Interstate Commerce Act and the decisions of our supreme court regarding “logo liability. Therefore. relying on Proctor.2d 25 (1987). He was an employee of Open Kitchens who regularly worked loading and unloading food from trucks at the direction of Open Kitchens. 360 Pa.Super.Dec. 394 N. 525 N. Again. Works.2d at 30.E. was as entitled to the protection intended by the Commission's regulations as any other member of the traveling public. at 532. Similarly. (CCH) P 11.App. applying the protection of the federal regulations and statutes to the plaintiff who was injured when he was a passenger in a truck which was involved in interstate commerce. 525 N. The Wilkerson court stated: “To hold that Wilkerson was not entitled to recover from the carrier under whose certificate of necessity the truck was being operated would defeat the salutary purpose of ensuring compensation for innocent persons who have been injured as a consequence of the carrier's doing business. 802. after completing his work. While the carrier argued that it could not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries on the basis that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was an employee of the lessor. which.2d at 551. 521 A. the plaintiff and another individual were employed by the lessor to drive a truck that had been leased to an interstate carrier. No Claim to Orig. could recover against Allied for the negligence of Jordan. 594 N. the court relied upon the decision in Proctor.E.” Schindele. or the negligence of one of his employees. representing the estate of deceased. 561. Inc. Inc.2d at 100. Ulrich..M.” See Schedler.3d 867. Kreider.2d 1028 171 Ill.E. the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed and relying upon the Proctor decision held: “[W]e think the lessee's assumption of ‘full responsibility in respect to the equipment it is operating’ requires it to assume liability to a codriver for injury caused by the driver's negligence.” Wilkerson. The truck was owned and operated by Jordan. 203 Ill. . 639 N.1978). at 516. In Wilkerson v. 72 Ohio App.3d 609. who leased the truck to Fisher & Brother. 93 N. 31 Ill. © 2011 Thomson Reuters.Dec. in turn.Rep. In Schindele v.2d 535.Dec.Dec. in Matkins v..2d 195 (App. 121 Ill.App. and to deny him the right to seek recovery from the carrier would undercut one of the primary purposes of the regulatory pattern. and. Although it is true that Jordan. could not have recovered from the carrier if he had been injured by his own negligence.2d 1179. 523. Proctor reasoned that plaintiff..2d at 200. although an employee of the negligent driver and a passenger in the truck driven by him.525 N. 76 Ill. the estate of a deceased passenger who had *453 been hired by the lessor as an assistant driver brought suit against the carrier for damages arising out of the ***321 **530 decedent's death when his co-driver negligently operated the leased truck.E. 602 P. The plaintiff suffered injuries when his co-driver negligently caused an accident. We feel that plaintiff here.3d at 131.Liab.

2d 236. v..3d at 1068.Rep.E.2d 253. We disagree. 313 N. US Gov.E. 525 N. 721. 721) Page 16 Decedent was not a co-driver of Lindsey's truck. [11][12] The burden of proof applied to a litigant in establishing parentage is clear and convincing evidence. uncontradicted by a disinterested witness.2d 236 (2007). 263. nor was he ever in Lindsey's truck before the day he was struck and killed by Lindsey.Dec. a father-child relationship may be established in a number of ways: by presumption. 1068. 525 N. 288 Ill. to carry its burden of proving the children's parentage. Specifically.E.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. Carmichael argues that although plaintiff may have proved that the 14 individuals were heirs to the estate.E.525 N.3d 867. Sean and Angel testified that the boys were given decedent's last name and the girls were given Sandra's last name.3d 867.2d 255 (1974) for the proposition that an order of heirship from the circuit court is entitled to no weight in a wrongful death case. as a matter of law. which included a valid. signed order of heirship from the probate court and testimony from several witnesses about decedent's paternal relationship with the putative children he was raising with their mother. Carmichael claims that plaintiff did not prove that decedent was the father of the beneficiaries according to the Illinois Probate Act (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/2-1 (West 2002)). Englewood Hospital Ass'n.” 750 ILCS 45/3 (West 2002). 158 Ill.Dec. Bridget Miller. 863 N. 121 Ill. Sandra further testified that decedent signed all public aid documents as father of the children required to receive benefits from the government. testified that she and decedent met in 1983 and lived together as husband and wife but they never married..2d 1028. .. and we find that case to be distinguishable on the facts. 6. Works.Liab.2d 172 (1991). **532 ***323 Carmichael claims that the testimony and probate court order is insufficient and that without more. 121 Ill.Dec. principal of the school attended by some of the children. we must conclude that this finding was against the manifest weight of *455 the evidence.2d 1028 171 Ill.M. 688. 378.App. In re Parentage of John M. 360-61. 19 Ill.3d 356.H. and not based on the evidence presented. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite result is clearly evident or where the determination is unreasonable. (CCH) P 11. Prod. the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/6) (West 2002)).E. regardless of the marital status of the parents.A.2d 998 (2001).App. 760 N. The Foster court. 19 Ill. 225. Sandra Logan. no basis to conclude that decedent was anything other than a member of the public under the circumstances presented in this case.A.2d at 198. Miller testified that decedent acknowledged the children as his own and assumed all responsibility for the children as their father. 260 Ill. J. 224 Ill. made no such holding. it failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged beneficiaries were decedent's next of kin for purposes of recovering damages under the Wrongful Death Act.2d 1028. We find it important to point out that Carmichael presented no evidence to rebut the evidence plaintiff admitted at trial.S.E. 212 Ill. 303 Ill. testified that decedent was listed on all of the school records as the children's father. There is.App. however.App.E.2d 259 (1999). The Parentage Act provides that “[t]he parent and child relationship * * * extends equally to every child and to every parent. In re S. © 2011 Thomson Reuters.App. Decedent had no interest in the equipment or lease agreement at issue. seq. in our view.2d 255. Foster. 224 Ill.Dec. J. 309 Ill. In re Estate of Willis. Accordingly. 565.S. under the Parentage Act. In support of its contention. 237 Ill. Illinois courts have held that a written acknowledgment of paternity is not required and that proof offered by way of testimonial and documentary evidence. In addition. In re M.Dec. No Claim to Orig. 817 N. the children's mother. 326 Ill. 198.2d 500 (2004).E. and the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2 et.E.3d 559.App.3d 1055.Dec. In order to reverse a trial court's finding that a party met its burden with clear and convincing evidence. 273. M. by consent or by judicial determination.R. Carmichael cites to Foster v. (West 2002)). plaintiff has failed.Dec.E. 574 N. 6. we hold that decedent was a member of the public intended to be protected under the Interstate Commerce Act.. 142. 214 Ill.2d 182.. 309 Ill. 863 N. arbitrary. Accordingly. was neither paid nor controlled by Carmichael and there is ***322 **531 no evidence decedent even knew of the relationship between Open Kitchens and Carmichael.E. 709 N.Dec. Next of Kin and Establishment of Parentage [10] Carmichael contends that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to establish that decedent was the biological father of the children who claimed to be beneficiaries of the estate.3d 683. The court there did not accept the order of heirship because it was both undated and unsigned by the court. 313 N.App.

280 Ill. in 1902. 721.App. Our supreme court has addressed this very issue as far back as 1905 in Miller v. including allowing evidence of Lindsey's failure to obtain a commercial driver's license and lack of experience. quoting Brock v.E.2d 720 (2002). that the father must show. 344 Ill. taken together with the valid. Bauer v. 272 Ill. a party is not entitled to a reversal based upon rulings on evidence unless the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the outcome of the trial. it would not have effected the outcome of the trial. by his acts. 377 Ill. 105. 763 N. 92. unlike the facts in Pennington. 525 N. 75 N. Moreover. 416 N.Rep. 912.App.E. 261 Ill. Pennington. taken together. Years later. In other words. the children and principal Miller. Many of these disinterested persons testified in the case. there was a significant amount of testimonial evidence of other witnesses that he had denied to them that he was the father of the parties and that such denials were made both before and after he married their mother.E. points out. that he regards. it as his legitimate offspring and that all his acts and words. we note that Carmichael alleges that the circuit court erred by allowing certain evidence to be admitted with regard to plaintiff's theory of negligent entrustment. words and treatment of the child.E. at 226. 610.” Brice. Prod. He acknowledged to a number of people that he *456 was the father of the two children. must show that he intends to make the child legitimate * * *.3d 895. Carmichael concedes the issue in its reply © 2011 Thomson Reuters. 399 (1882). The Pennington court stated: “[The] acknowledgment required by the statute is a general and public one. We have reviewed Carmichael's arguments and *457 the record and find the alleged evidentiary error to be without merit.’ ” Pennington.3d at 998. where a decedent was living with his first wife with whom he had four children. State. 566-67.E. No Claim to Orig.App. Kamm. 344 Ill.Dec. 316 Ill. 85 Ind. especially in light of the fact that Carmichael has no evidence to rebut the children's parentage.2d 1013 (2003). In the instant case.E. 525 N. had two children: one in 1864 and the other in 1865. “ ‘Having removed the “bar sinister. However. 471. Works. 411. an unmarried woman. 879 N.” Pennington. 48 Ill. decedent married the mother of the illegitimate children and lived with her until his death some two years later. the acknowledgment fixes the status of the child which cannot be changed by anything the mother or father might say afterward.E. and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. cumulative and prejudicial and the circuit court should not have given the jury Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions.Dec. 919.3d 867. Plaintiff. First. 75 N. and desires the public to regard. 666. certified order of heirship is overwhelming evidence. 919.3d 995. Civil. in its reply brief. 75 N. at 224. Snelson v. Brice v. 280 Ill. 93 Ill. Kennedy. and that the effect of cumulative error merits a new trial. His wife's cousin. that evidence relating to Lindsey's lack of proper licensing were improper. The Pennington court further observed that “no matter what the purpose of the acknowledgment was or whether the father intended to make the child his heir. 198 Ill. Simmons v. 218 Ill. The testimony from Sandra. Specifically. 919 (1905). 68.01 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000)).Dec.E. then Carmichael would be vicariously liable.App. 218 Ill.E. . 121 Ill. 121 Ill. 721) Page 17 is sufficient to prove paternity. (CCH) P 11.2d 541. and even if Carmichael's claims amounted to error.525 N.01 to the jury.E. allowing***324 **533 testimony that the accident at issue was preventable.E.2d 1013. 105. but that it must only determine whether Lindsey was negligent. 75 N. 787 N.Dec.Liab.E. that the circuit court did not instruct the jury on a theory of negligent entrustment nor issue IPI Civil (2000) No. Estate of White. Memorial Hospital. Evidentiary Errors [13][14][15] Carmichael alleges various evidentiary errors on the part of the circuit court. there was no evidence admitted at trial to rebut decedent's parentage. 204 Ill.2d 1188 (1981). as a matter of law.App.2d 1028. citing Pennington. 919. 997-98. 801 N.2d 1028 171 Ill. 68. at 226. citing Kennedy v. 220. 218 Ill.Dec. Garces. An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.3d 88.Dec. and barring evidence of decedent's alleged chronic heroin use. No.3d 867.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. 801 N. 397.2d 796 (2003). and the record confirms. We therefore find that plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that decedent was the children's father under the Illinois Parentage Act. US Gov.2d 1028. The jury was further instructed that if it found Lindsey to be liable.Dec.E.” they cannot replace it. The circuit court in fact advised the jury that it would not be called upon to decide whether Carmichael was negligent.App.Dec.2d 1.2d 478 (2007). The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of a trial court. 218 Ill.

Dec. In fact. 471. any conceivable error occurred. we conclude it was not reversible because we cannot discern any prejudice to Carmichael especially where the jury reduced the estate's recovery by 50% based on decedent's contributory negligence. lacked a foundation for its admission and was highly prejudicial.Y. v. Prod.Rep. 123.Dec. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation.E. the judgment or decree will not be disturbed. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n. In this case. 267.2d 240 (2008). 257 Ill.]’ ” Simmons. Peters. 754 N. O'Donnell's opinion was the postmortem finding of morphine in decedent's blood. We. 629 (1991). 721) Page 18 brief. the circuit court sustained its objection and it was not given to the jury. “ ‘ “Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below. The jury was free to draw any and all reasonable inferences from Dr. 153 Ill.2d 626.2d at 566-67. we do not view the Atkinson testimony as improper. That report made no mention of any evidence of drug abuse. No Claim to Orig. 786 N.2d 76.2d 1028.3d 867.E. even if we were to conclude that the testimony was improperly admitted. 606 N. O'Donnell would testify as an expert that heroin metabolizes to morphine in the blood and that the amount of morphine found in decedent's blood showed that he injected approximately 100 milligrams of heroin on the morning of his death. The testimony was elicited to advise the jury on the recognizable risk of Lindsey's conduct and the basis for concluding that the harm flowing from the consummation of that risk was reasonable preventable.App.3d 114.” [Citation. not every error requires reversal.2d 1028 171 Ill. 763 N.E.2d 720. 324 Ill. the word “license” does not appear anywhere in the issues instructions. citing Abrahamson v. we find that reversal is not warranted on this basis. Cochrane's of Champaign. 32.E. Carmichael argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Atkinson to testify as an expert that the accident at issue was preventable and by barring Dr. 34. 982. O'Donnell's theory was speculative. 94. See Heiden v.E.Dec.2d 264. [21][22] Carmichael also asserts that barring Dr. 847. O'Donnell's testimony of decedent's alleged chronic heroin use. 579 N.2d 729. [16][17][18][19][20] Next.E. 180 Ill. Nevertheless. 733.App.App. McGovern. 525 N.App. however. With regard to Carmichael's claim that Atkinson's testimony improperly referred to preventability. 285 Ill.3d 28. citing Rinaldo v. 198 Ill. 587 N. 271 Ill. We therefore hold that Carmichael's claims with regard to improper jury instruction and argument pertaining to negligent entrustment are without merit. We further note that Dr. Cummings. Hiscott v.E. 261 Ill. or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done. O'Donnell's testimony regarding impairment due to the presence of morphine in decedent's blood.3d 584. 525 N. We can find neither a time in the trial where the jury was advised nor an instruction to “consider the lack of licensure as negligence” as Carmichael claims in its brief.2d 1111 (1992). Works.E.Dec.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill. 121 Ill. 755. 673 N. (CCH) P 11. 721. including inferences that decedent was contributorily negligent or that the economic value of his life was diminished as a result. O'Donnell was permitted to testify that decedent somehow ingested morphine prior to his death in an amount that was higher than a level normally found in an individual under these circumstances. The record reveals that Carmichael objected to modified IPI Civil (2000) No. 121 Ill. especially since he did not perform analyses of his own and relied on the autopsy report. however. the only established fact underlying Dr. Because the evidence of Lindsey's negligence even without Atkinson's testimony was overwhelming and the alleged error does not appear to have prejudiced Carmichael or affected the outcome below.Dec. © 2011 Thomson Reuters.S.3d 867. O'Donnell from testifying that high levels of morphine in decedent's blood samples taken postmortem was conclusive proof that he was a chronic heroin abuser was an abuse of discretion. From this single fact. Inc.App.Y. 78 N. agree with the circuit court that Dr.2d 1028. If. the law is clear that the erroneous ***325 **534 admission of testimony does *458 not constitute grounds for reversal where there was sufficient competent evidence to support the ruling. .Dec.2d 1176 (1996). Simply put. 20. 220 Ill.Liab. Dr. In any event. 587.01. Second.2d 839 (2001) (holding that where essential facts are missing from the expert's opinion.E. US Gov.Dec. Carmichael desired to tell the jury that decedent was a heroin addict because there was morphine in his blood. 337 Ill.525 N. defendant's contention that the circuit court allowed a modified jury instruction on Lindsey's professional negligence and improper licensing to be admitted over Carmichael's objection is simply untrue. that opinion is as much guesswork as conjecture as would be the jury's finding absent essential and basic fact and has no probative value).

Bendersky. 210 Ill.” nor is it the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or seek error in the record. JJ. U.E. 306 END OF DOCUMENT © 2011 Thomson Reuters. preventability. 465. 341(h)(7). comments by plaintiff's expert Atkinson. 525 N.Liab. 920 N.3d 853. 624 N. 1 Dist. Ill.2d R.App. 383 Ill. To the extent that Carmichael claims that it was denied a fair trial based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors that it identified in its brief. Bank v.E.App.***326 **535 Defendants did not receive a fair trial. the circuit court did not commit error in its evidentiary rulings and any error that may have occurred was harmless and not *460 reversible either individually or cumulatively.525 N.2d 928 (1993). we hold that they would neither individually nor cumulatively require reversal of the jury's verdict in this case.Dec.3d 459. it is not merely a repository into which an appellant may “dump the burden of argument and research.3d 677. Plaintiff met its burden and proved by clear and convincing evidence that decedent was the father of the beneficiaries. Prod. (CCH) P 11. 336 Ill.2d 1028. No Claim to Orig. We find that Carmichael has waived any claim that it was denied a fair trial based on cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidentiary errors that occurred at trial. Carmichael's brief states that “defendants were severely prejudiced through questioning on improper subjects. Saville.E.. 494. Supreme Court Rule 341 requires that the appellant clearly set out the issues raised and the legal support therefore with relevant authority. Willaby v.2d 509 (2008). 682. 273. 191 Ill. 891 N. 740. 322 Ill.2d 1028 171 Ill.Dec.3d 437. US Gov. v.E.2d 1028. Universal Casualty Co.E. [23][24][25] A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments.App.App. 721. GARCIA and LAMPKIN.” Carmichael does not identify any specific error or explain what prejudice was suffered or offer any examples of unfairness in this portion of its argument. Defendants were prejudiced as a result of the admissibility of evidence pertaining to negligent entrustment matters.3d 867. 861. questioning on matters barred in limine.2d 273 (2007) (holding that arguments not supported by relevant authority and coherent legal argument are waived).Dec.E. 315 Ill.Dec. Works. 121 Ill. is that it is entitled to a new trial as a result of the cumulative effect of multiple errors.2d 515. as far as we can determine from its argument. we find that none were in fact error.S.3d 867. Obert v. concur.Dec. 876 N. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons. 525 N. the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.. Lopez. we hold that Carmichael was not entitled to immunity for Lindsey's negligence under the Act and that decedent was a member of the traveling public for purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act. 253 Ill.App. 376 Ill.2009.App. 121 Ill. and licensure. and even if all of the evidentiary rulings of which Carmichael complains were error.Rep. Finally. The consequence of not complying with Supreme Court Rule 341 is waiver of those issues on appeal.E.883 (Cite as: 171 Ill.Dec. . and the improper subject matter was highlighted during argument. Affirmed. 721) Page 19 *459 Cumulative Error Defendant Carmichael's final claim. Accordingly. Lindsey 397 Ill.App.

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