This is a limited portion of text from Volume 2 of "Combat with firearms" by "GlassyDarkGrayStylus.

" This document is incomplete and is very disorganized in this state. I'm releasing a portion of it here for the purpose of informing and getting feed backs. It is primarily about concepts I came up with, decisions I have reached, things I have personally experienced. However, I am not in any way claiming that I am the only one to came up with the ideas in this document, nor am I claiming I am the first one to come up with all the ideas in here. I started the project no later than Jan, 2005(I can't remember the exact time I decided to write a document about the subject). One version of manuscript of titled "Combat with firearms" was completed around 2007 and was submitted for evaluation for publishing, but it was unsuccessful. I expanded on that version, revised it over the years , although core ideas are mostly the same, and decided to release it on the net. WARNING: It is not the intent of this text to describe the legality of what is expressed on this text. The text in the content should not

be considered a legal advice. The reader is responsible for ensuring any action taken in relation to this document's content is legal in the reader's jurisdiction.
The document is written for research purpose.

Vol 2. Analysis of Combat Operations with Firearms. Operator:

“Operator” refers to a person who is engaged in a combat operation,
and Operator’s action is the subject of this text. The term was chosen partly because of lack of better words to describe the subject person of this text. Shooter only means a person who is engaging in a shooting activity. Also, the person had to be distinguished from military definition of “combatant.” It has nothing to do with sounding fancy. Note: In most part of this text, the points are illustrated through a single operator's action. This does not in any way mean I believe it is proper for one man to purposely engage in combat operations alone. It's just to illustrate a point.

The operation Objective: Specification of the objective is important, because it will govern how and why all actions within the operation are taken. For example, let’s say there is an opponent barricaded in a building, and the operator is out side of the building safe from the opponent’s attack. What the operator does about it will differ greatly depending on what the objective is. If the objective is security of the operator, there may be no reason for the operator to enter the building or do anything to interact with the opponent who is stationary inside the building. If the objective of the operator is to secure something the opponent has, situation such as police trying to secure evidence a criminal may destroy, the operator may initiate contact. If the objective is to rescue a hostage the opponent is holding, the operator may enter the building while knowing the opponent is anticipating contact and willing to respond with gun fire. Soldiers in an army may even be given a deadline to make contact and attack. This text will assume the operator’s goal is to achieve security. Terms defined: -POEZ (Possible opponent emergence zone): This is an area that an opponent may emerge from. Examples of POEZ includes door way, any object large enough for an opponent to hide behind. -OAZ (Opponent alert zone): This is an area where it is highly probable that an alerted opponent’s attention may be focused on. For example, if an operator is detected by an opponent as the operator moves behind a corner of a wall, that corner becomes OAZ.

2. Tactics Definition: Systematic, logical approach to control probability. This section will deal maximizing the probability of operator’s safety by controlling factors that affect combat operations. Operator should create conditions, manipulate or utilize environment, so that events will occur in a manner that is favorable while denying the opponent from achieving the same. Before contact, tactics will be primarily involved with keeping the operator from danger, and if contact with opponents could not be avoided, making the contact occur in a manner that the operator has maximum advantage. Major tactical factors are as follows: Information All parties involved or potentially involved ID Intentions / Actions Force size Weapons and other equipments Location Logistics Party relationships, alliance Techniques, tactics, doctrines used Tasking efficiency: a. Human factor Information processing efficiency Precision and speed of action Capabilities and limitations of human body b. Equipment factor Location of all parties Effectiveness of combat gunnery Shielding

Maneuver and positioning Emission control Large part of tactics will involve getting these major factors to be in operators’ favor while denying opponents to achieve the same.

2.1. Analysis of major tactical factors 2.1.1. Information Input method Direct collection through human body sensor, such as eyes, ears. Finite amount of information can be collected from sensors and processed at a given time frame. The speed of action has to be controlled to limit the information input rate so that sensors would not miss critical information. For example, too high movement speed would increase the probability of not recognizing a threat within field of view. Indirect collection by communication Type of information Includes and not limited to major tactical factors of all parties.

2.1.1. Tasking efficiency 2.1.1.1. Human factor Operator capabilities required: -Information collection / processing.

-Weapon skills -Tactical knowledge -Mental: Operator must have the mental capability to collect information, examine the situation, determine best course of action, and use deadly force if needed. Operator needs to be able to perform those actions while enduring stress of life threatening danger. Understanding and manipulation of human mind process and action: Human engages in activities by interaction with the environment. A person's sensors like eyes, ears, etc., gets signal input from the environment it is interacting with. It takes time for the person's mind to get that signal and interpret what it means to the person. It also takes time for the person to then decide a course of action based on that input. And, it takes an additional time for the person to physically move his or her body to take physical action such as moving or talking, etc. That is a very simplified model of how information that initiate a task get processed through the mind, and the purpose of it is to illustrate that it time it takes for a person to take action from the time the person perceived the information that triggered the response. Another thing to mention is that although the process of sensor input, perception/ interpretation, decision making, and response action flow is a consecutive process, each of those process is continuously running. That means the person may be in the course of taking action that is proper based on a perception / interpretation of information certain time ago while the person is in the process of perceiving and interpreting new information. And, the current action being taken may not be the best course of action to take based on the new information which the person did not finish perceiving and interpreting yet.

2.1.1.1.1. Information Process Maximizing information process efficiency: -Simplify task: Task should be simple as possible. Any step of action on the process should have a justification for the inclusion in the process. More steps or actions means increased effort or time consumed which increases the risk for the operator. If any action that increases effort or time consumed is added to the task, it must be something essential or have a benefit that overweighs the risk. -Minimize number of task at a given time: Attempt to control the speed, probability and frequency of events that require attention emerging. For example, slow movement for maneuver may make unrevealed area reveal slowly, making new elements of concern appear at a slower rate. Trying to keep number of tasks processed at the same time to a minimum, by selectively executing limited number of tasks at a time, may increase efficiency of mental process.

2.1.1.1.2. Precision, speed, effectiveness of task. Both precision and speed are necessary depending on the situation at hand, but sometimes one decreases the other. The goal is not a concern of what is most precise or what is fastest. It’s a question of what is most effective in achieving a desired state. Less complex or less fine actions can be executed quicker. Effort should be made to make task, techniques, or other motions less complex and require less fineness. However, this does not mean all complex or fine motions should be eliminated. It still needs to contain all steps or actions required to achieve the objective of the task or action, and if speed affects precision required to achieve the objective, the speed needs to be controlled to optimum level. Whether if a certain task that require complex or fine action is justified or not depends on certain factors:

-Ability: Is the operator able to execute the task? -Necessity: Are there easier, and at least equally effective alternatives? -Benefit: What benefit does the technique that may be difficult to execute gives the operator? For example, some claims using a sight is too complex of a task. But, if precision shot is called for, use of the sight may be the only viable option in certain situations. If the operator does not have the ability to properly use the sight, techniques involving the use of sight may be of no value to the operator. But, that does not relieve the operator from the problem of having to make a precision shot.

2.1.1.1.4. Capability and limitations of human For example, human eyes can only see things within certain field of view, and objects in peripheral vision are not clearly recognized. Also, it takes less time for an operator to shift focus from one object to another if the angular distribution of objects are less. Increased weight of the gear may reduce effectiveness and cause fatigue faster. These limitations should be considered while selecting course of action. Energy preservation: Keep energy expenditure for only the actions that are necessary. More the speed and number of actions, higher the energy consumption rate. Keep the speed and number of actions only to a level that is necessary. Fatigue affects overall efficiency of actions. Again, gaining and maintaining alertness should not be confused with deliberately being hyper. Example: If certain operation is expected to continue for 24 hrs, do not employ type of equipment that an operator cannot carry and have it ready for 24 hrs.

2.1.1.2. Capability and limitations of equipment For example, a firearm can usually attack only one target at a time, but has the ability to attack opponents at a distance. The maximum effective distance varies by type of weapon and the operator’s ability to use it. Operator must have an understanding of these characteristics and limitations.

2.1.2. Effectiveness of combat gunnery 2.1.3 Range: For lowest opposition firing effectiveness, the range should be kept as far as possible. This is favorable when the operator does not want contact or does not wish to attack the opponent. However, when the operator does intend to attack the opponent, the opponent has to be either within a range where the operator weapon’s weapon can be expected to inflict harm. With only the weapons involved considered, operators should try to be at a range where operators weapon effectiveness to opponent’s weapon effectiveness is highest. However, the preceding is assuming that the operator does want to attack the opponent. Should the operator attack? The question of what course of action enhances security should be the overriding factor. For example, if the opponent has better shooting skill that allows faster aim acquisition, the operator may have to be well inside the opponent's effective weapon range, if the operator intends to get the opponent in the operator's effective range. In that case, all other factors being equal, the operator's probability of survival may be unacceptable. Unless the operator gains advantage, or at least overcome the disadvantage, by making some of the other factors to be in favor of the operator, it may be better for the operator

to remain behind a cover or escape, that’s if the operator have those options, depending on the circumstances. There are more variables within those factors. For example, maximum effective range of an operator and weapon combination may change according to the condition the operator is in. 2.1.4. Protective objects. One type of Protective object is armor, the kind that may physically block an opponent's attack. There are many types of protective objects. Some are specifically designed and placed in location for the purpose of providing protection, and some are objects that are not designed for that purpose but can be utilized or manipulated for that purpose. Some types of barrier objects are mobile, some can be worn, and some are stationary. The concept of shielding is a relative one, meaning that a same object can provide protection one condition, but not in another. For example, certain body armor may protect against most pistol fired projectiles, but not against more powerful ammunition fired from other type of firearms. The protection effect also depends on the geometrical relationship of the operator, the object, and the opponent. There are three major factors: Material and structure of a protective object. How much of the operator’s body is covered. Opponent’s firearm type and ammunition type: Operator needs to know what kind of firearm and ammunition opponent is using in order to know what kind of object can be used to shield oneself against it. This is not always possible, so the operator needs to be aware of penetration capabilities of most type of firearms and ammunition combinations the operator is likely to encounter in addition to known opponent weapons and consider object that can

provide protection from those as what to use for protection. However, it’s also necessary to have a plan of action for when the operator discovers that opponents have more powerful weapons than anticipated. How far the opponent is from the protective object: This determines how much energy of the bullet fired by the opponent is lost before it reaches the object. As a bullet travels through the air and other materials, it continuously lose velocity which in turn decreases its kinetic energy based destructive power used for penetration (if the bullet also possess destructive power based on something other than kinetic energy, such as chemical energy from explosive, that won’t be affected).

One example of this would be an object used for protection between an operator and an opponent that has the same shape seen from both sides. With the object right in the middle, both sides may utilize the object to same degree. If not, the object will provide more shielding for the party that is closer to it. 2.1.3.1. Utilizing stationary objects for protection. Effectiveness of protective objects mostly depends on geometrical relationship among the operator, the object, and the opponent. A stationary protective object has to be placed between the operator and the opponent to be effective. If the operator does not know where the opponent is, the operator cannot know where to maneuver to in relation to a protective object. Also, closer the operator’s distance to the object’s edge, more field of view and field of fire the operator will have while more of the operator’s body may be covered. The ideal case would be finding a protective object which can cover the operator from all POEZ, which in most situations are not likely to

happen. If there are multiple POEZ in the area, and estimated probability of opponent appearance of each POEZ is about the same, an operator placing one self so that a protective object will provide security from most of the POEZ may be the best course of action. If probability of opponent appearance of certain POEZ or group of POEZ is higher than the others, the operator may have to adjust priority of POEZ the operator want to be protected from accordingly. However from the safety of the protective object from high priority POEZ, the operator will have to also watch those POEZ that the protective object is not covering. However, operator would need to keep a certain distance away from the protection object. One reason is because of individual space needed for an operator to execute essential functions such as gunnery process or maintaining a ready posture. If an operator has one's torso in contact with a wall in front of the operator, there would likely be a problem with the operator getting the gun in firing position. Another reason is the related to the effect of incoming rounds fired by opponents. If a bullet goes through the object, it still may cause a deflection in the bullet's flight path. The deflection may be large enough to miss the operator If the operator kept certain distance away from the object and kept the operator's exposure behind the object to a minimum. It is usually the edge of a protective object that the operator utilize for protection while shooting at opponents, and the edge on a protective object may be relatively weaker compared to other part of the object. Near that edge the operator is exposed from will be shot at the most. Same applies to any secondary projectiles created by incoming rounds hitting the protective object. -Distance to protective object and POEZ: In order to have time to react to an emerging opponent, the operator needs to keep distance from potential danger area, such as POEZ. However, a shielding may not only cover the operator from the opponent’s point of view, but it can also hide an opponent behind it at the same time. So, if an operator is using an object as a shielding,

such as using a corner of a wall for cover, the operator needs to keep some distance from what may appear behind the object, and at the same time be close enough to the object to use the object as a shielding. This is a requirement that contradicts one another. So, the exact distance from the object has to be decided by assessing the risks and benefits involved with being closer or being farther. Considering opponents with weapons that are not designed to be used at a distance, such as blunt force or edged weapons, the operator would prefer to have a distance that will give the operator enough time to respond before the emerged opponent can advance to the operator and make physical contact. More distance will be better. The problem is when opponent has firearms. If both parties are using the same object between them as a cover, the object may provide better cover for the party that is closer to it, if other geometrical relationship to that object is the symmetrical.

-Technical concerns, side of weapon mount: When utilizing a cover, such as corner of a wall, while attacking an opponent or examining an area, the operator may need to expose a part of one’s body and the weapon beyond the side edge of the object used for protection. Efficiency of the use of protective object may be less with the weapon positioned on the side of the operator’s body that is opposite of the side where the edge is on the shielding object. For example, an operator may have more difficulty utilizing a corner on the left side of a wall when a long gun is positioned with the stock contacting the operator’s right side shoulder. The best way to maximize the use of the corner is to match the side the weapon is mounted to the side the corner is on, but that may require switching the side the weapon is positioned. There are arguments against switching the side weapon is mounted on, in order to maximize utilization of shielding, when those two sides do not match, which is: a) Operator may become vulnerable while the switch is being executed. b) Operator is less accurate while shooting with the weapon mounted on the side the operator is less accustomed to. The first one is a valid argument. However, I find the second argument invalid. In order utilize the corner of a protective object with a weapon on the side of the body that is opposite to the side the corner, the operator has to use a technique that requires awkward positioning of the weapon, or form a very awkward posture. Depending on the situation, shooting accuracy with the awkward technique may not be any better than shooting with the weapon positioned on the side the operator usually does not position the weapon. Also, operator should train to shoot with a weapon positioned on either left or right side for various reasons, although it may not be necessary for the skill shooting from either side be equal.

Pistols can be retained on hand of the same side with more ease because it is not requires to be fixed on one side of the shoulder, and can be aimed with either eye.

2.1.5. Signature control: Minimize any signature that will give useful information to an opponent. Example: Light, sound, etc. -Visual -Sound -Radio communication signals -Instrument aided detection IR camera Thermal camera IR camera are getting more and more affordable. Thermal camera, although not as affordable as IR devices, are being offered on the market for general public in certain areas. I anticipate complex surveillance and electronic warfare devices that are now made man portable to be increasingly involved in individual level small arms combat. In the military sector, man portable radio transmission detection device is now a reality. The basic principle to counter to minimize signatures in regards to IR or thermal devices are not so different from that of minimizing visual signatures. The main difference is that those mechanical devices see things in different range of frequency. Most of them does not give the user the ability to distinguish color. Which limits the ability to recognize object by contrast on the screen only. Same principles of camouflage in visual signature apply. Since most light source that emits visible light also emits IR, shaded area is harder to see also with IR devices, although a lot easier than naked eye. And, even certain U.S. military issued ones does not work in complete darkness, and requires certain ambient light such as star light or moon light or active IR source for optimal working condition.

Thermal devices are relatively more difficult to protect from, because simply having an object block a direct line of sight would be insufficient. If body heat warms up the operator's surrounding object, it will be detectable, even if the object blocks direct line of sight from the device. Concealment object will work, however, if heating of the object can be prevented. It also detects very minimal heat generated by interaction between objects. For example, very minimal heat on a road caused by vehicle being driven over it may leave a heat trail on the road visible to thermal devices for certain duration even after the vehicle has moved away. However, the device do require the background heat picture to be somewhat monotonous to work better. For example, detecting a person walking in a desert at night would yield better result than trying to spot someone in a busy street of a heavily urbanized area. So, camouflage principles to work, although it would be a pattern of heat combined with outline contrast of surrounding objects at work. Another restriction is that with head worn types, such devices limit the user's peripheral vision, and may cause loss of situational awareness if the user moves through a series of different light condition quickly, such as running into a dark room to a brightly lit room. Concealment: This is anything that hinders the opponent's ability to detect the operator's signature. Most frequently utilized type is visual concealment, and the word usually refers to that one. Since there are ways other than eyes for a human to detect signatures, measures against audio, pressure, or temperature sensors can also be concealment. An opaque object can block the opponent's view, concealing the operator. Noises can hide sounds an operator makes. So, concealment work in one of two ways: Blocking or reducing a signal from getting to the opponent's sensors, or interfering or saturating the opponent's sensor with noise signals.

2.2. Utilizing, prioritizing of major factors. Factors such as utilization of protective objects, gunnery efficiency, information collection, etc. are all factors an operator wants to increase its effect. The problem is that the actions in order to increase positive effects of a certain factor conflicts with actions to increase the positive effect of some of the other. Each action has an affect on the tactical factors' influence to probability of gaining security. Each factor has different level of influence in different situations. It would be ideal if all factors positively influenced. However, an action may have a positive influence on certain factors and negative on other factors at the same time. Affect on probability of achieving security by certain action = (Probability rise by positively affected factors) (Probability decrease by negatively affected factors) Best course of action can be selected by determining what action has the maximum positive affect on probability of achieving security. At the same time the operator also have to attempt to decrease the opponent’s efficiency in doing so. For example, a gunnery process will expose the operator. If the operator incapacitates the opponent, the security will increase greatly. So, if the operator has high probability of success of gunnery process, the probability of gaining security may increase. However, if the operator has a low probability of success, the consideration to avoid the negative effect of exposure to an opponent’s observation and attack will prevail. But, if the operator is already exposed and under attack, withholding attack to avoid exposure and attack will no longer be a consideration. In that case, the operator may initiate a gunnery process, or maneuver to an area that is shielded, or do both. Gunnery process means at least some part of the operator's body being exposed to an opponent. And in some situations, to utilize a certain shielding object may hinder effective use of the operator's weapon. Effective gunnery will increase probability of security by incapacitation of the opponent, but certain degree of exposure from shielding effective gunnery requires may result in a decrease in probability of achieving security. Calculation is required to assess

probability of success of the gunnery incapacitating the opponent, probability of exposure resulting in injury of the operator, probability of positive or negative effect on security by remaining shielded behind a shielding object. Balancing gunnery efficiency, vision, utilization of shielding, and information processing: Opponent, new revealed areas, POEZ are the primary element of concern for visual information. If more than one of these are present, but the operator cannot put all of them in field of view, those elements have to be handled by order of priority. The operator should attempt to put many elements of concern in your field of view as much as possible, and at the same time minimize the field of direction the operator can be seen from. Also, at the same time, utilize shielding as much as possible. It is important to keep track of the opponent present. However, when an operator looks at an opponent, in most cases it will result in at least some part of the operator's body being exposed to the direction to the opponent. So, it would require a balancing between efficiency of observation and protection. If more than one threat is present, and the operator is exposed to all of them, it means more work load for information processing, because it has to recognize multiple opponents, assign priority to each threat, and select a course of action. Also, a gunnery process can handle only one target at a time. Taking action against smallest number of threat at a time, while using a shielding object to cover from other opponents, will lower the stress level of reacting to opponents, but that may result in losing track of the other opponents.

2.3. Maneuver and positioning Maneuver may be required for one or more of the following purposes: -Gain information. -Examine area. -Locate opponent. -Deny opponent of opportunity. -Gain tactical advantage by positioning. -Evasive action. As an operator changes positioning by maneuver, new area is revealed to the operator's field of view, new POEZ may appear, and relationship with the objects such as stationary shield objects and obstacles change. New information comes into the operator's sensor for processing. As new elements of tactical significance, such as POEZ or even an actual opponent, are observed, each of the information has to be integrated to the process of selecting the next course of action. Operator examines the space that comes into contact, secures it as maneuver continues toward a destination. The faster the operator moves, more the probability of information process workload increase, as it may make new elements of significance appear at a faster rate. If too many of those elements has to be processed at the same time or shorter period of time, more workload for the mind, and less information process efficiency. Some of those cannot be controlled, but some can be. Also, movement speed affects precision of gunnery if gunnery process is needed. More speed may increase audio and visual exposure. However, slow speed may increase exposure time if shielding object cannot be utilized or not present. Path the operator takes will control the operator’s relationship with utilizing stationary shielding objects, POEZ, and field of view. Path selection should have utilization shielding objects, field of view, and minimizing POEZ as a consideration. Path with most shielding protection from most POEZ is desirable. However, the use of that path may come at a risk of the operator's path being predictable. If the

operator have difficulty estimating what that path is, the operator can try to place shielding object so it will block visual from widest field of direction that covers the possible opponent location. Path through a narrow area restricts maneuver. If no shielding is provided, it may put the operator at risk or having no room for evasive maneuver while being exposed to attack. Longer the length of this kind of path, more the danger. Time in maneuvering through areas exposed to POEZ without shielding should be minimized. It is beneficial to determine what to do when attacked while in these area before entering. When moving through relatively high risk area, operator should note areas that provide possible shielding from POEZ along the path, and develop plans to move to those areas, or integrate it with path selection as necessary. Use of concealment when cover is not available may be good, but when the operator’s location is revealed to the opponent, concealment may only serve as an obstacle. Operator should keep that in mind when thinking about what to do when there is a hostile contact while behind a concealment. Also, objects such as glass wall usually only serves as an obstacle. Operator must maneuver in a way that gives the operator most control over the new space the operator comes in contact with.

Controlled exposure method There are times where exposing unexamined area needs to be done while risking the operator being exposed to the new exposed area. In such case, the manner of exposure, both that of the unexamined area and the operator, needs to be controlled. The primary need for such control is related to possible contact with opponents in the new exposed area. It's about the operators ability to process everything within the new revealed area, and ability of the opponents possibly in the area to react to the operator.

Exposing unrevealed area takes a big part of combat operations. Action taken to expose unrevealed area needs to be in a manner that keeps the exposure of the operator to the new area the operator is being exposed to to a minimum. In a situation where an operator is exposing an unrevealed area, and operator would be also exposed to the new exposed area while doing so, the operator needs to execute the process in a manner that keeps the amount of new information, such as opponent observed in the new exposed area, would be kept with in the limit of what the operator can properly react to. Controlling the amount of the exposure of unrevealed area and speed of the exposure, and also controlling the amount of operators exposure and speed of exposure to the new revealed area, in that manner is the one method of controlled exposure. Since most part of exposure of unexamined area to the operator would occur during maneuvering, For example, an operator may place oneself behind an object large enough to conceal him or her from the unrevealed area. Then the operator would move in a way that the unexamined area behind the object would be exposed in small portion while utilizing that object as concealment and protection from possible incoming fire. The speed of the exposure and the size of the portion controlled so that operator can mentally process and respond to anything in that portion of area properly in a timely manner. That technique is commonly known as "slicing the pie." Another method involved is to limit the time of operator's exposure to the new revealed area shorter than the expected time it takes for any opponent who may be present in the area that observes the operator to make an effective attack. Usually, the method takes form of a technique involving a fast peeking motion.

Theses methods can be used in any combination that suits the operators need.

It is good to move position if it is likely that the operator's position information is revealed to an opponent, and it is not necessary to hold the position, and the risk involved in the move itself is not greater than that of remaining in position.

POEZ and OAZ: POEZ and OAZ have to be processed as a part of the process of securing spaces the operator moves into during maneuver. Objects such as structure or anything large enough to hide a human behind may create a POEZ. During maneuvers, moving in a certain direction will bring a POEZ closer. If the operator continues to move in the direction without processing the POEZ, it will be left behind the operator. It is not desirable to have a possible point where an

opponent can emerge from that is not under the observation of the operator, especially when it is close to the operator. So, POEZ needs to be processed as much as possible. The processing is done started by examining the area behind the POEZ to check if there is an opponent in the area. If no opponent is present, the operator examines whether if an opponent has access to the area. If no opponent is in the area, and the opponent has no access to the area behind the POEZ, the POEZ is cleared. It is no longer a POEZ. One such example is a room with a single door as the only access point. The door may be a POEZ. But, once it is confirmed that no one is in the room, and there is no way, other than the single door, to get in the room, it is unlikely that anyone can come out the door. If no opponent is in the area, but there are access points to the area, other than the POEZ, the operator may continue examining all connected areas until the operator confirms that all combined areas are contained. Or the operator may check only a limited amount of areas beyond the POEZ, and try to maneuver away from the POEZ before an opponent enters the area beyond the POEZ from an access point other than the POEZ then emerge from the POEZ. If the operator can examine all the connected areas beyond a POEZ, and confirm that the areas are contained with no opponent inside, the POEZ can be cleared. However, this may not be practical in many situations. If an operator is in a structure with all rooms connected with each other, with more than one access points, no area in the structure is contained. Also, this process takes more time, and if the operator needs to maneuver out of an area quickly, it may increase risk by making the operator stay in the area longer, to clear a single POEZ in the path. If the operator only examines a limited area beyond the POEZ that has an access points other than the POEZ, the operator will only be able to know if there is an opponent who can immediately emerge from behind the POEZ. The zone will remain a POEZ, and the operator may need to keep observing the POEZ while maneuvering away from it, which may not always be possible.

OAZ differs from POEZ in that an opponent’s reaction is expected to be faster and more effective when the operator comes in contact with the opponent through that zone, because the opponent is expecting to come in contact with the operator through the zone. Any attempt to go through an OAZ should be avoided as long as there are better alternatives. An example of an OAZ single doorway of a room with the single door as the only access point when contains an opponents who knows your presence. Gaining positional advantage: Minimizing number of POEZ, and minimizing directional distribution of multiple POEZ or visible opponents lets the operator concentrate on a fewer number of area and more limited directions.

Minimum number of approach path for the opponent to reach an area that allows effective attack against the operator has a similar effect. Maximizing shielding also gives advantage. Area with conditions that are opposite from the above to the opponent will give the operator an advantage. An intelligent opponent will not knowingly and willingly enter an area with the above conditions. If the operator has positional advantage that requires the opponent to enter that kind of area for the opponent to attack, with other conditions being equal, the opponent will not be willing to attack. If the opponent has the positional advantage, the operator should avoid entering an area that would put oneself in a disadvantage. Either case will result in one party willing to keep the position and the other being reluctant to make contact, which may result in temporary security. If the operator strictly adheres to maintaining or enhancing positional advantage, the possibility of contact with the opponent lies with the opponent’s aggressiveness, making the opponent enter a position of

vulnerability or leave a position of advantage, in order to attack or pursue the operator. The contact may be also caused by lack of information or miscalculation on the part of the opponent. The aggression may be caused by the opponent’s personality, lack of information, miscalculation, or coercion.

3. Handling contact with possible opponent. -Contact handling decision flow: a) Contact is a threat? If yes, proceed to b). b) Shooting justified? If yes, proceed to c). c) Will executing a gunnery process enhance probability of achieving security? If yes, initiate gunnery process. If no, observe and/or evade. Major components of decision flow are as follows: -Threat assessment If contact is made, what is it? It can be a 3rd party non-threat, unknown non-threat, unknown threat, opponents. Keep in mind of the possibility of coming in contact with opposing force unrelated to opposition you were aware of. -Decision to attack -What to do in regards to unidentified, neutral, or hostile party operator decided not to attack. Plan for contact with opponents is not enough. There must be a plan for contact with 3rd party non-threat, and party whose identity is unknown. This is one of many reasons why I am against "rush rush" tactics, because it severely limits time and opportunity to identify contacts and think of options. Threat assessment must be made with any party that an operator comes into contact.

Once a party that came in contact is determined to be an opponent, operator needs to decide whether to shoot or not. The operator needs to clearly make up one’s mind about what justifies shooting. In many situations “imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death” is used as standards for justification of shooting. It is not practical to define “threat of serious bodily harm or death” in connection to specific type of weapons the opponent is using because many objects that are not purposely designed as a weapon can be used in a deadly manner, or in a way that may cause serious injury. Also, there are situations where opportunity to stop an opponent’s action that will cause serous injury, death, or other unacceptable damages will be lost if the opponent is not stopped immediately, even if the injury, death, or other unacceptable damages is not imminent. So, “opponent engaged in action causing high risk of serious bodily injury, death, or other unacceptable damages, and high risk of losing opportunity to stop the opponent if action is not taken immediately” would be a more reasonable standard than “opponent posing imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death.” A force necessary for incapacitating an opponent’s threat may be higher in level or magnitude than the force the opponent is using. Therefore, any policy or law that is reasonable would not, and should not, mandate anyone to limit the use of force to equal level to that of the opponent. Handling in regards to unknown party is difficult. With no other indicators, the recognition is possible when hostile action initiated by the contact is observed, under the assumption that if the certain hostile action taken by the contact itself justifies use of deadly force, nullifying the need for further effort for identification. Otherwise, an extra process may be needed to recognize the opponent’s action. In any case, threat level of the opponent’s action has to be examined to determine proper level of force the operator can use within legal limit. That takes time, and the operator should minimize exposure to the potential opponent’s attack while doing so. The operator should execute evasive actions, such as moving behind protective object, immediately upon recognizing an opponent or potential opponent, if

the maneuver itself does not increase danger level. This may also opens an option for the operator to retreat from the area, if the operator chooses not to pursue further contact with an unknown party when attacking them is not an option. Both processes should be executed at the same time. If the determination of whether if the person is an opponent or not cannot be made, escape from the area may be the best course of action. If it is determined that the person who came in contact is an opponent, the operator has to take action to incapacitate the opponent according to degree of threat, unless to use of force is not appropriate in the situation. If deadly force is justified, gunnery can be used to incapacitate the opponent. If a threat is confirmed but use of force is not appropriate, or estimated outcome of maintaining position with the opponent in the area is not favorable to breaking contact with the opponent, escaping the area may be the best course of action. However, the operator can still use any proper level of force to incapacitate or decrease opponent's attack efficiency as needed during the escape, because evasive maneuver and use of force is not mutually exclusive with a firearm. Attempt to escape the area may increase risk in certain circumstances, especially when the attempt exposes the operator to an opponent's attack, and decrease the operator's attack opportunity and efficiency. Operator may also choose to remain and observe the unidentified contact or an opponent if the operator chose not to shoot for some reason.

-Assessment of probability of successful response: Respond with force or evade? Existence of a deadly thereat does not always mean it will always be beneficial to start firing a gun at the threat, so part c) “Will executing a gunnery process enhance probability of achieving security?” is added to the decision flow.

Because firearms are weapons capable of attacking an opponent at a distance, evasive maneuver and attack is not mutually exclusive. So, effort to make evasive maneuver should always continue until the operator gets protection from shielding. However, the operator may choose to slow or temporarily stop an evasive maneuver for actions such as gunnery, as needed by the operator’s judgment. When a gunnery process is initiated, it may limit evasive maneuver, and it will decrease the utilization of cover. So, a judgment has to be made to determine if the benefit of initiating the gunnery process out weighs the risk, and ultimately achieves security. Success means the gunnery process incapacitating the opponent without the operator being harmed. Even if the opponent has engaged in an action to locate and harm the operator first, if the opponent is not aware of the operator’s appearing and attacking, the operator has a significantly high probability of success. If the opponent is aware of the operator’s location, it will be a dangerous situation for the operator when both parties initiate gunnery process upon the opponent seeing the operator emerging for attack, or vice versa. When both parties respond to each other by gunnery, probability of success will be affected by following factors. -Party that initiates action, rather than reacting to the other party’s action, gains probability of success, assuming same action speed. -Party that has less number or motions or sub tasks required to achieve the same result gains probability of success. -Party that has more information, or less time required to get the information required for the task gains probability of success. However, simply being able to aim and fire before the opponent does will not be sufficient to ensure safety. It has to be done before the opponent achieves an aim good enough to hit the operator. Otherwise, there still is a significant risk of operator receiving return fire with high hit potential, even after the operator hitting the opponent first. This risk may not be always avoidable, because in some

situations, the best course of action may be to attack the opponent with gun fire, even if it means exposure to the opponent’s gun fire. -Manipulation of human tasking characteristics. If all parties have same process speed, the party that initiated a process before the other will be able to initiate the action before the opponent does, if observation and information process time required is the same. There are a few ways for the party that started the process late to have a probability to overcome the opponent's speed advantage: a) Take action that requires shorter time than the opponent's action. Example: Assuming equal skills and equal situation, laws of physics dictate that the party who initiate the same gunnery process will hit the opponent first. But, let’s say an operator has a shielding the operator can hide behind close by, and the operator moving behind the cover takes less time than an opponent completing a gunnery process. In that case, moving behind the shielding may be more reasonable than attempting a gunnery process which will not complete before the opponent does first. b) Introduce a new element in situation that will require the opponent to abandon the current process and start a new one. Example: If you are a stationary target to the opponent, start moving will introduce a new element to the situation. Aim becomes less effective when target is moving because it takes time for the gunner to recognize movement then apply aim adjustment that corresponds to the target movement. It also consumes information processing power resources for calculating appropriate movement.

4. Examples of application These examples are hypothetical, and the intent is to show how principles of tactics can be applied. Methods shown are not meant to be presented as the definitive way to handle all similar situations. Individual space occupation: This will refer to the space large enough for an operator with desirable ready posture to occupy, and have some distance from the objects surrounding the operator to freely maneuver. If an operator is fighting an opponent with equal skills, and both of them shoots at each other using same degree of cover, both will have same probability of incapacitating the other and being shot. If both parties have same amount of cover, and one party is observing the only POEZ the other party can emerge from, exposed from the POEZ point of view, each party has different advantages. Unless the party exposed to the POEZ decides to move, when the contact will be made will be determined by the party hiding. The party hiding will decide when to emerge from cover, and the other party has to react to it. So, the hiding party has the advantage of initiating the action first. However, the observing party has the advantage of already having the weapon oriented close toward where the opponent will emerge. The emerging party has a disadvantage of having to re-examine the area revealed after emerging from behind the cover, but the observing party only needs to see the opponent emerging with relatively less amount of data that needs to be updated.

The point of this is that each has different advantages and disadvantages. The common wisdom is that an operator observing down a hall way with weapon oriented down that way "owns" it and got it "covered", but the advantage the operator has is not as absolute as it may appear. The advantages of the operator is further reduced if the opponent have a good idea of where the operator may be when the opponent emerge from the corner.

The above is a similar scenario, but it gives significant disadvantage to the party hiding. Even if the hiding party surprise the operator covering down the hallway, the operator in a dark room is not so visible while the operator can clearly see the opponent emerging.

Maneuvering into a T intersection is a good example of compromising and prioritizing. The problem is the operator needs to expose oneself to two opposing directions that the operator cannot observe or respond at the same time. One example of procedure is as follows:

This is used for hallway with a width of only a few individual space occupation. Wide hallways, lobby sized room as a hallway, or a three way intersection of a street may require a different technique. The new hallway the operator is about to enter is divided to space 1 and 2. Space 1 and 2 refer to opposing side of the new hallway. Operator intends to move down space 1. Weapon is oriented towards the unexamined space the operator is about to look into.

1. The operator moves close to the intersection, and view both directions of the hallways as much as possible. Step 1 ends when the operator gets close to the intersection to a degree that both directions of the hallways cannot be viewed clearly without rotating the head.

2. The operator moves to one side of the corner close to space 1, creating more filed of view to look into space 2 while covered by the corner to space 1. Operator moves in small portions using “slicing the pie” technique. After moving a portion, the operator may turn the head to view the space 1 side as necessary. Stop at the point the operator can no longer increase the field of view inside space 2 without being exposed to unobserved space in space 1 by leaving the corner as a cover.

3. The operator moves to one side of the corner close to space 2, creating more filed of view to look into space 1 while covered by the corner to space 2. Operator moves in small portions using “slicing the pie” technique. After moving a portion, the operator may turn the head to view the space 2 side as necessary. Stop at the point the operator can no longer increase the field of view inside space 1 without being exposed to unobserved space in space 2 by leaving the corner as a cover.

4. At this point, the operator has to expose oneself to unobserved area in two opposite sides in order to examine further. The operator uses momentary exposure technique to examine the rest of the unobserved area in space 2, then move back to cover.

5. The operator use “slicing the pie” technique to examine the rest of the unobserved are of space 1. The reason why space 2 is examined first in step 4 is that because the operator is closer to the corner to space 2, the operator has more field of view into space 1 and less into space 2. That will result in opponent being able to be closer to the operator without being seen on space 2 while the operator is near of the corner to space 2. Although there is still unobserved space in space 1, the area can get too narrow for anyone to hide in as the opponent approach the operator while trying to stay in the unobserved area in space 1. This assumes that the operator does not know the exact number or location of the opponent. The technique may not be necessary if the operator knows that a single opponent is on a particular side. Step 2 can be skipped. As step 3 is executed, area examined in step 2 becomes invisible again, and situation in that area may change. Also, extended time in the intersection area may increase risk.

Let’s examine another example. In this situation there is a single operator against two opponents. In the open, the operator has a very low probability of survival. If there is a cover the operator can use, the operator can move behind the cover, exposing oneself only to a single opponent to attack. For the moment that the operator becomes invisible to the other opponent, the operator using the cover will have the upper hand, and once the opponent visible to the operator is incapacitated, the other opponent can be engaged in the same manner. That does make the operator’s movement more predictable to the opponent, but the probability of survival may be still higher than only doing evasive maneuvers in the open.

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