Outline – Criminal Law NB: the only crimes we have looked at are sex crimes and homicide.

Therefore, know the ins and outs of these, and know defenses and conditions/tests for attempt. That is the final (except for perhaps statutory interpretation and some policy issue – retributive vs. utilitarian). I. Intro to Criminal Law A. Sources 1. modern penal code (MPC) 2. common law (CL) a. know which crimes prosecuted under what b. know differences in analysis between both forms B. Elements of a crime 1. mens rea (MR) 2. actus reus (AR) 3. causation: did my acts combined w/mental state combine to result in social harm actual and proximate causes 4. social harm a. all four elements should occur about the same time C. Trial Process 1. Sixth Amendment guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." 2. Steps for prosecuting a felony a. felonious crime committed b. arrest (made with probable cause) c. complaint d. arraignment e. preliminary hearing/grand jury indictment f. motions g. trial h. sentencing D. Punishment theories (understand basics for policy argument questions) 1. Utilitarian a. General deterrence b. Specific deterrence c. Isolation d. Reform 2. Retributive 3. Proportionality: Need it be considered? Owens v. State: Owens convicted of drunk driving but police never saw him driving only parked. Circumstantial convictions allowed to stand circumstances were "inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

State v. Ragland: Affirmed that while jury nullification is a power of juries, it is not a right under the Sixth Amendment and so no need to instruct juries that they have this power. Coker v. Georgia: US Supreme Court held that death was disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional punishment for rape under the "cruel and unusual" clause of the 8th Amendment. Decision justified by rape not as serious as murder and no other states had such a punishment. Harmelin v. Michigan: US Supreme Court upheld mandatory life sentence for drug possession deciding that the 8th Amend does not require strict proportionality, but rather it only forbids extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate." United States v. Jackson: Jackson released from prison and that same day robs a bank. Apprehended with a weapon and sentenced to life under a statute requiring recidivist felons caught with weapons to serve mandatory life. Upheld because statute [enacted by the people through legislature] "reflects judgment that career criminals possessing weapons should be dealt with severely." E. Statutory Requirments and the Principle of Legality 1. Nothing can be considered a crime without a pre-existing law a. Law-making power should not be delegated to anyone who is a member of the judicial hierarchy (i.e., legislatures make laws) 2. Statutes cannot be vague or overbroad or else they are void 3. "Strict construction" (aka rule of lenity) which requires that judicial resolution of uncertainty in penal statutes should be biased in favor of the accused. Keeler v. Superior Court of CA: Keeler willfully kneed his adulterous wife in her pregnant belly causing the termination of a viable fetus living inside of her. Court held that because CA's murder statute did not define "human being" and because historical context and common law precedent seemed to show fetuses were not considered human beings in 1872 when code was written, Keeler could not be tried on murder (i.e., the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought). Court cannot unforeseeably enlarge statute, for this would be the same as ex post facto law. Dissent: Argues that statutory language is not frozen in time but must be fairly and reasonably interpreted by the court to carry out the justice intended in the statute. [NB: Statute amended to include fetuses.] II. Actus Reus A. This is the physical or external aspect of a crime. B. Elements 1. conduct (voluntary act) 2. Causation 3. Harmful result Some offenses punish the result (murder); some punish the act (drunk

driving when no one is hurt). Conduct crimes vs. result crimes. NB: "attempt" turns result crimes into conduct crimes C. Voluntary Acts 1. Person must voluntarily commit act deemed criminal 2. Voluntary act objectively demonstrates willful intent (i.e., mens rea) Martin v. State: Police dragged Martin, already drunk, from his house onto a public road and charged him with public intoxication. Appeals court overturned conviction on grounds that appearance in public was not voluntary, as required in statute. State v. Utter: Appeals court held that, although facts insufficient to warrant reversal, principle that an involuntary act or spasm resulting in criminal harm removes culpability from D is valid, unless D placed himself in unconscious state voluntarily (such as use of drugs). D. Possession 1. A plants drugs in B’s purse to avoid detection during an airport security search. 2. How would MPC deal with a prosecution of B for possession of drugs? MPC 2.01(4) – possession defined - (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. E. Omissions and Resultant Guilt? 5 Ways one can be criminally liable for omissions 1. Statute imposes duty 2. Certain status relationship with another 3. Assumed a contractual duty of care for another 4. One has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid 5. Person creates a risk of harm to another People v. Beardsley: D accused of not properly caring for an adult (over 30) woman who became voluntarily drunk and intoxicated on morphine and later died. D and woman had spent several days carousing together. D convicted of manslaughter. Appeals court reversed stating that D had no legal duty to a woman who was not his wife . D's act may be moral reprehensible, but it is not criminal. Barber v. Superior Court, CA: Can two medical doctors be charged with unlawful killing (i.e., murder) by removing life support systems from a patient who, though in a vegetative state, maintains minor brain function? The removal of life support is not an act, but rather an omission of care (or heroic measures) and therefore there is no actus reus for homicide. This raises another issue: did doctors have a duty to continue to provide life sustaining treatment? The duty is removed once it is clear that such treatment is futile [i.e., no longer proportional]

Definition difficult. Specific vs. Proof of Intent a. b. Specific intent i. MPC abandons countless common law mens rea terms and replaces them with four: i. morally culpable state of mind Regina v. Normally both the conscious object of actor as well as anything he is virtually certain will occur. able to infer that D intended to cause "permanent disability" (statutory language) based on the viciousness of the attack. III. including lack of warning given to victim.02 and mens rea (141-145) a. to be cured. People v.132n1): a. intend to do something more than the act (e. the MR must be related to act committed. guilty mind. intent. ii. Culpability (common law) i. vicious will. General Issues in Proving Culpability 1. act itself is enough 4. Model Penal Code §2.g. in this case. General intent i. look at MR at the moment of the act B. not just a morally blameworthy manner b. Can therefore be inferred (but not presumed) that a person ordinarily intends the foreseeable consequences of his acts.in that it doesn't sustain a life while the pathology is diagnosed. having proven facts of vicious battery. statutory) i. does mens rea meet the requirements of the statutory language? Typically defining a type of intent. Knowingly a. General Intent (140n6.. Some broad attempts (p. Nature of Mens Rea 1. for the pathology is too severe. 2. Intent a. only applicable if resultant crime causes same level of social harm as intended crime (must have MR and AR) 3. Mens Rea A. 138-141) a. b. MPC requires prosecutor to prove particular mens rea for each crime. Transferred intent applicable to crimes (predominantly in homicides). break into house with intent to commit a felony therein) b. Purposely a. intends to cause a result ii. Conley: court. Cunningham: generalized evil mental state is not enough. Elemental (narrower def. i. knows behavior almost certain to cause result .

02(4): when words unclear. State v. Nations: By MO statute. Rules: mens rea is firmly entrenched in American law. the lack of awareness is a gross deviation from reasonable standard of care c. namely.02(7)). US: Court argues that punishment too severe for a strict liability offense. Negligently a. Exclusion of mens rea requirement from "public-welfare offenses" a. a gross deviation from law-abiding standard of conduct iv. Recklessly a. not refusal to find out. consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk b. the D had not yet ascertained a child's age when she let her dance scantily clad on a stage. State argued that age of child was only attendant circumstance. knowing requires actual knowledge of a fact. Held: D guilty of recklessness. MPC defines recklessly and knowingly in similar ways. i. In effect. building and factory laws ii. motor vehicle and traffic regs. a person can only endanger a child "knowingly". C. should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk b. Problems in Statutory Interpretation a.iii. are simply facts that occur with the crime and there is no need to prove a mens rea with respect to them. they apply to entire statute unless explicitly stated otherwise. b. or a knowledge that once other knowledge is known. that to criminalize their behavior strictly would trap a lot of people who would be unaware of the law. the result of conduct 5. i. MPC address it in §2. In this case. then a mens rea applies. minor violations of liquor laws. 6. just that they existed. According to MO code. court typically refuses to hold felony convictions to a strict liability standard Staples v. Cir. the nature of the forbidden conduct ii. If it is deemed a material element. she is guilty of nothing at all. it should be assumed. by statute. deliberate effort to avoid learning the truth. pure food laws. Court argues that as mens rea is traditional in our law. but not knowingly endangering a child and so. "Knowledge" of Attendant Circumstances a. One of these levels of culpability must be proved with respect to each "material element" of the offense. you won't like that knowledge! This is termed. Att. criminal liability attaches without regard to fault if conduct involves. mens rea is the rule not the . So many people own guns innocently. recklessness is a refusal to confirm a suspicion. i. the attendant circumstances iii. Strict Liability Offenses 1. "willful blindness" (§2.

cf. "legal wrong" doctrine i.e. dissent in Garnett) d. believing property to be yours) is not an excuse in general intent crimes. negligence is not applicable to specific intent crimes c. Common law mistake is complex due to elemental/culpability issues and general/specific intent b.05). then if jury holds that were the mistake true. statutory rape is the only major crime ascribed strict liability Garnett v. defense rarely permitted. then it is. b.. is not an excuse when there is no mens rea specified by a statute." then D is convicted (176n5. 3. "But for" test: a D's conduct is a cause-in-fact if the said result would not have occurred "but for" the D's conduct . State 2. Navarro: erroneous belief. the act was still "immoral.. "moral wrong" doctrine – minority of jurisdictions i. ii. Actual cause (cause-in-fact) 1. US: anti-tax crusader IV. mens rea requirement) even an unreasonable belief permitted to be given as excuse (though jury can disregard) Cheek v. Marrero (1987): After final appeal.exception. Causation A. i. i. Mistake and Mens Rea 1. unjust to condemn a person who is not morally culpable D. if act based on mistake is still "illegal. if mistake of fact occurred. strict liability statutes: even a reasonable belief not permitted as excuse People v. D was not allowed to claim that he misunderstood the statutory definition of peace officer (which led to his conviction of carrying an unlicensed firearm) and claim excuse under NY's "mistake of law" statute. Typical criticisms of strict liability a. even a reasonable one. does not deter since actor is unaware of the facts that render his conduct dangerous b. Mistake (or ignorance) of Law a. In specific intent crimes. specific intent (i.g. where a felonious belief must be proved. see People v." then D may be convicted of the more serious offense of which he is factually guilty (177n6) 2. severe punishment is inconsistent with regulatory matters. MPC generally rejects strict liability (§2. even if unreasonable may be considered by jury as excuse ii. Mistake of fact (e. Mistake of Fact a. D's conviction upheld because the statute he violated was a strict liability statute and therefore "mistake".

his beating is not a but-for cause (would be if could be proven he accelerated death) 2. happens without any cause from D ii. both can be found guilty this way 4.i. Proximate Cause ("Legal" Cause) 1. Intended Consequences (common law) 3. courts won't impose liability where: a. responsive/dependent i. but-for causal agent comes into play after D's act or omission. prohibited result of D's conduct is beyond scope of any fair assessment of the danger created by D's conduct b.intent to kill .intent to do serious bodily injury . Substantial factor test (rarely used to replace "but for" test): when acts of two D's would each alone be sufficient to result in the harm. merely a proximate cause req: "actual result not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on D's liability" C. "Apparent safety" (common law) a. act or omission of victim that assists in bringing about the outcome b. when a person reaches a position of safety. and before the social harm occurs i. Criminal Homicide Common Law Murder: (killing with "malice aforethought") . therefore. Oxendine: he beat kid but did not inflict mortal injury. 3rd party that accelerates or aggravates the harm caused by D iii. MPC § 2. Henderson: it is foreseeable to a reasonable that a drunk left by the side of the road might wander into it and be hit by a car c. breaks the chain of causation only if abnormal d. D is somehow responsible for bringing about this act ii. Concurrent and contributory but-fors i. where it would otherwise be unjust based on fairness and policy considerations B. act of God ii. original wrongdoer is no longer responsible for ensuing harm V. coincidental/independent i. Cannot be a proximate cause without being an actual cause [but] Can be an actual cause without being the proximate cause 2. acts together cause the criminal harm. Intervening force a.03 i. but neither alone would have 3.premed/deliberate MPC Murder: . breaks chain of causation unless foreseeable by D Kibbe v. Proximate cause req: even if D's act is cause-in-fact.

Provocation thus requires a dual test: .(felony murder) Vol Manslaughter: . sudden heat – no time to cool iv. MPC §210 C. depraved-heart murder (wanton. manslaughter was homicide without malice aforethought or without justification or excuse B.. heat of passion iii. Manslaughter: "Heat of Passion" (HOP) Killings a.voluntary . applying some specific standard (241) 1. intent to cause grievous bodily harm iii. and factual act 2. other wise it's murder (247) iii. Deliberation-Premeditation Formula 2.reckless . Common Law Principles i.depraved heart/reckless indifference . court took it out of jury's hands to mitigate down to manslaughter. murder committed during another felony 3. definition of "malice aforethought" i.intentional . Common law origins 1. willful disregard of risk to human life) iv. passion. causal connection between provocation. mutual combat 3. "misdirected retaliation rule" – must kill the provoker for mitigation.depraved heart . requires "adequate provocation to inflame passion of a reasonable man" due to unlawful conduct by provoker. a partial "justification" that mitigates murder down 1. intent to kill ii. adequate provocation ii.Gross negligence Four types of murder: intent to kill intent to cause serious bodily injury that results in death callous indifference to human life (depraved heart. The CL Objective Standard: Who is the Reasonable Man? i.involuntary . catching spouse in act of adultery 2. unlawful killing of human being with "malice aforethought" 2.EED Negligent Homicide: . typically words are not enough a.felony murder Manslaughter: (kill w/o "malice aforethought") . under common law. extreme recklessness) felony murder A. Intentional Killings – Degrees 1. Rule of Provocation (tested objectively) i. assault and battery b.

Unintentional Killings: Unlawful Conduct 1. MPC and beyond (mainly subjective) i. either sex 2. Accords no special significance to an intent to cause grievous bodily harm but rather treats such cases under the extreme recklessnss and recklessness standards c. Negligence is for criminal law an "objective" standard in that behavior is compared to that expected of a reasonable person in similar circumstances 3. Felony-Murder Rule (CL) a. if a reasonable man had it. the killing becomes a murder as a strict liability offense iii. "implied malice" b. Unintentional Killings: Unjustified Risk-Taking 1. intent to cause grievous bodily harm resulting in unintended death is murder with malice aforethought under CL 2. §2. might cause a reasonable man to act in the manner that D did ii. was D provoked? b. provocation sufficient to cause particular D to lose selfcontrol 2. Camplin court defines a reasonable man: 1. 280-282) E. takes into account D's subjective outlook re: a. was provocation adequate? c. Policy issues discussed (pp. Negligence a. e.e. the doctrine in its unlimited form i. response of D is sub/ob hybrid: Is D's subjective perception one that. which is much broader than the HOP standard 1. 13 yr old girl jumps out of moving car and dies because she knows driver wants to have sex with her (308) . CA: "abandoned and malignant heart". would lead to the same action? D. "conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" b.g. MPC a..02(2)(c) i. i. callous to value of human life and utter indifference as to whether one's conduct will create the requisite risk of death" c. also applies in commission or attempted commission of felony 1. Common law a. in effect. was level of response merited by gravity of provocation? c.1. unthinking reaction 2. Utah: "depraved indifference. no need for immediate. MPC uses the "extreme emotional distress" (EED) standard. a felony + a killing = a murder ii. once there is a felony.. Recklessness. normal powers of self-control 3.

then you can't charge felony-murder a. retribution and general culpability: punish the "evil mind". if death is a coincidence with the crime. CL originally punished all felonies with death. then no felonymurder rule a.b. charge people with different level of homicide ii. flying a plane transporting drugs. deterrence: the rule is so simple that it is likely to be understood by felons 4. promotes conservation of judicial resources normally needed to determine grade of homicide (i." 2. it is a misdemeanor to drive drunk. if felony not inherently dangerous (either in abstract or in the particular instant case) then murder rule should not be applied 2. the policy debate i. it affirms the sanctity of human life via condemnation 3. it crashes and kills one of the occupants = no felony-murder . transferred intent: mens rea for burglary is not the same of premeditation for murder 3. deterrence: how can we deter an unintended act? 2. the "independent felony" (or merger) limitation 1. if underlying felony is a step in the death. conflicts with trend of punishing homicide by degree of culpability iii. Policy: prevents stacking charges against D's. defense of felony murder rule 1.e. then it is homicide. are the acts that make up the underlying felony an integral part of death? b.. mention that in all essays) i. "in furtherance" of a felony 1. "ratcheting up" charges. The "inherently dangerous felony" limitation 1. efficiency) iv. Two part test is merger applies: a. 2. but if you kill someone. modern rationales (288-291 criticizes them) 1. felonymurder rule not much of a stretch ii. does the underlying felony exhibit an intent or goal to accomplish something apart from the ultimate result of the felony? iii. only apply it in very violent behavior. therefore. The classification system for these two related offenses "reflects societal notions of proportionality. Limitations on the Rule (not that under traditional CL these exceptions would not apply. MPC is against the felony-murder rule c.

g. justifiable homicide. for it treats human beings as things to be toyed with and discarded and removes their human dignity. Death must be declared unconst. this came about after the Furman v. Substantive Limitations on the Death Penalty a. self-defense). death should not be imposed ii. Oxendine (p. d. The "misdemeanor manslaughter" rule a. iv. Tison v. then the Ds cannot be charged with felony murder. we must punish them differently in order to maintain "the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability" . death penalty has a long history of acceptance in both England and US. Bonner) 3. causally related). if a single mitigating circumstance exists. Arizona (good exam review case) i. no intent to kill c. 324-328 i. good summary of policy on pp. if it is a direct consequence (i. Capital Murder 1.e. the Constitutional and Policy Debate a. degree of participation in felony is minor (when death imposed after felony-murder conviction) b. actor who is a major participant in a felony. Ds cannot be charged with felonymurder (see State v. deterrence ii. homicide during commission of a non-felony is common law involuntary manslaughter b. but who has reckless indifference to human life. so much judicial decisions. then felony-murder. retribution iii. 309) 2.. then. Dissent: as societal standards evolve. Dissent: major participation may reveal a mental state. therefore.. recklessness is much less culpable than intentional.6: provides sentencing hearing in which aggravating and mitigating factors mat be introduced re: death penalty i. so this is against declaring it unconstitutional per se c. MPC favors abolishing this rule F. Agency 1. 2. (and) "the notion that retribution can serve as a moral justification for the sanction of death is highly disturbing. but should not be used alone to impose death iii. Georgia decision requiring that a statute needed to ensure that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance b. according to MPC. if death occurs by someone not acting in concert with Ds. MPC §210. risk of executing the innocent 2. if the deaths are not illegal deaths (e. nevertheless is eligible for death after a felony-murder conviction ii.2.

General principles i. Mens Rea 1. no rape. Forcible Rape a. "No" (or absence of "yes") as force? 2. Proving Rape 1. therefore. Policy: these laws enacted to prevent character assaults on V that were prompted by CL assumption that previous unchastity meant woman was loose and readily consented to sex . totality of circumstances must give rise to a reasonable inference that the unspoken purpose of the threat was to force the victim to submit to unwanted sex d. deny D right to present other evidence re: V's prior sexual conduct or reputation c. (physical) threats.e. if a D entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that V voluntarily consented to sex. Rape Shield Laws a. Common law: "carnal knowledge of a woman against her will" + force Mens Rea: knowingly -sexual intercourse -unlawful. no rape b.VI. MPC Mens Rea: as low as Reckless. -w/o consent -against will -must resist (normally physically) b. then he does not possess wrongful intent that is a prerequisite for rape (majority belief) C. Mistake of Fact a. Boro v.. absent evidence of force or threats to overcome will of victim to resist sex. which in turn implicated the victim's own state of mind (i. Rape A. Rusk v. B. Superior Court: fraud to gain consent for sex does not vitiate the legitimacy of that consent. Deceptions and Non-Physical Threats a. the burden of proof is on the victim). fraud Force was identified and determined not as an independent factor but in relation to the response of the victim. deny a D right to question complainant re: her prior sexual conduct or reputation b. Alston a. Actus Reus 1. State v. -compels by threat -victim is incompetent -victim is unaware of the sexual act c. State ii. not wife -force.

Structure of Justification Defenses a. etc B. Categories of Defenses 1. Nonexculpatory Public Policy Defenses a. but no social harm or evil that the statute defining the offense sought to prevent i. making a ransom payment to kidnappers to save child is technically complicity in kidnapping 3. Principles of Justification 1. all elements of offense exist.2. prosecutor has burden of production for the elements of the crime)(450n1). insanity) b.13 recommends that prosecution carry the burden of disproving any affirmative defense raised1 by D C. necessity) a. General Defenses to Crimes Def. diplomatic immunity. Four approaches to rape shield laws a.. VII. a. Texas. existence of triggering conditions permit a b. but social harm still exists (all elements of crime satisfied) 5. defense of others. negates the moral blameworthiness of the actor. Excuses (duress. one or more elements in the definition of the offense cannot be proven 2. Constitutional test a. crime is ignored after a certain time period b. MPC §1. incompetence. justification negates the social harm of an offense 4. statute of limitations – guilt remains. Burden of Proof 1. California: trial courts can admit reputation evidence on a case-by-case basis when it seems relevant 3. justification represents a "superior social interest" b. Defense: "any set of identifiable conditions or circumstances which may prevent a conviction for an offense" A. Not unconstitutional to put the burden of production for affirmative defenses and also the subsequent burden of persuasion on Ds(meanwhile. Failure of Proof Defenses a. federal. obligation of states to define the elements of the crime b. most rape shield laws pass the Sixth Amend test giving a D the right to confront his accusers. Offense Modifications a. necessary (response to imminent threat) and proportional response to avert the threat 1 forcing prosecution to disprove all possible affirmative defenses is unreasonable . judicial immunity. but for public policy of fostering a more stable and forward-looking society. Justifications (self-defense.g. Michigan: allows evidence of prior sexual conduct with D or with others that would explain physical characteristics if judge determines that it is relevant b. e.

. at CL a. MPC §3. moral forfeiture of the right to life a.04(2)(b)(ii)). the necessary and proportional requirements are very important 2. D's knowledge about victim.. of death or serious bodily harm and c. objective defined as a reasonable person in the D's situation. def. a. public duty a. provokes the incident) iii. p. does this not open the door to allow people's prejudices to enter the consideration of the reasonableness of their actions c. same as CL (adds. "retreat to the wall" before use of force a. one forfeits the right to his own life iii. rarely applied when D faced with deadly force iv. response is proportional ii. and D's prior experiences in similar situations are all relevant to determining what was objectively reasonable for a man in D's situation to do 1. aggressor: cannot normally assert self-defense justification a.i. CL General principles i. castle doctrine: almost universally accepted that one has no duty to retreat if attacked within one's home b. lesser evils doctrine b. cf. aggressor – one who performs an unlawful act reasonably calculated to produce an affray leading to injuries or death (i. "Reasonable Belief" Requirement i. the right to preserve autonomy a. Deadly force not justifiable "if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating" (MPC §3. imminent harm req – objective test d. the defender kills to preserve his right to life iv. 471 b. prevent any forcible or atrocious crime ii. by threatening to take a life. necessity and proportionality of response – objective test . Self-defense a. in this case. Policy arguments in favor of self-defense justification i. a reasonable belief deadly or severe force only way to counter the threat and d.04 i. self-defense (CL) a. right to resist unlawful aggression (when State not there – in the form of police – to do it for you) v.e. retreat rule: under CL. info about physical attributes of all actors. otherwise. must be an unlawful and imminent threat b. no retreat at work) c.

04 a. simply permit justification where circumstances merit removal of imminence req 3. State v. Use excuse (rather than justification) based on impaired rationality or volition 2. no imminence req. Should imminence be removed? 1. to what extent do we incorporate the D's knowledge of the V's past bad acts. 2) proportionality of response. in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be (subjective). 2. Objective. MPC §3. physical size. Supreme court: harm must be imminent2 b. a person is justified in the use of force against another if a. uses a wholly subjective standard.ii. "self-defense" by proxy c. then he could be convicted of a homicide with one of these types of MR c.e. Defense of Others a. and 3) triggering mechanism: for exam) a. the force employed must. the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself 1. says inevitability is sufficient 2. the MPC §3. however. i. Battered Woman Syndrome (subjectivity) and Beyond a.. Norman 1. or a Mixed Standard? (which standard to we apply to 1) imminence. a reasonable person in the actor's position would believe his intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person and b. requiring jury to look only at what D believed the situation to be b. what is "reasonably believed" should take into account how a D's beliefs are affected by his/her gender. be proportional 2 the imminence requirement is the only thing that ensures killing in self-defense will be used as a last resort . State v. broader than imminence req: "justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting oneself" 1.05 standard i. 3. if D formed his belief recklessly or negligently. etc. no specific triggering mechanism in this case iii. Subjective. policy: is this wise? letting people set their own standards for permissible use of force? c. Appeals court: believes battered wife syndrome and sees it as a justification for killing in selfdefense. of course.. Wanrow 1.

coincidence) ii. armed robbery) ii. situation not self created (used in some courts) v. when threat of dispossession from house by felony b.g. then no justification v. threatened deadly force vs. Necessity ("Choice of Evils"): a utilitarian defense (p. CL requirements (Primarily an objective standard defense): i. no legal alternatives/no legislative (as voice of society at large) preclusion vi. MPC §3. without deadly force. "alter ego" rule i. (objective) the particular choice made has not been precluded . (objective) necessity must arise from an attempt to avoid an evil or harm that is greater than the evil or harm sought to be avoided by the law defining the offense charged (D chooses lesser harm) iii.02 (p. MPC § 3. 530-532) i. D faces choice of evils (created by natural situation. D chooses the lesser harm (objectively determined). person attempting felonious destruction or theft of property and has: a. causal connection between harm and conduct iv. you were faced with death and you took a life). 5. person attempting dispossession from house ii. b. (objective) balancing of evils is not committed to the private judgment of the actor – a fact-finder will decide iv. Defense of Property/Habitation a. Primarily an objective standard defense. 535) a. (subjective) actor must believe that his conduct is necessary to avoid an evil (that is. if harm is equal (e. California and MPC merge protection of property with protection of self except in case of dispossession.ii. b. MPC §3.06 – Deadly force permitted if i. then anyone who assists him is guilty of a crime) 4.. actor will be exposed to SBI CL: protection from any felony.. actor or b. a causal connection between actor's action and alleviation of the harm) ii. non-deadly force can be justified to defend property i.e. if third person was not privileged to use resistive force.09.g.05 must be interpreted in light of 3. Policy: to prohibit such a justification would increase alienation of individuals within society from each other iii. CL – one is not privileged to defend to a greater degree than the person himself (i. except when life threatened at same time (e.04 and 3. deadly force rarely justified to defend mere property. Illinois statute is more broad and permits killing after mere invasion of home. harm is objective and immediate iii. General Principles..

g. Another formulation: 1) a person unlawfully threatens actor or another person . If the act committed may reasonably believe that the action will directly affect the harm (i.. Causation (non-utilitarian): a person should not be blamed for conduct if it was caused by factors outside of his control i. Duress a. rob a bank because someone threatened to kill your kids if you didn't ii. the law is concerned for the person accused who has not made a culpable choice to break the law (utilitarian) i.g. Theories underlying excuses a. Why excuse wrongdoers? a. rather than preventing harm itself. Contento-Pachon: Three elements of duress defense: 1) (sub/ob hybrid) immediate threat of death or SBI 2) well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out 3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm 4) actor was not at fault in exposing himself to the threat ii. coercive threat b. lobbying) exist to gain what people want ii. a fairly direct causal connection). "Free Choice" (or Personhood): one can be punished if one entered into criminal act knowing all facts and punishments for the act 3. but leaves it up to courts to elaborate the limits of the defense D. General Principles i.g. e. then there should be no culpability 2. culpability implies moral criticism. necessity will exculpate unless the crime involved can be committed recklessly or negligently c. e. Schoon i.by legislative act (or no legal alternatives exist) v. US v. Civil Disobedience: United States v. mental illness. Necessity as Defense to Murder? i. can never be subject to necessity defense a.. Direct civil disobedience may be subject to it. Indirect civil disobedience. No. problem: so why do we punish people with good character who make a stupid mistake? c. The only defense to murder is self-defense or defense of a third person. d. if a person's action does not deserve criticism.. MPC §3. ii.e.. legal alternatives (e.02 does not specifically exclude homicide from the "choice of evils" defense. because it attacks a symbol of harm. Character: excuses should be recognized in those circumstances in which bad character cannot be inferred from the offender's wrongful conduct i. Principles of Excuse 1.

Duress negates MR (i. Necessity versus Duress i. intoxication is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense ii. however.08 i. but necessity (choice of evils) appears most applicable. Voluntary (Self-Induced) Intoxication a. ii. actor has no free will for actions). Policy: to permit intoxication to be an excuse. voluntary intoxication is relevant to the question of the capacity of the actor to have possessed the requisite intent of the crime charged ii..09 1) offender was coerced by use of. there is no social harm). Commonwealth v. MPC §2. Unger: prison escapee does not fit neatly into either category. Necessity negates AR (i. it would open the door to frauds and perjuries by persons to enable them to escape prosecution i. thus permitting an insanity defense . Policy: society's interests in preventing escapes must. MPC §2. Necessity normally arose from some sort of natural factor (a chance coincidence) whereas duress normally arises from a human element (gun to head. unlawful force [not necessarily deadly] against his person or the person of another [not just close family]. create a mental disease. Graves: under traditional CL. and a person of reasonable firmness in his situation (sub/ob hybrid) would have been unable to resist [more restrictive mental state. it does not negative recklessness iii. intoxication was never an excuse for a crime. that is. out weigh the interests of the individual defendant. involuntary intoxication or pathological [grossly excessive] intoxication is a defense d. modern CL saw intoxication as a mitigating factor to drop the crime down from specific intent to general intent.. since society doesn't benefit regardless of the choice. etc). intoxication is not mental disease iv. must intend the consequences c. People v.e. in all but the most egregious cases. the choice MUST have been reasonably compelled] 2) no imminence requirement 3) defense unavailable if offender placed himself in the situation by recklessness or negligence b. iii. D can use his drunkenness to prove that he did not have the requisite MR for the specific intent crime b. or threat of. an indiv who voluntarily ingests substances that create a loss of control over his actions.e.with death or serious bodily injury 2) actor was not at fault in exposing himself to the threat iii. 4. iv. chronic abuse of intoxicants may. i.

made D not . Johnson) -Two prongs: prove a mental defect. others mixed. Why Excuse the Insane? i. Competency to Stand Trial a. then he must show the D is sane d. A man who cannot reason cannot be subject to blame. D must first make a prima facie showing that they are insane (mention this 1st step) ii. concern is only with person's mental state at time of trial. presumption that you are competent d. Insanity a. Five tests for Insanity (State v. NGRI (not guilty by reason of insanity) i. committed until sane. not at any other moment c. must be able to consult with a lawyer "with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" b. . most states: automatic commitment b. Post-trial Disposition of Insanity Acquittees a. know which! -All except federal rule are proved by preponderance of evidence i. defect of reason. if burden of persuasion is on prosecutor. burden is normally preponderance of evidence iv. presumption of sanity c. -Some test are cognitive. not the AR of the crime iii. state puts him in mental hospital b. if court notes possible lack of competence. then court can raise the issue sua sponte ii. when one's free will is impaired. placed in prison for remainder of term v. insanity is a defense to the MR. repeat sex offender. One who is truly insane cannot be rehabilitated or deterred. then evidence must be presented a. GBMI (guilty but mentally ill) i. most states place the burden of persuasion on the D i. iii. still viewed as a danger and has perverted impulses. insanity is an affirmative defense b. Procedural context i. should they be subject to that law? c. M'Naghten Rule a. and then . Pre-trial Assertion of the Insanity Plea a. The law of criminal responsibility has its roots in the concept of free will. a D must prove incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence i. Burden of Proof at Trial a. others volitional. . from a disease of the mind.5. and morally we should not seek retribution against him ii. New Strategy for Civil Commitment a.

criticized for its all-or-nothing nature and a. Wilson a. or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law (volitional impairment) a. if he did know the nature and quality. know action is wrong i. if there had been prior resistance to the impulse. "Irresistible Impulse" or "Control" Test a. i. Federal a. excludes crimes not committed in a fit of rage iii. State v. then insanity easier to prove iv. if "know" is broadly. it was a product of the) mental disease or defect (no separation of volitional and cognitive aspects) i. if "know" is interpreted narrowly. MPC by its language can recognize either moral or legal wrongs] ii. a person is not responsible for conduct if.. no irresistible impulse req. either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct (cognitive impairment) [NB.01 (M'Naughten + Impulse test) a. as a result of severe mental disease or defect. crime would not have occurred but-for (i. MPC Test. the test would fail – requires total incapacity ii.e. it's all-or-nothing). at time of offense.know the nature and quality of his act b. similar to M'Naghten) b. failed to define disease or defect ii. D was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts (i. abandoned because only needed to show mental illness. then he did not know it was wrong.e. insane if. loss of control caused by insane impulse (volitional). as a result of mental disease or defect. D must prove by clear and convincing evidence . he lacks substantial (jury issue) capacity (not all or nothing. criticized because did not recognize degrees of incapacity (i. rather than jury iv. requires a high degree of incapacity ii. not total incapacity): i. v.. insanity difficult to prove iii. legally wrong is narrower b. §4.e. Durham or "Product" Test a.. morally wrong is broader ii. expert witnesses tended to decide the case. at time of conduct.

this is how court says that MPC should be interpreted ii.g. if Dim Cap retained. MPC § 4. recognizes partial responsibility variant a. or to reduce the degree of the crime for which D may be convicted. i. Wilcox i. diminished capacity most useful in jurisdictions that use the strict M'Naghten rule ii. still. e. under the circumstances as the defendant honestly but mistakenly understood them. Wilson a. Diminished Capacity (many jurisdictions removing this) a." (subjective/objective hybrid). a form of insanity defense (643) b. permits introduction of mental disease or defect evidence whenever it is relevant to prove or disprove the existence of any mental state. the MR requirement (642) . also. allows holes in sentencing c. but is rather simply a D asserting his constitutional right to present evidence to deny certain elements of the crime. Knowing/Appreciating the "Wrongfulness" of One's Actions (the cognitive requirement): State v. ii. State v. No: it is rarely used and even more rarely successful 6.. Role of Expert Witnesses: State v. would not have morally condemned his actions.d.02 i. at time of act as a result of mental disease or defect. either to negate a mental element of the charge (MR variant)3 a. permits D to introduce evidence of mental abnormality at trial i. Public Morality Test: D lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions if. in this case. Green a. court holds that it is too subjective and does not draw a bright line the way the insanity defense does (647) a. and insanity supposed to remove stigma of criminal conviction? is not insanity a stigma? convictions should simply be a determination of dangerousness to which community must respond iii. people could be in jail for a really short time. not as helpful iii. e. "he substantially misperceived reality and harbored a delusional belief that society. where M'Naghten is abandoned or broadened. thereby exonerating D ii. traditional policy argument against maintaining (634) iv. Yes: too many wrongdoers use it to escape punishment ii. M'Naghten and the MPC in Greater Detail i. extreme emotional distress 3 NB: Some say that this should not be considered a form of insanity defense. even if conduct satisfied all other reqs of higher charge (partial responsibility). when they "deserved" to be in their for life b. Should Insanity Defense be Abolished? i.

Forms of attempt: a. and actor does or omits something with purpose or belief it will cause that result ii. MR: can be stretched into several steps . shoot gun at person.g. Components of Attempt: a.must have highest level of intent for a conviction of attempt 1. Ensures that only obviously culpable receive this high punishment iii. specific intent. Overview 1.05 – Grading inchoate crimes a. holds that except where completed offense is punished by death. acting with the MR otherwise required for commission of the crime. Inchoate Offenses Spectrum of criminal offenses: solicitation  conspiracy  attempt  substantive crime A.VIII. cannot be convicted of attempt if offense was completed b. i. performs act or omission that is a substantial step in the course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of a crime 2. e. engage in conduct that would be a crime if circumstances were as actor believed them to be 3. he: a. attempted murder can only be successful if the MR was intent to kill (not reckless) 2. CL . solicitation and conspiracy B. Policy: attempt probably offers little specific deterrence. included offense 4. purposeful is req'd) i. incomplete: only some elements of crime realized before interrupted b.e. MPC §5: deals with inchoate crimes of attempt. attempt should receive the same punishment as completed offense 6. A person is guilty of attempt by MPC if.g. complete: all elements realized but unintended result (e. but bullet misses) 3. purposefully engages in conduct that would be a crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be or b. Mens Rea: (as with all inchoate crimes. MPC: have same level of culpability as completed crime and 1. Merger operates a.. take a substantial step to completion: tests 2.. MPC §5. Causing a particular result is an element of the crime. attempt is deemed a lesser. however.. assumes that the crime will be fulfilled even if he does nothing else or c. Attempt 1. but it does permit law enforcement officers to intervene before an individual can commit a completed offense 5.

everyone has to attempt to get to his portion of the crime. Actus Reus i. it will result in the crime intended ii. the greater the gravity and probability of the offense. mere preparation is not enough: CL tests (see 716-717 for examples) 1. however.e. would go ahead with criminal conduct. physical proximity4 test i. conduct is attempt if.. dangerous proximity i. plan b. abnormal step test i. AR: when does this attach? 1) discuss with 3rd party: no 1) preparations: no 2) substantial step 3) 1st step (e. conduct manifests an actor's intent to commit a crime 4 5 how close in space and/or time you are to final overt act of the crime Attempt is a derivative offense (i. if involving a conspiracy. in ordinary/natural course of events. Under accomplice. preparation vs. but-for the intervention of another force 5. indispensable element test i.1) conception of crime 2) evaluating idea 3) taking concrete steps toward actualizing crime. walk into the bank) 4) penultimate step (still not completed attempt) 5) courts have held that an appreciable fragment of the crime must have been committed and would be completed if not interrupted by circumstances independent of the attempter ii. conduct goes beyond the point where a normal citizen would think better of his conduct and desist 6. one member cannot be guilty of attempt until the other performs his part of the crime5 (see Peaslee) 4. . he would probably be guilty of something. probable desistance test i. res ipsa loquitur/unequivocality test i.. emphasizes any indispensable aspect of the criminal endeavor over which the actor has not yet acquired control ii. stronger the case for calling it attempt 3. perpetration (713n5).g. overt act must be proximate to completed crime or directly tending toward completion of crime or amounts to commencement of consumation 2. and the nearer the act to the crime.

can't get it up.g. no victim in being. substantial step tests focus on what has already been done i. acts that would be attempt in MPC are not attempt under this test.01(1)(b) omission can be corroborative of a criminal purpose. there can be no attempt to commit the substantive offense e. there must be specific intent to qualify as attempt) 1. can an omission constitute AR for attempt? a. cf McCloskey) iii. this is the most generous of the tests (e. MPC tests 1.. woman dead. this tends to extend liability for attempt ii. enticing or seeking to entice victim to intended spot of commission e. possession of materials to commit crime and can serve no lawful purpose b.01(1)(a)) a.e. iv. Special Defenses to Attempt a.13(5) "omission" can equal conduct.g.ii. Thomas) i. i. therefore. unlawful entry into place where contemplated to commit crime g. proximity tests focus on what remains to be done 2. so can't rape her even if penetration [no SH] however ii. soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime v. CL vs. searching for victim d.. Impossibility at CL (US v. reconnoitering the place contemplated for commission of crime f. but no such law 6 "strongly corroborative" of the commission of crime (see circumstances listed in outline) .. circumstances beyond accused's control make it legally impossible to commit a crime. so no rape possible [no complete AR] iii. possession at or near place of commission that can serve no lawful purpose c. if actor thinks he violated law. however. MPC: substantial step6 tests a. does not impose liability for remote preparatory acts 7.g... Under MPC 1. under 5. MPC does not permit this defense (§5. lying in wait. act that constitute AR must be intentionally performed (i. a physical impossibility unknown to accused rendering the accomplishment of crime impossible retains criminal attempt (impossibility in fact) [punishable as attempt in majority of jurisdictions] e.e.

No such thing as attempted assault. he can't be convicted merely for his faulty "criminal" intent = pure legal impossibility (750n7) b. MPC §5. then we may refuse to apply abandonment (755n2) iv. an attempt to conspire ii. for assault is an attempt D. Solicitation 1. but can be attempted murder. or counseling of another to commit a specific crime or specific type of crime i. negligent infliction of harm w/deadly weapon or iii.01(4) codifies this: "it is an affirmative defense that actor abandon his effort to commit the crime under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal purpose" 2. cannot have begun commission of crime ii.exists. Assault is much stricter and requires present ability to inflict harm. CL -asking. Abandonment at CL and MPC (McCloskey) i. intentional attempt to cause injury to another with a deadly weapon c. intentional/reckless infliction of bodily harm or ii. MPC §211. must voluntarily abandon course toward crime 1. Reckless endangerment i. later included mere menacing (without present ability to inflict harm) a. brings assault into the same standard of attempt (NB: must have a substantial step present) -no such thing as attempted assault under MPC a. aka.g. Assault 1. to commit battery. Aggravated Assault i. recklessly engages in conduct that may or does place others in danger of death or SBI 3. but MPC permits raising of the defense until the point of the penultimate step of attempting the target offense C. battery: use of force to cause injury to another 2. intentional/reckless infliction of infliction of injury with extreme indifference to value of human life8 ii. CL – attempt. 8 group all crimes based on "value of human life". Simple assault i. pointing an unloaded gun an pulling trigger is not assault.. etc into groups . cannot renunciate a completed attempt. depraved indifference. if SH has resulted before target offense is completed. inducing. coupled with present ability7. put another in fear of imminent SBI b. Under CL. enticing.1 -omits requirement of present ability to succeed. renunciation cannot be from fear of being captured or motivation from external circumstances iii. attempt is easier to prove. solicitation must actually be communicated to other person 7 e. only applies to incomplete offenses [?] 1.

03 is the same except it requires an overt act in furtherance of the agreement 1. two-fold. Conspiracy: an agreement between two or more persons express or implied to do either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.03 i.. intent must be express. this CL doctrine makes minor participants guilty ii. but often need it to prove at trial ii. MPC disfavors punishing minor parties f. one is liable for all substantive offenses carried out by fellow conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable until one takes an "affirmative action" to withdraw from the conspiracy i. MR is purposeful. relationship with perpetrators c.e. solicitation punished at same level as target crime 4. AR is the communication (AR and MR prove each other. if crime is "conspiracy to assault a police officer. bifurcated specific intent required i.. mere knowledge of another's criminal acts is not the same as purpose or intent to form an agreement d.. Actus Reus a. the crime is complete upon formation of the agreement i. MPC §5. abandonment is an affirmative defense to solicitation iv. i. not implied (779) c. present at scene b. attendant circumstances (e. with perps before and after .02 i. bifurcated specific intent 2.2. know distinction on 763n4 good review problem.does not even require a substantial step toward attempt to convict. agreement can be tacit (look at circumstances. permits conviction for solicitation even when D does not complete the communication. mutual understanding to accomplish unlawful act g. intent to combine with others ii.e. circular) 3.g. i. Mens Rea a. by the Pinkerton doctrine (769). specific intent 2. MPC §5. 764n7 E. MPC § 5. circumstantial evidence) a. show a tacit. establishing an agreement i. solicitation merges with the latter offense if it is committed or attempted ii." do the accused need to know it was a cop and not just some random guy?) e. at CL . but his conduct was designed to effect such a communication iii. intent to accomplish the illegal objective b.

exception: no overt act req'd for conviction when target crime is a first or second degree felony (i. presence at scene of crime 4. association of alleged conspirators 2.. Bilateral or Unilateral? a. general considerations i. key: was there prior planning? ii.e. aiding and abetting is not the same as conspiracy 1. unilateral: a single person intends to agree to a conspiracy and is thus guilty regardless if his agreement is reciprocated i. when you have a serious crime) ii. Scope of an Agreement: Party and Object Dimensions a. then the charge cannot stand b. if all alleged conspirators are tried in a single trial and only one is convicted. not aware of details of the plan of operation b.d. punished at same level as target offense d. knowledge of commission of the crime iii. courts disagree over which to apply i. antisocial people off the streets 4. can be a member of conspiracy even if: i. unilateral conspiracy is similar to solicitation ii.07(1)(b): if conspiracy for a single crime. exception under MPC 1. chain conspiracies9 9 usually involve distribution of narcotics or other contraband in which there is successive communication or cooperation . identities of fellow conspirators unknown and ii. conspiracy often proved by circumstantial evidence 1. knowledge of commission of crime 3. MPC uses unilateral theory c. while others hold that there must be a clear agreement before the criminal act begins (Cook) b. issue normally arises when one of the parties is an undercover agent who has no intention of truly agreeing 1. policy: we should permit the unilateral theory because it is a way to get dangerous. bilateral: two or more people must actually agree to participate (a feigned agreement is not sufficient AR) i. MPC i. participation in object of conpriacy 3. completed offense is a separate crime i. then it merges c. conspiracy does not merge with substantive crime when conspiracy is on-going (let's rob banks together) 1. requires an overt act (much less than substantial step. and often less than basic preparation) 1. some courts hold that the agreement can occur as the criminal act begins in process (Azim).

but has no liability for future acts committed by the remaining conspirators ii. each spoke knows that the other spokes exists 2. lack of communication or contact between the members is not a bar to conviction c. there exists a hub. so long as they are in furtherance of an original goal. to commit the same crime10 makes D guilty of conspiracy with those other parties ii. everyone has a community of interest in that 1.i. deals individually with different persons ("spokes") who do not know each other iii. a continuous conspiratorial agreement 5. if withdrawal done after the overt act. then D is guilty of conspiracy. when a groups of people commits various illegal acts over time. if withdrawal is complete and voluntary and accomplished before commission of an overt act 1. i.. therefore.e. conspiracy is complete upon the commission of the overt act 2. the crimes are object of the same agreement or 2. the success of one member's part is dependent upon success of the whole enterprise 2. even unknown parties.03(6) 1. multiple crimes: only implicate a single conspiracy charge if: 1. each spoke realize that all spokes together have a community of interest d. abandonment is an affirmative defense i. wheel conspiracy i. Defenses a. it can be any number of crimes. MPC is the SAME crime . inference of agreement easier here ii. or common source of conspiracy who ii. knowledge that a co-conspirator has conspired with other. community of interest test (to show an overarching conspiracy. renunciation is an affirmative defense if such 10 NB: under CL. there can be only one count of conspiracy against them ii. inference is more difficult because the spokes are less likely to have a community of interest or a reason to know of each other's existence because each spoke's success not dependent on other spokes iv. this can be overridden by statutes addressing conspiracies to commit specific illegal acts (814n1) e. MPC i. MPC §5. not just a bunch of individual conspiracies to which the hub is party) 1. ongoing conspiracy i.

gambling statute) ii.renunciation thwarted the success of the conspiracy b.g. bigamy.. then the conspiracy charge is dropped c. Green spent a lot of time on this) . if one person in alleged conspiracy is immune to prosecution (or mentally incompetent). but if convicted on the substantive charge. just intent for the crime and encouragement Extra stuff: Threat B a communication objectively indicating a serious intention to inflict SBI (MR) B communication is also conveyed for the purpose of furthering some goal through the use of intimidation (AR) . then conspiracy may be charged iii. third-party exception: when more people than necessary are present to commit the crime. this will not bar the other person from conviction for conspiracy NB: don't have to be at scene of crime to be convicted as a conspirator IX. policy: as Wharton's Rule normally applied to offenses not likely to harm anyone outside of the two participants. a prosecution for the substantive offense rather than a conspiracy must be brought 1. adultery. e. Wharton's Rule i. Wharton's Rule is merely a presumption rather than a set rule 2.g. often permit trial on conspiracy and substantive charge..04 i. 820ff) iv.must intimidate person to whom threat is directed (see Alkhabaz. MPC § 5. where substantive crime is defined as requiring more than one person..g. exception: no conspiracy where legislature intended only to punish one of the parties for the crime (e. it is not necessary to apply it to crimes designed to harm larger numbers (e. Accomplice liability accomplice liability: no agreement. modern courts 1. dueling 2. incest.

can be filled in with any level of intent other than negligence. .NB: remember that if statute has a mens rea missing.

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