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Schmitt Table of Contents Liberalism Bad Shell.........................................................................................................................................................3 Enemies Good Shell........................................................................................................................................................12 Link –Generic Links........................................................................................................................................................20 Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War.......................................................................................................................22 Link – Civil Society........................................................................................................................................................24 Link – Debate..................................................................................................................................................................25 Link – Democracy...........................................................................................................................................................28 Link – Education.............................................................................................................................................................31 Link – Hegemony............................................................................................................................................................32 Link – Humanity.............................................................................................................................................................33 Link – Humanitarianism..................................................................................................................................................34 Link - International Relations..........................................................................................................................................38 Link – Justice...................................................................................................................................................................40 Link – Liberalism............................................................................................................................................................41 Link – Modernity (Generic)............................................................................................................................................43 Link – Peace....................................................................................................................................................................44 Link – Rights to Africans................................................................................................................................................45 Link – Pluralism..............................................................................................................................................................46 Link – Rule of Law.........................................................................................................................................................47 Link – Technology..........................................................................................................................................................48 Link – War on Terror......................................................................................................................................................49 Link – We Demand.........................................................................................................................................................50 Impact – Civil War..........................................................................................................................................................51 Impact – Dictatorship......................................................................................................................................................52 Impact – Extinction.........................................................................................................................................................53 Impact – Governance Fails..............................................................................................................................................58 Impact – Internal Conflict...............................................................................................................................................60 Impact – Solvency Takeout.............................................................................................................................................62 Impact – War...................................................................................................................................................................63 Alternative – Agonism....................................................................................................................................................64 Alternative – Friends/Enemies........................................................................................................................................67 Alternative – Rejection....................................................................................................................................................70 Alternative – Sovereignty................................................................................................................................................71 Alternative Solvency – Compromise..............................................................................................................................73 Alternative Solvency – Extinction..................................................................................................................................74 Alternative Solvency – Economy....................................................................................................................................78 Alternative Solvency – Empowerment............................................................................................................................79 Alternative Solvency – Freedom.....................................................................................................................................81 Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort........................................................................................................................82 Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict.........................................................................................................................83 Alternative Solvency – Protection...................................................................................................................................84 Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other.................................................................................................................85 Alternative Solvency – State Collapse............................................................................................................................87 A2 Agamben....................................................................................................................................................................88 A2 Bad States..................................................................................................................................................................89 A2 Dictatorship Bad........................................................................................................................................................90 A2 Exceptions Bad..........................................................................................................................................................91
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007
A2 Friends Bad................................................................................................................................................................92 A2 Impacts Improbable...................................................................................................................................................94 A2 Liberalism Good........................................................................................................................................................95 A2 Nazi............................................................................................................................................................................96 A2 No Obligation to State...............................................................................................................................................98 A2 Perm...........................................................................................................................................................................99 A2 State Deconstruction Good......................................................................................................................................100 A2 Schmitt War.......................................................................................................................................................102 A2 Totalitarian..............................................................................................................................................................104 Aff – Destroys Debate...................................................................................................................................................105 Aff – Friendship Bad.....................................................................................................................................................106 Aff - Nazi Turn..............................................................................................................................................................107 Aff - Nihilism Turn.......................................................................................................................................................108 Aff – Perm.....................................................................................................................................................................109 Aff – Schmitt Dumb......................................................................................................................................................113 War Turn.......................................................................................................................................................................114 FYI: Difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship.............................................................................116
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007
Liberalism Bad Shell
The neo-liberal agenda embodied by the United States erodes state sovereignty through imposing international requirements on foreign states – leads towards a single new world order
Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law
and Social Sciences. University of London]. September 11. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.” http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/. P. 15-16. BH The second strand of cosmopolitanism is neo-liberal in its ideological location. As Peter Gowan notes, it 'run[s] parallel to the discourse of globalisation and rhetorically complement[s] it.' 34 It is a cosmopolitanism that instantiates a rewriting of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which were regarded as constitutive of the Westphalian order. Seen as conditional, they 'can be withdrawn should any states fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the requirements of liberal governance. ,35 In the words of William Rasch, state sovereignty becomes restricted by 'the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself'. 36 This neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, which Gowan associates with US and its allies and their academic apologists, often betrays an 'arbitrary attitude towards enforcing of universalist liberal norms of individual rights' despite its resting on the argument of a humanity that is 'finally on the verge of being unified in a single, just world order,.7 This arbitrariness often results in the imposition of incoherent domestic and international requirements on states in the form of legal domestic arrangements that promote individualism and liberal (i.e. good) governance, but also frequently in the form of social population control and consumerisation. Chantal Mouffe suggests that such policies might lead to an increasing detachment of citizens from their demos as a result of the imposition of externally acceptable arrangements. This would leave liberal cosmopolitans in the precarious position of losing their democratic rights of lawmaking. They would be left, at best, with their liberal right of appealing to transnational courts to defend their individual rights when those have been violated. In all probability, such a cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be realised, would not be more than an empty name disguising the actual disappearance of democratic forms of government and indicating the triumph of the liberal form of govemmental rationality that Foucault called "governmentality"38
January.ruc. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. p. BH . Ph. Of Aarhus Denmark].dk/handle/1800/2068.D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -4- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The West is reintroducing colonialism into the international sphere which is reinstating liberal globalism – this internalizes conflict and identifies those who are seen as the enemies of humanity Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. http://rudar. 320-321.
Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not. human and inhuman. this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law' (NE 187). they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of Nations in the Nomos. in other words. similarly. it has no localizable polis. did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104). then.60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity 'excludes the concept of the enemy. can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike-can only. they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace. September 11. 1 turn in the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of humanity and cosmopolitanism . but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). To be human. he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror." Scott writes. a philosophy of absolute humanity. However. and most importantly. they must be of the same category of being.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -5- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose. University of London]. could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. wrote in the interwar years of the right of this international community to impose its neutral will: The "international community. It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length: We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. because the enemy does not cease to be a human being. the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives. the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will. is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. but its utilisation by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it. the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable. 57 Finally. In its historical location.6! In the Nomos. once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole. against whom or what does it wage its wars? 58 'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy. . BH Thirdly. the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity.sgir. one cannot. humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. Schmitt noted how only when 'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity. or a pact or a covenant. "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity. . now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such." Therefore.org/conference2004/. That is. at least not on this planet'. a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century. Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is. historically examined. Schmitt feared. furthermore. . James Brown Scott. be inhuman62 Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war. in the interest of humanity. usually in the name of an international community which acts. there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other. P. not because of a treaty. or accommodated. 59 As Ellen Kennedy notes. in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that performs this all¬important service.63 With this in mind.56 Outside of this historical location. but is that which makes the distinction possible. It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation and destruction become possible. but because of an international need" (283). in his words. however. no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Moreover. Since nonbelievers can become believers." it has become "the representative of the common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States. Louiza. 19-21. When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality. If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need. where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an abstract politics of neutrality. and to punish its violation. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. of a 'just enemy'. humanity per se is not part of the distinction. as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations. which had declared the abolition of war. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables.” http://www. The concept of humanity. claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus publicum Europeaum. then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon. reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of Justus hostis. the enemy had no value and could be exterminated. let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil. where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. . it becomes apparent that.. who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. and to war and violence. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. and when this happens total extermination is possible Odysseos 2004 [Dr. which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). it needs its negative opposite. 'humanity is not a political concept. and no political entity corresponds to it. we are assured. where the other cannot be assimilated.
The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought. wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend oneself or to resist submission. The first concerns that ability of the order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. For Schmitt. With the predominance of this type of political entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church. rather. The concept of an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state. 'to prevent wars of anniliilation. because if balance was the political and military objective. based on substantive issues of justice . the landmass of the New World. University of London]. perhaps even worse types of war. whose belief was that war was an inevitable part of political life. This brings us to the second achievement of this order. then wars can be limited to achieving it. The amity lines set aside two distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). Therefore. and on the other. to bracket it' (NE 246). unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their resocialisation. rather than the extermination of the enemy. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance. . its right to self-defense and to resistance was recognised. on the contrary. And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just. whose belonging to the native populations was not recognised. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.his ultimate destruction was not sought. and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds . which was the development of the notion of justus hostis.e. Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187). 'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100). to abolish or banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted only in new. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. 7-9 BH According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order. It did not. i. precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. Since war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls. September 11. usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil. This avoided wars of conviction. Finally. This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction.justa causa) which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction. On the one hand. creed and religion (i. Louiza. force could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers (NE 99).org/conference2004/.” http://www.e. Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be waged against it. the newly mapped and navigable seas. The notion of the just enemy also meant that such a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -6- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A strong state is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are preferable to total extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr. the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance (NE 161). It. regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy . sought to find ways in which to gauge the opponent's strength. war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. to the extent that war was inevitable. In both types of space.sgir. but conflict with him was possible and regulated. through its international law. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. seek to end war as such. No state could claim to have the issue of 'righteousness' on its side. P. this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization. humanization and legalization' of war.as a justus hostis.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -7- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Liberalism lacks any political foundation – a lack of political theology dooms it to leadership failure – turns case Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.D. http://rudar. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. January. Of Aarhus Denmark]. 63.ruc. p. Ph.dk/handle/1800/2068. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. BH .
The sovereign is one who is given “the monopoly to decide.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -8- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The kritik must come first. Issue 2. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. (Continuted on Next Page) . The sovereign must come first before any political decisions can be made Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.. Rockefeller College Review. AN.” in matters of the exception and to exercise these powers. Spring). only through the sovereign state is the political will is further expressed. Volume1.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt -9- Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
final end. No doubt. one that is actually beneficial. however. the sovereignty of the state. then it is justified."(n51) . he would also recognize that war is not always the function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes.10 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War is inevitable."(n48) No doubt. The enemy is negated otherness. courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the inessential baggage of life (e. by providing the necessary context for martial courage.. It is a fundamental possibility. as such. absolute."(n45) The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant here.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political. p68. . fight them physically..g. in that it can be the expression of the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions. war is essentially a political matter. and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life. Summer98 Issue 112. dictators and business interests."(n41) The first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third. If this interpretation is correct. The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere. whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace. but only politically. by transcending the limits of the political framework.. war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal. economically wasteful and immoral. BH This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political.Justice does not belong to the concept of war. Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. the attempt to end war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars." Finally: "Hegel has. because the state is. Instead. For Hegel. it is as little ethical as it is evil."(n42) It is a beneficial one because. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political. Schmitt argues that this could well produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because. even "robbers and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives."(n49) As a political theorist. Quite different is patriotically motivated self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine. the culmination of courage. or economic categories should trump political ones. and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility.. but we must approach it from a political framework." as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage. because if we introduce moral. it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their destiny. received his Ph." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois.. is only negative because it is found in removing or negating the inessential. aesthetic. Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the value of courage. the modern state is the highest form of ethical life. This worth. the obsession with property)."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Such bravery has a merely negative worth because "it is the negation of externalities.. In particular. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family. no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the destiny of human beings. is not intrinsically of a spiritual character. the conduct of war is often also sublime. he recognizes that it appears inevitable. Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. without affirming something of real spiritual worth. vis-a-vis other states. with an emphasis on strengthening sovereignty Norris 1998 [Andrew. "and individuality essentially implies negation.(n47) For Schmitt. enemies and the political. the enemy must threaten relations and forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. aesthetic or economic categories into warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions. "Hegel remains everywhere political in the decisive sense. and their alienation."(n44) That is to say. an individual.D. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of political life. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. advanced a definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers. this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.” Telos. But Schmitt cautions against concluding from this that moral. to repel them and.
As one of the criteria of the political.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt ."(n52) . whom one loves. in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular concepts of friendship. does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics. All essential concepts are not normative but existential. that form of life might be defined in any number of ways: "All concepts." like "enemy. however. it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another. are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms of concrete political existence. "friend. As Schmitt makes clear. Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him." In contrast. Indeed. This. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of nationality within itself. whom one hates. so is his public friend distinct from the private friend. so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture. including the concept of mind. Just as Schmitt argues that the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy.11 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship. almost technical meaning. What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life." has a formal.
p. http://rudar.12 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Enemies Good Shell The politics created by the affirmative is a deviation form the preparation from war which dangerously threatens state power – we must prepare for our moment of clarity where battle is immanent Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. BH . January. 107.D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Ph.dk/handle/1800/2068. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.ruc. Of Aarhus Denmark]. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.
Issue 2. Volume1. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Rockefeller College Review.. AN. Spring). .13 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Case Take Out: Political action can only be achieved through distinguishing friends from enemies Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
to the extent that war was inevitable. 'to prevent wars of anniliilation. i. The amity lines set aside two distinct areas considered 'open spaces' (NE 94-95). . “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. September 11. to bracket it' (NE 246). on the contrary. through its international law. Louiza. this regulation of war without substantive cause meant a 'rationalization. because if balance was the political and military objective. It. but conflict with him was possible and regulated.org/conference2004/. The interstate order which existed in Europe until 1914 had sought. whose belief was that war was an inevitable part of political life. then wars can be limited to achieving it. The first concerns that ability of the order to bracket and regulate war: the lines or distinctions drawn between European soil mId 'free space' available for appropriation (the so-called 'amity lines') facilitated the conduct of limited war on Europeml soil. the newly mapped and navigable seas. rather. the jus publicum Europeaum allowed for the construction and maintenance of a balance (NE 161).justa causa) which had historically led to wars of annihiliation and destruction.sgir. Therefore. the landmass of the New World. perhaps even worse types of war. Finally. All of these achievements together enabled the emergence of limited and regulated wars that sought balance and the avoidance of preponderance. creed and religion (i. Any enemy that had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be waged against it. and by recognising the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds . On the one hand. its right to self-defense and to resistance was recognised. This avoided wars of conviction. and on the other. No state could claim to have the issue of 'righteousness' on its side. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of war' (NE 187): '[t]he essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. University of London]. With the predominance of this type of political entity and the weakening of the moral authority of the Church. sought to find ways in which to gauge the opponent's strength. force could be used freely and ruthlessely as these were areas 'designated for agonal tests of strength' amongst Europeml powers (NE 99). This brings us to the second achievement of this order.e.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . usually by striving for appropriation of lands in the new world or by fighting linlited wars on European soil. precisely because the issue of just cause was eliminated. regarding an enemy as both just and as an equal partner meant that peace could be made with that enemy . In both types of space. P. which was the development of the notion of justus hostis. to abolish or banish it from its international relations since it implicitly recognised that 'any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted only in new. The notion of the just enemy also meant that such a system of war allowed for both resistance and self-defence. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. The concept of an 'equal and just enemy' evolved alongside the consolidation ofthe modem state.as a justus hostis.his ultimate destruction was not sought. unlike wars of substance which required the submission of the opponent or their resocialisation. seek to end war as such. rather than the extermination of the enemy. For Schmitt. 7-9 BH According to Schmitt there are four major achievements that can be attributed to this order. whose belonging to the native populations was not recognised. wars did not need to eliminate that enemy given the recognition of the right to defend oneself or to resist submission.e. Since war was the means by which land could change ownership stahls. war became divorced from substantive causes of justice. Such wars are the opposite of disorder' (NE 187). This relates to the avoidance of wars of destruction.14 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Identifying enemies is critical to avoiding wars of annihilation – the regulated wars that arise with concretely identifiable enemies are preferable to total extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr. based on substantive issues of justice . humanization and legalization' of war. It did not. 'war came to be judged in terms of its outcome' and became a foml of military relation amongst states (NE 100). And this is the third achievement of this order: given that the enemy was apriori just. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246).” http://www.
2002 (Lawrence J. He grants that an agonistic element can be very valuable for life and for democratic politics (NCD. p. for Nietzsche. The proliferation of contests in ancient Greece represented both a sublimation of cruel instincts and a setting for the production of excellence. Nietzsche distinguishes between a brutal drive to annihilate and a modified drive to defeat in a competition. Hateb. Ph.783-92).Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .789). why we can still be Nietzcheans") Appel gives particular attention to a Nietzschean sense of agonistics that has been taken up by postmodern thinkers as applicable to democracy.140). which surely clashes with democratic provisions. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon..15 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency: Agonism crushes the drive towards destruction and instead replaces it with the production of excellence. since talent unfolds in a struggle with a competitor (KSA 1. 8 . their sublimation of violence into cultural contests prevented the Greeks from regressing into "the abyss of a horrible savagery of hatred and lust for destruction" (KSA 1. p. pp. Homer's Contest (KSA 1. Nietzsche praises the Greeks for not succumbing to an Orphic life-denial or an ideal of harmony in the face of life's conflicts. p.791).). Moreover. In the light of Hesiod's distinction between a good and bad Eris. but he correctly notices a problem rarely faced in postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche: an agon. p.162ff. what the Greeks called an agon. We can begin to address the complex question of agonistics by attending to an early text of Nietzsche's that is often cited in scholarly discussions. from Fordham University. Only agonism can solve liberalism's drive for destruction. Nietzsche maintains that civilization is not something separate from nature but a modulation of more vicious natural drives into less destructive forms.D. And an agonistic spirit insured a proliferation of excellence by undermining the stagnation that stems from unchecked control and the "domination by one" (KSA 1. is a selective activity restricted to an elite and not extended to the public as a whole (NCD. p. In this text.787).
the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights. 25 In addition. that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. simply insure lopsided political contests. I should also want that they be able adversaries. refusing any belief an ultimate warrant.16 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative: The alternative is to reject the affirmative by embracing a politics of enmity. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. Moreover. then. . and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Ph. it demands inclusion. access. Radical agonistics. such as a right to an adequate education. Any other mode of democracy only paces the way for tyranny Hateb. And. 2002 (Lawrence J. which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants." or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality. and liberation from traditional constraints. Constraints on speech. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. pluralism. agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth. but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent.D. from Fordham University. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon. the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like "equal regard. we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . We can even defend so-called positive rights. defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless." a sloppy "relativism. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement. why we can still be Nietzcheans") If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others. 26 An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights. In this way rights can be construed as balancing power relations in social milieus. then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. but as an epiphenomenal. As in athletics. as is well known. but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance. and so on. a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation. to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. therefore. association." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work described fairness and rights (D 112). Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others. Rights themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation. and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act of negotiating these tensions. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features. A true democracy must paradoxically embrace anti-democratic outcomes. and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect. This enables a more robust conception of tolerance and political rights informed by resistance. Democratic respect forbids exclusion. Democratic respect. as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state.. a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing. not as something "natural" possessed by an original self. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement.
The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. approaches to democratic politics. and particularly Nietzschean. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. for Nietzsche. and so on. the charge raises important questions facing postmodern. often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice. role. The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with race. gender. . but also to affirm action as action. would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . that is to say. But from a historical perspective. a broader conception of rights. communal enough. democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. 28 And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system. agonistic politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. agonistics. thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name. the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits. In my work I have tried to face this question.17 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Beyond political rights. For Nietzsche. and suggest a "tragic" model of democratic openness. And as radically open. to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness. to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. What is to be said of someone who. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence). uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. a good deal of work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling. even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely. A radically agonistic. despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters. class. as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient. virtuous enough. it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy. or eternal entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory. the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence. rather than some metaphysical essence. rational enough. For Nietzsche. but surely possible). a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. deliberative enough. would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not. 27 Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles. But a look at human history and experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they "are. Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. which themselves are incontestable. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. and eternal recurrence. secular enough. The irony of a tragically open. in the absence of a guarantee. can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational. with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. a real move in life amidst real resistances. thus enhancing life. admit the difficulty. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so. Just as. of resistances or obstacles." It may be sufficient to defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No. negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice. can be put in the following way. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power. so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. in my view. and so on). fully free. open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist. but if we consider how identities figure in injustices. Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. stable substance. something especially important when even purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough. character. but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice.
it is as little ethical as it is evil.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . then it is justified. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family. The bourgeois is an individual who does not want to leave the apolitical riskless private sphere. p68. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University.. the conduct of war is often also sublime.(n50) This seems to be what Schmitt has in mind when he writes: "In the concrete reality of the political. even "robbers and murderers bent on crime" sometimes demonstrate a willingness to risk their lives. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. dictators and business interests. the sovereignty of the state. an individual.(n46) But where Hegel's commitment to the view that reason must be actual leads him to celebrate the actual virtuous conduct of war. whose servants remain as alienated and isolated in conflict as they were in peace. because if we introduce moral. but we must approach it from a political framework. The enemy is negated otherness. in that it can be the expression of the solidarity that binds together the various warring factions."(n42) It is a beneficial one because. Such bravery has a merely negative worth because "it is the negation of externalities.. no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings rule over other human groupings and associations. or economic categories should trump political ones.g. it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed."(n49) As a political theorist. aesthetic or economic categories into warfighting considerations we will have a war to end all war that culminates in total extermination of enemies and ourselves – this political framework must rely on categories of friends and enemies so we can approach war with a solidarity that binds the warring factions Norris 1998 [Andrew. the attempt to end war because of its immorality may backfire horribly by producing a war to end all wars. "If there really are enemies in the existential sense meant here.18 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War is inevitable.. the modern state is the highest form of ethical life. If this interpretation is correct. one that is actually beneficial. vis-a-vis other states. In particular. It is such commitments and such solidarity that are the destiny of human beings. economically wasteful and immoral."(n43) As Hegel acknowledges. and the sacrifices it demands are part of that life. "Hegel remains everywhere political in the decisive sense. Schmitt argues that this could well produce a form of warfare that is "unusually intense and inhuman because. it is not merely because people are "evil" in the sense of dangerous that the political is their destiny. "and individuality essentially implies negation. Schmitt neither celebrates nor bemoans war. fight them physically.. war is essentially a political matter." He "also offers the first polemically political definition of the bourgeois. this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.” Telos. It is a fundamental possibility. and he argues that it is a distinctively political possibility."(n45) The affinities between this position and Schmitt's are obvious. It is not the threatening presence of the enemy alone that leads into the political. aesthetic. is only negative because it is found in removing or negating the inessential. and their alienation. But Schmitt cautions against concluding from this that moral."(n44) That is to say. by providing the necessary context for martial courage..Justice does not belong to the concept of war. the culmination of courage. because the state is. For Hegel. to repel them and. enemies and the political."(n41) The first two of these claims become clear in light of an explication of the third. final end."(n51) .(n47) For Schmitt. No doubt. Quite different is patriotically motivated self-sacrifice: "The intrinsic [or positive] worth of courage as a disposition is to be found in the genuine. without affirming something of real spiritual worth. Hegel argues that war is a fundamental possibility of political life.. Thus war "is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. war allows the individual to transcend the limited perspective of his place in society: "the important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal. BH This helps to understand the significance of Schmitt's almost cryptic note on Hegel in The Concept of the Political. advanced a definition of the enemy which has in general been evaded by modern philosophers." as it itself contains an "ethical moment": courage. This worth. absolute. by transcending the limits of the political framework. Summer98 Issue 112. the enemy must threaten relations and forms of life that are sufficiently cherished by those who partake of them. received his Ph. Schmitt never praises war as such and remains silent on the value of courage. however. . the obsession with property).D. is not intrinsically of a spiritual character. but only politically. he would also recognize that war is not always the function of such political systems some wars are little more than private squabbles between princes. as such. Instead." Finally: "Hegel has."(n48) No doubt. courage even in a wicked cause has some worth in that it strips away or "alienates" the inessential baggage of life (e. he recognizes that it appears inevitable.
whom one loves. As Schmitt makes clear. almost technical meaning. This. so is his public friend distinct from the private friend. including the concept of mind. Just as every nation has its own concept of nation and finds the constitutive characteristics of nationality within itself. it is not necessary that those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another. however. "friend." In contrast.19 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon To describe these "real human groupings" or "ways of life" as relations of friendship may be misleading. in stark contrast to both the Aristotelian and the popular concepts of friendship. so every culture and every cultural epoch has its own concept of culture." has a formal. Indeed. Schmitt's political friendship implies as little about the character of the "friend" as it does about one's feelings for him.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . that form of life might be defined in any number of ways: "All concepts. Just as Schmitt argues that the public enemy is conceptually distinct from the private enemy. does not mean that Schmitt's political friendship is the same phenomenon described by Aristotle in books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics." like "enemy. As one of the criteria of the political. are pluralistic and can only be understood in terms of concrete political existence."(n52) . What is essential is that there be a shared commitment to their way of life. Aristotle's philia emphasizes objective qualities of character and lacks the connotations of intimacy carried by "friendship. whom one hates. All essential concepts are not normative but existential.
ruc. BH .dk/handle/1800/2068.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Ph. January.20 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link –Generic Links The imminent danger embodied by the affirmative advantage scenarios is an act of the state alienating the indvidual – it is a sign of the retreat of the state Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.D. p. 311-312. http://rudar. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark].
Second.published in 1923. The state could not yield to the factitioustemperament of civil society. 218 ). situating itself totally in the most diverse social groups and passing on to its membership the correct views. This was the site of pluralism andthe dissolution of state unity. Each party realizes in itself the totality. First. 74-75. [Renato. By eliminating the state's autonomy and diluting itsauthority.authority and unity. BH In the mean time . that was foreign to the culture thatissued from the Enlightenment. Schmitt attributed the modern state's difficulty and ideas espoused by contemporary liberalism. Theaffirmation of the political secured the ultimate foundation onwhich rests the state's claim to authority. in opposition to the economicpoint of view Schmitt affirmed the viewpoint of the political. the correct ideology. The theme linked this earlyproduction with his work later in Weimar and the Nazi period. and also assumedby democrats and socialists. the correct economic s ystem.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . The Church was notthe seat of irrationalism but it embodied a form of rationality. In essence.akin to juridical thinking. which he designated as 'the economicpoint of view'. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. guiding individuals from the cradle to the grave. Professor in department of Philosophy. 219) .: p. Schmitt observedthat the Catholic Church had preserved intact an awareness of thepolitical and had kept faith in the true meaning of authority.The Church did so by endorsing a form of rationalism opposed tothe rationality of economics and technology. If we take a closer look. had become equally pervasive. Onlythe Church was in the position and had the will to affirm thepolitical and frustrate the prevalence of pure economic thought. the economic point of view sought tominimize the role of the state and dissolve its separation from civilsociety. p. Schmitt described this view by means of a tantalizing formula. representing a totally opposed standpoint. According to Schmitt. Professor in department of Philosophy. p. so that 'not even a bowling club [could] continue to exist without maintaining a good relation with the state' (App. from kindergarten to burial and cremation. totally absorbing their members . the 'total state'. we see that we do not have a total state but a plurality of total parties. and the correct sociability on account of the party.20 In R6mische Katholizismus andPolitische Form (Roman Catholicism and Political Form).and marked the conceptual ground that confirmed the continuityof his theoretical and practical interests. 'After years of attempting to reduce the state to economics. There was no sphere that could remain free from its interventions.: p. [Renato. p.21 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The affirmative plan is a representation of civil society that is the site of the dissolution of state power because of its implicit liberalism Cristi 1998. the correct form of state. If the state was to main-tain its strength and survive. it now [appeared] that economics [had] become entirely politicized' (App. civil society was given a free rein spontaneously to putits own affairs in order. one ought to affirm its sovereignty. the bearers of the total state were the total parties. another misguided view. 216). Politicization was most visible in the sphere of economics. Third. 32-33. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. BH The plea for a strong state was the one theme that stood out inSchmitt's early Weimar production. The state’s current method of politicization (esp economics) contributes o the state’s dissolution through internally warring political factions Cristi 1998. three facets articulated Schmitt's plea for astrong state. (App. That notion represented a centralized state that had expanded in every direction and politicized every domain of human existence .
. What was common to the first three configurationswas the dualist structure constituted by the separation of the statefrom civil society.22 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Aff Doing Anything Besides War Interference by the state into modern society weakens the apparatus as a whole – historically proven to be true Cristi 1998.between civil society and the state dissipated.Like a dying star.' in his Legalitit undLegitimit.which resulted in the modern state's slanted evolution.4 By overstepping its limits and becoming involvedin what were the exclusive concerns of civil society. as opposed to the purely quantitative total state which heequated with twentieth-century democracy. The legal basis for his decision wasarticle 48 of the Weimar constitution. the seventeenth. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. legislative and administrative forms of the state. Schmittcharted the course of this evolution and for that purpose hedistinguished four distinct state configurations: the Judicial. This development had its point of departure in the 'absolutestate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries'. and not a strengthening of stateauthority. which he expanded in 1931 into the book of that same title(19 31). Hindenburg's presidialregime intended to save the state by reinforcing its executive functions at the expense of the legislative power.The notion of authoritarian state in contrast to the total statewas the theme of Ziegler's book entitled precisely Autoritdreroder totaler Staat (1932).This. mediated by the 'neutral state of the nineteenth century'. It demanded the interpenetration of state and civil society. according to Schmitt. Up to that point. A consistent use and application ofarticle 48 of the constitution was the procedure he suggested.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . he thought. would break the hegemony of a parliamentary system gone astray and restore the fine balance between legisla-tive and executive functions procured by the parliamentarytradition before 'it was corrupted by the advancement of demo-cracy. Schmitt brought up the topicin the context of a broader discussion. Professor in department of Philosophy.4t (1932a).3 Schmitt sought to justify Hindenburg's presidentialregime not merely as a legal configuration sanctioned by theconstitution but also as the republic's only politically viableoption. and thus denied the completeindependence and autonomy on which rested the authority ofboth the absolute and the neutral states. it became clear that the identity that characterized thetotal state meant a weakening. What was atissue here compromised the very existence of the modern state. BH The first time Schmitt mentioned the notion of total state during the Weimar period was in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung (The Protector of the Constitution). namely the development ofGermany's constitutional design after the revolution of 1918-19. the judicial state.and more pointedly after the inauguration of a presidentialgovernment on 28 March 1930. much of Schmitt's work as a jurist hadbeen devoted to demonstrating the need for an enhanced politicalrole for the Reichsprisident. exec-utive.the executive state and the administrative state. when the dualism maintained by the separatior. The new governmentcould function as a non-parliamentary regime that rested onHindenburg's own authority. (Schmitt. The aim Schmitt had in mind in drawing this manifold distinction was a description of the political regime that had evolved under the aegis of the Weimar constitution. The administrative or tota. it reached itsfinal destination with the twentieth-century 'total state whichidentifies state and society' (1931: 79). He used that notion to highlight what he considered to bethe latest phase in the 'dialectical development' of the modernstate. and then. the notion of total state was again mentionedand explicitly contrasted with that of the authoritarian state. 179-182.5The total state was Schmitt's description of this predicament. the theory of thestate and the constitution acquires the specific indicators that help better and more clearly to understand the concrete peculiarity o-the legal system and its present situation. the state had experienced a voluminous expan-sion in size. The dissolution of the state occurred. In this respect. [Renato. powerand authority. According toSchmitt. The entrenchment of a presidial system could becharacterized as more than a provisional step aimed at solving theconj'unctural difficulties of Weimar parliamentarism. The next time Schmitt made publicreference to this notion was in his keynote address entitled'Strong State and Sound Economy'. In a 1929 article entitled 'Der Hiiter der Verfassung' (1929b). This event marked thecollapse of what Schmitt called the 'legislative state' in Germanyand the beginning of a presidential regime that departed from theparliamentary system as it had come to be known and practisedin the Weimar republic. With the distinction between the legislative state.2 This time he reversed his position and extendec*the use of the term 'total state' to include the authoritarian statehe sponsored. On each one of these occasions. As his argumentproceeded.the feudal state. this action could only be interpreted as the restoration ofa balance disrupted by the influx of democratic party politiCS. whose preface was dated March 1931. p. matched by a commensurate loss of prestige. presented at a meeting of the Langnamverein. This was to be understood as a qualitative totalstate. the state hadlost its autonomy and independence and advanced with accelerated pace towards its own extinction. Inthis case.and eighteenth century absolutist state. 1932a:'19) These configurations did not constitute four specific instantia-tions of a common generic nature. Schmitt acknowledged the work of Heinz Otto Ziegler. ReichsprisidentHindenburg appointed Heinrich Briining as Chancellor withoutprior consultation with the political parties. On that day. These werefunctional descriptions which corresponded to four historical embodiments.state was not properly a state but served as the portrayal of 'itsdissolution. the total state was diametricallyopposed to its earlier configurations. the nineteenth-century parliamentarvstate and the twentieth-century democratic state which he alsocalled the 'administrative' or 'total' state.
1976: 102-3. couldbe open to authoritarian rule did not appear contradictory toHayek. Still. Hayek's idea of a spontaneous order presupposed civilsociety's capacity for self-regulation and autonomous administra-tion. Hayek offered a series of precautionary measures aimed atavoiding a relapse into an unbalanced decisionist posture.It appears as if Hayek was unable to exorcise the notion of sover-eignty. so that the depoliticiza-tion of civil society could turn dialectically into the state's activepreservation of its monopoly over the political as such. (1967: 161. 166-168.The difference is best seen if we consider their opposites: theopposite of liberalism is totalitarianism. Individualspossessed a domain of action over which they alone could claimabsolute sovereignty. Again like Schmitt. it is at least possi-ble in principle that a democratic government may be totalitarianand that an authoritarian government may act on liberal princi-ples. Friedrich.16 His liberalism was thus politically conservative for itpresupposed the possibility of postulating both a strong state anda liberal society.23 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Any deviation of the state from a protective function is bad – the affirmation of positive outcomes weakens the state and fails to respect the autonomy of civil society Cristi 1998. . a work heavily influenced by Schmitt. he distinguishedbetween authoritarianism and totalitarianism in strict adherenceto the views expressed by Heinz Otto Ziegler in his Autoritarer und Totalitarer Staat. In accordance with liberalism.Hayek appeared to be saying the same thing when he wrote: Liberalism and democracy. The role of the state ought to be negative. The strong state advocated by Schmitt in the1930s was supposed to respect the autonomy of civil society. Professor in department of Philosophy. and which demanded limitations onconstructivist state interference. 1960: 103)ls That a liberal polity. are not the same. expressed a close affin-ity with Constant's political philosophy. [Renato. It should come as no surprise thatHegel. And just as Schmitt wasan attentive reader of Hegel. Like Schmitt. I willnot discuss here whether these measures were effective or not.so that its spontaneous order was converted into an organization. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Like Schmitt. compare with Hayek. 1955: 531). while Hayek emphasizedthe typical liberal limitations on the state.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . It wasthus positively and actively that the state ought to restrict andlimit its action to a merely negative one. This sameview was espoused by Schmitt and used by him as a way ofaccommodating political options akin to decisionism within theliberal discourse. 1979: 125). never affirma-tive of any positive outcomes or ideal patterns of production or distribution.Hayek first postulated unbounded individual freedom and therecognition of rights that were prior to the state. Possibly no one better expressed this conceptualdichotomy than Benjamin Constant when he wrote: 'le gouverne-ment en dehors de sa sph6re ne dolt avoir aucun pouvoir. while the opposite ofdemocracy is authoritarianism. And it did not escape his attention that there wassome plausibility in Schmitt's contention that 'whoever has thepower to proclaim an emergency and on this ground suspend anypart of the constitution is the true sovereign' (Hayek. so Hayek was an attentive reader ofSchmitt. Iwill only say that decisionist elements were potentially incorpor-ated into his system in so far as the separation between state andcivil society was essential to it.the knowledge of such a situation and the decision to alter thespontaneous order of civil society lay beyond its powers in so faras they were recognized as being of a political nature. Hayekadmitted that the power to declare a state of emergency belongedto the state. although compatible. In consequence. the negative tasks ascribed to the state were to bedetermined and sustained by the action of the state itself. together with Hayek and Schmitt. Wheneverthe normal working of civil society became in any way imperilled. he did not object to the formation of a strong state. again. BH Hayek defended the view that democracy and liberalism wereunrelated answers to completely unrelated questions. Theautonomy and independence reserved to the state grounded itsauthoritarian potential. 1979:149-50). It ought to be limited to a merely protective func-tion. He thought that strong authoritariangovernments could ensure the necessary depoliticization of civilsociety. Hayek opposedcentral planning and any form of state intervention in economicmatters. p. Second. Hayek reiterated his support for a politically conservativeliberalism and expressed a preference for strong but limitedgovernment. 1948:28. This should confirm the complete dethronement of politicswithin that sphere (compare with Hayek. This concurred with the necessary limitation andrelativization of state power demanded by individuals whoclaimed sovereignty and the spontaneous order that arose fromtheir free and sovereign activity. he too distinguished sharply between civilsociety and the state. dans sasph~re il ne sauralt en avoir trop' (compare with R6pke. one limited by abstract general rules.
sagepub.” http://tcs. AN .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rasch 2000 [William.24 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Civil Society When Civil Society is increased.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. and Society. where it is further reduced to the technology of the administration. Culture. the State is diminished until it is just another association among many.
"(n62) The relevant point here is that this characterization of the irrationality or arationality of the political decision is not necessarily connected with Schmitt's characterization of the nature of political community. democracy is not a matter of popular participation. and if that will not apply in the case of an exception.(n65) . On the face of it. or liberal/ parliamentary institutions. a Rousseauian polity that rests on the homogeneity of the commitments of its members is compatible with a variety of political structures and institutions. enemies and the political. This limitation is a result of Schmitt's decisionism. Schmitt is quite frank about this: "The decision becomes instantly independent of argumentative substantiation and receives an autonomous value. even of the minimal sort his theory will allow.(n60) This is why Schmitt has no faith in public debate."(n61) In the end "The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.” Telos. that of a norm or law governing that situation. according to this model."(n59) Such a remark might well be made in a debate over "Operation Desert Storm.(n64) This much is clear in Rousseau's own infamous references to the possibility of forcing the citizenry to be free when they misunderstand their own (general) will. the reply is easy enough to imagine. it is plain that open debate will serve no purpose but that of undermining authority. in his eyes.25 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Debate Open debate only serves to undermine the political and state authority Norris 1998 [Andrew. BH Schmitt himself demonstrates an easy confidence in his own ability to make the required distinctions: "To demand seriously of human beings that they kill others and be prepared to die themselves so that trade and industry may flourish for the survivors or that the purchasing power of the grandchildren may grow is sinister and crazy. in Schmitt's texts of the 1920s.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University." Here the claim might be that Americans are committed to and united in a democratic freedom that has only contingently been aligned with capitalism's interests. instead.(n63) Such identity is not at all irreconcilable with a form of dictatorship that denies to the populace the right to debate political issues. there is no indication. The rationality that characterizes the normal situation is. As The Social Contract again makes clear. revocable consent.one necessitated by the law's own limitations. Nonetheless. In his constitutional theory. the populace is accorded the right to evaluate the performance of the state only in the form of acts of acclamation. Summer98 Issue 112. such a debate about the nature of shared identity and the focus of mutual commitment would not seem to be in conflict with Schmitt's strictures. of any rational guidance whatsoever. it is a question of the identity of the ruler and the ruled.D. Schmitt understands the political decision as an alternative to the law -. and that Middle-East oil is not one of this polity's vital interests. received his Ph. But it does not necessitate dictatorship. As he emphasizes again and again. he does not permit for political decisions to involve public debate and deliberation. Put this way. In its absence. If the only rational guidance that can be found is that of a norm. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. Schmitt' s version of identity politics is largely derived from his reading of Rousseau. p68.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .sagepub. when individuals make political decisions it leads to social contracts that will break down the system of sovereignty Rasch 2000 [William. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.” http://tcs.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.26 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Political decisions are left only to the state. and Society. Culture. AN .
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .27 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
the parliamentary commissionhad become a place for secret party deals whose content thepublic ignored. changed or altered in any way. had ceased to be a place of rational discussion.Since 1848. Parliaments. . Its activity escaped constitutionalbounds. on a counter-revolutionary dictatorship as the onlymeans to guard the political unity of a nation and sustain the dualonslaught arising from humanitarian liberalism and atheistdemocracy. disrupting the delicate balance presupposed by theparliamentary system.deputies were acting as popular agents and commissaries. p. individual deputies no longer complied with theliberal requirements of the Weimar constitution as stipulated byarticle 21. should not have to yield todemocratic pressures. the Reichstag. inaccordance with wellestablished democratic demands.923a: 10). much like the CatholicChurch. 1928: 318-19). democracy acquired a disproportionateinfluence. in Die Diktatur and PolitischeTheologie. their activity could include theunilateral granting of constitutional charters. Second. Accordingto Schmitt. Democracy is self defeating – the will of the people is unorganized and fails to succeed Cristi 1998. The segregationand inflection of parliament's liberal essence was mandatory. the people as such was nota firm and organized entity. The historical development of parliamentarism had successfully incorporated monarchical.28 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Democracy Democracy is self defeating and it contributes to a weakened state Cristi 1998. Constituent power. parliament ought to limit andcontrol democracy's overwhelming leverage. 1928:92). but its discussions weresurrounded by secrecy and only the results yielded by voting werepublicly announced. as an accident supported byconstituent power. Schmitt's aim was to separate the parliamentary institutionfrom its democratic ties.the Reichstag had ceased to be.aristocratic and democratic elements. 122-123 BH After considering the issue of the subject of constituent powerSchmitt analysed its activity. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. The institution devised by classical liberals had beendefiled by the prevalence of democratic ideals. like sovereignpower. 80-82. It was not exhausted by its exercise and. First. According toSchmitt. . p. Inthe case of sovereign monarchs. They could not be said to be 'bound only to theirconscience' and to be free from the instructions of the particularelectoral group they represented. At times. suffer alterations and eventually die. In democratic polities. if allowed to function in agenuinely representative manner. Article 29 of the constitution requiredthat its deliberations be public. But this did not imply a renunciation of theirsovereignty. just as any measure transcends what is measured by it. the people was not to be taken as an organized subject of decision. The positive constitution.The nineteenth-century liberal-democratic rapprochement wasinterpreted by Schmitt as an irreversible pluralist trend whichinevitably led to the demise of the state. the Weimar constitution had introduced an ambiguity which now eroded parliamentary practices and weakenedthe state. open to publicinvestigation and scrutiny. Professor in department of Philosophy. The arcana imperli of absolutist times were fullyrevived (compare with Schmitt. they functioned as open to constitutesystems that used and mixed diverse political forms. parliamentarism could not be said to constitute a specificpolitical form or a specific form of state (compare with Schmitt. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Asa genuinely liberal institution. This was an indication of sovereignty. Furthermore. According to Schmitt. according to Schmitt. It was thereforenatural that Schmitt would rely. which until then had secured the unity of the state. This was the reason for its weakness and explained why.ts actual will could be falsified. By displacing the competing monarchicala-id aristocratic elements. preceded and rose.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . but alongside and above it the pouvoir constituant wouldContinue to exist. Constituentpower could not be destroyed. if it ever was. itpersevered as the extra-constitutional ground of constitutions andconstitutional laws. the people exercises itsconstituent power by means of any manifestation which conveysits express will. without identifying itselfwith any of them. legibus solutus. On the contrary. prudencedictated that monarchs reach agreements with the representativesof special interests. Professor in department of Philosophy. like other contemporary parliaments. Even if its power and plastic energy couldnot be extinguished and could embody an infinite variety offorms. Precisely because parliaments could not be saidto constitute specific political forms. Schmitt thoroughlyidentified liberal parliamentarism and democratic legitimacy. above all positiveconstitutional normativity. 1928: 305). BH Schmitt's reform proposal assumed that contemporary parlmentarism was facing a crisis due to a betrayal of its originalideals. Constituent activity.retains the ability to persevere in its existence' (Schmitt. and not endowed prima facie withpermanent authority. By opening the doorto democracy. The identification ofliberalism and democracy precluded any possibility of securing arole for the state as guarantor of political unity. Indifference to the political as such allowed parliamentarism to remain open to different political forms (comparewith Schmitt. [Renato. democratic legitimacy had supplanted the monarch-:cal principle. could be born. [Renato. In his earlier works. persistedautonomously and independently of any positive constitutionallegislation. parliamentarism owed its current problems to the ascendancy of democracy. Instead of being the 'representatives of the whole people' and 'bound by no instructions'.
The legislative state. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. the other by a democratic demand. . 8 By emphasizing the democratic principle c--identity. Liberalism was objectionable only when it assumed a political stance. p. First. Professor in department of Philosophy. This meant a loss o-autonomy and independence for the state. Schmitt would thus conclude that legality was conceptuallyDpposed to legitimacy. BH Two phases characterized the departure from the tradition ofthe strong executive state: one was determined by a liberaldemand. Schmittian scholarship has for the most part assumed a strict unity and continuity in his Weimar writings. neutral posture. Schmitt’s paramount concern was the attainment and safeguard of the unity of the state. BH Before drawing the distinction between liberalism and democracy in his Parlamentarismus. [Renato.Second. attentive only to the protection of individuals. what he wrote in Parlamentarismus is read in line with his earlier Die Diktatur and his Political Theology. untouched b-. by lasting norms ofdeterminable and measurable content. the nineteenth-century legislative state sought to encircle the authority of theexecutive state by way of a normativist system. He charged liberalist for its inability to withstand the democratic avalanche. and aimed at exporting pluralism onto the political sphere. which meant thatmonarchs. 17. not a political form. the curren:crisis of the Weimar republic was ultimately a crisis of authoritv. he was bale to extricate liberalism from popular democracy. But if kept at a clear distance from any political form. between law and its execution. In Schmitt's view. If the pluralism that was congruent with liberalism were allowed political expression. Thisalso implied a perfect congruence between justice and legality. the unity of the state would be put in jeopardy. realized the ideal of the Recbtsstaat.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . liberalism ceased to be a threat. and interpreted as an apolitical. where law is detached fromits application to the concrete case.29 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Democracy skews the separation between state and civil society and puts the power of the state in jeopardy Cristi 1998. Schmitt had attack liberalism because it seemed inextricably bound to democracy. 185-188. and thus to any recourse to a right ofresistance. his reservations subsided.Schmitt defined the legislative state as the state 'ruled by imper-sonal. As a guaranteethat those values would be respected it demanded state neutral-ity and the replacement of the rule of men by the rule of law. it must be neutralized Cristi 1998.Its claim to validity excluded and made it refractory to any exter-nal appeal to legitimacy. Democracy kills the unity of the state. marked the beginning of his rapprochement with liberalism. Thus. which he would attempt to disarm by means of a democratically elected sheriff. The distinction between liberalism and democracy.). Liberalism sawin the strong state of absolutist monarchs a threat to the indi-vidualist values of liberty and private property. however. Butwhat it got was a division of powers. [Renato. which naturally led tothe weakening of its authority. at its core. general and predetermined norms. The state was put in charge of the supervision ancdirection of the spontaneous order of the market. But as a universe of ideas distinct from democracy. and could henceforth aim all his efforts at taming democratic absolutism. dislodged from legislative functions. could still retainthe control of the executive (compare with Kelsen. This accommadation allowed him to identify what he feared most: the increased pace of the democratic revolution. Whoever claimedexercise of sovereignty and power could do so only 'according tothe law or in the name of the law' (ibid. Typical of the legisla-tive state was the distinction between laws and measures ordecrees. and its parliamentaryembodiment. where the legislator is detachedfrom the officials that execute it' (1 932a: 8).the nineteenth-century legislative state.which made the possibility of abusive legislation inconceivable. Schmitt was now able to aim his attack at the democractic populace. It was also on this concep-tion of law that Schmitt based his distinction between normativismand decisionism. 1929: 81). Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. liberalism appeared to Schmitt in 1923 as the best way to neutralize democracy.: 14). which Schmitt introduced in 1923. The anti-liberal stance of this early work is then projected onto his later Weimar writings. Nineteenth-century liberalism tried to fashion a state in its image and likeness. the liberal demand was superseded by a democratic de-mand that led to the formation of the twentieth-century state of total administration. the distinction between state and civil society "-ascompromised. The oldAristotelian dictum that laws and not men ought to rule impliedthat sovereignty and power were extinguished. Legality meant 'making superfluous and rejecting notonly legitimacy (both monarchical and the plebiscitary will of thepeople) but also any sovereign or higher authority' (ibid. In Parlamentarismus. p. Schmitt envisaged thelegal system imposed by the legislative state as hermetically closed. Once he came to the view that liberalism was. Professor in department of Philosophy.
an inner balance among itsconstituent elements. and not allowed the exorbitant developmentof the latter. the realization of a 'common opposition tothe state relativized those differences and did not impede socialintegration' (ibid.). for in it the notes thatdefined both the judicial and the executive states were subordi-nate to the legislative function. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.). a strong state could also be aneutral state. when possible. was able 'to build a state-free economy and aneconomic-free state' (ibid. Professor in department of Philosophy. Because the Weimar regime failed to do this. First.: 73). By yielding to democracy and inter-vening in society's spontaneous order the state became a 'welfarestate' and in the process lost its autonomy and independence. thus assur-ing the highest economic prosperity (ibid. furthermore. strong enough to keep at bay the many religious. to neutralize in relation to societyand its conflicts of interests. The crisis resulted from the extinction of the authoritarian ethos and the decisionisttemper that could sustain a strong state.). Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Observance of that dualism meant that the nine-teenth-century state resulted from 'a balance between two kindsof state: it was at the same time an executive state and alegislative state' (ibid. neutral with respect to religion and the economy and 'respectful of the autonomy of these vital and objectivedomains' (ibid. Only a strong state could hand over to civilsociety.Democracy. 189-190. Schmittproposed the retrieval of an executive state as a solution to thecrisis currently faced by the Weimar republic. the nineteenth-century state was'neither absolute nor strong enough to render any non-state busi-ness meaningless' (ibid. was responsible for weakening theunitary and decisive will of parliament. Schmitt recognized that the tendency of the liberal nineteenth century was. so that society and the economy couldadopt in their respective spheres the necessary decisions accordingto their immanent principles. p. culturaland economic differences that divided a state-free society. Second. compare withFil'alkowski. without fear or jealousy.e.). It was fair to say. so that partypolitics meant that the will of the majority shifted according tounstable compromises between a plurality of heterogeneousorganizations. the state's very existence was compromised by the rise ofdemocratic party politics and the state-form that democracydemanded and advanced. itsneutrality and strength. This development need nothave occurred if the parliamentary regime had been truly success-ful in preserving a status mixtus. to prevent it from intervening andinterfering with the economy. i.10 A fundamental alter-ation occurred when the dualist structure of state and civil societylost its antithetical tension. For it to survive as a state it wasessential that state sovereignty be enhanced and a sharp separa-tion from civil society be maintained.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . (ibid. Parliament had becomethe 'scenario of a pluralist system' (1932a: 90). [Renato. particularly between its executive andlegislative functions. The state. The neutrality of the state was aresult of its strength.According to Schmitt. Democracy destroys state strength Cristi 1998. [Renato. 1958: 27). namely the administrative or total state. the separation of the state fromcivil society ensured the formation and endurance of a strongstate. In his esti-mation. the management of its ownaffairs. Professor in department of Philosophy. 192-193. But this liberal order could only survive ifplaced under the aegis of a strong state. namely the dualism'of stateand civil society.30 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Democracy forces the state to intervene in civil society weakening its neutrality and strength Cristi 1998. The balance between state and non-statecompetences allowed the persistence of dualism.: 78. The total state obliteratedthat separation and imperilled the autonomy and independencenecessary for the state to function. p.: 75). as astato neutrale e agnostico and bereft of any metaphysical commit-ment. This situation seriously compromised the legislative state's capacity to survive. he saw no oblection in allowing the market tooperate according to its own 'automatic mechanism'. that the nineteenth-century constitutional stateought to be described as a legislative state. BH It is plain to see that Schmitt's interest in a description of state-forms and the difficulties he found in combining them prefacedhis concern for the preservation of the state as such.for example.: 78) Accordingly. . But Schmitt's primary interest wasto point out the common features that typified the historicalembodiment of those state functions. In this respect.to limit the state to a minimum. BH This coexistence and balance between state configurations did notpreclude the possibility of describing concrete states on the basisof the 'central sphere' of state activity (ibid.
majoritarian democracy with a mixedeconomy to be the highest universal good. What they want is recognition of their own highest value.PG 91. Bloom and his admirers demand that their values be validatedthrough acts of imposition. [Paul Edward. Schmitt would find understandable this convergence of views. which they hope to see implemented everywhere. he notes.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . for theasserting and imposing of values. 1990. It is alsoconceivable that intellectuals competing for political control will accept thesame highest value. entails Denkschaltungen." . but disagree on who is to carry it through. SD It is irrelevant that Bloom and other "traditionalist" intellectuals prefernot to speak of "values" but proclaim the "principles" of democraticequality. Thus they justify war not as a means toprotect national territory. but as an "educational project. not areturn to older patterns of life. Both the American Right and theAmerican Left consider a secular.31 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Education Education projects in South Africa can lead to force to implement our values in the area Gottfied. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. and it is not extraneous to our discussionthat their stated Hchstwert is one the political and intellectual Leftembraces no less readily than they. Force isof course an acceptable tool to achieve compliance. Like other valueassertors. conceptual manipulations in which values are readily reordered inaccordance with the changing wills of individuals or groups. including the Soviet Union and South Africa.
despite the attraction of regional blocs that the 'success' of the European Union has created. September 11. but especially since 1989. politically it is difficult to speak of the regional spatial order with the assumption of intemal unity within each bloc that Schmitt had presumed.sgir. University of London]. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. That this post1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations. And. 15 I would like to explore this spaceless universalism under the heading of today's cosmopolitanism and discuss some of the repercussions of cosmopolitanism's claim to 'erase' the lines or distinctions set by the intemational state order and promote the idea(l) of a universal humanity.ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention). I would like to remain with Schmitt's argument and concem of a 'spaceless universalism'. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain '''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations. The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m. At this stage. in this paper. would not rid the political world of exclusions. and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN Charter's tense comprom. Louiza.” http://www. this is far from the first altemative that Schmitt had outlined in that 'world unity' has not emerged under a sole sovereign or even through the impending retreat and demise of the modem state that processes of globalisation herald.ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions. which I think still best captures the lack of explicit spatiality to global politics that is prevalent today. P. is often discussed through various perspectives. indeed. Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. 10-11. Neither has a new global balance been constmcted in an explicit system akin to the European system of the balance of power under US hegemony. While the emergence of US hegemony since 1945. however. 17 .org/conference2004/.32 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Hegemony U. BH It is today often assumed that end of the Cold War meant the victory of the US.S. and that an American Empire is now being constmcted. hegemony contributes to a spaceless universalism that destroys the ability of lines to be drawn – leads to exclusion and annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
such as the League of Nations.48 . University of London].org/conference2004/. 17-18.sgir. . The politics of humanity focuses on moral questions and hopes to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether. There are in fact four main criticisms arising from political considerations. P. The first is an allencompassing objection that arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values: by using the discourse of humanity the new cosmopolitanism reverberates with the 'ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle' which go back to the nineteenth century.as Schmitt defines the political.46 For Schmitt. which Schmitt puts forward against the discourse of humanity. which is the politics of getting rid of politics.45 As David Dyzenhaus notes 'liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics. September 11.47 in terms of the friend / enemy distinction. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. liberal modernity 'is the battle against the political .33 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Humanity The discourse of humanity represents a battle against political that serves to ensure cosmopolitanism Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza.” http://www. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . BH In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increasing usage of the terminology of 'humanity' by both theorists and public actors.
Ph. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. p.dk/handle/1800/2068.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.34 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Humanitarianism Humanitarianism is a war for liberalism – the goal is not to help the victims of the world but instead to extend liberalism Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Of Aarhus Denmark].D.ruc. BH . http://rudar. 316-318.
35 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
allowed for an interventionist political state. but this produces new internal enemies that results in efforts at extermination Odysseos 2004 [Dr.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .org/conference2004/. since those who fall outside of these delineations become .87 become those to be excised from the global liberal order. The existence of the state. could override and render superfluous the inalienable human rights (1921: 140). a liberal. Professor in department of Philosophy. A democratic volonte generale. Humanitarianism attempts to create universal friendship. [Renato. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. p. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. BH A new type of war also requires a new type of enemy: 'it is an apparent fact'. As Schmitt argued in the Nomos.Individuals were assured a sanctuary for their immunities andprivileges.. On the other hand. September 11.apolitical element stressed the protection of individuals. When enemies are denied this procedural kind of 'justness'. then peace cannot be made with them. nor are they allowed a right of resistance and self-defence. the discourse of humanity enables the creation of 'a category of political non¬persons. as if by internal necessity. a political form. those subjects of other ‘modernities’ entangled with the liberal one. Louiza. 'that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces. contradicted the spirit of liberalism. On the one hand. 86 In the case of the war on terror.sgir. was what allowed war to be limited in nature but also peace to be made with enemies. alongside the notion of non-discriminatory war.36 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Humanitarian efforts are a form of liberalist impositions on the state Cristi 1998. The mere existence of a state proved that the attempt to dispense with notions such as sovereignty. 64-65. resting on the pouvoir constituent of the people. 26-27.. particularly if it responded to those unlimited political demands. the notion of just us hostis which the interstate order had developed. Rasch argues. The notion of an unjust enemy in the war on terror relies on the reintroduction of the notion of just cause for one's own side and points to an 'other' who has to be fought until there is no more resistance . the 'freedom-hating' recalcitrant others. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. ever new enemies'. but their elimination'. hence the need to distinguish between liberalism and the political. From this perspective the state ought to be seen as anintruder whose actions required close supervision. Schmitt recognized. The notion of enemy used by the war on terror is problematic because it denies any rationality or justice to its opponents.” http://www. which saw in those demands a permanent threat to the freedom of individuals. The tensions and contradictions within the Weimar constitution were powerful arguments aimed by Schmitt against humanitarian liberalism. 85 As we discussed above. University of London]. P. dictatorship and politics was futile. subject to a demonization which permits not simply their defeat. BH Schmitt explained this uneasy accommodation as the confluence of two distinct elements.
ruc. Of Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.dk/handle/1800/2068. BH . p. Ph.D. 297-298.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . http://rudar.37 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Humanitarianism is an effort to achieve a universal order in which opposition to this order is seen as the enemy of humanity Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.
38 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link .sagepub.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . clearly defining friends and enemies during war and peace Rasch 2000 [William. and Society.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. AN . Culture. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.” http://tcs.International Relations International Relations force alliances and groups to make friends and enemies thereby erasing the grey area of indistinction. where life can be eradicated.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .39 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
privileges and dispensations conveyed by particu-lar measures implied that the rule of law was indifferent to theconsequences of its application (Schmitt. particular and open to the needs and inter-ests of particular individuals or groups. The latter presup-posed a state whose function was limited to 'the preservation ofthe legal order'. together with equalitybefore the law. Thealternative to this state of affairs was summarily captured bySchmitt's formula 'a strong state and a sound economy'. and by legal order he meant 'a liberal legal order. Schmitt distinguished between the rule of lawas a generic notion and the liberal rule of law. 1960: 231-3).This corresponded to the substantive core embraced by earlyliberalism. As WilliamScheuerman has noted. coercive orders were in principleincompatible with the liberal idea. In this respect. where he proposed that thedistinction between law and measure.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. an administration subjectto judicial review (ibid. one that strongly asserted itsmonopoly over the political. p. whichsought to give capitalist managers freedom from state welfareregulation. The generality andpersistence of law was meant equally to protect all individualsfrom prerogative and arbitrary authority (Schmitt. In other words. Schmitt and Hayek agreed in assuming that the legalfoundations of liberalism consisted in this objective encirclementof authority. order and security' (Schmitt. 152-153. In theVerfassungslebre.viz. onewhich considers the state to be the armed warranty of liberalpeace. Hayek adoptedthese same four criteria (1960: 207-12). 207 n. Professor in department of Philosophy.: 154-5). He explicitly referred to the memor-andum written by Schmitt in 1926. The requirement ofequality before the law and the rejection of the particular opportunities.1960: 93). only a very strong state. 9). Hayekstood very much in agreement with Schmitt. 1928: 130. predictability and measurabilityof all political and juridical decisions. Both Schmitt and Hayek acknowledged that the rule of lawremained a purely procedural condition. andmeasures as concrete. Schmitt postulated that the conception oflaw required by the liberal rule of law demanded conformity withfour specific criteria: generality. In his The Constitution of Liberty. one based on private property and personal freedom. At the same time. my emphasis). [Renato. Schmitt sought to dispose of the Weimarwelfare state and thus eliminate the burdensome obligationsimposed by the principle of social justice (1995: 122). comparewith Hayek. would be able to protect the inde-pendence required by civil society.40 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Justice State intervention in the arena of social justice destroys individual freedom and is a deviation from the state’s true purpose – a strong state and sound economy is the necessary alternative – it protects civil society’s independence Cristi 1998. BH In this affirmation of a substantive conception of law. The value ofindividual freedom would be jeopardized only by attempts tomodify and correct such outcomes under the guidance of prin-ciples defined by social justice and by state intervention (Hayek. 1928: 154. and equality before the law(ibid. and acknowledged hisdebt to Schmitt (p. Schmitt's attacks on democratic liber-alism matched Hayek's assault on the welfare state. In addition. but they could be permitted oncondition that the authorities in charge of implementing themallowed all individuals equally to foresee and calculate the courseof legal actions. 1928:139-41). The emergence of substantive differ-ences among individuals was of no concern here. constituted the 'proper foundation of theRecbtsstaat and the most effective warranty against all despotism'(1926: 23). a decrease in state regulation couldnot amount to a decline in discretionary state authority. Schmitt defined laws as general and abstract. On thecontrary. .: 130-2).
favored apolitics of restraint: liberalism because it paid insufficient attention to man as a "dangerous. What Schmitt really thought of democracy comes through in Legality and Legitimacy when he expresses the opinion that "the cause of the totalstate. more accurately of the total politicization of man's entire existence. was the means bywhich a conservative president could hold the German state together.dk/handle/1800/2068. particularly against the principle of popular sovereignty. Plebiscitary democracy. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics." Schmitt regarded liberals as too muddled to save European states from democracy.ruc.must be sought in democracy. and democracy because it politicizedlife entirely to the detriment of other human activity. Inno other respect was Schmitt a political majoritarian. SD Neither liberalism nor democracy. dynamic being”. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. or at least found it moreconsistent with the maintenance of sovereignty in Weimar Germany. R. which he believed would engender totalitarian policies. “his attacks were directed against the democratic component in nineteenth-century liberalism. The association of democracywith national homogeneity would allow an ideal sovereign to benefit fromdemocratic legitimation without being stymied by majoritarian whims.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . He made them in order todefend an authoritarian presidential government against a liberal parliamentary one. p. he thought. January. 1990." It is that mode of organizing human groupings that totally sacrifices private to public life and that carries political antagonisms into ideological crusades. Cristi is right whenobserves that. [Paul Edward. contrary to the view of Schmitt as primarily antiliberal. in Schmitt's opinion. Ph. PG 80-81.41 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Liberalism Neither liberalism nor democracy favor politics of restraint and democracy sacrifices private life and heads to totalitarian politics Gottfied.D. his prodemocratic statements were mostly tactical. http://rudar. BH .132. F. Liberalism has increased the gap between representation and reality – we must break this cycle Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. He finessed hisdefinition of "democracy" to avoid making it refer to government thatdepended on changing popular opinion. Of Aarhus Denmark]. Though Schmittapparently preferred democracy to liberalism. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.
not only makesliberal regimes susceptible to emergencies but also leaves them vulnerableto alternatives like the one eventually put forth by Schmitt. D. Against Politics as Technology) PG 151-152. . Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. Lack of constitutionally facilitated emergency prerogative may then provide the opportunity to those like Schmitt who would use this particular liberal deficiency as a ruse to scrap the whole legal order.” The only apparent recourse available in this milieu to political actors confronted with a political exception is to act illegitimately and hope to pass off such actions as legitimate. AN Liberalism's denial of the exception and avoidance of' the discretionary activity that was traditionally sanctioned to deal with it. Schmitt’s deciding sovereign can be seen as a violent return of the prerogative represented by scientific liberalism. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. In this sense. “once the notion of prerogative power was abandoned no possibility of legitimately acting beside or against the law was left. McCormick ‘97 (John P. Ph. As Bernard Manin describes it.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .42 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Liberalism makes liberal regimes vulnerable to emergencies and must prefer the alternative.
January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.dk/handle/1800/2068.ruc. p. 66-67. http://rudar. Of Aarhus Denmark]. Ph.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.43 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Modernity (Generic) Modernity is penetrating the political (weakening the state) – if we fail to act to end this imposition on political dictatorship it will become irreversible Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.D. BH .
Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. p. Of Aarhus Denmark]. BH . In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Ph.dk/handle/1800/2068.44 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Peace The end goal of peace is a form of depoliticization that denies the existence of enemies and refuses to make a distinction between friend and enemy Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. http://rudar.ruc. 107-108.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .D. January.
169). BH The liberal element proper demanded. placed Schmitt explicitly in the Hobbesian camp. Civil rights. This concept of the political. the rule of law. 'theprotection of citizens from the abuse of state power' (p.The state had to be seen as 'a strictly controlled steward ofsociety' (p. This determined the two principles that found their way into every modern constitution: a recognition of funda-mental individual rights (principle of distribution) and a divisionof public powers (principle of political organization). on the contrary. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. as the possibility of distinguishing friends from enemies.The unity of the state could not be rendered by the liberal elementbecause the tendency of liberalism was to confront the state andstand apart from it. Individuals were best served by closelydemarcating a domain of action free of political interference. All that liberalism required in this respect was thelimitation and control of the state on behalf of individualfreedom. belonged to individuals living in a state of nature. Political rights. but factually and existentially. were privilegesthat could be held only within the state. This quest. anextra-state situation of personal freedom. as Schmitt understood it. first and foremost. 126). This relativization of the power and authority of thestate should count as the most essential ingredient in any attemptto define liberalism.45 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Rights to Africans The extension of liberal rights to aliens distorts the unity of the state Cristi 1998. 125). liberal rights parexcellence. the Kantian Herrschaft des Gesetzes(p. did not entail any specific principle of political organi-zation.on. As a liberalelement. the possibility of distin-guishing between friends and enemies. . would disappear’ (p. The political element of the constitution was meant to securethe unity of the state. Their scope was unlim-ited in principle. This was what the distinction between civiland political rights presupposed. [Renato. 127). 128-129. wasnot to be taken as a normative one. and the fundamentalpresupposition of political existence. Otherwise thepolitical unity and community would cease. They were limited in thesense that they could not 'be claimed by aliens.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Professor in department of Philosophy.
accordingto Schmitt. Ascribing sovereignty to theconstitution and the ideal of the rule of law was the illusionpeddled by humanitarian liberals in their campaign to discreditthe state and the political. p. a dangerous illusion. BH The argument presented in this book has chronicled the devel-opment of Schmitt's pre-1933 theory of the state and theconstitution. . Professor in department of Philosophy. 204. The Nazi destruction of the constitution in 1933 washailed by Schmitt as a reversal of that historical process. which ought to be regarded asa merely derivative pouvoir constitug. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. According to Schmitt. according to Schmitt. the front line of a broader campaign aimed againstthe German democratic revolution of 1918-19 and the Weimarconstitution. The original pouvoir constituant wouldalways transcend the constitution. But the German democratic revolution meant anirreparable weakening of the state. But it was simply a mistake to thinkthat a constitution could of itself warrant the realization of thejuridical (Recht). classical liberalism was ableto maintain a clear line of separation between civil society and thestate. which had the effect of preserving the latter's independenceand autonomy. [Renato.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .46 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Pluralism When pluralism enters the state. could not be contained within strictconstitutional bounds. By giving free rein to thepluralist tendencies buried in civil society it allowed the occupa-tion of the state by party politics and the consequent dissolutionof its unity. party politics begin to deteriorate state power Cristi 1998. The realization of the juridical was first andforemost the achievement of the pouvoir constituant whose activ-ity. To thinkthat a piece of paper could personify the sovereignty formerlyheld by the representative figure of the monarch was.
6 The liberal rule of law. in other words. that the legislative andthe ludicial character be kept separate' (Hayek.constitutions recognized the priority of individual rights. that the liberal rule of law had its propertask. On the one hand. Second. Theywere to be protected. civil society was granted precedence over thestate. 1960: 173). andadministered by another.47 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Rule of Law The liberal rule of law seeks to limit sate power Cristi 1998. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. civil society was legitimated in itsdemands for the least possible interference in its internal affairs.On the other hand. we arereminded by Hayek. but not established or generated.presupposed a clear separation between civil society and the state. should maintain aseparation of its powers and competencies as a guarantee that itwould remain within its own bounds.its powers and competencies were to be strictly defined and sep-arated. as a 'principle oforganization' (ibid. These two principles made-:p the heart of liberal constitutionalism. Schmitt assumed that civil societyneeded to be regarded as a protected sphere where individualswere accorded the freedom to develop and launch forth in everndirection.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . It was only in this latter function. limited in principle. as a separate sphere. .and. Professor in department of Philosophy. then. inorder to make sure that the state did not overstep its limitations. by thelimited legislative powers of the state.). 150-151. The classical liberal formulation of the rule of law. the struc-:ure of liberal constitutions reflected this dual condition. Schmitt maintained that the liberal rule of lawpostulated that a state. was given by William Paley: 'the first maximof a free state is that the laws be made by one set of men. BH Hayek also shared Schmitt's definition of the liberal rule of law as advancing the two general legal conditions required by a liberalpolity. This corresponded to whatSchmitt called a 'principle of distribution' (1928: 126). [Renato. p. First. Accordingly. As such. and the latter was taken as instrumental to the ends indi-viduals set for themselves.
" as well as hisdisdain for what he describes as an instrument or tool.might provide some provisional insight into this problem. . Against Politics as Technology) Pg. Perhaps more productive avenues for understanding each of these important entities.48 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – Technology Technology links to liberalism McCormick ‘97 (John P. D. Ph. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. A carefulstudy of Schmitt's work .where liberalism and technology inexorablyintersect . The problem of technocracy has become a persistent issue inthe practical reality and public discourse of liberal democracies. 24-25. They are indications of a deep-seated connection withinSchmitt's political theory between liberalism and modern technology.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . AN It is my argument that Schmitt's derogatory references to what is "tactical" or is a reflection of some kind of narrow "functionalism. are not merelyrhetorical. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism.
org/conference2004/. At the same time. 'the dream of a modernity without violence.” http://www. the apparatus of liberal cosmopolitanism responds by radicalising its normal mode of operation (which is the spread of modem subjectivity through commerce and cultural 'exchange ') and attempts to impose a liberal order by spreading modem subjectivity through logistical. University of London]. The occurrence of September 11 th in the seat of this dream. 82 That the war on terror is located in this understanding of modernity is less apparent. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. however.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . pertains to the rise of modem subjectivity and the institutions that it makes possible. Louiza. the threat entailed in dichotomous determinations of 'with us or against us' is intended to shape peoples.94 Outside. Recall the numerous speeches by George W. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. only partly subjectivised through other means. Hans Joas has eloquently called.. because. Therefore. September 11. P.org/conference2004/.81 That cosmopolitanism seeks 'perpetual' peace. perhaps even worse types of war. . how else can we understand the war on terror if not in a sequence of changing types of war. Not only does the recurrence of war throughout modernity serve to underline its paradoxical character. biopolitical and military means. as those undertaken by the League of Nations. 25-26. into subjects. BH The first relationship arises from their joint location in a long line of thought and policy aiming to articulate an outlook and a political programme of the modern world in which violence and war dissipate. the war on terror seeks to rid us of the scourge of terrorism. need no further justification' 95 . as Habermas notes regretfully. the United States of America.” http://www. was an unforgivable affront to this liberal modernist vision of perpetual peace. But the very forms of war that recur are of such increasing violence and intensity as to threaten the very sustainability of the proj ect of modemity understood in terms of the pursuit of perpetual peace. September 11. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. When threatened. yet another evolution after the one noted by Mary Kaldor in the late 1990s?84 The War on Terror promotes the spread of subjectivity and liberal political institutions and skews the concept of who is with and who is against us Odysseos 2004 [Dr. Louiza. and the singular way of achieving this is to spread modern subjectivity and its attendant liberal political institutions (or vice versa). And. the war on terror is central to the very paradox of liberal modernity and war which that has preoccupied realist.49 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – War on Terror The War on Terror is a modernist version of the end of war that produces civil wars of annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr. such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation' (NE 246). whose liberated citizens can participate in promoting a safer and more peaceful Middle East. in which war is gradually replaced by mles and principled behaviour.83 Schmitt's own assessment of prior liberal attempts to abolish war. 28-29. Marxist and poststructuralist thought. but nevertheless becomes obvious in the apocalyptic-sounding framing of the Bush Administration's understanding of the fight on terrorism as a fight that will not be abandoned until terrorism is rooted out. Bush on the desirability of a newly democratic Iraq. then. BH Outside of the liberal polity. Dispensing with intemational law and norms of state action cannot be understood as serious obstacles to this kind of war. in the age of the war on terror the US sees 'wars that make the world better.. 80 This. A recent articulation of this paradox is offered by Julian Reid who notes this disturbing paradox: [a] political project based concretely upon an ideal of 'peace' has continually produced its nemesis. is similar: 'any abolition of war without true bracketing [has historically] resulted only in new. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.sgir. is often acknowledged through the debts that cosmopolitan thinking owes to Immanuel Kant's understanding of cosmopolitan law.sgir. both the war on terror and liberal cosmopolitanism are located within a modernist vision of the end of war. and their global exportation. P. The second relationship of the war of terror to cosmopolitanism. war. University of London].
to read the Weimar consti-tution as a purely formal juridical document missed its truemeaning. Schmitt treated the constitution as a distinguishedpatient invited to lie on his couch and confess to its repressedpolitical intentions.50 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Link – We Demand Impositions by the civil society on the state crumble its strength Cristi 1998. 1970: 37-43). The rise of liberalism had depoliticizedpublic discourse to such an extent that the real nature of the statehad been obfuscated. Schmitt took the view that it was futilesimply to repress political life and attempt to cover it up with thelanguage of abstract legality. Then its impeccable liberal facade wouldcrumble and the real proportions of its article 48 would come tolight (compare with Schwab. was a bidto reassert the juridical validity of notions such as sovereignty. BH The intellectual task attempted by Schmitt immediately after thepublication of Political Romanticism and prior to 1923. [Renato. p. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. These non-romantic notions wereneeded to strengthen the state and keep it from drowning in thevortex of civil society. 1921:201-3). This is what heachieved in the last pages of his Die Diktatur (Schmitt.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .authority and dictatorship. Professor in department of Philosophy. . 63. Hence.
andacknowledge the necessity of a sovereign state that retained themonopoly of the political. 6.51 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Civil War A distinction of enemies and friends is needed to avert impending civil war – key to a strong state Cristi 1998. A convinced etatist and anti-monarchomachist.Schmitt followed Hobbes in judging that only the strongly decisive state could avert the possibility of a civil war. the exercise of state sovereignty could again be juridically determined.8 Schmitt's conservative thought found in the critique of liberal-ism a continuous line of argument. The normativity ofa legislative state could replace the stark raison d'itat. Only contempt for the reality ofthe political would allow one to pretend that a system of legalitycould sustain itself and maintain no reference to a substantiveorder of things. p. the political reason of an absolute prince. BH Schmitt's emphatic affirmation of the sovereignty of the statewas due to what he saw as the weak state that had resulted fromthe revolutionary abrogation of the monarchical legitimacy inGermany. . Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Once order wasreestablished and normality returned. [Renato. if liberalism wereto restrict its apoliticism to the sphere of civil society. Schmitt was a unswerving critic. If liberalism were to be identified with thisapolitical view. Schmitt would not object to conservative or authoritarian liberalism. Professor in department of Philosophy. Its strengthcould be measured by the capacity to identify friends and enemiesand draw between them clear adversarial lines.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
Ph. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. . the technical was a means to a prior-sanctioned good. emergency action becomes more extreme. butin modernity it becomes an end in itself-." Thus. As a result. because it is soon carried out by anelite whose actions are supposedly sanctioned by such "popular" sovereignty. For Hobbes. In this way is "the technical conception of the origin of the modern state directly related to the problem of dictatorship" (D. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. Concomitantly. as authority derives not from aspecific and definite individual person. Civil war and foreign war traditionally considered exceptional circumstances that might occasionally call for a dictator. who will become Schmitt's intellectual hero. Hobbes. as such.52 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Dictatorship Dictatorship is inevitable through the affirmative’s engagement in politics McCormick ‘97 (John P. sovereign. 115-16) and especially Siey6s (D. the present manifestation of 'War" is an exceptional circumstance that in the past. such as Mably(D. In line with these historicaltransformations. AN All of politics becomes technical and dictatorial politics. butr-ather from an amorphous and differentiated populace.13 According to Schmitt. or more accurately beneath the veneerof the present. is no longer commissarial butappropriate to its own name. further inverts the relationship of a normal political situation and an exceptional one with his concept of the "natural condition" or the "state ofnature. the "natural condition" or"state of nature. Against Politics as Technology) Pg. become something else in the writings of such statetheorists as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin. this process is radicalized as sovereignty becomesincreasingly defined as popular sovereignty. 10).Sovereign dictatorship becomes the power to perpetually suspend andchange political order in the name of an inaccessible "people" and aneschatological notion of history. 143-5) and more immediately theBolsheviks. Hobbes's "sovereign" andstate are hence a kind of dictatorship that has as its sole task guarding overthe ever-present exception and. dictatorship changes from a "commissarial" phenomenon to a "sovereign" one. D. the exceptional circumstance is viewed actually as areturn to normalcy and the regular order as a kind of exceptional situation -the distinction becomes deliberately blurred. correspondingly.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . there is a historical justification for the violentdestruction of an old order and the creation of a new one out of nothing. 132-133. both elements themselves change through the transformation: In a traditional framework. like an absolute monarch. Schmitt's chief examples of this development are the writings of the French revolutionary theorists. is actually a normal state of affairs.
AN .com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. the state of war goes beyond defeat . Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory.extinction Rasch 2000 [William.” http://tcs. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. Culture.53 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Extinction Without regular conflict in which our enemies are identified. and Society.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .sagepub.
ise between human rights and the affIrmation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention). would not rid the political world of exclusions. 10-11.54 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Universality fails – leads to exclusions and annihilation Odysseos 2004 [Dr. BH Schmitt had argued vehemently against the 'spaceless universalism' that followed the jus publicum Europeaum. The unwillingness or inability to concretely draw lines and distinctions would definitely not entail their permanent erasure but rather m.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Louiza. and subsequently by the United Nations (despite the UN Charter's tense comprom. That this post1914 order was spaceless was exemplified in the inability and unwillingness of major public actors to draw lines and spatial distinctions16 Schmitt's concem was that the ideal of universality and of a common or universal humanity that was first promoted by the League of Nations. P. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. Schmitt's historical survey and analysis led him to argue that a certain '''dialectic'' of inclusion and exclusion' operated in each historical era and could not be ignored or easily rescinded in the post19l4 era as was believed by the League of Nations. 17 .sgir.” http://www. September 11.ight signal the return of substantive conceptual distinctions that could lead to even more horrendous 'otherings' and exclusions. University of London]. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror.org/conference2004/.
but is that which makes the distinction possible. It is worth quoting Rasch's account at length: We can understand Schmitt's concems in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers. University of London]. not because of a treaty. of a 'just enemy'. he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated. then. "is coextensive with humanity-no longer merely with Christianity. as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations. However. let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil. 19-21. the international community "possesses the inherent right to impose its will. they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace. . they must be of the same category of being. they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom. in other words." Therefore. where does it fmd concrete expression? The discourse of humanity finds expression in an abstract politics of neutrality. 1 turn in the next section to the war on terror and its relation to the discourse of humanity and cosmopolitanism. be inhuman62 Without the concept of the just enemy associated with the notion of non¬discriminatory war. or accommodated. could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion. 'humanity is not a political concept. September 11. In its historical location. it needs its negative opposite. similarly. P. now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. furthermore. reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of Justus hostis. did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman' (NE 104). If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables. no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside.sgir. Since nonbelievers can become believers. Schmitt noted how only when 'man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity. one cannot. who is recognised as someone with whom one can make war but also negotiate peace. 57 Finally. If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need. and when this happens total extermination is possible Odysseos 2004 [Dr. can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole alike-can only. historically examined. because the enemy does not cease to be a human being. Moreover. however. the enemy had no value and could be exterminated.org/conference2004/. To be human.60 In T71e Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity 'excludes the concept of the enemy. When the enemy is not accorded a formal equality. . at least not on this planet'. or a pact or a covenant. it becomes apparent that.6! In the Nomos. The concept of humanity. in his words.. against whom or what does it wage its wars? 58 'Humanity as such' Schmitt noted 'cannot wage war because it has no enemy. once the term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole. 59 As Ellen Kennedy notes. but because of an international need" (283). The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it. and no political entity corresponds to it. the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives." Scott writes. is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. then the negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon. .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity. in the interest of humanity. the concept of humanity could not allow the notion of Justus hostis. human and inhuman.” http://www. a philosophy of absolute humanity.63 With this in mind. which had declared the abolition of war. Schmitt feared. the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable. but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the 'dissolution of "peace'" (NE 246). . Enemies of humanity cannot be considered 'just and equal' enemies. and to war and violence. and to punish its violation. usually in the name of an international community which acts. That is. but its utilisation by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition." it has become "the representative of the common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States. where 'the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. As will examine below in the context of the war on terror. Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is. there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other. Louiza. James Brown Scott. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. BH Thirdly. which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). humanity 'is a polemical word that negates hs opposite. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. . this denial of the self-defence and resistance 'can presage a dreadfhl nihilistic destruction of all law' (NE 187). claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the jus publicum Europeaum. we are assured.55 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The concept of a singular humanity inevitably finds enemies to oppose. humanity per se is not part of the distinction. in the twentieth centmy and beyond it must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that performs this all¬important service. it has no localizable polis. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not. In Schmitt's accomlt of the League of Nations in the Nomos. wrote in the interwar years of the right of this international community to impose its neutral will: The "international community. a jurist and prominent political fIgure in the United States at the beginning of the 20th Century.56 Outside of this historical location. It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation and destruction become possible. where the other cannot be assimilated. and most importantly.
108-109. January. Of Aarhus Denmark]. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. p. Ph.ruc. BH . http://rudar.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.56 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Having enemies is necessary to ensure the containment of war – The alternative is extinction Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.dk/handle/1800/2068.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
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With the implementation of values leads to naming enemy as worthlessness and lets extermination become a reality
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 89-90. SD It would not be stretching a point to recognize in Schmitt's modernpartisan an intellectual seeking desperately to carry through his "highest value [Hochstwert]." In the contemporary world partisans are losing theirattachment to homeland soil. Their dependence on great power and theiridentification with revolutionary ideals have turned them from nationalliberators into armed ideologues. Schmitt presents Lenin as a key figurein this process of change "who gave a new twist to the distinctionbetween friend and enemy." The Prussian military theorist Karl vonClausewitz had advocated total war during Prussia's struggle againstNapoleon. Clausewitz did so as an extraordinary, temporary measure in aEurope of established states. Lenin, by contrast, advocated total war asan instrument of raising the party above the state. He set out to turn thestate into a weapon of "world civil war" directed by the party, and his acthad irreversible significance: "Once the party became absolute, thepartisan too became absolute and was raised to being a bearer of absolutehostility. Today the absolutization of the enemy has become all the moredifficult to discredit, for it seems to be inherent in the reality of a nuclear age. Such statements are clearly related to the escalating war of valuesin which intellectuals damn the bearers of competing values, togetherwith the values being rejected. In The Tyranny of Valties Schmitt stressesthat the competition being discussed is not a mere academic exercise but adeadly confrontation: "For the highest value no price is too high to bepaid." Politics now centers on values and no longer on the definableinterests of established communities. Such politics demands just wars,"for any consideration of the enemy must vanish, must become anonvalue, when the struggle against this enemy is concerned with the highest value.” In this situation there are only two types of human beings, "the one who annihilates and the one who is to be annihilated." Inconclusion: "All categories of the classical military law of the jitspitblictim Europaelitium -- just enemy, just grounds for war, proportionality between the means and the intended purpose, reparation – must fall victim to this [judgment of] worthlessness. The drive toward theimplementation of values becomes here a compulsion toward their immediate realization.
Without the friend-enemy distinction any opposing view in the world will lead to war of all against all with new weapons of annihilation and extermination
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 88. SD The pure subjective freedom of positing values leads to the eternal struggle of values and worldviews, to a war of all against all, to an eternal bellum omniurn contra ornnes, in comparison to which the murderous state of nature in the political thought of Thomas Hobbes is a true pastoral scene. The oldgods arise from their graves and continue to wage their old struggle, butdisenchanted ... with new weapons of annihilation and procedures ofextermination.
Liberalism emasculates politics allowing a war of all against all which can lead to extinction
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 71. SD The views that remain standing on the problematic character of liberal politics in Schmitt's work are the first two: (1) Schmitt criticized liberalism for emasculating politics; and (2) he feared that liberalism, by taking human aggressiveness too lightly, would produce the war of all against all. Though these interpretations clearly diverge, it is possible to cite supporting passages for either from The Concept of the Political.
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Impact – Governance Fails
Liberalism fails as a organizing politic – creating enemies is a necessary framework for politics to function – only through the exception can the sovereign maintain order and power
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 52-53. BH
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Liberalism fails at governance because of the way it is limited from declaring emergencies – comparatively a politics based on friends and enemies is better
Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Ph.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. January. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. p. 95. BH
through the extensions of global capitalism. more incessantly.war in the present stage of liberal modernity becomes an activity that spreads modern subjectivity and subjectivist socio-political practices. P. BH The second relationship is that the war on terror is connected to cosmopolitanism in that it is a set of practices. David Held is correct to claim that the war on terror (and the US's unilateralist foreign policy) is a return to the Hobbesian state of nature. then we can see its function as a disciplining device helping to convince imperfectly domesticated subjects that they. which makes incrementally real the ideal of universal humanity. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. . the war on terror can be understood to serve a similar purpose and to entail. the war on terror contains what were traditionally recognisable as 'war practices'. Louiza. civil liberties are destroyed. that the sovereign is needed and ought to be made stronger92 Inside the polity.org/conference2004/. but also newly inserts 'peace practices' into its set of operations.60 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Internal Conflict Failure to adhere to a strict friend/enemy dichotomy produces internal conflict – preemptive war is justified. University of London]. its lessons of how citizens ought to cultivate readiness to deal with disaster. even though that condition does and must carry many ‘inconveniences’. an environment which (re )creates fearful subjects inside liberal polities. the internal disciplining of liberal publics is necessary in order to justify the undertakings of the war on terror on the world outside of liberal polities. making physical violence in principle illegitimate (if sometimes inevitable) .sgir. starting with the inversion both of their functions and of their "classical" relations'. its general logistical manipulation of citizens. should consent to remain there and should commit themselves more fully to the habits and principles that ensure the stability of their condition. then. If we understand the 'state of nature' to be an educational tool employed by Thomas Hobbes in order to discipline the unruly participants in the English civil war. 27-28.” http://www. As soon as liberal citizens stop being afraid. in their present state. as the state of nature did. has retumed. Given the commitment to the individual . in part. September 11.93 disciplines and controls the subjects of liberal societies by suggesting that the distinction between inside and outside no longer holds. Just as the device of the state of nature is able to achieve results for classical liberalism by exulting the need and desire for the sovereign. The type of violence that becomes possible in a liberal cosmopolitan age is that which promulgates modern subjectivity. The war of terror is. let us take the US as an example. which the Hobbesian solution had banished to the outside. Peace and War 'must be understood in accordance with a substitutive value that makes the two tenns absolutely contemporary with one another. Moreover. which intends to produce and spread modem liberal subjectivity. which abstracts human political diversity from its local constructions and retains only its cultural and aesthetic spectre88 The war on terror should be seen as the latest form of a longer project of subjectivising peoples who have only partially been subjectivised through colonialism. a similar relationship with liberal cosmopolitanism. the weakening of their civil liberties. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences.which sets into place norms and practices that prohibit the torturing of the subject's body. the practices of the war of terror such as its constant raising of colour-coded terror alerts. 89 As to the means of this war to spread the modern liberal subject. It reminds citizens. that the danger. therefore. as they may start to question. and the public is disciplined Odysseos 2004 [Dr. they may begin to seek justifications for pre-emptive wars.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . through the international biopolitical operations of the UN system in the last half of the 20th century and through other kinds of wars prominent since the end of the Cold War. 90 In one way.
in the form of civil war. whether an intellectual or parliamentary debatepresupposes the same degree of antagonism as that manifested in ashooting war. Nonpolitical groupings can suddenly transformthemselves into violently antagonistic ones. Thatgrouping is always political which orients itself toward this most extremepossibility. purely cultural criteria and motives.PG 63. BH Without a sovereignty to name foe’s conflict turns in on the state and forges religious. Gottfied.purely economic. even if the state nolonger directs it.armed combat does not cease among organized units. SD Moreover. 116. Sartori contends that Schmitt is making too much of theGreek word polemos (war) by extending it to essentially civil encountersamong oratorical or scholarly opponents.61 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Modernity has created the depoliticized enemy – this is the enemy that results from having no external enemies in which case hatred turns inward into uncontrollable violence and hate Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.. http://rudar. or cultural.D.. Ph. as well as among organizednations. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. [Paul Edward. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Schmitt's insistence on the polemical and thereforepolitical potential of holding opinions strongly appears to lend credibilityto Sartori's question. a point forcefully made in anoften misunderstood passage from The Concept of the Political: "The realfriend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that thenonpolitical antithesis.. He is only calling attention to thecc ever present possibility of conflict" that can erupt in the internal politicsof weak states. January. But Schmitt does not equatesuch encounters with shooting war.ruc.dk/handle/1800/2068. economic. . at precisely the moment at which it becomespolitical. 1990. Of Aarhus Denmark]. p.15 Where the state dissolves itself or renounces sovereignty.
Once that unity was attained. Classical liberalism acknowledged that the juridical value of absolutism lay in having definitely secured the unity of the state that had been menaced by the Frondes. switching his allegiance from monarchy to republicanism. The associations puissantes have vanished. this was to be seen as a perfectly normal event.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . [Renato. Condorcet was able to justify. The notion of sovereignty could be safely dissolved or. While they existed.62 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Impact – Solvency Takeout Plan fails – policy implementation/advocacy by the individuals fail to create any changes in the state Cristi 1998. il faut bien peu de force pour forcer les individus a l'obeissance. all intermediate associations. calculated and regulated in advance. transferred from the monarch to each individual citizen. Liberalism presupposed the elimination of all social groupings. un despotisme arme was required to contain them. (1921: 204)14” .13 The unity of the state could not thereby be placed in jeopardy. even better. The transition from monarchical absolutism to liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law presupposed that the challenge to the sovereign unity of the state posed by the aristocratic Frondes (these nobiliaire) had been met. 64-65. If henceforth an individual or a group of individuals conspired to alter the public order. the assertion of absolute monarchical sovereignty over feudal seigneurial claims. in the following terms: “the time is past when there existed within the state powerful groups and classes. Professor in department of Philosophy. according to Schmitt. Thus. it became necessary to limit what liberals then interpreted as royalist excesses and arbitrary rule. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. BH The emergence of the modern sovereign state was thus the result of the triumph of the these royaliste. and the isolation of individuals. Now individuals confront a unified totality. p.
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Impact – War
Without a sovereign power the state can fall into “legal war of all against all”
Gottfied, 1990. [Paul Edward, Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.PG 73. SD Gray depicts the "new Hobbesian dilemma" that is developing out ofbad liberal doctrines and social democratic zeal for stateinitiatedredistribution of services and income. In England, which is his test case,the "state has become the most powerful weapon in an incessantcompetition for resources" and entitlements. "Its power is sought byevery interest and enterprise partly because of the huge assets it alreadyowns and controls but also because no private or corporate asset is freefrom invasion or confiscating taxation." In contrast to the sovereign state,Gray describes an "anti-Hobbesian" one that is occupied by mutually antagonistic interests. Working through legislation and litigation andoften through human rights rhetoric, these interests create a "legal war ofall against all, with the ... state of nature being reproduced in thecontext of an over-extended government and a weak civil society.' Gray does not confuse this "over-extended government" with a trulysovereign state, which does not allow itself to fall victim to the "legal warof all against all." Only through the restoration of its political sovereignty,in the Hobbesian sense of maintaining public order against internal andexternal threats, can the state control its own destiny and protect itscitizens against each other as well as foreign enemies. Inherent in Gray'sanalysis are the three points of reference that define Schmitt's critique ofliberalism: sovereignty, the challenge of the exception, and humancontentiousness. The challenge of the exception is the assault on the state's sovereignty that has created Gray's "new Hobbesian dilemma," an occupied state that is also an "overextended government." His wordsrecall Schmitt's critical remark made in The Concept of the Political thatliberals "transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into acompetitor and from the intellectual viewpoint into a debating partner.' Through such redefinitions of identities, Gray and Schmitt both maintain,the participants in this process work to hide, while actually spreading, dangerous political antagonisms.
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Alternative – Agonism
Agonism is essential to self development and politics. In a political system, decisions are made based on wins and losses and the loser is forced to become subordinate to the winner.
Hateb, 2002 (Lawrence J., Ph.D. from Fordham University, "Prospects for a Democratic Argon; why we can still be Nietzcheans") How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity. 10 In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics. 12
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The creation of antagonisms is necessary for the sovereign’s ability to create exceptions – this is necessary to reaffirm state power
Cristi 1998. [Renato, Professor in department of Philosophy, Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. p. 63. BH Europe in 1848, Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918 provedCondorcet to be wrong. Within the state there arose new powerful associations whose 'antagonist force' created exceptionalsituations. These required the development of totally new frameworks of reference. In particular, the Marxist notion of adictatorship of the proletariat went beyond the notion of commissarial dictatorship, which could still be placed
within traditionalparameters. It represented an absolute dictatorship grounded ona revolutionary pouvoir constituant, very much the same powerthat was claimed by the National Convention in 1793, and whichSchmitt presented as an example of absolute dictatorship. Schmittconcluded his Die Diktatur with the thought that the Weimarrepublic, like the situation of Marx and Engels as described intheir address to the Communist League in 1850, had retrogressed, to the state of affairs of France in 1793 and was thus compelledto employ the same measures (1921: 205). Schmitt's self-imposed task was to bring to light what lay beneathWeimar's liberal facade. It was one thing to recognize the sovereignrights of individuals and quite another to attribute
broad unlimitedpowers to the executive authority, powers that could even configurean absolute dictatorship. If conceived as an outlet for the pouvoirconstituant, the Reichsprisident would be empowered to go beyondthe limits set by the constitution itself.
Schmitt sought to bring outthis repressed aspect of the constitution, its revolutionary stance, inorder to graft onto it his own counter-revolutionary programme, aprogramme he thought he shared with de Maistre, Bonald andDonoso Cort6s.16 Novalis's observation that Burke wrote arevolutionary book against the revolution could be extended to thework of these thinkers. It seems to me that it should be also extendedto Schmitt's Die Diktatur. Indeed it was by revolutionary means thatSchmitt intended to contest the revolutionary claims of theproletariat. The dictatorship envisaged by Marx was an extension ofthe enlightened rationalist dictatorship. The conservative reactioncontested the expulsion of the will from the constitutional empire ofreason. For the Enlightenment there could only be an administrationof things which left no room for ultimate decisions. The enlighteneddespot was a rational edifying dictator, who centralized control andadministered the state according to plan. To Burke, de Maistre andBonald this appeared repugnant. Schmitt notes their aversion to apriori constitutions, 'to "artifice" in political affairs, artificial consti-tutions based on the calculations of a clever individual, and thefabricators of constitutions and
political geometricians' (1 925b: 95).Only a decisionist, non-constructivist way of thinking such astheirs could fully restore and bring to life the political eminence ofthe Reichsprisident. He alone would then decide on the livingexception.
The notion of sovereign dictatorship developed by Schmitt in his Die Diktatur manifested his desire to keep alive what he sawas the foundation of the now disintegrated German monarchy,namely the monarchical principle. The French Charte of 4 June1814 constituted its paradigm. The monarchical principleallowed the monarch, in virtue of his pouvoir constituant, tostand above the constitution, so that from the monarch's point ofview the constitution appeared as something precarious and provisional. According to Schmitt, article 14 of the Charte meantan express manifestation of sovereignty, and not just a commissarial empowerment to deal with emergencies. The monarch was ictator, commissarial or sovereign. Like the sovereign dictator Schmitt modelled after him, the French monarch 'did notconsider it anticonstitutional to issue decrees that violated existing laws and even the constitution itself, when he alone judged itnecessary for the security of the existing order' (1921: 193).While
the function of a commissarial dictator was the preservation of the constitutional order, the aim of a sovereign dictatorwas the elimination of 'the whole existing order' and the generation of a new constitution, the only true constitution. Accordingto Schmitt, in such circumstances an appeal was made to theconstitution that would be enacted, not to the one that actuallyexisted (ibid.:
137). This abrogation of the existing order was totranslate into the adoption of a revolutionary stance whereby asovereign dictator could place himself above the constitution.This could be seen prima facie as a purely political move, as some-thing completely 'devoid of juridical value' (ibid.). But whatabided above and beyond a constitutional system was not purelya Machtfrage. A sovereign dictator appealed to a power that,though not constituted, was definitely the 'foundation' of aconstitution. Here resided, according to Schmitt, 'the meaning ofthe pouvoir constituant' (ibid.). It allowed one to transcend thelimits of a legal system without trespassing the limits of the juridical (Recht). Schmitt's sovereign dictator fell within the bounds oflegitimacy and could thus borrow the juridical status that wasbestowed on traditional commissarial dictators.17 In sum, Schmitt formulated the notion of sovereign dictatorshipand adopted the related doctrine of the pouvoir constituant tohighlight the perceived disharmonies within the make-up of theWeimar constitution. The framers of the constitution hadattempted to accommodate a 'combination of a sovereign and acommissarial dictatorship' (ibid.: 203). By enhancing the role ofthe Reichsprisident as a bearer
of pouvoir constituant and poten-tial sovereign dictator, Schmitt looked to exploit those perceiveddisharmonies in favour of a strong state. In view of the uncertainties of the new democratic course chartered by the Weimarconstitution, Schmitt's ultimate aim was to strengthen the state byreinforcing its unity. Later, in his Verfassungslebre, when circum-stances proved more auspicious for the state, the role of theReicbsprdsident would be de-emphasized. Even though Schmittstill recognized analogies between Reichsprilsident and Kaiser, theformer could not be presented as the Kaiser's heir 'because thejuridical foundation was not the same' (1928: 292). TheReichsprdsident was a plebiscitary figure, resting on the sovereignty of the people; the legitimacy of the Kaiser was based on themonarchical principle. If the monarchs of the Restoration periodhad recognized the Estates 'as representatives of the wholepolitically unified people' (1928: 52), this would constitute acontradiction. They would have surrendered the key element oftheir legitimacy - the monarchical principle. Equally contradictory would now be the attribution of constituent power to theReicbsprdsident as heir to the Kaiser. The juridical foundation ofthe Weimar republic was not a monarchical but a democraticlegitimacy.
2002 (Lawrence J.66 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Agonism can be healthy for establishing hierarchies. But he poses an important question. why we can still be Nietzcheans") Appel concedes that a political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can a Nietzschean agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics redescribe respect and political rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by Nietzsche? . My strategy has been to redescribe democratic ideals in the light of Nietzschean suspicions of their traditional warrants. 18 Nietzsche's genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche that reveal how modern "reason" cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcome—namely regimes of power—and consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of emancipation. Ph. and agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice.D. equality.162). is important and still relevant for political philosophy. I think.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . and human rights by ignoring Nietzsche's trenchant attacks. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon. which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of Nietzschean politics: Might not a radical agon all the way down in political life "debunk" important democratic "verities" such as universal suffrage. and political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for exclusion rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion. simply assumes the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions. from Fordham University. Nietzschean perspectivism. permanent hierarchies (NCD. like many critics of postmodernism. and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of Nietzschean genealogical criticisms. Yet Appel. We cannot assume the truth of universal suffrage. while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. equality. Universal suffrage. respect. p. equal respect. without much articulation of how agonistics threatens these notions. The question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of these ideals or does it open up the possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi-Nietzschean terms? Appel presumes the former possibility. Hateb.. [End Page 138] metaphysical suspicion. I take up the latter.
1990. The sovereign is needed to name the states enemies Gottfied.67 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Friends/Enemies Policy Alternative: Use political will in order to recognize the enemy Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.War would no longer be viewed as limited combat. he defines "political antagonism" bylooking specifically at the sovereign national state.. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. George Schwab notes that "thereturn of the foe. Spring). by contrast. as in medieval crusades. but as a total struggle. SD Though in The Concept of the Political Schmitt purports to bediscussing political life in general. [Paul Edward. . Issue 2.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. private citizens and civil society. AN.is at least implicit in Schmitt's picture of the end of the sovereign state. While Schmitt is willing toconsider the "political" defined as a "friend-enemy antithesis" in variousother situations. participate in politicalconfrontation only under the state's aegis." a situation based on absolute rather than legal enemies. His paradigmaticfriend-enemy grouping is the one institutionalized by the sovereign statethat mobilizes citizens against collective rather than personal enemies. Volume1. It is the state and its sovereign who take charge of this antagonistic relationship. against a criminalized and thus dehumanized enemy. proper normative political antagonism is linked for himwith the operation of sovereign states.PG 80.
Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. AN.68 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Decisions to make enemies are of utmost importance.. . Volume1. Spring). Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Issue 2.
.69 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Distinguishing between friend and enemy is a cornerstone of the political – it is up to us as individuals to make these representations Cristi 1998. . Schmitt related thecommunity and diversity of state-forms to two polarly oppositepolitical principles. At the same time. only adult members werepresent and their democratic encounter lasted only while theywere present together in session. There could be no state without some kind ofrepresentation. This could happen when the people attained a full real-ization of its identity and homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit). active New England citizens met in the proverbial town-hall. even in such cases. The Weimarconstitution acknowledged that the people was the true subject ofpouvoir constituant and the principle of identity determined thepeople's political unity. the people was capable of unified politicalaction. on the combination of two opposed principles: the principle of identity (namely the presenceof the people as a political unity . as a political unity. Representationcould never be implemented absolutely and in a pure fashion. The need for it would seem superfluous in caseswhen direct democracy was rigorously exercised. Only stark acceptance and recognition of the reality of thepolitical was able to validate it. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. just as nonecould wholly renounce representation. p. not with aview to hinder the status mixtus. theprinciple of representation was based on the fact that the politicalunity of a people could never attain full and permanent presence. But in truth.. 2 14): The state rests. It could not claimthe conceptual rank of the principles of identity and representa-tion. as a matter of fact.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . there could be no state withouta people and a people would always be present and make its pres-ence felt in the constitution of the state. Schmitt formulated the contrasted principles of identity and representation. Professor in department of Philosophy. For the truth was that no actualstate could entirely give up the principle of identity. but better to explain its poten-tial. concretely embodied in every state: the prin-ciple of identity and the principle of representation. In truth. when capable of distinguish-ing between friend and enemy) and the principle of representation.by virtue of which the political unity is constituted by the govern-ment.it could never be present as a actual identity. when. 132-134. On the one hand. In sum. On the other hand. Schmitt wrote(p. which excluded each other only when considered in theabstract. The principles of identityand representation were but theoretically opposed points of refer-ence. Theability to distinguish between friends and enemies became thecriterion for the existence of political consciousness. forinstance. no state coulddispense with the structural principle of identity. The status mixtus was not an ideal notion. [Renato. It needed always tobe represented personally by individuals. itwould always retain a presence. BH In order to provide philosophical underpinnings for thisretrieval of the notion of a status mixtus. Thepeople could not simply be ignored because. In reality they jointly configured the diversity of existingpolitical unities.
176-177. he maintained basically the same view. but dropped and added crucial terms which confirmed his rapprochement to the neoliberal standpoint. Second.Interventions by the state must be limited – key to a strong state Cristi 1998. There he haddeveloped a conception of a strong state.70 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Rejection Reject aff . BH In the 1932 edition.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . This again conformed with hisconception of a strong state. This view of the state coincided with require-ments demanded by German neoliberals and Schmitt had noreservations in complying with them. a substi-tution of the phrase 'society has its own order in itself' for the phrase 'society is good'. it only means that society has its own orderin itself and that the state is only its distrustingly controlled subor-dinate. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. This change coincided with what Schmitthad advanced in his Der Hiiter der Verfassung. the domain of society. defining in this way a conditionthat the state ought to respect. . he added the phraseland bound by precise limits'. Only a strong state couldrestrict its social interventions to a minimum and allow 'thatsociety and the economy could adopt in their respective spheresthe necessary decisions according to their immanent principles'(Schmitt. strong enough to main-tain its independence with respect to the free development of theforces that constituted civil society. Professor in department of Philosophy. a state that would stay within itsown limits and would not invade. in quantitative totalitarianfashion. 1931: 78). [Renato. in the first place. the goodness of humankind signifiesnothing more than an argument by means of which the state ismade to serve society. p. by contrast. The same text now read: For the liberals. bound to precise limits (1932b: 60) A comparison of these two texts shows.
It was easy for Schmitt to prove that this was simply a cover-up. putto sleep by liberal enchantments.. (1922b: 55)” For Schmitt this meant that the foundations of a legal orderrested on a transcendent source: a subject who had the will todecide politically. 'Kelsensolved the problem of sovereignty by negating it . BH In his Political Theology. 'The basis for the validity ofa norm is only a norm' (ibid. reversed this order of generation.grounded a legal order whose central point was the sovereignstate. whichessentially meant decision. would of necessity wake up atthe slightest invocation. 1922c: 27). .no natura naturans. The capacity and willingness to make politi-cal decisions defined sovereignty. Professor in department of Philosophy.71 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative – Sovereignty The sovereign’s capacity to make political decisions is the essence of the unity of the state Cristi 1998. The living authority of the state. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. the relevance of the Churchon its rendering of the last decision that could not be appealed.A. no eminent legislator to which the state'shighest authority could be traced. p. which was published shortly after Die Diktatur.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Kelsen's Grundnorm. To him the relevance of the state restedon the fact that it provided a decision. compare with Schmitt 1921: 194). Liberal constitutional theories. Sovereignty in turn secured theunity of the state. likethe one developed by Kelsen. supreme underived basic norm. According to Schmitt. so maligned by liberal thinkers and rescued from oblivion by the Catholicconservatives.: 19).Infallibility was for him the essence of the decision that cannot beappealed. There was no transcendent subject of pouvoir constituant. “De Maistre spoke with particular fondness of sovereignty..18 He thereby eliminated authority merelyat the level of definitions. This [was]in fact the old liberal negation of the state vis-a-vis law (Recht)and the disregard of the independent problem of the realizationof law (Recht)' (1922b: 21. 70-72.. Schmitt explored the notion of sovereignty. and the state was henceforth in the positionto generate a system of law. [Renato.Kelsen drew no distinction between state and law (Recbt) andidentified the state with the legal order (Recbtsordnung)(Schmitt.
and Society. AN .72 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Strong sovereignty is needed to combat bad stuff in the world Rasch 2000 [William.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.sagepub. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. Culture.” http://tcs.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.
it may no longer be possible for all western governments to be as sovereign as the states that reconstructedthe European map after the Napoleonic Wars. Still. it may be warrantedto distinguish between military cooperation and the turning of military dependence into the subversion of another state's sovereignty. the United States imposed on Germany and Japan a reeducation plan and a preferred regime. Those who promote such politicsresemble the Persian Emperor as depicted by Isocrates. 1990. SD The sovereign and (still in Europe to some extent) national state maybe the only sound alternative to those largely empty hopes that have beenraised against it. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics.73 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Compromise Schmitt’s alternative provides compromises for international cooperation Gottfied. it avoids the irreversible surrenderof the right of war. . by right of conquest.PG 119. At the end of the Second World War. Above all. [Paul Edward. In view of the foreign balance of power that has controlled Europe since 1945 and the current international problems of terrorism and drugrelated crimes. who treatedGreek allies as slaves by another name. Such a project by now has become paradigmatic for many architects ofAmerican foreign policy who approach military alliances looking foropportunities for further conversions. The sovereign state defended by Schmitt does not rejectinternational cooperation but remains wary of encroachment on itsinternal governing power.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
external enemy is needed to preclude the rise of an exterminationist ethic that seeks annihilation Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.ruc. Of Aarhus Denmark].74 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Extinction Eliminating conceptions of enmity results in them reemerging in worse ways – a return to recognizing a concrete. BH . 300-304. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. p.D. Ph. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. http://rudar.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January.dk/handle/1800/2068.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .75 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .76 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .77 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
78 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Economy A strong state is key to a successful economy Cristi 1998. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. crucial achievement: the Prussian coup of 20That decision went to the core of 'the Weimar constitution'sworst design defect . Despite his disappointment with that decision. One could not avoid 'the general impression that the state has grown weaker and the circumstances have worsened and become more chaotic' (Appendix: p. the enigmatic decision handed down byme supreme court at Leipzig on 25 October of that same year which appeared to confirm the legality of the government's decision that led to the Prussian coup. Second. the one handed down thepreceding month by the supreme court at Leipzig.atVerfassung. it sparked an immediatereaction that brought together a vast coalition of the most unlikelyconfederates. which he saw as a weak state) to refer to this strong state. . the establishment. Alexander Riistow. BH The fact that he was Schleicher's legal adviser and member o-his clique influenced some contingent aspects of Schmitt'sLangnamverein speech. where his views were interpreted favourably. he used the formula 'qualitative total40m m opposed to the 'quantitative total state' of totalitarianism. Third. Schmitt did not hide. 214). Professor in department of Philosophy. he was also willing to credit that failed regime. Despite the anti-liberal resonances conjured by the notion of a state described as both strong and total.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .40 did not hesitate to confirm the liberal ancestry of Schmitt's conception of the total state (1932: 69). on 28 March. 30-32. But he was still prepared to defend 'the practical usefulness And energy of article 48' in the face of a campaign to discredit and Defame it. in turn. Schmitt deployed many of the principles andessential elements of his theory of the state and the constitution. second. compromised by another decision.Schmitt’s address began by reviewing three epochal events inrecent history: first. p. instigated by Schleicher andsupported Juridically and ideologically by Schmitt's interpretation of article 48 of the Weimar constitution. Hesummed it up by adopting the conference's striking motto . that sole achievement had been. [Renato. But its overall argument marched inunison with what he had first developed in Der Hiiter. There he sought to reiforce the authoritarian tendencies he discerned in the Weimarconstitution by clearly demarcating the realms of the state a-Zof civil society. and third. A noted neoliberal economist. Schmitt noticedthat when a strong state asserted itself. He blamed party politics for weakening state authority and espoused a strong state to provide the necessary protection for the development of a free economy. in his view.Schmitt was still hopeful that a strong state would prevail in theface of a number of opposing forces. it was well-received in liberal circles. published the year before. of a presidential regime. In this conference. 214. In hisLangnamverein speech. the Prussian coup June 1932.the dualism between the Reich and Prussia'p.only a strong state6 can preserve and enhance a free-market economy. first of all. disappointment with the results shown by the presidentialSince its inauguration in 1930.
. Issue 2. Volume1.. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. Rockefeller College Review.79 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Empowerment The delineation between friends and enemies empowers individuals within a political community Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Spring). AN.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
80 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The task of the political is to provide experience and nourishment. Spring). The decisions regarding friends and enemies are placed at the center of the political which provides life with increased meaning.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Rockefeller College Review. Issue 2.. Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Volume1. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. . AN.
81 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Freedom The alternative protects freedom through spontaneous market mechanisms and monopolization of protection Cristi 1998. an appeal that had theeffect of destroying the Weimar constitution and placing in itsstead the enabling act as a provisional constitution. The strength ofthis state was dependent on its ability to remain neutrall6 anddepoliticize society. 19-20. Schmitt was personally responsible for advancing aninterpretation of the enabling act of 24 March. could be read as an anticipated agenda for Schleicher's stint asChancellor. the Instrument ofGovernment of Hitler's regime. The twotexts that he published shortly after Hitler rose to power showedSchmitt's enthusiastic support for a new revolutionary statewhose strength was bolstered by the absence of an essentialliberal ingredient. p.His conservatism was combined with a liberal view that sought to leave civil society to a large extent free of state regulation and ruled mainly by spontaneous market mechanisms. Schmittreferred to this authoritarian state as 'qualitative total state' andcompared it to the stato totalitario of Italian fascism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Implicit in his argument was anappeal to the notion of constituent power. Professor in department of Philosophy. BH The first text was a conservative plea that decried party factionalism and appealed for a further strengthening of state authority. the separation of the executive and legislativepowers. as the revolutionary abrogationof the Weimar constitution. Schmitt's strong state was not meant to interfere inany way with the affairs that properly belonged to civil society. . [Renato. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. This it could do by monopolizing the political and assuming the full scope of its protective function.
that history had passed its verdict: Westernculture was exhausted. National integrity. monarchical or democratic. 73-74. its soul had perished. p. BH If Schmitt's critique of liberalism put him within the conser. Other conser-vative revolutionaries. They saw that the preser-vation of traditional ways of life and past institutions wasillusory. the existentialist tone of this hard decisionism wasmore akin to a conservative revolutionary outlook. ought to be affirmed bythe decisive will of one single individual.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . [Renato. also gave up any claim tolegitimacy.82 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Individual Effort culture has been exhausted. When the cultural soul of anation died nothing could revive it. Their pessimism led them to think that their present wasbeyond redemption.revolutionary conservatives.vative camp. Traditional con-servatives thought that the past retained its vivifying force. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. like Spengler. in theabsence of spiritual forces to sustain it. on the contrary. stoically gave upany efforts to revitalize tradition. Professor in department of Philosophy. . it is up to individuals to affirm national integrity Cristi 1998.
207-208. According to Schmitt. a well-ordered liberalsociety was one founded on substantive values like private prop-erty and individual freedom (Schmitt. [Renato. Onthese rested a string of other axiomatic distinctions which shapedthe architecture of his theory of the constitution (pouvoir consti-tuant and pouvoir constitu6. once those associations puissantes aredismantled. 1921: 204). 1928: 8 and 130). Only a strong state could be trustedto minimize the power to be exercised over individuals. p. This metaphysical appurtenance of dynamicity andstaticity. Schmitt built his last line of defence. To attain such an order Germanyrequired a strong state. This was the complexio opposito-rum that separated and brought together the state and civilsociety. 1921: 194). pluralism and unity was meant as the conceptual struc-ture that would ease the inevitable transition to a substantivelyliberal society. one that could crush the powerful factionsthat menaced it from within. Around the distinction between the juridical and the real-ization of the Juridical.3 In thecourse of history. likely to be dismissed as 'scholastic subtleties' (Schmitt. absolute andpositive constitution) and his theory of the state (the polarltvstate/civil society. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. BH Much of what appears bewildering and contradictory inSchmitt rested on the metaphysical symbiosis of dynamicity andstaticity.83 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Internal Conflict A strong state is needed to crush factions that oppose it and ensure individual freedom Cristi 1998. pluralism and unity. law and measure. 'll faut blen peu de force pour forcer les individus l'obeissance' (Schmitt. the separation of executive and legislativepowers). and that between the substance of powerand its exercise. AsCondorcet acknowledges. . other national communities had been able toentrench and institutionalize a substantive liberal order that didnot dissolve into factions. Professor in department of Philosophy.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
AN..” who make decisions on who “enemies. Rockefeller College Review.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . “Friends” are willing to risk their lives to defend communities against “enemies” Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Spring). .” are. Volume1. Issue 2. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.84 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Protection Politics are dependant on “friends.
sagepub. AN .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .” http://tcs. and Society.85 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – Respect for the Other The sovereign is the only way to preserve differences in an international system Rasch 2000 [William. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. Culture.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.
86 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
Issue 2. AN. Spring).87 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Alternative Solvency – State Collapse Individuals must unite to view enemies collectively. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Volume1.. . preventing the state collapsing in on itself Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Rockefeller College Review.
which derives only from the exception. 6-7). McCormick ‘97 (John P. 15. rules could never derive. Schmitt asserts that the rule. defines the exception and that the exception. ForSchmitt. for it confirmsits existence. Because of this. emphasis added) . everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations" (PT. but because the seriousness of an insight goesdeeper than the clear generalizations inferred from what ordinarily repeatsitself. in turn. Ph. the exception can be good for the legal order. any attempt to define the exception or to describewhat circumstances might constitute an exceptional case is a hindrance onthe ability to manage it when it in fact arises to threaten a regime.88 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Agamben The rule only exists as a result to the exception. by definition neither can it exist at all times. Schmitt goes on. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. however. not because of aromantic irony for the paradox. in effect. Schmitt seemingly attempts to allay such fears. the exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but its existence.37 Any limit. legal or otherwise. (PT. on the contrary. ostensibly restoring confidence in the importance and primacy of the norm-bound situation.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt ."'The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal descriptions can be valid must first be brought about. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. according to Schmitt. AN Exactly how does this natural-scientifically tainted constitutionalism hamper the ability to deal with the exception? As we know from Chapter 3. 6-7). than the rule. hence." in which an authoritarian regime is required to standguard at every moment for the possibility of the sudden appearance of theexception.. D. The exception is more interesting than the rule. draws attention to the rule. There can be no "exceptional" situation without a normal one. to suggest that the normal situation actually owes its legitimate existence. Against Politics as Technology) PG 226-227. Just as the exceptional case by definition cannot be predicted. The rule proves nothing. This could easily be taken as a call for a perpetualstate of "emergency.. to this government's functioning would jeopardize its vigil and would necessarily require suspension. to the exception: The exception can be more important . Every general norm demands a normal. Without the exception. it is ridiculous to make plans or provisions for what one could notpossibly foresee (PT.
Summer98 Issue 112. it is one thing to say that the internal standards of a group defy evaluation by universal rationalist standards. "it would be senseless to wage war for purely religious. if there is one.(n57) . not in the sense of a distinct new domain. But they are states nonetheless. and quite another that the members of the group are incapable of guiding their own decisions by shared values or shared ideas of what constitutes a good reason. No doubt. appears to be nothing more than a fact.' one independent of the criteria that define the moral. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. not can it be traced to these. Hence the only "sensible" justification for waging war is the self-defense of the group.89 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Bad States The internal standards that make up a group are irrelevant so long as there is some form of homogeneity of the group so that war will only be waged in self defense Norris 1998 [Andrew.(n56) The homogeneity that defines the group may well have its origins in a shared religion or a shared set of moral values. beautiful and ugly] or any combination of other antitheses.D. economic and even religious matters are things about which one can argue. Moral. received his Ph. The first step toward this unwelcome conclusion is taken when he insists on the political irrelevance of the content of the "motives" that define any given political group. or purely economic motives. p68. some states have been largely concerned with the pursuit of murder and thievery. it is not even that because this identity is so formalized. BH Here it may be objected that Hegel's distinction between a legitimate state and a gang of courageous "robbers or murderers bent on crime" is valid. will the solidarity of the group be based? What do they have in common if it is neither economic. Schmitt argues that the political "is independent. profitable or unprofitable." Further. If so. Such states are deplorable."(n55) On what. so thoroughly drained of content. Schmitt commits himself to the latter as well as the former position. then. it is neither a fact nor a norm. enemies and the political. beautiful or ugly. Like the sovereign decision.(n54) However.” Telos. aesthetic and economic spheres of human thought and action. or moral? The answer is a shared identity. purely moral. But shared identity. aesthetic. Schmitt is attempting to provide "a definition [of the political] in the sense of a criterion. does Schmitt's political theory allow him to recognize it? It does in so far as it distinguishes between a loosely organized group and one in which the sovereign authority is acknowledged by the citizenry to possess "the right to demand from its members the readiness to die. but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis [such as good and evil. It follows that he will acknowledge as political some forms of association that may be good or evil. Indeed." Whether a group of the latter sort is made up of thieves and murderers is beside the point. religious. This would seem to squash most public debate and deliberation. purely juristic.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . But politically this content is irrelevant. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. that is nothing more than a shared commitment. the homogeneity of the group.
and the fact that it must restore a previously standing order. if the Communists partially understand the essence of dictatorship. xiii). often democratically acclaimed. completely misapprehend it.transitional" (D. xix). According to Schmitt. Schmitt isalarmed that the concept seems to be taken seriously only by the Communists with their doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (D. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. the classical institution employed them to restore a previous inexisting one. and they equate aunreflectively with authoritarianism. according. xiv). xiii). "definitive" for the Communists. xiii)."for whom the problem of dictatorship has as much to do with a legalproblem. 124-127. AN It is important to note that this purely technical aspect of dictatorship isat the very heart of the concept and the institution for Schmitt and that ithad much to do in his mind with the contemporary use.. xi-xii).Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . military government. Schmitt notes that one might then see the communist theory of dictatorship as simply a modern incarnation of the classical institution: a negationof parliamentary democracy without formal democratic justification (because the Communists are often a minority) and a replacement of thepersonal dictator with a collective one (the party) (D. . as a brain operation has to do with a logical problem. D. the normallegally legitimated order. thecommissarial char-acter of dictatorship" (D. despite its fixation on equilibrium. Classical dictatorship is a wholly technical phenomenon that restores what is not wholly technical." which is unlimited in any way and may proceed to establish a completely new order. Bonapartism. Dictatorship emphasizes the importance of the regular order through the imperative to bring it to restoration. and "sovereign dictatorship. and even the papacy (D. for theyrecognize its purely technical and temporary characteristics: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is the technical means for the implementation of thetransition to the Communists' final goal" (D. disuse. Unlike the separation of powers that. to Schmitt. xiv). McCormick ‘97 (John P.8 But by corrupting the notion of this important technique for dealing withemergencies and subsequently banishing it from constitutional concerns. The "centralizing machine" and "domination-apparatus" of the state seized by the proletariat is not. Caesarism.7 Liberals have completely forgotten its classical meaning and associate the idea and institution solely with the kind described by Schmitt as "sovereign" dictatorship: A distinction is no longer maintained between dictatorship and Caesanmmand the essential determination of the concept is marginalized . Liberals deem a dictator tobe any single. and abuse ofthe concept in the early twentieth century.. Its blind faith in the technical apparatus of its standing constitutions andthe scientistic view of the regularity of nature encourages liberalism tobelieve that it needs no technique for the extraordinary occurrence. to the extent that they pay any attention to the concept at all.. Without a dictator or sovereign. xiii). specified task. be cause the regular constitutional techniques are assumed to be appropriateto a nature free of the extraordinary.90 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Dictatorship Bad Dictatorship is always going to be superior to liberalism. ironically. according to their ideology. that the authority of the state cannotbe separated from its value" (D. Against Politics as Technology) Pg. So. Liberal constitutionalism is an order become increasingly technical through its formulation of a conception of normalcythat excludes the extraordinary. according to Schmitt. or despite legal positivism that.. individual ruling through a centralized administration withlittle political constraint.the one between thetraditional concept of "commissarial dictatorship." which is bound by allotted time. due to its mechanical nature. namely. the "bourgeois political literature" either ignores the concept altogether or treats it asa kind of slogan to be used against its opponents (D. This difference has important ramifications for the question ofjust how limited a dictatorship can be if it is legitimated and bound by afuture situation as opposed to being legitimated by a previously existingone.For Schmitt. liberals are incapable of handing emergencies and are vulnerable to these very emergencies. according to Schmitt. The classical dictatorship emphasizes the importance of theregular order something that eludes the liberal positivism of Hans Kelsen. cannotensure stability. but rather. cannot distinguish between right and wrong and hence legality andlegitimacy. the separation of powers and legal positivism defile it throughthe emphasis on uninterrupted processes and not what is substantively important about a regime.5 This difference also lays the groundwork for the theoreticalhistoricaldistinction that governs the whole of Die Diktatur. But this obscuresthe truly fundamental transformation of the essence of the classical concept: The communist institution employs technical means to create a newsituation.liberals.6 I will return to theseissues in greater detail in subsequent sections. This is aresult of a relativistic formalism that misunderstands that dictatorship dealswith something else entirely. TheCommunists have the concept partially right.liberal constitutionalism leaves itself especially susceptible to emergencies. dictatorship has an end that is not simply the perpetual means toanother end. Professor of Political Science at The University of Chicago. Ph.
such violations did not imply the destruction or suppression of the constitution as a whole. when particular constitutional norms wereviolated.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . according to Schmitt. above the law. Of themselves.superiority of the existential over mere normativity' (ibid. implied a sovereign prince or a sovereign people who stood legibus solutus. [Renato. the purpose of the liberal ideal was. He now felt he could point withoutmisgivings to what he called 'apocryphal acts of sovereignty'. Those violationswere only 'measures' (1928: 107) and not constitutional norms. On thecontrary. Bycontrast. and thus relativize. 1928: 108) were betterjustified when they could be seen as grounded in the constituentpower of the people. For Schmitt.whoever had the faculty to violate. Professor in department of Philosophy. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.They were justified by particular exceptional and abnormal transitory situations. . According to Schmitt.91 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Exceptions Bad Sovereignty is inevitable.). to subject the power of the state to the rule of law andexpel sovereignty from its domain. Theyforced the recognition of sovereignty. They tookplace. The politicaland the state could be erased by legal fabrications and methods ofavoidance. particular constitutional norms were violated in orderto safeguard the substance of a constitution. Sovereignty manifesteditself when the legal order was violated. An absolute form of government. p. BH The recognition of the democratic political form and itsconstituent power had a price which Schmitt was eager to exact:the reintroducion of sovereignty as a legitimate theme for constitutional discussion. for instance. Accordingto Schmitt.monarchical or democratic. this ideal ofabsolute normativity constituted a tenuous fiction. Acts of sovereignty would always occur. the legalorder as a whole was sovereign. 124-125. What these situations demonstrated was the. But 'theseacts of inevitable sovereignty' (Schmitt. but certain exceptions are necessary to momentarily confirm constitutional validity and protection Cristi 1998.These sovereign actions set in motion the activity of constituentpower in the daily ordeal of constitutional business. such cases confirmed constitutional validity.
Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will. . Volume1.. Rockefeller College Review. Spring). Issue 2.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .” Friendship develops as a result of goodness Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. AN.92 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Friends Bad Friends are classified in as part of Aristotle’s “the good.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .93 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
Spring). AN.. Issue 2. Volume1.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.94 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Impacts Improbable Even if war is only a tiny possibility. it reaffirms the need of a strong sovereign Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. Rockefeller College Review. .
disciplines political choices. I argue. 78 This section examines the claim that the war on terror does not indicate a crisis in cosmopolitanism but rather is the quintessential liberal cosmopolitan war. alternatively. despite the prominent sense in which the war on terror is portrayed as the antithesis of cosmopolitan orientations and achievements. moreover.71 More recently. “Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on terror. . poststructuralist accounts have suggested understanding liberalism as a strategy for the gradual dissemination of principles that derive from war within the power relations that pervade the societies it governs. thus paying scant attention to the ways in which liberalism. promotes it and intensifies the ways in which it is fought. BH Of course. this latter endeavour is hardly new and it is important to acknowledge that such questions about the relationship between war and liberalism/liberal cosmopolitanism have been historically posed either from a traditional power-political (political realist) perspective or. in seeking to disavow war.95 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Liberalism Good Liberalism is self defeating – it intensifies wars. and fails to promote peace Odysseos 2004 [Dr. September 11.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .org/conference2004/. from a historical materialist perspective. P.” http://www. Department of Politics and International Studies Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. Comprehending liberalism first and foremost as a strategy of power is. there are strong relationships between cosmopolitanism and the pursuit of the war on terror. 79 It suggests that. Louiza. 24-25. but it pursues this claim in a different way than the critiques noted above. suggesting that liberal values are often used to obscure a power political reality.sgir. This section examines these in turn. The latter has customarily sought to interrogate both the ways in which the use of force is promoted within liberal zones of peace but also the ways in which liberalism involves a modernist disciplining of those political endeavours which contradict its key tenets or even seek to provide alternatives to its worldview. to deepen and broaden our understanding of the relations between war and modernity in ways that can help us make sense of the profoundly logistical orientation of liberal societies today.76 The former disregards the liberal nature of these wars. University of London].
For it is simply not true that every Nazi or Stalinist was an evil.D. 12. but exposes one to the risk of not seeing the arrival. which then led to an obsequious intellectual capitulation to the most perverse aspects ofNazism.96 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Nazi Nazism and Stalinism definitely had needs that had to be met. it should be done with a clear awareness of the from this that there were what appeared to be good reasons to believe that legitimate needs could be met by such movements.” Telos. As Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe LacoueLabarthe(n69) note: "It is not possible to push [Nazism] aside as an aberration. it is undeniable that his concept of the political continues to apply today.(n68) Whether one finds Schmitt acceptable or not. Professor in department of Philosophy. still less as a past aberration. tries to do this. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. . it is difficult to meet them in other ways and to resist those movements that promise to meet them.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . this collaboration with the Nazis ought not 'to overshadowall other aspects of his life and work' (1983: 282). it follows course. this admission should be able to save the core ofSchmitt's conservative thought from Nazi contamination. If boundlessambition and lack of moral character alone could explain hissudden conversion in March 1933. Butwhile it is true that opportunism was an ingredient in Schmitt'sintellectual adventure. Until those needs are understood. at the sametime. BH In order to rescue Schmitt's Weimar writings and politicalphilosophy. his apologists have explained his later behaviour asdue to a flawed moral character. Only if politics and experience can be imagined in a new way -. 1990: 3).one that does not revolve around the attempt to regain unity and totality -. or morally retarded human being. but until we understand these needs from the clear awareness that the alternative allows these types of movements will resurface without Democracy and Morality having a chance of stopping them Norris 1998 [Andrew. forinstance. received his Ph. of needs it promises to fulfill. this does not necessarily absolvehis entire Weimar output. A comfortable security in the certitudes of morality and of democracy not only guarantees nothing.will it be possible to move beyond Schmitt's concept of the political."(*) Using Schmitt’s Nazi affiliation to overshadow his important political contributions is problematic – we still must recognize the utility of his political theories Cristi 1998. and his apologists have been right in pointing this out (Gottfried. p68. According to Bendersky. stupid. BH The appeal and the danger of Schmitt's political thinking largely derive from his twofold insistence on the primacy of the whole. As disturbing as it sounds. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. But the mere assertion of liberal principles to those who seek something else from politics is clearly futile. It is still possible to discern aspects ofhis conservative thought in his Weimar writings that may be saidto configure and predetermine his intellectual abdication toHitler's authoritarian figure. 'Schmitt's Nazi career definitely revealed a personalweakness so far as moral principles are concerned'. Liberalism. of that whose possibility is not due to any simple accident of history. enemies and the political. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. If it is to be set aside. p. Summer98 Issue 112. [Renato. or the return.
TJ Bendersky not only provides a serious treatment of Schmitt's relationship to the Weimar Republic. [Paul Edward. that Schmitt could be "neither nazified nor denazified. Though charged by his critics with being "Hitler's Crown Jurist.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 1990. Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College] “Carl Schmitt: Policies and Theory” Global Perspective in History and Politics. 3. Bendersky's judgment." Schmitt expounded a modified traditionalist view of the state that had little in common with Nazi theory or Nazi practice. Pg. but also undertakes to put into perspective his real and alleged involvement with Hitler's Third Reich. He conclusively demonstrates that Schmitt's support of the early Nazi regime was at most an opportunistic tactic. Bendersky proves Gottfied. .97 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Schmitt can’t be classified as a Nazi." was an attempt to counter the accusation seen as having led to his intellectual ostracism in the United States.
It reads "In memory of my friend. p68. this is one of the most important features of the Schmittian state. existential selfpreservation. the enemy wants to destroy us all and sacrifices must be made Norris 1998 [Andrew. "the right to demand from its members the readiness to die" implies that the state has a priority over the individual. but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. it follows that the latter are not entirely a function of the external relation to the enemy. such a demand? In the longer of the two passages just quoted. in this regard.(n19) Indeed. how can that polity ever demand that they risk or sacrifice their lives? As Schmitt explicitly states.. however. The threat to human life does not make one political.. but serves only as a reminder of one's commitment. "the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. is inherent in every consistent individualism. at which point the conflict becomes political. it can only be this recognition itself that makes the group political. Compare. BH Schmitt relies on the threat to the individual's own physical life to draw out the "existential" quality of the political.namely. then.until they pose a threat to the group's existence. What is distinctively political. The sovereign decision is then made whether or not to go to war in order to resolve the conflict.98 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 No Obligation to State People must be willing to risk their lives for the sake of the state – these political communities transcend all other associations.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. Schmitt must present the Lebensform as in some way prior to the individual. received his Ph. Schmitt is wholly unconcerned with the substance or motives of the association that enters into the political conflict."(n20) Since the enemy is defined as a threat to those relations of "friendship" internal to the state.. then Wolin must be wrong in claiming that Schmitt's "existential definition of politics in terms of the primacy of the friend-enemy grouping necessitates the relinquishing of all claims to the 'good life' and instead to rest content with 'mere life' -. which are said to have no specifically political substance."(n26) What does justify. More. 1917. If the final step of this interpretation were correctly taken. prize the integrity of one's way of life over one's own lives. or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations.” Telos." At this point. This is why Schmitt never acknowledges as his own the problem that bedevils Hobbes: if individuals merely enter into a polity to protect their lives.D. Yet something connected to these motives. Given the political indifference of the content of the group's motives and beliefs."(n22) If an often intemperate writer is also capable of subtlety. liberal individualism: "The negation of the political. of the fact that one's way of life is valued above one's life." The decisive conflict is between political solidarity and apolitical. then he has become political. in view of Schmitt's claim that the political has an existential priority over all other forms of association. in the assault on Moncelul."(n23) The plainest reading of this is as follows: groups define themselves in a variety of ways. one might see Schmitt's dedication to The Concept of the Political as a clue to this."(n24) How then can Schmitt assure his readers that "War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics"?(n25) "In case of need. is strong enough to lead men and women to offer their lives for the group." Schmitt writes. for whatever reason. It is "by virtue of [its] power over the physical life of men [that] the political community transcends all other associations or societies. But this threat is hardly identical with the threat to the collectivity's "way of life" or "form of existence. Wolin would be quite right to conclude that Schmitt is committed to the view that "all the energies of modern life stand in the service of war. national (in the ethnic or cultural sense). then it cannot be justified. the quotation at the beginning of this paragraph with Schmitt's previously cited claim: "If physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one's own way of life. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. The conflicts that emerge between these various groups are not political until they reach a certain level of intensity -. who fell on August 28. enemies and the political." In order to bridge the gap between the two. But Schmitt explicitly states that: "The political. economic. the relation with the friend is only a pretext: for this conflict. When one. does not describe its own substance. August Schaetz of Munich. it is strong enough that men and women ought to recognize as legitimate the "right" of the state to "demand" their lives."(n27) . is entirely a matter of the conflict with the enemy..(n21) If Schmitt is at all coherent. Summer98 Issue 112. this may seem to be making extremely heavy weather out of a few turns of phrase.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .99 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Perm Combining the state with the legal order does not allow the state to be the highest force and will ultimately lead to the destruction of the state Rasch 2000 [William.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1.” http://tcs. Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. and Society.sagepub. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics. Culture. AN .
com/cgi/content/abstract/17/6/1. “Conflict as Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics.100 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 State Deconstruction Good The idea of deconstructing the state is an “astonishing misunderstanding” and must be reject. AN . Asssociate Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University] Theory. Culture.” http://tcs. Turning to the state leads to unrestricted participation in all social systems Rasch 2000 [William.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .sagepub. and Society.
101 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
"(n34) "Simultaneously. is in his emphasis on authority (and hence commitment) and mortality. received his Ph. As Schmitt put it: "The political does not reside in the battle itself. Schmitt aligns himself with the Greeks in his insistence that politics be a response to the fragility and futility of human life. Schmitt insists that "The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is.. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. BH No doubt. but it is brought into view in its true significance.(n35) but that the people belonging to them see war and what it demands as a real possibility.” Telos. It is far more uncomfortable to recognize his close relation to the currently fashionable identity politics.(n39) If Tocqueville seeks to broaden personal interests and to temper "the habits of the heart. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. i. al.e..102 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Schmitt War War is not the aim or the purpose of the identity politics that Schmitt prescribes – it is democracy that seeks the eradication of the other Norris 1998 [Andrew. Where Schmitt adds decisively to the analysis of Tocqueville et. in concrete clarity. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends.. As Schmitt rather chillingly puts it "[D]emocracy requires . enemies and the political. wholly irrespective of what is being fought for. "the affirmation of the political is the affirmation of fighting as such. not simply because of his authoritarian tendencies.” Telos.. recognized as the enemy.. it would make him an easy target. The relation of friend is not defined by the emergence of the enemy. pleasures."(n67) Constant conflict is not necessary."(n32) This still places too much emphasis on actual combat. Summer98 Issue 112." But it would be naive or disingenuous to maintain that a politics that defines itself in terms of a shared identity did not raise this and other dangers. (n37) Much of the drama and the danger of Schmitt's work is a function of this attempt to use politics to counter nihilism. of their willingness to give their lives when the sovereign demands they do so. Though Schmitt's polemical political theory sets itself against the presuppositions of what he finds to be today's "individualistically disintegrated society." Schmitt seeks to change the concept of who one are. Too many of Schmitt's critics take him to task for war-mongering.if need arises -elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . It is not that groups need to be constantly at war with one another to be political.(n36) Life will lack meaning unless it contains commitments cherished above mere physical existence. . Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. in the absence of an independent moral affirmation of the political. p68. is simply incapable of addressing this issue." because such high points of politics are not identical with the recognition of the enemy. Where Tocqueville contrasts individualism with a public life of the sort that jury duty might encourage. Schmitt is quite right when he insists that "[w]ar is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the content of politics.D. In a passage often quoted by his detractors. p68. He is hostile to individualism. it makes sense to sacrifice one's life."(n38) he is hardly a latter-day Tocqueville or a communitarian a la Michael Sandel. This should make it plain why Schmitt suggests that a loss of meaning and significance attends the eclipse of the political. this interpretation shifts the grounds of the debate on Schmitt in an important way. but we must always be willing to recognize the enemy and realize that conflict is a real possibility – without the will to this political beyond physical existence life has no meaning – a loss of life contributes to something bigger Norris 1998 [Andrew.D. The assertion of identity need not follow from nor lead to a violent conflict. Schmitt contrasts it with solidarity in the face of the potential enemy.. enemies and the political. BH Compare this interpretation with Leo Strauss's reading of Schmitt: Strauss concludes that. and commodities.first homogeneity and second -. received his Ph. but also because the form individualism has taken in contemporary society. If this were true. that they are reminded of their commitments. Summer98 Issue 112.(n40) Politics paves the way for this in such a way that. because of the awareness that there will be some other form of survival."(n33) That mode of behavior is a solidarity that makes possible both self-sacrifice and political authority. but in the mode of behavior which is determined by this possibility. manifest in the consumption of images.
and.(n13) Nonetheless. enemies and the political. however difficult this latter task may be. BH That all said. because of the stress he places on the threat of physical death implicit in the encounter with the enemy. interpretations of Schmitt that center on his alleged "occasional" belligerence remain plausible. a valley cannot be imagined without a hill. Since The Concept of the Political understands the state in terms of the political. as the old saw has it.(n14) .” Telos. it characterizes the state primarily in terms of external conflict rather than in terms of specific internal social structures.103 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon The sovereign’s insistence on belligerence is justified given the external threats of the enemy Norris 1998 [Andrew. he has far more to say about the enemy than the friend. "The friend. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. This is not merely true because.D. he argues. received his Ph."(n12) Because of this structural configuration. Summer98 Issue 112. and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. p68. it would be a mistake to think that what Schmitt means by an enemy can be grasped without understanding what he means by a friend. that establishes the existential independence of the political: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy". It is this. enemy.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . It is also because some meaning must be given to the notion of the friend in order to make any sense of Schmitt's distinction between the private and the public. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends.
mentioned only in his early Weimarproduction.rather than value -. 5-6.D. his provocative formulations of the friend/enemy distinction should not lead to the conclusion that he reduces politics to a function of war. BH This reading of The Concept of the Political is unwarranted.(n7) To properly understand Schmitt's work it must be considered not as a rejection of an established moral order but as a response to a culture of nihilism in which meaning -. 1921:44.(n6) Schmitt's attempt to characterize politics in terms of friendship and enmity is both more complicated and more interesting than his critics suggest.7 My choice of the motto’strong state and free economy' as the subtitle of this book is intended to highlight this. If totalitarianism means that the state ultimately assimilatesand metabolizes civil society.is ebbing away. provided him with the definitive model for the operation of a strong state.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . This distinction. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism. Schmitt appealed to the distinction. he thought that an autonomous state would prove itsstrength by affirming the freedom and autonomy of civil society. it does not follow that Schmitt's concept of the political is itself necessarily totalitarian.which neatly encapsulates the aim and scope that defined histheory of the state and the constitution. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. His account of political authority. . one in which group identity is valued above physical existence. Schmitt is not totalitarian – the friend enemy distinction does not always lead to war and is actually a response to nihilism Norris 1998 [Andrew. in particular.This is a keystone of Schmitt's theory of the state and the constitution. it emphasizes freedom and autonomy Cristi 1998. although most of his colleagues and students were shocked. waiting to be roused in exceptional circumstances. Normally.however. Schmitt publiclystated his dual affirmation of a strong state and a free economy. Professor in department of Philosophy. Summer98 Issue 112. But thesubstance of its omnipotence was unlimited and remained in a stateof latency. On thecontrary. In order to adjudicate between theopposing claims of a sovereign state and a free civil society andharmonize their interests. Only this would shore up andstrengthen the power and authority of the state. enemies and the political. p.securing the state'sautonomy and independence. BH The argument expounded in this book seeks to define the scopeand assumptions of Schmitt's theory of the state and the constitution and the pivotal task it addressed . 193). the exercise of state sovereignty was juridically ordained and was thus limited.104 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon A2 Totalitarian Schmitt’s alternative does not embody totalitarian regimes. [Renato. At one point during the Weimar republic. at no point of his intellectual development did Schmitt espouse such a totalitarian view. received his Ph. A strong state. did not imply canceling civil society's own independence.” Telos. The friend/enemy criterion defines a particular form of life. Schmitt's theoretical position requires a prior substantive commitment to relations of "friendship" and social solidarity. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. While some might not be surprised that Schmitt put his intellectual powers in the service of the Nazi Party when it came to power. between the substance and the exercise of sovereignty. rests on an almost Hegelian understanding of the individual's relation to the community and one's own mortality. In particular. developedby medieval philosophers like D'Ailly and Gerson (Schmitt. p68.
dk/handle/1800/2068. January. 54.ruc. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .105 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Destroys Debate Schmitt’s emphasis on depoliticization is a de-democratization that destroys debate because it precludes movements from bringing people to the streets Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.D. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Of Aarhus Denmark]. p. http://rudar. Ph. BH .
106 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Friendship Bad The reason to engage in friendship is purely selfish in that engagement in friendship is only for one’s own personal benefit. Issue 2.. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . . AN. Rockefeller College Review. Spring). Volume1. or to benefit the state Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.
The next day he completeda commentary on that piece of legislation which he then sent tobe published in the Deutscbe juristen-Zeitung. This Revolutionary action had cancelled the effects of the German revolution of 1918. of which one cannot find traces in any of hisearlier writings. After cautiously observing the turn of events hemade his move immediately after 24 March. Professor in department of Philosophy. soonfound their Kronjurist was dispensable. p. In November 1933. and in June 1934. forexample. however. Wilfred Laurier University] Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism.Nazi Turn Schmitt’s arguments contributed to the rise of the Nazi party Cristi 1998.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .107 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff . In 1936 Schmitt lost-much of what he had gained politically and his ideas were no longer seriously considered by the Nazi authorities. There he interpreted the enabling act as having somehow activated the notionof constituent power or pouvoir constituant. he was appointed Director of the Association ofCierman National Socialist jurists. the day the enablingact was promulgated by the Reichstag. . their Anti-Semitism. This began on 1 April. 8-9. he became The editor of the Deutsche juristen-Zeitung.n strengthening the party than in strengthening the state. Unforgivably. Schmitt's initial reaction was of dismay at realizing Schleicher'spolitical failure. Installed asregime's Kronjurist.9 which meant that the Weimar constitution had been formally superseded. BH When the Nazis rose to power at the end of January 1933. he soon climbed to prominent positions Within the government and his profession. who showed more interest.scarcely two months after Hitler's rise to power. he alsobegan to adopt the most despicable aspect of Nazi doctrine. The Nazis had attained in a few days what Schmitt had strived to defend during Weimar: a strong state. [Renato. The Nazis. TheNazi regime acknowledged the great service Schmitt had rendered immediately invited his collaboration.
108 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff . p68. it is alleged. As Martin Jay puts it. with only one consistent commitment --to the irrational. enemies and the political. understand. in the political identification of the existential enemy." with the aim of overturning the vapid bourgeois order. and they are valued only insofar as they allow for success in the resulting war. Insofar as rights are defined and guaranteed by law.e. "the hated other [is] needed to create the solidarity of the homogeneous self. and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. since Schmitt stresses the decision's role in the most extreme case. As he puts it: "Only the actual participants can correctly recognize.Nihilism Turn Schmitt’s politics is nihilistic – it glorifies violence and reduces friendship to a common will to destroy the enemy Norris 1998 [Andrew."(n2) The bellicose nihilism this suggests is often seen as a causal factor in Schmitt's own active participation in the Nazi movement in the 1930s. received his Ph. and the true criterion of the political is the enemy."(n5) .. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence. is opportunistic. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University. i. BH The main complaint: against this formulation is familiar enough: Schmitt allegedly emphasizes the limitations of law only to glorify the decision that exceeds the regulation of any law. war. politics for Schmitt is a matter of conflict and war. Who one's political "friends" are is determined only in the encounter with the enemy.D. from the University of California at Berkeley] “Carl Schmitt on friends. This is found to be all the more distressing.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .(n4) In the end. His political theory.(n3) The result is a glorification of violence. Summer98 Issue 112. Schmitt's existential concept of the political makes these rights vulnerable to unregulated political decision. Thus Richard Wolin claims that the central roles played in Schmitt's political theory by the political decision and the threat of war are both motivated by a "vitalism" and a "politics of authenticity.” Telos.
109 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Perm Perm: do both. . AN. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Spring). Volume1.. Rockefeller College Review. Issue 2. pass plan in order to recognize the enemy Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.
p. so we should use the combination of the two alternatives because there are limits to both – get the best of both worlds Thorup 2006 [Mikkel.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . January.ruc.D. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism.dk/handle/1800/2068.110 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Perm – A combination of liberalism and non-liberalist regimes is best to maintain the power of the sovereign – the impacts of the kritik are inevitable. BH . 90-92. Of Aarhus Denmark]. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. Ph. http://rudar.
Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .111 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon .
yet not be given unchecked political power. One passage seems to imply that a fortified democratic egalitarianism would spur even higher forms of creativity (BGE 242). but context is everything.244). but overlaps between the spheres show that Nietzsche's authoritarianism is weakened by his own philosophical orientation. . and that democratic political life [End Page 141] can exhibit certain creative. from Fordham University.438 and KSA 10.a combination of democracy and the politics of Schmitt is net beneficial.dk/handle/1800/2068. Such an interpretive outcome might be satisfying. BH Perm: agonism and democratic politics can overlap to allow for more creativeity.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . 96-97. A restricted agon might be appropriate for the arts. but not by reasserting democratic traditions. neither system works on it’s own – the perm is net beneficial because it ensures the legitimacy as a result of the people Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. Hateb.. and agonistic elements to a degree that may warrant calling it Nietzschean enough to support a democratic appropriation of Nietzsche (thus answering Appel's challenge). Of Aarhus Denmark]. much of democratic politics.ruc. So the distinction between cultural and political spheres allows us to challenge some of Nietzsche's political vision.D. but I would not want to establish it by separating the cultural and political spheres. even constitutive of. The context of political practices and milieus is such that artistic genius seems out of place. which would be consistent with Nietzsche's overall agonistics. let's say. January. 2002 (Lawrence J. Nietzschean cultural creators could simply coexist with a democratic polity. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni. but by showing that much of Nietzsche's cultural and philosophical outlook is compatible with. p. the established norm. and dissatisfaction with. even be given some honor. "Prospects for a Democratic Argon.D.112 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Perm . Ph. In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. in the sense that part of creativity is a resistance to. Some of Nietzsche's own remarks suggest as much (see HAH I. why we can still be Nietzcheans") Perhaps one could argue for a coexistence of a Nietzschean cultural elite and a democratic egalitarian politics. p. http://rudar. as some would be happy to do in order to either preserve democratic ideals from Nietzsche's critique or rescue Nietzsche from reprobation by sidestepping his frightful political remarks or decoding them as simply metaphors for self-creation. Ph. I think that Nietzsche's attack on democracy ought to be challenged. nonegalitarian.
Issue 2. Volume1.. He only talks about the possibility conflict and the formation of friend/enemy groups Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander. . AN. Spring).113 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Aff – Schmitt Dumb Schmitt never concedes that conflict and the friend/enemy relationship is inevitable. Rockefeller College Review. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt .
Moral philosophers are preoccupied with justice. it does not demand annihilation. Schmitt wrote that every realm of human endeavor is structured by an irreducible duality. But you do have to be prepared to vanquish him if necessary. even short of war. Issue 30. War is the most violent form that politics takes. http://chronicle. Chronicle of Higher Education: The Chronicle Review. “A Fascist Philosopher Helps Us Understand Contemporary Politics” Volume 50.114 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon War Turn Politics is centered around the idea of friends and enemies. Page B16. the core distinction is between friend and enemy. Wolfe 2004.com/weekly/v50/i30/30b01601. and economics with the profitable and unprofitable. making it the most extreme source of friction that will eventually lead to war.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . In politics. politics still requires that you treat your opposition as antagonistic to everything in which you believe. AN In The Concept of the Political. [Alan. It's not personal. but it is incompatible with the life-or-death stakes politics always involves. That is what makes politics different from everything else. . Economic exchange requires only competition. but.htm. Morality is concerned with good and evil. director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life and professor of political science at Boston College. Not so politics. Jesus's call to love your enemy is perfectly appropriate for religion. "The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism. but politics has nothing to do with making the world fairer.] April 2. you don't have to hate your enemy." Schmitt wrote. aesthetics with the beautiful and ugly.
AN. Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will.. . Volume1. Issue 2.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . Spring). Rockefeller College Review.115 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon Although war is not the purpose of politics. it is the most extreme result of friction between friends and enemies Valk in 2002 (Frank Vander.
116 - Melodious/Brooklyn/Mormon FYI: Difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship Thorup 2006 [Mikkel. BH .dk/handle/1800/2068.ruc. Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas @ Uni.D.Wyoming Forensics Institute 2007 Schmitt . In Defence of Enmity – Critique of Liberal Globalism. Of Aarhus Denmark]. p. Ph. 50-51. http://rudar. January.
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