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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTACHMENT 81 _______________________________ ) LAURA J. MCGARRY, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) GERIATRIC FACILITIES ) Of CAPE COD INC., et al ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________)

Article III Judicial Notice Requested
OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOROKIN’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS Dkt.# 80 REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT Dkt. #71

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10 CA 11343 GAO

Laura J. McGarry, the Plaintiff in this action, hereby OBJECTS (Dkt. #81) to the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Dkt. #80) filed by Magistrate Judge Sorokin regarding the Defendants, Geriatric Facilities of Cape Cod, Inc., et al, Motion for Contempt(Dkt. #71) against this Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s OPPOSITION Dkt. #78 to the contempt clearly stated that she be allowed a “hearing before US District Judge after fact finding by any Judge other than Judge Sorokin and her right to appeal the results of CERTIFIED facts before they are presented to a US District Judge”. This OBJECTION is based on the violation of multiple statutory provisions including Magistrate Judge Sorokin’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and intentional violation of this Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights. This Plaintiff was never provided with the COURT'S GENERAL ORDER (10-1) or form for designating the parties' consent or refusal to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction upon her filing of this civil action. This Plaintiff has never consented to the Magistrate's jurisdiction and strongly objected to the sudden reference when on January 28, 2011 PSSA Morse wrote the order for reference (Dkt. #57) in her fit of usurpation as she

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"RULED" on Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. #51) for injunctive relief of which she was the subject; multiple indicators that this PSSA was in collusion with the Defense Counsel with an ongoing concerted effort to deprive this Plaintiff access to the court and a fair litigation process that played by the rules triggered said motion. Then on January 30, 2011 Plaintiff filed a Motion (Dkt. # 58) CONTEMPT-PSSA & Defense Counsel demanding that the case go immediately before the US District Judge. The reference was forced over Plaintiff's objection. Magistrate Judge Sorokin is the undersigned on the February 1, 2011 ORDERS (Dkt. #61) [“Plaintiff is prohibited from filing any further pleadings or documents in this action until directed to do so by a judicial officer.”] Magistrate Judge Sorokin stated he approved of Dkt. #61 and accepted the draft be undersigned in his name; Magistrate Judge Sorokin is under no constitutional authority to make a ruling regarding contempt. Plaintiff, under duress and fearful that if she did not attend that her case would be illegally dismissed, attended a February 14, 2011 Scheduling Conference. The order was verbally reinforced by Magistrate Judge Sorokin at a February 14, 2011 scheduling conference that this Plaintiff attended by phone from Washington State and Plaintiff’s son, who lives in Massachusetts, was physically present in the court room. This Plaintiff asked Magistrate Judge Sorokin directly during this conference if she could file to appeal his orders to the US District Judge O’Toole and request, also, reconsideration of orders administered under usurpation (Dkt. #53 and Dkt. #57). Plaintiff was told directly by Magistrate Judge Sorokin that she could not appeal his orders to the US District Judge or request reconsideration of the orders on Dkt. #53 & # 57. Plaintiff asked, “Then what am I suppose to do?” and Magistrate Judge Sorokin’s response was “get a lawyer”. Plaintiff is a pro se in forma pauperis disabled litigant who lives on SSDI. These orders were also reinforced

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on February 15, 2011 ORDERS [(Dkt. #67 & #68) same document docketed twice on the ECF System and also sent to this Plaintiff via US Mail] “The Plaintiff shall not make any filings with this Court without the prior approval of a District or Magistrate Judge”. Magistrate Judge Sorokin assumed assignment of this action knowing full well that he had no jurisdiction and ignored documented objections to the order of reference noted on January 30, 2011 with (Dkt. # 58) Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt – PSSA & Defense Counsel which was captioned CASE MANAGEMENT BY ARTICLE III JUDGE and the relief requested in Dkt.#58 *“(1) Immediately put this action before Judge O’Toole…”+ Plaintiff also sent an email to Judge O’Toole’s Docket Clerk on January 31, 2011 when in spite of the caption and relief requested in Dkt.#58 he electronically entered the reference from the January 28, 2011 order (Dkt. #57) onto the docket and then ignored this Plaintiff’s email to remove the reference from the docket (see Dkt. #64 exhibit 2---email to the docket clerk is at the end of exhibit)). See (attachment 1) to this document for an excerpt of rules. Dkt. #58 was followed by (Dkt. #59) Plaintiff’s Letter to the Clerk of the Court and then the electronic order of reference was entered on the Docket; the docket at Document 58 above the electronic reference order and Dkt. #59 shows text stating; “oppression and intimidation of Plaintiff-deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights and blocking disabled in forma pauperis pro se litigant's access to the court-- this case has had no legitimate court procedure beyond complaint filing and service of process for six months…requesting immediate relief and case management by Article III Judge--O'Toole”. Entered: 1/31/2011 10:43:19 Filed: 01/28/2011 Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin Referred for: all Pretrial Proceedings. Motions referred: 58 Emergency MOTION for Contempt against Barbara Morse PSSA and Defense counsel Guy Tully & Brian Childs--collusion with PSSA---oppression and intimidation of Plaintiff-deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights and blocking disabled in forma paupe. (Danieli, Chris) Motions referred to Leo T. Sorokin. The order for Plaintiff’s Contempt Motion (Dkt. # 58) was purposefully entered incorrectly on the docket and does not specify FACT FINDING or Report and Recommendations (rr).

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The PSSA “RULED” on Plaintiff’s Contempt Motion see DKT. # 61 and noted the undersigned as Magistrate Judge Sorokin. The memorandum includes [“The Court will not require Defendants’ to respond to Plaintiff’s most recent motion, which is denied.”] There was no notation anywhere in Dkt.# 61 informing this Plaintiff of her right to object A pro se staff attorney and a Magistrate Judge do not have the authority to “RULE” on a motion of contempt, excuse the parties allegedly in contempt from submitting oppositions to the contempt motion or distribute orders in regards to the contempt motion (Dkt. #61). Therefore the order is not only invalid it is void, not voidable, but simply void and there is no order that restricts this Plaintiff’s filing with the court. Federal magistrate judges are creatures of statute, and so is their jurisdiction. Unlike district judges, they are not Article III judicial officers, and they have only the jurisdiction or authority granted to them by Congress, which is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 636. As applicable here where the parties did not consent to proceeding before the magistrate judge, see § 636(c)(1), the district court may designate a magistrate judge to consider various matters. See § 636(b). These matters are generally categorized as `dispositive' or `non-dispositive,' and a magistrate judge's authority with respect to each category is different: Magistrates may issue orders as to nondispositive pretrial matters, and district courts review such orders under a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). While magistrates may hear dispositive motions, they may only make proposed findings of fact and recommendations, and district courts must make de novo determinations as to those matters if a party objects to the magistrate's recommendations. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). First Union Mortgage Corp., v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). “We need not decide whether there was a proper reference to the magistrate judge under § 636(b) and the District of Colorado local rules because even if there was, the magistrate judge had no authority to enter a final order on the matter at issue here”. Jonathan Guy, Et. Al. V. William T. Beierwaltes And Lynda L. Beierwaltes, United States Court Of Appeals Tenth Circuit (2006). United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. - 923 F.2d 7 Decided Jan. 14, 1991 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." As the Third Circuit has said: "To be a 'final' order of the district court within the meaning of section 1291, the magistrate's decision must have been reviewed by the district court, which retains ultimate decision-making power." Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 115 (3d Cir.1983), and cases cited therein. See also Horton v. State Street Bank & Trust Company, 590 F.2d 403, 404 (1st Cir.1979). Save for a specific statutory exception, this rule is iron-clad: a magistrate's order is not a 'final' order which can be reviewed directly by a court of appeals. The reasons for the rule are salutary: "[N]ot only will review at the district court level save parties the expense and difficulty of appeal, but it will also give the appellate court the benefit of the district court's reasoned consideration." Sick v. Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir.1978).

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The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636, "details magistrates' functions regarding pretrial and post-trial matters, specifying two levels of review depending on the scope and significance of the magistrate's decision." Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 2245, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989). We have designated the two categories of magistrates' orders as "self-operating" and "non-self-operating." United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 585 (1st Cir.1981). "Self-operating" orders, which cover most pretrial and discovery matters, are valid when made and can be "appealed" by a motion for reconsideration directed to the district court. See Sec. 636(b)(1)(A); Local Magistrates Rule 2(b). The "non-self-operating" orders are specified in section 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), see also Local Magistrates Rule 3; they are not valid until after the district court accepts the magistrate's report and recommendation and enters an order or judgment. United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d at 585. In a civil contempt proceeding, the party seeking an order of contempt need only establish (1) that a court order was in effect, and (2) that the order required certain conduct by the respondent, and (3) that the respondent failed to comply with the court's order. Martin v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir.1992). Defendants fail because there are no legitimate orders —any orders that Defendants’ allege this Plaintiff has disobeyed are the result of unquestionable usurpation of which Defense Counsel is fully aware. This Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights have been deprived by a concerted effort as she has been constantly intimidated with threats of sanctions and complaint dismissal by people who exercise power they do not legally possess while intentionally depriving a citizen of these United States her Constitutional Rights as they ignored Supreme Court Law, First Circuit authority and authorities established in this very court; Defendants’ with multiple instances of documented fraud in the record remain untouchable which has only validated this Plaintiff’s allegations of collusion. Further each and every filing this Plaintiff has made with the court since the void orders that restricted her filing has been to assert deprivation of her Constitutional Rights and she has filed said documents in an effort to reach an honest authority to restore her Constitutional Rights. ["There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights." Sherer v Cullen, 481 F 946]

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Further the objections herein, particularly to Dkt. 80 where there is not only No Certification of facts but outside of the word “facts” in a couple of sentences that have been copied and pasted to the document from Dkt. # 57 the word fact is absent and the documented content of Dkt. # 80 by the “Undersigned” Magistrate Judge Sorokin consist of continued fabrication with intentional omission of the actual facts. Plaintiff specifically objected in her Opposition (Dkt. #78) to Magistrate Judge Sorokin submitting any report in regards to the Contempt Motion (Dkt. #71). Plaintiff captioned “Hearing Requested” yet there was no hearing. Where a magistrate judge believes that a person has committed contemptible behavior, the magistrate judge shall: forthwith certify the facts to a district judge and may serve or cause to be served, upon any person whose behavior is brought into question under this paragraph, an order requiring such person to appear before a district judge upon a day certain to show cause why that person should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts so certified. 28 U.S.C. 636(e)(6)(B)(iii); Ivie, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13592 at *4 - *5. Section 636(e) requires the district judge to conduct a de novo hearing.” Taberer v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 904 (3rd Cir. 1992) See also Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1996)(Federal magistrates have no power of contempt themselves but must certify the facts to a judge of the district court.”). REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT This plaintiff demands a hearing before a US District Judge to not only show cause as to why she should not be adjudged in contempt by the reason of the facts but to show cause as to why the Dkt. # 58 Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt remains valid. The Magistrate’s Report is contrary to multiple laws and should be rejected. Due process may require a district court to hold a hearing, and allow relevant discovery, on civil contempt sanctions where there are disputed issues of material fact. See Tranzact Techs., Inc. v. 1Source Worldsite, 406 F.3d 851, 855 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Due process requires a district court to resolve relevant factual disputes — allowing discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing if necessary— in a civil contempt proceeding.”); Ayres, 166 F.3d at 996; N.L.R.B. v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court need only permit discovery and conduct a hearing where such procedures are necessary “to resolve relevant factual disputes.” Tranzact Techs., 406 F.3d at 855.

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On March 2, 2011 Magistrate Judge Sorokin DENIED with docket text Plaintiff’s February 23, 2011 Motion (Dkt. # 69) IMMEDIATE REASSIGNMENT TO A DIFFERENT US DISTRICT COURT JUDGE AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE and terminated the motion on the docket yet no response had come from Judge O’Toole to the (Dkt. #69) motion. Plaintiff also Moved (Dkt. #70) on February 23, 2011 to vacate void orders and captioned this Motion “please address immediately UPON REASSIGNMENT OF A NEW US DISTRICT JUDGE”; On March 3, 2011 Judge Sorokin DENIED Dkt. #70 with Docket Text [“Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered denying 70 Motion to Vacate; This Motion is DENIED. The Court cautions Plaintiff that she has been ordered not to file any documents with the Court without prior permission of the Court”] and terminated the motion on the Docket. Magistrate Judge Sorokin had no authority to deny the Motion (Dkt. # 70) Vacate Void Orders or administer orders to that motion; even if the specific request in the caption had not been noted his authority to address this motion did not extend beyond fact finding with a report and recommendations 925 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1991) footnote 5. First this case was under the total control of PSSA Morse and there remains a strong appearance that the Honorable Judge George A. O’Toole has no idea that this action exist. When motions were filed by this Plaintiff to set this action back on a legal tract Judge Sorokin was engaged by the PSSA and he is now, in effect, holding this case hostage with no Article III oversight and continued blocking of this Plaintiff to Article III access. Docket entry 8/10/2010 *“Case Assignment. Judge George A. O’Toole, Jr. assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin.”] yet PSSA Morse freely ignored this instruction as she without Judicial oversight “Ruled” (Dkt. #53) on 1/20/2010 on six

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outstanding motions and the associated oppositions and manipulated the file date back to 1/19/2011. Morse actually filed her Document #53 on 1/20/2011 at 12:01:25 PM. The properties of Dkt. # 53 are as follows: [Title: Q:\Morse\2010 cases\10cv11343-GAO (Mcgarry, Laura)\10cv11343 Order denying pending motions for sanctions to strike.wpd Author: Morse Created: 1/20/2011 11:41:26 AM]. Morse took action on 1/20/2011 on motions that had been left lingering after she read Plaintiff’s Injunctive Relief Motion Dkt. #51 filed 1/19/2011 at 17:37:42 PM that was pled with particularity; this Motion alleged collusion between Morse and Defense Counsel and requested that Morse be enjoined from duty on this case and communicating with Defense Counsel. Plaintiff’s Motions from 10/25/2010 (Dkt. #27) to Disqualify Defense Counsel (Emergency Motion) and (Dkt. #28) Strike Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses were DENIED. Defendants’ Motions from 11/5/2010 (Dkt. # 37) to Strike Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendants’ Answer and (Dkt.# 39) to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint Amendment were ALLOWED. Plaintiff’s Motion from 11/11/2010 (Dkt. #43) for Default Judgment that included a second emergency request to disqualify defense counsel with a description of deliberate planned fraud upon the court was DENIED. Plaintiff’s 11/29/2010 (Dkt. #46)Motion for well deserved Sanctions was DENIED. Captions on Plaintiff’s Motions that included Judicial Review and Judicial Notice were ignored. Supreme Court law, First Circuit authorities and all supporting authorities cited in Plaintiff’s Motions and Oppositions were ignored. Plaintiff’s opposition (Dkt. # 42) which clearly indicated absolutely no amendments to the Complaint were made after service of process to any Defendant and that significant harassment was directed at this Plaintiff by Defense Counsel regarding her Complaint Amendment and additional Count X against Defendant Mikita was ignored. Defense Counsel relentlessly insisted that Rule 15

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regarding Complaint Amendments indicated that “as a matter of course” included the time since the Complaint was filed even after citing authority in both their Motions that thoroughly discussed rule 15 before and after the 2009 amendment yet Defense Counsel submitted their frivolous motion to strike knowing very well the language of the rule was after service. Plaintiff’s Complaint Amendment was stricken and the relief requested which was a default judgment was ignored. Morse’s documentation: *“…motion (No. 39) to strike plaintiff’s attempt to file an amendment to her complaint without leave of court… To the extent defendants seek to strike plaintiff’s response to the answer as well as plaintiff’s attempt to file two amendments to her complaint, such requests are granted. McGarry’s pro se status doesn't insulate her from complying with substantive and procedural law.”+ The Answer (Dkt. #21) in footnote 1 Defendants’ indicated Plaintiff’s amendments had occurred since service of process to Defendant Mikita; they chose to purposely misstate the rule in their Motion to achieve striking the amendment. Defendants referred to Appeals Court authority in Plaintiff’s motion addendum (Dkt. #32) in a footnote (Dkt. # 37) [“This motion addendum is of no moment—it offers no legal basis whatever to support the Response—and should by no means affect the striking of Plaintiff’s Response”+ absolutely no professional argument with “only” used to embellish rule and erroneous authority to support their frivolous motion to strike. Defense Counsel halted a conference after this Plaintiff cited the authority she would use to support her document and promptly filed a motion to strike. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Dkt. #41) where Plaintiff reinforced the Appeals Court authority as well as Rule 9 in support of the Response was ignored. Complaint exhibits that offered evidentiary support to allegations were ignored. The actual language of the FRCP was ignored as outright intentional violation of the FRCP by Defense Counsel was more than evident. The violation by Defense Counsel of the Court’s local rules was ignored which started with RULE 83.5.2 APPEARANCES. Evidentiary

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support that this law firm violated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct during a federal agency investigation with continued and additional violations of these rules as they initiated their defense with this court was ignored; more than apparent inappropriate litigation tactics were ignored as they carried a known fraudulent defense to the court with unsupported denials and outright false statements in their Answer to a 41 page Complaint pled with particularity supported by 47 exhibits. The Addamax case Defendants cite in their Opposition (Dkt. #35) does not support their fabricated innocent position. Prompt disqualification would have not only been prudent to ensure a fair litigation process but would have significantly cut the time this case remained in court. Ignoring Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Defense Counsel and allowing them to proceed on erroneous authority is why we are now at this point in which a stain has been casted on the court and reputations of court staff. They are unethical attorneys who freely break the law and are an embarrassment to anyone who legitimately practices law; any a US District Judge would agree which is why they created this sham of pretense litigation and engaged court staff to assist them in avoiding Article III oversight. The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). Courts will reconsider an issue only “when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, when new evidence has become available, or when there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 314, 324 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1995); Smith v. City of Chester, 155 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (E.D. Pa. 1994). While broad, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited. The [trial] judge must consider the proper mix of factors and juxtapose them reasonably. "Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them." Independent Oil and Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923

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(1st Cir. 1988) (to warrant reversal for abuse of discretion, it must "plainly appear[] that the court below committed a meaningful error in judgment"). Morse promptly sabotaged Plaintiff’s prosecution of her action and projected inappropriate litigation practices by the Defense Counsel onto this Plaintiff in her memorandum. Alleging dishonesty when the evidence shows dishonesty is not a personal insult; it is fair comment. Alleging fraud when there is evidence of fraud is fair comment. Count IX of this action is conspiracy and the fraud and dishonesty that is stated in the allegations of the Complaint are supported by exhibits and pleadings of particularity; the conspiracy started in the work environment and it was carried through and post the EEOC investigation and now it has infected this Court; these defense attorneys with their known tactics were hired by the Defendants who were fully aware that there was sufficient incriminating evidence to pursue a discrimination charge against them. The unprofessional, unethical and illegal actions of the Defense Counsel are imputed to these Defendants. One does not bring suit because of another’s appropriate behavior; fair comment to documented behavior is allowed. In order to be fair, it must be shown that the facts upon which the comment is based are truly stated and that the comment is an honest expression of the publisher’s opinion relating to those facts. Where a comment imputes evil, base or corrupt motives to a person, it must be shown that such imputations are warranted by, and could reasonably be drawn from those facts. Plaintiff through her pleadings to this court in response to the frivolous pleadings by the Defendants has more than met the criteria required to make her fair comments. Defendants have offered no defense beyond trickery, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation because they have brought a meritless defense to this court. Their only hope is Complaint dismissal which they are attempting to achieve through the fairy tale memorandums written by Morse that are now

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being approved by a Judicial Officer who is without legal jurisdiction of this action; this can be construed as nothing less than active assistance in continued usurpation, blocking of Article III Judicial authority and collusion. Excerpts from Dkt. #53 follow: *“From her numerous motions and communications to the court, it is clear that McGarry is dissatisfied with the way her employment discrimination case is proceeding. Plaintiff’s pleadings, in conjunction with her communications to the Court, reveal a heightened level of suspicion and hostility directed not only toward defense counsel, but to the defendants as well as employees of the court. Because the level of suspicion and hostility is continuing, if not escalating, the Court will take the opportunity to advise McGarry that her pro se status cannot shield her from the consequences of frivolous litigation practices. The Court notes that, in virtually every pleading filed by McGarry, she consistently makes a variety of personal insults directed to the defendants and their counsel, to the point of harassment. In each of the pending motions, McGarry accuses defense counsel of committing fraud. She has also speculated that court staff are colluding with defense counsel to thwart her case.”+ Morse then utilizes Dkt. #53 to spin a tale of how this Plaintiff’s was concerned because her Ex Parte Motion appeared on the ECF System and that the ECF System may have been compromised. The reality is that this Plaintiff noted on December 31, 2010 that the scanned PDF’s Defense Counsel entered into the ECF System on November 5, 2010 had been changed to word processed PDF’s. It was also noted by this Plaintiff that her case was randomly entered by a Docket Clerk on December 3, 2010 with modifications noted in the docket text on two previous docket dates; the stated modifications were just that, only stated, and not taken because this Plaintiff had already taken the stated actions when she filed on the given dates. Plaintiff filed her Motion Dkt. 46 for SANCTIONS on November 29, 2010 which is hereby incorporated herein. Defense Counsel had initially entered the PDF’s scanned to make authority search more daunting since they only used erroneous authorities that offered zero legal support in regards to their frivolous oppositions and motions. The scanned documents were also helpful to Defense Counsel since they chose sneak adverse authority into a footnote with a

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misspelled party and changed lexis number where no hyperlink could be established. Morse freely allowed these unprofessional tactics over justice as she “Ruled” on those six motions on January 20, 2011 with memorandum that set the stage for the next step in their scheme. Plaintiff’s “Numerous” motions began with two well supported motions that were followed by the Defendants’ frivolous motions and oppositions which, at minimum, contained unprofessional litigation tactics and advanced to outright acts of fraud; the noted aforementioned required further movement by this Plaintiff. This Plaintiff has not found any case in this court on any docket that has a motion for default judgment that has lingered for three months. The time motions lingered allowed for further fraud that required further movement by this Plaintiff and she filed Dkt. #51 & #52. The Defendants then file their oppositions Dkt. #55 & #56 on 1/21/2011 to Plaintiff's Motion Dkt. #51 to enjoin Morse and third EMERGENCY Motion #52 to Disqualify Defense Counsel. Both Dkt. #51 & #52 are hereby incorporated by reference herein. ["...the document in fact contains many false statements and scurrilous accusations against Defendants and their counsel, in addition to containing many similar allegations against Court personne"..."Instead, unless deterred, she will persist in personal attacks against Defendants, their counsel, and Court personnel, all the while driving up defense costs."] ["Defendants oppose the Motion on the ground that Plaintiff has not identified any factual or legal basis in support of it. Defendants also rely on their oppositions to Plaintiff’s prior motions to disqualify their counsel. See Doc. Nos. 35 and 47. Further still, Defendants contend that the Motion is mooted by this Court’s order of January 20, 2011 (the “January 20 Order”). See Doc. No. 53."] The Defendants raise the issues of Dkt. #53 again in their memorandum to support their motion for contempt against this Plaintiff Dkt. #72. ["After the entry of the January 19 Order, Defendants requested that Plaintiff withdraw her disqualification motion and the motion to enjoin the PSSA, a request that this Court later acknowledged flowed necessarily from the Court’s January 19 Order.'+

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There seems to be some difficulty on Defense Counsels’ end in getting the January date consistent. Plaintiff assures the court January 20, 2011 was the filing Date of Dkt. #53 and that Dkt #53 was an antagonistic filing that lacked fact, law and rule and was a panic response because of Plaintiff’s allegations of Dkt. # 51 and #52 filed on January 19, 2011. The concerted effort to stall the case now required a concerted effort to deprive this Plaintiff of her Constitutional Right to Article III adjudication to ensure that no US District Judge would see the supported allegations of Dkt. #51 & #52. After a reasonable delay on January 28, 2010 Morse then “Ruled” (Dkt. # 57) on the Plaintiff Motions #48, #51 & #52; Morse constructed this document to look more like one written by Judge O’Toole as she “Ruled” on an injunctive motion of which she was the subject of relief. She was not successful on several levels but the one level that stood out the most is that no competent honest US District Court Judge was going to order a litigant to relinquish her Constitutional Right. *“On January 19, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order (Docket No. 53) that, among other things, denied Plaintiff's two motions to disqualify defense counsel. As aptly noted in Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff's third attempt to disqualify Jackson Lewis' as defense counsel, such request is essentially mooted by this Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s first two attempts to disqualify counsel. See 1/19/11 Order, Docket No. 43.’+ *“In the alleged conspiracy scheme, the undersigned is initially described as being fooled; first by defense counsel, and subsequently by the PSSA.”+ Plaintiff has searched and searched and she does not see the word “fooled” in any of her documentation. *“Rather than litigate her case, and not content to repeat her baseless allegations solely against defense counsel, Plaintiff has taken the occasion of her most recent filings to make an unwarranted, immaterial and unfair attack on the professional character of one of the Court’s Pro Se Staff Attorneys, Barbara Morse. Needless to say, the record does not reflect any such conduct by Ms. Morse. Although McGarry believes that she has discovered a “smoking gun” by way of computer data, it reveals nothing more than the internal clerical and docketing system of the court.”+

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Morse has moved on from her previous fairy tale that Plaintiff’s concern over compromise to the ECF System was related to her Ex Parte Motion showing in the ECF system and makes a light touch regarding the docketing system. *“ORDERED, Plaintiff is prohibited from making personal comments or attacks upon defense counsel or court staff, intimidating, harassing, or warning defense counsel or court staff in any way as to make a direct or indirect threat, or making reference to docketing information; ORDERED, Plaintiff’s Motion (Docket No. 48) for Rule 16(b) conference is granted in part by directing the clerk to refer this matter to Magistrate Judge Sorokin for all pretrial proceedings and the motion is denied in all other respects; and it is further ORDERED, the Clerk shall refer this case to Magistrate Judge Sorokin for all pretrial proceedings.”+ Plaintiff has research her documentation and no threats or warnings have ever been expressed in her filings to this court. Apparently Plaintiff’s fair comment is perceived as intimidating and harassing; however, it is, in fact, merely fair comment. Docketing information is in the public domain (PACER)and Morse cannot restrict this Plaintiff from referencing it. This would be ordering Plaintiff to relinquish her First Amendment rights and such an order would have never been approved by any US District Judge which clearly indicated Morse had drafted and filed another memorandum and order that was not under the approval of an Article III Judge and clear and unarguable usurpation continued. Morse has a duty to draft credible, dignified, and impartial judicial opinion. These orders of Dkt. #53 and Dkt. #57 are beyond invalid; they are void, not voidable, but simply void. The orders are an insult to the Honorable Judge George A, O’Toole. There is at common law "a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). The Court of Appeals reversed. United States v. Mitchell, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 551 F.2d 1252 (1976). It stressed the importance of the common law privilege to inspect and copy judicial records...It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and document, including judicial records and documents. See, e.g., McCoy v. Providence Journal

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Co., 190 F.2d 760, 765-766 (CA1), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951); Fayette County v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 395-396, 130 S.W.2d 838, 843 (1939); Nowack v. Auditor General, 243 Mich. 200, 203-205, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (1928); In re Egan, 205 N.Y. 147, 154-155, 98 N.E. 467, 469 (1912); State ex rel. Nevada Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Grimes, 29 Nev. 50, 82-86, 84 P. 1061, 10721074 (1906); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 303-306 (1882); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill.App.2d 372, 374-375, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962). In many jurisdictions this right has been recognized or expanded by statute. See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat., ch 116, § 43.7 (1975) ...American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit. The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, see, e.g., State ex rel. Colscott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 621-627, 57 N.E. 535, 536-538 (1900); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336-339 (1879), and in a newspaper publisher's intention to publish information concerning the operation of government, see, e.g., State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis.2d 672, 677, 137 N.W.2d 470, 472 (1965), modified on other grounds, 28 Wis.2d 685a, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1966). Apparently Morse and Defense Counsel did not want this Plaintiff referring to the random docket entry of 12/3/2010 where scanned PDF’s were switched with word processed PDF’s four days after this Plaintiff motioned for Sanctions. See Docket text at 10/25/2010 Document 29 and Docket text at 11/5/2010 Document 34. Plaintiff found the continued usurpation beyond prejudice and that the multiple improprieties of this action required the immediate attention of a US District Judge; referencing the case to the Magistrate Judge where absolutely no consent had ever been given, continued projection of inappropriate behavior, orders that Plaintiff relinquish her Constitutional Rights, and the clear sabotage of Plaintiff’s action required an immediate motion for contempt. Motion for Contempt against PSSA Morse and Defense Counsel (Dkt. # 58) hereby incorporated by reference herein and the Motion still requires a legitimate ruling. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

Case 1:10-cv-11343-GAO Document 81

Filed 04/05/11 Page 17 of 20

Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (upholding sanction of district court made pursuant to inherent powers where defendants had practiced a fraud upon the court and used tactics of delay, oppression and harassment). Memorandum from this court thus far threatens, intimidates and oppresses this Plaintiff in a concerted effort to deprive her of her Constitutional Rights and access to the court. There can be no contemptuous behavior in a court by a party when the party has been intentionally deprived of establishing legitimate access to the court; it is these Defendants and their Counsel who are in contempt of this court and more than deserving of strong sanctions not this pro se in forma pauperis disabled litigant. This Plaintiff is being railroaded by court staff and Defense Counsel with their perceived power, illegal collusion, fabricated documentation and ability to write whatever they want in court documents regardless of truth. Certainly the maneuver of posting a decision regarding alleged contempt signed by the Magistrate Judge with absolutely no US District Judge involvement in violation of Constitutional provisions is proof enough that there has been usurpation with a deliberate effort to keep this case from the view of a US District Judge (justia.com). If by the slim chance a US District Judge is actually reading this document this Plaintiff is pleased to meet you; however, knowing that Dkt # 80 never came from an original US District Judge order that would have requested a certification of the facts along with a report and recommendations she doubts a notation of a pending (rr) regarding this contempt is noted on any US Districts Judge’s Docket or that a US District Judge is aware that a pending contempt motion exist; Plaintiff fears usurpation will continue. Plaintiff has had her rights deprived by a concerted effort where people ignored law, purposely strayed from established court process, violated local rule, and have made patently dishonest statements both verbally and in writing and she has suffered unnecessary stress that has exacerbated her

Case 1:10-cv-11343-GAO Document 81

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disabilities. These people have made a mockery of court process and have shamed the concept of public service. *“The Court finds that defendants are prejudiced in having to respond to the vexatious allegations made in McGarry’s motions. The Defense Counsel commented, see Docket No. 44, that they should be spared the continued burden of footing bills for contesting such motions from plaintiff.”+ The first time the Defense Counsel became concerned regarding the Defendants’ “bill” was when this Plaintiff motioned for sanctions (Dkt. #46) and they have now expressed concern for their client’s financial status in every document they have filed since Plaintiff described and attached the antagonistic letter she received from their partner last July (Dkt. #52). July 19, 2010 Plaintiff sent Defendants and Patrick Egan of Jackson Lewis a letter to compromise. Plaintiff closed this letter to Defendants and Egan with *“A current situation has me out of state and I have no personal phone number at this time.”+ Egan returned correspondence to the address of Plaintiff’s daughter stating *"Pleasant Bay took no discriminatory action toward you, and your employment ended when you voluntarily resigned to relocate to the State of Washington (Dkt. #52 exhibit 1). Egan's language was taunting this Plaintiff into litigation as he knew very well that this Plaintiff had not moved out of Massachusetts after she was constructively discharged from Pleasant Bay. In March of 2010 from a hotel in Florida Egan returned a call to this Plaintiff; he quite obviously dialed a Massachusetts area code to reach Plaintiff's Dedham home. Plaintiff was fed up with the retaliation and the conversation grew heated as Plaintiff admonished him for the Defendants' patently false statements and deceptive tactics during the EEOC investigation. Plaintiff alleged that he and the Defendants had violated Title 18 sec. 1001 and that is why he hand delivered the position statement to the EEOC. The only reference the Defendants make to attachment one of their position statement

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was in-- footnote one of page one-- and this addresses Plaintiff’s referral source to Pleasant Bay which was irrelevant to the investigation. Nowhere in the position statement do the Defendants state see attachment one to verify their position that Plaintiff only wanted part time work. Nor do the Defendants make reference to Position Statement attachment one directing the EEOC to view Plaintiff’s work history in support of their position regarding Plaintiff's lack of qualifications. The aforementioned neglected directives would have pointed out their false statements. Egan mailed Defendants’ Position Statement to Plaintiff's Hyannis address in July of 2009. This Plaintiff did not relocate to Washington State until June of 2010. This Plaintiff’s last day of work for the Defendants was September 30, 2008. This EEOC sham and this pretense litigation where these Defense Council continually violate Model Rules of Professional Conduct has gone on long enough. The Defense Counsels' behavior is imputed to the Defendants and this Plaintiff is requesting a Treble Default Judgment as allowed with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. violations. The ongoing conspiracy to oppress, intimidate and deprive this Plaintiff of her rights must now promptly cease. Each and every opposition and motion by the Defendants thru their defense counsel has been a vexatious defense with absolutely zero support thru fact, law, or rule in regards to the substance of their documents starting with the Answer. The conspiracy to violate this Plaintiff’s rights started in the work environment resulting in a constructive discharge and continued through a federal agency investigation and now the court. These people with their pretence litigation can let motions linger for months and when pseudo court process begins Plaintiff is admonished for a late submission to the court; an explanation that her son was seriously ill and hospitalized was found to be an unacceptable excuse and the fact that Plaintiff

Case 1:10-cv-11343-GAO Document 81

Filed 04/05/11 Page 20 of 20

sent an email on 2/28/2011 (attachment 2) to Judge Sorokin’s Clerk alerting her to the situation which received no response seems to missing from the record. Plaintiff in her exhausted state prepared and submitted the required document where all but two items were then stricken from the record. However, Plaintiff’s Discovery request DKt. #76 had an attached a file and attachment 1 of Dkt. #76 which is hereby incorporated by reference herein; Defendants record a denial in their answer Complaint paragraph 189. The career destruction through retaliation, significant change in this Plaintiff’s quality of life, and ongoing depression and anxiety that has contributed to Plaintiff’s failing physical health that these people seem to get a charge out of exacerbating and then mocking in bogus court documents that are of public record is so below civility that this Plaintiff is at a loss for words. REQUEST FOR RELIEF For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff, Laura J. McGarry, respectfully request that the Court: (1)order a Default Judgment and allow this Plaintiff to amend count IX of the complaint to include RICO violations (2)order the relief as requested in all Documents Plaintiff has filed with this court (3) reassign Plaintiff a New US District Judge and initiate legitimate court process (4) enjoin Barbara Morse and Judge Sorokin from participation in this action (5) charge misconduct against Defense Counsel and their law firm (6) schedule a hearing for this Plaintiff before a US District Judge Respectfully submitted, /s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se Dated: April 5, 2011 Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se 1717 Sheridan Road Apt. A- 50 Bremerton, WA 98310 360-551-6773 (daughter’s cell phone but she is 50 minutes away from me by car) late_linda@yahoo.com (best contact) CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE--inappropriate I hereby certify that this document has been filed through the ECF system and will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the notice of electronic filing (NEF) on April 5, 2011. /s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se

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