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Nerissa Russell1

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication

ABSTRACT

This paper examines not the process but the concept of non-
human animal domestication. Domestication involves both bio-
logical and cultural components. Creating a category of domestic
animals means constructing and crossing the boundaries between
human and animal, culture and nature. The concept of domesti-
cation thus structures the thinking both of researchers in the pre-
sent and of domesticators and herders in the past. Some have
argued for abandoning the notion of domestication in favor of a
continuum of human-nonhuman animal relationships. Although
many human-animal relationships cannot be neatly pigeonholed
as wild or domestic, this paper contends that the concept of
domestication retains its utility.There is a critical distinction between
animals as a resource and animals as property. Domestication
itself had profound consequences for the societies and world-
view of the domesticators and their descendents. In addition to
the material effects of animal wealth, domestic animals provide
both a rich source of metaphor and a model of domination that
can be extended to humans.

Nonhuman animal domestication is surely the most


profound transformation that has occurred in human-
animal relationships, setting the stage for later trans-
formations that include factory farming, genetic
engineering, and transplants of animal parts into
human bodies. Animal domestication also has
created, or at least is implicated in, some profound

Society & Animals 10:3 (2002)


© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2002
transformations in human-human relationships. For well over a century,
archaeologists, zoologists, and animal scientists have studied the process of
domestication has from various points of view. My purpose here is not to
review this voluminous literature (Armitage, 1986; Benecke, 1994; Clutton-
Brock, 1999; Crabtree, 1993; Gautier, 1992; Helmer, 1992; Wing, 1986). Rather,
I will focus on the concept of domestication and its implications both for
those who study it in the present and for those who have enacted it through
the years.

DeŽ nitions
It has proven remarkably difŽcult to formulate a satisfactory deŽnition of
animal domestication. This results both from the wide range of human-non-
human animal relationships that do not Žt neatly into dichotomous wild/
domestic categories and from the hybrid nature of animal domestication
that involves both biological and social components (Clutton-Brock, 1992,
p. 79; Crabtree, 1993, p. 205; Meadow, 1989, p. 81). Although most scholars
recognize these dual aspects, they usually have stressed either the biological
or the social side in their deŽnitions, often according to their disciplinary
background and goals. This duality maps onto the hoary nature/culture
dichotomy. As a zooarchaeologist seeking to understand the process of domes-
tication from the ancient animal bones and other material remains, I consider
it critical to consider both components. Animal domestication serves as a par-
ticularly good example of the value of approaching this in terms of nature
and culture—rather than nature or culture or nature versus culture.

Most deŽnitions of animal domestication make a distinction between tam-


ing and domestication, although the boundary may not be precisely the same
for all writers. Taming is a prerequisite for domestication, necessary but not
sufŽcient. Once established, however, a separate population of domestic ani-
mals may be herded in ways that do not involve taming, as in ranching
(Ingold, 1980). Taming is a relationship between a particular person and a
particular animal without long-term effects beyond the lifetime of that ani-
mal. Domestication is a relationship with a population of animals that often
leads to morphological and behavioral changes in that population (Bökönyi,
1969, 1989; Clutton-Brock, 1994; Harris, 1996; Hesse, 1984; Ingold, 1980, p. 82,
1984; Reitz and Wing, 1999, pp. 279-305). Many hunting peoples occasionally

286 • Nerissa Russell


tame animals as pets or decoys, but this does not fundamentally alter human-
animal relationships or social and economic relationships among humans.
Nor does it lead to biological changes in the animal, as long as the tamed
animal does not breed and establish a population in captivity.

Biological DeŽnitions

Those who emphasize the biological side of animal domestication generally


stress either human control of breeding or human-animal symbiosis. These
two approaches have quite different implications for human agency and inten-
tionality.

Control of Breeding

DeŽnitions of domestication that privilege control of breeding are particu-


larly associated with scholars whose backgrounds are in animal science, as
was true of many of the early faunal analysts in the Old World. Thus, Bökönyi
(1969, p. 219) offers what most would regard as the classic deŽnition of ani-
mal domestication: “. . . the capture and taming by man of animals of a species
with particular behavioral characteristics, their removal from their natural
living area and breeding community, and their maintenance under controlled
breeding conditions for proŽt.” The critical elements in this deŽnition are the
control of movement and of breeding, which separate the domestic animals
from the wild breeding population. Only under these circumstances can the
genetic changes of domestication take place. Although Bökönyi surely meant
it in a general sense, the capitalistic tone of “for proŽt” seems out of place
in a Neolithic context. Bökönyi presumably included it to exclude compan-
ion animals or pets from the category of domesticates.

ProŽt is retained, although softened, in a more recent deŽnition by Clutton-


Brock (1994, p. 26) in which a domesticated animal is “. . . one that has been
bred in captivity, for purposes of subsistence or proŽt, in a human commu-
nity that maintains complete mastery over its breeding, organization of ter-
ritory, and food supply.” Here, the stress on control is even stronger. This is
the end point of what both Clutton-Brock and Bökönyi (1969) regard as a
long and gradual process, not an event. Thus, animals subject to less than
complete mastery must be only partially domesticated. Bökönyi (pp. 219-220)
identiŽes two stages in the process of animal domestication: animal keeping

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 287


in which only the movements and breeding of animals are controlled; and
animal breeding, where the herders practice both artiŽcial selection and con-
trol of feeding. In the Old World, people are animal keepers from the Neolithic
but become animal breeders only in the Classical period. This perhaps is too
neat a dichotomy; one can easily imagine that people could control animals’
movements but not their breeding or that they might control their feeding
long before artiŽcial selection. However, it gives some sense of how the process
of domestication might proceed.

Clutton-Brock (1994) sees behavioral modiŽcation as perhaps even more


important than genetic change. In an unusual twist, she argues that as well
as controlling their movement, feeding and breeding, people control domes-
tic animals’ transmission of culture. This rests on a somewhat eccentric
deŽnition of culture—another concept that is notoriously difŽcult to deŽne
(Borofsky, Barth, Shweder, Rodseth, & Stolzenberg, 2001)—as “. . . a way of life
imposed over successive generations on a society of humans or animals by
its elders” (Clutton-Brock, p. 29). Thus, by usurping the position of the dom-
inant animals, widely regarded as an essential part of domestication or even
taming, humans become “elders” to their domestic animals and impose a dif-
ferent culture on them. Although Clutton-Brock couches this in cozy famil-
ial terms, overthrowing the native leaders and forcing the adoption of a
foreign culture is much more like imperialism. Indeed, the deŽnition of domes-
tication in terms of control models the human-animal relations of domesti-
cation as powerful, active humans dominating subordinate, passive animals.
Bökönyi (1969) and Clutton-Brock both think that people domesticated ani-
mals (other than dogs) to provide a steady meat supply. Thus, they cast the
humans as acting consciously and deliberately, for proŽt.

Symbiosis

The focus on control of breeding arises from the desire to explain how an
animal population can be isolated from the wild genetic pool. The champi-
ons of this classic deŽnition are interested in the biological effects of domes-
tication in the animals, but they seek the cause in the cultural sphere of
deliberate human behavior. They thus implicitly invoke a nature/culture
dichotomy, with humans outside of nature. An alternative approach denies

288 • Nerissa Russell


culture and places humans Žrmly back into nature. This school interprets the
relationship of domestication itself in biological terms as a symbiotic rela-
tionship no different from that between ants and aphids. Proponents such as
Zeuner (1963) explicitly deny human intentionality, at least initially, in domes-
tication. Although Zeuner sees early domestication as deriving from toler-
ated scavenging (dogs, pigs, ducks), human parasitism on animal herds
(reindeer, sheep, goat), or control of crop robbers (cattle, water buffalo, ele-
phant, rabbit, goose), he does allow that people later deliberately domesti-
cated additional animals (cat, chicken, horse, camel).

O’Connor (1997) prefers the symbiotic model because it acknowledges


animals as equal partners in the relationship. He argues that it is wrong to
see domestication as human exploitation of animals. Rather, it is a mutual-
istic relationship beneŽting both. Clutton-Brock (1994, p. 27) rejects this
view, because humans beneŽt more and have modiŽed animals in ways
that are maladaptive for them. However, it all depends on the deŽnition of
“beneŽt.” Although such modiŽcations would act to the detriment of domes-
tic animals returned to the wild and may well impair their quality of life, it
is undeniable that the populations and ranges of domestic animals have
expanded dramatically, usually at the expense of their wild counterparts. So
in terms of reproductive success, domestic animals have beneŽted from the
relationship.

Approaching domestication as a symbiotic relationship erases human inten-


tionality and seemingly empowers animals while drawing attention away
from the issue of exploitation. O’Connor (1997, p. 54) proposes that instead
of asking why people chose to control animals, we should ask why humans
became particularly attractive to certain animals at certain times and places.
This model renders it unnecessary to include phrases such as “for proŽt” in
deŽnitions of domestication or to distinguish between pets and domestic ani-
mals. In fact, domestication ceases to have any real meaning. Rather, both
parties adapt to a variety of human-animal relationships.

It is useful to be reminded that animals participate actively in domestic-


ation and other human-animal relationships. Although this approach has
its advantages, we should not forget the human end of the human-animal
relationship. Thus, it also is productive to examine the social aspects of
domestication.

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 289


Social DeŽnitions

Those who give more weight to the social aspect of domestication empha-
size changes in human-animal and human-human relationships. These changes
are conceptualized not in terms of symbiosis but of bringing animals into the
human sphere.

Property
O’Connor (1997) prefers to treat domestication as symbiosis partly because
the relationships between humans and animals conventionally regarded as
domestic are so variable in terms of control (cattle, cats, elephants, honey-
bees). Ducos (1978, 1989) recognizes these difŽculties and Žnds classic deŽnitions
such as Bökönyi’s (1969) inadequate.

It is not obvious, however, that there does exist a single common criterion
for all the man/animal relationships we call domestication. In fact it is pos-
sible that our intuition of what is domestication corresponds to modern sit-
uations, not to ancient ones. (Ducos, 1978, p. 53)

He also rejects domestication as symbiosis, because domestication is not a


relationship among equals but something that humans impose on animals.
Ducos casts his deŽnition in social terms: “. . . domestication can be said to
exist when living animals are integrated as objects into the socioeconomic
organization of the human group, in the sense that, while living, those ani-
mals are objects for ownership, inheritance, exchange, trade, etc. . . .” (p. 54).
That is, the essence of domestication is converting animals into property. This
may or may not involve control of movement and breeding, but for Ducos
it implies a major conceptual shift from relating to animals as species to relat-
ing to them as individuals. Perhaps this is better expressed as a change in
focus from the dead to the living animal (Meadow, 1984, 1993). Although not
all forms of herding involve relationships with individual animals, it is strik-
ing that one of the effects of domestication has been greater morphological
variation, which makes it easier to distinguish individual animals.

Ducos (1978) acknowledges that domestication has both biological and social
aspects and proposes labeling animals who are integrated into the human
sphere “domesticated” and those exhibiting morphological signs of domes-
tication “domestic.” Ingold (1980, p. 82) makes essentially the same distinc-

290 • Nerissa Russell


tion but unfortunately uses exactly the opposite terminology (“domestic” for
animals incorporated into the human household, “domesticated” for those
showing morphological change). Ingold breaks down domestication into three
elements that do not necessarily co-occur: taming, herding, and breeding.
“Taming” means bringing the animal into the household, not necessarily as
property (so pets would be included). “Herding” involves keeping groups
of animals as property—these animals are not necessarily either domestic or
domesticated. “Breeding” naturally refers to control of reproduction. Although
this is likely to lead to morphological domestication, such animals may not
be socially domestic if, as in ranching, they may run wild.

When animals become property, human-human relationships are also trans-


formed. For Ingold (1984, p. 4), domestication means “. . . the social incor-
poration or appropriation of successive generations of animals” by humans.
Although living wild animals are not directly engaged in human social rela-
tions, tame animals have personal relations with individual humans; domes-
tic animals are the objects or vehicles of relations between human individuals
and households. This locates the key change in animal domestication not in
the animals’ bodies, nor even in human-animal relations, but in the social
deŽnition of animals as a resource. It is a change in human social relations.
People share wild animals; they husband domestic ones. It is ownership that
makes this husbanding possible (Alvard & Kuznar, 2001).

Digard (1990) takes perhaps the broadest view of domestication, seeking a


deŽnition that will include not only pets but also animals captured from the
wild for human use who do not breed in captivity. Thus, he rejects the usual
distinction between taming and domestication as well as that between domes-
tic and domesticated animals. Instead, although he sees possession and dom-
ination as the key features of domestication, he conceives of domestication
as a process that essentially is the same in all cases. The degree of domesti-
cation varies according to the inherent suitability of the animal species and
the technological and social features of the human society. Rather than think
in terms of a state of domestication, Digard argues that we should focus on
domesticatory action that people exert on animals in the context of a partic-
ular, culturally variable, domesticatory system. He sees no value in deŽning
a particular threshold at which we consider animals to be domesticated or
fully domesticated.

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 291


Rejecting Domestication

From both the biological and the social perspective, then, some deŽne domes-
tication so broadly as to render the concept of limited utility. Others have
advocated the abandonment of the concept of domestication, which they feel
obscures, rather than enlightens, in that it creates a false dichotomy. For them,
human-animal relations form a continuum along which there are only dif-
ferences of degree. In fact, we are indebted to the palaeoeconomy school for
introducing the concept of human-animal relations (or “man-animal rela-
tions,” as they put it), as an alternative to the wild/domestic dichotomy
(Higgs & Jarman, 1972; Jarman, 1972, 1977; Jarman & Wilkinson, 1972). Jarman
and his fellow palaeoeconomists felt that domestication by the standard
deŽnition was a biological concept based on morphological change that did
not address the kinds of human-animal relationships involved in hunting or
herding. They preferred to study “animal husbandry”: the control of animals’
lives that is present to varying degrees along the continuum of human-
animal relations.

Hecker (1982) likewise rejects the dichotomous concept of domestication, pre-


ferring to focus on human-animal relations by replacing it with the term “cul-
tural control.” His objection is different from the palaeoeconomists. It is not
that he sees the transition from hunting to herding as unimportant but that
morphological change may not correspond to the behavioral changes of inter-
est to anthropologists. The elements of Hecker’s “cultural control” are remark-
ably similar to the deŽning features of domestication for Bökönyi (1969) and
Clutton-Brock (1994): deliberate interference with movement, breeding, or
population structure that is of long enough duration to require active care,
affecting a whole group of animals (not just individual pets), and rendering
this group more accessible for future human use (p. 219). Intentionality is
explicitly a key element, in contrast to the palaeoeconomists for whom it is
just noise (Higgs & Jarman, 1975).

Thus, many who have rejected the concept of domestication are objecting less
to the concept than to the methods used to recognize it archaeologically in
the early years of zooarchaeology, which relied mainly on morphological
change. In contrast to the symbiotic view, they stress human agency, but their
concern is with its effect on the structure of animal populations and the orga-

292 • Nerissa Russell


nization of human subsistence rather than the incorporation of animals into
human society and its effect on human social relations.

Summary
In reviewing these various approaches to animal domestication, it is not my
intention to judge which ones are valid and which are not. They focus on
different aspects of a complex phenomenon and are suited to different pur-
poses, depending, in part, on whether one is more interested in the changes
in the humans or the changes in the animals. As an archaeologist, I am pri-
marily concerned with the human social context of domestication, but the
biological changes provide crucial information about herding practices.

If we try to formulate a holistic approach to animal domestication, each of


these deŽnitions has something to offer. The biological deŽnitions, in partic-
ular, bring out the importance of viewing domestication as a process (Clutton-
Brock, 1992). Not only do morphological changes happen gradually, but
herding systems change. Digard’s (1990) notion of “domesticatory action”
seems useful here and also helps to avoid the sense of an inevitable pro-
gression from one step of the process to the next. We should ask not simply
whether the animals are domestic but inquire into the speciŽc practices of
domestication.

The point at which animals become property is critical in terms of both human-
human and human-animal relations and is the point at which we should
begin to see alterations in human and animal behavior. Morphological change,
to the extent that it is genetic, can occur only when domestic populations are
isolated from wild ancestors. Unless this is a result of transport of the domes-
tic animals outside their wild range (demonstrating at least control of move-
ment) or of the extirpation of local wild populations, it indicates closer human
control of the animals. ArtiŽcial selection, usually marked by the appearance
of breeds, is a further intensiŽcation of this process. Modeling the domesti-
catory process as symbiosis reminds us that it is not simply a matter of human
control but of interaction among species. The human side of this mutual adap-
tation, at least in most instances, has a larger component of intentionality
than is normally implied by symbiosis. A good case can be made that dogs
and cats initially “domesticated themselves” by entering into a commensal

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 293


relationship with humans, although later both have been subject to extensive
control of breeding and movement.

Jarman (1972) and his colleagues have done us a great service by introduc-
ing the idea of a continuum of human-animal relationships. I do not agree,
however, that domestication in the social sense is simply a point of no par-
ticular signiŽcance along this continuum. The transformation of animals from
shared resource to property is a major and critical transition that is not ade-
quately modeled as sliding along a continuum. There is a real difference
between managing wild animals through conservation measures and appro-
priating domestic animals as property. The distinction lies not so much in
the practices of animal control as in the human social relations. This is a quan-
tum shift in human-animal relations that we cannot ignore, a difference not
only of degree but also of kind. However, it is unlikely to correspond with
the appearance of morphological change in animals, so we must rely on other
lines of evidence to detect it. This is not the place for a discussion of the
methods of studying animal domestication. I will observe only that as well
as reconstructing the demographics of the animals killed, it would be useful
to examine how the meat is distributed among households and to consider
the contexts of consumption (feasting vs. daily household meals), as these
are likely to alter with changing property relations.

Implications of Domestication
We have seen that the way domestication is deŽned is related to the deŽners’
view of the relationship between nature and culture and the place of humans
with respect to nature. Casting the issue in terms of a dichotomy between
the wild and the domestic leads to many problems. However, it is the wild,
not domestication, that is problematic. When the wild is implicitly deŽned
as everything that is not domestic, we are left with a grab bag of different
human-animal relationships that includes pets, totems, game, animals cap-
tured and kept for some length of time before ritual sacriŽce, animals trans-
ported to islands and released to live and breed on their own, and animal
populations managed in various ways.

Changing the dichotomy to a continuum is not enough. For example, pets


can be either wild or domestic, and totemic and shamanic relationships with

294 • Nerissa Russell


animals have little to do with domestication, although such animals usually
are not domesticated. If we view human-animal relations not as a continuum
but as a spectrum, with domestication as one human-animal relationship
among many, we can retain a sense of its importance without dismissing
other kinds of human-animal relationships. This helps to resolve some of the
difŽculties in deŽning domestication, such as whether and how to include
pets.

Similarly, when ancient peoples domesticated plants and animals, among


other things they created a category of the Wild. The Wild cannot exist until
there is a Domestic. The creation of this dichotomy has had profound con-
sequences for human thought and perhaps for human societies. At the least,
it has been a rich source of metaphor. We do not have to look far for this in
our own society, whether it is the nobility and ferocity of wild animals invoked
as team mascots or the denigration of other humans as living like wild ani-
mals. The classic works of Leach (1964) and Tambiah (1969) demonstrate that
other cultures have made similar symbolic use of the wild and domestic.

This is not to say that the Wild has everywhere the same meaning. In par-
ticular, we should avoid equating wild/domestic with nature/culture. Although
this may hold in contemporary western society, it is certainly not universally
the case (Strathern, 1980). A large body of recent scholarship has revealed the
socially constructed and historically contingent character of nature (Barry,
1999; Cartmill, 1993; Oelschlaeger, 1991; Thomas, 1983). Similarly, the Wild
in general and wild animals in particular hold rather different connotations
among and within cultures and according to context. The metaphor of the
Wild and its potential domestication is one that can be manipulated to many
ends in social negotiations.

Although I am discussing the domestication of animals, I also should add


that animal domestication is hardly the only—and in most societies proba-
bly not the Žrst—way to create the Domestic, and hence the Wild. Leaving
aside dogs, who may have entered domestication through a different route
from most animals, the domestication of herd and barnyard animals took
place in the context of plant agriculture, that is, subsequent to plant domes-
tication. (We may have to rethink this blanket statement if claims of pig
domestication in the context of a foraging economy at Hallan Çemi in

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 295


eastern Turkey withstand scrutiny (Rosenberg, Nesbitt, Redding, & Peasnall,
1998)). It can also be argued, hearkening back to the root meaning of domes-
tication, that the domestic/wild distinction was created by the construction
of solid houses (Hodder, 1990; Wilson, 1988). These developments very likely
made animal domestication thinkable.

I would argue, though, that animal domestication gave the wild/domestic


distinction new force. Animal metaphors are particularly powerful and par-
ticularly prone to being applied to human beings (Tilley, 1999, pp. 49-51).
Animal domestication creates a new set of possibilities. Although not every
society may stress the wild/domestic distinction, most with domestic ani-
mals regard this as important. Among the Mafulu of New Guinea, wild and
domestic pigs are genetically and presumably phenotypically identical. Wild
and domestic pigs interbreed freely, and domestic pigs go feral. Wild pigs
are captured and raised as domestic. Nevertheless, speciŽc ceremonies require
the consumption of either wild or domestic pigs, and one cannot be substi-
tuted for the other (Rosman & Rubel, 1989, pp. 30-31).

Most often, domestic animals are regarded as inferior to their wild counter-
parts, perhaps lacking the souls possessed by wild animals (Ingold, 1987).
The relations of animal domestication are inherently unequal, and this has
provided both a metaphor and a model for domination. This metaphor has
been applied to subordinate humans at least from Sumerian times (Algaze,
2001, p. 212). Tani (1996) even argues that the practice of creating human
eunuchs may have been inspired by the gelding of bell-wethers. Such mod-
els have clearly owed the other way as well, with human domination of
other humans shaping modes of animal exploitation (Tapper, 1988).

It is a difŽcult, if fascinating, question whether human inequality inspired


animal domestication or vice versa. Certainly in the Old World, animal dom-
estication precedes detectable hierarchy in the archaeological record. In the
New World, the situation is more complicated, because states developed in
Mesoamerica and complex societies in parts of North America without domes-
tic herd animals. Some Mesoamerican societies did treat dogs as a minor herd
animal, but this probably postdates the appearance of human hierarchies.
However, while domestic herd animals more or less necessitate property rela-
tions, even dogs, which were present throughout the New World, are likely
to be seen as belonging to particular people. Dogs attach themselves to indi-

296 • Nerissa Russell


vidual people, adopt a position of subordination, and in many cases were
valued for their labor. Thus even in the New World, domestic animals may
have provided a mental template for domination.

On the other hand, Ingold (1987, p. 254) argues that animal domestication is
modeled on relations of inequality within the human household, although it
seems to me that domestic animals occupy a position more like that of chil-
dren than of wife, as he suggests. If indeed domestic animals initially enter
the household as “children,” the permanence of that position alters the rela-
tionship. This new model can then be projected onto humans, as in metaphors
of leaders (or gods) paternalistically caring for their “ocks” (Brotherston,
1989).

Conclusion
In this brief paper, I have painted with a very broad brush in an effort to con-
vey a sense of the power of the concept of animal domestication in both past
and present. A full understanding of how this has played out must derive
from careful studies of particular societies. I simply suggest that the idea of
domestication, and particularly animal domestication, provides an important
tool in power negotiations among humans as well as between humans and
animals.

Although I have not discussed it here, I do not intend to minimize the mate-
rial effects of animal domestication on human societies. Clearly, the appro-
priation of animals as property creates not only a new source of wealth and
base for power but also one with particular properties that have crucial social
implications (Ingold, 1980; Schneider, 1979; Russell, 1998). From the schol-
arly perspective, I believe that one of the difŽculties of studying animal domes-
tication, its simultaneously biological and social character, also is one of its
virtues. Domestication is a concept that can bridge disciplines as well as medi-
ating or even negating the nature/culture dichotomy.

* Nerissa Russell, Cornell University

The Wild Side of Animal Domestication • 297


Note
1
Correspondence should be sent to Nerissa Russell, Department of Anthropology,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-mail: nr29@cornell.edu This article devel-
oped out of conference papers presented in the session “The Call of the Wild:
Critiquing the Wild Resource/Domestic Staple Dichotomy” at the 2001 Society for
American Archaeology meetings and in the invited session “Anthropology’s
Animals” at the 2001 American Anthropological Association meetings. I would
like to thank the organizers, Katheryn Twiss and Emily Dean and Molly Mullin
and Sarah Franklin, respectively, for inviting me to participate and for creating
two highly stimulating symposia. I also am grateful to all the participants for their
insights. In addition, my thinking on domestication has beneŽted immensely from
my collaboration and long discussions with Louise Martin. I am indebted to two
anonymous reviewers, whose thoughtful comments have led to substantial improve-
ments in this Žnal version. Naturally, none of these people are responsible for the
wild views expressed here.

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