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Delivering the Prevent Strategy:

An Updated Guide for
Local Partners

August 2009

This guide is aimed at local partners in England but much of the information it contains
will also be helpful to partners in the devolved administrations with responsibility for
delivering Prevent.

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Introduction 4
Summary of Key Points 5
Section 1: The Prevent Framework 76
• Prevent aim and objectives 6
• Further information: CONTEST and Prevent 6
• Partnerships 7
• The local context 8
• Prevent research 9
• Vetting and security classification 9
• Communicating Prevent 9
• Prevent and other forms of violent extremism 10
Section 2: Effective Prevent Delivery 11
• Radicalisers and the places where they may operate 11
• Supporting vulnerable individuals 11
• Communities 13
• Broadening engagement with communities 15
• Schools and colleges 15
• Adult and youth justice 15
• Tackling violent extremism on the internet 16
• UK Border Agency (UKBA) 17
• Communications 17
• Connecting the local and international: foreign policy 18
Section 3: Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation 19
• Accountability 19
• Monitoring and evaluation 19
• NI35 as an evaluation tool 20
• Further guidance to assist with evaluation 20
• Interventions monitoring 21
• Shared values 21
Section 4 Practical Support 22
• Central Government 22
• Government Offices 22
• Other sources 23
• Websites 24
Section 5 Funding 25
• Local authorities 25
• Police 25
• Other funding 26
Annex 1: Information Sharing 28
Annex 2: Glossary of Terms 33
Annex 3: Responding to Questions and Myth-Busting 35

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The challenge The key messages in the June 2008

One of the key challenges for any document remain current and this
Government is to keep its communities guidance does not change the overall
safe. Like many countries, the UK faces Prevent strategy. It updates the earlier
a continuing threat to the safety of our document, taking into account lessons
communities from international terrorism. learned and emerging best practice, with
The Government has developed a the aim of enabling more effective local
comprehensive counter terrorist strategy delivery of Prevent in communities.
known as CONTEST, a revised version of The guide provides:
which was published in March 2009. • Information on Prevent for those who
One of the four main CONTEST work- are new to the strategy or who are
streams is Prevent, the aim of which is reviewing their existing work;
to stop people becoming terrorists or • Guidance on developing effective
supporting violent extremism. Prevent programmes;
As CONTEST makes clear, Prevent builds • A summary of official publications on
on and is linked to the Government’s Prevent produced since June 2008;
wider work to create strong, cohesive and and
empowered communities, based on a
• Information on practical support and
commitment to our common and shared
funding available to local partners.
This guidance has been drafted by the
The Government recognises the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism
importance of challenging violent (OSCT) in the Home Office, in close
extremism in all its forms, and continues to conjunction with Communities and Local
work do so, but the most significant current Government (CLG) and other Government
terrorist threat comes from Al Qa’ida and Departments.
like minded groups. It is this threat that is
the focus of Prevent.
The Prevent strategy has had real success
but we recognise that there is more to do.
This updated guidance highlights issues
which are important to the continued
success of the programme.
This guide
In June 2008 the Government published
a booklet entitled The Prevent Strategy:
A Guide for Local Partners in England
strategy/ which explained the background
to and content of the new Prevent strategy
and provided some advice on local delivery.

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Summary of Key Points

The Prevent Framework

The Prevent strategy is based around five objectives. It needs to be delivered through a
wide ranging local partnership and should be informed by an understanding of the local
Local Prevent partnerships should make connections between Prevent and other
associated and related agendas. Local partners can give Prevent work different titles
but, irrespective of the way Prevent is presented, it is vital to retain a focus on the
Prevent objectives.
Prevent is part of the Government’s strategy to counter the threat from international
terrorism. Alongside Prevent, Government and the police are engaged in a range of
work to address other forms of violent extremism.

Effective Prevent Delivery

In the past two years, together we have developed best practice around the Prevent
objectives, which needs to be reflected in the design of local Prevent programmes.
Programmes need to focus on individuals, communities and places. It may also be
important to facilitate debate about foreign policy. Communications, and in particular,
the internet and digital media are vital to Prevent.

Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation

Local partnerships should ensure that their Prevent programme of action includes clear
objectives, measurable impacts and comprehensive arrangements for monitoring and
Organisations funded under Prevent need to demonstrate a commitment to our shared

Practical Support
A range of support is available on delivering Prevent, including from central
Government, Government Offices, sector led initiatives and websites. Local partners
need to take advantage of this support in developing and delivering their Prevent

Prevent funding is not intended for a single ethnic or faith community. Effective
interventions often need to draw in many different communities, working alongside one
Localities need to make full use of all available resources, not just Prevent specific

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Section 1 The Prevent Framework

The Prevent strategy is based around five objectives. It needs to be delivered through
a wide ranging local partnership and should be informed by an understanding of the
local context.
Local Prevent partnerships should make connections between Prevent and other
associated and related agendas. Local partners can give Prevent work different titles
but, irrespective of the way Prevent is presented, it is vital to retain a focus on the
Prevent objectives.
Prevent is part of the Government’s strategy to counter the threat from international
terrorism. Alongside Prevent, Government and the police are engaged in a range of
work to address other forms of violent extremism.

Prevent aim and objectives Further information: CONTEST and

1.1 The overall Prevent programme has Prevent
five main objectives which are intended to 1.4 Detailed information on the overall
address specific causes of radicalisation. counter terrorism strategy and Prevent
Local delivery organisations require is available from a number of sources,
flexibility to implement Prevent according to including:
local circumstances and conditions but it • Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare:
is important that these common objectives The United Kingdom’s Strategy for
provide a framework for activity. Countering International Terrorism
1.2 The five objectives are: (HM Government March 2009):
• To challenge the ideology behind
violent extremism and support counter-terrorism-strategy/ The first
mainstream voices; section of this document includes a
summary of the history of terrorism
• Disrupt those who promote violent as it has affected the UK and UK
extremism and support the places interests overseas, an assessment of
where they operate; the changing nature of the threat and
• Support individuals who are vulnerable ideas about how it might develop in
to recruitment or who have already the future. This section was drafted to
been recruited by violent extremists; specifically meet local requirements
• Increase the resilience of communities for a narrative that might be used with
to violent extremism; and local stakeholders.
• Address the grievances which • The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for
ideologues are exploiting. Local Partners in England (HM
Government June 2008): http://
1.3 The strategy has two supporting
objectives or ‘enablers’:
• To develop supporting intelligence, prevent-strategy/ This document sets
analysis and information; and the framework for local delivery of the
• To improve strategic communications. Prevent strategy and provides practical
examples of the kind of action that can

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be taken to deliver Prevent. It includes institutions and communities; and
annexes which address factors driving • Effective mechanisms for shared
radicalisation and performance learning.
1.7 The Association of Chief Police
• Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Officers (ACPO), the Local Government
Practical steps for local partners and Association (LGA) and the Association of
Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Good Police Authorities (APA) have all published
practice examples (June 2009). These guidance on the specific contribution they
documents provide local partners can make to local delivery of Prevent:
with further advice on delivering
Prevent and offer examples of how • Association of Chief Police Officers:
local Prevent partnerships are putting Prevent: The Police Implementation
Prevent into practice. Both documents Plan – a summary for partners can
can be obtained by emailing Prevent1@ be obtained by emailing prevent@ This is a summary
of the guidance produced by the
Partnerships Association of Chief Police Officers
1.5 Partnerships are the key to the for police forces and sets out how the
successful local delivery of Prevent. Local police can contribute to local Prevent
authorities and the police both have partnerships and to the seven Prevent
leading roles to play but the breadth of objectives.
the Prevent challenge (in terms of the • Local Government Association:
range of relevant places, communities, Leading the PVE agenda – a role
institutions and issues) requires a multi- made for councillors; and Leading
agency approach. Local partnerships with the PVE agenda – engaging,
responsibility for Prevent should include supporting and funding community
all or most of the organisations listed in groups. These booklets are available
the Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local at
Partners (pages 8-10), including police, They are
local authorities (social, cultural, children’s designed to help councillors and local
and leisure services), education, probation, authorities with Prevent, emphasising
prisons, health and the UK Border Agency. the importance of the community
1.6 An effective partnership will have leadership role that councillors provide
agreed: and outlining the steps they can take
to increase their engagement with this
• Aims, objectives and a collective
delivery plan, with individual activities/
projects clearly assigned to a range of • Association of Police Authorities:
different partners; Prevent - A Strategic Framework
for Police Authorities. The APA
• Arrangements for oversight, monitoring
has produced a strategic framework
and accountability;
to assist local police authorities to
• A decision making and commissioning develop their response to Prevent
process; and contribute to the national Prevent
• Coverage of geographical areas, objectives. It is focused on governance

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and oversight of Prevent policing, 1.9 A range of published non-Government
consultation and engagement, and material is also now available which
police authorities’ strategic role provides an important context for Prevent
in Prevent partnerships. Further related work. Two examples are:
information on the role of police • Understanding Muslim Ethnic
authorities in Prevent and the APA Communities: http://www.
Prevent Strategic Framework are
available from racecohesionfaith/research/
The local context understandingmuslimcommunities/
1.8 Prevent work needs to be grounded This is research into 13 of the most
in information about local communities significant Muslim ethnic diaspora
and local risks. Much of the information communities in the UK.
which is required will already be held by • The Role of Muslim Identity Politics
organisations attending the partnership in Radicalisation (a study in
group. Since the publication of our progress): http://www.communities.
2008 guidance, two additional sources of
information are now available which can be muslimidentitypolitics This is an
shared with Prevent delivery partners using abridged working study on the
new information sharing protocols: role of Muslim identity politics in
• Counter Terrorism Local Profiles radicalisation, written by Durham
(CTLPs) are being produced by counter University academic Tuyfal Choudhry.
terrorism police to inform strategy-
making at a local level and are
designed to give some detail about
local risks. They are intended to
generate information sharing between
police and partners in preventing
violent extremism. Further information
on CTLPs can be obtained by
• Central Prevent Analysis (CPA): These
products provide deeper background
information on issues related to
radicalisation and violent extremism.
They are designed to provide
senior local statutory partners with
information to support policy decisions
and resource allocations. CPA papers
can be obtained through Prevent leads
in the regional Government Office and
the police Counter Terrorism Unit or
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit.

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Prevent Research
There is an active social science Prevent research programme across Government,
addressing pathways and metrics of radicalisation, effective intervention programmes
and community attitudes/responses to violent extremism. Research findings are used
to inform strategy and help develop and guide interventions. They will be shared with
local delivery partners.
A recent example of research work that has shaped thinking on Prevent is a process
evaluation of Channel (see page 11 for information on Channel), led by the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI) on behalf of the Home Office. This highlighted the need for
improved communications about the purpose of Channel to community stakeholders,
information sharing protocols and clearer evidence based guidelines on vulnerability
and risk assessment. OSCT is aiming to publish key Channel findings later in 2009.
Work by the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) in OSCT has
addressed communication themes (audiences, messages and channels/messengers)
to establish the most efficient and effective ways of communicating with priority
audiences on counter terrorism. This work is being presented to local partners in
strategic communications workshops.
Government views on the radicalisation process are continually being updated by new
research, although it is evident that there is no single pathway to radicalisation, just as
there is no single profile of a person who is vulnerable to radicalisation. New insights
will be circulated to local partners.
For further information please contact:

Vetting and security classification Standard, advocated as recruitment best

1.10 Vetting should not be a barrier to practice by the Cabinet Office, is sufficient
sharing counter terrorism related material for unlimited access to RESTRICTED and
above RESTRICTED level. Consideration CONFIDENTIAL material, and occasional
about whether it is appropriate for an access to SECRET material. For further
individual to be vetted should take place at information see
a local level and on a case-by-case basis. media/45160/hmg_bpss.pdf
Further advice, including the possibility of Communicating Prevent
funding for vetting, is available from OSCT 1.12 Prevent and the associated funding
by emailing arrangements, such as the Area Based
uk Grant, have been designed to give local
1.11 The Government Protective Marking partners maximum flexibility to deliver a
System (GPMS) and personnel security programme which takes into account local
issues are explained in the Security Policy circumstances.
Framework available from the Cabinet 1.13 Some areas have delivered
Office website: elements of their Prevent programme
spf.aspx The Baseline Personnel Security alongside and as a part of associated

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agendas – for example community
cohesion and safer neighbourhoods. In
some cases, areas have chosen not to
use the terms Prevent or Preventing
Violent Extremism when delivering specific
interventions in conjunction with these
other local agendas.
1.14 Making these connections across
agendas is certainly vital and where
particular terminology is impeding
relationships locally and damaging
delivery it can be dropped. However,
although the community cohesion and
safer neighbourhood agendas and
Prevent overlap, they are not identical.
The remainder of this document sets out
areas where they are clearly different.
In using the language of cohesion and
safer neighbourhoods it is therefore also
important for local partners to maintain
a focus on the Prevent objectives set out
here and to be clear with communities
and organisations they may be funding
what they are seeking to achieve.
Prevent and other forms of violent
1.15 Prevent is part of the Government’s
strategy to counter the threat from
international terrorism. The Government
recognises and takes seriously the threats
from other forms of violent extremism, in
particular from violent far right groups,
though it judges that these threats are
not at present as great as the threat from
international terrorism.
1.16 Alongside the Prevent strategy,
Government and the police are already
engaged in a range of work to address
other forms of violent extremism. Over the
coming months, the Government will be
further developing work in these areas and
specifically in strengthening community
resilience. This work will be resourced
separately to Prevent.

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Section 2 Effective Prevent Delivery

In the past two years together we have developed best practice around the Prevent
objectives, which needs to be reflected in the design of local Prevent programmes.
Programmes need to focus on individuals, communities and places. It may also be
important to facilitate debate about foreign policy. Communications and, in particular,
the internet and digital media are vital to Prevent.

2.1 Two years after revising the Prevent Supporting vulnerable individuals
strategy and developing the five core 2.3 Supporting individuals who are at risk
objectives we have much more experience of being or who have been recruited to
of Prevent delivery and some emerging violent extremist groups or more generally
best practice. to the cause of violent extremism is the
Radicalisers and the places where they third of the Prevent objectives.
may operate 2.4 Local areas need to have in place
2.2 Although the police have the key part or have access to arrangements for
to play in disrupting the activities of those intervening with vulnerable individuals that
who promote violent extremism, all local include:
partners have responsibilities in this area. • Provision for the identification and
The partnership will also be able to support referral of those who are vulnerable to
institutions where radicalisers may operate. violent extremism;
For example, partners should:
• A means of assessing the needs
• Ensure Criminal Records Bureau and vulnerabilities of the person
checks are in place for all individuals concerned; and
working with vulnerable young people;
• A range of interventions aimed at
• Ensure funding is denied to groups or addressing the individual’s needs and
individuals involved in radicalisation; vulnerabilities. These interventions
• Work with other public state will often draw on a very wide range of
accommodation providers to limit the community and partnership resources.
use of their premises for inappropriate 2.5 In many areas these arrangements are
activity; and provided through a ‘Channel’ programme.
• Ensure appropriate checks and The ‘Channel’ process uses existing
systems are put in place to ensure partnership working between the police,
groups accessing and using council local authorities, statutory partners and the
premises are committed to upholding local community to support those who are
shared values. The Local Government vulnerable to violent extremism. ‘Channel
Association and Improvement and – A guide for local partnerships’ will be
Development Agency recently released available later in 2009 at
guidance on this issue: Striking This guidance will be
the Balance: Managing the use of particularly useful to the police and local
council facilities for communities; authorities implementing Channel but will also be relevant to other partnerships.

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2.6 The support needed for people vulnerabilities are addressed. Further
referred under Channel programmes or information on safeguarding and promoting
other multi-agency arrangements will vary the welfare of children, young people and
but may include: families can be found at
• Mentoring and counselling: providing everychildmatters/
support, challenge and direction; 2.9 Work with vulnerable individuals may
• Theological guidance and discussion: require the sharing of personal information
helping an individual to develop their between partners. Further guidance on
knowledge so that they can better information sharing has been included in
understand and respond to violent Annex 1 to this guide.
extremist rhetoric; 2.10 An important part of work to
• Educational projects: supporting support vulnerable individuals is the co-
individuals through a combination ordination of activities commonly defined
of cultural, ethical, religious and as Prevent and Pursue. This means
vocational education and, where increasing community confidence in
necessary, also helping them to find counter terrorism policing, making best use
employment; of the range of interventions available (so
that a Prevent response is considered for a
• Encouraging civic engagement:
Pursue problem and vice versa) and using
exploring themes such as political and
information and intelligence to effectively
community engagement, volunteering,
inform decision making. In August 2009,
civil challenge, human rights and social
the National Prevent Delivery Unit in
justice; and
ACPO and OSCT published Prevent Case
• Working with the support network of Management Guidance, a RESTRICTED
the person referred: engaging family guide for counter terrorism police and
support structures and peer networks practitioners. It aims to provide guidance
to help them provide support and on:
challenge to the individual.
• Integrating Prevent into force and
2.7 OSCT currently funds a range of regional counter terrorism tasking
projects to intervene with individuals processes, combining national
identified as radicalised or vulnerable to consistency with local flexibility;
violent extremism, both in the community
and in custody. OSCT is also working with • Supporting the case management of
Government Offices and local partners to Prevent interventions, to ensure there
identify priority areas where the availability is a mechanism to record decisions
of these types of intervention needs to be and manage and monitor action;
improved and will fund increased provision • Information sharing for Prevent
in 09/10. purposes, covering personal data,
vetting and classification; and
2.8 In cases where an individual is under
the age of 18 and believed to be at risk • Tactical delivery, with case studies and
from violent extremism, consultation best practice.
with Local Authority Children’s Service is 2.11 Although a RESTRICTED document,
needed to ensure that the full range of the police can share this guidance

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with other partners where relevant and Secretary of State for Communities and
appropriate. For further information or to advises on a range of issues including
seek a copy please email prevent@acpo. empowerment and participation in or Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi. civic, economic and social life. The NMWAG can also provide advice to
Communities local partners on engaging with Muslim
women at a local level. Every region
2.12 The great majority of people in all has at least one representative on the
communities in this country are strongly group. Local delivery partners can
opposed to violent extremism. Some access the NMWAG by emailing PEU@
communities may seek specific support to
better enable them to speak out against
• Young Muslims Advisory Group
violent extremism. Communities and Local
(YMAG): YMAG is a group of 23
Government (CLG) has published guidance
young Muslims, aged 17-26, from
and studies on effective community-based
across England with a broad range of
interventions to build resilience to violent
backgrounds and experiences which
extremism and supports a number of
reflect the ethnic and denominational
groups and initiatives. Building leadership
diversity of Muslim communities in
is critical in strengthening communities.
the UK. The YMAG is sponsored by
• Preventing Violent Extremism: CLG and Department for Children,
Next Steps for Communities: Schools and Families (DCSF) and acts as a critical friend to Government
uk/publications/communities/ to help find solutions to a range of
preventingviolentextremismnext This challenges, including discrimination,
document sets out the work of CLG to unemployment, extremism and civic
reduce support for violent extremism participation. The YMAG can also
by building civic, community and faith provide advice to local partners on
leadership. engaging with young Muslims at a local
• Empowering Muslim Women: Case level. Every region has at least one
Studies: http://www.communities. YMAG representative and local delivery partners can contact them by emailing
empoweringmuslimwomen These case or by
studies provide a snapshot of some visiting
of the good work that is taking place 2.13 It is not the role of the Government
across the country to empower Muslim to intervene directly in matters of faith.
women to play a more active role in But where theology purports to justify
both their own communities and in and legitimise violent extremism, the
wider society. Government will work with communities
• National Muslim Women’s Advisory and institutions who are best placed
Group (NMWAG): NMWAG is a group to refute it and to provide a coherent
of women who are in positions of response to the questions it may pose.
leadership or who work with Muslim
communities in Britain. The group
was established in 2008 by the then

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2.14 Examples of work in this area outcomes, career pathways and
include: aspirations of future Muslim faith
• The Contextualising Islam in leaders.
Britain project, in which Cambridge • The framework of minimum standards
University lead an established group for state institutions engaging
of academics and scholars in a debate Muslim chaplains in public service
about Islam in this country. The (for example, universities and prisons).
content of these discussions will be The draft framework was produced
disseminated to a wider audience, in 2008 and is now being piloted in a
helping to strengthen young people’s number of public institutions.
understanding of their faith. 2.15 CLG is active in all these projects.
• The Radical Middle Way Roadshows, CLG also works closely with faith
which create an intellectual space to institutions such as mosques to strengthen
engage on issues that are confusing their ability to play a proactive role in their
and challenging to young people communities, including through:
through the use of prominent domestic • The Faith and Social Cohesion Unit in
and international Islamic scholars. the Charity Commission which provides
They take place at a number of support and advice to faith groups
locations around the country, through through outreach work, capacity
cooperation with local partners. For building and training, publications and
more information go to: guidance; and
• Supporting the Mosque and Imams
• The Islam in Citizenship Education National Advisory Board which aims to
project, which has been developing improve standards of governance and
citizenship education materials for use leadership in mosques.
in Madrassahs. For more information
go to: 2.16 For more information on these
projects contact
• The Faith Community Development
Qualification, which has been
developed by the National Institute of
Adult Continuing Education to equip
Muslim faith leaders, including imams
and other Muslim faith leaders, with
the skills to be community leaders.
For more information go to: www.
• The Review of Muslim Faith Leader
Training, which will look at student
intake, curriculum, recruitment of
teachers and pedagogy, linkages
with mainstream education, course

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Broadening engagement with referral units across England. It reflects
communities discussions with young people, teachers,
police, community representatives and
Local partners will wish to continue to local authorities across the country.
broaden and deepen their engagement
with those most at risk from violent 2.19 The section entitled ‘understanding
extremism. However, as CLG made clear the issues’ at the start of the toolkit gives
in Next Steps for Communities, work on background information on the threat
the Prevent agenda should draw on the from violent extremist groups and on what
experience, energy and ideas of all faith might make young people vulnerable. The
and non faith communities. second section includes practical advice
for building resilience and managing
Where it would improve the impact and risks under four headings: leadership
delivery of the Prevent agenda, CLG and values; teaching, learning and the
funding to local authorities can, and should, curriculum; pupil support and challenge;
also be used to support cross community
and managing risk and responding to
engagement and communication –
provided a clear connection is maintained
to achieving the Prevent aim and objectives 2.20 In February 2009, the then
and to the local programme of action. Department for Innovation, Universities and
For more information contact PEU@
Skills (DIUS) also published a toolkit for further education colleges, in conjunction
with DCSF and the Association of Colleges,
Schools and colleges based on the schools version described
above. This toolkit - Colleges: Learning
2.17 Schools and colleges are an together to be safe toolkit and Next
important part of local communities. The Steps document - reflects consultation
Department for Children, Schools and on the role of further education colleges
Families (DCSF) has published a toolkit - in promoting community cohesion and
Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to preventing violent extremism. In response
help schools contribute to the prevention to the consultation, a next steps document
of violent extremism - in response to calls has also been published, explaining how
from schools for more practical advice on work will be taken forward in the sector.
how they can contribute to Prevent. The Both documents have been sent to all
toolkit is available online: http://www.dcsf. college principals. They can be viewed online at:
index.shtml A more comprehensive on-line education/guidance_and_good_practice/
version of the guidance is also available on preventing_violent_extremism.aspx
teachernet and can be viewed at: http:// Adult and youth justice
violentextremism/ 2.21 The National Offender
2.18 The toolkit is aimed at school Management Service (NOMS) has
leaders for use in staff training, reviewing developed a strategy for the management
school practice and developing partnership of the risks of extremism and radicalisation
working and is intended for all schools posed by offenders, both in prison and
(primary and secondary) and pupil under probation supervision. The NOMS

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programme contributes in particular to
objectives 2 and 3 of the Prevent strategy. 2.22 The Youth Justice Board (YJB)
It includes work to better understand risks is running and evaluating counter-
and motivating factors behind violent radicalisation projects for young offenders
extremist offending and the development and those at risk of offending. The
of intervention approaches for extremist projects are being delivered through the
offenders in custody and in the community. multi-agency youth offending teams and
The programme of work is supported by an in places of detention. Practitioners have
intelligence infrastructure, close working received training to support these projects.
with partner agencies and training and Further details can be obtained from Kirk
support for Muslim Chaplains, Offender Master or Tamara
Managers and other front-line staff. Walker
Further details can be obtained from the
NOMS Extremism Unit: 020 7217 2727;

Tackling violent extremism on the internet

As CONTEST sets out, the internet enables faster dissemination of violent extremist
propaganda and provides a means for recruitment into violent extremist groups. But it
also provides a way of challenging violent extremist rhetoric and promoting a positive
response. The internet is therefore important to the Government and to local Prevent
delivery plans.
OSCT is responsible for the co-ordination and delivery of the Cross-Government
Internet Strategy. The framework has been designed directly to support CONTEST and
to address the areas in which the internet can have maximum impact in countering
Objective 1: Terrorists and violent extremists find it hard to exploit the internet for
operational purposes.
Objective 2: Terrorists and violent extremists find it hard to exploit the internet for
radicalisation and recruitment.
Objective 3: The Internet is an environment where terrorist and violent extremist
messages are challenged and alternatives are readily available.
Objective 1 is largely in support of the Pursue workstrand of CONTEST but both
Objectives 2 and 3 recognise the role that the internet can play in support of the
Prevent agenda.
OSCT has been working with partners across Government, as well as with the police,
intelligence agencies and statutory bodies to deliver this strategy. However improved
engagement with communities and citizens is vital. Community driven action on the
internet has the potential to significantly increase the impact of any Government effort.
In November 2008 OSCT invited community representatives to a conference to discuss
the use of the internet in recruitment and radicalisation. This highlighted confusion
and concern around whether individuals could enter into debate online around topics

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such as jihad or suicide-bombing, without being at risk of falling foul of new terrorist
legislation. As a direct response to this, OSCT is producing a legal guidance document
for use by communities which clarifies the issues.
Many of the potential risks that the internet poses and practical steps that can be
taken to mitigate these are set out in an OSCT e-safety best practice guidance leaflet.
This can be found on the Home Office website:
publications/publication-search/general/Officers-esafety-leaflet-v5.pdf. This leaflet will
also be sent to all e-safety officers in local authorities. Similarly, OSCT has worked with
ACPO to ensure that these same messages were part of the advice provided to front
line police officers in their recent poster and leaflet campaign.
What can you do?
– Find, read, circulate and promote the guidance that has already been provided;
–  nsure that both the negative and positive influences from the internet are
understood by all those who have responsibility for internet provision (schools,
libraries, community centres, parents);
– Include the role of the internet as an element of general discussions on Prevent;
– Feedback to OSCT any issues that arise around the internet that are not felt to be
adequately addressed;
– Encourage communities to take action against violent extremist material on
the internet themselves by reporting the content to internet providers – or by
countering inaccurate views; and
– Consider how you can incorporate the internet into all aspects of your Prevent
For more information please contact:

UK Border Agency (UKBA) programme of guidance and training

2.23 UKBA is supporting work on Prevent for detention staff, managers and the
at a local level through a programme within chaplaincy; and
in-country immigration, asylum and • Improve integration of migrants into
citizenship processes to: the UK through the ‘Earned Citizenship’
• Raise awareness of Prevent amongst
staff and partners; 2.24 It is vital that UKBA is integrated
into local Prevent partnerships. For further
• Ensure UKBA is fully integrated into
information on UKBA work contact Daksha.
arrangements for the identification,
referral and support of potentially
vulnerable foreign nationals; Communications
• Develop a strategy for supporting 2.25 Good Prevent delivery programmes
vulnerable individuals in immigration can be wholly undermined by poor
detention centres through a communications. An effective local delivery

Page 17
plan needs to have a section dedicated ——A framework to help local
to communications work. This should partners develop a communications
consider: strategy, moving beyond stakeholder
• How Prevent itself should be explained communications to using
and presented to local communities; communications principles to support
policy delivery; and
• How news stories which may play
into the Prevent agenda need to be ——Bespoke communications support
addressed locally; and on request.
• How arguments presented by violent 2.27 Annex 3 to this document lists our
extremist organisations can best be response to frequently asked questions
refuted. about the Prevent strategy.
2.26 Regular guidance to local partners Connecting the local and international:
on all these issues is available from the foreign policy
Research Information and Communications 2.28 Outreach to British Muslim
Unit (RICU), the cross-government counter- communities on foreign policy is a key
terrorism strategic communications unit part of our Prevent work. The aim of this
located in the Office of Security and programme is for Foreign Office officials
Counter Terrorism. Examples include: and Ministers to take part in discussions
• Counter Terrorism Communications with British Muslims on foreign policy
Guidance: This is a general guide issues of concern. The events open up
for communicating with Prevent space for informed debate and allow us
audiences, available by emailing challenge myths often peddled by violent It is extremists in their attempts to radicalise
not intended to be prescriptive. On others. Discussions on previous outreach
the basis of both in-depth qualitative visits have covered a wide range of policy
research commissioned by RICU issues, from Iraq, Afghanistan and the
into how messages are received by Middle East Peace Process to climate
community audiences and informal change and aid to Africa.
feedback from communities, this
2.29 Since March 2008 Foreign Office
paper sets out general principles
officials have taken part in 45 events, along
for communicating with community
with FCO Ministers including the Foreign
audiences, top-line messages on
Secretary, who has held ‘question time’
terrorism and use of specific language.
style events with audiences of between 80
• The following products are also and 300 young Muslims in Tower Hamlets,
available from RICU by emailing Birmingham, Bradford and Glasgow. During his visit to Bradford, the Foreign Secretary
——The RICU Weekly Update provides also addressed over 2,500 worshippers at
facts on topical news stories and issues the Madni Jamia mosque following Friday
that resonate with communities. The prayers – a first for a Cabinet Minster. For
update includes links to interesting further information please contact Toby.
news articles relevant to Prevent that or
local delivery partners may wish to draw
to the attention of people in their area;

Page 18
Section 3 Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation

Local partnerships should ensure that their Prevent programme of action includes
clear objectives, measurable impacts and comprehensive arrangements for monitoring
and evaluation.
Organisations funded under Prevent need to demonstrate a commitment to our shared

Accountability police Prevent policy development and

3.1 At a national level different aspects monitors force progress. Regional Police
of Prevent work are accountable to a Prevent Co-ordinators also play a key role in
number of Ministers, including the Home supporting the forces in their regions, who
Secretary, the Communities Secretary and in turn report to the Police Prevent board
the Foreign Secretary. The Home Secretary through a National Prevent Delivery Unit.
is the Minister accountable for the overall 3.4 At a local level much Prevent work is
co-ordination of the domestic counter accountable to elected local councillors
terrorist strategy, CONTEST. Aspects of and the leader of the council who can and
Prevent have been or are being reviewed should play an important role in Prevent
by the Parliamentary Home Affairs Select programmes. The Local Government
Committee and the Communities and Local Association (LGA) has highlighted the
Government Committee. importance of elected members creating
3.2 Ministers receive advice and progress strong links between community groups,
reports from a national Prevent Board, local authorities and other partners;
attended by representatives of all those providing leadership in the discussion of
Government Departments and agencies sensitive issues; and providing feedback on
which engage on Prevent, as well as successes and areas of improvement.
regional and local representatives. The 3.5 Members of Parliament are also likely
Home Secretary and Communities to want to take a close interest in Prevent
Secretary also receive advice on the work and may wish to be briefed by local
development of the Prevent strategy and partnership groups. We strongly support
its delivery in local communities from this.
the Local Delivery Advisory Group, which Monitoring and evaluation
involves representatives from a range
of relevant national, regional and local 3.6 Delivering an effective Prevent
organisations. programme depends on ensuring that
projects within it have clear objectives in
3.3 Police forces are accountable to their line with the strategy, include measurable
local police authorities for the part they impacts and strong arrangements for
play in preventing violent extremism in their monitoring and evaluation.
communities in support of the national
Prevent strategy. They are also supported 3.7 Good monitoring and evaluation will:
by the National Prevent Delivery Unit in • Improve the effectiveness of the overall
the Association of Chief Police Officers programme;
(Terrorism and Allied Matters) (ACPO (TAM))
• Allow better use of public funds;
in delivering their own Police Prevent
Strategy. A Police Prevent board oversees • Mitigate the risk of the local

Page 19
partnership funding activities that are pdf?view=Standard&pubID=629824
ineffective or counter-productive; and Further guidance to assist with evaluation
• Provide evidence for local authorities
3.12 Several other reports have been
and their partners to use within the
published on early Prevent work which may
National Indicator Set (particularly
be helpful in developing and evaluating
National Indicator 35 (NI35)) and the
Comprehensive Area Assessment.
3.8 Local partners must be clear how • Delivering the Prevent Strategy: Good
funded work is expected to be effective practice examples can be obtained
and which elements of the strategy they by emailing Prevent1@homeoffice.gsi.
are seeking to address – whether it is work It contains examples of how
focused around vulnerable individuals or local Prevent partnerships are putting
building community resilience. Prevent into practice.
• Preventing Violent Extremism
3.9 CLG has published guidelines for local
Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of project
authorities and their partners on evaluating
activities 2007/2008: http://www.
local Prevent projects and programmes.
The guidance focuses on helping local
partners answer the following questions:
This summarises the activities
• Why evaluate Prevent activities? undertaken by local authorities as part
• What are we evaluating? of CLG’s Preventing Violent Extremism
Pathfinder Fund in 2007/2008.
• What evaluation questions will we ask?
• Preventing Violent Extremism:
• How will we assess success?
Learning and Development Exercise:
• How will we collect data?
• How will we analyse the data? uk/communitysafety/goodpractice/
• What will we do with the results? Pages/preventingviolentextremism.
aspx This summarises points from the
• What resources do we have available? Audit Commission and Her Majesty's
3.10 The guidance is available Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
at: Learning and Development Exercise on
uk/publications/communities/ the first year of local work to prevent
localPREVENTprojectsprogrammes violent extremism.
NI35 as an evaluation tool • Delivering Prevent – Responding to
Learning: http://www.communities.
3.11 Self-assessing local performance
against NI35 is an important means
deliveryingprevent This draws together
of evaluation, helping local partners
common themes from learning and
evidence how they are tackling Prevent
research exercises into the local
and identify areas for improvement.
delivery of Prevent.
Guidance to assist with this is available
at: • Prevent – Progress and Prospects:
uk/news-publications/publication- http://inspectorates.homeoffice.

Page 20
prevent-report/ This is the public relating to objectives 2 and 3 of the
version of the June 2009 report by Prevent strategy. This identified a gap in
HMIC of its inspection of Prevent work information gathering at local, regional
by police in all 43 police forces in and national levels about the number,
England and Wales. It focuses on the location and type of interventions, as
key themes of assessing vulnerability; well as monitoring of throughput and
leadership and governance structures; outcomes. This data will be collected from
information sharing; community September 2009 onwards and should allow
engagement and interventions; and the provision of interventions monitoring
assessing success. reports to local partners, Channel schemes
Interventions monitoring and Government Offices. For more
information please contact: Prevent1@
3.13 In the first quarter of 2009 OSCT
conducted a national audit of interventions

Shared values
The Government is committed to promoting cohesion and our shared values more
clearly and strongly across society. The Government regards the promotion of shared
values – including fairness, respect and tolerance, democracy and the rule of law - as
a key element of building strong, empowered and resilient communities; tackling all
forms of hate crime; and promoting equal opportunities.
The concept of shared values needs to be upheld by local partners in Prevent delivery.
The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England http://security.homeoffice. explained that local
authorities and their partners should ensure that organisations funded under the
Prevent programme demonstrate a respect for and commitment to the rule of law;
reject and condemn violent extremism and terrorist acts; and support freedom of
speech, equality of opportunity and respect for and responsibility towards others. The
revised CONTEST Strategy
expands on this guidance (see page 87).
There are a number of indicators which will help local partners judge whether
organisations meet these criteria. They include: its stated aims, the nature of its work,
public statements by its representatives or members and the consistency of these
statements with the internal practices of the organisations and its engagement with

Page 21
Section 4 Practical Support

A range of support is available on delivering Prevent, including from central

Government, Government Offices, sector led initiatives and websites. Local partners
need to take advantage of this support in developing and delivering their Prevent

Central Government training is also being driven forward

• Central Government departments: at a local level, with the Government
Many departments and agencies Office network and police playing a key
contribute to Prevent and can offer part. More information can be found
support to local partners. The 2008 from local partners or by emailing
Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local
Partners in England includes an • The Research Information and
annex on the part each department Communications Unit: RICU’s Local
plays. A regular cross-Government Communications Team supports local
newsletter is available for local partners to deliver Prevent objectives
partners with details of upcoming using strategic communications and
events and publications, together with is holding a series of workshops
a series of working documents on throughout England to develop a
practical aspects of delivering Prevent. better understanding of strategic
If you would like to subscribe to the communications at a local level. The
newsletter or would like details of Local Communications Team is also
publications please contact available to provide advice to local partners on communication issues and
• Training: OSCT has identified a challenges (see page 17-18 above).
significant training and awareness For more information please contact
raising need on Prevent and products
are being developed both centrally Government Offices
and locally to meet this requirement. 4.1 Every region has Government Office
Key learning needs include what staff dedicated to supporting Prevent
the Prevent agenda is; the role of delivery. Government Offices are
individual frontline staff; what we mean tasked with supporting local delivery;
by vulnerability and radicalisation; overseeing performance management and
and what should be done to support programme delivery in their areas; sharing
those at risk of radicalisation. OSCT is good practice; and coordinating activity
developing various products including between the centre and the localities. All
a DVD-based facilitated workshop and Government Offices host regional networks
an e-learning package, and working which bring together those leading
with various sectors to produce specific Prevent work at local level to share ideas.
products - for example for YJB staff and Government Offices can arrange additional
the Prison Service. Other departments support for individual areas where
such as DCSF and the Department of necessary. Please email
Health are also developing products for contact
for the sectors for which they are details.
responsible. A range of Prevent

Page 22
Other sources
4.2 In line with the approach to If you would like more information on the
improvement set out in the National work of the IDeA please contact
Improvement and Efficiency Strategy, there
are a number of sector led approaches to • Beacon Scheme: Four local authorities
support available: have been awarded Beacon status
• The Improvement and Development for their work to promote cohesion
Agency for Local Government (IDeA): and build communities resilient to
The IDeA has several initiatives to violent extremism. Part of their status
support local authorities to deliver the involves a commitment to share good
Prevent strategy, including: practice. Information on the some
—— Peer Mentors made up of elected of the work being developed by the
members, local government officers four local authorities - Hounslow,
and third sector representatives. They Southwark, Waltham Forest and
have a comprehensive knowledge of Lancashire - can be found at www.
Prevent and are accredited to work
with local authorities. Peer Mentors of_hope.html Further information on
provide advice, support delivery and the Beacon Scheme can be found at
share best practice on the ground and
through the IDeA Prevent Community
of Practice. • Regional Improvement and Efficiency
—— Regular workshops and discussion Partnerships (RIEPs): RIEPs are in
groups on relevant issues such as place to support local authorities to
the use of local authority property deliver priority outcomes for their
by extremist groups and awareness communities. Work is underway
training for councillors. to develop RIEP support for work
around cohesion, empowerment and
—— The IDeA Preventing Violent preventing violent extremism. RIEPs
Extremism ‘Community of Practice’, can be contacted through the IDeA by
which enables local authorities and emailing
front line practitioners from partner with more information available from
organisations, including the police
and third sector agencies, to share
knowledge and good practice on 4.3 Additionally, CLG is working to develop:
Prevent. The Community of Practice The Prevent Exemplar Partnership
(CoP) allows users to post threads Programme: CLG is developing a team of
for discussion and feed into regular advisers with experience in the delivery of
‘hot seats’ on topical Prevent issues. Prevent locally who will work intensively
The CoP also publicises forthcoming with a small number of key areas to
events, holds an extensive document improve central-local coordination and
library and shows latest wiki and blog knowledge sharing, to help build a body of
activities of users. To apply for Prevent best practice ‘champion’ authorities.
Community of Practice membership
please go to: www.communities.idea.

Page 23
4.4 Prevent website: This website,
established by the Office of Security and
Counter Terrorism in the Home Office,
provides background information, case
studies and information on resources
and links to key documents relating to
Prevent delivery. It is intended to facilitate
the dissemination of best practice and
lessons learned and to enable debate and
discussion. To apply for access please
4.5 The IDeA ‘Knowledge’ website
provides background information, case
studies and information on resources and
links to key documents relating to Prevent

Page 24
Section 5 Funding

Prevent funding is not intended for a single ethnic or faith community. Effective
interventions often need to draw in many different communities, working alongside one
Localities need to make full use of all available resources, not just Prevent specific

5.1 Some localities have received challengeinnovationfund/

additional resources to deliver Prevent 5.6 CLG funding is not intended to be
but all areas should make full use of all confined to projects and interventions in a
available resources, with action to tackle single community. Many effective Prevent
violent extremism embedded within the related projects involve different ethnic
wider provision of services intended to and faith communities working together
support vulnerable people and strengthen and both demonstrating and promoting the
communities. Existing local resources shared values which the Government has
can often be used to deliver local Prevent placed at the heart of this agenda.
programmes of action.
5.2 This section describes the Prevent
specific funding that has been made 5.7 Under the Comprehensive Spending
available to some local partners and Review (CSR) funding arrangements
national level agencies. Local partners can 2008/09 – 2010/11 the Home Office is
obtain further details of the funding that providing additional funding to establish
has been made available for Prevent from over three hundred new police posts across
their regional Government Office. the country dedicated to Prevent.
Local authorities 5.8 In 2008/9 the focus for Prevent
delivery was on ensuring that specific
5.3 82 local authorities are receiving activity was delivered in those areas
£15m in funding to support Prevent work where vulnerability in communities was
in 2009/10. This figure will rise to £18m considered the greatest. The posts were
for 94 authorities in 2010/11. Details of intended to support existing neighbourhood
funding allocations can be found at: http:// policing teams.
localgovernment/xls/770621.xls 5.9 In 2009/10, a broader approach is
being taken to the allocation of resources
5.4 The Communities Secretary has so that all forces in England and Wales
announced £7.5m in additon to these receive some funding. This approach
figures to increase local authority Prevent will provide funding to the 19 previously
funding through the Area Based Grant. unfunded forces to buy dedicated Prevent
5.5 The £3 million Challenge and resource in addition to targeting other
Innovation Fund was announced by the available resource in line with the analysis
then Communities Secretary in December of vulnerability and risk and to support
2008. Applications are now closed but national rollout.
details of the scheme and the results can
be found at:

Page 25
Other funding vulnerable individuals, as part of local
5.10 Other funding streams for Prevent programmes of action. Further details
activities are set out below: can be obtained from Kirk Master Kirk. or Tamara Walker
• Police funding for work with schools,
colleges and universities: In 2009-
• OSCT directly funded counter-
10, the Home Office is providing £1.2
radicalisation and de-radicalisation
million in additional police funding for
projects: OSCT currently funds
specific work with schools, colleges
10 projects to intervene with
and universities. The funding is
individuals identified as radicalised
allocated regionally, based again on
or vulnerable to violent extremism,
ACPO’s allocation criteria, which take
both in the community and in custody.
into consideration the size of the
They provide a mix of mentoring,
Muslim population and the most recent
counselling, education and more
data. Police Regional Co-ordinators will
intensive de-radicalisation work. OSCT
work with local Prevent partnerships in
is working with Government Offices
their regions to decide how the funding
and local partners in priority areas
will be distributed across forces. All
where the availability of these types of
activity should be reflected in local
intervention needs to be increased and
Prevent programmes of action.
will fund additional provision in 09/10.
• Prisons and Probation: OSCT is The projects are all subject to a
providing the National Offender rigorous evaluation, which is expected
Management Service (NOMS) with a to report in mid 2010. This will
grant to the value of approximately inform future best practice. Further
£5.6m in 2009/10 to fund their information can be obtained from
Extremism Programme, which spans
the whole of CONTEST. The funding is
• OSCT ‘one-off’ funding for Prevent
used to support work on intelligence
Objectives 2 and 3 in 08/09: This
gathering and partnership working,
fund was set up to provide funding for
training and awareness, capability and
projects aimed at delivering objectives
resilience, and offender management
2 and 3 of the Prevent strategy. Over
and interventions, across prisons and
30 projects are being funded between
probation areas. Further details can
2008 and 2011 across the country,
be obtained from the NOMS Extremism
covering a variety of fields from
Unit: 020 7217 2727; securitygroup.
building local capacity to providing
interventions to vulnerable individuals;
• Youth Offending: The Youth Justice educational projects; regional
Board (YJB) has been given almost immigration pilots; work in prisons,
£3.5 million in 2009/10 as part of a probation and the education sector;
two year funding programme to fund its as well as training and awareness
Prevent programmes across England for frontline staff. The fund has now
and Wales. The majority of this funding closed but further information can be
is distributed to YOTs, STCs and YOIs to obtained from Prevent1@homeoffice.
deliver Prevent work locally, particularly
focusing on efforts to support

Page 26
• CLG Community Leadership Fund
is providing £5.1m over three years
to community groups for projects of
national scope or significance aimed
at building the capacity of individuals,
organisations and communities to take
the lead on tackling violent extremist
influences. Applications for the fund
closed on 11th November 2008.
Government Offices can provide local
partners with more information about
projects taking place in their area.
Further information can be obtained

Page 27
Annex One Information Sharing

Prevent may require the sharing of personal required to have the desired outcome
information (for example about vulnerable should be shared, and only to those
individuals) and sharing of information partners necessary. Key to determining
and intelligence between partners on local the necessity and proportionality of
threats. This section provides guidance on sharing information will be the professional
the procedures and legislation relevant to judgement of the risks to an individual or
information sharing. the public.
Sharing personal information for Prevent Case merits
purposes Each case should be judged on its own
Key principle merits and the following questions should
be considered when sharing information:
Partners may consider sharing personal
information with each other for Prevent • What information you are intending to
purposes, subject to a case by case pass;
assessment which considers whether the • To whom you are intending to pass the
informed consent of the individual can information;
be obtained and the proposed sharing
• Why you are intending to pass the
being necessary, proportionate and
information (i.e. with what expected
outcome); and
Effective information sharing is vital to the • The legal basis on which the
delivery of Prevent, enabling partners to information is to be passed.
take informed action to tackle an identified
threat. This will sometimes require the Consent
sharing of personal information, particularly The default should be to consider seeking
in connection with objectives 2 and 3 of the the consent of the individual to share
Prevent strategy. information. There will, of course, be
Any sharing of personal or sensitive circumstances in which seeking the
personal data should be considered consent of the individual will be neither
carefully, particularly where the consent desirable nor possible, because it
of the individual is not to be obtained. will prejudice delivery of the intended
The legal framework within which public outcome, and there may be gateways or
sector data sharing takes place is often exemptions which permit sharing to take
complex, although there is a significant place without consent. If you cannot seek
amount of guidance already available. In or obtain consent, or consent is refused,
addition to satisfying the legal and policy you cannot share personal information
requirements, there are some principles without satisfying one of the gateway or
which should guide Prevent information exemption conditions. Compliance with
sharing. the Data Protection Act and Human Rights
Act are significantly simplified by having
Necessary and proportionate the subject’s consent. The Information
The overriding principles are necessity Commissioner has indicated that consent
and proportionality. The sharing of should be informed and unambiguous,
information must be necessary to conduct particularly in the case of sensitive
the work in question. Only the information personal information. If consent is sought,

Page 28
the individual should understand how is necessary, proportionate and lawful.
their information will be used and for what In engaging with non-public bodies to the
purpose. extent of providing personal information,
Power to share it is good practice to ensure that they are
aware of their own responsibilities under
The sharing of data by public sector bodies the Data Protection Act.
requires the existence of a power to do so,
in addition to satisfying the requirements Legislation and guidance relevant to
of the Data Protection Act, the Human information sharing
Rights Act and the common law duty of Although not an exhaustive list, the
confidentiality. Some statutes confer an following acts and statutory instruments
express power to share information for a may be relevant. The original legislation
particular purpose (such as section 115 of can be found at the Statute Law Database
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). More
often, however, it will be possible to imply Overarching legislation
a power to share information because
it is necessary for the fulfilment of an Data Protection Act 1998
organisation’s statutory functions. The The DPA is the principal legislation
power to share information arises only as governing the process (including collection,
a consequence of an organisation having storage and disclosure) of data relating to
the power to carry out an action which is individuals. The Act defines personal data
dependent on the sharing of information. (that information by which an individual can
Having established a power to share be identified) and sensitive personal data
information, it should be confirmed that (including information about an individual’s
there are no bars to sharing information, health, criminal record and political or
either because of a duty of confidentiality religious views), and the circumstances in
or because of the right to privacy enshrined and extent to which they can be processed.
in Article 8 of the European Convention The Act also details the rights of data
on Human Rights. Finally, it will also be subjects.
necessary to ensure compliance with the The first data principle states that personal
Data Protection Act, either by meeting the data shall be processed fairly and lawfully,
processing conditions in Schedules 2 and meaning that other statutory and common
3, or by relying on one of the exemptions law obligations must be complied with,
(such as section 29 for the prevention and that the DPA cannot render lawful
of crime). There are further details of any processing which would otherwise be
the overarching legislation and some unlawful. Schedules 2 and 3 of the Act
potentially relevant gateways in the section provide the conditions necessary to fulfil
on legislation and guidance below. the requirements of the first principle.
Where non-public bodies (such as Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive
community organisations) are involved in Personal Data) Order 2000
delivery of Prevent work, you may need to
This statutory instrument (SI 2000/417)
pass personal and sensitive information
specifies further conditions under which
to them and your approach to information
sensitive personal information can be
sharing should be the same – i.e. that it

Page 29
Information Sharing: Case Study
In an area without a Channel project, a twenty three year old individual was referred
to a multi-agency Prevent Interventions Panel by the Probation Service. He had been
convicted for possession of an offensive weapon and common assault. He lived at
home with his mother, younger brother and sister, and had become increasingly violent
towards family members. His family had raised concerns about his behaviour with the
Probation Service as he was becoming increasingly obsessive over religion and had
been spending a lot of time on the internet reading about religion and terrorist related
activities. During weekly visits by the Probation Service, the individual’s behaviour was
becoming more concerning, he had made comments supporting the 7/7 bombers, and
had demonstrated anti-western views. He was deemed vulnerable by the Probation
Service and was referred to the police.
Following this referral, a multi agency meeting involving the police, local authority
housing and probation took place. At this meeting information regarding this individual
was shared with the consent of the individual and under the power of the Offender
Management Act 2007. In response to this meeting, arrangements were made for
this individual to be provided with housing away from his family. Regular support was
provided for this individual by the Probation Service. In response to these actions and
multi-agency support mechanisms being put in place, concerns for this individual’s
behaviour subsided.

processed, including conditions where the for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
processing must necessarily be carried the protection of health or morals, or for
out without the explicit consent of the the protection of the rights and freedoms of
data subject. Of particular relevance to others”.
Prevent are paragraph 1 (for the purposes Common Law Duty of Confidentiality
of prevention or detection of crime) and
paragraph 4 (for the discharge of any The key principle built up from case law
function which is designed for the provision is that information confided should not
of confidential counselling, advice, support be used or disclosed further, except as
or any other service). originally understood by the confider,
or with their subsequent permission.
Human Rights Act 1998 Judgments have established that
Article 8 of the European Convention on exceptions can exist “in the public interest”;
Human Rights (which is given effect by the confidentiality can also be overridden or set
HRA) provides that “everyone has the right aside by legislation.
to respect for his private and family life, The Department of Health has produced a
his home and his correspondence”, and code of conduct concerning confidentiality,
that public authorities shall not interfere which is required practice for those
with “the exercise of this right except such working within or under contract to NHS
as is in accordance with the law and is organisations.
necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country,

Page 30
Gateways, exemptions and explicit In general terms, if the sharing of the
powers information is for a purpose related to
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 policing (as above) and the conditions of
the Data Protection Act are satisfied, then it
Section 115 confers a power to disclose will be lawful.
information to a “relevant authority” on
any person who would not otherwise have Local Government Act 1972
such a power, where the disclosure is Section 111 provides for local authorities
necessary or expedient for the purposes to have “power to do any thing…which is
of any provision of the Act. The “relevant calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or
authority” means a chief officer of police incidental to, the discharge of any of their
in England, Wales or Scotland, a police functions”.
authority, a local authority, a health Local Government Act 2000
authority or a probation committee in
England and Wales, and includes an Section 2(1) provides that every local
individual acting on behalf of the relevant authority shall have the power to do
authority. The purposes of the Crime and anything which they consider is likely to
Disorder Act include, under section 17, a achieve the promotion or improvement of
duty for the relevant authorities to do all the economic, social or environmental well-
that they reasonably can to prevent crime being of the area.
and disorder. National Health Service Act 2006 and
Common Law Powers Health and Social Care Act 2001
Because the range of partners with whom Section 251 of the NHSA and Section
the police deal has grown - including the 60 of the HSCA provides a power for the
public, private and voluntary sectors, there Secretary of State to make regulations
may not be either an implied or explicit governing the processing of patient
statutory power to share information information.
in every circumstance. This does not Offender Management Act 2007
necessarily mean that police cannot
Section 14 of the OMA enables disclosure
share the information, because it is often
of information to or from providers of
possible to use the Common Law. The
probation services, by or to Government
decision to share using Common Law
departments, local authorities, Youth
will be based on establishing a policing
Justice Board, Parole Board, chief officers
purpose for the activity that the information
of police and relevant contractors, where
sharing will support, as well as an
the disclosure is for the probation purposes
assessment of any risk.
(as defined in section 1 of the Act) or other
The Code of Practice on the Management purposes connected with the management
of Police Information (MoPI) defines of offenders.
policing purposes as: protecting life and
Existing Guidance
property, preserving order, preventing the
commission of offences, bringing offenders • Information Sharing – Guidance for
to justice, and any duty or responsibility of Practitioners:
the police arising from common or statute uk/everychildmatters/resources-and-
law. practice/IG00340/

Page 31
• Public Sector Data Sharing – Guidance
on the Law:
• Information Commissioners Office
Guidance on Interpretation of the
• DH Confidentiality NHS Code of
• DH Caldicott Guardian Manual:

Page 32
Annex Two Glossary of Terms

TERRORISM: there is no single • foster hatred intended to cause

definition of terrorism that commands full violence between communities in the
international approval. However the present UK.
definition of terrorism used in UK domestic RADICALISATION: in the specific context
law is found in section 1 of the Terrorism of the CONTEST and Prevent strategies
Act 2000 which, in summary, defines this refers to the process by which people
terrorism as the use or threat of action come to support violent extremism and,
designed to influence the government or in some cases, join terrorist groups.
an international governmental organisation Radicalisation has a range of causes,
or to intimidate the public or a section of varying from one country and one
the public, for the purpose of advancing organisation to another. We recognise that
a political, religious, racial or ideological radicalisation is an imperfect term, which
cause. The action threatened or used must some have inferred to mean that we are
involve serious violence against a person, against radical thinking of all kinds. That is
serious damage to property, endanger not the case.
a person’s life (other than the person
committing the action), create a serious ISLAMISM: Islamism is a political
risk to the health or safety of the public philosophy which, in the broadest sense,
or a section of the public, or be designed promotes the application of Islamic values
seriously to interfere with or seriously to to modern governance. The term ‘Militant
disrupt an electronic system. (Where the Islamism’ is used in CONTEST to specify
use or threat of action involves firearms an ideology which argues for the use of
or explosives, it need not be designed to violence to achieve this objective. There
influence the government or intimidate the are no commonly agreed definitions
public). of ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’. They do
not refer to a single unified movement
In this definition, ‘action’ includes action and individuals and groups that define
anywhere in the world and references to themselves using these terms - or may
the ‘public’ and to ‘the government’ include be described by others using these terms
references to the public of any country or - can hold widely differing views. Most
the government of any part of the United Islamists do not condone the use of
Kingdom or any other country. violence to achieve their aims. For that
VIOLENT EXTREMISM: unlike terrorism, reason (and because the term Islamism
there is no statutory definition of violent can be confused with Islam), we do not
extremism (in many cases the two will be recommend that local partners use this
synonymous). However, violent extremism phrase to define the ideology they are
describes the attitudes, beliefs and actions seeking to address.
that condone violence (and in particular CONTEST: the Government’s counter-
terrorist violence) as a means to a political terrorism strategy, which aims ‘to reduce
end. It includes views which: the risk to the UK and its interests overseas
• foment, justify or glorify terrorist from international terrorism, so that people
violence; can go about their lives freely and with
• seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; confidence’. CONTEST is divided into four
and strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and

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PREVENT: the strand of the strategy change, i.e. ceasing extremist activity.
which seeks to prevent people becoming It does not necessarily involve de-
terrorists or supporting violent extremism. radicalisation and extremist views may still
The most significant terrorist threat to the be held. Disengagement may also occur
UK currently comes from Al Qa’ida and like without intervention.
minded groups. COMMUNITY INTERVENTIONS: non-
5+2: shorthand used to describe the five selective interventions provided for all
key work-streams of the Prevent strategy members of a targeted or particular
(challenge the ideology behind violent community such as the residents of
extremism and support mainstream a geographical area; the members of
voices; disrupt those who promote violent an institution, for example a school or
extremism and support the places where university; or to certain social groups that
they operate; support individuals who are have a common interest such as young
vulnerable to recruitment or have already people, women, families, students, etc.
been recruited by violent extremists; Community interventions usually come
increase the resilience of communities under objective 4 of the Prevent strategy,
to violent extremism; and address the in contrast to interventions for vulnerable
grievances which ideologues are exploiting) individuals which come under objective 3.
and the two enabling functions (develop INDIVIDUAL INTERVENTIONS: selective
supporting intelligence, analysis and interventions provided for identified
information; and improve our strategic individuals assessed as vulnerable to
communications). radicalisation or already radicalised. These
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: the usually come under objective 3 of the
title given to the funding stream from CLG Prevent strategy.
to local authorities via the Area Based
Grant. This term is no longer used to
describe that funding.
intended to prevent radicalisation which
can be delivered with communities or
DE-RADICALISATION: interventions
intended to reverse or neutralise
radicalisation that has already occurred.
These interventions usually focus on the
individual and involve cognitive change,
i.e. change in beliefs, values, attitudes
and outlook. De-radicalisation may occur
without intervention.
DISENGAGEMENT: interventions intended
to stop involvement in violent extremism -
again, usually only at the individual level.
Disengagement requires behavioural

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Annex Three Responding to Questions and Myth-Busting

Why does Prevent focus on Muslim depends on their support.

communities? • Young people are often best placed
• Historically, many terrorist to identify the causes of violent
organisations and groups in this extremism and find solutions to
country and overseas have tried to prevent people turning to violence. The
recruit people from specific ethnic or Young Muslims’ Advisory Group (see
faith groups. Al Qa’ida and other like page 13 of this guidance for details)
minded organisations have chosen seeks to make use of this commitment
to try to recruit people from Muslim and expertise.
communities around the world and Is Prevent making explicit or implied
in this country. Al Qa’ida continues criticisms of Islam?
to pose a threat. We want to support
communities which are at risk from • The Prevent strategy is not making
them. any criticism or judgment about Islam.
The focus of the strategy is on the
• We need to be very clear that the activities of terrorist organisations,
vast majority of people in Muslim some of whom have sought to justify
communities have rejected Al Qa’ida; their action by reference to theological
we must also understand that many arguments. The strategy emphasises
Muslims around the world have that these arguments have been very
been harmed in Al Qa’ida related widely refuted by scholars and rejected
attacks; and we need to avoid giving by communities.
any impression that that Prevent (or
terrorism more widely) is the only policy • The strategy proposes that where
area on which we engage with Muslim necessary and appropriate
communities in this country. Government should support the
wider dissemination of these counter
• Moreover, in this document we have arguments to enable the isolation
made clear that Prevent must not focus of apologists for violent extremism.
exclusively on Muslim communities. The first objective of Prevent is about
It is vital that our response to the challenging the ideology behind
contemporary international terrorist violent extremism and supporting
threat engages all communities in a ‘mainstream voices’.
common and coordinated effort around
a set of commonly held shared values. Is Prevent a pretext for spying on
Doesn’t Prevent stigmatise young
Muslims? • We want to be completely open about
the aim, objectives and programmes of
• We are not stigmatising young Muslims Prevent. They have been set out here
as future terrorists. The vast majority and elsewhere in detail. There is no
of young people and Muslims in Britain hidden or ‘covert’ agenda. Prevent is
reject violent extremism. Muslims in not a pretext for spying. It is intended
the UK continue to make an enormous bring together communities, local
contribution to the well being of this authorities and police in a joint and
country. The Prevent strategy engages collective effort.
with this majority and its success

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Isn’t Prevent a response to a addressing grievances which can lead
misrepresentation of the outlook of to radicalisation.
Muslim communities by the media? • A community which has isolated
• We recognise that many Muslim and minimised the impact of violent
communities judge that their views extremism will enable people to have
on terrorism are being systematically more confidence to build relationships
misrepresented in some UK media with one another and so increase
reporting. We accept that on occasions community cohesion. So Prevent builds
this has been the case and that upon and then facilitates cohesion.
reporting can be inaccurate and How does Government decide with which
sensationalist. groups to engage in connection with
• The Government will make every Prevent?
effort to ensure that the media are • Engagement in this context means
accurately briefed on terrorist related debate, discussion, coordination and
issues and incidents and regards this the sharing of lessons learned.
as extremely important.
• We will continue to broaden and
• Prevent is not however based on media deepen our engagement across
misreporting. It rests on a considered Muslim and other communities to
and well informed assessment of the oppose violent extremism, promote
threat that Al Qa’ida poses in this shared values and understand
country and on the knowledge that differences of view.
the vast majority of people in Muslim
communities reject violent extremism. • But Government is clear that it will not
engage with organisations domestically
Is there any difference between Prevent where there is clear evidence of active
and community cohesion? support for violent extremism.
• Work to promote community cohesion • Our engagement principles are based
and to prevent violent extremism are on the objectives of countering violent
separate but related policy areas. extremism and fostering community
Building community cohesion means cohesion and are applied to all
developing relationships between organisations equally.
people of different backgrounds and
How does Government decide which
provides an essential foundation
groups to fund under Prevent?
for successful Prevent work. But
experience has shown that without • In this context engagement and
additional interventions violent funding are different. Government
extremism can emerge from even departments and agencies will
the most cohesive communities. inevitably engage with more
Prevent therefore goes further in organisations than they wish to fund.
wishing to create a challenge to violent Decisions on which organisations to
extremist ideologies, in developing fund are not taken lightly. The first
programmes to support vulnerable key considerations are whether the
individuals (including in prisons), and interventions these groups make
in debating and where appropriate are effective in addressing Prevent

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objectives and whether they subscribe close and tightly knit group.
to our commonly shared values. • It is possible to identify factors which
• We will not fund groups which: may cause radicalisation. They include:
——Express racist or intolerant views exposure to areas of conflict and
that publicly and directly encourage violence overseas; exposure to violent
discrimination based on gender, extremist peer group pressure; the
ethnicity, faith or sexuality; influence of a charismatic ideologue
(either direct or via the internet);
——Promote beliefs and activity under achievement at school or in
that publicly and directly reject or employment; and criminality.
undermine democracy in the UK;
• Much more data on these issues is
——Are ambiguous about their available in open source material. See
observance and recognition of UK law; page 8 above.
——Are ambiguous in their stance Isn’t it all about foreign policy? If we
towards terrorism; sorted this out, the problem would go
——Advocate the isolation and autonomy away
of religious or ethnic groups in the UK.
• We recognise that individual reactions
• Our funding strategy will be kept to UK foreign policies, such as military
under continuous review and, should involvement overseas, can be a factor
it become clear that the balance in radicalisation and that violent
of benefit no longer lies in pursing extremists exploit this when recruiting
particular projects, we will stop funding others to their cause. As part of out
them. Prevent work we want to explain
Is there a profile of an individual our foreign policy and to challenge
vulnerable to violent extremism? allegations sometimes made about it.
• The vast majority of credible academic • But no credible academic research
literature on this issue is cautious suggests that foreign policy is the only
about trying to generate a profile for driver for radicalisation in this country
people who are either vulnerable (or anywhere else). And Al Qa’ida itself
to radicalisation or who have been has made very clear that foreign policy
radicalised and are members of violent is not the only reason why it wishes
extremist organisations. to engage in terrorism. Terrorists
have been attacking and murdering
• Potential signs to look out for
innocent people, and plotting to do so
which may indicate that a person is
in the UK, long before the intervention
vulnerable to radicalisation include:
in Iraq. They have killed many Muslims
open support for violent extremist
around the world, in and outside
causes; possession of violent extremist
Muslim majority countries.
material and related internet based
activity; behavioural change, including Are you are only concerned about violent
withdrawal from peer and mixed extremism?
group activities and from widely used • CONTEST is focused on taking action
institutions and meeting places; and against those who incite, promote,
hostility towards those outside of a

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engage in and are vulnerable to violent
extremism. But the Government is
also committed to promoting and
defending our shared values, notably
democracy and the rule of law. That
means challenging those who seek
to undermine these values and call
for us to abandon them, regardless
of whether those calls are legal or
illegal, and regardless of what type of
extremism it may be.
• But the Government has no intention
of criminalising extremist views which
are at present legal.
What are we doing about other types of
extremism, such as the far-right or animal
• Al Qa’ida related terrorism is at present
the biggest threat to the UK. Prevent
is the Government’s long term strategy
to tackle this threat. However the
Government also recognises and takes
seriously other forms of extremism and
violent extremism, in particular from
violent far right groups.
• Alongside the Prevent strategy,
Government and the police are
therefore engaged in a range of work
in response to these concerns. Over
the coming months, the Government
will be making further announcements
about work in these areas. This work
will be resourced separately to Prevent.

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