Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007

Schmitt
-1-

Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon

Schmitt Table of Contents Liberalism Bad Shell.........................................................................................................................................................3 Enemies Good Shell........................................................................................................................................................12 Link –Generic Links........................................................................................................................................................20 Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War.......................................................................................................................22 Link – Civil Society........................................................................................................................................................24 Link – Debate..................................................................................................................................................................25 Link – Democracy...........................................................................................................................................................28 Link – Education.............................................................................................................................................................31 Link – Hegemony............................................................................................................................................................32 Link – Humanity.............................................................................................................................................................33 Link – Humanitarianism..................................................................................................................................................34 Link - International Relations..........................................................................................................................................38 Link – Justice...................................................................................................................................................................40 Link – Liberalism............................................................................................................................................................41 Link – Modernity (Generic)............................................................................................................................................43 Link – Peace....................................................................................................................................................................44 Link – Rights to Africans................................................................................................................................................45 Link – Pluralism..............................................................................................................................................................46 Link – Rule of Law.........................................................................................................................................................47 Link – Technology..........................................................................................................................................................48 Link – War on Terror......................................................................................................................................................49 Link – We Demand.........................................................................................................................................................50 Impact – Civil War..........................................................................................................................................................51 Impact – Dictatorship......................................................................................................................................................52 Impact – Extinction.........................................................................................................................................................53 Impact – Governance Fails..............................................................................................................................................58 Impact – Internal Conflict...............................................................................................................................................60 Impact – Solvency Takeout.............................................................................................................................................62 Impact – War...................................................................................................................................................................63 Alternative – Agonism....................................................................................................................................................64 Alternative – Friends/Enemies........................................................................................................................................67 Alternative – Rejection....................................................................................................................................................70 Alternative – Sovereignty................................................................................................................................................71 Alternative Solvency – Compromise..............................................................................................................................73 Alternative Solvency – Extinction..................................................................................................................................74 Alternative Solvency – Economy....................................................................................................................................78 Alternative Solvency – Empowerment............................................................................................................................79 Alternative Solvency – Freedom.....................................................................................................................................81 Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort........................................................................................................................82 Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict.........................................................................................................................83 Alternative Solvency – Protection...................................................................................................................................84 Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other.................................................................................................................85 Alternative Solvency – State Collapse............................................................................................................................87 A2 Agamben....................................................................................................................................................................88 A2 Bad States..................................................................................................................................................................89 A2 Dictatorship Bad........................................................................................................................................................90 A2 Exceptions Bad..........................................................................................................................................................91

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007

Schmitt
-2-

Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon

A2 Friends Bad................................................................................................................................................................92 A2 Impacts Improbable...................................................................................................................................................94 A2 Liberalism Good........................................................................................................................................................95 A2 Nazi............................................................................................................................................................................96 A2 No Obligation to State...............................................................................................................................................98 A2 Perm...........................................................................................................................................................................99 A2 State Deconstruction Good......................................................................................................................................100 A2 Schmitt  War.......................................................................................................................................................102 A2 Totalitarian..............................................................................................................................................................104 Aff – Destroys Debate...................................................................................................................................................105 Aff – Friendship Bad.....................................................................................................................................................106 Aff - Nazi Turn..............................................................................................................................................................107 Aff - Nihilism Turn.......................................................................................................................................................108 Aff – Perm.....................................................................................................................................................................109 Aff – Schmitt Dumb......................................................................................................................................................113 War Turn.......................................................................................................................................................................114 FYI: Difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship.............................................................................116

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007

Schmitt
-3-

Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon

Liberalism Bad Shell
The neo-liberal agenda embodied by the United States erodes state sovereignty through imposing international requirements on foreign states – leads towards a single new world order
Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law
and Social Sciences. University of London]. September 11. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.” http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/. P. 15-16. BH The second strand of cosmopolitanism is neo-liberal in its ideological location. As Peter Gowan notes, it 'run[s] parallel to the discourse of globalisation and rhetorically complement[s] it.' 34 It is a cosmopolitanism that instantiates a rewriting of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which were regarded as constitutive of the Westphalian order. Seen as conditional, they 'can be withdrawn should any states fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the requirements of liberal governance. ,35 In the words of William Rasch, state sovereignty becomes restricted by 'the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself'. 36 This neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, which Gowan associates with US and its allies and their academic apologists, often betrays an 'arbitrary attitude towards enforcing of universalist liberal norms of individual rights' despite its resting on the argument of a humanity that is 'finally on the verge of being unified in a single, just world order,.7 This arbitrariness often results in the imposition of incoherent domestic and international requirements on states in the form of legal domestic arrangements that promote individualism and liberal (i.e. good) governance, but also frequently in the form of social population control and consumerisation. Chantal Mouffe suggests that such policies might lead to an increasing detachment of citizens from their demos as a result of the imposition of externally acceptable arrangements. This would leave liberal cosmopolitans in the precarious position of losing their democratic rights of lawmaking. They would be left, at best, with their liberal right of appealing to transnational courts to defend their individual rights when those have been violated. In all probability, such a cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be realised, would not be more than an empty name disguising the actual disappearance of democratic forms of government and indicating the triumph of the liberal form of govemmental rationality that Foucault called "governmentality"38

January. http://rudar. BH . 320-321. Ph. Of Aarhus Denmark]. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -4- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The West is reintroducing colonialism into the international sphere which is reinstating liberal globalism – this internalizes conflict and identifies those who are seen as the enemies of humanity Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. p.D.dk/handle/1800/2068. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.ruc.

usually in the name of an international community which acts. which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). Schmitt noted how only when 'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -5- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose. similarly. the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis." Therefore.sgir. or accommodated. and when this happens total extermination is possible Odysseos 2004 [Dr. reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of Justus hostis. and most importantly. The concept of humanity. it has no localizable polis.. 19-21. there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other.” http://www.56 Outside of this historical location. "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity. let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil. P. one cannot. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror.60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity 'excludes the concept of the enemy. no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. but its utilisation by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition. can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike-can only. be inhuman62 Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war. Louiza. is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made.org/conference2004/. a philosophy of absolute humanity. humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. however. because the enemy does not cease to be a human being. then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon. the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable. That is. and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it. claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus publicum Europeaum. and to war and violence." it has become "the representative of the common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States. they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom. Since nonbelievers can become believers. BH Thirdly. it needs its negative opposite. we are assured. . Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is. .63 With this in mind. the enemy had no value and could be exterminated. this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law' (NE 187). where the other cannot be assimilated. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. they must be of the same category of being." Scott writes. could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. then. historically examined. Schmitt feared. If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need. It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length: We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity. 57 Finally. he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated. against whom or what does it wage its wars? 58 'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy. but is that which makes the distinction possible. or a pact or a covenant. in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that performs this all¬important service. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not. wrote in the interwar years of the right of this international community to impose its neutral will: The "international community. 'humanity is not a political concept. now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. and to punish its violation. September 11. which had declared the abolition of war. did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104). Moreover. once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole. who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality. it becomes apparent that. as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations. .6! In the Nomos. but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation and destruction become possible. in other words. in the interest of humanity. University of London]. a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century. 1 turn in the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of humanity and cosmopolitanism . Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. furthermore. 59 As Ellen Kennedy notes. However. at least not on this planet'. James Brown Scott. To be human. Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. in his words. they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace. of a 'just enemy'. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of Nations in the Nomos. human and inhuman. where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. humanity per se is not part of the distinction. In its historical location. where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an abstract politics of neutrality. but because of an international need" (283). the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives. the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will. . not because of a treaty.

For Schmitt. . usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil. Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187). The notion of the just enemy also meant that such a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). i. Louiza. The concept of an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state. wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend oneself or to resist submission. This brings us to the second achievement of this order. which was the development of the notion of justus hostis.sgir. The first concerns that ability of the order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. Therefore. Finally. creed and religion (i. The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought.justa causa) which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction. perhaps even worse types of war. then wars can be limited to achieving it. 7-9 BH According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order. This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction. It did not. the landmass of the New World. because if balance was the political and military objective.” http://www. On the one hand. It. force could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers (NE 99). to the extent that war was inevitable. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance. In both types of space. sought to find ways in which to gauge the opponent's strength. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -6- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A strong state is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are preferable to total extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr. war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. whose belonging to the native populations was not recognised. rather than the extermination of the enemy.his ultimate destruction was not sought. seek to end war as such. The amity lines set aside two distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). whose belief was that war was an inevitable part of political life. unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their resocialisation. to abolish or banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted only in new. University of London]. September 11. and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds . the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance (NE 161). No state could claim to have the issue of 'righteousness' on its side.e. 'to prevent wars of anniliilation. on the contrary.as a justus hostis. P. regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy . based on substantive issues of justice . and on the other. the newly mapped and navigable seas. its right to self-defense and to resistance was recognised. 'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100). humanization and legalization' of war. rather.e. to bracket it' (NE 246). through its international law. This avoided wars of conviction.org/conference2004/. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. Since war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls. precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. but conflict with him was possible and regulated. With the predominance of this type of political entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church. this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization. Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be waged against it.

http://rudar. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.D. Of Aarhus Denmark].dk/handle/1800/2068. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -7- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Liberalism lacks any political foundation – a lack of political theology dooms it to leadership failure – turns case Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. January. BH . Ph. 63. p.ruc.

Issue 2. AN.” in matters of the exception and to exercise these powers. Volume1. The sovereign is one who is given “the monopoly to decide. Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -8- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The kritik must come first. only through the sovereign state is the political will is further expressed. Spring). The sovereign must come first before any political decisions can be made Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.. (Continuted on Next Page) . Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -9- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .

"(n44) That is to say.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .(n47) For Schmitt.10 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War is inevitable.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war. and their alienation. Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their destiny. Summer98 Issue 112. in that it can be the expression of the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions. In particular. the attempt to end war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars.. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the destiny of human beings. is not intrinsically of a spiritual character. even "robbers and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives. economically wasteful and immoral." Finally: "Hegel has.."(n42) It is a beneficial one because. he recognizes that it appears inevitable. it is as little ethical as it is evil. the modern state is the highest form of ethical life. the conduct of war is often also sublime. an individual. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political. war is essentially a political matter.. aesthetic or economic categories into warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions."(n41) The first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third. Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant here. because if we introduce moral. and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility.D. he would also recognize that war is not always the function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes. advanced a definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers.Justice does not belong to the concept of war. and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life. however. vis-a-vis other states."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges. BH This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political. but we must approach it from a political framework. Instead. without affirming something of real spiritual worth. The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere. No doubt. It is a fundamental possibility. the sovereignty of the state."(n51)       . the obsession with property)."(n49) As a political theorist. with an emphasis on strengthening sovereignty Norris 1998 [Andrew. it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.. Such bravery has a merely negative worth because "it is the negation of externalities."(n45) The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious. fight them physically. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. because the state is. This worth. by providing the necessary context for martial courage.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political. absolute.." as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of political life. whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace. enemies and the political. war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal."(n48) No doubt. but only politically. the culmination of courage. For Hegel. by transcending the limits of the political framework. aesthetic. . Schmitt argues that this could well produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because. the enemy must threaten relations and forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. "and individuality essentially implies negation. Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the value of courage. If this interpretation is correct. as such. is only negative because it is found in removing or negating the inessential. Quite different is patriotically motivated self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine.. then it is justified. courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the inessential baggage of life (e.g. dictators and business interests. The enemy is negated otherness. this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy. p68. final end. "Hegel remains everywhere political in the decisive sense. to repel them and. one that is actually beneficial. or economic categories should trump political ones.” Telos. But Schmitt cautions against concluding from this that moral. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family. no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations. received his Ph.

so is his public friend distinct from the private friend. however. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship. does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics.11 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms of concrete political existence. it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another. All essential concepts are not normative but existential. in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular concepts of friendship. Just as Schmitt argues that the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy. almost technical meaning. including the concept of mind. "friend. Indeed. whom one hates. that form of life might be defined in any number of ways: "All concepts." In contrast. What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture." has a formal. This. As one of the criteria of the political. whom one loves. Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him."(n52) .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . As Schmitt makes clear." like "enemy. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of nationality within itself.

Ph.dk/handle/1800/2068.ruc. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. January. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. p. 107.D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . BH .12 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Enemies Good Shell The politics created by the affirmative is a deviation form the preparation from war which dangerously threatens state power – we must prepare for our moment of clarity where battle is immanent Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. http://rudar.

.. Issue 2. Spring). Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. AN. Volume1.13 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Case Take Out: Political action can only be achieved through distinguishing friends from enemies Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.

'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100).” http://www. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). then wars can be limited to achieving it.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . rather. precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. 'to prevent wars of anniliilation. its right to self-defense and to resistance was recognised. Therefore. and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds . The notion of the just enemy also meant that such a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence. University of London]. this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization.e.his ultimate destruction was not sought. This avoided wars of conviction. It. the newly mapped and navigable seas. Since war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls. to abolish or banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted only in new. regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy . whose belief was that war was an inevitable part of political life. wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend oneself or to resist submission.org/conference2004/. In both types of space. but conflict with him was possible and regulated. unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their resocialisation.justa causa) which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction. force could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers (NE 99). This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction. And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just. For Schmitt. through its international law. Finally. This brings us to the second achievement of this order. The first concerns that ability of the order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. With the predominance of this type of political entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church. No state could claim to have the issue of 'righteousness' on its side.as a justus hostis. to bracket it' (NE 246). September 11. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. perhaps even worse types of war.sgir. The amity lines set aside two distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). . usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil. The concept of an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state. creed and religion (i. rather than the extermination of the enemy. based on substantive issues of justice . Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187). and on the other.e. because if balance was the political and military objective. P. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance. The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought. On the one hand. 7-9 BH According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order.14 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Identifying enemies is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are preferable to total extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr. whose belonging to the native populations was not recognised. Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be waged against it. i. war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. It did not. which was the development of the notion of justus hostis. seek to end war as such. Louiza. the landmass of the New World. on the contrary. humanization and legalization' of war. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance (NE 161). to the extent that war was inevitable. sought to find ways in which to gauge the opponent's strength.

p.787). 8 .140). The proliferation of contests in ancient Greece represented both a sublimation of cruel instincts and a setting for the production of excellence. In this text. Moreover. pp. their sublimation of violence into cultural contests prevented the Greeks from regressing into "the abyss of a horrible savagery of hatred and lust for destruction" (KSA 1.789).783-92). Nietzsche maintains that civilization is not something separate from nature but a modulation of more vicious natural drives into less destructive forms. for Nietzsche. p. p.162ff. from Fordham University. Nietzsche distinguishes between a brutal drive to annihilate and a modified drive to defeat in a competition. since talent unfolds in a struggle with a competitor (KSA 1.. He grants that an agonistic element can be very valuable for life and for democratic politics (NCD. We can begin to address the complex question of agonistics by attending to an early text of Nietzsche's that is often cited in scholarly discussions. is a selective activity restricted to an elite and not extended to the public as a whole (NCD. what the Greeks called an agon.791). Homer's Contest (KSA 1. p. Hateb. which surely clashes with democratic provisions. why we can still be Nietzcheans") Appel gives particular attention to a Nietzschean sense of agonistics that has been taken up by postmodern thinkers as applicable to democracy. Ph. And an agonistic spirit insured a proliferation of excellence by undermining the stagnation that stems from unchecked control and the "domination by one" (KSA 1. but he correctly notices a problem rarely faced in postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche: an agon.15 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency: Agonism crushes the drive towards destruction and instead replaces it with the production of excellence. In the light of Hesiod's distinction between a good and bad Eris. Nietzsche praises the Greeks for not succumbing to an Orphic life-denial or an ideal of harmony in the face of life's conflicts.). Only agonism can solve liberalism's drive for destruction. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon. p. 2002 (Lawrence J.D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

D. but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. Democratic respect. access. such as a right to an adequate education. In sum. why we can still be Nietzcheans") If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others. not as something "natural" possessed by an original self." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. therefore. We can even defend so-called positive rights. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement. political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. I should also want that they be able adversaries." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse." a sloppy "relativism. an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like "equal regard. refusing any belief an ultimate warrant. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon. which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. Again allow me to quote my previous work. And. procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. simply insure lopsided political contests. as is well known. a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. it demands inclusion. from Fordham University. Democratic respect forbids exclusion. agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth. a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing. that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. 26 An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights. but as an epiphenomenal. Moreover. and liberation from traditional constraints. Radical agonistics. as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. This enables a more robust conception of tolerance and political rights informed by resistance. Constraints on speech. Any other mode of democracy only paces the way for tyranny Hateb. defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest.16 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative: The alternative is to reject the affirmative by embracing a politics of enmity. 2002 (Lawrence J. association. is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus. then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. A true democracy must paradoxically embrace anti-democratic outcomes. Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others.      . 25 In addition. Ph. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation. as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). then.. pluralism. and so on." or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality. but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement. and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features. As in athletics. and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect.

So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with race. The irony of a tragically open. often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice. deliberative enough. can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational. a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. virtuous enough. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. a broader conception of rights. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. approaches to democratic politics. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling. role." It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No. But from a historical perspective. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they "are. . the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so. to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness. For Nietzsche. but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice. or eternal entity. would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. admit the difficulty.17 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Beyond political rights. but if we consider how identities figure in injustices. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence). fully free. and particularly Nietzschean. in the absence of a guarantee. communal enough. thus enhancing life. A radically agonistic. of resistances or obstacles. to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. class. agonistics. an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice. and suggest a "tragic" model of democratic openness. which themselves are incontestable. rational enough. democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. and so on. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory. but also to affirm action as action. secular enough. as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient. character. For Nietzsche. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . the charge raises important questions facing postmodern. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles. and so on). even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely. negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. that is to say. in my view. The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. stable substance. something especially important when even purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough. Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as. would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not. but surely possible). In my work I have tried to face this question. despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters. the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits. can be put in the following way. thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name. and eternal recurrence. gender. Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. What is to be said of someone who. And as radically open. open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power. 28 And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system. it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy. for Nietzsche. agonistic politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. 27 Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles. rather than some metaphysical essence. a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. a real move in life amidst real resistances. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. with no justification beyond its contingent enactment.

Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. is only negative because it is found in removing or negating the inessential. war is essentially a political matter. BH This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political. Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. aesthetic or economic categories into warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions Norris 1998 [Andrew. because if we introduce moral.. to repel them and. In particular. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. Instead. this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy. and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life. fight them physically. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the destiny of human beings.Justice does not belong to the concept of war. It is a fundamental possibility.. in that it can be the expression of the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions. dictators and business interests. and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility. or economic categories should trump political ones."(n41) The first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third."(n49) As a political theorist." as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage.. vis-a-vis other states. economically wasteful and immoral.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . But Schmitt cautions against concluding from this that moral. whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace. final end.18 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War is inevitable. No doubt. by providing the necessary context for martial courage. but we must approach it from a political framework. the attempt to end war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars. it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. the culmination of courage. aesthetic.. an individual. The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere.(n47) For Schmitt. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of political life.D. because the state is. even "robbers and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives. "and individuality essentially implies negation. as such."(n44) That is to say. Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. the obsession with property). received his Ph. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political. is not intrinsically of a spiritual character. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family. however. the modern state is the highest form of ethical life.” Telos. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant here. "Hegel remains everywhere political in the decisive sense. it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their destiny. Such bravery has a merely negative worth because "it is the negation of externalities. p68. by transcending the limits of the political framework. Summer98 Issue 112. one that is actually beneficial. and their alienation. advanced a definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers. . without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the value of courage. it is as little ethical as it is evil." Finally: "Hegel has. war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal. For Hegel. Quite different is patriotically motivated self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine. he would also recognize that war is not always the function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes.g.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war. absolute. If this interpretation is correct. then it is justified. the enemy must threaten relations and forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. but only politically. This worth. courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the inessential baggage of life (e. The enemy is negated otherness."(n45) The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges. no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political."(n42) It is a beneficial one because. enemies and the political." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois."(n48) No doubt.."(n51)       . the conduct of war is often also sublime. he recognizes that it appears inevitable.. Schmitt argues that this could well produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because. the sovereignty of the state.

This. What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. "friend. it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship. including the concept of mind." has a formal. so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture. does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics. whom one hates. Just as Schmitt argues that the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy. in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular concepts of friendship.19 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. As Schmitt makes clear." like "enemy.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Indeed. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of nationality within itself. so is his public friend distinct from the private friend. Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him. All essential concepts are not normative but existential. whom one loves. are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms of concrete political existence. however. As one of the criteria of the political. almost technical meaning. that form of life might be defined in any number of ways: "All concepts." In contrast."(n52) .

Ph.ruc. p.20 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link –Generic Links The imminent danger embodied by the affirmative advantage scenarios is an act of the state alienating the indvidual – it is a sign of the retreat of the state Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Of Aarhus Denmark].Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. http://rudar. January. BH .dk/handle/1800/2068.D. 311-312.

it now [appeared] that economics [had] become entirely politicized' (App. from kindergarten to burial and cremation. The state’s current method of politicization (esp economics) contributes o the state’s dissolution through internally warring political factions Cristi 1998. Professor in department of Philosophy. Onlythe Church was in the position and had the will to affirm thepolitical and frustrate the prevalence of pure economic thought. BH The plea for a strong state was the one theme that stood out inSchmitt's early Weimar production. 216). That notion represented a centralized state that had expanded in every direction and politicized every domain of human existence . Third. BH In the mean time . Second. the correct ideology.21 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The affirmative plan is a representation of civil society that is the site of the dissolution of state power because of its implicit liberalism Cristi 1998.authority and unity. The Church was notthe seat of irrationalism but it embodied a form of rationality. and also assumedby democrats and socialists. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. This was the site of pluralism andthe dissolution of state unity. so that 'not even a bowling club [could] continue to exist without maintaining a good relation with the state' (App. Each party realizes in itself the totality. representing a totally opposed standpoint. another misguided view.akin to juridical thinking. we see that we do not have a total state but a plurality of total parties. p. Schmitt observedthat the Catholic Church had preserved intact an awareness of thepolitical and had kept faith in the true meaning of authority. 32-33. totally absorbing their members . Schmitt attributed the modern state's difficulty and ideas espoused by contemporary liberalism. the correct form of state. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Theaffirmation of the political secured the ultimate foundation onwhich rests the state's claim to authority. situating itself totally in the most diverse social groups and passing on to its membership the correct views. First. If the state was to main-tain its strength and survive. the economic point of view sought tominimize the role of the state and dissolve its separation from civilsociety. p.20 In R6mische Katholizismus andPolitische Form (Roman Catholicism and Political Form). in opposition to the economicpoint of view Schmitt affirmed the viewpoint of the political. Politicization was most visible in the sphere of economics. the correct economic s ystem. According to Schmitt. 218 ). If we take a closer look. three facets articulated Schmitt's plea for astrong state. 74-75.The Church did so by endorsing a form of rationalism opposed tothe rationality of economics and technology. which he designated as 'the economicpoint of view'. that was foreign to the culture thatissued from the Enlightenment. and the correct sociability on account of the party. Schmitt described this view by means of a tantalizing formula. By eliminating the state's autonomy and diluting itsauthority. [Renato. guiding individuals from the cradle to the grave. Professor in department of Philosophy. The theme linked this earlyproduction with his work later in Weimar and the Nazi period.published in 1923.: p. (App. one ought to affirm its sovereignty. 'After years of attempting to reduce the state to economics. The state could not yield to the factitioustemperament of civil society.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . There was no sphere that could remain free from its interventions. the bearers of the total state were the total parties. 219) . had become equally pervasive. civil society was given a free rein spontaneously to putits own affairs in order.: p. In essence.and marked the conceptual ground that confirmed the continuityof his theoretical and practical interests. the 'total state'. p. [Renato.

[Renato. he thought. powerand authority. ReichsprisidentHindenburg appointed Heinrich Briining as Chancellor withoutprior consultation with the political parties. the judicial state. This event marked thecollapse of what Schmitt called the 'legislative state' in Germanyand the beginning of a presidential regime that departed from theparliamentary system as it had come to be known and practisedin the Weimar republic. Schmittcharted the course of this evolution and for that purpose hedistinguished four distinct state configurations: the Judicial. According toSchmitt. and not a strengthening of stateauthority.and eighteenth century absolutist state. it became clear that the identity that characterized thetotal state meant a weakening. legislative and administrative forms of the state. the seventeenth. The legal basis for his decision wasarticle 48 of the Weimar constitution. What was common to the first three configurationswas the dualist structure constituted by the separation of the statefrom civil society. This was to be understood as a qualitative totalstate.4 By overstepping its limits and becoming involvedin what were the exclusive concerns of civil society. It demanded the interpenetration of state and civil society. The new governmentcould function as a non-parliamentary regime that rested onHindenburg's own authority. matched by a commensurate loss of prestige. p. BH The first time Schmitt mentioned the notion of total state during the Weimar period was in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung (The Protector of the Constitution). according to Schmitt. presented at a meeting of the Langnamverein.' in his Legalitit undLegitimit. What was atissue here compromised the very existence of the modern state. and thus denied the completeindependence and autonomy on which rested the authority ofboth the absolute and the neutral states. namely the development ofGermany's constitutional design after the revolution of 1918-19. which he expanded in 1931 into the book of that same title(19 31). the total state was diametricallyopposed to its earlier configurations. 179-182. These werefunctional descriptions which corresponded to four historical embodiments. In a 1929 article entitled 'Der Hiiter der Verfassung' (1929b). Schmitt brought up the topicin the context of a broader discussion. The dissolution of the state occurred. the notion of total state was again mentionedand explicitly contrasted with that of the authoritarian state. exec-utive. this action could only be interpreted as the restoration ofa balance disrupted by the influx of democratic party politiCS.the executive state and the administrative state.This. . as opposed to the purely quantitative total state which heequated with twentieth-century democracy.Like a dying star. mediated by the 'neutral state of the nineteenth century'. whose preface was dated March 1931. In this respect. Professor in department of Philosophy. the nineteenth-century parliamentarvstate and the twentieth-century democratic state which he alsocalled the 'administrative' or 'total' state. The administrative or tota.3 Schmitt sought to justify Hindenburg's presidentialregime not merely as a legal configuration sanctioned by theconstitution but also as the republic's only politically viableoption.the feudal state. The aim Schmitt had in mind in drawing this manifold distinction was a description of the political regime that had evolved under the aegis of the Weimar constitution. the theory of thestate and the constitution acquires the specific indicators that help better and more clearly to understand the concrete peculiarity o-the legal system and its present situation. He used that notion to highlight what he considered to bethe latest phase in the 'dialectical development' of the modernstate.2 This time he reversed his position and extendec*the use of the term 'total state' to include the authoritarian statehe sponsored. The next time Schmitt made publicreference to this notion was in his keynote address entitled'Strong State and Sound Economy'. As his argumentproceeded.4t (1932a). 1932a:'19) These configurations did not constitute four specific instantia-tions of a common generic nature. On each one of these occasions. With the distinction between the legislative state. (Schmitt.22 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War Interference by the state into modern society weakens the apparatus as a whole – historically proven to be true Cristi 1998.between civil society and the state dissipated. Hindenburg's presidialregime intended to save the state by reinforcing its executive functions at the expense of the legislative power.and more pointedly after the inauguration of a presidentialgovernment on 28 March 1930. Up to that point. Schmitt acknowledged the work of Heinz Otto Ziegler.5The total state was Schmitt's description of this predicament. the state hadlost its autonomy and independence and advanced with accelerated pace towards its own extinction. A consistent use and application ofarticle 48 of the constitution was the procedure he suggested. On that day. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. would break the hegemony of a parliamentary system gone astray and restore the fine balance between legisla-tive and executive functions procured by the parliamentarytradition before 'it was corrupted by the advancement of demo-cracy.state was not properly a state but served as the portrayal of 'itsdissolution. Inthis case. the state had experienced a voluminous expan-sion in size. The entrenchment of a presidial system could becharacterized as more than a provisional step aimed at solving theconj'unctural difficulties of Weimar parliamentarism. and then.which resulted in the modern state's slanted evolution.The notion of authoritarian state in contrast to the total statewas the theme of Ziegler's book entitled precisely Autoritdreroder totaler Staat (1932). when the dualism maintained by the separatior. This development had its point of departure in the 'absolutestate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries'.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . it reached itsfinal destination with the twentieth-century 'total state whichidentifies state and society' (1931: 79). much of Schmitt's work as a jurist hadbeen devoted to demonstrating the need for an enhanced politicalrole for the Reichsprisident.

Again like Schmitt. Still. BH Hayek defended the view that democracy and liberalism wereunrelated answers to completely unrelated questions. so that the depoliticiza-tion of civil society could turn dialectically into the state's activepreservation of its monopoly over the political as such. In accordance with liberalism. although compatible. dans sasph~re il ne sauralt en avoir trop' (compare with R6pke. while the opposite ofdemocracy is authoritarianism.so that its spontaneous order was converted into an organization. a work heavily influenced by Schmitt. compare with Hayek. 1960: 103)ls That a liberal polity. I willnot discuss here whether these measures were effective or not. together with Hayek and Schmitt. it is at least possi-ble in principle that a democratic government may be totalitarianand that an authoritarian government may act on liberal princi-ples. It wasthus positively and actively that the state ought to restrict andlimit its action to a merely negative one. This should confirm the complete dethronement of politicswithin that sphere (compare with Hayek. And just as Schmitt wasan attentive reader of Hegel. expressed a close affin-ity with Constant's political philosophy.16 His liberalism was thus politically conservative for itpresupposed the possibility of postulating both a strong state anda liberal society. (1967: 161. Theautonomy and independence reserved to the state grounded itsauthoritarian potential. Possibly no one better expressed this conceptualdichotomy than Benjamin Constant when he wrote: 'le gouverne-ment en dehors de sa sph6re ne dolt avoir aucun pouvoir. while Hayek emphasizedthe typical liberal limitations on the state. In consequence. 1979: 125). he distinguishedbetween authoritarianism and totalitarianism in strict adherenceto the views expressed by Heinz Otto Ziegler in his Autoritarer und Totalitarer Staat. are not the same. He thought that strong authoritariangovernments could ensure the necessary depoliticization of civilsociety. 1948:28. Friedrich. couldbe open to authoritarian rule did not appear contradictory toHayek.23 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Any deviation of the state from a protective function is bad – the affirmation of positive outcomes weakens the state and fails to respect the autonomy of civil society Cristi 1998.Hayek appeared to be saying the same thing when he wrote: Liberalism and democracy. The role of the state ought to be negative.The difference is best seen if we consider their opposites: theopposite of liberalism is totalitarianism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Wheneverthe normal working of civil society became in any way imperilled. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. And it did not escape his attention that there wassome plausibility in Schmitt's contention that 'whoever has thepower to proclaim an emergency and on this ground suspend anypart of the constitution is the true sovereign' (Hayek. Hayek opposedcentral planning and any form of state intervention in economicmatters. It ought to be limited to a merely protective func-tion. Hayekadmitted that the power to declare a state of emergency belongedto the state. It should come as no surprise thatHegel. never affirma-tive of any positive outcomes or ideal patterns of production or distribution.It appears as if Hayek was unable to exorcise the notion of sover-eignty. Like Schmitt. Hayek offered a series of precautionary measures aimed atavoiding a relapse into an unbalanced decisionist posture. This concurred with the necessary limitation andrelativization of state power demanded by individuals whoclaimed sovereignty and the spontaneous order that arose fromtheir free and sovereign activity. 166-168. 1979:149-50). The strong state advocated by Schmitt in the1930s was supposed to respect the autonomy of civil society. Hayek's idea of a spontaneous order presupposed civilsociety's capacity for self-regulation and autonomous administra-tion. 1955: 531). . Professor in department of Philosophy. again. and which demanded limitations onconstructivist state interference.Hayek first postulated unbounded individual freedom and therecognition of rights that were prior to the state. This sameview was espoused by Schmitt and used by him as a way ofaccommodating political options akin to decisionism within theliberal discourse. one limited by abstract general rules. Individualspossessed a domain of action over which they alone could claimabsolute sovereignty. 1976: 102-3. Like Schmitt. he too distinguished sharply between civilsociety and the state. [Renato. he did not object to the formation of a strong state. Iwill only say that decisionist elements were potentially incorpor-ated into his system in so far as the separation between state andcivil society was essential to it. Hayek reiterated his support for a politically conservativeliberalism and expressed a preference for strong but limitedgovernment. so Hayek was an attentive reader ofSchmitt. p. the negative tasks ascribed to the state were to bedetermined and sustained by the action of the state itself. Second.the knowledge of such a situation and the decision to alter thespontaneous order of civil society lay beyond its powers in so faras they were recognized as being of a political nature.

where it is further reduced to the technology of the administration.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . AN .sagepub. Culture.24 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Civil Society When Civil Society is increased.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. Rasch 2000 [William. and Society. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.” http://tcs. the State is diminished until it is just another association among many.

Nonetheless. it is a question of the identity of the ruler and the ruled. according to this model. p68. On the face of it.(n63) Such identity is not at all irreconcilable with a form of dictatorship that denies to the populace the right to debate political issues.(n64) This much is clear in Rousseau's own infamous references to the possibility of forcing the citizenry to be free when they misunderstand their own (general) will. As he emphasizes again and again. Schmitt is quite frank about this: "The decision becomes instantly independent of argumentative substantiation and receives an autonomous value. there is no indication. or liberal/ parliamentary institutions. instead. and if that will not apply in the case of an exception. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. the reply is easy enough to imagine.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . such a debate about the nature of shared identity and the focus of mutual commitment would not seem to be in conflict with Schmitt's strictures. Summer98 Issue 112. The rationality that characterizes the normal situation is. even of the minimal sort his theory will allow. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University."(n61) In the end "The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. and that Middle-East oil is not one of this polity's vital interests." Here the claim might be that Americans are committed to and united in a democratic freedom that has only contingently been aligned with capitalism's interests. he does not permit for political decisions to involve public debate and deliberation. the populace is accorded the right to evaluate the performance of the state only in the form of acts of acclamation. This limitation is a result of Schmitt's decisionism. Put this way. a Rousseauian polity that rests on the homogeneity of the commitments of its members is compatible with a variety of political structures and institutions. that of a norm or law governing that situation. But it does not necessitate dictatorship. enemies and the political."(n62) The relevant point here is that this characterization of the irrationality or arationality of the political decision is not necessarily connected with Schmitt's characterization of the nature of political community.” Telos.(n60) This is why Schmitt has no faith in public debate.25 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Debate Open debate only serves to undermine the political and state authority Norris 1998 [Andrew. revocable consent. democracy is not a matter of popular participation.D.(n65) .one necessitated by the law's own limitations. As The Social Contract again makes clear. In his constitutional theory. in Schmitt's texts of the 1920s. Schmitt' s version of identity politics is largely derived from his reading of Rousseau. In its absence. Schmitt understands the political decision as an alternative to the law -. of any rational guidance whatsoever. in his eyes. If the only rational guidance that can be found is that of a norm. it is plain that open debate will serve no purpose but that of undermining authority. received his Ph. BH Schmitt himself demonstrates an easy confidence in his own ability to make the required distinctions: "To demand seriously of human beings that they kill others and be prepared to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the survivors or that the purchasing power of the grandchildren may grow is sinister and crazy."(n59) Such a remark might well be made in a debate over "Operation Desert Storm.

AN     .” http://tcs. when individuals make political decisions it leads to social contracts that will break down the system of sovereignty Rasch 2000 [William. and Society.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. Culture.26 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Political decisions are left only to the state.sagepub. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.

27 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

By opening the doorto democracy. At times. parliament ought to limit andcontrol democracy's overwhelming leverage. and not endowed prima facie withpermanent authority. According to Schmitt.28 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Democracy Democracy is self defeating and it contributes to a weakened state Cristi 1998.deputies were acting as popular agents and commissaries. p. Constituentpower could not be destroyed. . The segregationand inflection of parliament's liberal essence was mandatory. Democracy is self defeating – the will of the people is unorganized and fails to succeed Cristi 1998.aristocratic and democratic elements. changed or altered in any way. But this did not imply a renunciation of theirsovereignty. Precisely because parliaments could not be saidto constitute specific political forms. Schmitt's aim was to separate the parliamentary institutionfrom its democratic ties.Since 1848. p. the people exercises itsconstituent power by means of any manifestation which conveysits express will. The positive constitution. . but its discussions weresurrounded by secrecy and only the results yielded by voting werepublicly announced. individual deputies no longer complied with theliberal requirements of the Weimar constitution as stipulated byarticle 21. but alongside and above it the pouvoir constituant wouldContinue to exist. They could not be said to be 'bound only to theirconscience' and to be free from the instructions of the particularelectoral group they represented. BH Schmitt's reform proposal assumed that contemporary parlmentarism was facing a crisis due to a betrayal of its originalideals. By displacing the competing monarchicala-id aristocratic elements. if allowed to function in agenuinely representative manner. Parliaments. the Reichstag. democratic legitimacy had supplanted the monarch-:cal principle. democracy acquired a disproportionateinfluence. 122-123 BH After considering the issue of the subject of constituent powerSchmitt analysed its activity. just as any measure transcends what is measured by it. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. on a counter-revolutionary dictatorship as the onlymeans to guard the political unity of a nation and sustain the dualonslaught arising from humanitarian liberalism and atheistdemocracy.ts actual will could be falsified. according to Schmitt. they functioned as open to constitutesystems that used and mixed diverse political forms. prudencedictated that monarchs reach agreements with the representativesof special interests.the Reichstag had ceased to be. open to publicinvestigation and scrutiny. the Weimar constitution had introduced an ambiguity which now eroded parliamentary practices and weakenedthe state. in Die Diktatur and PolitischeTheologie. like other contemporary parliaments. This was the reason for its weakness and explained why. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Furthermore. disrupting the delicate balance presupposed by theparliamentary system. The historical development of parliamentarism had successfully incorporated monarchical. their activity could include theunilateral granting of constitutional charters. The institution devised by classical liberals had beendefiled by the prevalence of democratic ideals. 1928: 318-19). the people was not to be taken as an organized subject of decision. inaccordance with wellestablished democratic demands. [Renato. without identifying itselfwith any of them. On the contrary. First.retains the ability to persevere in its existence' (Schmitt. if it ever was. parliamentarism could not be said to constitute a specificpolitical form or a specific form of state (compare with Schmitt. had ceased to be a place of rational discussion. Second. Professor in department of Philosophy. The identification ofliberalism and democracy precluded any possibility of securing arole for the state as guarantor of political unity. It was thereforenatural that Schmitt would rely. Schmitt thoroughlyidentified liberal parliamentarism and democratic legitimacy. Its activity escaped constitutionalbounds. Constituent activity. the parliamentary commissionhad become a place for secret party deals whose content thepublic ignored. as an accident supported byconstituent power. In democratic polities. The arcana imperli of absolutist times were fullyrevived (compare with Schmitt.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . According toSchmitt. Article 29 of the constitution requiredthat its deliberations be public. could be born. legibus solutus. should not have to yield todemocratic pressures. Instead of being the 'representatives of the whole people' and 'bound by no instructions'. It was not exhausted by its exercise and. Indifference to the political as such allowed parliamentarism to remain open to different political forms (comparewith Schmitt. In his earlier works. preceded and rose. itpersevered as the extra-constitutional ground of constitutions andconstitutional laws. like sovereignpower. 1928: 305). Accordingto Schmitt. much like the CatholicChurch. parliamentarism owed its current problems to the ascendancy of democracy. [Renato. Asa genuinely liberal institution. Inthe case of sovereign monarchs. 1928:92). the people as such was nota firm and organized entity. This was an indication of sovereignty. above all positiveconstitutional normativity.The nineteenth-century liberal-democratic rapprochement wasinterpreted by Schmitt as an irreversible pluralist trend whichinevitably led to the demise of the state. 80-82. Professor in department of Philosophy. which until then had secured the unity of the state. suffer alterations and eventually die. Even if its power and plastic energy couldnot be extinguished and could embody an infinite variety offorms.923a: 10). Constituent power. persistedautonomously and independently of any positive constitutionallegislation.

he was bale to extricate liberalism from popular democracy. Democracy kills the unity of the state. Schmitt would thus conclude that legality was conceptuallyDpposed to legitimacy. Liberalism sawin the strong state of absolutist monarchs a threat to the indi-vidualist values of liberty and private property. which he would attempt to disarm by means of a democratically elected sheriff. Professor in department of Philosophy. He charged liberalist for its inability to withstand the democratic avalanche. Schmitt had attack liberalism because it seemed inextricably bound to democracy. the nineteenth-century legislative state sought to encircle the authority of theexecutive state by way of a normativist system. p. Thisalso implied a perfect congruence between justice and legality. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. neutral posture. realized the ideal of the Recbtsstaat.: 14). untouched b-. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.Schmitt defined the legislative state as the state 'ruled by imper-sonal. The legislative state. The distinction between liberalism and democracy. Schmittian scholarship has for the most part assumed a strict unity and continuity in his Weimar writings. .Second. could still retainthe control of the executive (compare with Kelsen. not a political form. As a guaranteethat those values would be respected it demanded state neutral-ity and the replacement of the rule of men by the rule of law. [Renato. marked the beginning of his rapprochement with liberalism. 185-188. and aimed at exporting pluralism onto the political sphere. and interpreted as an apolitical. and thus to any recourse to a right ofresistance. where the legislator is detachedfrom the officials that execute it' (1 932a: 8). however. Schmitt was now able to aim his attack at the democractic populace. BH Before drawing the distinction between liberalism and democracy in his Parlamentarismus. In Parlamentarismus. But if kept at a clear distance from any political form. [Renato. Butwhat it got was a division of powers. Whoever claimedexercise of sovereignty and power could do so only 'according tothe law or in the name of the law' (ibid. which naturally led tothe weakening of its authority. dislodged from legislative functions.Its claim to validity excluded and made it refractory to any exter-nal appeal to legitimacy. Thus. the distinction between state and civil society "-ascompromised. Schmitt envisaged thelegal system imposed by the legislative state as hermetically closed. This accommadation allowed him to identify what he feared most: the increased pace of the democratic revolution. The oldAristotelian dictum that laws and not men ought to rule impliedthat sovereignty and power were extinguished. The state was put in charge of the supervision ancdirection of the spontaneous order of the market. liberalism ceased to be a threat. the liberal demand was superseded by a democratic de-mand that led to the formation of the twentieth-century state of total administration. and could henceforth aim all his efforts at taming democratic absolutism. at its core.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . liberalism appeared to Schmitt in 1923 as the best way to neutralize democracy. Nineteenth-century liberalism tried to fashion a state in its image and likeness. attentive only to the protection of individuals. what he wrote in Parlamentarismus is read in line with his earlier Die Diktatur and his Political Theology. Legality meant 'making superfluous and rejecting notonly legitimacy (both monarchical and the plebiscitary will of thepeople) but also any sovereign or higher authority' (ibid. 1929: 81).which made the possibility of abusive legislation inconceivable. p. It was also on this concep-tion of law that Schmitt based his distinction between normativismand decisionism.the nineteenth-century legislative state. his reservations subsided. Schmitt’s paramount concern was the attainment and safeguard of the unity of the state. the other by a democratic demand. Once he came to the view that liberalism was. where law is detached fromits application to the concrete case. the unity of the state would be put in jeopardy. it must be neutralized Cristi 1998. the curren:crisis of the Weimar republic was ultimately a crisis of authoritv. But as a universe of ideas distinct from democracy. which Schmitt introduced in 1923. BH Two phases characterized the departure from the tradition ofthe strong executive state: one was determined by a liberaldemand. 8 By emphasizing the democratic principle c--identity. Professor in department of Philosophy. and its parliamentaryembodiment. between law and its execution. The anti-liberal stance of this early work is then projected onto his later Weimar writings. This meant a loss o-autonomy and independence for the state.29 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Democracy skews the separation between state and civil society and puts the power of the state in jeopardy Cristi 1998. If the pluralism that was congruent with liberalism were allowed political expression. by lasting norms ofdeterminable and measurable content. In Schmitt's view. general and predetermined norms.). First. Typical of the legisla-tive state was the distinction between laws and measures ordecrees. 17. which meant thatmonarchs. Liberalism was objectionable only when it assumed a political stance.

But Schmitt's primary interest wasto point out the common features that typified the historicalembodiment of those state functions. the separation of the state fromcivil society ensured the formation and endurance of a strongstate. so that society and the economy couldadopt in their respective spheres the necessary decisions accordingto their immanent principles. culturaland economic differences that divided a state-free society. [Renato. was responsible for weakening theunitary and decisive will of parliament.: 78. an inner balance among itsconstituent elements. when possible. The neutrality of the state was aresult of its strength.). a strong state could also be aneutral state. to neutralize in relation to societyand its conflicts of interests. itsneutrality and strength.to limit the state to a minimum. In this respect. and not allowed the exorbitant developmentof the latter. [Renato. 1958: 27). Second. so that partypolitics meant that the will of the majority shifted according tounstable compromises between a plurality of heterogeneousorganizations. he saw no oblection in allowing the market tooperate according to its own 'automatic mechanism'. The balance between state and non-statecompetences allowed the persistence of dualism. For it to survive as a state it wasessential that state sovereignty be enhanced and a sharp separa-tion from civil society be maintained. BH This coexistence and balance between state configurations did notpreclude the possibility of describing concrete states on the basisof the 'central sphere' of state activity (ibid. Professor in department of Philosophy. 189-190. BH It is plain to see that Schmitt's interest in a description of state-forms and the difficulties he found in combining them prefacedhis concern for the preservation of the state as such. Only a strong state could hand over to civilsociety. neutral with respect to religion and the economy and 'respectful of the autonomy of these vital and objectivedomains' (ibid. furthermore. Professor in department of Philosophy.30 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Democracy forces the state to intervene in civil society weakening its neutrality and strength Cristi 1998.e. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. the state's very existence was compromised by the rise ofdemocratic party politics and the state-form that democracydemanded and advanced. thus assur-ing the highest economic prosperity (ibid. This situation seriously compromised the legislative state's capacity to survive. as astato neutrale e agnostico and bereft of any metaphysical commit-ment.Democracy.10 A fundamental alter-ation occurred when the dualist structure of state and civil societylost its antithetical tension. This development need nothave occurred if the parliamentary regime had been truly success-ful in preserving a status mixtus. Because the Weimar regime failed to do this. The state. strong enough to keep at bay the many religious. for in it the notes thatdefined both the judicial and the executive states were subordi-nate to the legislative function. p.: 78) Accordingly. the nineteenth-century state was'neither absolute nor strong enough to render any non-state busi-ness meaningless' (ibid. Observance of that dualism meant that the nine-teenth-century state resulted from 'a balance between two kindsof state: it was at the same time an executive state and alegislative state' (ibid. the management of its ownaffairs. particularly between its executive andlegislative functions. By yielding to democracy and inter-vening in society's spontaneous order the state became a 'welfarestate' and in the process lost its autonomy and independence. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.: 73).for example. Parliament had becomethe 'scenario of a pluralist system' (1932a: 90).). Schmitt recognized that the tendency of the liberal nineteenth century was. namely the dualism'of stateand civil society. The total state obliteratedthat separation and imperilled the autonomy and independencenecessary for the state to function. namely the administrative or total state.According to Schmitt. .: 75). 192-193. compare withFil'alkowski.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . the realization of a 'common opposition tothe state relativized those differences and did not impede socialintegration' (ibid. Democracy destroys state strength Cristi 1998.). was able 'to build a state-free economy and aneconomic-free state' (ibid. i. to prevent it from intervening andinterfering with the economy. First. p. In his esti-mation. The crisis resulted from the extinction of the authoritarian ethos and the decisionisttemper that could sustain a strong state. without fear or jealousy. It was fair to say. But this liberal order could only survive ifplaced under the aegis of a strong state.). that the nineteenth-century constitutional stateought to be described as a legislative state. Schmittproposed the retrieval of an executive state as a solution to thecrisis currently faced by the Weimar republic. (ibid.

1990. Like other valueassertors.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Force isof course an acceptable tool to achieve compliance. he notes. Thus they justify war not as a means toprotect national territory.PG 91. including the Soviet Union and South Africa. SD It is irrelevant that Bloom and other "traditionalist" intellectuals prefernot to speak of "values" but proclaim the "principles" of democraticequality. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. but disagree on who is to carry it through. but as an "educational project. and it is not extraneous to our discussionthat their stated Hchstwert is one the political and intellectual Leftembraces no less readily than they. not areturn to older patterns of life. which they hope to see implemented everywhere. What they want is recognition of their own highest value." . Schmitt would find understandable this convergence of views. [Paul Edward. Bloom and his admirers demand that their values be validatedthrough acts of imposition.31 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Education Education projects in South Africa can lead to force to implement our values in the area Gottfied. conceptual manipulations in which values are readily reordered inaccordance with the changing wills of individuals or groups. It is alsoconceivable that intellectuals competing for political control will accept thesame highest value. for theasserting and imposing of values. Both the American Right and theAmerican Left consider a secular. majoritarian democracy with a mixedeconomy to be the highest universal good. entails Denkschaltungen.

hegemony contributes to a spaceless universalism that destroys the ability of lines to be drawn – leads to exclusion and annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr. in this paper.org/conference2004/. this is far from the first altemative that Schmitt had outlined in that 'world unity' has not emerged under a sole sovereign or even through the impending retreat and demise of the modem state that processes of globalisation herald. despite the attraction of regional blocs that the 'success' of the European Union has created. Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. University of London]. The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m. September 11. At this stage.” http://www. is often discussed through various perspectives. 15 I would like to explore this spaceless universalism under the heading of today's cosmopolitanism and discuss some of the repercussions of cosmopolitanism's claim to 'erase' the lines or distinctions set by the intemational state order and promote the idea(l) of a universal humanity. but especially since 1989. indeed. While the emergence of US hegemony since 1945. And. and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN Charter's tense comprom.ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention). however.ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions. 10-11. BH It is today often assumed that end of the Cold War meant the victory of the US. would not rid the political world of exclusions. I would like to remain with Schmitt's argument and concem of a 'spaceless universalism'. 17 . and that an American Empire is now being constmcted.32 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Hegemony U. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.S. politically it is difficult to speak of the regional spatial order with the assumption of intemal unity within each bloc that Schmitt had presumed.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . That this post1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations. Louiza. P.sgir. Neither has a new global balance been constmcted in an explicit system akin to the European system of the balance of power under US hegemony. which I think still best captures the lack of explicit spatiality to global politics that is prevalent today. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain '''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations.

“Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. University of London]. 17-18. which is the politics of getting rid of politics. Louiza. There are in fact four main criticisms arising from political considerations.47 in terms of the friend / enemy distinction. BH In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increasing usage of the terminology of 'humanity' by both theorists and public actors. which Schmitt puts forward against the discourse of humanity. liberal modernity 'is the battle against the political . The politics of humanity focuses on moral questions and hopes to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether.48 . .46 For Schmitt.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . P.sgir.45 As David Dyzenhaus notes 'liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics. such as the League of Nations.33 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Humanity The discourse of humanity represents a battle against political that serves to ensure cosmopolitanism Odysseos 2004 [Dr. The first is an allencompassing objection that arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values: by using the discourse of humanity the new cosmopolitanism reverberates with the 'ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle' which go back to the nineteenth century.as Schmitt defines the political. September 11.” http://www. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.org/conference2004/.

http://rudar. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.ruc. January. p.dk/handle/1800/2068. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.34 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Humanitarianism Humanitarianism is a war for liberalism – the goal is not to help the victims of the world but instead to extend liberalism Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 316-318. BH     . Of Aarhus Denmark].D.

35 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

University of London].36 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Humanitarian efforts are a form of liberalist impositions on the state Cristi 1998. The mere existence of a state proved that the attempt to dispense with notions such as sovereignty. 64-65. The existence of the state. the discourse of humanity enables the creation of 'a category of political non¬persons. ever new enemies'. nor are they allowed a right of resistance and self-defence. dictatorship and politics was futile. The notion of an unjust enemy in the war on terror relies on the reintroduction of the notion of just cause for one's own side and points to an 'other' who has to be fought until there is no more resistance .Individuals were assured a sanctuary for their immunities andprivileges. Louiza.sgir. When enemies are denied this procedural kind of 'justness'. particularly if it responded to those unlimited political demands. The tensions and contradictions within the Weimar constitution were powerful arguments aimed by Schmitt against humanitarian liberalism. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. which saw in those demands a permanent threat to the freedom of individuals. BH A new type of war also requires a new type of enemy: 'it is an apparent fact'. Schmitt recognized. those subjects of other ‘modernities’ entangled with the liberal one. a political form.. allowed for an interventionist political state. Professor in department of Philosophy. p. Rasch argues. The notion of enemy used by the war on terror is problematic because it denies any rationality or justice to its opponents.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . BH Schmitt explained this uneasy accommodation as the confluence of two distinct elements. could override and render superfluous the inalienable human rights (1921: 140).” http://www. the notion of just us hostis which the interstate order had developed. the 'freedom-hating' recalcitrant others. [Renato. As Schmitt argued in the Nomos.apolitical element stressed the protection of individuals. resting on the pouvoir constituent of the people.org/conference2004/. A democratic volonte generale. alongside the notion of non-discriminatory war.87 become those to be excised from the global liberal order. From this perspective the state ought to be seen as anintruder whose actions required close supervision. subject to a demonization which permits not simply their defeat. but this produces new internal enemies that results in efforts at extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr. since those who fall outside of these delineations become . contradicted the spirit of liberalism. On the one hand. P. 86 In the case of the war on terror.. a liberal. then peace cannot be made with them. hence the need to distinguish between liberalism and the political. was what allowed war to be limited in nature but also peace to be made with enemies. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. but their elimination'. On the other hand. September 11. 85 As we discussed above. 26-27. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. as if by internal necessity. Humanitarianism attempts to create universal friendship. 'that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces.

ruc. http://rudar.dk/handle/1800/2068. Ph. Of Aarhus Denmark]. 297-298. p. BH .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. January.D.37 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Humanitarianism is an effort to achieve a universal order in which opposition to this order is seen as the enemy of humanity Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.

and Society. clearly defining friends and enemies during war and peace Rasch 2000 [William. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .sagepub. where life can be eradicated. Culture.International Relations International Relations force alliances and groups to make friends and enemies thereby erasing the grey area of indistinction. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. AN     .” http://tcs.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.38 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link .

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .39 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .

In his The Constitution of Liberty. In other words. predictability and measurabilityof all political and juridical decisions.1960: 93). 152-153. 1960: 231-3). The latter presup-posed a state whose function was limited to 'the preservation ofthe legal order'. Both Schmitt and Hayek acknowledged that the rule of lawremained a purely procedural condition. The generality andpersistence of law was meant equally to protect all individualsfrom prerogative and arbitrary authority (Schmitt. and acknowledged hisdebt to Schmitt (p. 207 n. constituted the 'proper foundation of theRecbtsstaat and the most effective warranty against all despotism'(1926: 23). onewhich considers the state to be the armed warranty of liberalpeace. privileges and dispensations conveyed by particu-lar measures implied that the rule of law was indifferent to theconsequences of its application (Schmitt. He explicitly referred to the memor-andum written by Schmitt in 1926.: 154-5). one based on private property and personal freedom. [Renato. Schmitt sought to dispose of the Weimarwelfare state and thus eliminate the burdensome obligationsimposed by the principle of social justice (1995: 122). . whichsought to give capitalist managers freedom from state welfareregulation. coercive orders were in principleincompatible with the liberal idea. my emphasis).This corresponded to the substantive core embraced by earlyliberalism. In theVerfassungslebre. order and security' (Schmitt. As WilliamScheuerman has noted.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Schmitt and Hayek agreed in assuming that the legalfoundations of liberalism consisted in this objective encirclementof authority. particular and open to the needs and inter-ests of particular individuals or groups. together with equalitybefore the law. 9). Schmitt's attacks on democratic liber-alism matched Hayek's assault on the welfare state. 1928:139-41). BH In this affirmation of a substantive conception of law. Professor in department of Philosophy. In this respect. Schmitt distinguished between the rule of lawas a generic notion and the liberal rule of law. Thealternative to this state of affairs was summarily captured bySchmitt's formula 'a strong state and a sound economy'.40 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Justice State intervention in the arena of social justice destroys individual freedom and is a deviation from the state’s true purpose – a strong state and sound economy is the necessary alternative – it protects civil society’s independence Cristi 1998. The value ofindividual freedom would be jeopardized only by attempts tomodify and correct such outcomes under the guidance of prin-ciples defined by social justice and by state intervention (Hayek. At the same time.viz. Schmitt defined laws as general and abstract. and by legal order he meant 'a liberal legal order. and equality before the law(ibid. Hayekstood very much in agreement with Schmitt. comparewith Hayek. On thecontrary. where he proposed that thedistinction between law and measure. Hayek adoptedthese same four criteria (1960: 207-12).: 130-2). Schmitt postulated that the conception oflaw required by the liberal rule of law demanded conformity withfour specific criteria: generality. The requirement ofequality before the law and the rejection of the particular opportunities. The emergence of substantive differ-ences among individuals was of no concern here. andmeasures as concrete. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. would be able to protect the inde-pendence required by civil society. 1928: 130. but they could be permitted oncondition that the authorities in charge of implementing themallowed all individuals equally to foresee and calculate the courseof legal actions. one that strongly asserted itsmonopoly over the political. 1928: 154. only a very strong state. In addition. a decrease in state regulation couldnot amount to a decline in discretionary state authority. an administration subjectto judicial review (ibid. p.

favored apolitics of restraint: liberalism because it paid insufficient attention to man as a "dangerous. He finessed hisdefinition of "democracy" to avoid making it refer to government thatdepended on changing popular opinion." It is that mode of organizing human groupings that totally sacrifices private to public life and that carries political antagonisms into ideological crusades. Cristi is right whenobserves that. http://rudar. Ph. his prodemocratic statements were mostly tactical. “his attacks were directed against the democratic component in nineteenth-century liberalism. Liberalism has increased the gap between representation and reality – we must break this cycle Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.dk/handle/1800/2068. What Schmitt really thought of democracy comes through in Legality and Legitimacy when he expresses the opinion that "the cause of the totalstate. SD Neither liberalism nor democracy. particularly against the principle of popular sovereignty. and democracy because it politicizedlife entirely to the detriment of other human activity. The association of democracywith national homogeneity would allow an ideal sovereign to benefit fromdemocratic legitimation without being stymied by majoritarian whims. he thought. R. F.ruc. in Schmitt's opinion. Of Aarhus Denmark]. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.D. more accurately of the total politicization of man's entire existence. BH . Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. PG 80-81. contrary to the view of Schmitt as primarily antiliberal." Schmitt regarded liberals as too muddled to save European states from democracy.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . which he believed would engender totalitarian policies. Inno other respect was Schmitt a political majoritarian. 1990. p. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. January. was the means bywhich a conservative president could hold the German state together. He made them in order todefend an authoritarian presidential government against a liberal parliamentary one. Plebiscitary democracy.41 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Liberalism Neither liberalism nor democracy favor politics of restraint and democracy sacrifices private life and heads to totalitarian politics Gottfied. Though Schmittapparently preferred democracy to liberalism. or at least found it moreconsistent with the maintenance of sovereignty in Weimar Germany.must be sought in democracy. [Paul Edward. dynamic being”.132.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . “once the notion of prerogative power was abandoned no possibility of legitimately acting beside or against the law was left. In this sense. AN Liberalism's denial of the exception and avoidance of' the discretionary activity that was traditionally sanctioned to deal with it. D. Against Politics as Technology) PG 151-152. Schmitt’s deciding sovereign can be seen as a violent return of the prerogative represented by scientific liberalism. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. Lack of constitutionally facilitated emergency prerogative may then provide the opportunity to those like Schmitt who would use this particular liberal deficiency as a ruse to scrap the whole legal order.42 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Liberalism makes liberal regimes vulnerable to emergencies and must prefer the alternative. . McCormick ‘97 (John P. As Bernard Manin describes it.” The only apparent recourse available in this milieu to political actors confronted with a political exception is to act illegitimately and hope to pass off such actions as legitimate. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. not only makesliberal regimes susceptible to emergencies but also leaves them vulnerableto alternatives like the one eventually put forth by Schmitt. Ph.

http://rudar. p. BH .D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.dk/handle/1800/2068.43 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Modernity (Generic) Modernity is penetrating the political (weakening the state) – if we fail to act to end this imposition on political dictatorship it will become irreversible Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph. January. 66-67. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.ruc. Of Aarhus Denmark].

Ph. 107-108. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.dk/handle/1800/2068.44 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Peace The end goal of peace is a form of depoliticization that denies the existence of enemies and refuses to make a distinction between friend and enemy Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January. BH . Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.ruc.D. Of Aarhus Denmark]. http://rudar. p.

anextra-state situation of personal freedom. The political element of the constitution was meant to securethe unity of the state. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. They were limited in thesense that they could not 'be claimed by aliens. Political rights. the possibility of distin-guishing between friends and enemies. wasnot to be taken as a normative one. As a liberalelement. would disappear’ (p. All that liberalism required in this respect was thelimitation and control of the state on behalf of individualfreedom. as Schmitt understood it. 126). 'theprotection of citizens from the abuse of state power' (p. BH The liberal element proper demanded.The state had to be seen as 'a strictly controlled steward ofsociety' (p.on. This determined the two principles that found their way into every modern constitution: a recognition of funda-mental individual rights (principle of distribution) and a divisionof public powers (principle of political organization). Their scope was unlim-ited in principle. on the contrary. . Civil rights. p. This was what the distinction between civiland political rights presupposed. but factually and existentially. This concept of the political. Individuals were best served by closelydemarcating a domain of action free of political interference. 128-129. first and foremost. [Renato.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Professor in department of Philosophy. and the fundamentalpresupposition of political existence. 127). belonged to individuals living in a state of nature.45 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Rights to Africans The extension of liberal rights to aliens distorts the unity of the state Cristi 1998. 169). 125). liberal rights parexcellence. Otherwise thepolitical unity and community would cease. This quest. placed Schmitt explicitly in the Hobbesian camp. the rule of law.The unity of the state could not be rendered by the liberal elementbecause the tendency of liberalism was to confront the state andstand apart from it. did not entail any specific principle of political organi-zation. the Kantian Herrschaft des Gesetzes(p. as the possibility of distinguishing friends from enemies. were privilegesthat could be held only within the state. This relativization of the power and authority of thestate should count as the most essential ingredient in any attemptto define liberalism.

could not be contained within strictconstitutional bounds. the front line of a broader campaign aimed againstthe German democratic revolution of 1918-19 and the Weimarconstitution. accordingto Schmitt. But it was simply a mistake to thinkthat a constitution could of itself warrant the realization of thejuridical (Recht). To thinkthat a piece of paper could personify the sovereignty formerlyheld by the representative figure of the monarch was. [Renato.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . According to Schmitt. BH The argument presented in this book has chronicled the devel-opment of Schmitt's pre-1933 theory of the state and theconstitution. which had the effect of preserving the latter's independenceand autonomy. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. But the German democratic revolution meant anirreparable weakening of the state. The realization of the juridical was first andforemost the achievement of the pouvoir constituant whose activ-ity. classical liberalism was ableto maintain a clear line of separation between civil society and thestate. which ought to be regarded asa merely derivative pouvoir constitug. p. a dangerous illusion. party politics begin to deteriorate state power Cristi 1998. Professor in department of Philosophy. The Nazi destruction of the constitution in 1933 washailed by Schmitt as a reversal of that historical process. according to Schmitt. 204. The original pouvoir constituant wouldalways transcend the constitution.46 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Pluralism When pluralism enters the state. . By giving free rein to thepluralist tendencies buried in civil society it allowed the occupa-tion of the state by party politics and the consequent dissolutionof its unity. Ascribing sovereignty to theconstitution and the ideal of the rule of law was the illusionpeddled by humanitarian liberals in their campaign to discreditthe state and the political.

as a separate sphere.its powers and competencies were to be strictly defined and sep-arated. civil society was legitimated in itsdemands for the least possible interference in its internal affairs. but not established or generated.constitutions recognized the priority of individual rights. Theywere to be protected. First. 1960: 173). It was only in this latter function. we arereminded by Hayek. This corresponded to whatSchmitt called a 'principle of distribution' (1928: 126). . and the latter was taken as instrumental to the ends indi-viduals set for themselves.presupposed a clear separation between civil society and the state. andadministered by another. On the one hand. Second. The classical liberal formulation of the rule of law. was given by William Paley: 'the first maximof a free state is that the laws be made by one set of men.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Professor in department of Philosophy. limited in principle. 150-151. p. by thelimited legislative powers of the state. then. Schmitt assumed that civil societyneeded to be regarded as a protected sphere where individualswere accorded the freedom to develop and launch forth in everndirection. inorder to make sure that the state did not overstep its limitations.and. These two principles made-:p the heart of liberal constitutionalism. Schmitt maintained that the liberal rule of lawpostulated that a state.On the other hand. in other words. as a 'principle oforganization' (ibid.). [Renato. that the liberal rule of law had its propertask. civil society was granted precedence over thestate.6 The liberal rule of law. should maintain aseparation of its powers and competencies as a guarantee that itwould remain within its own bounds. that the legislative andthe ludicial character be kept separate' (Hayek. Accordingly. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. BH Hayek also shared Schmitt's definition of the liberal rule of law as advancing the two general legal conditions required by a liberalpolity.47 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Rule of Law The liberal rule of law seeks to limit sate power Cristi 1998. As such. the struc-:ure of liberal constitutions reflected this dual condition.

Ph. The problem of technocracy has become a persistent issue inthe practical reality and public discourse of liberal democracies.might provide some provisional insight into this problem. Against Politics as Technology) Pg. A carefulstudy of Schmitt's work . .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .48 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Technology Technology links to liberalism McCormick ‘97 (John P.where liberalism and technology inexorablyintersect . Perhaps more productive avenues for understanding each of these important entities." as well as hisdisdain for what he describes as an instrument or tool. 24-25. They are indications of a deep-seated connection withinSchmitt's political theory between liberalism and modern technology. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. AN It is my argument that Schmitt's derogatory references to what is "tactical" or is a reflection of some kind of narrow "functionalism. D. are not merelyrhetorical.

University of London]. both the war on terror and liberal cosmopolitanism are located within a modernist vision of the end of war. the threat entailed in dichotomous determinations of 'with us or against us' is intended to shape peoples. however. only partly subjectivised through other means. and the singular way of achieving this is to spread modern subjectivity and its attendant liberal political institutions (or vice versa). 25-26. but nevertheless becomes obvious in the apocalyptic-sounding framing of the Bush Administration's understanding of the fight on terrorism as a fight that will not be abandoned until terrorism is rooted out. Therefore.” http://www. Dispensing with intemational law and norms of state action cannot be understood as serious obstacles to this kind of war. the war on terror seeks to rid us of the scourge of terrorism. in which war is gradually replaced by mles and principled behaviour. Marxist and poststructuralist thought. And. September 11.94 Outside. is often acknowledged through the debts that cosmopolitan thinking owes to Immanuel Kant's understanding of cosmopolitan law. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. At the same time. Louiza. 80 This. Bush on the desirability of a newly democratic Iraq. perhaps even worse types of war. When threatened. as those undertaken by the League of Nations. A recent articulation of this paradox is offered by Julian Reid who notes this disturbing paradox: [a] political project based concretely upon an ideal of 'peace' has continually produced its nemesis. The second relationship of the war of terror to cosmopolitanism. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. September 11. as Habermas notes regretfully. yet another evolution after the one noted by Mary Kaldor in the late 1990s?84 The War on Terror promotes the spread of subjectivity and liberal political institutions and skews the concept of who is with and who is against us Odysseos 2004 [Dr.83 Schmitt's own assessment of prior liberal attempts to abolish war. P. in the age of the war on terror the US sees 'wars that make the world better.sgir. then.org/conference2004/. was an unforgivable affront to this liberal modernist vision of perpetual peace. because.49 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – War on Terror The War on Terror is a modernist version of the end of war that produces civil wars of annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr. into subjects. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). Louiza. the war on terror is central to the very paradox of liberal modernity and war which that has preoccupied realist. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. pertains to the rise of modem subjectivity and the institutions that it makes possible. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. 'the dream of a modernity without violence. war.” http://www. is similar: 'any abolition of war without true bracketing [has historically] resulted only in new. the apparatus of liberal cosmopolitanism responds by radicalising its normal mode of operation (which is the spread of modem subjectivity through commerce and cultural 'exchange ') and attempts to impose a liberal order by spreading modem subjectivity through logistical. 82 That the war on terror is located in this understanding of modernity is less apparent. Recall the numerous speeches by George W. and their global exportation.81 That cosmopolitanism seeks 'perpetual' peace. P.. the United States of America. how else can we understand the war on terror if not in a sequence of changing types of war. Not only does the recurrence of war throughout modernity serve to underline its paradoxical character. Hans Joas has eloquently called.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . But the very forms of war that recur are of such increasing violence and intensity as to threaten the very sustainability of the proj ect of modemity understood in terms of the pursuit of perpetual peace.. 28-29. BH The first relationship arises from their joint location in a long line of thought and policy aiming to articulate an outlook and a political programme of the modern world in which violence and war dissipate. biopolitical and military means.org/conference2004/. University of London].sgir. whose liberated citizens can participate in promoting a safer and more peaceful Middle East. . The occurrence of September 11 th in the seat of this dream. BH Outside of the liberal polity. need no further justification' 95 .

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . was a bidto reassert the juridical validity of notions such as sovereignty. This is what heachieved in the last pages of his Die Diktatur (Schmitt.50 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – We Demand Impositions by the civil society on the state crumble its strength Cristi 1998. to read the Weimar consti-tution as a purely formal juridical document missed its truemeaning. Hence. [Renato. Professor in department of Philosophy. Schmitt took the view that it was futilesimply to repress political life and attempt to cover it up with thelanguage of abstract legality.authority and dictatorship. Then its impeccable liberal facade wouldcrumble and the real proportions of its article 48 would come tolight (compare with Schwab. 1970: 37-43). BH The intellectual task attempted by Schmitt immediately after thepublication of Political Romanticism and prior to 1923. . The rise of liberalism had depoliticizedpublic discourse to such an extent that the real nature of the statehad been obfuscated. 63. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. These non-romantic notions wereneeded to strengthen the state and keep it from drowning in thevortex of civil society. Schmitt treated the constitution as a distinguishedpatient invited to lie on his couch and confess to its repressedpolitical intentions. 1921:201-3).

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . andacknowledge the necessity of a sovereign state that retained themonopoly of the political. the exercise of state sovereignty could again be juridically determined. if liberalism wereto restrict its apoliticism to the sphere of civil society. Once order wasreestablished and normality returned. Schmitt would not object to conservative or authoritarian liberalism. [Renato. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p.51 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Civil War A distinction of enemies and friends is needed to avert impending civil war – key to a strong state Cristi 1998. Only contempt for the reality ofthe political would allow one to pretend that a system of legalitycould sustain itself and maintain no reference to a substantiveorder of things. Schmitt was a unswerving critic.Schmitt followed Hobbes in judging that only the strongly decisive state could avert the possibility of a civil war. BH Schmitt's emphatic affirmation of the sovereignty of the statewas due to what he saw as the weak state that had resulted fromthe revolutionary abrogation of the monarchical legitimacy inGermany. . If liberalism were to be identified with thisapolitical view. Professor in department of Philosophy. 6.8 Schmitt's conservative thought found in the critique of liberal-ism a continuous line of argument. the political reason of an absolute prince. The normativity ofa legislative state could replace the stark raison d'itat. Its strengthcould be measured by the capacity to identify friends and enemiesand draw between them clear adversarial lines. A convinced etatist and anti-monarchomachist.

In line with these historicaltransformations. . emergency action becomes more extreme. because it is soon carried out by anelite whose actions are supposedly sanctioned by such "popular" sovereignty. dictatorship changes from a "commissarial" phenomenon to a "sovereign" one. as such. this process is radicalized as sovereignty becomesincreasingly defined as popular sovereignty. who will become Schmitt's intellectual hero. Hobbes's "sovereign" andstate are hence a kind of dictatorship that has as its sole task guarding overthe ever-present exception and. For Hobbes. Ph. butin modernity it becomes an end in itself-. 143-5) and more immediately theBolsheviks. Civil war and foreign war traditionally considered exceptional circumstances that might occasionally call for a dictator. like an absolute monarch. In this way is "the technical conception of the origin of the modern state directly related to the problem of dictatorship" (D. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. as authority derives not from aspecific and definite individual person. there is a historical justification for the violentdestruction of an old order and the creation of a new one out of nothing." Thus.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . is actually a normal state of affairs. Hobbes. become something else in the writings of such statetheorists as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin. D. such as Mably(D.52 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Dictatorship Dictatorship is inevitable through the affirmative’s engagement in politics McCormick ‘97 (John P. the technical was a means to a prior-sanctioned good. the present manifestation of 'War" is an exceptional circumstance that in the past. 132-133. 115-16) and especially Siey6s (D. Against Politics as Technology) Pg. both elements themselves change through the transformation: In a traditional framework. AN All of politics becomes technical and dictatorial politics. is no longer commissarial butappropriate to its own name. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. sovereign. or more accurately beneath the veneerof the present. the "natural condition" or"state of nature. the exceptional circumstance is viewed actually as areturn to normalcy and the regular order as a kind of exceptional situation -the distinction becomes deliberately blurred.13 According to Schmitt. Concomitantly. butr-ather from an amorphous and differentiated populace. 10). Schmitt's chief examples of this development are the writings of the French revolutionary theorists. As a result.Sovereign dictatorship becomes the power to perpetually suspend andchange political order in the name of an inaccessible "people" and aneschatological notion of history. further inverts the relationship of a normal political situation and an exceptional one with his concept of the "natural condition" or the "state ofnature. correspondingly.

Culture.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . and Society. AN .” http://tcs.sagepub. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.53 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Extinction Without regular conflict in which our enemies are identified. the state of war goes beyond defeat . “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.extinction Rasch 2000 [William.

Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.” http://www.ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention).ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions.org/conference2004/. September 11. would not rid the political world of exclusions. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain '''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations. University of London].Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 17 . The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m. and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN Charter's tense comprom. Louiza. That this post1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations. BH Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. 10-11.sgir.54 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Universality fails – leads to exclusions and annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. P.

63 With this in mind. and no political entity corresponds to it. they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace. furthermore. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not. it needs its negative opposite. 59 As Ellen Kennedy notes. When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality. but its utilisation by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition. BH Thirdly. human and inhuman. can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike-can only. "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity. where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. To be human. did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104)." Therefore. Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. However. and to war and violence. Schmitt noted how only when 'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity. but is that which makes the distinction possible. 57 Finally. If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need.” http://www. of a 'just enemy'. Louiza. and to punish its violation. against whom or what does it wage its wars? 58 'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy. not because of a treaty. and most importantly. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it." Scott writes.org/conference2004/. the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis. Moreover. historically examined.56 Outside of this historical location. usually in the name of an international community which acts. it has no localizable polis. we are assured. where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an abstract politics of neutrality. It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length: We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that performs this all¬important service. no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Since nonbelievers can become believers. he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated. one cannot.55 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose. Schmitt feared. That is. because the enemy does not cease to be a human being. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity. wrote in the interwar years of the right of this international community to impose its neutral will: The "international community. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of Nations in the Nomos. at least not on this planet'. but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables. 19-21.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole. in the interest of humanity. September 11. . or a pact or a covenant. humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. humanity per se is not part of the distinction. In its historical location. where the other cannot be assimilated. 'humanity is not a political concept.sgir.6! In the Nomos. they must be of the same category of being. University of London]. claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus publicum Europeaum. the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable. It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation and destruction become possible. let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil. could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will." it has become "the representative of the common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States. a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century. however. . . there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other. 1 turn in the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of humanity and cosmopolitanism. The concept of humanity. as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror. in other words. Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is.60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity 'excludes the concept of the enemy. the enemy had no value and could be exterminated. then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon. be inhuman62 Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war. this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law' (NE 187). it becomes apparent that. which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). but because of an international need" (283). which had declared the abolition of war. and when this happens total extermination is possible Odysseos 2004 [Dr. . a philosophy of absolute humanity. is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. P. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of Justus hostis. James Brown Scott. then.. who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom. or accommodated. in his words. . similarly.

D. Ph.56 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Having enemies is necessary to ensure the containment of war – The alternative is extinction Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. BH . Of Aarhus Denmark].ruc. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. http://rudar. 108-109.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.

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With the implementation of values leads to naming enemy as worthlessness and lets extermination become a reality
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 89-90. SD It would not be stretching a point to recognize in Schmitt's modernpartisan an intellectual seeking desperately to carry through his "highest value [Hochstwert]." In the contemporary world partisans are losing theirattachment to homeland soil. Their dependence on great power and theiridentification with revolutionary ideals have turned them from nationalliberators into armed ideologues. Schmitt presents Lenin as a key figurein this process of change "who gave a new twist to the distinctionbetween friend and enemy." The Prussian military theorist Karl vonClausewitz had advocated total war during Prussia's struggle againstNapoleon. Clausewitz did so as an extraordinary, temporary measure in aEurope of established states. Lenin, by contrast, advocated total war asan instrument of raising the party above the state. He set out to turn thestate into a weapon of "world civil war" directed by the party, and his acthad irreversible significance: "Once the party became absolute, thepartisan too became absolute and was raised to being a bearer of absolutehostility. Today the absolutization of the enemy has become all the moredifficult to discredit, for it seems to be inherent in the reality of a nuclear age. Such statements are clearly related to the escalating war of valuesin which intellectuals damn the bearers of competing values, togetherwith the values being rejected. In The Tyranny of Valties Schmitt stressesthat the competition being discussed is not a mere academic exercise but adeadly confrontation: "For the highest value no price is too high to bepaid." Politics now centers on values and no longer on the definableinterests of established communities. Such politics demands just wars,"for any consideration of the enemy must vanish, must become anonvalue, when the struggle against this enemy is concerned with the highest value.” In this situation there are only two types of human beings, "the one who annihilates and the one who is to be annihilated." Inconclusion: "All categories of the classical military law of the jitspitblictim Europaelitium -- just enemy, just grounds for war, proportionality between the means and the intended purpose, reparation – must fall victim to this [judgment of] worthlessness. The drive toward theimplementation of values becomes here a compulsion toward their immediate realization.

Without the friend-enemy distinction any opposing view in the world will lead to war of all against all with new weapons of annihilation and extermination
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 88. SD The pure subjective freedom of positing values leads to the eternal struggle of values and worldviews, to a war of all against all, to an eternal bellum omniurn contra ornnes, in comparison to which the murderous state of nature in the political thought of Thomas Hobbes is a true pastoral scene. The oldgods arise from their graves and continue to wage their old struggle, butdisenchanted ... with new weapons of annihilation and procedures ofextermination.

Liberalism emasculates politics allowing a war of all against all which can lead to extinction
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 71. SD The views that remain standing on the problematic character of liberal politics in Schmitt's work are the first two: (1) Schmitt criticized liberalism for emasculating politics; and (2) he feared that liberalism, by taking human aggressiveness too lightly, would produce the war of all against all. Though these interpretations clearly diverge, it is possible to cite supporting passages for either from The Concept of the Political.

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Impact – Governance Fails
Liberalism fails as a organizing politic – creating enemies is a necessary framework for politics to function – only through the exception can the sovereign maintain order and power
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 52-53. BH

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Liberalism fails at governance because of the way it is limited from declaring emergencies – comparatively a politics based on friends and enemies is better
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 95. BH

P.” http://www. in their present state. and the public is disciplined Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Moreover. If we understand the 'state of nature' to be an educational tool employed by Thomas Hobbes in order to discipline the unruly participants in the English civil war. making physical violence in principle illegitimate (if sometimes inevitable) . they may begin to seek justifications for pre-emptive wars. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. that the sovereign is needed and ought to be made stronger92 Inside the polity.org/conference2004/. then. an environment which (re )creates fearful subjects inside liberal polities. its general logistical manipulation of citizens. but also newly inserts 'peace practices' into its set of operations. civil liberties are destroyed. the practices of the war of terror such as its constant raising of colour-coded terror alerts. which the Hobbesian solution had banished to the outside. let us take the US as an example. 89 As to the means of this war to spread the modern liberal subject. the war on terror contains what were traditionally recognisable as 'war practices'. its lessons of how citizens ought to cultivate readiness to deal with disaster.sgir. that the danger. September 11. has retumed. as they may start to question. the weakening of their civil liberties. The type of violence that becomes possible in a liberal cosmopolitan age is that which promulgates modern subjectivity. through the international biopolitical operations of the UN system in the last half of the 20th century and through other kinds of wars prominent since the end of the Cold War. Peace and War 'must be understood in accordance with a substitutive value that makes the two tenns absolutely contemporary with one another.93 disciplines and controls the subjects of liberal societies by suggesting that the distinction between inside and outside no longer holds. Louiza. It reminds citizens. more incessantly. should consent to remain there and should commit themselves more fully to the habits and principles that ensure the stability of their condition. even though that condition does and must carry many ‘inconveniences’. Given the commitment to the individual .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . which makes incrementally real the ideal of universal humanity. David Held is correct to claim that the war on terror (and the US's unilateralist foreign policy) is a return to the Hobbesian state of nature. which intends to produce and spread modem liberal subjectivity. As soon as liberal citizens stop being afraid. a similar relationship with liberal cosmopolitanism. University of London]. as the state of nature did. . which abstracts human political diversity from its local constructions and retains only its cultural and aesthetic spectre88 The war on terror should be seen as the latest form of a longer project of subjectivising peoples who have only partially been subjectivised through colonialism. therefore. starting with the inversion both of their functions and of their "classical" relations'. the internal disciplining of liberal publics is necessary in order to justify the undertakings of the war on terror on the world outside of liberal polities.war in the present stage of liberal modernity becomes an activity that spreads modern subjectivity and subjectivist socio-political practices. the war on terror can be understood to serve a similar purpose and to entail. then we can see its function as a disciplining device helping to convince imperfectly domesticated subjects that they. BH The second relationship is that the war on terror is connected to cosmopolitanism in that it is a set of practices. 90 In one way. The war of terror is.60 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Internal Conflict Failure to adhere to a strict friend/enemy dichotomy produces internal conflict – preemptive war is justified. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.which sets into place norms and practices that prohibit the torturing of the subject's body. 27-28. in part. through the extensions of global capitalism. Just as the device of the state of nature is able to achieve results for classical liberalism by exulting the need and desire for the sovereign.

Schmitt's insistence on the polemical and thereforepolitical potential of holding opinions strongly appears to lend credibilityto Sartori's question.D. He is only calling attention to thecc ever present possibility of conflict" that can erupt in the internal politicsof weak states.armed combat does not cease among organized units. SD Moreover. [Paul Edward.. at precisely the moment at which it becomespolitical. 1990.ruc.. Nonpolitical groupings can suddenly transformthemselves into violently antagonistic ones. 116. BH Without a sovereignty to name foe’s conflict turns in on the state and forges religious. whether an intellectual or parliamentary debatepresupposes the same degree of antagonism as that manifested in ashooting war. Sartori contends that Schmitt is making too much of theGreek word polemos (war) by extending it to essentially civil encountersamong oratorical or scholarly opponents. purely cultural criteria and motives.purely economic.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Ph. as well as among organizednations.15 Where the state dissolves itself or renounces sovereignty. or cultural. But Schmitt does not equatesuch encounters with shooting war. even if the state nolonger directs it. http://rudar. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. economic. January. in the form of civil war..61 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Modernity has created the depoliticized enemy – this is the enemy that results from having no external enemies in which case hatred turns inward into uncontrollable violence and hate Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. a point forcefully made in anoften misunderstood passage from The Concept of the Political: "The realfriend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that thenonpolitical antithesis. Of Aarhus Denmark]. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.dk/handle/1800/2068. . Thatgrouping is always political which orients itself toward this most extremepossibility.PG 63. p. Gottfied. pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.

The notion of sovereignty could be safely dissolved or. Condorcet was able to justify. it became necessary to limit what liberals then interpreted as royalist excesses and arbitrary rule. calculated and regulated in advance. according to Schmitt. Now individuals confront a unified totality. all intermediate associations. even better.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .13 The unity of the state could not thereby be placed in jeopardy. p. and the isolation of individuals. transferred from the monarch to each individual citizen. un despotisme arme was required to contain them. While they existed.62 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Solvency Takeout Plan fails – policy implementation/advocacy by the individuals fail to create any changes in the state Cristi 1998. The transition from monarchical absolutism to liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law presupposed that the challenge to the sovereign unity of the state posed by the aristocratic Frondes (these nobiliaire) had been met. Thus. Professor in department of Philosophy. 64-65. in the following terms: “the time is past when there existed within the state powerful groups and classes. switching his allegiance from monarchy to republicanism. [Renato. the assertion of absolute monarchical sovereignty over feudal seigneurial claims. BH The emergence of the modern sovereign state was thus the result of the triumph of the these royaliste. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. (1921: 204)14” . this was to be seen as a perfectly normal event. il faut bien peu de force pour forcer les individus a l'obeissance. If henceforth an individual or a group of individuals conspired to alter the public order. Classical liberalism acknowledged that the juridical value of absolutism lay in having definitely secured the unity of the state that had been menaced by the Frondes. Once that unity was attained. The associations puissantes have vanished. Liberalism presupposed the elimination of all social groupings.

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Impact – War
Without a sovereign power the state can fall into “legal war of all against all”
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 73. SD Gray depicts the "new Hobbesian dilemma" that is developing out ofbad liberal doctrines and social democratic zeal for stateinitiatedredistribution of services and income. In England, which is his test case,the "state has become the most powerful weapon in an incessantcompetition for resources" and entitlements. "Its power is sought byevery interest and enterprise partly because of the huge assets it alreadyowns and controls but also because no private or corporate asset is freefrom invasion or confiscating taxation." In contrast to the sovereign state,Gray describes an "anti-Hobbesian" one that is occupied by mutually antagonistic interests. Working through legislation and litigation andoften through human rights rhetoric, these interests create a "legal war ofall against all, with the ... state of nature being reproduced in thecontext of an over-extended government and a weak civil society.' Gray does not confuse this "over-extended government" with a trulysovereign state, which does not allow itself to fall victim to the "legal warof all against all." Only through the restoration of its political sovereignty,in the Hobbesian sense of maintaining public order against internal andexternal threats, can the state control its own destiny and protect itscitizens against each other as well as foreign enemies. Inherent in Gray'sanalysis are the three points of reference that define Schmitt's critique ofliberalism: sovereignty, the challenge of the exception, and humancontentiousness. The challenge of the exception is the assault on the state's sovereignty that has created Gray's "new Hobbesian dilemma," an occupied state that is also an "overextended government." His wordsrecall Schmitt's critical remark made in The Concept of the Political thatliberals "transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into acompetitor and from the intellectual viewpoint into a debating partner.' Through such redefinitions of identities, Gray and Schmitt both maintain,the participants in this process work to hide, while actually spreading, dangerous political antagonisms.

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Alternative – Agonism
Agonism is essential to self development and politics. In a political system, decisions are made based on wins and losses and the loser is forced to become subordinate to the winner.
Hateb, 2002 (Lawrence J., Ph.D. from Fordham University, "Prospects for a Democratic Argon; why we can still be Nietzcheans") How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity. 10 In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics. 12

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The creation of antagonisms is necessary for the sovereign’s ability to create exceptions – this is necessary to reaffirm state power
Cristi 1998. [Renato, Professor in department of Philosophy, Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. 63. BH Europe in 1848, Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918 provedCondorcet to be wrong. Within the state there arose new powerful associations whose 'antagonist force' created exceptionalsituations. These required the development of totally new frameworks of reference. In particular, the Marxist notion of adictatorship of the proletariat went beyond the notion of commissarial dictatorship, which could still be placed
within traditionalparameters. It represented an absolute dictatorship grounded ona revolutionary pouvoir constituant, very much the same powerthat was claimed by the National Convention in 1793, and whichSchmitt presented as an example of absolute dictatorship. Schmittconcluded his Die Diktatur with the thought that the Weimarrepublic, like the situation of Marx and Engels as described intheir address to the Communist League in 1850, had retrogressed, to the state of affairs of France in 1793 and was thus compelledto employ the same measures (1921: 205). Schmitt's self-imposed task was to bring to light what lay beneathWeimar's liberal facade. It was one thing to recognize the sovereignrights of individuals and quite another to attribute

broad unlimitedpowers to the executive authority, powers that could even configurean absolute dictatorship. If conceived as an outlet for the pouvoirconstituant, the Reichsprisident would be empowered to go beyondthe limits set by the constitution itself.
Schmitt sought to bring outthis repressed aspect of the constitution, its revolutionary stance, inorder to graft onto it his own counter-revolutionary programme, aprogramme he thought he shared with de Maistre, Bonald andDonoso Cort6s.16 Novalis's observation that Burke wrote arevolutionary book against the revolution could be extended to thework of these thinkers. It seems to me that it should be also extendedto Schmitt's Die Diktatur. Indeed it was by revolutionary means thatSchmitt intended to contest the revolutionary claims of theproletariat. The dictatorship envisaged by Marx was an extension ofthe enlightened rationalist dictatorship. The conservative reactioncontested the expulsion of the will from the constitutional empire ofreason. For the Enlightenment there could only be an administrationof things which left no room for ultimate decisions. The enlighteneddespot was a rational edifying dictator, who centralized control andadministered the state according to plan. To Burke, de Maistre andBonald this appeared repugnant. Schmitt notes their aversion to apriori constitutions, 'to "artifice" in political affairs, artificial consti-tutions based on the calculations of a clever individual, and thefabricators of constitutions and

political geometricians' (1 925b: 95).Only a decisionist, non-constructivist way of thinking such astheirs could fully restore and bring to life the political eminence ofthe Reichsprisident. He alone would then decide on the livingexception.
The notion of sovereign dictatorship developed by Schmitt in his Die Diktatur manifested his desire to keep alive what he sawas the foundation of the now disintegrated German monarchy,namely the monarchical principle. The French Charte of 4 June1814 constituted its paradigm. The monarchical principleallowed the monarch, in virtue of his pouvoir constituant, tostand above the constitution, so that from the monarch's point ofview the constitution appeared as something precarious and provisional. According to Schmitt, article 14 of the Charte meantan express manifestation of sovereignty, and not just a commissarial empowerment to deal with emergencies. The monarch was ictator, commissarial or sovereign. Like the sovereign dictator Schmitt modelled after him, the French monarch 'did notconsider it anticonstitutional to issue decrees that violated existing laws and even the constitution itself, when he alone judged itnecessary for the security of the existing order' (1921: 193).While

the function of a commissarial dictator was the preservation of the constitutional order, the aim of a sovereign dictatorwas the elimination of 'the whole existing order' and the generation of a new constitution, the only true constitution. Accordingto Schmitt, in such circumstances an appeal was made to theconstitution that would be enacted, not to the one that actuallyexisted (ibid.:
137). This abrogation of the existing order was totranslate into the adoption of a revolutionary stance whereby asovereign dictator could place himself above the constitution.This could be seen prima facie as a purely political move, as some-thing completely 'devoid of juridical value' (ibid.). But whatabided above and beyond a constitutional system was not purelya Machtfrage. A sovereign dictator appealed to a power that,though not constituted, was definitely the 'foundation' of aconstitution. Here resided, according to Schmitt, 'the meaning ofthe pouvoir constituant' (ibid.). It allowed one to transcend thelimits of a legal system without trespassing the limits of the juridical (Recht). Schmitt's sovereign dictator fell within the bounds oflegitimacy and could thus borrow the juridical status that wasbestowed on traditional commissarial dictators.17 In sum, Schmitt formulated the notion of sovereign dictatorshipand adopted the related doctrine of the pouvoir constituant tohighlight the perceived disharmonies within the make-up of theWeimar constitution. The framers of the constitution hadattempted to accommodate a 'combination of a sovereign and acommissarial dictatorship' (ibid.: 203). By enhancing the role ofthe Reichsprisident as a bearer

of pouvoir constituant and poten-tial sovereign dictator, Schmitt looked to exploit those perceiveddisharmonies in favour of a strong state. In view of the uncertainties of the new democratic course chartered by the Weimarconstitution, Schmitt's ultimate aim was to strengthen the state byreinforcing its unity. Later, in his Verfassungslebre, when circum-stances proved more auspicious for the state, the role of theReicbsprdsident would be de-emphasized. Even though Schmittstill recognized analogies between Reichsprilsident and Kaiser, theformer could not be presented as the Kaiser's heir 'because thejuridical foundation was not the same' (1928: 292). TheReichsprdsident was a plebiscitary figure, resting on the sovereignty of the people; the legitimacy of the Kaiser was based on themonarchical principle. If the monarchs of the Restoration periodhad recognized the Estates 'as representatives of the wholepolitically unified people' (1928: 52), this would constitute acontradiction. They would have surrendered the key element oftheir legitimacy - the monarchical principle. Equally contradictory would now be the attribution of constituent power to theReicbsprdsident as heir to the Kaiser. The juridical foundation ofthe Weimar republic was not a monarchical but a democraticlegitimacy.

permanent hierarchies (NCD.162). We cannot assume the truth of universal suffrage.D. without much articulation of how agonistics threatens these notions. Ph. and political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for exclusion rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion. equality. equal respect. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche that reveal how modern "reason" cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcome—namely regimes of power—and consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of emancipation. respect. [End Page 138] metaphysical suspicion. which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of Nietzschean politics: Might not a radical agon all the way down in political life "debunk" important democratic "verities" such as universal suffrage. I think. Hateb. 2002 (Lawrence J. while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. Nietzschean perspectivism. simply assumes the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions. My strategy has been to redescribe democratic ideals in the light of Nietzschean suspicions of their traditional warrants.66 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Agonism can be healthy for establishing hierarchies. and agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . But he poses an important question. Yet Appel. 18 Nietzsche's genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals. Universal suffrage. why we can still be Nietzcheans") Appel concedes that a political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched. I take up the latter. p.. is important and still relevant for political philosophy. like many critics of postmodernism. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon. and human rights by ignoring Nietzsche's trenchant attacks. equality. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can a Nietzschean agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics redescribe respect and political rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by Nietzsche? . and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. The question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of these ideals or does it open up the possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi-Nietzschean terms? Appel presumes the former possibility. from Fordham University. and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of Nietzschean genealogical criticisms.

Volume1. by contrast. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.PG 80. Spring). [Paul Edward. he defines "political antagonism" bylooking specifically at the sovereign national state.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 1990. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. against a criminalized and thus dehumanized enemy. but as a total struggle. Rockefeller College Review. AN. proper normative political antagonism is linked for himwith the operation of sovereign states. The sovereign is needed to name the states enemies Gottfied." a situation based on absolute rather than legal enemies. participate in politicalconfrontation only under the state's aegis. His paradigmaticfriend-enemy grouping is the one institutionalized by the sovereign statethat mobilizes citizens against collective rather than personal enemies.War would no longer be viewed as limited combat. It is the state and its sovereign who take charge of this antagonistic relationship. SD Though in The Concept of the Political Schmitt purports to bediscussing political life in general. George Schwab notes that "thereturn of the foe. private citizens and civil society. Issue 2. as in medieval crusades..is at least implicit in Schmitt's picture of the end of the sovereign state. While Schmitt is willing toconsider the "political" defined as a "friend-enemy antithesis" in variousother situations. .67 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Friends/Enemies Policy Alternative: Use political will in order to recognize the enemy Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.

Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Volume1.68 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Decisions to make enemies are of utmost importance. . Spring). Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Issue 2. Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . AN..

but better to explain its poten-tial. on the combination of two opposed principles: the principle of identity (namely the presenceof the people as a political unity . Thepeople could not simply be ignored because. In reality they jointly configured the diversity of existingpolitical unities. there could be no state withouta people and a people would always be present and make its pres-ence felt in the constitution of the state. .. In sum. which excluded each other only when considered in theabstract.69 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Distinguishing between friend and enemy is a cornerstone of the political – it is up to us as individuals to make these representations Cristi 1998. The status mixtus was not an ideal notion. The need for it would seem superfluous in caseswhen direct democracy was rigorously exercised. theprinciple of representation was based on the fact that the politicalunity of a people could never attain full and permanent presence.by virtue of which the political unity is constituted by the govern-ment. just as nonecould wholly renounce representation. The Weimarconstitution acknowledged that the people was the true subject ofpouvoir constituant and the principle of identity determined thepeople's political unity.. not with aview to hinder the status mixtus. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Schmitt formulated the contrasted principles of identity and representation.it could never be present as a actual identity. when. Only stark acceptance and recognition of the reality of thepolitical was able to validate it. There could be no state without some kind ofrepresentation. the people was capable of unified politicalaction. as a matter of fact. It could not claimthe conceptual rank of the principles of identity and representa-tion. no state coulddispense with the structural principle of identity. Schmitt related thecommunity and diversity of state-forms to two polarly oppositepolitical principles. This could happen when the people attained a full real-ization of its identity and homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit). forinstance. But in truth. as a political unity. [Renato. even in such cases. It needed always tobe represented personally by individuals. In truth. concretely embodied in every state: the prin-ciple of identity and the principle of representation. On the other hand. Schmitt wrote(p. At the same time. Professor in department of Philosophy. itwould always retain a presence. Theability to distinguish between friends and enemies became thecriterion for the existence of political consciousness. 132-134. only adult members werepresent and their democratic encounter lasted only while theywere present together in session. BH In order to provide philosophical underpinnings for thisretrieval of the notion of a status mixtus. Representationcould never be implemented absolutely and in a pure fashion. The principles of identityand representation were but theoretically opposed points of refer-ence. On the one hand. For the truth was that no actualstate could entirely give up the principle of identity.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . p. 2 14): The state rests. when capable of distinguish-ing between friend and enemy) and the principle of representation. active New England citizens met in the proverbial town-hall.

defining in this way a conditionthat the state ought to respect. The same text now read: For the liberals. Only a strong state couldrestrict its social interventions to a minimum and allow 'thatsociety and the economy could adopt in their respective spheresthe necessary decisions according to their immanent principles'(Schmitt. a substi-tution of the phrase 'society has its own order in itself' for the phrase 'society is good'. a state that would stay within itsown limits and would not invade. . There he haddeveloped a conception of a strong state. 1931: 78). he added the phraseland bound by precise limits'.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Professor in department of Philosophy. but dropped and added crucial terms which confirmed his rapprochement to the neoliberal standpoint. BH In the 1932 edition. bound to precise limits (1932b: 60) A comparison of these two texts shows. This view of the state coincided with require-ments demanded by German neoliberals and Schmitt had noreservations in complying with them. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. in quantitative totalitarianfashion. in the first place. strong enough to main-tain its independence with respect to the free development of theforces that constituted civil society. [Renato.70 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Rejection Reject aff . by contrast. the domain of society. the goodness of humankind signifiesnothing more than an argument by means of which the state ismade to serve society. This change coincided with what Schmitthad advanced in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung. 176-177. it only means that society has its own orderin itself and that the state is only its distrustingly controlled subor-dinate. p. This again conformed with hisconception of a strong state.Interventions by the state must be limited – key to a strong state Cristi 1998. he maintained basically the same view. Second.

and the state was henceforth in the positionto generate a system of law. (1922b: 55)” For Schmitt this meant that the foundations of a legal orderrested on a transcendent source: a subject who had the will todecide politically. p. compare with Schmitt 1921: 194). According to Schmitt. no eminent legislator to which the state'shighest authority could be traced. . 70-72. likethe one developed by Kelsen.18 He thereby eliminated authority merelyat the level of definitions... whichessentially meant decision. It was easy for Schmitt to prove that this was simply a cover-up. The living authority of the state. 'Kelsensolved the problem of sovereignty by negating it . 'The basis for the validity ofa norm is only a norm' (ibid. The capacity and willingness to make politi-cal decisions defined sovereignty. BH In his Political Theology. 1922c: 27).Kelsen drew no distinction between state and law (Recbt) andidentified the state with the legal order (Recbtsordnung)(Schmitt. supreme underived basic norm..Infallibility was for him the essence of the decision that cannot beappealed.71 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Sovereignty The sovereign’s capacity to make political decisions is the essence of the unity of the state Cristi 1998. Sovereignty in turn secured theunity of the state. which was published shortly after Die Diktatur. would of necessity wake up atthe slightest invocation. so maligned by liberal thinkers and rescued from oblivion by the Catholicconservatives. Kelsen's Grundnorm.no natura naturans. [Renato. putto sleep by liberal enchantments. reversed this order of generation. Liberal constitutional theories.grounded a legal order whose central point was the sovereignstate.: 19). There was no transcendent subject of pouvoir constituant.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. the relevance of the Churchon its rendering of the last decision that could not be appealed. To him the relevance of the state restedon the fact that it provided a decision.A. Professor in department of Philosophy. This [was]in fact the old liberal negation of the state vis-a-vis law (Recht)and the disregard of the independent problem of the realizationof law (Recht)' (1922b: 21. Schmitt explored the notion of sovereignty. “De Maistre spoke with particular fondness of sovereignty.

and Society.sagepub. AN .” http://tcs.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. Culture. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.72 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Strong sovereignty is needed to combat bad stuff in the world Rasch 2000 [William.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

1990. . In view of the foreign balance of power that has controlled Europe since 1945 and the current international problems of terrorism and drugrelated crimes. At the end of the Second World War. it avoids the irreversible surrenderof the right of war.PG 119.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . it may be warrantedto distinguish between military cooperation and the turning of military dependence into the subversion of another state's sovereignty.73 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Compromise Schmitt’s alternative provides compromises for international cooperation Gottfied. Those who promote such politicsresemble the Persian Emperor as depicted by Isocrates. by right of conquest. The sovereign state defended by Schmitt does not rejectinternational cooperation but remains wary of encroachment on itsinternal governing power. Still. Such a project by now has become paradigmatic for many architects ofAmerican foreign policy who approach military alliances looking foropportunities for further conversions. SD The sovereign and (still in Europe to some extent) national state maybe the only sound alternative to those largely empty hopes that have beenraised against it. the United States imposed on Germany and Japan a reeducation plan and a preferred regime. [Paul Edward. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. who treatedGreek allies as slaves by another name. it may no longer be possible for all western governments to be as sovereign as the states that reconstructedthe European map after the Napoleonic Wars. Above all.

Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. http://rudar. Ph. p.D. BH     .ruc. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.dk/handle/1800/2068.74 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Extinction Eliminating conceptions of enmity results in them reemerging in worse ways – a return to recognizing a concrete. 300-304.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January. external enemy is needed to preclude the rise of an exterminationist ethic that seeks annihilation Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Of Aarhus Denmark].

75 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon     .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

76 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon     .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

77 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

on 28 March. crucial achievement: the Prussian coup of 20That decision went to the core of 'the Weimar constitution'sworst design defect . in turn. compromised by another decision. where his views were interpreted favourably. [Renato. One could not avoid 'the general impression that the state has grown weaker and the circumstances have worsened and become more chaotic' (Appendix: p.atVerfassung. the enigmatic decision handed down byme supreme court at Leipzig on 25 October of that same year which appeared to confirm the legality of the government's decision that led to the Prussian coup. Alexander Riistow. Professor in department of Philosophy. Third. But its overall argument marched inunison with what he had first developed in Der Hiiter. There he sought to reiforce the authoritarian tendencies he discerned in the Weimarconstitution by clearly demarcating the realms of the state a-Zof civil society. it sparked an immediatereaction that brought together a vast coalition of the most unlikelyconfederates. first of all. BH The fact that he was Schleicher's legal adviser and member o-his clique influenced some contingent aspects of Schmitt'sLangnamverein speech. Hesummed it up by adopting the conference's striking motto .78 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Economy A strong state is key to a successful economy Cristi 1998. second. In this conference. Schmitt noticedthat when a strong state asserted itself. Despite the anti-liberal resonances conjured by the notion of a state described as both strong and total.Schmitt was still hopeful that a strong state would prevail in theface of a number of opposing forces. disappointment with the results shown by the presidentialSince its inauguration in 1930. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. and third. Second. instigated by Schleicher andsupported Juridically and ideologically by Schmitt's interpretation of article 48 of the Weimar constitution. p. it was well-received in liberal circles. Schmitt deployed many of the principles andessential elements of his theory of the state and the constitution. 214. in his view. he used the formula 'qualitative total40m m opposed to the 'quantitative total state' of totalitarianism.the dualism between the Reich and Prussia'p. that sole achievement had been.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . . But he was still prepared to defend 'the practical usefulness And energy of article 48' in the face of a campaign to discredit and Defame it. A noted neoliberal economist.only a strong state6 can preserve and enhance a free-market economy. He blamed party politics for weakening state authority and espoused a strong state to provide the necessary protection for the development of a free economy. Schmitt did not hide. the Prussian coup June 1932. of a presidential regime. In hisLangnamverein speech. the one handed down thepreceding month by the supreme court at Leipzig. 30-32. Despite his disappointment with that decision. the establishment. which he saw as a weak state) to refer to this strong state. 214).Schmitt’s address began by reviewing three epochal events inrecent history: first. he was also willing to credit that failed regime.40 did not hesitate to confirm the liberal ancestry of Schmitt's conception of the total state (1932: 69). published the year before.

Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Spring). . Issue 2.79 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Empowerment The delineation between friends and enemies empowers individuals within a political community Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Volume1. AN..

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. The decisions regarding friends and enemies are placed at the center of the political which provides life with increased meaning.80 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The task of the political is to provide experience and nourishment. AN. . Issue 2.. Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Volume1. Spring).

This it could do by monopolizing the political and assuming the full scope of its protective function. Implicit in his argument was anappeal to the notion of constituent power. The strength ofthis state was dependent on its ability to remain neutrall6 anddepoliticize society. 19-20. the Instrument ofGovernment of Hitler's regime. p. . [Renato. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. The twotexts that he published shortly after Hitler rose to power showedSchmitt's enthusiastic support for a new revolutionary statewhose strength was bolstered by the absence of an essentialliberal ingredient. Schmitt was personally responsible for advancing aninterpretation of the enabling act of 24 March. Schmitt's strong state was not meant to interfere inany way with the affairs that properly belonged to civil society.81 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Freedom The alternative protects freedom through spontaneous market mechanisms and monopolization of protection Cristi 1998. could be read as an anticipated agenda for Schleicher's stint asChancellor. an appeal that had theeffect of destroying the Weimar constitution and placing in itsstead the enabling act as a provisional constitution.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . the separation of the executive and legislativepowers. BH The first text was a conservative plea that decried party factionalism and appealed for a further strengthening of state authority. Schmittreferred to this authoritarian state as 'qualitative total state' andcompared it to the stato totalitario of Italian fascism. as the revolutionary abrogationof the Weimar constitution.His conservatism was combined with a liberal view that sought to leave civil society to a large extent free of state regulation and ruled mainly by spontaneous market mechanisms. Professor in department of Philosophy.

Their pessimism led them to think that their present wasbeyond redemption. its soul had perished. Other conser-vative revolutionaries. it is up to individuals to affirm national integrity Cristi 1998. like Spengler. the existentialist tone of this hard decisionism wasmore akin to a conservative revolutionary outlook. .vative camp. [Renato. Traditional con-servatives thought that the past retained its vivifying force. also gave up any claim tolegitimacy. Professor in department of Philosophy. stoically gave upany efforts to revitalize tradition. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. When the cultural soul of anation died nothing could revive it. that history had passed its verdict: Westernculture was exhausted.82 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort culture has been exhausted. ought to be affirmed bythe decisive will of one single individual.revolutionary conservatives.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . on the contrary. monarchical or democratic. 73-74. They saw that the preser-vation of traditional ways of life and past institutions wasillusory. National integrity. in theabsence of spiritual forces to sustain it. p. BH If Schmitt's critique of liberalism put him within the conser.

This metaphysical appurtenance of dynamicity andstaticity. absolute andpositive constitution) and his theory of the state (the polarltvstate/civil society. AsCondorcet acknowledges. 1928: 8 and 130). pluralism and unity. the separation of executive and legislativepowers). a well-ordered liberalsociety was one founded on substantive values like private prop-erty and individual freedom (Schmitt. Schmitt built his last line of defence. 1921: 204). p. According to Schmitt.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Around the distinction between the juridical and the real-ization of the Juridical. once those associations puissantes aredismantled. 'll faut blen peu de force pour forcer les individus l'obeissance' (Schmitt. This was the complexio opposito-rum that separated and brought together the state and civilsociety. Only a strong state could be trustedto minimize the power to be exercised over individuals.83 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict A strong state is needed to crush factions that oppose it and ensure individual freedom Cristi 1998. one that could crush the powerful factionsthat menaced it from within. Professor in department of Philosophy. Onthese rested a string of other axiomatic distinctions which shapedthe architecture of his theory of the constitution (pouvoir consti-tuant and pouvoir constitu6.3 In thecourse of history. pluralism and unity was meant as the conceptual struc-ture that would ease the inevitable transition to a substantivelyliberal society. [Renato. To attain such an order Germanyrequired a strong state. law and measure. and that between the substance of powerand its exercise. other national communities had been able toentrench and institutionalize a substantive liberal order that didnot dissolve into factions. . likely to be dismissed as 'scholastic subtleties' (Schmitt. BH Much of what appears bewildering and contradictory inSchmitt rested on the metaphysical symbiosis of dynamicity andstaticity. 207-208. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. 1921: 194).

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. AN. Issue 2. Spring). Volume1.84 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Protection Politics are dependant on “friends. “Friends” are willing to risk their lives to defend communities against “enemies” Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. .” who make decisions on who “enemies.” are..

Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. Culture.85 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other The sovereign is the only way to preserve differences in an international system Rasch 2000 [William.sagepub. AN     .com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . and Society. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.” http://tcs.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .86 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .

Issue 2.87 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – State Collapse Individuals must unite to view enemies collectively. preventing the state collapsing in on itself Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Rockefeller College Review. Volume1. . Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. AN. Spring).Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt ..

for it confirmsits existence. Schmitt seemingly attempts to allay such fears. There can be no "exceptional" situation without a normal one. hence. in effect. Ph. to this government's functioning would jeopardize its vigil and would necessarily require suspension. 6-7). on the contrary. ForSchmitt. the exception can be good for the legal order. to the exception: The exception can be more important . Every general norm demands a normal.88 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Agamben The rule only exists as a result to the exception." in which an authoritarian regime is required to standguard at every moment for the possibility of the sudden appearance of theexception. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but its existence. Without the exception. emphasis added) . rules could never derive. however. 6-7). D. Against Politics as Technology) PG 226-227. ostensibly restoring confidence in the importance and primacy of the norm-bound situation. (PT. legal or otherwise. The exception is more interesting than the rule. it is ridiculous to make plans or provisions for what one could notpossibly foresee (PT. Just as the exceptional case by definition cannot be predicted. 15. Schmitt asserts that the rule. The rule proves nothing. than the rule.37 Any limit. Schmitt goes on. draws attention to the rule. to suggest that the normal situation actually owes its legitimate existence. according to Schmitt."'The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal descriptions can be valid must first be brought about. This could easily be taken as a call for a perpetualstate of "emergency. by definition neither can it exist at all times. everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations" (PT.. Because of this. but because the seriousness of an insight goesdeeper than the clear generalizations inferred from what ordinarily repeatsitself. in turn. any attempt to define the exception or to describewhat circumstances might constitute an exceptional case is a hindrance onthe ability to manage it when it in fact arises to threaten a regime. AN Exactly how does this natural-scientifically tainted constitutionalism hamper the ability to deal with the exception? As we know from Chapter 3. defines the exception and that the exception.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .. McCormick ‘97 (John P.which derives only from the exception. not because of aromantic irony for the paradox.

religious. some states have been largely concerned with the pursuit of murder and thievery. beautiful or ugly. it is not even that because this identity is so formalized. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis [such as good and evil.(n56) The homogeneity that defines the group may well have its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral values. aesthetic and economic spheres of human thought and action. This would seem to squash most public debate and deliberation. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. p68. Schmitt argues that the political "is independent. enemies and the political." Whether a group of the latter sort is made up of thieves and murderers is beside the point. then. Summer98 Issue 112. No doubt. But shared identity. it is one thing to say that the internal standards of a group defy evaluation by universal rationalist standards. Like the sovereign decision. if there is one. The first step toward this unwelcome conclusion is taken when he insists on the political irrelevance of the content of the "motives" that define any given political group. But they are states nonetheless." Further. will the solidarity of the group be based? What do they have in common if it is neither economic. it is neither a fact nor a norm.89 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Bad States The internal standards that make up a group are irrelevant so long as there is some form of homogeneity of the group so that war will only be waged in self defense Norris 1998 [Andrew.(n54) However. But politically this content is irrelevant. and quite another that the members of the group are incapable of guiding their own decisions by shared values or shared ideas of what constitutes a good reason. not in the sense of a distinct new domain. BH Here it may be objected that Hegel's distinction between a legitimate state and a gang of courageous "robbers or murderers bent on crime" is valid. beautiful and ugly] or any combination of other antitheses. Hence the only "sensible" justification for waging war is the self-defense of the group.' one independent of the criteria that define the moral.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . that is nothing more than a shared commitment. not can it be traced to these.(n57) . Indeed. so thoroughly drained of content. If so. purely juristic. purely moral.” Telos. economic and even religious matters are things about which one can argue. or moral? The answer is a shared identity. Schmitt is attempting to provide "a definition [of the political] in the sense of a criterion."(n55) On what. Schmitt commits himself to the latter as well as the former position. aesthetic. Such states are deplorable.D. It follows that he will acknowledge as political some forms of association that may be good or evil. does Schmitt's political theory allow him to recognize it? It does in so far as it distinguishes between a loosely organized group and one in which the sovereign authority is acknowledged by the citizenry to possess "the right to demand from its members the readiness to die. "it would be senseless to wage war for purely religious. the homogeneity of the group. Moral. or purely economic motives. received his Ph. appears to be nothing more than a fact. profitable or unprofitable.

. xi-xii). Liberals deem a dictator tobe any single. Dictatorship emphasizes the importance of the regular order through the imperative to bring it to restoration. This is aresult of a relativistic formalism that misunderstands that dictatorship dealswith something else entirely. according to Schmitt. xiv). Classical dictatorship is a wholly technical phenomenon that restores what is not wholly technical. and "sovereign dictatorship. The classical dictatorship emphasizes the importance of theregular order something that eludes the liberal positivism of Hans Kelsen. 124-127.5 This difference also lays the groundwork for the theoreticalhistoricaldistinction that governs the whole of Die Diktatur. despite its fixation on equilibrium. namely. dictatorship has an end that is not simply the perpetual means toanother end. xiii). to Schmitt. and the fact that it must restore a previously standing order.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . or despite legal positivism that.. Unlike the separation of powers that. specified task.7 Liberals have completely forgotten its classical meaning and associate the idea and institution solely with the kind described by Schmitt as "sovereign" dictatorship: A distinction is no longer maintained between dictatorship and Caesanmmand the essential determination of the concept is marginalized . Liberal constitutionalism is an order become increasingly technical through its formulation of a conception of normalcythat excludes the extraordinary. often democratically acclaimed. TheCommunists have the concept partially right. and they equate aunreflectively with authoritarianism. disuse. as a brain operation has to do with a logical problem.."for whom the problem of dictatorship has as much to do with a legalproblem.the one between thetraditional concept of "commissarial dictatorship. xiv). and abuse ofthe concept in the early twentieth century. be cause the regular constitutional techniques are assumed to be appropriateto a nature free of the extraordinary. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. according. the classical institution employed them to restore a previous inexisting one. the "bourgeois political literature" either ignores the concept altogether or treats it asa kind of slogan to be used against its opponents (D. D. according to Schmitt. "definitive" for the Communists.90 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Dictatorship Bad Dictatorship is always going to be superior to liberalism. McCormick ‘97 (John P. individual ruling through a centralized administration withlittle political constraint. ironically. according to their ideology. and even the papacy (D. if the Communists partially understand the essence of dictatorship. xiii)." which is unlimited in any way and may proceed to establish a completely new order.For Schmitt. Caesarism. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. Without a dictator or sovereign. . The "centralizing machine" and "domination-apparatus" of the state seized by the proletariat is not. But this obscuresthe truly fundamental transformation of the essence of the classical concept: The communist institution employs technical means to create a newsituation. for theyrecognize its purely technical and temporary characteristics: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is the technical means for the implementation of thetransition to the Communists' final goal" (D. xiii). Ph. cannot distinguish between right and wrong and hence legality andlegitimacy. xiii).liberal constitutionalism leaves itself especially susceptible to emergencies. According to Schmitt." which is bound by allotted time. the normallegally legitimated order. So. completely misapprehend it. that the authority of the state cannotbe separated from its value" (D. Against Politics as Technology) Pg. Its blind faith in the technical apparatus of its standing constitutions andthe scientistic view of the regularity of nature encourages liberalism tobelieve that it needs no technique for the extraordinary occurrence.6 I will return to theseissues in greater detail in subsequent sections. to the extent that they pay any attention to the concept at all. This difference has important ramifications for the question ofjust how limited a dictatorship can be if it is legitimated and bound by afuture situation as opposed to being legitimated by a previously existingone. liberals are incapable of handing emergencies and are vulnerable to these very emergencies. but rather.. military government. thecommissarial char-acter of dictatorship" (D. Schmitt notes that one might then see the communist theory of dictatorship as simply a modern incarnation of the classical institution: a negationof parliamentary democracy without formal democratic justification (because the Communists are often a minority) and a replacement of thepersonal dictator with a collective one (the party) (D. xix). AN It is important to note that this purely technical aspect of dictatorship isat the very heart of the concept and the institution for Schmitt and that ithad much to do in his mind with the contemporary use. the separation of powers and legal positivism defile it throughthe emphasis on uninterrupted processes and not what is substantively important about a regime. cannotensure stability.liberals. Schmitt isalarmed that the concept seems to be taken seriously only by the Communists with their doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (D. Bonapartism. due to its mechanical nature.8 But by corrupting the notion of this important technique for dealing withemergencies and subsequently banishing it from constitutional concerns.transitional" (D.

when particular constitutional norms wereviolated. For Schmitt.monarchical or democratic. 124-125. Those violationswere only 'measures' (1928: 107) and not constitutional norms. What these situations demonstrated was the. Of themselves. particular constitutional norms were violated in orderto safeguard the substance of a constitution. Bycontrast. p. They tookplace.superiority of the existential over mere normativity' (ibid. BH The recognition of the democratic political form and itsconstituent power had a price which Schmitt was eager to exact:the reintroducion of sovereignty as a legitimate theme for constitutional discussion.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . this ideal ofabsolute normativity constituted a tenuous fiction. such cases confirmed constitutional validity.These sovereign actions set in motion the activity of constituentpower in the daily ordeal of constitutional business. implied a sovereign prince or a sovereign people who stood legibus solutus. An absolute form of government. [Renato. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Theyforced the recognition of sovereignty. He now felt he could point withoutmisgivings to what he called 'apocryphal acts of sovereignty'.). and thus relativize. The politicaland the state could be erased by legal fabrications and methods ofavoidance. above the law.whoever had the faculty to violate. the legalorder as a whole was sovereign. But 'theseacts of inevitable sovereignty' (Schmitt. On thecontrary. Professor in department of Philosophy. such violations did not imply the destruction or suppression of the constitution as a whole. according to Schmitt. Accordingto Schmitt. Sovereignty manifesteditself when the legal order was violated. the purpose of the liberal ideal was. to subject the power of the state to the rule of law andexpel sovereignty from its domain. 1928: 108) were betterjustified when they could be seen as grounded in the constituentpower of the people. . for instance.91 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Exceptions Bad Sovereignty is inevitable. Acts of sovereignty would always occur. but certain exceptions are necessary to momentarily confirm constitutional validity and protection Cristi 1998.They were justified by particular exceptional and abnormal transitory situations. According to Schmitt.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Volume1.    . Rockefeller College Review. AN. Spring). Issue 2.92 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Friends Bad Friends are classified in as part of Aristotle’s “the good.” Friendship develops as a result of goodness Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.

93 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

Spring). Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Volume1.. Rockefeller College Review.94 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Impacts Improbable Even if war is only a tiny possibility. Issue 2. it reaffirms the need of a strong sovereign Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . . AN.

BH Of course. 79 It suggests that. University of London]. Comprehending liberalism first and foremost as a strategy of power is. suggesting that liberal values are often used to obscure a power political reality. September 11. but it pursues this claim in a different way than the critiques noted above. P. I argue. poststructuralist accounts have suggested understanding liberalism as a strategy for the gradual dissemination of principles that derive from war within the power relations that pervade the societies it governs. disciplines political choices. despite the prominent sense in which the war on terror is portrayed as the antithesis of cosmopolitan orientations and achievements. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. 24-25.95 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Liberalism Good Liberalism is self defeating – it intensifies wars.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . moreover. promotes it and intensifies the ways in which it is fought. this latter endeavour is hardly new and it is important to acknowledge that such questions about the relationship between war and liberalism/liberal cosmopolitanism have been historically posed either from a traditional power-political (political realist) perspective or. Louiza. This section examines these in turn. The latter has customarily sought to interrogate both the ways in which the use of force is promoted within liberal zones of peace but also the ways in which liberalism involves a modernist disciplining of those political endeavours which contradict its key tenets or even seek to provide alternatives to its worldview.” http://www. to deepen and broaden our understanding of the relations between war and modernity in ways that can help us make sense of the profoundly logistical orientation of liberal societies today. . alternatively.71 More recently.76 The former disregards the liberal nature of these wars. and fails to promote peace Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. there are strong relationships between cosmopolitanism and the pursuit of the war on terror. in seeking to disavow war. 78 This section examines the claim that the war on terror does not indicate a crisis in cosmopolitanism but rather is the quintessential liberal cosmopolitan war. from a historical materialist perspective.sgir. thus paying scant attention to the ways in which liberalism.org/conference2004/.

Liberalism. at the sametime. . of that whose possibility is not due to any simple accident of history. Only if politics and experience can be imagined in a new way -. But the mere assertion of liberal principles to those who seek something else from politics is clearly futile. As Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe LacoueLabarthe(n69) note: "It is not possible to push [Nazism] aside as an aberration. stupid. enemies and the political. of needs it promises to fulfill. this does not necessarily absolvehis entire Weimar output. his apologists have explained his later behaviour asdue to a flawed moral character. A comfortable security in the certitudes of morality and of democracy not only guarantees nothing. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. 1990: 3). it follows course. Professor in department of Philosophy.” Telos.one that does not revolve around the attempt to regain unity and totality -. forinstance."(*) Using Schmitt’s Nazi affiliation to overshadow his important political contributions is problematic – we still must recognize the utility of his political theories Cristi 1998. It is still possible to discern aspects ofhis conservative thought in his Weimar writings that may be saidto configure and predetermine his intellectual abdication toHitler's authoritarian figure.96 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Nazi Nazism and Stalinism definitely had needs that had to be met. or morally retarded human being. or the return. If boundlessambition and lack of moral character alone could explain hissudden conversion in March 1933. this collaboration with the Nazis ought not 'to overshadowall other aspects of his life and work' (1983: 282). it is difficult to meet them in other ways and to resist those movements that promise to meet them. and his apologists have been right in pointing this out (Gottfried. this admission should be able to save the core ofSchmitt's conservative thought from Nazi contamination. BH In order to rescue Schmitt's Weimar writings and politicalphilosophy. 'Schmitt's Nazi career definitely revealed a personalweakness so far as moral principles are concerned'. According to Bendersky. If it is to be set aside.D.(n68) Whether one finds Schmitt acceptable or not. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. Summer98 Issue 112. BH The appeal and the danger of Schmitt's political thinking largely derive from his twofold insistence on the primacy of the whole.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . still less as a past aberration. tries to do this. For it is simply not true that every Nazi or Stalinist was an evil. received his Ph. which then led to an obsequious intellectual capitulation to the most perverse aspects ofNazism. but until we understand these needs from the clear awareness that the alternative allows these types of movements will resurface without Democracy and Morality having a chance of stopping them Norris 1998 [Andrew. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Butwhile it is true that opportunism was an ingredient in Schmitt'sintellectual adventure. As disturbing as it sounds. it is undeniable that his concept of the political continues to apply today. Until those needs are understood. 12. p68. it should be done with a clear awareness of the from this that there were what appeared to be good reasons to believe that legitimate needs could be met by such movements. p. [Renato.will it be possible to move beyond Schmitt's concept of the political. but exposes one to the risk of not seeing the arrival.

" was an attempt to counter the accusation seen as having led to his intellectual ostracism in the United States. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics." Schmitt expounded a modified traditionalist view of the state that had little in common with Nazi theory or Nazi practice. Bendersky proves Gottfied. Pg. . 3. that Schmitt could be "neither nazified nor denazified.97 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Schmitt can’t be classified as a Nazi. TJ Bendersky not only provides a serious treatment of Schmitt's relationship to the Weimar Republic. but also undertakes to put into perspective his real and alleged involvement with Hitler's Third Reich. 1990. Though charged by his critics with being "Hitler's Crown Jurist. He conclusively demonstrates that Schmitt's support of the early Nazi regime was at most an opportunistic tactic. [Paul Edward.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Bendersky's judgment.

national (in the ethnic or cultural sense).. one might see Schmitt's dedication to The Concept of the Political as a clue to this. how can that polity ever demand that they risk or sacrifice their lives? As Schmitt explicitly states. which are said to have no specifically political substance. then. Yet something connected to these motives. at which point the conflict becomes political. the quotation at the beginning of this paragraph with Schmitt's previously cited claim: "If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life. When one. August Schaetz of Munich. economic.. then Wolin must be wrong in claiming that Schmitt's "existential definition of politics in terms of the primacy of the friend-enemy grouping necessitates the relinquishing of all claims to the 'good life' and instead to rest content with 'mere life' -. it is strong enough that men and women ought to recognize as legitimate the "right" of the state to "demand" their lives. is inherent in every consistent individualism."(n24) How then can Schmitt assure his readers that "War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics"?(n25) "In case of need. More."(n23) The plainest reading of this is as follows: groups define themselves in a variety of ways. What is distinctively political." In order to bridge the gap between the two." Schmitt writes. does not describe its own substance.."(n20) Since the enemy is defined as a threat to those relations of "friendship" internal to the state.D. Compare. prize the integrity of one's way of life over one's own lives."(n26) What does justify. of the fact that one's way of life is valued above one's life. received his Ph."(n27) . It is "by virtue of [its] power over the physical life of men [that] the political community transcends all other associations or societies. BH Schmitt relies on the threat to the individual's own physical life to draw out the "existential" quality of the political.. Wolin would be quite right to conclude that Schmitt is committed to the view that "all the energies of modern life stand in the service of war. Schmitt is wholly unconcerned with the substance or motives of the association that enters into the political conflict.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . it follows that the latter are not entirely a function of the external relation to the enemy. "the right to demand from its members the readiness to die" implies that the state has a priority over the individual. is entirely a matter of the conflict with the enemy. who fell on August 28. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University.namely. this may seem to be making extremely heavy weather out of a few turns of phrase. such a demand? In the longer of the two passages just quoted.” Telos." The decisive conflict is between political solidarity and apolitical. If the final step of this interpretation were correctly taken."(n22) If an often intemperate writer is also capable of subtlety.98 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 No Obligation to State People must be willing to risk their lives for the sake of the state – these political communities transcend all other associations. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. The conflicts that emerge between these various groups are not political until they reach a certain level of intensity -. liberal individualism: "The negation of the political. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. The sovereign decision is then made whether or not to go to war in order to resolve the conflict. But this threat is hardly identical with the threat to the collectivity's "way of life" or "form of existence.until they pose a threat to the group's existence. then he has become political. The threat to human life does not make one political. however. It reads "In memory of my friend." At this point. or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations. p68. is strong enough to lead men and women to offer their lives for the group. it can only be this recognition itself that makes the group political. the enemy wants to destroy us all and sacrifices must be made Norris 1998 [Andrew. Summer98 Issue 112. the relation with the friend is only a pretext: for this conflict. for whatever reason. in the assault on Moncelul. existential selfpreservation. in this regard. but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious. then it cannot be justified. Schmitt must present the Lebensform as in some way prior to the individual. 1917. but serves only as a reminder of one's commitment. in view of Schmitt's claim that the political has an existential priority over all other forms of association. But Schmitt explicitly states that: "The political. enemies and the political. This is why Schmitt never acknowledges as his own the problem that bedevils Hobbes: if individuals merely enter into a polity to protect their lives. Given the political indifference of the content of the group's motives and beliefs. "the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. this is one of the most important features of the Schmittian state.(n19) Indeed.(n21) If Schmitt is at all coherent.

” http://tcs. Culture.sagepub. and Society.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .99 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Perm Combining the state with the legal order does not allow the state to be the highest force and will ultimately lead to the destruction of the state Rasch 2000 [William. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. AN .

com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.” http://tcs. Turning to the state leads to unrestricted participation in all social systems Rasch 2000 [William. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. and Society.sagepub.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. AN      .100 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 State Deconstruction Good The idea of deconstructing the state is an “astonishing misunderstanding” and must be reject. Culture.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .101 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .

As Schmitt put it: "The political does not reside in the battle itself."(n34) "Simultaneously. The assertion of identity need not follow from nor lead to a violent conflict.(n35) but that the people belonging to them see war and what it demands as a real possibility.(n39) If Tocqueville seeks to broaden personal interests and to temper "the habits of the heart."(n67) Constant conflict is not necessary.D. it would make him an easy target. al. BH No doubt. This should make it plain why Schmitt suggests that a loss of meaning and significance attends the eclipse of the political."(n38) he is hardly a latter-day Tocqueville or a communitarian a la Michael Sandel. but also because the form individualism has taken in contemporary society. In a passage often quoted by his detractors. because of the awareness that there will be some other form of survival." Schmitt seeks to change the concept of who one are. p68. it makes sense to sacrifice one's life. It is not that groups need to be constantly at war with one another to be political. and commodities.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . enemies and the political. wholly irrespective of what is being fought for. As Schmitt rather chillingly puts it "[D]emocracy requires . in the absence of an independent moral affirmation of the political.. p68. not simply because of his authoritarian tendencies. but it is brought into view in its true significance. enemies and the political.e. Where Schmitt adds decisively to the analysis of Tocqueville et. Though Schmitt's polemical political theory sets itself against the presuppositions of what he finds to be today's "individualistically disintegrated society. Schmitt contrasts it with solidarity in the face of the potential enemy. in concrete clarity. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University." But it would be naive or disingenuous to maintain that a politics that defines itself in terms of a shared identity did not raise this and other dangers. BH Compare this interpretation with Leo Strauss's reading of Schmitt: Strauss concludes that.. The relation of friend is not defined by the emergence of the enemy. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. .if need arises -elimination or eradication of heterogeneity. (n37) Much of the drama and the danger of Schmitt's work is a function of this attempt to use politics to counter nihilism. of their willingness to give their lives when the sovereign demands they do so. Too many of Schmitt's critics take him to task for war-mongering.. Schmitt is quite right when he insists that "[w]ar is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the content of politics.” Telos. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends.D."(n33) That mode of behavior is a solidarity that makes possible both self-sacrifice and political authority. is simply incapable of addressing this issue.. "the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of fighting as such.. that they are reminded of their commitments. pleasures.first homogeneity and second -. Schmitt aligns himself with the Greeks in his insistence that politics be a response to the fragility and futility of human life. Where Tocqueville contrasts individualism with a public life of the sort that jury duty might encourage.102 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Schmitt  War War is not the aim or the purpose of the identity politics that Schmitt prescribes – it is democracy that seeks the eradication of the other Norris 1998 [Andrew. Schmitt insists that "The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is.” Telos. but in the mode of behavior which is determined by this possibility.. received his Ph. recognized as the enemy. this interpretation shifts the grounds of the debate on Schmitt in an important way. but we must always be willing to recognize the enemy and realize that conflict is a real possibility – without the will to this political beyond physical existence life has no meaning – a loss of life contributes to something bigger Norris 1998 [Andrew. received his Ph. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. Summer98 Issue 112. If this were true. i." because such high points of politics are not identical with the recognition of the enemy. Summer98 Issue 112.(n40) Politics paves the way for this in such a way that. manifest in the consumption of images. He is hostile to individualism. It is far more uncomfortable to recognize his close relation to the currently fashionable identity politics.(n36) Life will lack meaning unless it contains commitments cherished above mere physical existence. is in his emphasis on authority (and hence commitment) and mortality."(n32) This still places too much emphasis on actual combat.

(n13) Nonetheless. Summer98 Issue 112.D. it characterizes the state primarily in terms of external conflict rather than in terms of specific internal social structures. as the old saw has it. It is this. and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. that establishes the existential independence of the political: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy". This is not merely true because. he argues. "The friend. enemies and the political.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .” Telos.103 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The sovereign’s insistence on belligerence is justified given the external threats of the enemy Norris 1998 [Andrew. interpretations of Schmitt that center on his alleged "occasional" belligerence remain plausible. Since The Concept of the Political understands the state in terms of the political. it would be a mistake to think that what Schmitt means by an enemy can be grasped without understanding what he means by a friend. however difficult this latter task may be. enemy.(n14) ."(n12) Because of this structural configuration. and. because of the stress he places on the threat of physical death implicit in the encounter with the enemy. p68. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. BH That all said. he has far more to say about the enemy than the friend. a valley cannot be imagined without a hill. received his Ph. It is also because some meaning must be given to the notion of the friend in order to make any sense of Schmitt's distinction between the private and the public.

Professor in department of Philosophy. Schmitt is not totalitarian – the friend enemy distinction does not always lead to war and is actually a response to nihilism Norris 1998 [Andrew. provided him with the definitive model for the operation of a strong state. he thought that an autonomous state would prove itsstrength by affirming the freedom and autonomy of civil society. BH This reading of The Concept of the Political is unwarranted. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Normally. p. 193). his provocative formulations of the friend/enemy distinction should not lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to a function of war. If totalitarianism means that the state ultimately assimilatesand metabolizes civil society. Summer98 Issue 112. in particular. On thecontrary. . enemies and the political. mentioned only in his early Weimarproduction. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. rests on an almost Hegelian understanding of the individual's relation to the community and one's own mortality.D.however. the exercise of state sovereignty was juridically ordained and was thus limited. The friend/enemy criterion defines a particular form of life. Schmitt's theoretical position requires a prior substantive commitment to relations of "friendship" and social solidarity. received his Ph. This distinction. BH The argument expounded in this book seeks to define the scopeand assumptions of Schmitt's theory of the state and the constitution and the pivotal task it addressed . did not imply canceling civil society's own independence. His account of political authority.which neatly encapsulates the aim and scope that defined histheory of the state and the constitution.rather than value -. Only this would shore up andstrengthen the power and authority of the state.(n7) To properly understand Schmitt's work it must be considered not as a rejection of an established moral order but as a response to a culture of nihilism in which meaning -. it does not follow that Schmitt's concept of the political is itself necessarily totalitarian.(n6) Schmitt's attempt to characterize politics in terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more interesting than his critics suggest. Schmitt publiclystated his dual affirmation of a strong state and a free economy. developedby medieval philosophers like D'Ailly and Gerson (Schmitt. Schmitt appealed to the distinction. one in which group identity is valued above physical existence. [Renato. While some might not be surprised that Schmitt put his intellectual powers in the service of the Nazi Party when it came to power.This is a keystone of Schmitt's theory of the state and the constitution. But thesubstance of its omnipotence was unlimited and remained in a stateof latency. between the substance and the exercise of sovereignty.104 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Totalitarian Schmitt’s alternative does not embody totalitarian regimes.securing the state'sautonomy and independence. 1921:44.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .7 My choice of the motto’strong state and free economy' as the subtitle of this book is intended to highlight this. although most of his colleagues and students were shocked. In order to adjudicate between theopposing claims of a sovereign state and a free civil society andharmonize their interests. waiting to be roused in exceptional circumstances. it emphasizes freedom and autonomy Cristi 1998. p68. at no point of his intellectual development did Schmitt espouse such a totalitarian view.is ebbing away. In particular. A strong state.” Telos. At one point during the Weimar republic. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. 5-6.

Of Aarhus Denmark]. p. http://rudar. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.D. Ph.105 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Destroys Debate Schmitt’s emphasis on depoliticization is a de-democratization that destroys debate because it precludes movements from bringing people to the streets Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.dk/handle/1800/2068. 54.ruc. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. BH .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January.

106 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Friendship Bad The reason to engage in friendship is purely selfish in that engagement in friendship is only for one’s own personal benefit. or to benefit the state Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander..Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Volume1. AN. Spring). . Issue 2.

Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . he soon climbed to prominent positions Within the government and his profession. however. 8-9. After cautiously observing the turn of events hemade his move immediately after 24 March. he became The editor of the Deutsche juristen-Zeitung. of which one cannot find traces in any of hisearlier writings. forexample. This Revolutionary action had cancelled the effects of the German revolution of 1918.107 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff . he was appointed Director of the Association ofCierman National Socialist jurists. Installed asregime's Kronjurist. Schmitt's initial reaction was of dismay at realizing Schleicher'spolitical failure. soonfound their Kronjurist was dispensable.scarcely two months after Hitler's rise to power. Professor in department of Philosophy. The next day he completeda commentary on that piece of legislation which he then sent tobe published in the Deutscbe juristen-Zeitung. the day the enablingact was promulgated by the Reichstag. This began on 1 April. their Anti-Semitism. Unforgivably. In 1936 Schmitt lost-much of what he had gained politically and his ideas were no longer seriously considered by the Nazi authorities.n strengthening the party than in strengthening the state. . he alsobegan to adopt the most despicable aspect of Nazi doctrine. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.Nazi Turn Schmitt’s arguments contributed to the rise of the Nazi party Cristi 1998. BH When the Nazis rose to power at the end of January 1933. The Nazis.9 which meant that the Weimar constitution had been formally superseded. who showed more interest. [Renato. p. In November 1933. The Nazis had attained in a few days what Schmitt had strived to defend during Weimar: a strong state. There he interpreted the enabling act as having somehow activated the notionof constituent power or pouvoir constituant. TheNazi regime acknowledged the great service Schmitt had rendered immediately invited his collaboration. and in June 1934.

.108 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff . Insofar as rights are defined and guaranteed by law. enemies and the political. As he puts it: "Only the actual participants can correctly recognize. Thus Richard Wolin claims that the central roles played in Schmitt's political theory by the political decision and the threat of war are both motivated by a "vitalism" and a "politics of authenticity.(n4) In the end. it is alleged.” Telos.e. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.Nihilism Turn Schmitt’s politics is nihilistic – it glorifies violence and reduces friendship to a common will to destroy the enemy Norris 1998 [Andrew."(n2) The bellicose nihilism this suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Schmitt's own active participation in the Nazi movement in the 1930s. p68. in the political identification of the existential enemy."(n5) . Schmitt's existential concept of the political makes these rights vulnerable to unregulated political decision. "the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self. with only one consistent commitment --to the irrational. and they are valued only insofar as they allow for success in the resulting war.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . since Schmitt stresses the decision's role in the most extreme case. war. is opportunistic. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends.(n3) The result is a glorification of violence.D. As Martin Jay puts it. understand. and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. politics for Schmitt is a matter of conflict and war. This is found to be all the more distressing. BH The main complaint: against this formulation is familiar enough: Schmitt allegedly emphasizes the limitations of law only to glorify the decision that exceeds the regulation of any law. and the true criterion of the political is the enemy. His political theory. i. received his Ph. Who one's political "friends" are is determined only in the encounter with the enemy." with the aim of overturning the vapid bourgeois order. Summer98 Issue 112. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University.

Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Volume1. Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . . Spring).109 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Perm Perm: do both.. pass plan in order to recognize the enemy Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Issue 2. AN.

In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . p. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.D. http://rudar. so we should use the combination of the two alternatives because there are limits to both – get the best of both worlds Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.ruc.110 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Perm – A combination of liberalism and non-liberalist regimes is best to maintain the power of the sovereign – the impacts of the kritik are inevitable.dk/handle/1800/2068. January. BH     . Ph. Of Aarhus Denmark]. 90-92.

111 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .

Ph. from Fordham University. p. Some of Nietzsche's own remarks suggest as much (see HAH I. 2002 (Lawrence J. A restricted agon might be appropriate for the arts. January. So the distinction between cultural and political spheres allows us to challenge some of Nietzsche's political vision. .D. yet not be given unchecked political power.. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon. Hateb. but not by reasserting democratic traditions. nonegalitarian. even be given some honor. One passage seems to imply that a fortified democratic egalitarianism would spur even higher forms of creativity (BGE 242).D. but overlaps between the spheres show that Nietzsche's authoritarianism is weakened by his own philosophical orientation. even constitutive of.a combination of democracy and the politics of Schmitt is net beneficial.244). Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. but I would not want to establish it by separating the cultural and political spheres.438 and KSA 10. and agonistic elements to a degree that may warrant calling it Nietzschean enough to support a democratic appropriation of Nietzsche (thus answering Appel's challenge).Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . BH Perm: agonism and democratic politics can overlap to allow for more creativeity.dk/handle/1800/2068. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. which would be consistent with Nietzsche's overall agonistics. and dissatisfaction with. but by showing that much of Nietzsche's cultural and philosophical outlook is compatible with. as some would be happy to do in order to either preserve democratic ideals from Nietzsche's critique or rescue Nietzsche from reprobation by sidestepping his frightful political remarks or decoding them as simply metaphors for self-creation. http://rudar.112 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Perm . Such an interpretive outcome might be satisfying. I think that Nietzsche's attack on democracy ought to be challenged. Nietzschean cultural creators could simply coexist with a democratic polity. but context is everything. in the sense that part of creativity is a resistance to. p. much of democratic politics. Ph. why we can still be Nietzcheans") Perhaps one could argue for a coexistence of a Nietzschean cultural elite and a democratic egalitarian politics. The context of political practices and milieus is such that artistic genius seems out of place. and that democratic political life [End Page 141] can exhibit certain creative. the established norm. 96-97. neither system works on it’s own – the perm is net beneficial because it ensures the legitimacy as a result of the people Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Of Aarhus Denmark]. let's say.ruc.

Spring). Issue 2. AN. Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .113 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Schmitt Dumb Schmitt never concedes that conflict and the friend/enemy relationship is inevitable. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Volume1. . He only talks about the possibility conflict and the formation of friend/enemy groups Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander..

the core distinction is between friend and enemy. Chronicle of Higher Education: The Chronicle Review. [Alan. making it the most extreme source of friction that will eventually lead to war. Not so politics. but it is incompatible with the life-or-death stakes politics always involves. Moral philosophers are preoccupied with justice. it does not demand annihilation. It's not personal. Page B16. http://chronicle. Issue 30. but. aesthetics with the beautiful and ugly. and economics with the profitable and unprofitable. director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life and professor of political science at Boston College. . That is what makes politics different from everything else. War is the most violent form that politics takes.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Wolfe 2004. even short of war. "The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism. Jesus's call to love your enemy is perfectly appropriate for religion. But you do have to be prepared to vanquish him if necessary. but politics has nothing to do with making the world fairer.htm.com/weekly/v50/i30/30b01601. Economic exchange requires only competition. In politics. politics still requires that you treat your opposition as antagonistic to everything in which you believe. Morality is concerned with good and evil. Schmitt wrote that every realm of human endeavor is structured by an irreducible duality. you don't have to hate your enemy.] April 2. AN In The Concept of the Political." Schmitt wrote. “A Fascist Philosopher Helps Us Understand Contemporary Politics” Volume 50.114 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War Turn Politics is centered around the idea of friends and enemies.

AN.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Spring). it is the most extreme result of friction between friends and enemies Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Issue 2. Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.. . Volume1.115 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Although war is not the purpose of politics.

In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 50-51. BH . January. http://rudar. p.ruc. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Ph. Of Aarhus Denmark].dk/handle/1800/2068.D.116 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon FYI: Difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.

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