The rmored Division as an assault landing force. The Armred School. May 52.

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT L ENWORTH, KANSAS
DO NT NO. 2146 *12 COPY NO. 1

13 Mar 51DOWNGRADED

AT 3 YERR TNTRVAT*.R

THE ARMORED DIVISION AS AN ASSAULT LANDING FORCE

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
. ... BY

COMMITTEE 34,

OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1951 -1952
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALVA "T. McDANIEL MAJOR FRANCIS A. MAJOR GEORGE V, COOCH 3rd LABADIE

CAPTAIN EDWIN VT. PIBURN JR CAPTAIN JAIES R. PORTA

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY May 1952

)

('S<

Fl^,^
II B~

TABLE OF COTTNTS Chapter
1 INTRODUCTION
Scope "... .. ,,

Page
................................
.. .* .....

*,. .
... ........... ..

1
3

Problems and Limitation
Definition
Outline

of the Study ...........
*.........
.*...........

3
5

of Terms
Of Study ....

...........
,,..

.....
...

Methods Of Research ...........................

7
8

2

ASSAULT LANDI NGS,

IORLD WAR II ................. Invasion of North Africa ....................... Sicilian Invasion ~ *.... .. *... ..... *......

10 12 28

Normandy - 6 June 44 ......
Okinawa Conclusion

",..............
...........
. . ..... ,.. 0f.

35
.....
. .0 . •

1 April
...

45
,,.......

,..

45
51

3

DOCTRINE AND

ORGANIZATION

.*.........*...*...e...

56

Characteristics of Amphibious Operations .......

56

World War II, Armored Division Organization
Conclusion ........ . *.... ..
4 SPECIAL VETICLE Equipment for
Conclusions .

....

61
67
69 69
82

.. ..
...

..............
............
.. .....

REQUIREM'TTS the Assault
. ...............

.....
.,,

........................
.......

5

NAVAL RETIREMETS
Landing Craft,
Ship, Utility

..................
(LCM-6)

......
..............

85
87
90

Mechanized
(LSU)

............................

Landing Landing

Ship, Ship,

Medium (LSM) ...................... Tank (LST) ......................

91 91

Landing Craft,
6

Vehicle,

Personnel (LCVP)

.......

93
99

ATiPHIBIO{S TRAINING

............................

7

CONCEPT OF EMPLOY1E T ......
Organization for Landing
Formations
*....

.........
"...

..

... ..
..
...

111
*. 113
115

..... ......

o..... ............

:.........

Conclusion

..........

.............. ......

116

APPENDICES ....................
I.

.... ,,r......

Troop List, TF Red, CC "B", 1st Armored Division, 8 November 42 ....................

118
119
120

II. III. IV.

Troop List, TF Green, CC"B" 1st Armored
Division, 8 November 42
.......

......... .........

Troop List, CC "A",
10 June 43 ........

2nd Armored Division,
..............

Summary, Armored Division Strength and
Principal Weapons
..... . ....

............ .............
....... .... ..........

121.
...

BILIOGRAPHY

o

123

CHPTER I
INTRODUCTION The history of American diplomacy and foreign policy since the founding of our country, America has rarely has, with few exceptions, been the

one of peace.

been the aggressor.

Rather,

aggressors of the world have

come to us.

This policy has

put us

initially on the defensive in almost every war in which we-have
been engaged. We have had to suffer initial reverses while our

industry became geared to war and our civilian armies were mobiliSed and trained. stages of a war, While we are suffering are reverses. losing in the initial

we and our allies

ground -

ground

which later we must retake, our necessity stages for retaking -

Herein lies the basis the ground we have must be lost lost

of our study in the initial

of our wars

ground that

because

of our be-

lief

in

the proper conduct of nations.
The retaking of lost ground involves many factors.. factors is One No

of the most important greater example in World War II,

of these

amphibious warfare..

of this can be found than our recent experiences Our Pacific war was a continual succession of

amphibious operations.

All of our great land operations invasions.. During the war,

in Europe as our

were preceded by amphibious

experience gained on the practical field of battle,.so did our amphibious doctrine grow, was studied, applied, corrected, tried today what in our World

again, revised, and tried again., As a result, we have we believe to be sound amphibious doctrine. However,

War II landings,

little use was made of our armored divisions as an

r

'

}

'

T

r

r

77~"O~&

assault force.. This same omission is apparent in the doctrine published and available today. Doctrine concerning the use of

armor in an amphibious operation is limited to a few short sentences. Doctrine pertaining to the use of an armored div-

ision in such a role is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. The armored division, a relatively new organization, has a definite place in our army. In the early days of World War II

its capabilities and limitations were understood by only a few of our leaders. As the war progressed and experience was gained, How-

knowledge and understanding of the armored division grew.

ever, there remains a general lack of understanding throughout the army. This misunderstanding applies not only to the armored

divisions but also to armor in general, This study is not concerned with the overall doctrine of armor, the above only being mentioned to show the need that exists for studies on the capabilities, limitations, and uses of the armored division in various roles. Our mission is to determine

the practicability of the armored division as an assault landing force. Armor has a place in the American Army. The armored

division has a definite role to play in any operations we may undertake in our study. the foreseeable future. With this fact we preface

From here then, let us move to the specialized field What is the role of the armored division in hvo should the present These

of assault landings. such an operation?

Given such a mission,

day armored division go about accomplishing this task? 2

are the questions we shall attempt to answer, Scope This study is designed to look into one role in which

an armored division might be employed - that of an assault landing force. We shall here attempt to formulate broad doctrine

which would apply to an armored division given such a role. First we shall go. into the history of World War II and look at

the few examples where an armored division was employed in an assault landing. With these few historical examples as a

springboard, we shall project ourselves into the future., Using the current organization of the armored division as a basis,,we will determine the practicability of such a mission for the division and the methods for conducting such a landing, 1. showing:

The factors that would determine the employment

of the armored division in such a role; 2, 3, 4. 5. special training required; amphibious vehicles and vehicular equipment; shipping requirements; organization for the landing; and our recoormmenda-

tions concerning the concept of employment. This is our scope. It will be as was stated above, broad

doctrine - an overall look at the requirements for and practicability of the empl6yment of an armored division as an assault landing force, Problems and Limitations of the Study In undertaking this study, we enter upon a virgin field. The only document directly concerned with the subject, other than 3

historical examples, that came to light during our research was sixteen volumes of loading tables for an armored division, tables were prepared for the army at Camp Calvin B. Matthews, California, by the Marine Corps in February 1945.1 based both on World The tables are These

*War II

armored division organization, and the of World War II landing craft. They con-

capabilities and capacities have, therefore,

limited application as far as this study is

cerned. Further research brought out that, during World War II, To

an armored division as such, never made an assault landing. be sure, major elements of armored divisions took part in two

amphibious operations, and separate tank battalions took part in many landings, but the complete armored divisions was never used. Both vehicles

One other difficulty must be mentioned.

and landing craft for use in future wars are still in the research and development stage. Many new developments are highly classified. impossible to determine exactly what future amphibious operations. With-

These two factors make it

equipment will be available in

out this definite information, many of the details involved in a landing cannot be exactly determined. Assumptiors may be made, to a division in Generalities may be stated.

but much of the information so necessary

an assault landing cannot be exactly determined,

Many of the statements that follow in subsequent chapters, because of the lack of historic example, ledge of future equipment. committee. past research, and knowof the

Are entirely the opinidn

Whe have attemped, wherever possible, to support

conclusions ~iith documentaytion,

Where it has not been possible,

we have attempted to draw conclusions which could be supported by available facts, doctrine, or logical thought. Definition of Terms The terms listed below are used quite frequently in this study. Most of them are military. Even among the military,

however, there is often a difference of opinion as to their exact meaning. In addition, many have special meanings when used in Therefore, in order to

connection with an amphibious operation.

clarify their meaning as used in this study, we are defining them below: 1. Amphibious Operation - "A landing made from ships

or craft to achieve an objective on land...The forces involved depend primarily upon waterborne means for transport to the objective area, for initial tactical and logistical support, and
2 for special techniques and equipment used in debarking."

2.

Assault Landing Force - A unit making the initial

landings on a hostile shore. 3. Waves - The order in which troops making an assault

landing move from either one shore to the next or from the ship to the shore. 4, H-hour - The time at which the first wave reaches

the hostile shore. 5. D-day - The day the assault troops are to land

on the hostile shore. 6. Landing Craft - "A craft which is especially de-

signed for beaching, unloading or loading, and retracting from

the beach.

The term generally is applied to non-ocean-going

vessels of less than 200-foot length designed for landing operations." 3 7. ROT - Regimental Combat Team. Usually consists

of an infantry regiment plus supporting artillery and engineers. Miscellaneous service troops may be attached. 8, Combat Loading - "The loading of assault troop

units with their essential combat equipment, vehicles, and supplies in the same vessel, and in a manner permitting immediate and rapid debarkation in a desired priority for the landing attack." 4 9. Organizational Loading - "Troops with their equip-

ment and supplies embarked on the same ship but without regard to the prerequisites of a tactical debarkation."5 10. -Convoy Loading - "The loading of troops, equipment,

and supplies on vessels in the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same ship." 6 1.. Shore to Shore - "The bulk of the landing force with certain supplies and equipment is transported in landing ships....from a shore base directly to a landing beach without

transehipmon ' "7 12. Ship to Shore - "A transshipment of troops, equip-

ment, and supplies from seagoing vessels to smaller landing craft and the subsequent movement to the landing beach."8 13. Demonstration - "Amphibious demonstrations are

made for the purpose of confusing the enemy as to the location

6

of the main landing. 't 9 14. Raid - "...an operation,......, involving the or a swift penetration confuse the enemy or

temporary seizure of a limited objective,

of hostile territory to seure information, destroy his installations. It

ends with a planned withdrawel up-

" on completion of the assigned mission. l0

15.

Occupation-

"...a

limited operation to seize and or logistical base

secure a land area for use as an air, naval, to support further operations, enemy,

or to deny use of the area to the

11
16, Invasion - "...a large scale operation to seize

and secure a beachhead from which to launch and support a major land offensive 17. .... 12 An amphibious

LVT - Landing vehicle tracked,

personnel or cargo carrier, 18. amphibious tank, Methods of Research In undertaking this study, our first mine our scope. effort was to deterLVT(A) - Landing vehicle tracked (armored). An

Shortly after beginning the study we attempted As research progressed, the scope, of necessity,

to set it

down.

was revised.

Many factors,

originally thought necessary to be Conversely, factors not originally

included, have been dropped. considered have been included,

Another factor that 'came under consideration was how deep we should go into each phase of the subject, 7 After a few weeks,

we realized that many factors under consideration could conceivably, in themselves, be the subject of long research studies. not to cover each phase of the landing

We deceided, therefore,

operation in great detail. During the first four months of the project, all members of the committee worked as individuals securing as much background material as possible, Toward the end of the fourth month, a com-

mittee meeting was held in which the chapters to comprise the study were outlined. became a specialist. At this point, each member of the committee

Each was assigned a particular chapter or This step was necesIt was felt

chapters which became his specific project.

sitated because of the broad field of the subject.

that a combined effort on each chapter would produce too much diversion of effort. Furthermore, it would allow no one individ-

ual sufficient time to dig as deeply as time would permit into any particular phase. This then was our method of research - first, we determined

a scope; second, we outlined the study; third, each member of the committee assumed responsibility for the preparations of one or two chapters. Outline of Study Following this brief explanation of our study and the problems involved, the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of armored participation in several World T ar II landings.

Subsequent chapters will consider the following as they affect this studys a brief review of amphibious operation doctrine; 8

current armored division organization; vehicular developments since World War II that affect the armored division shipping

requirements; training; and conclusions and recommendations.

_.

^13

_

_

~_

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I Combat Loading of Armored Division (Loading Tables 16 volumes), prepared by US Marine Corps (Camp Calvin B. Matthews, 21 February 45).
2

FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington;

1951), 1951),

1.

3 4FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: 1951), 5FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Nashington: 1951), 6FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:
7 8

329. 322.

332
324.
,

1951), 1949),
L:

FM 100-5, Department of the Army (Washingtor FM 100-5, FM 17-34, Department of the Army (ashingtor

233,

1941),

> 233, p 71. 4. 4. 3.

9 10

Department of the Army (Washington 1: 1950), 1951), 1951), 1951),

FLl 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: Department of the Army (Washington:
Department of the Army (Washington:

12FM 60-5,
2 1

FM 60-5,

CHAPTER 2 ASSAULT LANDINGS - WORLD WAR II We shall now briefly turn back the pages of history to look at several World War II many.amphibious operations. landings. The past war involved

However, in none was an intact Armor

armored division employed as the assault landing force. was employed in almost all landings.

In two major operations -

TORCH (Invasion of North Africa) and HUSKY (Invasion of Sicily) major elements of armored divisions were employed. tank battalions were employed in many landings. Separate these

Today,

separate tank battalions are organic to the Infantry Division, Our study, however, is concerned with the armored division, are few, Nevertheless, our study would

So, the lessons for us, not be complete, World War II

if we did not at least briefly look into some

landings.

Although specific lessons concerning the armored division are few, many are the lessons concerning armor. then, that if together, It would appear put them

we took these lessons concerning armor,

and looked at the result, we would have a clear pattern This, at the best, is a half truth.

for an armored division.

The armored division is more than just a collection of tanks. True, the division is built around the tank - everything in the

division is objective.

there with one mission - to get the tanks on the The entire division is geared to this. In the infan-

try division, everything is seizing the objective.

designed to assist the doughboy in

For this reason, the sum total of the 10

experiences of separate tank battalions operating with infantry divisions in assault landings will not add up to complete armored division doctrine for the same type of operation. The

basic doctrine for and the techniques of employing the armor in the two divisions is greatly different. Each of the four landings we

Our review will be short.

will discuss - North Africa - Sicily - Normandy . Okinawa are subjects for complete studies, Accounts of the last two have

already been published by the Historical Section, Department of the Army, in lengthy volumes. Three years was spent in the prepa1

ration of "Cross Channel Attack" by Dr. G.A. Harrison, accounts of all

Many other Here, we and in

four landings have also been published.

shall touch each briefly to show the part played by armor, particular, where applicable, the armored division,

Since we are covering these four landings briefly, we shall make no comment on the manner in which the armor was employed. Both praise and criticism will be left to more lengthy studies. Here, we will state facts - the plans and what actually happened. The critical analysis we leave to others. The reader has probably wondered why we chose to discuss only four landings, and why, after choosing but four landings, To answer the first space, quostion -

we selected the four covered here.

four landings were chosen because time, of the study did not permit more.

and the purpose

In answer to the second question, both the North

the four landings selected were chosen because (1)

African and Sicilian landings represent the only occasion when

major elements of an armored division have been employed in an assault landing; and (2) the Normandy and Okinawa landings

represent two of the largest assault operations in two major theaters during World War IIin We could have picked many others, But,

addition to or instead of,V tho four we have chosen.

within the time available and the scope of our study, these four appeared to offer the most: Invasion of North Africa General: On 8 November 42, the Allies took their first 1940, toward

major step forward,

since the fall of Dunkirk in

the defeat of Germany."

On that day, landings in North Africa Months of planning had gone

(Operation TORCH) were initiated. into the operation."

During the spring and early summer of 1942, there was much discussion of possible courses of action at the highest Allied levels. 2 The main issue concerned whether we should put all effort 1943 or,

into plans for an invasion of the continent of Europe in

to keep Soviet Russia in the war, we should undertake a major operation in 19424, On the evening of 30 July 1942, the President
tr4

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'that he wanted to do TORCH.. The next day the information was cabled to General Eisenhower, then in London,5 He was to take temporary comeand until a final
6

deci'

sion was made on a permanent commander.

The final TORCH plan involved three major Task Forces. The Western Task Force, under the command of Major General George

S. Patton was to sail directly 'Ifrom the United States to capture

Casablanca,

This force included five Regimental Combat Teams, The

one armored combat command and one armored combat team.

shipping required for transport consisted of 12 combat loaders, ten auxiliary combat leaders, six cargo ships, and one sea train.
7

The Center Task Force, under the command of Major General L, R. Fredendall, sailed from the United Kingdom and had the misThis force consisted of three Regimental one combat

sion of seizing Oran.

Combat Teams (all from the lst Infantry Division),

command from the lst Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat talion. The shipping required to transport the force consisted

of thirteen infantry landing ships, seven personnel ships, three tank landing ships, one gun landing ship, and twenty-three motor
7

transport landing ships.

The Eastern Task Force, Charles W. Ryder,

under the command of Major General S, Infantry Division,

Commanding General 34th U.

sailed from the United Kingdom, Algiers.

and had the mission of seizing

Once a firm foothold was established, command of this N., Anderson,

force was to pass to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Comnunding General 1st British Army.
8

In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with the armor of the Western and Center Task Forces, into the details concerning these two landings, detail must be brought out. Before going one significant

This point involves around the It must be remembered that

political background of the landing. in all cases, French.

the enemy who would oppose our landings would be allies of the British until their collapse

The French,

in the summer of 1940, c~trolled all of that portion of North

Africa in which our landings were to take place.

Most French

Officers were torn between their traditional hatred of the German and their loyalty to their governmamt, regardless of what form that government took.. The pre-invasion political intrigue is a subject in itself,. Hovever, no study on this invasion would be complete without pointing out that the Allied leaders felt, that, in all likelihood, little or no resistance to the landings would be met. This very fact made it possible

"to accept certain calculated risks which in other circumstances would have been unwarranted. The success of the assault phase

makes it apparent that the risks taken were justifield. " 9 Center Task Force, The Center Task Force, consisting

of elements of the 12th Air Force

st

Infantry Division (/),

CCB, 1st Armored Division, plus attached and supporting service troops, was ordered to attack at 080100 November 42 to seize Oran and adjacent airfields. The plan of attack was to land

on three beaches from east to west (Arzew Bay, Les Andalouses, and Mersa Bou Zedjar) to capture the objective by converging attacks from the Northeast, West, and South. (Chart No I) Two

RCTts of the 1st Division made the initial assault at Arzew Bay. Their mission - to secure a beachhead for CCB, protect

the left (West) flank of the Center Task Force, and to capture Oran. The assault at Les Andalouses was made by the 26th RCT, The assault at Les Andalouses was made The assault at Mersa

1st Infantry Division.

by the 26th RCT, 1st Infantry Division.

4

F

.

$ § 2{

-

;

:

Bou Zedjar was made by elements of CCB.10 be studied more in detail later,.

This landing shall

In addition to these main landings, elements of the Task Force were ordered to sail on coast guard cutters directly into Oran harbor in hopes for a rapid seizure of the city
ll

This

force was doomed to failure and suffered by large the greater casualties of any force during the landing. CCB, 1st Armored Division. For this landing, CCB was

divided into two columns.

The East column was under the command

of Major General (then Brigadier General) Oliver, Commanding General CCB, and was to land at Arzew Bay after the beach had been secured by the 1st Infantry Division. The West Column,

Green Force, under the command of Brigadier General (then Colonel) Robinett, CO, 13th Armored Regiment, was to make the assault landings at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-Ray beach). 1 0 Let us now turn our attention to each of these columns: 1. troop list): Task Force Red (East Column) (See Appendix I for Task Force Red was ordered to land at Arzew Bay

(Zebra Red Beach) after the beachhead had been secured by elements of the 1st Infantry Division. In addition, the column They were:

had several missions which are of interest. a,

dispatch a Provisional Battalion ("Red Flying Column") to seize and secure Tafaraoui airfield seize and sec ure La Senia airfield :seize and secure Oggaz airfield; and assist the 1st Infantry Division in the capture of Oran by attacks from the South. 1.

b. c, d,

All in all, CCB, in Field Order #1 dated 11 October 1942, gave the Red Column eleven specific missions they were to accomplish. The "Flying Column" was under the command of Colonel (then Lieutenant Colonel) Waters and consisted of the following troops.: 1st Battalion 1st Armored Regiment (-); Company E, 6th

Armored Infantry Regiment; one platoon, Company B, 701st TD Battalion; one .platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineers; and an attached reconnaissance section. The general plan called

for the column to land as soon as the beach was secured, assemble in the vicinity of St. Leu, and then, as soon as assembled, move out to seize Tafaraoui, In addition to seizing Tafaraoui, the

column also had the mission of covering the assembly area of the remainder of Task Force Red. "Flying Column and 0ran.
12

Once Tafaraoui was secured, the

was to be prepared to move on La Senia airport

Prior to the invasion, CCB had been located in the United Kingdom. On or about 1 October 42, in preparation for embarkation,

elements of the combat command began assembling at various ports throughout England. two "Maricabo" boats. The "Flying Column" was combat loaded on Prior to loading, all vehicles of the

Flying Column were waterproofed for a landing in at least 32 feet of w- ter. 13 At 0051 on 8 November 42, land operations commenced on Zebra Beach. The landing was unopposed, and at 0221 hours the Shortly thereafter, the "Flying

beach was reported clear. 14

Column" began unloading opposite St Leu (near Arzew), 1 3

The first Company (-

unit to strike out inland was the Reconnaissance 13th Armored Regiment. This unit departed

1 .Platoon).

the beach area at 0820,14,and by 0840 had cleared CR 106, three miles southeast of St Cloud.
15

Here they remained throughout the

day protecting the left flank of. the troops at Tafaraoui,16 The "Flying Column" was not much longer in The column departed from Tafaraoui at 0835, and, encountering only ight scattered resistance, assault the airport.14 getting started.

around 1100, after

was in position to

Company B, 1st Armored Regiment (lst

Platoon, Company E, .6th Armored Infantry Regiment Attached) a-s:saulted from the East. the South. Company A, 1st Armored Regiment assaulted from 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-L Platoon)

Company E,

was ordered to establish roadblocks to the North and Northeast for the dual purpose of preventing reinforcements from Oran reaching the airport and also preventing the escape of the airport garrison.
17

At 1112 the attack was launched and by 1215, the

airport and 300 prisoners were in the hands of the "Flying Column" 14 Meanwhile, Company E, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-1 Platoon), intact,
18

on road block duty, had captured,

an ammunition train and The road blocks es-

guards enroute to Tafaraoui from Oran.

tablished by the company received ineffective artillery fire and aerial bombardment during the day. by French planes from La Senia,
14 19

Tafaraoui was also bombed

Immediately after securing the airport, the "Flying Columns began to reorganize for a continuation of the attack toward La Senia. However, the bombing and strafing attacks, 18 the

necessity for the guarding of prisoners of war and captured material, the necessity for the destroying of seceral artillery batteries, and reports of troops coming up fran the South pre-

vented an assault on La Senia from being launched that day. 1 3 Shortly after daylight on 9 November 1942, for La Senia - but that is Meanwhile, another story. CCB, spent the column moved out

the remainder of Red Task Force,

the day getting ashore and reorganizing.

About mid-morning the
15

Command Post of CCB was established in the Post Office of St Leu. The 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment :(4Company E with

the "Flying Column") completed their unloading at 1130 and were immediately ordered to move to and occupy the high ground threequarters of a mile East of St Leu. Here they remained for the

rest of the day, protecting the beachhead, without enemy contact. 2 0 2. see Annex II): Task Force Green (West Column - For Troop List, Task Force Green, under Brigidier General (then

Colonel ) Robinett's command, was ordered to attack the beaches at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-ray beach) at 080100 Nov 1942 to seize and secure the airport at Lourmel. Thereafter, to assist the

Red Force to capture the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia, and to assist in the capture of Aran as directed by The commanding General, CCB.
21

Colonel Robinett gave the assault mission to the 1st Battalion, ments). 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-Company B and detachThis

A "Green Flying Colun , was also organized .

force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd (killed

in Tunisia on 28 December 1942) consisted of the 1st Battalion, 13 Armored Regiment (-Companies A,. B, and a detachment of Headquarters Company), Company B, 6th.Armored Infantry Regiment (-2 platoons), 2nd Platoon, Company.C, 701st TD Battalion, and the 1st Platoon (Reinf), Company A, 16th Armored Engineer Battal21 ion,2 The assault force was ordered to assault the beaches at 080100 November 1942 with one company on X-ray Green beach and one company on X-ray White beach.. As soon as the beach was secured, plans called for the "Flying Column" to land, and, as soon as assembled, to move out toward Lourmel to secure the airport and facilities there,. Upon seizure of the the Lourmel airport, the

column was to reorganize and be prepared to advance on Tafaraoui or La Senia airfields. 2 1 Landing operations against Mersa Bou Zedjar started on 7 November 1942 at 2347 hours, There was no opposition any-

where on X-ray beach and at 0346, the beachhead was reported clear.22 At 0400, Lieutenant Colonel Kern, CO, 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment radioed the Task F:orce Command .Post his entire unit was ashore and was proceeding to their final objectives. 2 3 These objectives were soon secured, and the

Battalion (-Company B) spent an uneventful day securing the beachhead.2 4 Meanwhile, the remainder,the Task Force began to unload. The first unit to land, was a platoon from the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment. On the beach, soft sand was

20.

encountered which slowed down the unloading considerably. Nevertheless, the "Flying Column" managed to get ashore and at 0900 hours moved out for Lourmel, 2 2 Meanwhile, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment had 'proceeded the'"Fly-+ ing Column" toward Lourmel. to the landing near Lourmel. 0903 had been overcome. This unit met the first However, it resistance

was very light, and by

The "Flying Column" occupied Lourmel

without incident at 1125.22 Orders went out almost immediately for the "Flying Column" to continue the attack to seize La Senia. on 8 November 1942, the column moved out. 2 2 The first resistance, an enemy roadblock, was encountered one mile west of Bou Telis at .1408. This roadblock was destroyed So, shortly after noon

by 1443, but. two friendly tanks were lost in the engagement. 2 2 An enemy roadblock, one machine gun, and one emplaced 75 mm gun were destroyed at 1517 near Brediah.2 2 However, another

vehicle was lost to the column during this attack - a half trackand the column by-passed Brediah to the South and continued on their mission to La Senia. La Senia was not to be reached that

day horWver, and the column bivouced for the night in Sabkra, 2 5

fthei Summarys. :In- thi.s short review.:t-

a.t.ion.t ;,Q.CB:lt
one major

Armored

Division, during the TORCH Operation, we have seen haov

element of an armored division was given several missions to accomplish during the assault landing phase. One element of the

combat command landed after the beach had been secured and, 21

after
inland.

landing,

advanced rapidly to seize an objective deep
time, another element landing, of the after combat comsecuring

At that.same

manad was making its

own assault

and,

a beachhead, dispatched a mobile Task Force deep inland to seize an important objective. only on rare gardless True, the landings were unopposed, and Re-

occasions will it be possible to land so easily. fact, the operation does point out several

of this

poss-

ible missions for an armored division in an assault landing.
Western Task Force, command of Major States General G. The Western Task Force, S. Patton, Jr, sailed under the United

from the

in October 1942.

Their mission -

to invade French Morocco This in-

and seize the principal port and city of Casablanca.

vasion involved the longest pre-landing sea voyage
of warfare to convoy to that time. In addition, it infested was

in the history
for the Even so, not

necessary

travel through submarine

waters,

one ship of the convoy was

lost during the voyage.

The plans called for landings to be made in three places;

(a) at Fedala, thirteen miles northeast of Casablanca; the objective here was to initiate
from the East: Casablanca; (b) at

operations for the capture
Safi, 130 miles to the southeast

of Casablanca
of land

the immediate

objective

of this

landing was to

armor and to prevent the French Troops at Marrakech from re-

inforcing Casablanca; east of Casablanca;
Lyautey airfields

and (c)

approximately eighty miles north-

here the objective was to seize the Port
protect the northern flank of the Task

and to

Force. 2 6

This study will primarily concern itself with the landings at Safi, for it was here that the greatest amount of armor was involved. Safi. Safi, 150 miles South of Casablanca, was assaulted

by Task Force Xray (Blackstone) under the command of Major General E, N Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division. General

Harmon was given the following missions:

(a) to secure Safi and

the airport East of the town; (b) to insure the unloading of the armored units aboard the Sea Train LAKEHURST; (c) to secure crossings over the Oued Oum Er Rebia River in order to insure participation of his force in the capture of Casablanca; and (d) to prevent the garrision at Marrakech from reinforcing Casablanca. 2 7 To accomplish the mission, the following troops were put under General Harmon's command: (a) an infantry landing;.team con-

sisting of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division and the 2nd Battalion, 540th Engineers; (b) an armored battalion landing team consisting of a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion (both from the 2nd armored division), and two platoons of AAA; and (c) the 'Sea Train LAKEHURST carrying a tank battalion from the 67th Armored Regiment, a detachment from the 56th Medical Battalion and a platoon from Company "B", 443rd AAA Battalion.2 7 This force comprised the bulk of the armor in the Western Task Force. It was given to General Harmon since the overall plan

envisoned his force moving the 150 miles up the coast to Casablanca and attacking that city from the rear,2 7 Although a brilliant

attempt was made to accomplish .this mission, rapid conclusion of an armistice with the French made this plan, in the and,, unnecessary.
23

The Safi garrison, 450 effectives, alert at 0320 on the morning of 8 November

received an invasion 1942, Then, about

0400,

under the cover of darkness, the destroyer BERNADOU, carryentered Safi Bay. At 0428, it was

ing Company K, 47th Infantry,
fired on from the shore fire.,

by a French 75 battery The destroyer fire and within opposition

followed by mach-

ine gun and rifle

IMERVINE, covering the six minutes, all enemy

BERNADOU, countered this fire or the was silenced. machine

No further the

from the

75 battery Hbw-

guns at

harbor mouth was encountered.

ever, at 0430 the BERNADOU ran aground necessitating debarking K Company over the side. This was done, and that part of the port

(Phosphate
stroyer

dock) was seized without opposition.
up at the Phosphate relieved the Dock.

At 0500,

the' de-

COLE tied

L Company,

47th

Regiment, the they

on board,

disembarked,

K Company of guarding South of Safi where

dock after established

which K Company moved to a roadblock.
2 8

The main assault tanks attached main harbor area to the 1st

landings began at 0530 when the Battalion,

light the on

47th Regiment landed in 1st Battalion landed

on Green Beach and the

Blue Beach, about 2000 yards to the North.
ing just fire road. the 1st Battalion began to move

Immediately after

land-

South toward Safi. machine

At dawn, gun and rifle East troops, of the and

North of the

town, the column received position initial on the

from French in This was the

high ground just for these

baptism of fire

after deployinig, they bogged down. regimental commander, took personal

However, Colonel Randle, the charge of the battalion, led

an attack against' the position, and the resistance was quickly
overcome.2

28

The only other resistance of note during the day centered around the French barracks in'Safi. A combination of tanks and

infantry soon eradicated this resistance and the beachhead was seized by 1000. The final D day objective - a 10,000 yard beach28

head - was secured by 1600 hours.

The Sea Train LAKEHURST tied up at the Phosphate Dock at 1400 hours, and within twenty-four hours, board had been unloaded. Meanwhile,
28

all the tanks on

the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment with one

platoon of light tanks attached had made an unopposed landing on Yellow Beach, eight miles south of Safi, Here, the surf condi-

tions were bad and not until 1400 hours was the entire team on shore. By night fall, they had moved north without oppositon

and were occupying the south portion of the 10,000 yard beachhead, An armored team was sent twelve miles east along the road

to Marrakech to cover any threat that might develop during the night from French troops stationed there. positions without incident, The next day,
28

This force occupied its

General Harmon proceeded North toward CasaBy skillful maneuver, he had

blanca with a large armored force.

deceived the French as to his intentions and was well on his way to Casablanca when the armistice was signed. The landing at Safi, although against only light opposi-

tion, illustrates another mission for which an armored division
25

THE PLAN OF ATTACK
.. INITIAL OBJECTIVES

LE

SHIMA

AFLD

5

0 MILES

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III AMPH CORPS

29MA CORPS RES

XXV J
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might be used as an assault landing force - to land on a lightly held beach several miles from the main landing, and after landing, to move parallel to the coast and attack the enemy defending the main beachhead from the rear, Port Lvautey and Fedalah(See Maps 2 and 3). same time the Safi operations were taking place, were being made at both Port Lyautey and Fedalah. Primarily infantry landings, At the

hndings Both were

Within both Task Forces there
Both of these landings

were armored battalion landing teams. ran into some difficulties,

but in the end were successful.

For our purpose, they have little application and will not be studied, Conclusion. In concluding the TORCH operation, it

seems pertinent to quote firom the after action recommendations submitted by the G3, Center Task Force: ... Armored Units. In all future planning it is believed that the use of Armored Units should be stressed. The coordinated use of Infantry and Tanks permits maximum exploitation of surprise or early success. Also, the psychological effect on the enemy caused by the early appearance of tanks cannot be overemphasized. It is futther believed that the inclusion of tanks where practicable will minimize casualties and reduce the time required to reach the objective. Special types assault craft to transport large numbers of tanks, AA guns, artillery, and other tehicles must be made available, 2 9 ... Sicilian Invasion Introduction (Se Map 4). On 10 July 1943. Allied
-

Forces invaded the island of Sicily 2nd U.S. employed.

Operation HUSKY.

The

Armored Division was one of major United States units Prior to the landing, the division received special

amphibious training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center

C0
v 0

.

ti

H

<4

.f

,f.

fr°

%

(FATIC)

in North Africa,

During this training period, loading techniques of LCI's,

practice LSTts and

landings were conducted, LCT's were studied

and vehicles and equipment were waterproofed In order to acquaint the tank actual gunnery

and prepared for shipment.

gunners with the peculiarities of firing from LST,

practice was conducted from the LST's during the practice landings.
30

The greatest difficulty encountered throughout this training period was in unloading the LSTts. This was brought

about by the flat beach gradient of the Mediterranean shore and the deeper draft of the LST. Both FATIC and naval personnel although much training

attempted to solve this problem, and,

time was lost while this difficulty was under study, a completely satifsactory solution was never found.
31

Final plans for the la nding calle d for the division to be split into two separate forces. CCA was attached to the 3rd

Infantry Division - JOSS Force - and placed under the command of Lieutenant General (then Major General) L. K. Truscote. division, The

less CCA but with the 18th RCT attached was to be the

army floating reserve.32 CCA, Organization). 2nd Armored Division (See Appendix III for Task In addition to CCA -commanded by Major General

(then Brigadier General) Maurice Rose.

The JOSS Force consisted ':idsppeqt-

of the 3rd Infantry Division, one ranger battalio, ing troops.
33

The missions of this force were to land in the

LICATA area, capture and secure the port and airfield by dark of D day, extend the beachhead, 30 and protect the left flank of

the operation against interference from the northwest. right flanks it was to maintain contact with II Corps,
34

On its

Prior to the embarkation; special floating ramps were procured to expedite the unloading .of the LST s6 Beside this

difficulty with the beach gradients insufficient troop space further complicated the loading. This necessitated the separa35

tion of the armored infantry units from their personnel carriers: One other technique employed during the embarkation phase was that of split loading battalion and separate company headquarters. Although this increased the loading problem, it was

felt necessary in order that an entire headquarters would not be lost with the sinking of one ship,
36

This split loading paid 1), two folke-Wulfe

off, for on the morning of 11 July 1943 (D / 109ts bombed the harbor at Licata.

Two LST's were sunk, one of Al-

which was carrying one half of Headquarters Company, CCA.

though person. el casualties were light, vehicular casualties were high - 40% loss in Headquarters Company, CCA.
37

During the forty-eight hours prior to D day, the Western Mediterranean experienced one of the worst storms in recent years.

The entire invasion was nearly disrupted and serious damage was done to the special floating ramps so necessary to the successful unloading of the vessels.
36

At 100245 July 1943, the infantry of the 3rd Division and the 3rd Ranger Battalion assault landed on the coast of Sicily, Fc the landing, the 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment was

detached from CCA and attached to the assaulting infantry..

31

Shortly after daybreak, three companies from the battalion were debarked and deployed on: the beach assisting the infantry in mopping up beach resistance. 3 8 Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, led the debarkation of the main body of CCA. Shortly

after getting ashore, twelve enemy soldiers were captured near Licata by Company G of the Battalion.
38

The combat command continued to debark throughout the rest of the day and night. At midnight, General Rose received

orders to attack at 0630 on the morning of 11 June 1943 to secure Nardo and Canacat$i. By daybreak, two-thirds of the combat the advanced guard passed through The remaining

command had debrked and at 0630,

the leading elements of the 3rd Infantry Division.

one-third of the combat command was ordered to close up on the
38 main body in company sized groups immediately after debarking.

2nd Armored Division (-CCA /

18th RCT) The 2nd Armored

Division - KOOL Force - was under the command of Iajor General Hugh Gaffey. This force ws the floating reserve of 7th Army support of any of

and was ordered "to be prepared to land in n 32 the assaults.At 1520,

on D day, KOOL Force received orders to land on
9

Dime Beach just West of Gela,3 hours

H hour here had been at 0245

'The command echelon went ashore at. 1700 and made arrangeand at .1900, the 18th RCT and the

ments for assembly areas. 4 0

1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment began to debark. These units were completely unloaded prior to daylight.

The first tanks to debark were two platoons of Company I, 67th Armored Regiment which were unloaded at 0200 on the However, it because of high surf and

mornihg of 11 July 1943. congestion on the beach,

was decided not to unload any more
42

armored vehicles during the hours of darkness, Until about noon, were available beachhead. Colonel), 11 July 1943,

only four American tanks
.to

for combat and in position

fire on the entire

During the early morning, CCB commander,

Major General White(then He ordered

had located these tanks.

them to take up positions from which they could c over the CCB command post and the troops in the assembly area.
42

The unloading continued all day on 11 June 1943 and was completed by early morning of 12 June 1943, Concerning this landing phase, the following: ... A number of tanks were out of actions for a considerperiod of time after getting ashore because of two factors: (a) Somervelt mats (chickens were laid to assist wheel vehicles through deep sand) and (b) Deep sand. The Somervelt mats became entangled in the tracks and could only be removed by cutting with large nippers. In avoiding the Somervelt mats successive vehicles moving up the steep sandy hill near the beach bogged down in the sand and generally threw one or both tracks,.., 4 4 While the main body of the division was busily engaged in debarkation, the 1st Infantry Division, one of the assault About 1000
43

General White has said

divisions, hours,

was receiving a serious counterattack.

on the morning of 11 June 1943,

the division was attacked The enemy tanks succeeded

by approximately 30-40 German tanks.

in breaking through 1st Division position and debouching on the

plain Northeast of Gela

44

Here they were engaged and success-

fully repulsed by a-platoon of four tanks from Company I, 67th Armored Regiment assisted by some 1st Division Field Artillery and Infantry cannon; This action lasted about two hours when

the enemy withdrew leaving behind fourteen knocked out tanks. Most of these fourteen tanks were destroyed by the four American tanks while the losses to our own tankers consisted of four men wounded,. The defeat of this enemy counterattack was one of the turning points of the Sicilian campaign.
4 5

The bulk of the 1st

Division anti-tank guns had been lost when the LST on which they were being transported was hit by a bomb and burned on D day, If the four tanks had not been present, would have come of this attack. Conclusion.
4 6

serious. consequences

The landings in

Sicily point out several armored division. These

lessons of particular importance to thb are: 1. It is

essential that tanks be debarked early in
6

order to support an amphibious operation. 4

.2. Vehicles should be compactly and completely loaded so that crews can sustain themselves until supply echelons can become operations.47 3. ship in Unloading ramps are necessary on each tank carrying
8

order to permit quick unloading of units such as platoons. 4, Split loading of units, especially headquarters units

should be practiced to the maximum extert consistent with shipping.

49

Normandy

6 June 1944

Introduction.

The long awaited assault against Fortress Allied Forces, launched their

Etrope began in the early morning of 6 June 1944. under the supreme command of General Eisenhower, initial

assault to secure a beachhead on the continent of Eurrsp the

Many volumes have and will be written on this operation, greatest invasion in all history . For our purpose,

we shall

take but a few short paragraphs to see what armor was used and how it was employed during the initial assault,

No armored divisions were initially employed in the operation. The first armored division to arrive in France was

the 2nd Armored Division, which began landing on 9 June - three days after D day,5 0 The use of tanks in the assault was a subject of prolonged discussion and experimentation. The final decision was

to empl.oyt'anks as close support artillery - not as an armored force, Two of the major characteristics of armor - mobility

and shock action - were disregarded.

In addition, final plans

did not call for the tanks to make any exploitation off beaches. This decision was brought about y the feeling that only an In

armored gun would have any change for survival on the beach. addition, it

was felt, that tank cannon would be quite effective The planners visualized

for firing into pillbox embrasures.

the tanks not leaving the beach during threassault phase, but, rather remaining in and firing from positions hull deep in the water. 51

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With this concept in mind then; a tank battalion was attached to each of the assault regiments. to lead the attack. Some would be carried first infantry waves. "swim" into shore. These tanks were one of two ways.

They were to get ashore in

a the beach on LCT's and land with the
Others were to be launched at sea and

The "swimmingu tanks were expected to reach

the beach prior to the arrival of the infantry. - 1 These amphibious tanks were commonly called "DD" Tanks. Later chapters will explain them in more detail. For the landings, the separate tank battalions were placed in two armored groups - the 3rd and 6th. These groups

were in turn attached to the ls t Infantry Division (3rd Armored Group) for the landing on OMAHA Beach and the 4th Infantry Division (6th Armored Group) for the UTAH Beach landings. The

3rd Armored group consisted of the 741st, 743rd, and 745th Tank Battalions while the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions made up the 6th Armored Group. 52 In turn, the battalions were organized fort he assault into two echelons - assault and support. consisted of three medium tank companies. with the DD flotation device. The assault echelon Two were equipped

The third was not so equipped, The support echelon

but did have a Tank Dozer Platoon attached.

consisted of a minimum of battalion command personnel plus a maintenance section and supply vehicles. It was not planned

for the residue of the battalions to land until about 15 June. 52 During the period 1 March 1944 to 16 May 1944, the 3rd Armored Group conducted intensive trailing in the employment of
38

LANDING DIAGRAM, OMAHA BEACH
(SECTOR OF 1I6th RCT)

EAS

GREEN

-

;

D-----__ RED-_

i-

DOG WHITE

000

GREEN

_____Co

C (CD) 743 Th Sn

Co B (DII) 743 to 90

Co A

743

Th

Bn

Co A 743 Tk

an
o0101p lSn

Co E ! lot i6

Co F 116of

H!O

46 £r

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Demolitipon

Control Soat

146

Engr CT

146 Enyr CT

C

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lot

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AAAW Stry _..-1161
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31

of DD Tanks.

Then,

on 16 May, loading began.

On this date,

two companies each from the 70th, 741st, and 743rd Tank Battalions loaded on LST's - four DD Tanks to a ship. On

30 May, the 3rd Armored Group Headquarters and the remaining battalions began loading. June.
52

This loading was completed by 2

Everyone was ready for the big show.
6 June 1944 (See Map 5). Originally the landings were

scheduled for 5 June,

but channel storms necessitated calling By now, the entire wold is

off the operation for that day.

familiar with General Eisenhower's famous decision to go ahead on 6 June even though the weather was not promising. bad weather, and, as a consequence, with our DD Tanks. In the 4th Division sector, on UTAH Beach, where initial resistance was unexpectedly light, thirty-two DD Tanks were supposed to la nd in the first wave. However, they landed fifteen But this

rough sea was to play havoc

minutes late because of the loss of a control vessel which struck a mine. But the opposition was so light that there was All but four of these thirty-two

no immediate need for them.

tanks got ashore safely - the four being lost when the LST carrying them hit a mine.53 On OMAH Beach, the picture was quite different. the 1st Division had an extremely difficult time, Here

Throughout

most of D day, the German LXXIV Corps believed they had stopped this assault on the beach, 5 4 At H-50, two DD companies of the 741st Tank Battalion 40 -

OPERATIONS OVERLAY PORT LYAUTEY OPERATIONS

OVERLAY OPERATION MAP
1

+72
RESERVE II

50,000 TO ACCOMPANY FO NR 1 BY COMMAND OF BRIG GEN L K TRUSCOTT DON E CARLSTON COLONEL,CAVALRY CHIEF OF STAFF OFFICIAL: DAN H BOND MAJ, INF ASST C/S G3

SREIN H 3 60 (+DE TS)

LURE

TO THIS LINE

MY

NORTH

THIS LINE

H -- 2:15

BROWN 2 SEIZE HOLDBRIOGE

/'
-Sd

NAVAL

GUNFIRE ON CALL AFTER

A-B- BOMBARDMENT 0615 C-OINTERDICTIONS

SOURCE:

E- SCHEDULED
US LANDINGS IN FRENCH MOROCCO, THE ARMORED FORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943 (de,

FIRES

AFTER 0615

HC'LDE

EPI

RFC

O

*am"mI ER

THIS' t TO
'°'°

LN

--- 33

RED

CC"B"

SOURCE:

FO 1, HQS CCB, 1ST AD, 11 OCT 42 ON MF 307, DOCUMENTS SECTION, TAS

CENTER TASK LANDINGS IN SAFRICA

FORCE NORTH BER 42

26RCT

8 NOVEM

OR AN LES ANDALOUSES
ST.

*

GREEN I

CCB

BON THELIS

MILES 5

4
I

3
I

2

I;
1

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5
I

were launched 6000 yards off shore.

Almost immediately they Only five of the thirty-

began to have difficulty with the sea.
two launched succeeded in

reaching shoreS 5 5

On the extreme right flank of the beach, sixteen tanks were scheduled to land ahead of the infantry (Company "A",, 116th Infnatry). Only eight survived enemy artillery and reached shore. on LST's, it
56 t

These eight were brough in

having been decided that

the sea was to rough to launch them.

On the left flank of the 116th Regiment situation was not so bad, Here,

s sector, the

two companies of tanks were These companies did

landed by LST's ahead of the infantry. not suffer any losses. 5 Meanwhile,
6

in the 16th Regiment's sector (on the left the troops were experiencing what Almost all

flank of 116th Regiment),

was probably the most difficult of the landings. the DD tanks were swamped and lost.

One tank company was As

beached from LSTts and almost immediately lost five tanks. a result, initially only one-third of the planned armor support was available to the 16th Infantry. Thus,
56

we have seen how on the UTAH Beach, where initially they were

tanks were not needed because of light resistance, available. was stiff, cluding its On the other hand,

on OMAHA Beach where resistance In con-

most of the tanks were lost to the surf.

report on the D-day landings, the 1st Army Armored

Section made the following pertinent statement: ... The use of DD Tanks in their present state of

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development is

restricted to quiet water.**

57

Oktnow
General. Japanese "home"

1 April. 1945

The operation against Okinawa - the first island to be invaded58- was one of the last It is the only amphibious

large battles of World War II.

landing from the Pacific Theater of Operations that we shall study. A brief statement as to why this battle is cluded is in order. As will be shown later, initial being inenemy

resistance was almost non-existant.

However, the operation

was one of the largest undertaken in the Pacific Theater during World War II. ,.,For the assault echelon alone, about 183,000 troops and 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into over 430 assault transports and landing ships at 11 different ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of 6,000

miles59 ..
Not just from the viewpoint of size alone is important. this battle

This plan was-in many respects the culmination of the Pacific wara " 60

experience of all previous operations in

There were no armored divisions in the Pacific Theater during World War II, tank There were, however, many tank and amphibious

battalions.

Many experiences of these units are applicable Here we have tim~e for but one landing. Thus,

to this study.

since our time limit was restricted, we attempted to choose that landing that would offer the most. Okinawa, because

of the factors outlined above appeared to offer what we needed.

Background.. Operation ICEBERG, the plan for the invasion of Okinawa, marked the beginning of the Japan,
'zd

for

United States troops were at last to fight on land islands..

considered by the Japanese to be part of their "home" On 3 October 1944,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Okinawa is

that a portion of the Ryukyu Islands be seized. 6 1 the most important island in this group.

Not only that, it Once Okinawa (1) surren62

is within the outer ring of Japanese defenses. was under our control, der or (2)

Japan had but two choices:

prepare for an all

out defense of their home islands.

The landings were to be conducted by the Tenth U.S. Army under the command of Liutenance General S. Jr. B. Buckner,

For this operation, Tenth Army consisted of two najor in addition to air and naval forces - XXIV Corps R. Hedge andIII Amphibious S. Geiger.

commands,

under command of Major General J. Corps (Marine)

under command of Major General R.

Attached to the XXIV Corps were two army divisions - the 7th and 96th. Attached to the III Amphibious Corps (Marine) were

two marine divisions - the 1st and 6th.

In addition, under

Army control were the 2nd Marine Division, 27th Army Division and the 77th Army Division.
63

Within the XXIV Corps, Battalions,

coordination of the Tank and Amphibious

Amphibious Tractor Battalions,

,Tank Battalions was accomplished through the 20th Armored Group.
64

It

is with this group that we are primarily con-

cerned.

PLA N OF ATTACK) (DETAILED FEDALA- BEACHHEAD(DALEPANOATCK

MANSOURI A

SOURCE: f US LANDINGS IN FRENCH MOROCCO,

THE ARMORED FORCE SCHOOL,

APRIL 1943

, In January 1945, XXIV1 Corps was engaged in the final

phase of the Leyte operation when orders were received attaching them to 10th Army for the Okinawa campaign. 20th Armored Group was a part of XXIV Corps. after receiving the corps order for Okinawa, Officer, 20th Armored Group,
64

At this time, Immediately

the Commanding

directed the amphibious units

within the group to hold show down inspections; to prepare and submit loading plans; to requisition all shortages; and to maintain command liaison with the divisions to which-they would be attached in the assault. These units would come under

operational control of the divisions when they (the amphibious units) crossed the beach to load. The Tank Battalions of the

group remained with the divisions with whon they had operated during the Leyte Campaign.
65

During this preparation, ily in an advisory capacity.

group headquarters acted primar-

Issue of major items of supply to

the Tank Battalions was controlled by the group through coordination with XXIV Corps special staff. amphibious units were issued by the Griup S4. nijor items for the In addition, the

Group Commander acted as Armored Advisor to the Commanding General XXIV Corps.65 Time for training and rehearsal was limited by the time required for maintenance. their experience in the Leyte, The Group had learned from Saipan, and Tinian Operations,

that amphibious vehicles, because of their specialized nature, required more maintenance time to ready them for the assault

after

the final rehearsal the
6 operation. 6

than

any other

ground units

taking

part in

Upon completion of the training period, all units of the Group loaded under division available. 6 follows 67 7th Inf Div 536th Amph Tractor 718th Amph Tractor 776th Amph Tank Bn 711th Tank Bn 77th Division 773rd Amph Tractor Bn 715th Amph Tractor Bn 708th Amph Tank Bn 706th Tank Battalion Landings -1 April 1945. The final plan to attack Bn Bn 96th Inf Div Bn Bn control as the shipping became

6

For the

operation, the

units were attached as

788th Amph Tractor 728th Amph Tractor 780th Amph Tank Bn

763rd Tank Battalion

called for XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps to land with
two divisions assault. abreast In addition, a a total of four divisions in the

demonstration was to

be made by of the island.

the 2nd Marine

Division on the Southeastern side Units were

(See Chart 7)68 shown in

loaded and the assaults made as

Chart 8,69 B hour was set for 0830. The fire support force of

10 battleships, began their

9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 at 0530,. Altogether

gunboats this

pre H hour bombardment

49

was the largest pre-invasion concentration of naval gunfire in history - a total of 44,825 rounds of five inch or larger, 33,000 rockets, preparation. with napalm. 70 Meanwhile, the troops and tanks to lead the assault were readying themselves. Amphibian tanks comprised the first and 22,500 mortar shells were fired in this carrier planes covered the beach

Then at 0745,

wave and at 0800 they were flagged across the line of departure, 4000 yards from the beach. Behind them, five to seven waves

of assault troops in amphibian tractors followed. 70 The way in was led by gunboats firing rocket, mortars and 40 mm guns. This concentration was so great that it each 100 yards square. Upon approaching

averaged 25 rounds in

the reef, these gunboats turned aside and the amphibious tanks and tractors continued to the beach.
71

During the entire move the the beach, the only sign of the enemy was an occasional mortar or artillery shell"... long line of invasion craft advanced as though on a large scale maneuver
s. ... 71

the.

At 0830, the first waves began to touch downall

almost There

tn

tin.

,7 1

The entire landing was unbelieveably easy.

had been but little artillery fire, no enemy on the beach, and only a few land mines. By nightfall, the beachhead was 1 00 It wasn t t until The

yards long and, in places, 5000 yards deep. 72 5 April 1945 that stiff

enemy resistance was finally met. a long way off. But a very

winning of the island was still

deviiite foothold had been secured.

Conclusion Thus we have seen, in four landings, different methods First, to

for the use of armor in an amphibious operation.

secure an objective deep inland; second, to advance parallel to the coast and attack enemy opposing another landing from the rear; third, as the army reserve; fourth, as armored artillery; and fifth, leading an attack as amphibious tanks. Armor has a place in an amphibious operation. We

will now determine the role of the Armored Division in an assault Landing.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ?

iArmy - Navy - Air Force Journal (Washington: 16 Feb 1952),p 749. Invasion of North Africa 2Gordon A. Harrision, Cross Channel Attack (Washington: Historical Section, Department of the Army, 1951)(hereinafter referred to as Harrison), p 11 Harrison,
4

p 11

Harrison,,p.31

5Harrison,,p
6 7

31

Harrison, p 32

General of the Army D,D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1V43, p 6
.. . .= ,, ---. ,-

General of the Army DD. Eisenhower, Europe (New York:1948), p 83

8

Crusade In

9Major General J. C, haydon, DSO,, OBE, Impressions Gained from the Assault Phase of the Operations in North Africa between 6 November and 23 November 1942, p 1 10F #1, October 1942, Headquarters CCB, 1st Armored Division, 11

llA Short History of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored

Infantry Regiment (Author and date of publication unknown),
1F

P2

#1,

(Headquarters Red Force,

CCB,

and 251,

111800

October 1942
1st Bn, 1st Armored Regiment, After action Report (Submitted 31 December 1942)
14 13

Operations Report,

TF Red, CCB,

1st Armored Division,

p

1

.
15 1

S-3 Journal,

13th Armored Regiment,

8 November 1942,

p 1 Opns Report, CCB, November 1942.
17 6

1st Armored Division, as of 082400

A Brief History of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment from October 11, 1942 to 1ay 12, 1943, author unknown, ;p2 (hereinafter referred to as 2nd Bn, 6th AIR.) 12nd Bn, 6th AIR,
19 9
20

p 2 p 2 p 3 CCB, 1st Armored Division 2347 hours, 7 November

2nd Bn, 6th AIR, 2nd Bn, 6th AIR,

21FO #1,
22

Green Force,

0perations Report, TF Green, 1942 to 1625 hours, 10 November 42. 30perations Joura, 8 November 1 9 4 2 , p 1
2 24 perations Report,

2

13th Armored Regiment,

0400 hours,

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry

Regiment,
25

8 %ovember 1942. Operations Journal, Green Force "Flying Column"

in

General of the Army DD, Eisenhower, Commander Chief 's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, p 12.
2 7

2

U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department, Armored School (Fort Knox: 1943) p8 28U.S. Landings in Morocco, Armored School (Fort Knox,: 1943),

The

Tactics Department, The pages 12,13, and 14.

(APO 512:

Compilation of Reports, on Lessons of operation TORCH Allied Force Headquarters, 16 January 1943), p 10 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign, Advanced Class, The Armored School, 1949-50 May 1950), (hereinafter referred to as Committee Class, TAS, 49-50), p 10

30 3The Committee -f4, (Fort Knox: #4, Advanced
3 1

Committee

#4,

Advanced Class,

49-50, p 11

Report of Operations, 7th US Army in the Sicilian Campaign, by the Staff, 7th US Army (APO #758: September, 1943) (Hereinafter referred to as Opns Report, 7th Army), p a6
33 3
34 3 5 36

32 3

Committee #4, Advanced Class, Committee

49-50,

33 3 34 35 37 36

#4

,Advanced

Class, 49-50, 49-50,

Committee #4, Advanced Class,

Committee #4, Advanced Class, 49-50, Committee i4, Advanced Class, Advanced Class, 49-50, 49-50,

37 3
38 39

Committee #4,

0pns Report, 7th Army, page 64 Committee 4, Advanced Class, 49-50, 49-50, 49-50, 49-50, 49-50, 20 21 22 23 24

40

41

Committee #4, Advance d Class,

42Committee
43 44

#-4,
4

Advanced Class,

Committee Committee

4, Advanced Class, Advanced Class,

45 4
46

Committee #4, Advance d Class, 49-50, Committee #, Advanced Class,

25
26

49-50,
49-50,

47

Committee 74, Advanced Class,

71

4 8

Cormmittee

#4,

Advanced Class, Advanced Class,

49-50, p 72 49-50, p 73

49Committee #i4
50 5

Harrision,

p 3

1

1Hrrrision, p 192 1st US Army Report of Operations 20 Oct 13 to 1

52

August 1944, by Staff
5 3

1st US Army, p 195 (annex 9 to report).

Harrision, p 304 P 305

5 4 Harrison,
5 5 56

Harrison, p 309 Harrision, p 315

1st US Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43 to 1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st US Army, p 201 (Annex 9 to report). Appleman, Burns,Gugelor and Stevens, The War in the Pacific, OkinJaJa: The Last Battle, (Washington: Historical Division, DA, 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Appleman, Burns,
58

57 5

Gugeler,
59

and,. tevenst. p 69
Appleman, Appleman, Burns, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 36 p 17

60
°
61

Gugeler, and Stevens,

Appleman, Burns, Applemnan, Burns,

Gugeler, and Stevens, p 4 Gugeler, Gugeler, and Stevens, and Stevens, p 1 p 25

62
636 3

Appleman, Burns,

Major Daniel E. Westervelt, Armored Group in an Amphibious Operation (Fort Knox: May 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Westervelt), p 1
6 6 6 67

festervelt, Westervelt,

p 2 p 4 p 6 Gugeler, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 30

Westervelt, Appleman,

6 8

Burns, Burns,

Appleman, opposite p 43,

6 9

and Stevens, Chart IV,

70Appleman, Burns,

Gugeler, 54

and Stevens, p 69

7 1 Appleman,

Burns, Gugeler,

and Stevens, p 70

72 Appleman, Burns,

Gugeler, and Stevens, p 72

Charts And Pictures Page 36 - Omaha Beachhead (6 June - 13 June 1944) (Washington: Historical Division, War Department, 20 September 1945), (hereinafter referred to as Omaha Beachhead), p 31 Page 37 - Utah Beach to Cherbour (6 June - 27 June 1944), (Washington Historical Division, DA, 1 October 1947), (hereinafter referred to as Utah Beach to Cherbourg), p 52 Page 41 - Omaha Beachhead, Page 42 -Utah p 109 p 44 and Stevens, Chart IV opposite

Beach to Cherbourg, Burns, Gugeler,

Page 47 - Appleman, page 43.

CHAPTER 3 DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION The tactics and techniques ations in World War II varied employed in amphibious oper-

considerabley

as experience was

gained and lessons learned. landing forces apparent, ... changed with was

The strength and composition of each operation part but one thing became

the tank

a necessary

of any landing force. the assault force depends

The position

of tanks within

upon...and the nature of the enemy defenses,
by infantry....

and beach obstacles.

In any case, tanks must either closely follow or be followed closely

...When the terrain is suitable for tank operations and

the beaches are not heavily defended by antitank weapons and anti
tank obstacles, tanks may be in the ... When the terrain or when the beach is heavily leading waves.... is poor or restricted weapons and

operations tank for defended by antitank

obstacles, tanks are used in later waves...3 This chapter is concerned with two questions in sihoe the

tank is a necessary part of the landing force why was the armored division

amphibious operations, landing force now suit-

not used as an assault is the

during World War II, and secondable for such a role?

armored division the

Before considering

armored division

organization, however, the general nature and characteristics of amphibious operations must be fully appreciated. The execution of amphibious operations is divided into the

following. general phases:

Planning.
execution of a

Detailed planning is required for the successful
Planning begins months coordinate the forces in advance of the required

landing.

expected D-Day in

order to

for the operation.

The time required for this phase depends For example, the planning staff

upon the size of the operation,

for OVERLORD (invasion of France) was established under Lieutenant General Frederick E, Morgan in April 1943 - 14 months before the actual invasion, Even before the end of 1941 British joint

planners had drawn up an invasion plan for the European continent called ROUNDUP, This plan bore little. resemblence to the

final OVERLORD Plan but is

mentioned here to show the degree

of planning required for an operation of this nature, Concentrat.ion and special planning, Forces selected

for the operation are concentrated and specialized training is accomplished to insure the organization of an integrated task force. Specialized training includes rehearsals under conditions

as near as possible like those to be encountered in the actual operation.

Embarkation.

Troops, equipment, supplies, and vessels
The landing force

are concentrated at the places of embarkation. is combat loaded in Voyage. assault craft.

The landing force is

moved from points of

embarkation to the landing area in Landing,

preparation for the assault.

Naval and Air units are 'positioned to support

the landing force and begin preparation of the beach area by naval gunfire and air bombardment. The landing force assaults

the beach and secures beachhead lines, Consolidation, is Reorganization of the assault forces Major

accomplished and beachhead lines are consolidated.

supply points are established ashore and adequate supplies are unloaded. The detailed planning for landing operations is required

because of the special problems created by unfavorable conditions inherent in follows: 1. Tactics and techniques of landing operations are such operations. Some of these conditions are as

largely dictated by the availability of suitable ships and landing craft. employed in space. 2. Organic supporting weapons of the landing force The strength, composition, equipment, and supplies

an operation must be fitted to the available shipping

function only to a limited degree in the early stages of an operation and fire support must usually be furnished by the navy and aviation. The use of naval gunfire and close air support

increased the problems of coordination, communications, command, and preinvasion training since most army units are unfamiliar with naval fire procedures. 3. Special organization of army units is required to

provide appropriate forces for the landing and to facilitate the debarkation of intact combat units. Combat units uast be so fire power until

organized that they are self sufficient in supporting weapons are landed.

Automatic weapons and other fires

must be used in lieu of normal artillery support. 4. Suitable beaches and terrain in the objective area

are of vital concern,

Favorable beaches are those that permit

the beaching of landing craft and landing ships close to the 58

shoreline to permit rapid debarkation, and advance inland of troops and equipment without excessive interference from navigational hazards. Suitable exit routes from the beach in-

land are required to facilitate rapid dispersion of vehicles and supplies. 5. Enemy strength and dispositions in the objective Special

area affect the composition of the assaulting forces.

equipment may be required to remove obstacles and clear areas for landing craft. . Heavily defended shores may have pillboxes

constructed on the beach with flat trajectory weapons emplaced to fire on assaulting troops while still afloat. The presence

of enemy mechanized forces in the objective area requires that tanks be landed in the early waves to counter the threat and protect the beachhead. Many other problems can and do arise in amphibious operations.. Assault troops may be landed on the wrong beaches.,

Ships may be forced by enemy action to leave the transport area after landing the assault troops but before supplies and equipment can be. landed., deny certain beaches. landings. Underwater conditions and strong defenses may Unfavorable tides and weather may prevent

All these factors affect the planning and successful however, certain characteristics

execution of landing operations,

of arrhibi:vs operations tend to favor the attacker and should be considered here, Amphibious ope rations are aggressive by nature. The

choice of time and place lies with the attacking force and

require the defender to dissipate his forces in

order to defend

the entire coastline or leave certain area lightly defended and relatively unprotected. Tactical surprise may be obtained by the attacker. The

enemy can often be deceived as to the true location of the main landing by the use of demonstrations and feints. surprise normally is Strategic

not possible because of the necessity for

a buildup of supplies and troop concentrations. The mobility of floating reserves makes it possible for the attacker to take advantage of success in an unexpected quarter or to exploit any weakness discovered in the hostile defense. of amphibious operobtained over-

The most outstanding characteristic ations is shock at the point of contact.

This shock is

by the concentration of superior forces and striking in

whelming strength at one or more selected points in the hostile defensive system. The initiative is with the attacker and allws

this concentration of force. These are the general characteristics and conditions, favorable and unfavorable, that must be considered in the planning There are many details in

and execution of a landing operation.

addition to the above that must be planned for but will not be discussed here. It has been pointed out in the preceeding chapter that as an assault

the armored division was not used in World War II landing force.

The discussion to follow will attempt to show

some reasons why,

ORGANIZATI ON The armored division of World War II was the result of six separate reorganizations occurring during the period July 1940-'September 1943.4 Actually, two different organizations were

employed during World War II but only one will be discussed, the organization prescribed on 15 September 1943, since all but two were organized under this Table of Organization. As stated in the initial training directive, 6 August 1940, the role of the armored division was to conduct highly mobile offensive warfare through a self contained unit composed of the requisite arms and services. 5 This statement was amplified in the "The role of the

Armored Force Field Manual 17-10, which stated:

armored force and its t components in the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare is primarily offensive in character, by selfsustained units of great power and mobility composed of specially equipped troops of the required arms and services." By 15 January

1944, FM 17-100, The Armored Division stated the role of the armored division as follows: "The armored division is organized

primarily to perform missions that require great mobility and fire power." The various reorganizations of the division followed four continuous trends: a decrease in light tank strength, an increase

in the relative strength of the infantry elements of the division, the elimination of needless command echelons, and the lightening of the service elements.

Figure 1

lARMOPED DIVISION TO&E 17 (Abstract) 15 Sept 1943

Entire division Div. Hq. Tank Battalions (3) Infantry Battalions (3) CC Hq & Hq Co, (2) Div Trains, Hq & Hq Co, Reserve Comd Hq Field Arty (3 bns) Car Recon Sq Engr Bn Med Bn Ord Bn Sig Co. MP Plt Div Hq Co Band Atch Medics Atch Chaplains

10,937 164 729 1001 184 103 8 1623 935 693 417 762 302 91 138 58 261 8

Figures taken from the Army Almanac, Wash D,C.,

1950

A study of Figure 1 shois that even though the relative strength of infantry in the division was improved over the former organizations, operations. the strength was entirely inadequate for most companies

A total of three battalions of three rifle

could harldy be considered sufficient for a landing operation. Another weakness oft support. he division was inadequate service

No quartermaster battalion was organic and special normal operations.

measures were required for service support in

A quartermaster truck company was attached to provide this

support in some divisions, Division artillery consisted of three armored field artillery battalions, to the division. In addition to the weaknesses of the armored division, a serious shortage of ships and landing craft existed throughout the planning phase. ,*.The Allies did not have enough landing craft and other facilities to mount simultaneously both the cross-channel and the Mediterranean attacks in the strength we wanted 6 ,,, Whether such a shortage will exist in is a matter of speculation. future operations light. No medium artillery was organic

. The requirements for landing craft

were not known, at the start of World War II and craft were designed and produced as the need became apparant. Much experienceResearch-

was gained at this time and some craft are now available.

and development has continued to the present time as will be -seenin later chapters. There is little reason to believe that such-

a serious shortage should exist in future operations,-These factors no doubt influenced the composition of landing forces in World

War

II

Certainly the shortage of land-

ing craft suitable for transporting armored vehicles was a deciding factor in all these operations.:

What has been done since then to correct the weaknesses of the armored division and is landings? the division suitable for assault

By June 1945 organizational changes were being solid-

ified by the War Department for a new type armored division based on the concepts of our armored commanders,, It-was realized that

there was a definite pla ce in

our armored organization for the

heavy type division to perform missions beyond the capabilities of the light armored division. In the new armored division, prescribed in October 1948,

combat effectiveness and service support were increased materially, (See appendix IV). The armored infantry units were reorganized

to provide four rifle companies in each armored infantry battalioa and an additional battalion was added to give a total of sixteen rifle companies compared to nine in the former organization. quartermaster battalion was added to provide the much needed service support to make the division logistically self sufficient for limited operations. A medium artillery battalion was added A

to provide the balance of artillery required for fire support, Other units added are the heavy tank battalion and an antiaircraft artillery battalion to bring the total strength of the division to 15,973. The division now possesses a balance of arms and services required for the accomplishment of assigned missions and son characteristics particularly desirable in a unit employed in amphibious operations. A high degree of flexibility is provided in the division The

by the combat command-seperate battalion organization. seperate battalion is

self sufficient administratively with organic Battalions

supply, maintenance, and administrative personnel.

and companies from the battalions may be assigned to the combat commands for a particular mission

-without interference

with its

service support ar ability to operate independently.

This

flexibility in the formation of combat teams is of particular importance in landing operations because of the required special organization for landing, Combat command staffs are accustomed The

to having a variety of types of units under their control. integration of these units into a fighting team for maximum efficiency is a daily problem.

One other point that cannot be overlooked.

The infantry

and tank soldi rs of the division are trained from the beginning to take their place as a part of the tank infantry team. Rarely

does the armored infantry battalion fight without attached tanks. Conversely, infantry. the tank battalion rarely fights without attached

This practice of fighting as a part of a task force

rather than as battalions develops in the individual a ready ability to fight in any type of organization,

The automatic weapons essential to the early stages of an amphibious operation are present in power of the division is tremendous. the division. The fire

The following table shows the armored infantry battalion

the number and types of weapons in

compared to those of the standard infantry battalion, Figure 2 COMPKRISON OF AUTOMILTIC TEAPONS

MG,

Cal 30 light

MG, cal 30 heavy

MGG cal 50

BAR

SMG

Armd

Inf.

Bn

45
13
. . . r .' . " -. . . .

38
4
. . . " - ... . - T .

9
8
. . . . . . ..

37
45
. ..

123
0
. ..

Inf Bn,

Inf Div

Figures taken from CS 2, The Armored School, Sept 1949 and Reference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School, May 1951, The automatic weapons of attached tanks are added to the figures above when combined into tank infantry teams, The armored division operates with radio as the normal means of communication. This flexible means is required for

effective control of a mobile unit. equipment is present in the division.

Adequate communications For example, the armored

infantry battalion is equipped with 202 radio sets of all types. of which 169 are suitable for hand carry. Special communications to

control assault units, naval gunfire and air support is essential in landing operations. The communications equipment of the armored

division meets this requirement. The armored division is ashore, a completely mobile unit. Once

this mobility combined with the characteristic

shock of

the landing would enable the division to quickly expand the beachhead and capture the assigned objective. The characteristics favoring the employment of the armored division in landing operations have been pointed out. exists, however,

Ote

problem The

that should be considered at this time.

heavy equipment providing the mobility and armor protection presents a problem when considered in World War II. connection with conditions existing in

A comparision of the total vehicles in the armored

division and the infantry division is given in Fig 3.. This comparis6n points up the fact that although the

armored division has fewer general purpose vehicles and trailers, it has approximately 1000 more armored vehicles than the infantry division;, This requirement for shipping space could be lowered

somewhat by the elimination of some nonessential administrative 66

vehicles when combat 'loading and in could land and operate initially carriers. This, however,

addition,

armored infantry

without armored personnel

would seriously restrict the mobility

of the unit ashore if

carriers did not follow closely and the

effectiveness of the division would be neutralized to some degree.

Figure 3 COPARISTON OF V TTICL'S BY TYPE

Unarmored (All types)

Armored (All types)

Trailers

Infantry Division Armored Division

2334

259

1514

2165

1241*

1358 and all

*Figures include 636 armored personnel carriers self propelled artillery.

Figures taken from Instructional Pamphlet CS 2, Sept 1949 and Reference Data Infantry Regiment, May 1951.

The Armored School, The Infantry School,

CONCLUSION

In

this

chapter

an attempt has been made to point out

some of the factors

that must be considered before a dedision

can be reqched to employ an armored division as an assault landing force. Many other factors must be considered effect of adverse organ-

sea and weather,

organization of the force elements,

for landing,

ization of shore logistical considerations

to name a few.

These

are inherent in

any amphibious

operation and not The

special considerations characteristics

affecting the armored division alone.

and capabilities

of the armored division of today

must be considered when planning future.

amphibious operations of the

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
1

FM 31-5,

(War Department,

November

1944),

p 150

2 3

:Ibid,

p,151 (Department of the Army, February 1951),p 227 (US Government Printing Office, 1950)

FM 60-5,

4The Army Almanac,
p 275.
5

Ibid Crusade in Europe, (Doubleday

6Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, & Co, 1948), p 231.

CHAPTER 4 SPECIAL VEHICLE REUIREMENTS The use of an armored division as an assault landing force is govetned largely by the type and availability of the

necessary equipment to get the armored vehicles from transport area over the last three to six thousand yards of water from naval transports to the beach. In this chapter we will discuss

the various methods and materiel used in the past, that presently available, and some possible future developments that will get us through this particularly vulnerable stage of an assault landing. Equipment for the Assault Beach landing of armored vehicles has been accomplished in two ways; (1) transporting tanks to the beach on naval land-

ing craft, or ships and (2), by making the tanks capable of floating and propelling themselves over this distance.
Craft and considerations involving their use will be

discussed in detail in

the following chapter.

HoNwever,

to

understand the necessity for the development of amphibious vehicles and related equipment we should remember some of the advantages and disadvantages in the use of landing ships as a This method requires

method of getting armor on the beach.

less shipping space than when tanks are equipped to float and allows speedier movement to the beach. beach is The movement to the

easier to control and almost unlimited time can be On the other

spent in the transport area prior to the assault,

69

hand use of our present landing Ships limits almost entirely the employment of the tank guns during the assault, presents a large target, and entails the loss of all tanks as well as the landing Ship itself if sunk. In some instances it requires

a ship of the LSD type to carry the loaded landing Ship to the assault area. These and other considerations brought about the development of two general types of amphibious equipment to get armor ashore. Devices were built to make standard tanks float, and

for the primary purpose of amphibious operations, tanks capable of "swimming" without special attachments were manufactured. In discussing these vehicles and vehicular equipment we should first realize what characteristos are desired and then we will be better able to decide whether these requirements have been met satisfactorily. Also we must keep in mind that our

purpose in this discussion is to arrive at the best method of landing an armored division in an amphibious assault. Starting from the beginning we first want to take up as little shipping space as possible, We want ease of launching

from the transport, and a certain degree of safety in the water. Sufficient speed to allow us to accompany assaulting infantry is required. We must have enough endurance to allow for

necessary assembly in the transport area, movement to the beach, and. normal operation after landing. be maneuverable in the water. gun during the assault. Also the vehicle should

We must be able to fire the tank

Upon reaching shore the vehicle must be

capable of immediate combat and should be able to discard in a minimum of time any flotation equipment which hinders its operation. These requirements must in no way reduce the land

amount of ammunition carried by the vehicle. With these requirements in mind we will discuss in more detail what equipment is available to meet them. Duplex Drive Tank. One of the earliest developments for available or could conceivably be made

floating standard type tanks was the Duplex Drive of DD tank. Designed by the British and used in World War II, it consisted

of a medium tank with a collapsible canvas wall built around it just above the tracks, it Propellers were geared to the engine and With the addition of waterproof-

was steered by two rudders.

ing the tank was able to float and propel itself through deep water until the tracks contacted the ground. Upon reaching shore

the propellers were disengaged and the canvas wall was collapsed, allowing the tank to operate normally. About three times as many DD tanks can be carried in one landing craft as those fitted with pontoons. The system

does not greatly restrict the mobility of the vehicle and it enables a tank when so equipped to cross more than one water obstacle. Preparation for swimming requires very little time62

The vehicles can be used only in water as there is

comparatively quiet

danger of being swamped in heavy seas or by Due to the

the surf as the tracks make cn.tact with the beach,

height of the canvas float the main armament cannot be fired
71

tp

Y: b

while the tanks is

in the water.

The canvas is

also highly

vulnerable to underwater obstacles. Rigid Flotation Devies. A more rugged type of

flotation device for the M4 medium tank, known as the T-6 was employed experimentally by Marine and Army tank units during the Okinawa landing. ...The T-6 consists essentially of six steel pontoons; one pontoon on each side of the tank, one on the bow, one on the rear, with bow extension and rear extension pontoons which hinge upward for more compact stowage prior to launching. The six pontoons are compartmented by sheet steel partitions into many sub-compartments; Sub-compartments are filled with plastic foam-to further ensure buoyancy should the pontoons 'bec one punctured. T-6 floated tanks are seaworthy, having been successfully tested in twelve foot waves. The floated tank is fortythree feet long and therefore provides a fairly stable gun platofrm, enabling a tank gunner employing the gyrostabilizer to deliver accurate fire during the beach approach. Compared with LVT(A)ts (amphibious tanks), the floated tank constitutes a more stable gun platform; the higher velocity and greater accuracy of the stabilized tank gun in comparision with the LVT(A) howitzer and the tank's heavier armor, are important advantages. Pontoons are jettisonable form inside the tank on reaching the beach. Pontoons are remountable and can be reused. T-6 devices, as used on Okinawa, generally provided adequate flotation but needed further development to improve steering, to increase speed above the 42 knots obtained by the tank tracks revolving in the water, and to provide a reverse... Little modification has been made on this device. is now called the M-19 Flotation Device by the Army. It

Some of

the disadvantages are readily apparent in the specificationsIts length is 47 feet 8 inches, width 11 feet, and heiaght 11

feet 8 inches (including exhaust and intake stack of waterproofL Ing kit) when prepared for launching: The front and rear out-

boards can be folded upward for loading, reducing the length

to 33 feet 7 inches and increasing the height only two inches. The weight of the flotation device is approximately 16 tons. No improvement has been made in manner of propulsion and the speed remains about five miles per hour in water.4 The same principle was employed in the development of the TS swimming device for the M-26 Tank, This model could

probably be adapted very easily for use on the M-46 or M-47 tank. To compensate for the weight of the M-26 tank it was necessary to increase the length of the device to 65 feet and the width to 14 feet. pounds. 5 The weight of the device itself is 34,000

Since this is the latest equipment built along this

line the following extracts from the development report gives a good picture of its capabilities and limitations. DESCRIPTION: .... The Deive, T8 provides the means for floating the Medium Tank, M26 as a self-propelled unit. It consists of metal floats in four jettisonable assemblies with propulsion furnished by the vehicle tracks; steering is accomplished with two rudders....The rudders are manually operated by a crank handle in the driver's compartment which connect to the rudders by chain and cable. The vehicle is equipped with a standard fording kit... PURPOSE : To provide flotation equipment which will permit the Medium Tank, N26 to negotiate, under its own power, deep rivers and expanses of ocean. HISTORY: The first test of the equipment was made at APG (Aberdeen Proving Ground,) 25 April 1946,..(The size and weight of the device poses a problem in logistics. Assembly under field.caditions would be a major problem. It was recommended.. "No further development work should be carreid on with floating devices of this type for the Medium Tank or tther vehicles of equal or greater 5 weight except as an expedient ..

1.26,

The rear extension and the width of the device make

7>1

f

T

+44

f
3

launching from the landing Ships impossible.

They can only

be launched from a ship of the LSD type which actually floats the tank inside the ship allowing it power. The poor speed and maneuverability in water of tanks equipped with this device might possibly be improved with the installation of removable propellers geared to each rear track idler. This would enable the driver to speed up or slow down done to move out under its own

either propeller by use of the normal tank steering as is with all water craft having two propellers. LVT!a and LVT (A)s

Amphibious tanks ar Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored) while not organic to the Armored Division, might be issued for the initial assault and used until the standard tanks can come ashore, or Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions could be attached for the assault phase. The initial assault is the

normal mission for units equipped with these vehicles. LVT's have been used successfully in many amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II inchon landing in Korea. and as recently as the

These vehicles are all basically

the same with the exception that the LVT(A)l mounted a 37 mm gun while the LVT(A) -4)s and 5s mount a 75 mm howitzer. The The

4s and 5s are the only type in use by the Army at present. primary differences in the LVT(A)4 and the LVT(A)5 are the

addition of a gyrostabilizer and poweroperated turret on the latter.

~
: 04 d

V7

LVT(A)'s

need no

special

preparation for swimming.

Their tracks are equipped with a double cup welded to each section which gives better

traction in

the water,

but speed

is still only about 5.7 mph. amphibious operations

Being specifically designed for

it has poor cross country endurance,

particularly in regard to tracks. armor make it
ing the for infantry

A high silhouette and thin accompanyused

vulnerable to
to their It

anti-tank fire, so after
objective capable it is usually

first is

artillery tons stages

support.

of carrying often in short

over two and supply in

one-half the first

of ammunition which is of a landing. of the

Amphibious persornnel as the

tractors

LVT(4) type

are

cargo and

carriers and have the

same suspension system and engine is open and the

amphibious tank,

Their cargo compartment

rear door is
equipment at eight

a hinged ramp which allows the loading of such
4 ton

as the

truck or 105mm howitzer.
but have been known to load is, on land.

They are rated carry as much as hard on

8000 pounds capacity tons in still

water.

Such a operating

of course,

the suspension Marine differs the side only in

system wTvhen units that

are prosently equipped with LVT3 which it instead has two Cadillac of the engines mounted in behind the

pontoons

air--cooled engine

drivers compartment as in the LV74.

This results in some

reduction of the cargo compartment.
nor the of the two Cadillac tanks and tractors engines

'Neither the radial engine
for the weight

give enough power loads they

and the

carry.

'The

Vehicles cannot be steered at low speeds in the water due to the track propulsion. Also continual turning causes the brake bands

to heat up and become inoperative. None of these vehicles have been manufactured since World War II. Haoever, the Army has one regular battalion and

other Reserve and National Guard battalions consisting of two companies of tanks and two companies of tractors each. They

are equipped with the LVT(A)4 and LVT(A)5 in the tank companies and the LVT in the tractor companies. A modification has been made on the LVT3 by way of a removable armored cover for the cargo compartment making it a good armored personnel carrier. It was used as such by the

Marines in the Inchon Landing and for two crossings of the Han River. This could well be an answer to the problem of armored

personnel carriers not being able to accompany the armored infantry in the initial assault waves of the armored division, As mentioned above all tanks using

Deep Fording Kits. either the DD or

rigid type of swimming device as well as

those brought ashore by landing craft require the use of deep fording kits. Such kits are available for all armored vehicles

presently in use and are composed generally of exhaust and intake stacks, waterproofing compound and tape. Installation

required around four hours by a crew with proper supervision. On some vehicles it is necessary to weld adapter plates to the tank for installation of stacks.5 Deep fording kits allow a tank to be submerged to the 80

top of the turret if so desired4

Those portions of the kit

which inhibit normal operation of the vehicle can be quickly and easily removed. Wheeled Vehicles. Wheeled vehicles .needed on an

amphibious assault present no particular problem as they will necessarily be brought ashore in landing craft. Most recently

developed wheeled vehicles are water-proofed when built and some are capable of operation while completely submerged.5 If older type vehicles are used, water-proofing kits are available to make them capable of moving under their own power through the water between the landing craft ramp and the beach. Uhderwater Tanks. An article In "Mechanic Illustrated"

envisions an underwater tank mounting a recoilless rifle 6 and may not be as visionary as it sounds according to an unconfirmed report of an ex-German officer published in "Armor Magazine". This officer states he was trained in undersea tanks for the planned invasion of England in World War

11.7

An operation using such undersea tanks would require extensive reconnaissance of the ocean floor and the beaches. Also many beaches which might otherwise make good landing areas would have to be ruled out because of very deep water or because of the existence of a shelf, or other underwater obstacle. This would limit even further the normally limited use of amphibious tanks. If, however, standard tanks could be equipped

economically and with sufficient margin of safety for this type operation, it would solve some of our problems. There would

be no need to fire the main armament between ship and shore, shore batteries would have little or no effect during the and certainly there would

most hazardous part of the operation, be a degree of surprise inherent.

Some problems which would probably arise in

such a

vehicle would be those of exhaust and air intake or a special engine-burning fuel which supplies its own oxygen. lems which would arise are air for the crew, Other prob-

underwater navi-

gation, traction - on soft ocean floor, escape mechanism for crew, and lowering the vehicle from the ship to the ocean floor. How-

ever, more thought could well be given this subject. Planned Developments. There is no indication. of any Army toward solv-

development or research at present in the U.S.

ing the problem of ship to shore movement of armored vehicles under their own power. Report of the Combined Conference on Armor

for 1949 states in effect that for the present the British will proceed with their development of DD type swimming devices and the United States will continue to develop the rigid type like the T8 for all tanks of the light and medium classes,
2

The

Report of Cqmbined Conference on Armor for 1951 states essen. tially the same thing with no indication of any progress being made in the intervening two years. United States, as far as is known, The present plans of the call for no research toward

the design of an improved amphibious tank, Conclusions, medium tank it is Due to the great weight of our present

obvious that any rigid device to float them

will necessarily be very large.

It is not desirable to modify

the tank at the factory for propellers because of increased weight and cost, Non-rigid devices have not proved reliable The problems of speed, endurance;

under fire or in rough water.

maheuverability, as well as that of increased shipping space requirements still remain in the use of the rigid type. They

would probably be very useful on a shore tp-shore operation, river crossing, or in crossing reefs, but the facts indicate that an entirely different method should be developed to take tanks to the beach on a ship to shore assault.. The LVT(A) s while giving the best solution available at present still la ck speed and maneuverability. more powerful gun, more armor, and a bigger engine, They need a but this

would cause a corresponding increase in size and weight. The best solution for the problem of transporting Armor in an assault landing, we believe, is the further development of a new tank landing craft which will eliminate many of the disadvantages inherent in those presently available.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4
1

Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Army, 20 Octcter 1943 to 1 August 1944, a report prepared by the Armored Sction lst U.S. Army, P 194.
2 3

Report of Combined Conference on. Armor 17-24 March 1949

Amphibious Operations Empleyment of Tanks, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, PHIB-18, pp 27, 28, 29.
4

Report of Subcommittee

on Automotive Equipment to

Ordnance Technical Committees,

5 MJ

194h 6

Research Developme nt Manual, Combat Vehicles and Wheeled Transport '.,Vhicle Components, ORDMX-D, Detroit Arsenal, Centerline, Michigan"Undersea Tank" Armor, Photographs and Editorial Comment, January February 1951, LX, p 39
6 7 Major Charles R. Cawthon, "Amphibious Tapk Experiment", LX, September October 1951, p 26.

Armor,

CHAPTER 5 NAVAL REQUIREMENTS Through the ages Armies have relied upon Navies to

move them from the continent to continent and'to maintain their supply lines, However, World War II was the greatest period of The combined

Development of the amphibious operation per se.

arems concept of warfare was extended to include joint ArmyNavy command relationships, staff planning, and fire support. To execute these amphibious operations specialized ships were required. The necessity for invasion from the sea, beginning

in North Africa and Sicily and continuing through Normandy against the German; from Guadalcanal almost tlo the main islands of Japan in oraft all the Pacific brought about these developments. shallow draft, flat bottomed, and capable ranging in These

of unloadsize from length.

in men and vehicles directly onto a beach,

seven foot rubber boats to ships of over 300 feet in Since World War II, Army equipment. This is

there have been many changes in

especially true of the Armored Division

where the weight of the medium tanks of its main striking force have increased by approximately 15 tons. This exceeds or alters

the rated capacities of most of the World War I.I landing craft. The latest Naval concept of the ship-to shore movement is based upon dispersion and speed. This is dictate. by the

obvious atomic bomb target that the invasion fleet presents To gain dispersion, consideration is being given to moving

A2b-AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

i|
Type Amphibious Force Flagship Class ISymbol | AGO Appalachian Mt McKinley
Adirondack

ISe Id
(4) (8)
(3)

Length Beam 459 63 459 63
459 63

Draft 24' 24'
24'

Cargo Ship, Attack Transport, Attack

Hi-Speed Transport Escort Vessel, Control Submarine Transport Submarine Cargo Vessel Landing Ship, Dock

ex c WAGC AKA Arcturus APA President Jackson | Crescent City ( Arthur Middleton Bayfield S Haskell APD Charles Lawrence Crosley IDEC DE 217 ASSP Perch

(1) (18) (1) (4) (3) (6) (57) (41) (51) (1) (2) 1 (1) (8) (3)1 (9) (1) (127) (2)

244 459 492 491 489 492 455 306 306 306 312 312 458 458 458 458

36 63 70 66 70 70 62 37 37 37 27 27 72 72 72 72

27' 27' 26' 29' 26' 24' 13' 13' 14' 18' 17' 18' 18' 18' 18' 11' 13' 7' 8' 20' 20' 6' 6' 6' 6' 4' 8' 8'
9'

Range Max |Cruising I 116 kts 15 kts 31,089 @ 15 16 kts 115 kts 31,089 @ 15 16 kts 15 kts I31,089 @ 15 16 kts 17 kts 115 kts 1 1',086 @ 15 18 kts 17 kts 18 kts 17 kts 15 kts li,630 @ 15 17 kts 115 kts 1,800 @ 15 24 kts 115 kts i,00 @ 15 24 kts 15 kts i,100 @ 15 24 kts 15kts 5,100 @ 15 15 kts 13 kts*l 12,000 @ 13

kts kts
kts

Dlsp 7,431 7,234
6,884

Troop Cargo Capacitv Capacity Landina Craft Off Enl ITons (Combat)l SqFt | CuFt I LCM 8 LCM S LCVP ( LCPL -2 | 4 105*1 500* ** - I - | . 2 4 105* 500*1 ** - I I
105*1 500*1 ** -

LCPR 2 2
2

Cargo Booms 4-10T 4-10T
4-10T

NOTES *Varies depending on size of Naval Staff embarked. **Limited number of vehicles and essential equipment.

| 300,000

-

I
6

-

2

|

4

1,5321 kts 6,456 10,305 8,4291 110,812 8,100 kts kts 6,720 kts 1,400 kts 1,400 kts 1,400 kts*l 1,695

I
2 15 1 4-35T, 2-10T, 6-5T** *Includes using cots, only 54 regular bunks. *Arneb-AKA 56 has 1-60T boom.

12

90 94 86 12 12 5 -

160*1 I 1500 15001 1200 1300 | 1475 151 | 151 110 ] I 200 200 200 200

1500 500 500I 500 500 500 40 40 30 190

30,000

1

I
21,000 15,000 13,000 900 900 221,000 | 160,000 | 110,000 5,250 5,150 1,200 4 4 2 ** I 18 18 22 4 4 3 3 1 I 2 2 2-30T, 6-10T 1 I1-35T, 8-10T, 6-5T 2-5T 2-5T

I

200

I_ I
**1 LVT in hanger plus 8-LCR 10, 2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat-8 outboard engines for LR 10. *Surface **2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat. well )I(w/Pearl Harbor Deck )I(w/2temp.decks) Typical 3-LSU (Combat Loaded)l(18 LCM (combat loaded )I( 92 LVT or or * or load characteristics 18-LCM (Combat Loaded)l( 23 LVT or 27 DUKW )]( 108 DUKW ) or 41 LVT *Cargo Capacity shown is that of 3 combat loaded LSU or 18 LCM. *Loading shown is that required to permit ships to beach. Amphibian vehicles may he carried in addition. Pontoon causeways, pontoon barges and LSU may be carried in addition but must be launched prior to beaching. *Surface

I

I I I
2 2 2 2

I

I IASSA I
LSD Barbero Ashland SCasa Grande Cabildo SFort Marion LST-1 LST-1153 LSM-1 LSMR-188 Catskill 15 kts 113 kts*l 12,000 @ 13 kts*l 1,525 I 1 15 kts 112 kts I 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,490 15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,490 15 kts 112 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,547 15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts 4,547 12 kts | 9 kts 13 kts 9 kts 13 kts 13 kts 20 kts 20 kts 14 kts 14 kts 14 kts 14 kts 8 kts 20 kts 20 kts
15 kts

20 20 20 20

I
4b1 450* 450*

SI
Landing Ship, Tank LST

I
50 54 35 35 70 60 24 24 24 24 33 23 23
33

I
127 180

I

328 382 204 204 454 458 159 159 159 158 119 174 174
185

21,000 @ 12,263 @

9 kts I 1,625 9 kts I 2,324

14 17

I

500* 500" 165 * * 75 -

| **I I I(Open I 5,6401 5,640* 5,640*1 5,640*1 I I I I 13,000 110,000 17,800 145,000 I 2,900 9,740 9,740 20,500 82,750 | 82,750 -

11,400

1 1 11 1

-

2-35T 2-35T 2-35T 2-35T 1-3T crawler crane 2-7%T

I
-

I
3 4 1 I

SI
Landing Ship, Medium Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) Landing Ship, Vehicle Landing Ship, Flotilla Flagship Landing Ship, Infantry, Large Landing Ship, Infantry, Mortar Landing Ship, Support, Large Landing Ship, Utility Submarine Chaser (173') Control
Escort, (180'), Control

LSM LSMR LSV

SOsage
I LSFF LSFF-367 LSIL LSIL-351 I LSIM ILSIL LSSL LSSL-1 LSU LSU-501 PCC IPCC-289 PCC-463
PCEC PCEC-873

(159) (48) I (2) (3) (25) (70) (1) (98)1 (125) (7) (11)
(4)

12 kts 12 kts | | 12 12 12 12 7 115 15

4,00 @ 12 kts 3,000 @ 12 kts

kts kts kts kts kts kts kts

8,000 8,000 8,000 5,500 1,200

@ @ @ @ @

12 12 12 12 7

kts kts kts kts kts

520 6 840 5,177 4,626 234 2091 91 233 2501 158 315 315
640

51 800" 800 -200

-

14 14

-

-

1-30T 1-30T

*44 DUKW-LVT cannot be carried. *21 LVT and 31 DUKW or 1800 troops w/o vehicles.

I I

--

150

1,800I

-II-

12 kts

RD 7248(C)

Chart No. 4-A-2b

directly to the beach with the possible elimination of the rendezvous area (as referred to in waves form in the transport area, FM 60-10). The assault

possibly out of sight of

land and move directly to the beach past control vessels acting as check points and lines of departure. is Further dispersion

obtained by increasing the size of the transport group

circels and distance between theme. To obtain speed, control, and maneuverability, it is

envisioned that the Tank-Infantry team will be landed in the assault by Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel, Mechanized, Landing Craft, by Landing

and under the most ideal conditions, Medium,

Ship, Utility and Landing Ships, for each of these vessels is

The maximum speed

approximately 10 knots.

In discussing the shipping requirements for landing an Armored Division in assault, we will deal with both present A discussion of each of

standard and proposed landing craft.

the landing craft considered usable in the assault phase of the Armored Division landing followvs. Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-6) 2 to land It is not

This vessel was designed during World War II one M-4 medium tank or 68,000 pounds of supplies.

suitable for landing a modern medium tank of the M-46 or 47 type; it is capable, however, of landing any of the follow-

ing Armored Division loads : 1 Light Tank M-24 1 Loaded Half Track

4 Loaded iton 2 Loaded

Trucks

-ton Trucks with trailers. Mechanized (LSM-8)
3

Landing Craft,

The latest developments in tank landing craft are a series of LCM-8's known as "H1", " and "U". The most radical It is a scow-

and the one showing the most promise is

the LCM (8H).

bowed craft with a ramp; very similar in appearance to the LCMi-6 but much larger. feet. Its length over all is is 90 feet with a beam of 21

The LCM (8H)

capable of carrying and beaching a 70 ton It can carry two TD-24 angle dozers These loads

load at a speed of 10,7 knots. or two M-4A3E8 medium tanks, have actually been carried in considered "full load." it is

or one M-26 medium tank. test.

Two M-4A3E8 medium tanks are that

The main feature of this vessel is

provided with retractable caterpillar treads which enable Its speed

it to crawl over bars and land high up on the beach. using these traction units is the "8" 65 feet per minute.

The ramps of all

series of LCM's are fixed so that embarked tanks can fire Although not proven

their main armament to the front and flanks. by test, it is

expected that a Landing Ship Dock will carry seven

LCM (8H)Is.
The LCM (8W) capable and LCM (8V) are similar in that they are

of carrying a 70 ton load (one tank, embarked well

astern in the well deck to preserve'.tim) at a speed of 10 knots. They differ in hull shape, one being V-shaped, the other W-

shaped, and do not have the traction mechanism.

WHEELHOUSE

2-20MM

WINCH

."0

ORE W

(9 V-'--J
STERN SEC/LWN-I HArCH

fT -

~

\

.

yL.J - 00

IPOR'TABLtE
I RO E AVIT DO

,/f)SN/PS

SEC/ON

LANDING SHIP? UTILITY

COCKPITP 77E RINGS
---

0'

tO'

--

186"

SLINC SPACIA16

LANDING CR~AFT

-MCHANIZED

6

Their over all length is feet, LSD

70 feet compared with the H's 90

giving a template loading figure of nine aboard an The Landing Ship, Dock at present seems to be the only

practical way of transporting these craft because of their size and lifting weights (56 tons for the "V" for the "H", Landing Craft, Mechanized are considered appropriate for landing tanks on histile shores under fire. 'Current Navy and '"W" and 110,5 tons

doctrine prefers the use of these craft rather than dealing with the greater ocean going shipping problem incurred when handling tanks fitted with "one way" flotation devices.
4

It

is

expected

that LCM-6 and LCM-8 will land the tanks and reconnaissance units, fromn -Hour to H plus 60, and, of course, a certain

percentage of them can be used more than once, losses. Ship, Utility (LSU) (Formerly known as LOT-5).
5

depending upon

A somewhat larger vessel

than the LCM, this vessel is capable of beaching a load of 150 tons, or three medium tanks. it is Because of its greater

vulnerability,

expected that this vessel will be used

for landing the Armor of the floating re serve and supply vehicles. Under the most ideal beach and surf conditions and it could be used for assault

light to moderate resistance, waves.

Typical loads for the LSU are 3 Medium Tanks M-46 or 47 9 Loaded 2 -ton Trucks

9 Loaded Half Tracks This ship can also be loaded at sea from Landing Ship., Tank by lashing the LSU to the open ramp of the TST and opening its stern gate. Thus, any vehicle aboard the LST can be This technique Its. ability

driven aboard the LSU and taken to the beach. would be useful in

landing reserve tanks "on call."

to be used in this fashion and as a lighter to unload transports and cargo ships makes it phase. most valuable in the supply build up

It is normally carried long distances aboard LSD's or

in special launching racks on LST's. LANDING SHIP, I DIUi (LSM)
6 \

Although similar in capacity and use to the LSU, the LSM is a larger vessel with accomodations for troops. It is

definitely a sea going vessel. 500 miles. It is

Its speed is 13 knots; range

capable of. carrying 165 tons of cargo or other typical loads would be

three medium tanks;

6 Motor Gun Carriage I, -37 9 Loaded 22-ton Trucks. Many of these have been converted to support ships by the addition of multiple rocket launching racks.
Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 7

The largest ocean going ship that is beach and land tanks over a bow ramp.

designed to

Its enclosed tank

deck will hold 10 medium tanks or 500 tons for beaching purposes. Total pay load is 1,900 tons, but the draft with Its speed loaded is 9 knots.

this load precludes beaching.

04 Vit /-4GCM/-0M WHEErL HOUSE

23'9",r/4' ELE VAr-OR (OLD rrPE) J/'6 "X 9' RAMP HArcH

LCT (f)

OR

(6)

fsT

VENTS

\

/-40 MM M ,2-20

SINGLE

40

MM

20

MM

40

MM

20 ~o

MM

20

MM 20 MM

/

OFF

E PS

MESS O

0

p

o

0 Q

0

0

0

0 0

0

C7

CP_

Y

O

F

O o

N.

C

00
"; OFF/ ERs c o_ O in O
MM

o

a

c

o

o

E
o -0

o

0

0

c1

c

a

0

ra

40

MM

20

MA/

0

VV

20

20

MM

20

MM

LANDING SHIP TANK
0'

25"
-s-STORESY
-.

203 6
-GALLEY---

EN/GINE

HATCH' OV/R

LANDING SHIP MDIUM

It

can carry 350 tens of vehicles

(no tanks)

or cargo as a,

deck load or one LSU in a launching cradle or two LCM(6)'s Pontoon causeway sections and barges may be carried also but must be launched prior to beaching. It is envisioned that the

bulk of the Armored Division support,

logistical, and reserve

elements would-be carried aboard LST's, Landing Craft, Vehicle, This vessel is Personnel (LCVP)
8

designed to land 36 dismounted troops The initial waves of Armored Inf-

of 8,100 pounds of cargo.

antry (without carriers) will be landed in this type craft. Other typical loads are 1 -ton Truck and Trailer

1 3/4-ton Truck The normal operating procedure for the ocean going shipping is to preload the LCMts and LSU's and carry them Dock (LSD's), An LSD can carry 14

aboard Landing Ships, loaded LCM(6)'s, (8)s,.

3 loaded LSL's,

and seven to 9 loaded LCM davits or stacked on the that carry the

The LCVP 1 s are carried in

deck on the same transports (APAts and AKAts)

infantry and are loaded in the transport area off shore from the hostile beach. An APA (Haskall Class) carries 1,581 an AKI (Arcturus Class) carriers 1500

troops and 22 LCVP's tons of cargo,

172 troops and 15 LCVP's.

Standard amphibious practice for landing direct support artillery is to use amphibious 2-:ton trucks, DUETs, The

DUiKWXs are preloaded with towed artillery pieces and are launched from an LST as an "on call" wave and unloaded by an A-Frame

Is

Pi;

Ii>

8~

Li11i
iL9Lli
BEAC~I

Thiff'
LP -

led~~~~

:6

I8I'

i]t[6.

Fes,'

M1 °-I

Tis TI
jpiLCV?

ill7~

'

Is iS S

6LCM6
}LCM8H

LLTL
t IL
Chart 94 2

SLST

ad winh. on the DUTWat.

The Armored Field Artillery of the

Armored Division will be landed later directly cn the beach from LST s. It is envisioned that Air support, Naval gunfire

and 4.2 mortars will provide sufficient fire support until the above can be accomplished safely. The problem of reefs and/or obstacles remains. envision it being solved by landing UDT's and/of We

engineer breaching teams depending upon the obstacle to be cleared prior to the arrival of the tank-infantry teams of the first wave. These breaching teams could be landed under cover

of darkness or by stealth from Perch class submarine Transports which will carry 115 troops, an' boats, LVT, and eight 10-man rubber needed.

complete with outboard rmotors if EXPLANATION OF CHART 2

1.

The first

wave contains four armored infantry rifle platoons This represents the assault rifle

and two medium tank platoons.

platoons and attached tank platoons of two armored infantry rifle companies (dismounted). and 10 LCM (8S)'s. They are transported in 8 ICVP's

2,

The second wave contains the remainder of both assault

armored infantry companies in 6 LVBPts.

3.

The third wave contains the other two rifle companies,

8mm

mortar platoon and command group of the armored infantry battalion, The only vehicles of the armored infantry battalion brought ashore up to now are the command half track and two 4-ton trucks. This

wave is

composed of 18 LCVP's and one LCM-6,

4,

The fourth wave cantains the balance of the assault tank

company and two reconnaissance platoons (mounted) -- one organic to the armored infantry battalion, the other organic to the same tank battalion that provided the tank company. of the reconnaissance platoons are in tanks and half track are in 6 LCM-6's. (81I) s in this wave. The -ton trucks

10 LCVPs while their light There are also seven LSM

5.

The fifth wave,

contains a 4.2 mortar platoon with trans. 8 LCVPts,

portation and extra ammunition in

64

The next three waves are "on call" waves, (a) A battalion of towed 105

consisting of

nm artillery in DUIe's

and one company of AAA (SP) (b) (c) A company of medium tanks The half tracks of the armored infantry battalion

loaded with ammunition and ration re-supply for their respective squads. Those waves would be called in by radio in the order

and at a time specified by Armored Infantry Battalion Commanding Officer. ing LSU's. if not, It These last three waves are all is aboard LSTts carry-

hoped that the LST's can be beached on call; contemplated..

use of the 9 LSU's as lighters is

7,

It

is

realized that a large portion of these vessels are This is is done to preserve

not filled to absolute capacity. tactical integrity of units and it

believed that remaining

space aboard craft will be taken up by extra ammunition, party elements would accompany waves 4 and 5. are not shown,

Shore

Their vessels

8,

The total ocean going transportation required to move the estimated

armored battalion landing team represented here is to be: 9 Landing Ships, Tank

3 Landing Ships, Dock 1 APA, Attack Transport

NOTES CHAPTER 5 Reith, George CDR. U.S.N., Member, Joint Amphibious Board. Interviewed at U,S.N.,B., Little Creek, Virginia, February, 1952. 2U.S. -Army, FM 60-5 Amphibious Operations ,Battalion in Assault Landing. Washington 25, D.C., 11 p 280 Naval Amphibious Test and Evaluation Unit, "Report of Beaching and Retracting Tests of Experimental LCIMs and LCVP's,. Amphibious Training Command, U,S, Atlantic Fleet, U.S.N.AB., Little Creek, Virginia, 1952 Peatross, Oscar F., 4Lt Col., MS.M.C., Amphibious Instructor, The Armored School, Interviewed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, December, 1951, LCDR,, U.S.N,, Member of Joint ,"i, Bridwell, Amphibious Board, Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek; Virginia, February, .1952,
5 5 4 3

U.S. Army, FM 605 Amphibious Operations,Battalion
Washington 25 , Appenix i ,

in

assault Lanin
6

7 1bid
7I' id

Ibid

97.

9 Ib id.

CHAPTER 6 AM~PHIB IOU S TRiAINING The ultimate goal of the armored division in the amphibious assault landing is to develop tank-infantry teams

in which the individual members kniow not only their own jobs but also how to function with other members of the team. These

teams may be as small as an infantry squad with one tank or as large as an infantry battalion supported by a tank company. infantry must be trained to protect tanks from enemy antitank measures during the reorganization after the landing. manders The comThe

of the coabined arms teams must be selected carefully, have complete control of their

because they will initially teams if ashore.

committed prior to reorganization of the assault units

The discussion of amphibious training herein is based on the following premises: 1. All individuals must have completed tactical

training in land warfare and technical training in the operation and care of organic weapons and equipment. 2. That the navy will use its present amphibious

training center for the armored divisions and provide special courses, conduct shore training, supervise and assist in ship-

board training. 3. .To prepare individuals, in units and staffs to per-

form their as signedpfunctions

a coqrdinated amphibious

assault landingi

The training must develop individual and

unit proficiency for the unified aggressive assault against an enemy held beach by the tank-infantry team. In order to clearly specify what type of training, special or otherviise, troops of the armored division must have in order to make an assault landing on hostile shores, we must first attempt to determine what type of craft or vehicles If the requirements

they would make the assault landing in.

are to swim tanks across the water in a ship-to-shore movement it would also be required that the vehicle must be able main armament while afloat.
1

to fire its

To date no major

power accepts the present DD (Duplex Drive) device on armor inasmuch as the equipment prohibits the use of the main armament of the tank while afloat. porting one or more tanks, If landing craft, capable of transis deemod

were utilized then it

necessary that the craft be so constructed that the tanks could fire their main armament over the bow ramps. Doctrine and techniques as set forth in Field Manuals 17-34, 60-5 and 60-10 clearly outline the necessary training if landing craft are used in the landin.g. The training time

would and could be cut down because present equipment was used. landing craft (as outlined in

of this especially if

In the event more modern and larger preceding chapters) are so con-

structed and are available then trainining problems would still be much simpler. However, if the training phase leans towards

the use of amphibious type tanks, then the training problems

100

become much more acute and individual and unit training time would have to be increased twofold. Even though landing craft or tanks were used, the individual training would certainly cover the same subjects. All units of the armored division, especially the main assault forces, tank and armored infantry battalions, would be given It is recognized

the same individual training and schooling.

that specialists from all units would attend specialists courses at amphibious training cetters. The individual training for
2

units of the division would include; 1. 2. naval customs 3. 4.
5.

Technique of embarkation Requirements of troop life aboard ship and

Survival at sea Technique of debarkation Conduct during the ship-to-shore movement Method of assaulting the hostile beach. Prior

6.

to conducting water exercises all personnel must undergo training in survival methods, procedure of using life belts and all

should have a basic knotwledge of how to swim, Individual crew members, drivers, and maintenance

sections of all units within the armored division will receive training in the proper method of waterproofing of wheeled and It is possible that the teams from TTU (Troop

track vehioles

Training Units) from amphibious training centers will conduct such training at the division's hmme station, At the same time

101

the Amphibious Training Command,

U.S. Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets are conducting waterproofing courses that are open to army personnel as individuals or for an entire unit. Like

courses are conducted by the Amphibious Training Commands for corrmunication personnel and intelligence personnel. The training schedules at present in effect in the armored division should be augmented by many subjects embracing the amphibious movement, appropriate Field The training schedule as outlined in

JManuals seems adequate for the basic training for this more specialized use of

of the individual; however,

the personnel and vehicles of the armored division, the training schedule would have to include many subjects of amphibious warfare., it is Returning to our previous statement of the fact that

possible for a landing to be made in landing craft or by must be ready to change the trainSubjects necessary for either

the swinming tank,. we still ing schedule to fit

either case.

type of training that must be included within the training schedule are: 1.. LANDING CRAPT AND LANDING SHIPS a.. Physical training,. swimmiing b.. Introduction to naval -- landing crafts '& landing awhips c. Boat:team organization

d.. Debarkation techniques e... Troop life aboard ship. f:. Medical treatment and evacuation

102

2,.

ST'IP-TO.'SHORE MOVEM4ENT OF TANKS a. Physical training, swimming

b.
c. d e. f. g.

Amphibious ship types
Driving water, individual, clay and night

Driving water, formation, day and night Combat firing, water Abandon tank exercises Navigation on water

Much detailed training would have to be spent on that portion of the training schedule if tanks were used rather than The problems are

landing craft to land the armored division.

ably put forth in this extract from the Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Operations Page 22:

in Europe of the A.E.F. to 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945,

It was, moreover, not possible in every beach to swim in the amphibious DD tanks upon which we relied to provide fire support for the infantry clearing the beach exits. These were launched at SWORD, UTAH and OMRHA beaches and, although late, reached land at the two formnr; at OMA k however, all but two or three foundered in the heavy seas,.., Unit training for the tank and armored infantry battalions may begin at the home station and continue at an amphibious traini ing center unless additional facilities such as adequate landing craft and a beach area are available near the home station. Unit training includes instruction in ship-to-shore movements,

boat discipline and assault landing tactics and techniques. Most important the instruction includes the organization, composition and formation of tank-infantry teams to further include-2 103

1.. The formation and tactics of assault waves 2. 3. 4, 5, Boat drills Reduction of beach defense Air support Naval gunfire support

Formations used by the amphibious teams are similar to those employed on land in unit training: line formations

of platoon or company strength for the initial assault wave or succeeding waves; column formation of platoons and companies abreast for the initial wave or succeeding waves; and an echelon or wedge formation
3

, Platoon and company training should

be conducted until all members of the teams are thoroughly familiar with the various assault landing formations. training phase concerning formations must be Each unit

.so

conducted that

the situation on the hostile shore and the surf would make it necessary to attack in various types of formations. Control

craft with suitable radios could conduct the phase and through the radio so chance the situation on shore so that the wave commander could change his formation. Familiarization of the

different types of formations should be conducted by sand tableand mock-up drills prior to the actual training in the water. Control through radios and arm signals is an important fact and will have to be continually stressed throughout the training. The main landing and the advance inland is the final part of unit training and emphasis must be. placed on the integration of the tank infantry teams and coordination of all

104

participating and supporting elements.

The tank-infantry

teams are organized and trained to reduce enemy installations in the immediate beachhead area~ The characteristics of the

available landing craft and naval ships may affect the composition of these teams. The landing exercises permit a check

on the status of training of the teams' For the initial phase of waterborne training the team

commanders will have to conditimon the members of the combined arms team to the continual hazards until each can overcome the natural fear of becoming trapped in a swamped landing craft or sinking tank, Exercises should be conducted near the shore and

escort craft should accompany each of the teams for salvage and emergency rescue. Commanders and key staff officers would be schooled in amphibious doctrine so that they can prepare their plans properly and assist in the preparatinn of joint armor and infantry plans. Staff training for amphibious operations is started. tVhen the division

completed before unit training is is

ready to start unit training the staffs prepare and superCommand post exercises are an Further staff instructions

vise the training exercises.

important part of staff training. should include : 1, 2. 3. 4. Operation orders Administrative orders Embarkation orders Debarkation orders

105

5. 6, 7, 8.

Approach schedules Loading diagrams Naval gunfire plans Shore party plans

Selected staff officers should receive special instructions in the principles of loading and the necessary coordination and the details of planning the combat loading and priority for unloading of the type of ships on which their units are to be transported, 1. 2, 3. The special instruction includes:

Loading diagrams Consolidated unit personnel and tonnage tables. Vehicle debarkation priority tables o the actual assault landing

Loading plans should c .nformr in

order to lend realism to the landing exercises. Upon completion of the unit training, landing exercises

should be conducted for assault teams of battalion size and larger, The purposes of these exercises are to test the plans

and to effect the necessary coordination to ensure the success of the landings. The area selected for these exercises should The shore

be a logical site for landing on a hostile shore.

line selected should offer no hazardous underwater formations nor strong offshore currents... Areas where live ammunition can be fired are highly desirable. 1. 2. The exercises should include:

Combat loading of troops and vehicles Voyage to exercise area with concurrent briefing

of the tank-infantry teams..

1.06

3.

Assembly and organization of landing waves in the

rendezvous area and movement to the line of departure. 4. 5. 6, 7, Assault landing Movement inland by the tank-infantry teams Landing under naval gunfire and air support Final ocitique

Other factors of importance to the teams and the division as a whole during the landing exercises are: 1. 2. 3. 4. Methods of control and communications Methods of recovery of vehicles in the water

Continuous maintenance of vehicles and equipment Medical treatment and evacuation during the ship-

to-shore movement. The amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,

located at Little Creek, Norfold, Virginia and U.S. Pacific Fleet, Coronedo, California conducts various amphibious trainTo attend It is

ing courses for navy, air forces and army personnel. courses army personnel request quotas through OCAFF.

deemed advisable that officer personnel assigned to specialist duties within the armored division be sent to these courses. The general Amphibious Communications course is for all phases of joint communications applicable in designed

amphibious

warfare, and to familiarize communication officers with the operation and use of communications equipment used in amphibious operations, including waterproofing. Instruction will also

107

include ship-to-shore phases, familiarization with tactical air control parties and shore fire control parties, as communications methods, techniques, doctrines, as well

organization,

and practices in amphibious warfare.

Similar courses are con-

ducted for enlisted communication personnel. The Naval Gunfire Spotters and AssistantSpotters course prepares troop officers and senior noncomissioned officers as naval gunfire spotters for duty in troop units. This course

includes map and aerial photograph reading; naval gunfire communications procedures, equipment and nets; elementary fire

control for gunfire support; extensive conduct of fire; a brief review of the tactical employment of field artillery and close air support; and the technique of executing naval gunfire support. A like course is designed for staff officers

to prepare them for duty with gunfire support groups, troop divisions and higher echelons in the fields of naval gunfire support and the coordination of the supporting arcs. Courses available at the Amphibious Training Command for composite groups of United States armed forces that personnel of the armored division could attend are: 1,. Troop amphibious staff planning course

2;
3.

Signal waterproofing course
1Wheeled

vehicle waterproofing course

108

In the event an armored division was selected to engage in amphibious training and exercises it seems logical from time, space, material and equipment involved from both the army and navy that only elements of the division would be actually trained at one time...,. Qoe battalion reinforced or elements of a combat command. This would involve moving the unit or

units selected to a previously designated coastal area with suitable terrain for onshore and offshore armored operations. Because of the large amount of equipment and number of vehicles that would have to be:oved to the coast, it is anticipated that the amphibious training center would have the necessary vehicles, equipment and landing craft on hand for the training period. Much of the training could be completed at the amored division's home station. However, because of the magnitude and importance

of the ship-to-shore movement training phase, training for assault teams and staff personnel, would have to be conducted on the water typical of that the division would be facing in the event they were to make an amphibious landing. Control,

communications and importance of realism in the ship-to-shore movement are important enough that this training should not be simulated if at .all possible. Conclusion To properly determine the type of special training the armored division must hate in order to make an amphibious landing, the conclusions reached in preceding chapters regarding new equipment must be studied. With present equipment in the

109

hands of the troops, there is

no doubt at all that training

doctrines and training equipment used in World War II would again have to be used. It is always important to remember basic in the

that the reproduction of actual conditions is education of troops.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 1Report of combined C nference on Armor, United States - United Kingdom - Canada. (Fort Monroe, Virginia 17-24 March 1949, Brigadier General Bruce C Clarke), p 11 2Catalo of Amphibious Training 1951 (Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet), p 21-32
3 Amphibious

Operations, Reiiment in Assault Land-

in s FM 60-10 (Department, of the Army, January 1952), Chapter 3 and 4.

110

CHAPTER 7 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT Conclusions made as a result of this study are of necessity based on some indefinite factors, be made on the basis of what is Assumptions must Past per-

presently known,

formances cannot be relied upon since, as has been pointed out, an entire armored division was not employed as a landing force in World War II tested. and the present organization is not combat

New armored equipment is

being developed and perAmphibious equipment This equipment

formance tests have not been completed. is

being produced to handle the heavier loads.

is still being tested.

Atomic weapons are being produced The princiiles

that will greatly affect all future operations. of war have not changed, however, for some conclusions.

and can provide the basis

The authors believe the arm-ored division of today could profitably be employed as an assault landing force and will have a place in the future. large scale amphibious operations of not expected to replace the

The division is

infantry division as the normal landing force, but rather, will be employed as a part of the corps as a complementary organization to the infantry division as in all other operations. Normal terrain limitations will apply possibly to other operations but the opportunity

a greater degree than in

for surprise cannot be overlooked4

.. Surprie .must be sought throughout the action by every means and by every echelon of command. Surprise may be produced by...,, by *ariations in the means and methods employed in combat, by rapidity and. power of execution; and by the utilization of terrain which appears to impose great difficulties.,, The armored division is operations in not suitable for prolonged

a small beachhead area and missions assigned to

the division must be those that utilize to the utmost the characteristics of mobility, heavy firepower and shock action.

The division might be employed in conjunction with airborne forces dropped on critical objectives inland from the beach area. The employment of the division to effect the

linkup would permit the use of airborne forces at a greater distance from the beach than has been possible in ations and result in past oper-

a more rapid expansion of the beachhead. a secondary land-

The armored division employed in

ing as an enveloping force could force the rapid expansion of the main beachhead by conducting a surprise attack on the flank or rear of the enemy opposing the main landing. The early seizure of major ports and airfields is essential to the rapid buildup of supplies and reinforcements for large:invading forces. for the armored division. Such a mission would be suitable
'i

The development of atomic weapons byp-ote

a.--

xemi es can be expected to force changes in the techniques employed in furure operations. The c a.centration of great small

numbers of ships and ladding craft in a re1aiely

transport area such as was used in World War II will be impossible in the face of an atomic threat. A much greater

dispersion of forces will be required and the transport area moved further offshore; The result will be increased problems The

of control for the landing force both afloat and ashore.

possibility of assault forces being landed on the wrong beaches and being widely separated will be greatly increased. cases it In some

may be desirable to employ a highly mobile armored

unit as the landing force to provide armor protection for the assault troops in the movement to the beach to insure prompt reorganization ashore, and to insure the rapid expansion of the beachhead. If the enemy has the capability of employing

atomic weapons against an invading force the concentration of large numbers of dismounted troops in be disastrous. ORGANIZATION FOR LANDING The successful accomplishment of anMy o the missions a small beachhead could

outlined above would depend upon the degree of surprise obtainedi n the operation and the speed of execution. These

requirements are not peculiar to this type operation alone nor to the armored division but arc required to a greater degree than in many other operations. the speed required, In order to obtain

special attention must be given to the

organization and training of the division shore party as well as the combat engineers required for the improvement of the beaches. Suitable attachments -would berequired to 113

perform the following functions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Embarkation of troops, .equipment, and supplies. Debarkation and landing of troops and equipment. Conduct of initial assault operations ashore.

Control of naval gunfire support. Discharge of cargo from assault shipping. Operation and tactical use of amphibious vehicles.

The attachments required to perform these functions would depend upon the mission, enemy forces and disposition, nature of the beaches and types of assault craft available. Suitable attachments for the division might include the following: 1. 2. 3, 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Division shore party. One or more combat engineer battalions. Naval gunfire ocntrol personnel.' Tactical air control parties. Two or more amphibious truck canpanies One or more amphibious tank battalions. One or more amphibious tractor battalions One or more chemical mortor battalion s. One or more artillery battalions. (DUKW).

Units must be assigned to combat commands as required to perform the assigned missions, personnel and equipment, to provide dispersion of

and to allow independent operation A typical combat

of the combat commands for a limited time. command organization might be as follows:

Two armored infantry batt4lions One medium tank battalion One armored field artillery battalion One armored engineer company One reconnaissance. company One antiaircraft artillery battery One armored signal company or detachment One armored ordnance company or detachment One military police platoon One armored medical company Combat command shore party Tactical air control. parties Quartermaster detachment FOR AT ION The formation adopted by the division for the assault landing will be governed by the mission and the distance to the objective. Missions requiring the division to make the

assault landing and to seize an objective at some distance from the beach will require the landing to be made in column of combat commands. a

The division' could land on a

comparatively narrow front with the leading combat command organized infantry heavy to establish the beachhead and protect the landing of other elements. The following combat

conmmands would be' permitted freedom of action to assemble rapidly and pass through the leading combat command to seize the distant objective. Disadvantages of this formation are

115

that a greater period of time would be required to land the division at a time when speed is essential and during this time the force would be concentrated in a small beachhead.

Missions requiring a limited objective attack or seizure of close-in terrain features would permit the division to attack with two combat commands abreast in the initial assault. Such a formation would speed the landing of the

division elements and allow greater dispersion of vehicles and personnel in the beachhead. In this formation forces

would bemore widely dispersed on the beach perimeter and only a small portion of the units would be uncommitted. This

formation limites the flexibility of the division and would be effective against light resistance. CO1NCLUSION This concept of employment does not differ from the published doctrine for amphibious operations and the general principles for employment of the armored division, Basically,

the question of successfully employing the armored division as an assault landing force depends upon the availability of suitable shipping and the selection of proper missions that utilize the .outstanding characteristics of the division. The

power of this unit must be exploited to the fullest in ope rat ions.

future

116

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, August 1949, Washington, D.C.

117

APPENDIX I

Troop List,. Task Force Red *
CCB,. 1st Armored Division 8 November 1942 Brigadier General Olvier,. Commanding Headquarters CCB Detachment, Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company Headquarters 13th Armored Regiment 13th Armored Regiment (1platoon)

Reconnaissance,

1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment (Reinforced) 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (Reinforced) 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced) Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (-1 platoon -1 squad) Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion Maintenance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment) Service Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment) Company B, 47th .Armored Medical Battalion (-Detachment) Company B, 1st Armored Supply Battalion (-1 platoon) 2nd Battalion, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment (-Company F) 106th Separate CA Battalion (AA) (-Battery D)

*From Field Order #1, feadquarters CCB, Division, 11 October 1942.

1st Armored

118

APPENDIX II Troop List, Task Force Green * CCB, Ist Armored Division

8 .November 1942 Colonel Robinette, Cor mmanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment) 1st Battalion, 13 Armored Regiment 1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) Battery C, 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced) Company C, 701st TD Battalion Battery D, 106th C A Battalion (AA) Company F, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment

Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company Detachment, Detachment, Company B, Company E, 47th Armored Medical Battalion 16th Armored Engineer Battalion 15th Armored Engineer Battalion (Re-

One Platoon, Company A, inforced)

One Platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (less one squad)

* From Field Order #l, Armored Division, 11 Oct 1942.

Headquarters CCB,

1st

APPENDIX III Troop List, CCA, 2nd Armored Division *

Operation HUSKY 10 June 1943 Brigadier General Maurice Rose, Commanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCA. 66th Armored Regiment 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less 14th Armored FA Battalion Company B, Company A, 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion 17th Armored Engineer Battalion 1st Battalion)

Company B, 48th A rmored Medical Battalion Company C, Division Maintenance Battalion Detachment, 142nd Armored Signal Company

* From the 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign, Committee 34, Advance Class 1949-1950, (Fort Knox: 1950),

120

APPENDIX IV Armored Division T/0 & E 17 (Abstract) 8 October 1948. Entire Division--------------- ....... -----------------. 15973 189
7

Division Headquarters --Medical Detachment

-----------------------------------------

Infantry Battalions (4) Tank Battalions

1089 677 757

(4)--------------------------

Heavy (1)----------------------------------

Medium (3)---------Combat Command, Hq & Hq Co (2)--------------Reserve Command, Hq & Hq Co (1)-------------Division Trains, Hq & Hq Co-----------------Field Artillery ----------------------------Reconnaissance Battalion -------------------Engineer Battalion -------------------------Medium Battalion ---------------------------Ordnance Battalion ------------------------Signal Company --------- -----------------Military Poliec Company -------------------Division Headquarters Company --------------Band ----------------------------------------Replacement Company ----------------------

113 111 100 3755 829 1095 424 737 374 188 166 70
41

Principal Armament Rifle, cal. 30 - ------ - - --3200 6938 167

Carbine,

cal. .30 - - 30
-

- - - - -

Auto Rifle, Cal,
MG, cal .30 -

- -

- - - - - -473

MG, cal, Mortars, Mortars,

50

- --

- --

- -- -

-

-

- - --

-

-- -

354 51 20 691 3 32
32
315

60 mm 81 mm

- - - -- - - - - - - --- - -

- -. .

- -. -

-

AT Rocket Launchers - - -Rifle, 75 m - - - - Carriage,
Carriage,
Tank,

- - - - - - - - ----

- -

- - --

motor multiple gun- motors twin 40 mm
-

- - --

--

mediu

Tank,

light motor:

---

- ---

-- ---

----

58

Carriage,

Howitzer105 rmi
155 mm Howitzer -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -

54
18

Carrier, HT, 81 mm mortar Vehicle, armored utility

-

- - - - - - - -- -

12 :636

- - - - - - -

Vehicles, all types (except boats and planes) (Less combat types) - -

- - -

- - - - - - -4764 ------ 3607

- - - --

122

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Ary Almanac. Washington Office, 1950.

U.S.

Government Printing

Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens- .The War in the. Pacific, Okinawa; The Last Battle., Washington, Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948 Bradley, Omar N., General, U.S. Army. New York, 1951 A Soldier's Story.

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