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THE LOOPHOLE IN OUR DEMOCRACY
KENYA STATES OBAMA BORN IN KENYA
NEVER VETTED BY PAMELA BARNETT
N O T N A T U R A L B O R N
ABOVE THE LAW?
HAWAII OFFICIAL “THERE IS NO BIRTH CERTIFICATE.”
B O R N B R I T I S H
BY PAMELA BARNETT
“I cannot think of any other subject in recent American history that has been so mired in controversy, so factually misrepresented, mischaracterized and so misunderstood than the matter of the eligibility of Barack Hussein OBAMA II to hold the ofﬁce of President of the United States. Despite its importance, the topic has been summarily dismissed as fodder for conspiracy theorists by many, while others insist that the question of OBAMA’s citizenship has been “asked and answered.” But has it really been answered, and if not, why not?”
Douglas J. Hagmann, Director of the Northeast Intelligence Network
“….how could a young man born here in Kenya, who is not even a native American become the President of America?“
James Orengo, The Kenyan Minister for Lands (3/25/2010)
BY PAMELA BARNETT
“There is no birth certiﬁcate (for Barack Obama in Hawaii). It’s like an open secret. There isn’t one. Everyone in the government there knows this.“
Tim Adams, Senior Elections Clerk for City and County of Honolulu in 2008
OBAMA ELIGIBILITY VETTING No Yes ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ ❒ CONGRESS ELECTORS COURTS FEC OPM FBI MEDIA
INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
First of all, the Constitutional eligibility of Barack Hussein Obama is not a political issue but a very important legal issue that affects all facets of the United States government. If you have not read the prologue please do so for background on the motivation of this book. This chapter defines the legal term NATURAL BORN CITIZEN and explains how Barack Hussein Obama is not one. It is required under the U.S. Constitution to be a Natural Born Citizen to be a lawful President and Commander in Chief. Consequently, Obama is usurping the Constitution and is operating above the law, and courts and Congress continue to fail to remove him from the White House as required under the Constitution. The word “Natural” is capitalized and underlined to bring attention to it, because a Natural Born citizen is different than a “born” citizen by law. As the reader will see in the Never Vetted Chapter most Congressmen ignore the legal term “Natural” when referring to Article II, Section 1, Clause 5. Natural Law is a legal theory that the founders prescribed to when drafting the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. According to the American Heritage Dictionary “natural law is a law or body of laws that derives from nature and is believed to be binding upon human actions apart from or in conjunction with laws established by human authority”. The Oxford Dictionary of Politics states that Natural Law has “rules of conduct determined by reflection upon human nature, the natural conditions of human existence, or the requirements of human flourishing.” For example, under natural law a son would inherit the rights and privileges of his father without having to have a man-made law to declare this. Natural laws are the unwritten laws of nature, and the divine, and therefore are immutable. A son would also naturally have allegiance to his father and to his father’s allegiances. “They (the Founders) understood that natural allegiance or allegiance by birth did not depend upon boundaries or place but rather upon parentage. Id. at 364. They also understood that “as long as the parents continue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship.” Id. at 365. Finally, the Founders understood that even though a child may be born on U.S. soil, if he was born of a British father, the Crown of England owed that child the same protection that it owed the father. Id. at 370-71.
Even if Obama was born in Hawaii with an American citizen mother, Obama is naturally not a Natural Born Citizen, because he was born with his father’s allegiance to another country other than the United States. Obama’s father was a British citizen and was a resident of Kenya when he was born. Natural born requires sole allegiance at birth to the United States and it requires no written law because it is what comes natural - the child’s citizenship comes from parents and place and there is no question to what country that child belongs to, or to what country would have the child’s allegiance. No other country has claim to a U.S. Natural Born Citizen child. Therefore, because the legal definition of 'natural born Citizen' comes from Nature, it cannot be changed: not by the legislature, and not by the courts. Proof that the founders prescribed to Natural Law exists in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. The Declaration of Independence in the first paragraph states the following – “When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.” The Constitution Article I, Section 9 cites the Law of Nations which was a book by Emmerich de Vattel and a natural law legal theory that outlined natural law between nations “To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations;” (Law of Nations is
Capitalized in the original text of the U.S. Constitution.)
The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations by Emmerich de Vattel a renowned 18th century law expert, defines Natural Born Citizen as (in the original French) “Les naturels, ou indigenes, sont ceux qui sont nes dans le pays de parents citoyens,” meaning the naturally born or indigenes (natives) are those born in the country of citizen parents. Both the Framers and later English translators of Vattel's treatise used the words "natural born
citizen" instead of "natives or indigenes”. Mario Apuzzo Esq., expands upon this in his Essay “The Natural Born Citizen Clause of Our U.S. Constitution Requires that Both of the Child’s Parents Be U.S. Citizens At the Time of Birth,” which appears later in this chapter.
THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE NATURAL BORN CITIZEN REQUIREMENT
The Natural Born Citizen Clause is the strongest, most reliable way to ensure that the President and Commander in Chief has no allegiances to foreign nations, and that his/her sole allegiance will help ensure the preservation of the Constitution and the United States of America. A president with foreign allegiances would not soley have the United State’s best interest at heart. A man cannot serve two masters without taking from one to give to the other. The following is the Presidential Oath – "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The founders, most of them British born subjects, were particularly sensitive to the subject of allegiance as they had fought Britain for their freedom to establish a new nation. Just a citizen through naturalization or other law was not enough security for the nation, so they opted for the mergence of being born in the United States with both parents being U.S. citizens. The founders, even though many of them born in the American colonies before gaining their U.S.citizenship by virtue of the Declaration of Independence, knew that they were not Natural Born Citizens because all of them were born with foreign allegiances. This is why they had to create the Grandfather Clause in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, because none of the founders were Natural Born Citizens of the United States. This is additional proof that to be a Natural Born Citizen of the U.S. you cannot be born with foreign citizenship/allegiances. The first 7 presidents were all born in areas of America that would become the United States. Imagine a son born to a foreign terrorist father in NY… The Natural Born Citizen requirement ensures
the survivability of the United States and its Constitution by helping to shield it from dangerous foreign influences like the aforementioned example. The President of the United States, the position of highest power in this country, controls the nuclear football and the U.S. military. America’s founders gave us the greatest protection from foreign influence by inserting the Natural Born Citizen Requirement in the Constitution. However, this protection is only effective if it is enforced. There have been five attempts to change the meaning of Natural Born Citizen since 2001. (This information is available at end
Introduction of the Natural Born Citizenship Clause to the U.S. Constitution
John Jay, the first Supreme Court Chief Justice of the United States, supported the Natural Born Citizen presidential requirement in a letter to George Washington the country’s first President and the then presiding officer of the Constitutional Convention. (Letter and letter transcription next 3
Jay wrote,“Permit me to hint whether it would not be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of foreigners into the administration of our national government ; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on any but a natural born citizen.”
FATHER OF NATURAL BORN CITIZEN CLAUSE
Honorable John Jay, First Chief Justice of the U.S.
(Scanned copy of original letter from The Library of Congress.)
John Jay’s Letter to George Washington
John Jay Letter to General George Washington
Both Jay and Washington were well read on Vattel’s Law of Nations and his definition of Natural Born Citizen (natives in its abbreviated form), which requires two citizen parents and being born in the country. In April 2010 the NY Library reported that George Washington never returned his copy of the Law of Nations by Vattel. The timing of this find is very serendipitous to the fact that Obama, a British Born citizen, is ruling from the White House. See excerpt below.
George Washington's $300,000 library fine
(The Telegraph) Librarians in New York's oldest library have discovered that George Washington, the first president of the United States, has an unpaid fine of $300,000 (£195,000). “The former president (George Wasington), who died in December 1799, borrowed two books from what was then the only library in Manhattan – "Law of Nations," a dissertation on international relations, and a volume of debate transcripts from Britain's House of Commons.” In another letter from Jay to Washington in 1790 he states – “… comprized within two Classes vizt cases of urgent necessity, and cases of convenience—The present case belongs to the latter. Vattel who well understood the Subject, says in the 7th chapter of his 3d Book— That an innocent Passage is due to all Nations with whom a State is at Peace, and that this …”
U.S. Man-made Laws (Not Natural Law) Regarding Citizenship, Natural Born Citizenship, and Actions Required By Congress Against A Usurper The U.S. Constitution
The following Sections and Amendments of the U.S. Constitution contain the Natural Born Citizen clause of Article II, Section 1, as well as what shall happen if the President has an ”inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office” or the President elect “fails to qualify”. The 14th Amendment has questionably been interpreted to give citizenship to all children born within the United States regardless of parent’s citizenship (not just the slaves who the Amendment was originally intended for), but it does NOT mention the legal term Natural Born Citizen. The author specifically mentions this Amendment because Congressmen and Women, including Senator Diane Feinstein herald the 14th Amendment as a reason Barack Hussein Obama is qualified to be President under the Natural Born Citizen Clause even though this Amendment and no other Amendments or sections mention the term except in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5..
Article II, Section 1, Clause 5
“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President”
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6
“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”
20th Amendment, Section 3
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
14TH Amendment, Section 1
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Important Note: The legal term Natural Born does not appear in this amendment.
Quotes from Author of 14th Amendment
“Every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen., (Cong. Globe, 39th, 1st Sess., 1291 (1866) And… “As to the question of citizenship I am willing to resolve all doubts in favor of a citizen of the United States. That Dr. Houard is a natural-born citizen of the United States there is not room for the shadow of a doubt. He was born of naturalized parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, and by the express words of the Constitution, as amended to-day, he is declared to all the world to be a citizen of the United States by birth.” - Rep. John A. Bingham The first Congress of the United States defined Natural Born Citizen, but the next Congress replaced the law and natural born citizen was not mentioned.
“and the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens; Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descent to persons whose fathers have never been a resident in the United States:”
Three Legal Essays on Natural Born Citizen Two early 19th Century and One Recent Essay
Essay I - 2008 By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
The following essay “The Natural Born Citizen Clause of Our U.S. Constitution Requires that Both of the Child’s Parents Be U.S. Citizens At the Time of Birth” was written by Mario Apuzzo, Esq., the attorney representing the plaintiffs of Commander Charles Kerchner et al v. Barack Hussein Obama, U.S. Congress, et al which was not given a hearing on the merits on whether Barack Hussein Obama is a Natural Born Citizen as required to be President of the United States. Apuzzo was not alone in
having his case rejected by the courts, as more than 70 other lawsuits were thrown out of court without a fair hearing or discovery allowed – mostly on the issues of lack of standing, jurisdiction and political question. (List of Lawsuits available in Citizen Action Chapter.) In the interest of full disclosure, the author had assisted in gathering some of the research that may have been used by Apuzzo. This essay is printed here with his full permission. Apuzzo has many essays on Natural Born Citizen located at his blog apuzo1.blogspot.com and at scribd.com. Apuzzo has practiced law for close to 30 years. He graduated from Temple University School of Law in Philadelphia with his J.D. in 1982 and from McGeorge School of Law (University of the Pacific, Sacramento, CA) with a Post-Graduate Degree in Advanced International Legal Studies. He continues his advanced studies in the European civil law system at the University of Naples. Apuzzo founded his general practice law firm in 1983 in New Jersey. He engages in trial and appellate work in the state and federal court systems. For more information about Apuzzo and his involvement with the Kerchner et al v. Obama lawsuit go to www.thepostemail.com for an indepth interview.
The Natural Born Citizen Clause of Our U.S. Constitution Requires that Both of the Child’s Parents Be U.S. Citizens At the Time of Birth
The purpose of this essay is to show that one United States citizen parent is not enough to bestow “natural born Citizen” status upon a child. When interpreting the Constitution, we must decide whether we will look to the document as an original and static one whose meaning has already been established at a given time by the People and its Framers or one that is living and which can be changed over any given time by a court of law. See the address of Justice Antonin Scalia to the 2008 Annual National Lawyers Convention on November 22, 2008, at the Mayflower Hotel, in Washington, D.C. (http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/pubid.1193/pub_detail.asp. (advocates originalism rather than living constitutionalism).
I submit that Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause has a fixed and knowable meaning which was established at the time of its drafting and should therefore be interpreted through the eyes of the original Framers that drafted and ratified the clause so as to determine what they intended the clause to mean (original intent theory). I also submit that we should interpret the “natural born Citizen” clause in a way that reasonable persons living at the time of its adoption would have declared the ordinary meaning of the text to be (original meaning theory). This is not living constitutionalism but rather originalism or textualism as applied to interpreting the Constitution. It is this latter approach that I will utilize in this article. E. Vattel stated in 1758, as translated into English in 1797: "The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see, whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country." E. Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law, Sec. 212 Citizens and natives. In Footnote 1 at the end of Sec. 212, Vattel stated that “as a general rule” the child inherits his father’s citizenship, or his mother’s but only if she is not married. The first thing that we have to understand about what Vattel wrote is that he made a distinction between a “citizen” and a “natural born Citizen.” A citizen is simply a member of the civil society who is bound to the society
by certain duties and subject to its authority. “Citizens” also participate equally in all the advantages the society has to offer. On the other hand, a “natural born Citizen” means much more than just “citizen.” Vattel required that for a child to be a “natural born citizen,” or what he called in French in his 1758 first edition of The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law, les naturels, ou indigenes (the “natives or indigines”-The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814)), the child must be born in the country to both parents who are also citizens of the same country. In the original French, Vattel wrote: "Les naturels, ou indigenes, sont ceux qui sont nes dans le pays de parents citoyens,” meaning the "natives or indigines" are those born in the country of citizen parents. Both the Framers and later English translators of Vattel's treatise replaced the words"natural born Citizen" for the words "natives or indigenes." From Madison's notes, we see that there were some delegates who were concerned about foreigners. For example, from Max Farrand's transcripts of Madison's notes (August 9 and August 13, 1787), there is the following concerning the House of Representatives eligibility requirements: "Mr. Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might be confined to Natives." The word "native" occurs multiple times in the notes for these two days. (The phrase "natural born citizen" was not used here by the delegates.). The word "native" was a synonym for the phrase "natural born citizen." The delegates had already used the term “natural born citizen” when proposing the requirements for President, Vice President, and either House of Congress and later used the word “natives” when referring to eligibility requirements for the House of Representative. There is further evidence of this in at least three works: Blackstone's "Commentaries on the Laws of England" (see Book the First: The Rights of Persons; Chapter the Tenth: Of People, Whether Aliens, Denizens or Natives.), translations of Quintilian's "Institutio Oratoria", and the 1797 English edition of Vattel's "The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law." In the beginning of his definition, Vattel required that the children be born of “parents” who are citizens. The use of the word “parents” refers to both mother and father. If he required only one parent such as the father, he would have said “of fathers who are citizens” and not “of parents who are citizens.” He did later refer to “fathers,” but only because wives automatically acquired the citizenship of their husbands the same way
children did. Hence, if Vattel meant to focus only on “fathers,” he would have used “fathers” throughout his definition and never mentioned “parents” when he first defined “natural born Citizen,” for there would not have been any need to use the word “parents” when “fathers” would have sufficed. Hence, Vattel would have focused on the citizenship of the father since that citizenship would determine that of both the mother and child. It is also noteworthy that Vattel had no problem allowing the child to inherit the citizenship of the mother when the mother was not married to the child’s father. Given that Vattel in effect really focused on the citizenship of both the child’s father and mother in defining a “natural born Citizen,” Vattel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen” does not violate the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053; 150 L.Ed.2d 115 (2001). There is other evidence in his treatise that shows that Vattel meant to refer to both the child’s mother and father in his definition of a “natural born citizen.” When defining what a country is in Section 122, he stated the “term signifies the state, or even more particularly the town or place, where our parents had their fixed residence at the moment of our birth…. A man ought to preserve gratitude and affection for the state to which he is indebted for his education, and of which his parents were members when they gave him birth….” In commenting on the citizenship status of children born at sea at Section 216, he stated that a child born abroad a foreign vessel that is docked in a port belonging to their own nation is reputed born in the country, provided “she [the mother] and her husband have not quitted their native country to settle elsewhere.” In commenting upon vagrants in Section 219 he stated: “Vagrants are people who have no settlement. Consequently those born of vagrant parents have no country, since a man’s country is the place where, at the time of his birth, his parents had their settlement (Section 122), or it is the state of which his father was then a member…” Given that Vattel in effect really focused on the citizenship of both the child’s father and mother in defining a “natural born Citizen,” Vattel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen” does not violate the equal
protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053; 150 L.Ed.2d 115 (2001). There is also United States Supreme Court support for the position that Vattel's “Parents” meant mother and father. In the case of Dred Scott, Justice Daniel in his concurring opinion substituted the word “parent” for “father” and “parents” for “fathers.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). Historically, we have always treated the citizenship of the husband and wife as being merged in the husband. Historically, a women's citizenship merged into that of her husband upon marriage. Thomas Franck wrote: “[I]n domestic law a woman had been, until the 19th century, a ‘femme couverte,’ incapable of acquiring rights in her own name…” T.M. Franck, Individuals, Groups and States as Rights Holders in International Law, In Canadian Council on International Law, The Impact of International Law on the Practice of Law in Canada-Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 15-17, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 62, 64. See also K. Knop, Feminist Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 Transna’l L. & Contemporary Pr. 293, 323-328 (1993). “[I]n every country, except where the English law prevails, the nationality of a woman on marriage merges in that of her husband, she loses her own nationality and acquires his.” Cockburn, Nationality 24 (1869). On matters of a married woman’s citizenship, we did not follow the English law. Rather we followed the “Continental private international law.” Secretary Sherman, in an instruction to the United States Minister at St. Petersburg, March 15, 1897; Foreign Relations, 1901, 443. The rule that the wife followed the condition of her huband was carried into our own naturalization laws, wherein citizenship could be derived from a marital and child relationship. Historically, a number of U.S. laws have provided for the automatic naturalization of children or wives (not husbands) of naturalized U.S. citizens. In some periods of our history, these laws provided that married women derived citizenship from their husband and had no control over their status. Under the Act of 10 February 1855, a woman automatically became an American upon marrying a U.S. citizen or
following the naturalization of her foreign husband. Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 496 (1868). Further, Section 3 of the Citizenship Act of 1907, which would have confirmed the general rule prevailing at the time, provided that any American woman who married a foreigner took the nationality of her husband. Indeed, our Supreme Court in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) upheld the constitutionality of the Citizenship Act of 1907 which provided “[t]hat any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband….” The Court applied this rule to an American woman born in California and held that she lost her American citizenship and took on his citizenship when she married a “native and subject of the kingdom of Great Britain.” The Court said that “the identity of the husband and wife is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence, and is still retained notwithstanding relaxation thereof.” The Court said that the husband and wife merge their identity, with dominance given to the husband. It said that the rule is dictated not only by domestic policy but more importantly by international policy. The Court added that Congress has such power to make such a rule as part of its power to deal with international relations with other countries and to keep the United States out of embarrassments and controversies with other nations. Id. at 311-12. “Until September 22, 1922, the status of the wife depended upon that of her husband, and therefore the children acquired their citizenship from the same source as had been theretofore existent under the common law.” In re Citizenship Status of Minor Children Where Mother Alone Becomes Citizen Through Naturalization, 25 F.2d 210 (D.C.N.J. 1928). The rule for woman finally changed with the 1922 Cable Act which established that a woman’s marriage to an alien no longer automatically stripped her of her citizenship. See FAM 1200 Appendix E, Loss of Nationality of Married Women Under the Act of 1907 and Successor Statutes (provides a full discussion on the status of women marrying aliens). On the rule that the wife’s citizenship automatically merged into that of her husband, it is also noteworthy that Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 (48 Stat. 797) permitted the transmission of citizenship only by U.S. citizen fathers until it was amended prospectively on May 24, 1934, to permit transmission by U.S. citizen mothers. (The similar rights of women
were also addressed by the 1994 amendment to section 301 INA (see 7 FAM 1133.2-1).) The Framers were very familiar with William Blackstone. We can also see in the writings of Blackstone that the allegiance of both parents to the King was needed to avoid dual allegiance in the child. Blackstone wrote: "When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The common law indeed stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that a particular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, for the naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles. And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two masters, at once. Yet the children of the king's embassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by his father, the embassador. To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute 25 Edw. III. st. 2. that all children born abroad, provided both their parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the king, and the mother had passed the seas by her husband's consent, might inherit as if born in England: and accordingly it hath been so adjudged in behalf of merchants. But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king's ligeance, whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes, without any exception; unless their said fathers were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or were then in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain (emphais in the original)." William Blackstone, Commentaries 1:354, 357--58, 361-62 (1765). We can see that even the English Parliament gave importance to a child having both parents be “in the allegiance of the king,” which under English common law meant the parents would have been “natural born subjects.” By having both parents be “natural born subjects,” the child would not have
been born with any other conflicting allegiance other than the one that attached from the foreign soil. Parliament was willing to live with any allegiance attaching to the child from the foreign soil but not with any that may attach by descent from one of the parents, the latter one being by nature a much more stronger one. It was only later in time that the rule was made less restrictive and allowed for just the father to be a “natural born subject.” There is historical evidence that the Founders also borrowed heavily from the Dutch when making the new nation. During the revolutionary period Dutch law provided for citizenship by jus sanguinis. There is considerable evidence that the Framers were also influenced by the citizenship law of Holland. “The American colonists had become familiar with the rights of citizenship possessed in other countries, both from the fact that some of them resided in Holland for a time, before they came to America, and from the further fact that the New York colony was essentially Dutch in its original settlement and government.” John S. Wise, A Treatise on American Citizenship (1906). In Holland, “[c]itizenship could be acquired in several ways. Probably the most common was birth. Some towns accepted everyone as citizen who was baptized in a local church. But more commonly it was required that one’s parents were citizens too. . . .” R. Po-chia Hsia & Henk F. K. van Nierop, Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age 161(2002). “One’s parents” would necessarily included one’s mother and father. This Dutch law is consistent with Vattel’s definition of what is a “natural born citizen.” Apart from the heavy Dutch influence upon the Founders, when the Framers drafted the Constitution, they relied heavily upon Vattel to guide them. Citizenship was a topic that affected U.S. relations with other nations. Given that citizenship affects "the behavior of nation states with each other" (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Founders would have looked to the law of nations to define it for the purposes of the new nation. The law of nations definition on citizenship also gave uniformity to the subject area, which the Framers wanted to achieve for citizenship laws as they did for naturalization laws. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 36 (Wheat) (1824). They would therefore have referred to and accepted Vattel's law of nations definition to give meaning to what an Article II “natural born Citizen” was.
The meaning of a “natural born Citizen” as expressed by Vattel, including that both parents of the child must be citizens at the time of the child’s birth in order to make the child a “natural born Citizen,” was carried forward in American history following the Founding. The standard provided by Vattel has not changed in our jurisprudence and is still valid today as it was during the Founding. Also, the Fourteenth Amendment has not changed the meaning of a “natural born Citizen.” Legislative activity by the early Congresses provides insight into the question of whether Vattel required one or two parents to be citizens. There are Congressional acts that were passed after the Constitution was adopted that give us insight into what the Framers of the Constitution meant by “natural born Citizen.” The 1790 First Congress, which included twenty members who had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention eight of whom were members of the Committee of Eleven that drafted the “natural born Citizen” clause, passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 (1 Stat.103,104) which provided that “And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.” This phrasing followed the literal terms of British statutes, beginning in 1350, under which persons born abroad, whose parents were both British subjects, would enjoy the same rights of inheritance as those born in England; beginning with laws in 1709 and 1731, these statutes expressly provided that such persons were naturalborn subjects of the crown.” The Naturalization Act of 1790 declared these children to be "natural born Citizens," but only retrospectively. See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927). It is interesting to note that George Washington was president of the Constitutional Convention and President of the United States when this bill became law and if he had disagreed with the two U.S. citizen-parent requirement, he could have vetoed this bill. One would then at first think that this legislation strongly suggests that the Framers of the Constitution understood this phrase to refer to citizenship acquired from both of the child’s parents at birth, regardless of whether or not that birth had taken place in the United States. This statute shows what role the parents played in the minds of the early founders.
While only retrospectively, the First Congress was willing to declare a child born out of the United States to two United States parents a “natural born Citizen.” This was not consistent with what Vattel wrote in The Law of Nations of Principles of Natural Law, at Sec. 215. Children of citizens, born in a foreign country, where he declared these children just “citizens” and not “natural born citizens”: "It is asked, whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens? By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights (Sec. 212); the place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him; I say 'of itself,' for civil or political laws may, for particular reasons, ordain otherwise. . . .” (emphasis supplied). Clearly, Vattel addressed the question of whether these children are “citizens,” not “natural born citizen.” He does not address the question of whether they are “natural born citizens” because according to his own definition, a child had to be born “in the country” in order to be a “natural born citizen.” Being born abroad and therefore not “in the country,” such a child could not be a “natural born citizen.” Vattel did did state that there was an exception to the "in the country" rule for children born abroad to citizen parents who were serving the armies of the state or in government service, for he considered these children to be "reputed born in the country." Vattel, Sec. 217. In this connection and as an aside which applies to the question of whether Senator McCain is an Article II “natural born Citizen,” it should be noted that according to Vattel, being physically born out of the country did not necessarily mean that one was not born “in the country.” Vattel explained that if a child was born “in the armies of the state,” that child was “reputed born in the country; for a citizen, who is absent with his family on the service of the state, but still dependent on it, and subject to its jurisdiction, cannot be considered as having quitted its territory.” Vattel, Sec. 217. Since this child would have been born in the foreign “armies of the state,” he would normally not be granted citizenship in the country in which he was physically born. Additionally, the country on whose soil the child might be born might adhere to a jus sanguinis system of conferring citizenship (meaning that born on its soil alone would not confer citizenship and therefore allegiance and loyalty on the child). Being born under those conditions, this child would therefore be born with sole allegiance to the
country of his parents and would qualify as a “natural born citizen” of that country. While the 1790 act naturalized all "persons" and so included women, it also declared that "the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States...." This prevented the automatic grant of citizenship to children born abroad whose mother, but not father, had resided in the United States. Citizenship was inherited exclusively through the father. As we have seen above, Congress did not remove the inequity until 1934. This focus on the father as the source of citizenship (but not meaning that the status of the mother was not considered) is consistent with what Vattel wrote in Section 212 of The Law of Nations. This is further evidence that the Framers relied upon Vattel in defining citizenship for the new Republic. In 1795 the Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1795 which removed the words “natural born” from the term “natural born citizen” and thereby just left “citizens” as the status to be given to children born out of the United States. The fact that the 1790 Act as written was short lived and was only retrospective shows that Congress just wanted to make certain persons born abroad during the early years of the Republic “natural born Citizen” so that they could be eligible to be President. This sort of special allowance was comparable to the grandfather clause of Article II which allowed a “citizen” to be President provided that he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution which the Framers in 1790 knew occurred in 1789. It seems that the Third Congress passed this amendment to the 1790 Act to clarify for those living at that time who was and who was not a “natural born Citizen” per the Framers intent at that time, since the 1790 Act had introduced confusion into that subject regarding the use of those special words as found in Article II. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 714 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (statute “passed out of abundant caution to obviate misunderstandings” about the citizenship status of foreign-born children of Americans). It is again important to note that George Washington was also President in 1795, making him aware of this change by the Third Congress. If he disagreed with the clarification and change in the wording in the new 1795 Act, he would have vetoed it. The 1790 and 1795 Acts are contemporaneous
evidence of who the Framers meant to include as “natural born Citizens.” Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 Yale L.J. 881 (1988). Subsequent Supreme Court cases have stated that in interpreting the Constitution, we must look to the common law that the Framers accepted at the time of the Founding. There is strong historical evidence that the Framers in constituting the new Constitutional Republic rejected the English common law and accepted the new federal common law which emanated from the law of nations. On this subject, see my article included at this blog entitled, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law as U.S. Federal Common Law Not English Common Law Define What an Article II Natural Born Citizen Is. Indeed, as we will see below, our Supreme Court adopted that definition when defining a “natural born Citizen” and thereby incorporated it into U.S. federal common law. The definition and two-parent requirement has been reiterated by the Supreme Court and other courts in the cases of The Venus, 12U.S. 253(1814), Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830), Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) , Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 582 (C.C.W.D. Ark 1879), United States v. Ward, 42 F. 320 (1890); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), and Ludlam, Excutrix, & c., v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863). It has also been confirmed by renowned legislators, including Senator Trumbull, the author of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and Representative John A. Bingham, the architect of the 14th Amendment to our Constitution. In the case of The Venus 12 U.S. 253, 289 (1814), Justice John Marshall said: "Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says 'The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.'”
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), did not directly deal with Article II "natural born Citizen." But there are parts of the Dred Scott decision that are relevant to the question of what is a “natural born Citizen.” The case clearly defined “natural born citizen.” While as repugnant as slavery was and still is, no court or amendment has over turned the meaning of “natural born citizen” from Dred Scott. The main point is that in deciding what a "citizen" was in 1857, both the majority and dissent went back to 1787 to examine what the Framers and the people of that time considered a "citizen" to be. The Court said that the Constitution must be understood now as it was understood at the time it was written. The judges did not disagree that one had to look back to the Founding Fathers. What they disagreed on is what the public opinion was at that time as to whether a freed slave was a citizen. In this regard, we know that the case was overruled by the Thirteenth Amendment. As to the “natural born Citizen” clause, the Court said: "The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights. Again: I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. . . ." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 476-77 (1857). As can be seen from the quoted language, the Court actually removed from the Vattel’s definition the reference to “fathers” and “father” and replaced it with “parents” and “person,” thus showing that it is not just one parent (the father) that needs to be a citizen, but the “parents,” i.e., both mother and father. Also, both Vattel and the Court stated that “if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.” The controlling language is “a foreigner.” In the English language, the letter “a” is an indefinite article meaning one. Hence, the use of the word “a” shows that only one is required. We know that a child has both a mother and father and the “a” would necessarily refer to either the mother or father. Surely, if the child were born of one parent who was not a
citizen, he would be “born there of a foreigner,” who would be either his foreign mother or father. As can be seen, it is our United States Supreme Court that has made this reading and interpretation of Vattel. This understanding of Vattel is not only correct but also binding upon us. Chief Justice Waite, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), stated: "The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first." Here we can see that the U.S. Supreme Court in all three of these cases adopted Vattel’s definition of what a “natural born Citizen” is, and specifically repeated his two U.S.-parent test. Dred Scott even removed the word “father” and replaced it with the word “parents.” The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Act of April 9, 1866) first established a national law that provided: “All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.” Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866 (14 Stat. 27). Not being subject to a foreign power includes being free from any political and military obligations to any other nation and not owing any other nation direct and immediate allegiance and loyalty. The primary author of this Act was Senator Trumbull who said it was his intention “to make citizens of everybody born in the United States who owe allegiance to the United States.” Additionally, he added if a “negro or white man belonged to a foreign Government he would not be a citizen.” In order for this requirement to be satisfied, clearly both parents of the child must be U.S. citizens, for if one is not, the child would inherit the foreign allegiance and loyalty of foreign parent and would thereby “belong to a foreign Government.” Rep. John A. Bingham, who later became the chief architect of the 14th Amendment's first section, in commenting upon Section 1992 of the Civil Rights Act, said
that the Act was “simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen” (emphasis supplied). Rep. Bingham said “parents.” He did not say “one parent” or “a mother or father.” Now let us turn to the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Trumbull, when commenting on that Amendment declared: “The provision is, that ‘all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.’ That means ‘subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.’ What do we mean by ‘complete jurisdiction thereof?’ Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means.” Sen. Howard added: “the word jurisdiction, as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.” On May 30, 1866, Senator Howard continued: "This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Govern- of the United States, but will include every other class of persons." Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, May 30, 1866, P. 2890, col. 2. Again, only if the both parents of the child were citizens at the time of birth could the child be subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States, not owe allegiance to any foreign power, and not be a person “born in the United States who are foreigners [or aliens].” There then followed Supreme Court cases that discussed citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. In The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873), in discussing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause said: “[t]he phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and
citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.” Even the dissenting opinion affirmed that the citizenship clause was designed to assure that all persons born within the United States were both citizens of the United States and the state in which they resided, provided they were not at the time of birth subjects of any foreign power. Again, only if both parents of the child were citizens at the time of birth could the child not be considered a citizen or subject of a foreign State born within the United States, be subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States, and not be subject to any foreign power. In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), the Supreme Court specifically addressed what is meant by “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” and held: "The persons declared to be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired." Only if the child’s both parents were citizens at the time of birth could the child be “completely subject to their [U.S.] political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), did not address what an Article II “natural born Citizen” is as it applies to presidential eligibility. Rather, the Supreme Court there gave a new, divergent, and incorrect interpretation of the “subject to the jurisdiction” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and vetoed the will of the People and their Legislature to declare Wong a U.S. “citizen of the United States” under the unique circumstances of that case. While the case did approvingly cite Minor v. Happersett, since the case only dealt with what is a Fourteenth Amendment “citizen of the United States,” the holding of the case cannot be used to define what the Founders meant by Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause.
While Justice Gray was correct in stating that it was public law that defined national citizenship, he was not correct in defining that law with reference to the English common law. Justice Gray went to great lengths to tell us what the English common law was during the colonies on the question of citizenship. But he failed to show that the Founders and Framers adopted that law to define the national citizenship in the new Constitutional Republic. Wong Kim Ark is the only United States Supreme Court case that up to that time relied upon English common law to define U.S. national citizenship. While he provided evidence that the English common law continued to be applied by the States to resolve local issues, Justice Gray provided no evidence that our public law used the English common law to define national citizenship. Indeed, the Court in Wong Kim Ark was misled by British authority that applied only during the colonial period. What the Court did through its decision and by relying on English common law is create a class of born “Citizens of the United States” who are born in the United States who are not necessarily eligible to be President because they are not born to a citizen mother and father. But regardless of whether the Court erred in relying on English common law to define a “citizen of the United States,” the decision did not change the meaning of an Article II “natural born Citizen,” for the case’s holding only defined what a “citizen of the United States” is under the Fourteenth Amendment and in the decision the Court also cited Minor and quoted its passage which included Vattel’s definition of what a “natural born Citizen” is. Justice Antonin Scalia, during his address to the 2008 Annual National Lawyers Convention on November 22, 2008, at the Mayflower Hotel, in Washington, D.C., gave three reasons in ascending order (the last being the most compelling) which would serve justification for overturning a prior case: how wrong was it, i.e., was it blatantly and malicious improperly decided ; how well has the public accepted the case; and did the decision cast the Court as a policy maker rather than an interpreter of the law. Given that the Wong Court did not give Congress and the Executive the wide deference that they deserve in exercising its immigration and naturalization powers (Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053; 150 L.Ed.2d 115 (2001) and the Scalia factors, the Wong decision is a prime candidate for reversal.
We have seen that the citizenship status of the parents of a child determines whether that child is born a “natural born Citizen.” Why should we want the child’s parents to be citizens? Alexander Hamilton explained what happens to a person when he or she becomes a citizen of the country: "But there is a wide difference between closing the door altogether and throwing it entirely open; between a postponement of fourteen years, and an immediate admission to all the rights of citizenship. Some reasonable term ought to be allowed to enable aliens to get rid of foreign and acquire American attachments; to learn the principles and imbibe the spirit of our government; and to admit of a probability at least, of their feeling a real interest in our affairs. A residence of not less than five years ought to be required. " Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, (Federal Edition), vol. 8 > EXAMINATION OF JEFFERSON’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 7, 1801 1 > paragraph 827. Additionally, the development in the formative years of a child’s minority of a relationship between citizen parents and their child is essential to the child’s ties and allegiance to the United States. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S.Ct. 2053; 150 L.Ed.2d 115 (2001) (addressing the importance of the tie between a child and his U.S. citizen father before the child’s 18th birthday as a crucial ingredient in the child attaching and owing allegiance to the United States and that the U.S. government has a “profound” important interest and objective in promoting that link; showing that a child must meet all statutory preconditions [would also mean constitutional requirements] no matter how much one may deem them to be unfair or onerous in order to be bestowed U.S. citizenship). But we have seen that United States Supreme Court case law, the early 1790 and 1795 Naturalization Acts, legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of the 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment all conclusively show that Vattel was understood to say that both parents had to be citizens in order for a child to be a “natural born Citizen.” The Founders, our Supreme Court, Congress, and framers of the Fourteenth Amendment all adopted Vattel’s Law of Nations definition and two-parent requirement and made it part of Article II, United States citizenship federal common law, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively. Obama is missing one of the two necessary natural conditions needed to make one a “natural born Citizen.” He would satisfy the birth-in-the-country
requirement. But he would be missing the two-U.S.-citizen-parent requirement to be an Article II “natural born Citizen.” Obama would be missing unity of citizenship and allegiance at birth which is necessary to be a “natural born Citizen.” One who meets the definition of a “natural born Citizen” is considered to have been born with sole and absolute allegiance to the United States and not owing allegiance by birth to any foreign state. Obama’s mother was probably a “natural born Citizen.” But because his father was a British subject/citizen and never a “Citizen of the United States” and Obama himself was a British subject/citizen” at the time of his birth, he was born with dual allegiances rather than just one to the United States. Therefore, Obama is not and cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” because of his father's and his birth allegiance to Great Britain. That his mother was a United States citizen does not in any way alter that reality bestowed upon Obama by nature at the moment of his birth. Obama still acquired a complete and natural allegiance to Great Britain at the time of his birth. In other words, at birth he was as much a British subject/citizen as he was an American citizen, assuming he was born in Hawaii. His mother’s United States citizenship did not and could not change that. It also would not make sense to allow just one United States citizen parent to be sufficient to bestow "natural born Citizen" status on a child, for each parent has just as much influence as the other in creating in the child attachment to a nation. The purpose of Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause is to exclude foreign influence from the Office of President and Commander in Chief. It “cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments . . .” Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3:Sec 1472-73 (1833). Remember that Vattel said that if a child is born on a nation's soil to a non-citizen father (meaning parents), that place "will be only the place of his birth, and not his country." Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause looks only to the moment of birth and not thereafter. This interpretation is consistent with Jay’s underlining the word “born” in his 1787 letter to General (later President) Washington.
In other words, to meet that special Presidential eligibility requirement, one must be born a “natural born Citizen” and cannot acquire that status later in life. Under the British Nationality Act 1948, when Obama was born in 1961 his father was a British subject/citizen and Obama himself was a British subject/citizen by descent from his father. Under the British Nationality Act 1981, today Obama can still be a British Overseas Citizen (BOC). See my April 7, 2009 article on this topic at this blog entitled, Obama, the President of the U.S., Is Currently Also a British Citizen. Hence, when Obama was born he failed to meet the two-U.S.-citizen-parent test which caused him to be born subject to a foreign power. See my article at this blog entitled, Being Born Subject to a Foreign Power, Obama Cannot be President and Military Commander. It is inescapable that Obama is not and cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” and is therefore not eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. Obama’s current citizenship status is the same as that which the Framers and Founders had during the Constitutional Convention. If he was born in Hawaii (which he has yet to conclusively proven), he is a “Citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment just as they were under natural law and the law of nations. And he is not a “natural born Citizen” as they also were not. Like a naturalized citizen who is not a “natural born Citizen” and therefore not eligible to be President, the Framers and Founders were born subject to a foreign power as was Obama. Being born subject to a foreign power, both the original Founders and Obama qualify as “citizens of the United States” but not as “natural born Citizens.” But the difference between Obama and the original Founders is that Obama cannot take advantage of Article II’s grandfather clause to make him eligible to be President. Obama is therefore not eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military.
By Breckinridge Long, 1916
Breckenridge Long, a lifelong Democrat that helped to elect Woodrow Wilson and was later appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt as an Ambassador to Italy and as an Assistant Secretary of State, wrote this in response to Charles Evans Hughes running against Woodrow Wilson for President of the United States in 1916.
From the CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, Vol. 146-148, pp. 220-222.
IS MR. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES A “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION?
A Legal Examination of the Subject by Breckinridge Long, of the St. Louis Bar. Whether Mr. Hughes is, or is not, a “natural born” citizen within the meaning of the Constitution, so as to make him eligible or ineligible, to assume the office of President, presents an interesting inquiry. He was born in this country and is beyond question “native born.” But is there not a distinction between “native born” and “natural born”? At the time he was born his father and mother were subjects of England. His father had not then been naturalized. The day after Mr. Hughes was born his father had a right, as an English subject, to go to the British consul, at New York, and to present his wife and infant and to claim any assistance he might need from the consul as the representative of the English government. If war had broken out between this government and England this government would have had a right to interne the father, the mother and the son as subjects of an enemy power. The Constitution of the United States puts a particular qualification upon those who shall become President and Vice-President. For all other offices it requires that they be “citizens of the United States,” but for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency it requires that they be “Natural Born citizens.” The
word “natural” means “of the nature of”; “naturally a part of”; “by the laws of nature an integral part of” a system. Following that line of thought, a “natural born” citizen would be one who was naturally, at his birth, a member of the political society; naturally, a part of the political system into which he was born; by the laws of nature a citizen of the society into which he was born. It would mean, further, that no other government had any claim upon him; that his sole allegiance was to the government into which he had been born and that that government was solely, at the time, responsible for his protection. “Native born” does not mean quite the same thing. He might be born in a country under conditions similar to the conditions under which Mr. Hughes was born, and subsequently become a citizen of that Country. In that case, after he became a citizen, he would be a “native born” citizen, but he would not have been a “natural born” citizen. From the instant of his birth this government would not be solely responsible for his protection. Mr. Hughes was born before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, so the status of his citizenship must be considered as under the laws existing prior to the time of the adoption of that Amendment. The only reference in the Constitution to the subject (except that Section specifying the qualifications for President) is that Congress shall have the power to make uniform laws to provide for naturalization. Congress under that authority enacted the following law: “The children of persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United States, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof.” That Statute says that children born of persons who have been duly naturalized become citizens, but become so by virtue of the act of the parent. That is, they become naturalized citizens. They are citizens by operation of law. They were not born so, but, because of the act of their father, are invested with all the rights of citizens. If they are born in this country and their father subsequently becomes naturalized, they then, upon the naturalization of the father, become citizens. After becoming citizens they are “native born” citizens; but they are not “natural born citizens.” That is, they are not born, in the nature of things and by the laws of nature, a citizen of this Republic.
If the father becomes naturalized before the birth of the child and is at the time of the birth of the child a citizen of the United States, then the child is a “natural born” citizen. But in the case of Mr. Hughes the father was not naturalized at the time the son was born, and was at that time a subject of England. How could the son be a “natural born” citizen of the United States? If you had been born in England of American parents, would it be necessary for you to be naturalized if you came to this country to reside? No. If he, born in this country of English parents, had returned to England to reside, would it have been necessary for him to be naturalized there? No. If it was not necessary for him to be naturalized in England, would he be a “natural born citizen” of the United States? The Statute above referred to announced the law of this country to be that the children of persons who should be naturalized became citizens by virtue of the act of their father. And obversely, that they were not to be considered as citizens until their father was naturalized. “…The naturalization of the father operates to confer the municipal right of citizenship upon the minor child…” (Secretary Blaine, February 1st, 1890.) It is admitted that the legal status of the child, under the circumstances we have to deal with, is not explicitly defined by the Statutes. But any question which the reading of the Statute does not clear up is elucidated and illuminated by the courts (113 U.S. Supreme Court 94 infra) and by official documents written by men in authority and vested with the administration of the law. In this connection it will be pertinent to make a few illusions to the recommendations made to Congress urging them to clarify the situation. President Arthur, in his Fourth Annual Message, in 1884, said: “Our existing naturalization laws also need revision. * * * Section 2172, recognizing the citizenship of the children of naturalized parents, is ambiguous in its terms* * *. “An uniform rule of naturalization, such as the Constitution contemplates, should, among other things, clearly define the status of persons born within the United States subject to a foreign power and of minor children of fathers who have declared their intention to become citizens* * *.”
President Cleveland, in his First Annual Message, in 1885, said: “The laws of certain states and territories admit a domiciled alien to the local franchise conferring upon him the rights of citizenship to a degree which places him in the anomalous condition of being a citizen of a state and yet not of the United States within the purview of Federal and International law.” The United States Supreme Court has said: “The existing provisions leave much to be desired and the attention of Congress has been called to the condition of the laws with reference to the election of nationality; and to the desirability of a clear definition of the status of minor children whose fathers had declared their intention to become citizens * * *.” (143 U.S. 178.) Again the United States Supreme Court says, in the same case: “clearly minors acquire an inchoate status by the declaration of intention on the part of their parents. If they attain their majority before the parent completes his naturalization, then they have an election to repudiate the status which they find impressed upon them, and determine that they will accept allegiance to some foreign potentate or power rather than hold fast to some citizenship which the act of the parent has initiated for them.” These opinions indicate where the doubt and uncertainty may be. On the other hand, Willoughby, in his work on the Constitution (Vol. I, page 283), makes the positive statement that: “The naturalization of a father operates as a naturalization of his minor child, if they are dwelling in the United States. We find the positive declaration of the court that the “citizenship of the father is that of his child.” (1 Ruling Case Law, 796.) There is no dispute on the facts that the father in 1862 was an English subject. There can hardly be, under the law just quoted, any dispute that Mr. Hughes was at the time of his birth an English subject. If he was at that time an English subject, he became a citizen of the United States by a process of naturalization, and is not a “natural born” citizen of the United States. He became a citizen by virtue of the subsequent act of his father. He became a citizen by operation of law, but he was not at the instant of birth, by right and of the nature of things, a “natural born” citizen of the United States.
And, Willoughby, further on, says: “A declaration of a father of an intention to become naturalized gives to his children, who attain their majority before their father’s naturalization is complete, an inchoate citizenship which, upon majority, may be repudiated.” These point clearly to the fact that the child of un-naturalized parents is an alien and that he becomes a citizen by virtue of the subsequent act of the father. That is, that the child is a naturalized citizen; that he becomes a citizen by operation of law and that he is not a “natural born” citizen within the meaning of the Constitution. It might be supposed that the Statute above quoted applies to children born in foreign countries and brought to the United States by the father. A careful reading of the Statute will permit of no such discrimination and, directly on that point, is a document written by Mr. Fish, when Secretary of State, under date of February 11th , 1874, in answer to an official inquiry. The document reads as follows: “The laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization provide, in relation to persons situated as your sons are ‘that the children of persons duly naturalized under any law of the United States * * * being under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of their parents being so naturalized, or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States.’ Assuming that your three sons were born in France * * * accompanied you to this country and have continued to reside here, they, together with your son born here, are, under the provisions just cited, to be considered, when dwelling in the United States, citizens of the United States. * * *” It will be noted that the eminent Secretary of State not only drew no distinction between the children born abroad and the child born here, but that he included all together in the same category and as to be considered, when dwelling in the United States, as citizens of the United States. What would happen if they did not dwell within the United States? What would happen if the father took them back to the country from which he emigrated? Under the Statute, and under the opinion just cited interpreting the Statute, they would, in that case, not be citizens of the United States; and if they were not to be considered citizens of the United States, when they left the boundaries of the United States, how could they be “natural born” citizens of the United States who would owe allegiance to no other
power and who would have a right to the protection of this Government no matter where they might find themselves? The Supreme Court of the United States has construed that Statute and the Constitution, and has passed directly on the point in issue. It has said that one born of alien parents in the territorial limits of the United States is not a “natural born citizen” within the meaning of the presidential qualification clause and, further, said that “such (persons) not being citizens can only become citizens * * * by being naturalized in the United States.” (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94.) Such naturalization can be accomplished by the son on his own account or through the subsequent act of the parent. Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State, in an official document to the United States Minister to Germany, again, under date of February 1st, 1890, construed the law pointing out the status of the child if it left the United States. The facts in that case were as follows: A husband and wife, both natives of Prussia, came to the United States. A son was born in the State of Pennsylvania six months before the naturalization of the father. Later the father died and the mother returned to Germany, taking her son with her, and they were residing in Germany at the time of the inquiry. While in Germany, that Government made some claim upon the son for military service, and a ruling was requested from the Secretary of State. Mr. Secretary Blaine wrote as follows: “’The words, ‘if dwelling in the United States,’ whether meaning residence at a particular moment or contemplating a settled abode, apply to Carl Heisinger, who, being now nineteen years of age, has for about eleven years been dwelling in Germany. It is not known that the government of that country has made any claims upon him. But, if the German Government should, under a provision of law similar to that in force in the United States in relation to the foreign-born children of citizens, seek to exact from him the performance of obligations as a natural-born subject, the Department would be bound to consider the provisions of Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes.” Mr. Blaine’s reference to Section 2172 of the Revised Statutes means that this Government would recognize that child as a citizen of the United States if he lived in the United States, but would not recognize him as a citizen of this country if he lived in Germany. Was that boy “a natural born” citizen of the United States? If he was, then why would not the government
of the United States recognize him as a citizen of the United States whether he were in Germany, England or China? The only conclusion is that he was not a “natural born” citizen of the United States; that some other government beside that of the United States had some claim upon his allegiance; that he was not exclusively and by operation of the laws of nature a citizen of the United States. The boy that Mr. Blaine referred to in the above quotation was not only born in this country but born to a male parent who had not only expressed his desire to become an American citizen, but who had proceeded to perfect his naturalization and who actually was naturalized six months subsequent to the birth of the child. The rulings under the statute hold that the child became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his father, but that his citizenship during his minority, was only inchoate and that if he continued to reside in the United States he would be recognized as a citizen of the United States (not a “natural born” citizen) but that if he went to Germany he would not be, by our Government, considered one of its citizens. How does this case differ from that of Mr. Hughes except in this: that Mr. Hughes and his parents continued to reside in this country? Their domicile affected his citizenship. Had they taken him back to England, he would not have been considered by the government of the United States as a citizen of the United States. The mere circumstances that he continued to live here, and, upon the attainment of his majority, to exercise his political rights perfected the inchoate citizenship which he inherited by the naturalization of his father. Only from the time of the actual naturalization of his father was he considered to be a citizen of the United States, and only upon the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did he actually become a citizen of the United States. But what was the status of that boy at the time of his birth, and immediately following his birth? The government of England might have exercised jurisdiction over him. That government had some claim which, under certain conditions, it might have exercised. Had he been a “natural born” citizen of the United States, no government on earth, but that of the United States, would have had any claim upon his allegiance. The law of England at the time of his birth was “once an Englishman, always an Englishman.” Not until 1872 did England change that law. It must be admitted that a man born on this soil, of alien parents, enjoys a dual nationality and owes a double allegiance. A child born under these conditions has a right to elect what nationality he will enjoy and to which of
the two conflicting claims of governmental allegiance he will pay obedience. Now if, by any possible construction, a person at the instant of birth, and for any period of time thereafter, owes, or may owe, allegiance to any sovereign but the United States, he is not a “natural born” citizen of the United States. If his sole duty is not to the United States Government, to the exclusion of all other governments, then, he is not a “natural born” citizen of the United States. The doctrines of dual citizenship and of double allegiance are too well known and too well founded in international law to be doubted or disputed. “The doctrine of ‘Election’ necessarily implies the existence of a double allegiance. This condition naturally arises where a person is born in one country to a father who is a citizen of another country. By rules of municipal law, which generally prevail, such a person has citizenships by birth—(1) citizenship by virtue of the place of birth (jure soli) and (2) citizenship by right of blood (jure sanguinis) i.e., by virtue of the father’s nationality. Unless this be so, the child on attaining his majority has nothing to elect.” (Moore, International Law Digest, III, 524-525.) The subject of double allegiance and dual citizenship is a well recognized doctrine of international law, and one with which all nations have to deal. The question has been presented many times and in many different ways to the government of the United States. That it has taken official cognizance of the existence of double allegiance is not only not questioned, but is too well known to need references. It may, however, be elucidated by citing a few of the instances. An application was made for a passport for a youth of seventeen, whose father desired to send him to Germany as a student. Mr. Freslinghuysen, then Secretary of State, in regard to him, wrote the following: “The young man referred to, under the Constitution of the United States, having been born in this country, is, while subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, a citizen of the United States, notwithstanding the fact of his father being an alien. As such citizen he is entitled to a passport. This, of course, would be a sufficient protection to him in every other country but that of his father’s origin—Germany. There, of course, as the son of a German subject, it may be claimed that he is subject to German military law, and that, not being
then subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, he cannot claim the rights secured to him, etc.” (Moore, International Law Digest, III., 532.) That young man had a divided allegiance. A double allegiance necessarily implies a divided allegiance. His allegiance is not exclusively to one country or to one flag, and a man born with a double allegiance cannot be a “natural born” American. Again, Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, held that: “While a person born in the United States, though of alien parents, is by the laws thereof a citizen, yet, should he be taken by his parents while a minor to the country of which they are subjects, he becomes amenable to the laws of that country and subject to a claim of allegiance thereunder jure sanguinis.” On this ground the Department of State refused to issue a passport for the protection of a minor, born in the United States, whose parents proposed to return with him “for a brief period” to the country (Russia) of which they were subjects. (March 9th, 1893.) How could the government of the United States refuse the issuance of a passport to a “natural born” citizen under those circumstances? That child was not considered a “natural born” citizen of this country, and yet his parents proposed to return with him to the country from which they had emigrated only “for a brief period.” In 1866 a son was born in the State of Massachusetts to a father who was a Frenchman. In 1885, he, the parent, went back to France with his family, including his son, then nineteen years of age. Two years later the son was notified to perform military duty and, on failing to respond, was arrested and imprisoned. He appealed to the government of the United States, through the American Ambassador in France. Mr. Bayard, the Secretary of State at that time, instructed the American Embassy to use “its good offices” to obtain the young man’s release from military service, but added: “You will, however, advise him that his remaining in France after he becomes of age may be regarded as an election of French nationality and that his only method of electing and maintaining American nationality is by a prompt return to this country.” (December 28th, 1887.) All these young men were born in the United States, but had the right to elect whether they should be a citizen of a foreign country or a citizen of this
country. If they had the right to elect to which government they would pay allegiance, they were not exclusively the subjects of this country; they were not “natural born”citizens of this country. Again, a citizen of Prussia immigrated to the United States and had a son born to him. Later he returned to Germany, with his family, including the son. On reaching the military age, the son was called upon by the German government to perform military duty. The father invoked the intervention of the American Legation at Berlin. In that case it was held that the son, being a minor, acquired, under the laws of Germany, the nationality of his father, but did not thereby lose his right to claim American nationality, and that, upon attaining his majority, the son might, at his own election, return and take the nationality of the place of his birth, or remain in Germany. But that, during his minority and while domiciled with his father in Germany, he must submit himself to the claim of military duty on the part of the German Government. (Edwards Pierrepont, Attorney-General, and U.S. Grant, 15 Op. 15.) The only difference in the case of Mr. Hughes and in the case of the subject above examined, is that Mr. Hughes’ father did not take him back to England. But if he had, the English Government would have had a claim upon him, which they might have exercised, and if the English Government did have a claim upon him, then the United States did not have exclusive jurisdiction over him and he did not owe to the United States exclusive allegiance and he was not a “natural born” citizen within the meaning of the Constitution because he was not naturally a part of the Government under the jurisdiction of which he happened to be born. Particularly is this so in view of the declaration of Mr. Porter, Acting Secretary of State, under date of September 14th, 1885, when he says: “By the law of nations an infant child partakes of his father’s nationality and domicile.” It is not disputed that Mr. Hughes is not a citizen of the United States, but if he had the right to elect, he must have had something to choose between. He was native born because he was born in this country, and he is now a native born citizen because he is now a citizen of this country; but, had he been a “natural born” citizen, he would not have had the right to choose between this country and England; he would have had nothing to choose between; he would have owed his sole allegiance to the government of the United States, and there would have been no possible question,
whether he found himself in the United States or in any other country in the world, that he would be called upon to show allegiance to any Government but that of the United States. That it was the intention of the men who framed the Constitution to provide that no person should be President except those who were naturally a part of this government can hardly be doubted by an examination of documents contemporary with the framing of the Constitution. It was originally proposed in the Constitutional Convention that the presidential qualifications be a “citizen of the United States.” It was so reported to the Convention, by the Committee which had it in charge, on the 22nd day of August, 1787. It was again referred to a Committee, and the qualification clause was changed to read “natural born citizen,” and was so reported out of Committee on September the 4th, 1787, and adopted in the Constitution. There is no record of debates upon the subject, but the Federalist contains a contemporary comment on it written by Alexander Hamilton. It reads: “Nothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of Republican government, might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union?” (Federalist, LXVIII.) The interpretation of their position, as expressed in the Federalist, is corroborated by Mr. Story, in his work on the Constitution, in the following words: “It is indispensable, too, that the president should be a natural born citizen of the United States * * * . The general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common cases, will scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman. It cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the most serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe.” (Story on the Constitution, Vol. 2, page 353-54.) Of course, these articles are not used with the idea of suggesting that Mr. Hughes’ affiliations and sympathies and present allegiance are to any government but to that of the United States. Any such idea is disclaimed.
They are used, however, to show the reason that underlay the constitutional provision requiring a person to be a “natural born” citizen if he would assume the presidency of the United States. If, with full knowledge of the meaning of the phrase “natural born,” the framers of the Constitution used those words to express a certain idea and to necessitate a certain qualification, then their meaning is the law of the land. That they did use them is undoubted; that they knew what they were writing hardly seems possible to doubt, in view of the contemporary expressions on the subject and the actual change in the phraseology of the proposed constitution. The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Federalist, Story, the eminent commentator on the Constitution, all agree that only a “natural born citizen” should ever become President of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States, several Presidents of the United States, numerous Secretaries of State and an Attorney-General, each vested with authority in connection with the law, have commented upon and interpreted the only existing statute in such words as to disqualify from the presidency a person born under such circumstances as surround Mr. Hughes’ birth on the ground that he is not a “natural born citizen” of the United States. Take one more authority. In view of the military draft proposed in 1862, on account of the Civil War, under the head of “aliens,” it was declared by the government at Washington that the following persons were exempt from draft for military service in the armies of the United States: (1) All foreign born persons who have not been naturalized; (2) All persons born of foreign parents and who have not become citizens. (Papers relating to foreign affairs, 1862, p. 283.) The very year Mr. Hughes was born, the government to which he now pays allegiance officially recognized that it had not the right to call his father to defend the flag and that it had not the right to call him to defend the flag. The government he now aspires to preside over classed him under the general head of “Aliens” the year he was born and drew a line of distinction between him and “natural born citizens”—between him and those to whom it owed protection and from whom it had a right to claim protection. Is Mr. Hughes a “natural born citizen” of the United States?
Essay III By Alexander Porter Morse, 1904
Alexander Porter Morse was an attorney in the late 1800’s, early 1900’s that wrote the Treatise On Citizenship By Birth and By Naturalization in 1881.
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES: ELIGIBILITY FOR THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT
By ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., March, 19o4 (ALBANY LAW JOURNAL VOL. 66 (1904-1905) As a wide-spread interest attaches to the discussion of the meaning and scope of the constitutional provision in respect to eligibility for the office of president of the United States, I submit some views in this relation which may be opportune. The question is often asked: Are children of citizens of the United States born at sea or in foreign territory, other than the offspring of American ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary, natural-born citizens of the United States, within the purview of the constitutional provision? After some consideration of the history of the times, of the relation of the provision to the subject-matter and of the acts of congress relating to citizenship, it seems clear to the undersigned that such persons are natural-born, that is, citizens by origin; and that, if otherwise qualified, they are eligible to the office of president. In respect to the citizenship of children of American parentage, wherever born, the principle of jus sanguinis seems to be the American principle; that is to say, the law of hereditary, rather than territorial allegiance, is recognized, which is modern, as distinguished from the ancient, and at one time, common-law principle of jus soli. If the provision was as sometimes inaccurately cited, namely, that the president must be “a native-born citizen,” there might be no question as to its meaning. But the framers generally used precise language; and the etymology actually employed makes the meaning definite.
Its correspondent in English law, “natural-born subject,” appears in constitutional history and parliamentary enactments; and there it includes all children born out of the king’s allegiance whose fathers were natural-born subjects; and the children of such children (i. e., children whose grandfathers by the father’s side were natural-born subjects), though their mothers were aliens, are now deemed to be natural-born subjects themselves to all intents and purposes, unless their said ancestors were attainted or banished beyond sea for high treason, or were at the birth of such children in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, immigration was anticipated and provisions for naturalization would immediately follow the establishment of the government. Those resident in the United States at the time the Constitution was adopted were made citizens. Thereafter the president must be taken from the natural-born citizens. If it was intended that anybody who was a citizen by birth should be eligible, it would only have been necessary to say, “no person, except a native-born citizen”; but the framers thought it wise, in view of the probable influx of European immigration, to provide that the president should at least be the child of citizen(s) owing allegiance to the United States at the time of his birth. It may be observed in passing that the current phrase “native-born citizen” is well understood; but it is pleonasm and should be discarded; and the correct designation, “ native citizen” should be substituted in all constitutional and statutory enactments, in judicial decisions and in legal discussions where accuracy and precise language are essential to intelligent discussion. The earliest act of congress to establish a uniform rule of naturalization (March 26, 1790) contained the following clause: “And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born at sea or out of the United States, shall be considered as natural-born citizens.” The draft of this act has been credited to Mr. Jefferson, although his authorship has been questioned; and his reputed relationship to it may be ascribed to the fact that he was the author of the original naturalization acts in the Constitution of Virginia, and was an ardent supporter of a wise system of naturalization laws before and after he became President. But whoever drew the act followed closely the various parliamentary statutes of Great Britain; and its language in this relation indicates that the first congress entertained and declared the opinion that children of American parentage, wherever born, were within the constitutional designation, “natural-born citizens.” The act is declaratory; but the reason that such children are natural born remains; that is, their
American citizenship is natural—the result of parentage—and is not artificial or acquired by compliance with legislative requirements. The second act of naturalization (January 29, 1795), which was reported and probably drawn by Mr. Madison, chairman of a select House committee, enacted “That the children of persons duly naturalized dwelling within the United States, and being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization, and the children of citizens of the United States born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States shall be considered as citizens of the United States.” As carried forward in the Revised Statutes, the provision reads: “All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.” This provision, as its terms express, is declaratory; it is not the statute that constitutes children of American parentage citizens; it is the fact of American descent, the jus sanguinis, that makes them citizens at the moment of birth—a fact which, for sufficient and convenient reasons, the legislative power of the State recognizes and announces to the world. If there was ambiguity, the rights and privileges of children of American parents dependent upon constitutional guarantee would demand recognition; and constitutional guaranties in favor of such persons might not be restricted or denied by congress. To return to the constitutional requirement in respect to eligibility for the office of president, let us inquire what was the obvious purpose and intent of the limitation? Plainly, it was inserted in order to exclude “aliens” by birth and blood from that high office, upon considerations which naturally had much weight at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It was scarcely intended to bar the children of American parentage, whether born at sea or in foreign territory. Where it was said in the old books that an alien is one born out of the king’s or State’s dominions or allegiance, this must be of the limits understood with some restrictions. A forced or restricted construction of the constitutional phrase under consideration would be out of harmony with ‘modern conceptions of political status, and might produce startling results. It remains to be decided whether
a child of domiciled Chinese parents, born in the United States, is eligible, if otherwise qualified, to the office of president and to all the privileges of the Constitution. And it would be a strange conclusion, in another aspect, if the child of American parents, born in China, should be denied correspondent rights and privileges in the United States. A natural-born citizen has been defined as one whose citizenship is established by the jurisdiction which the United States already has over the parents of the child, not what is thereafter acquired by choice of residence in this country. Our conclusion is that the child of citizen(s) of the United States, wherever born, is “a natural-born citizen of the United States,” within the constitutional requirement; and, as such, if possessed of the other qualifications, would be eligible for the office of president of the United States. WASHINGTON, D.C., March, 19o4 (Underling and Parenthesis are Author’s Emphasis.)
HISTORICAL ADHERENCE TO THE NATURAL BORN REQUIREMENT History proves the past adherence to Natural Born being defined as born within the United States to two American Citizen parents. The following research was gathered by CMD Charles Kerchner, USN Retired. Only two Presidents have not met the Constitutional definition of natural born: Barack Obama and Chester Arthur. Chester Arthur hid the fact that his father was not an American citizen when he was born. In fact, he had all of his records burned before he died. Barack Obama has no birth marker because there has been no proof given to where exactly he was born, and he is not natural born because his father was British. Therefore, Obama is a Usurper, a de facto president.
U.S. PRESIDENTS ‐ Natural Born Citizen, Grandfather Clause or Usurper*?
Only Obama and Chester Arthur did NOT meet the legal definition of Natural Born Citizen: Born in the Jurisdiction of the U.S. to two American Citizen Parents
Research Done by Commander Charles Kerchner, USN Retired
(Citizen at Child's Birth) # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Name George Washington John Adams Thomas Jefferson James Madison James Munroe John Quincy Adams Andrew Jackson Martn Van Buren Wiilliam Henry Harrison John Tyler James K. Polk Zachary Taylor Millard Fillmore Franklin Pierce James Buchanan Abraham Lincoln Andrew Johnson Ulysses S. Grant Rutherford B. Hayes James Garfield Chester A. Arthur Grover Cleveland Benjamin Harrison Grover Cleveland William McKinley Theodore Roosevelt William Howard Taft Woodrow Wilson Harden G. Harding Calving Coolidge Birth Eligibility GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC Usurper** NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC Father Citizen N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Mother Citizen N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Born in U.S.A VA MA VA VA VA MA Carolinas NY VA VA NC VA NY NY PA KY NC OH OH OH VT NJ OH NJ OH NY OH VA OH VT Birth Marker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Name Herbert Hoover Franklin D. Roosevelt Harry S. Truman Dwight D. Eisenhower John F. Kennedy Lyndon B. Johnson Richard M. Nixon James Carter Ronald Reagan George H. W. Bush William J. Clinton George W. Bush Barack Hussein Obama TBD
Birth Eligibility NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC NBC Usurper** * TBD
(Citizen at Child's Birth) Father Mother Citizen Citizen Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Born in U.S.A IA NY MO TX MA TX CA GA IL MA AR CT HI
Birth Marker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
*Usurper = Does not meet the Natural Born Citizen requirement of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution. ** Chester Arthur like Obama was a British citizen at birth and created a circus around where he was born to detract from the non‐citizen father issue. With the media at his side and his race card ammunition, Obama unlike Arthur took the chance that no one would challenge his admission father. Arthur lied about his family history and had all of his records burned before he died. His fraud was first publicized in 2008 by Leo Donofrio, Esq. For more on Chester Arthur's Fraud ‐ www.naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com Source documents: Eligible. Mr. Chester A. Arthur to the Office of Vice President, Brooklyn Eagle, Aug. 15, 1880, at http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.org and http://naturalborncitizen.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/william‐arthur‐naturalization.pdf ***According to Obama, his father was a British citizen of Kenya when he was born.
Kerchner's original report can be found here http://www.scribd.com/doc/48856102/. Other
Natural Born research and information on Kerchner et al v. Obama can be found at www.protectourliberty.org. At www.americanpresidents.org all presidential birth places and markers can be verified except Obama's.
WHAT IS/WAS NOT FOUND REGARDING NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP
Like all of Obama’s vital records, a definition of natural born citizen cannot be found to legitimize his Constitutional eligibility. The author as well as many other researchers have not been able to find a U.S. court ruling or historical reference that defines a natural born citizen as a person born on American soil to a foreign citizen father and an America citizen mother or vice versa. There is no court ruling to declare a dual citizen to be a Natural Born Citizen. However, American case law repeatedly shows an American natural born citizen to be a person born within the United States to two American citizen parents. Barack Hussein Obama purports that his father was Barack Hussein Obama, a citizen of Britain that was born and lived in Kenya. Under the British Nationality Act Obama was born with British citizenship. He then became Kenyan in 1962 when Kenya became an independent nation.
FactCheck.org Clarifies Barack’s Citizenship
“When Barack Obama Jr. was born on Aug. 4,1961, in Honolulu, Kenya was a British colony, still part of the United Kingdom’s dwindling empire. As a Kenyan native, Barack Obama Sr. was a British subject whose citizenship status was governed by The British Nationality Act of 1948. That same act governed the status of Obama Sr.‘s children. Obama’s admission from FighttheSmears.com, the DNC website.
Based on the Essays presented in this book and on the 14th Amendment, if Obama was born in Hawaii as he claims, he only meets two of the three requirements of being a natural born citizen. FighttheSmears.com website (below) claims that Obama is a native, but does not state Obama is a Natural Born Citizen. Historically, jurors have used the abbreviated term of native for Natural Born Citizen as is demonstrated under Famous Juror’s Quotes. Interesting also to note is that he is referred to as a “Junior” when on his online Hawaii certification of live birth he is clearly referred to as “II”.
Just recently Obama put a picture of his current passport that has the name Barack Hussein Obama – no “Junior” no “II”. Obama has other verifiable aliases as well: Soebarkah and Barry Soetoro. What’s his legal name now? When was it changed?
According to Obama’s past attorney registration with Illinois, he swore that he was only known as “Barack Hussein Obama”. A complaint was made and Obama voluntarily retired his law license in Illinois. Surrendering licenses stops investigations by Bar Associations. See next page.
The 14th Amendment was used by many Congressmen for their reason to state Obama is a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN (See Chapter 3 Never Vetted). The 14th Amendment has been interpreted by courts that “within the jurisdiction” includes the physical jurisdiction (jus soli) and jurisdiction through the blood line (jus sanguinis). This Amendment created “born” citizens. A baby born to one American parent not within the physical jurisdiction of the United States still can
become a “born” U.S. citizen. By excluding “natural born citizen” from the 14th Amendment, Congress tells you that you need more than just being born on American soil or being born to one American parent overseas to be a Natural Born Citizen. Another conclusion is clear, a natural born citizen has NEVER judicially been defined as a person born to one American parent overseas or on American soil to a foreigner parent. Because Obama’s father was a Kenyan native with British citizenship that he passed onto him, he could never be defined as a natural born citizen. Congress would have to make a Constitutional amendment to eliminate the Natural Born Citizen Requirement to have Obama be a legal POTUS. Being a professed Constitutional law professor Obama should have known what a Natural Born Citizen is, but ran for President anyway. Finally, an offer to pay $100,000 to the first person to provide proof that Obama is a natural born citizen has existed for two years. Obama has never claimed the prize, nor has anyone else been able to provide proof and claim the prize. More on this in the Citizen Activism chapter. A preponderance of the evidence available proves Obama is a Usurper, an Unlawful President. How did this happen? Was all of Congress grossly negligent and ignorant? Taken advantage of by a well orchestrated misinformation campaign by Obama operatives? Or did Congress know the truth but were afraid to act? What happened to the courts? Justice Clarence Thomas said that the Supreme Court was avoiding the Obama eligibility issue during Congressional hearings. (video available www.unlawfulpresident.com) Has Congress and the Supreme Court effectively removed the Natural Born Citizen requirement for Obama by not enforcing it? More on this in the Obstruction chapter. What about all of the consequences of a non-legal POTUS? Will bills signed by Obama stand the test of time? Judicial nominations? Treaties? Are U.S. soldiers legally protected under the Geneva Convention while waging war overseas under an Unlawful POTUS?
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