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FACTS: Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands¶ (BPI) Ermita Branch from 1988 to 1997. In 1997, Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay but prefers to purchase such directly from the landowner As agreed, Suarez client shall deposit the s. money for payment of the purchase at Suarez account in BPI and Suarez shall then issue checks to the sellers. In accordance to his clients instructions Suarez transacted with the owners of the Tagytay properties making it appear that he was the buyer of the lots. Furthermore, Suarez client deposited on 16 June 1997 a Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) check amounting to 19,129,100 representing the total amount of the sales in BPI Pasong Tamo Branch to be credited to Suarez¶s current in BPI Ermita Branch. Being aware of the 3 day check clearing policy, Suarez instructed his secretary, Petrolina Garaygay to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC Check was already credited to his account that same day of 16 June 1997. According to Garaygay, BPI allegedly confirmed the crediting of the RCBC Check and relying on the confirmation, Suarez issued on the same day five checks of different amounts totalling to 19,129,100.oo for the purchase of the Tagaytay Properties. While being in US for vacation Garaygay informed Suarez that the five checks he issued were all dishonoured by BPI due to insufficiency of funds this is despite of the assurance of RCBC, the drawee bank, that the amount of 19,129,100 had already been debited from the account of the drawer on June 16,1997 and it was fully funded. He was further informed that his current account had been debited a total of 57,200 as penalty for the dishonor of the checks. But on 19 June 1997, the payees of the five BPI Checks which Suarez issued on 16 June 1997 presented the checks again since it had already been cleared; rendering Suarez¶s available funds sufficient thus BPI honoured the checks. Suarez, thru a letter to BPI demanded an apology and reversal of the charges that was debited to his account. BPI requested a meeting with him to explain their side but the meeting did not transpire. Subsequently, Suarez received letter from the BPI president stressing that the bank did not see that Suarez had suffered damages just because the reason for the return is DAIF and not DAUD. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not BPI was negligent in handling the account of Suarez?
2. Whether or not Suarez is liable to pay the service charges imposed by the Philippine Clearing House Corporation? 3. Whether BPI is liable to pay Suarez Compensatory Damages?
RULING: 1. NO. BPI was not negligent in handling the account of Suarez. Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
1997. (HJI) a contract for site preparation. The question concerning ´ BPI's negligence. 160972 March 9. CNP Industries. 3. CNP INDUSTRIES. sufficient funds in his account although it is not available yet at the time the check was drawn. DAIF means that a depositor¶s balance is inadequate for the bank to pay a check while DAUD means that the account has on its face.223. Inc was awarded by Hardie Jardin.009 kgs of steel as an estimate. building foundation and structural steel works of its fibre cement plant project in Barangay Tatalon in Sani Isidro Cabuyao. submitted to the petitioner a proposal to undertake. A same-day clearing of a check requires approval of designated bank official or officials and not any bank official can grant such approval. BPI was not estopped from dishonoring the checks for inadequacy of available funds in Suarez¶s account since the RCBC check remained uncleared at that time.223. Respondent agreed and petitioner instructed to work. Suarez failed to show that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks. amounting to 44. depends on whether BPI indeed confirmed the same -day crediting of the RCBC check¶s face value to Suarez¶s BPI account.doing of something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do.. petitioner subsequently accepted respondent¶s proposal specifying that the project cost was for the fixed lump sum price of 44. NO. vs. INC. Laguna. On July 5. There is no sufficient evidence to show that BPI conclusively confirmed the same day crediting of the RCBC check which Suarez client deposited late on 16 June 1997. Suarez. NO. Suarez is not liable to pay the service charges imposed by the Philippine Clearing House Corporation BPI mistakenly marked the dishonoured checks with ³drawn against insufficient funds´ DAIF. Inc.909. 1997. 2. Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred.´ Suarez claims that he suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to the Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks are not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. or that BPI assured Suarez that he had sufficient available funds in his account. No. no negligence can be ascribed to BPI¶s dishonor of the checks precisely because BPI was justified in dishonoring the checks for lack of available funds in Suarez¶s account. On July 15.. However. Accordingly. instead of ³drawn against uncollected deposit´ DAUD. G. INC. the construction of the structural steelworks of HJI¶s fibre cement plant project which will require 885.R. In this case. Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence. in natural and continuous sequence. 1997 and likewise estimated the revisions shall require an . Petitioner. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. sufficient funds but not yet available to the drawer because the deposit. Respondent FACTS: In 1997. Suarez failed to prove that BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. petitioner revised the fabrication drawings of several of the structure¶s columns necessitating adjustments in the designs of roof ridge ventilation and crane beams. Considering that there was no binding representation on BPI¶s part as regards the sameday crediting of the RCBC check. Leighton Contractors Philippines. usually a check had not yet been cleared. Hence. Inc.909. In the present case. as subcontractor. The revisions were communicated to respondent on July 16. 2010 LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PHILIPPINES. has on its face. The failure of Suarez secretary to identify and name the alleged BPI employee and establish that such male employee was authorized by BPI either to disclose any information regarding a depositor¶s bank account to a person other than the depositor over the telephone or to assure Garaygay that Suarez could issue checks totalling the face value of the RCBC check. Proximate cause has been defined as "any cause which.
993. During the takeover. Neither the authority for the changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefore may be proved by any other evidence. It further presented the cost estimates in the progress report. In contracts for a stipulated price like fixed lump-sum contracts. compliance with the two requisites of Article 1724. In a fixed lump-sum contract. 1998.442.90. 1997 progress report it reiterated that the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were not included in the scope of work and were not part of the sub-contract price. asserting that the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were excluded from the project cost. On July 28. 1997 by the respondent it informed the petitioner that it incurred additional costs amounting to 13. The CIAC found that the subcontract was perfected when petitioner accepted respondent¶s proposal on July 15.In a letter dated July 31.422.442. petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract which requires the respondent to finish the project within 20 weeks from the time petitioner was allowed access to the site on June 20.364.On July 29.1997.008. petitioner took over the project since the respondent was unable to meet the project schedule. respondent had already accomplished 86% of the project for which the petitioner paid 42.882 due to the revisions in the designs of the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams. the recovery of additional costs is governed by Article 1724 of the Civil Code.312 kgs of steel costing amounting to 13. The principal issue submitted was whether the cost of the additional steel used for the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams was included in the fixed lump-sum price.882 but did not re-negotiate the fixed lumpsum price with petitioner. Furthermore. Respondent submitted its weekly progress report including the progress billing. a specific provision governing additional works. (2) written agreement of parties with regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in work or design modification. the project owner agrees to pay the contractor a specified amount for completing a scope of work involving a variety of unspecified items of work without . because the fabrication drawings for the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams had not yet been finalized then. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is liable to pay the respondent the increase in cost due to the adjustments in the design? RULING: NO.1997. respondent asked the petitioner to settle the ³outstanding balance´ of 12. petitioner paid respondent 10% of the project cost amounting to P4.69.343. Petitioner refused to pay on the ground that the subcontract clearly stated that the price was a fixed lump sum. Settled is the rule that a claim for the cost of additional work arising from changes in the scope of work can only be allowed upon the: (1) written authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written changes in work and. Petitioner is not liable for the additional costs incurred by the respondent. The matter was submitted by the parties to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commision (CIAC) for arbitration. 1997. 2009. Thereafter. the same were deemed "additional works" not included in the lump-sum price. The absence of one or the other condition bars the recovery of additional costs.390. Petitioner. paid the billings but in its August 12.additional 8. on the other hand. Thus. On April27. is a condition precedent for the recovery.94.
the respondent found that the petitioners still had an outstanding balance of 1... 2010 PRISMA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ROGELIO S...000.40.. FACTS: On December 8.000. 12% per annum.772. respondent filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC to enforce the unpaid balance plus 4% monthly interest. 1994. G.. 1997.... The parties did not agree to the 4% monthly interest on the loan.. otherwise... Its total obligation is 1. 1997 to which it applied a 4% monthly interest.00 May 8. vs. The contractor estimates the project cost based on the scope of work and schedule and considers probable errors in measurement and changes in the p rice of materials. 1994.000.00 February 8.. 160545 March 9.. respondent was presumed to have estimated the quantity of steel (the minimum and maximum amount) needed on the said portions when it made its formal offer on July 5.00 June 8..000.4 0..... ISSUE: Whether or not the parties agreed to the 4% monthly interest on the loan? If so. 1994 to January 4. the literal meaning of its stipulations governs In such cases. No. On August 28....1994...000. does the rate of interest apply to the 6-month payment period only or until full payment of the loan? RULING: NO.00 plus 4% per month interest from February 11...000.00 March 8. President and Chairman of the Board of PRISMA. 1997.00.40.40.1.526.108. the petitioners paid a total of 1. From September 8..00 and is payable for six months which is secured by a promissory note issued by Rogelio S Pantaleon.. By entering into a fixed lump-sum contract.240.1993 PRISMA obtained a 1 million loan from respondent with a monthly interest of 40.117. Interest due should be stipulated in writing.. MENCHAVEZ.00 to be paid under the following schedule of payments: January 8.. Petitioners. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.... petitioner was only liable to pay the stipulated subcontract price.040....364... by the very nature of a fixed lump-sum contract. a court's duty is confined to the interpretation of the contract the parties made for themselves without regard to its wisdom or folly..000.40. The RTC ordered the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the respondent the amount of 3. Since the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were included in the scope of work.00 as of January 4.00 April 8... PANTALEON.151.1999 until fully paid. 1994. Respondent... ARTHUR F.... computed from the filling of the complaint until finality of judgment and thereafter. 1997. as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into the contract .. The sub-contract explicitly stated that the stipulated price was not subject to remeasurement. 1994.000. Concomitantly..CA affirmed the RTC Decision by imposing a 12% per annum interest. courts have no authority to alter the contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties.. 1994... respondent undertook the risk of incurring a loss due to errors in measurement. However..requiring a cost breakdown.R.00 The petitioners failed to completely pay the loan within the stipulated 6 month period. When the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties.
G. the interest on the loan should be at the legal interest rate of 12% per annum. 182720 March 2. terms and conditions they have agreed to. and signed a Reservation Agreement on May 15. Respondent . Charge 3% interest per month on all unpaid receivables. or from December 8. owner/developer of Global Business Tower.000. Ortigas Center. or from January 8..772. interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall apply. Therefore.000.240. the payment of interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest. offered to purchase the 38 floor penthouse unit and 16 parking slots for 32 cars in world Class¶s condominium project for the discounted pre-selling price of 89. vs. There is nothing from the records and. The 1 million loan with 40.00 per month was voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioners and the respondent. which is the law between them.00 per month for a period of six (6) months. in fact. amounting to P1. Rescind and cancel the Agreement without the need of any court action upon cancellation.00 per month interest for six months having a total obligation of 1. The payment of the specific sum of money of P40. SPORTSWEAR MFG. Pasig City slated for completion on December 15. Thereafter. th GG Sportswear. there is no allegation showing that petitioners were victims of fraud when they entered into the agreement with the respondent.00.000. It is only when the contract is vague and ambiguous that courts are permitted to resort to the interpretation of its terms to determine the parties¶ intent. 1999 should be deducted from the total amount due. It further provides that the failure of the buyer to pay any of the instalments on the stipulated date will give the developer the right to either 1.00 shall earn P40. for a total principal and interest amount of P1. rather a fixed sum equivalent to this fixed rate was agreed upon Article 1956 of the Civil Code specifically mandates that "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." Under this provision. G.228. As contained in the agreement. clauses.000. 1994 to June 8.00 as of February 12. No. but no such rate of interest was stipulated in the promissory note. as agreed upon by the parties in the promissory note.000. automatically forfeit the reservation fee and other payments made thereof.000. 1994. we find that the interest of P40. It is a familiar doctrine in obligations and contracts that the parties are bound by the stipulations. clauses. GG sportswear paid 500. 1994..000.00 per month corresponds only to the six (6)-month period of the loan. 42 morals. as agreed by the parties.00 for the total six month period is an agreed sum which can be computed at 4% interest per month. 1993 to June 8. the only limitation being that these stipulations. or 2. INC. 000.words the contract does not contain. 1998. Applying this provision. FACTS: World class.240. computed as indicated above. Thereafter. an office condominium project located on Julia Vargas Avenue and Jade Drive. public order or public policy. The amounts already paid by the petitioners during the pendency of the suit. a domestic corporation. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of interest at a stipulated rate.000.82. CORP. the loan of P1. WORLD CLASS PROPERTIES. Petitioner. and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.272. .00 reservation fee.R. 1996 which provides for the schedule of payments.624. terms and conditions are not contrary to law. the contract to sell of the entire 38th floor Penthouse unit and the parking lots would be executed only upon payment of 30% of the total purchase price. 2010 G. Thereafter. including the stipulated monthly instalment on the down payment and the balance on the purchase price.
There was no breach on the part of World Class to justify the rescission and refund.339.Since GG Sportswear had only . 1997. Whether or not GG Sportswear has the right to demand rescission of the Agreement or the refund of payments? 2.From May to December 1996. GG Sportswear did not object to the execution of a new reservation Agreement. World Class issued a second Reservation Agreement which was transmitted to GG Sportswear for its conformity. 1998) and insisted that GG Sportswear pay its overdue account. World class likewise acceded but suggested that the execution of a new Reservation Agreement to reflect the arrangement involving the replacements of the checks. GG Sportswear delivered the replacement checks and paid the January 1997 instalment which had been delayed by two months. On January 30. In turn. 1997 Sportswear file a complaint with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) claiming a refund of the instalment payments made to World Class because it was dissatisfied with the completion date found in the Contract to Sell. GG Sportswear cannot claim that it did not know the time-frame for the project¶s completion when it entered into the Agreement with world Class. with the retention of the other terms and conditions of the old Agreement. GG Sportswear anchors its claim for rescission on the following grounds: (a) its dissatisfaction with the completion date. Whether breach is slight or substantial is largely determined by the attendant circumstances. Whether or not the GG Sportswear was not entitled to the execution of a Contract to Sell because it had not yet paid 30% of the total value of the sale? RULING: 1. Moreover. 1997. World Class makes much of the fact that the completion date is not indicated in the Agreement. It directly implies that a specific completion date was not a material consideration for GG Sportswear when it executed the Agreement. The Agreement expressly provides that GG Sportswear shall be entitled to a Contract to Sell only upon its payment of at least 30% of the total contract price. As to the first ground. rescission is allowed only when the breach of the contract is substantial and fundamental to the fulfilment of the obligation.50 or 21% of the contract price.GG Sportswear has no legal basis to demand either the rescission of the Agreement or the refund of payments it made to world Class under such Agreement. the provisional Contract to Sell that accompanied the second Reservation Agreement explicitly provided that the condominium project would be ready for turnover no later than December 15. thereafter GG Sportswear again informed World Class that the second Reservation Agreement was incomplete because it did not expressly provide the time of completion of the condominium unit however World Class contended that the provisional Contract to Sell it previously submitted to GG Sportswear expressly provided for the completion date (December 15. and (b) the lack of a Contract to Sell. Unless stipulated by the parties. 1998. GG Sportswear Signed the Agreement despite the omission to expressly state the specific completion date. but requested that World Class defer the deposit of the replacement checks for 90 days which World Class subsequently denied contending that a deferment would delay the subsequent monthly instalment payments.1997 because it was experiencing financial difficulties. GG sportswear timely paid the eight monthly instalments amounting to 19. GG Sportswear requested through a letter the return of the outstanding postdated checks it has previously delivered to World Class because the latter intended to replace the old checks with new ones from the corporation¶s new bank. it demanded GG Sportswear to immediately pay its overdue instalments (January 1997) to avoid penalties as provided in the Agreement. World Class rejected the request. GG Sportswear instead of signing the second Reservation Agreement requested World Class that the check dated April24. a clear expression of the project¶s completion date 2.717. On June 10. ISSUE: 1.1997 be deposited on May 15. maintaining that this lack of detail renders the Agreement void on the ground that the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained. World class also sent the provisional Contract to sell which states that the condominium project would be ready for turnover to the buyer not later than December 15. Instead. 1998. On March 5.
The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones. in its decision dated May 8. 2002 an action for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage pursuant to Act No. 99-1005-0(Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages) and in violation of herein petitioners¶ right to due process. Under the Agreement. 3135. 2003 was issued in favour of PS Bank. which provides: Art.paid 21% of the total contract price. the date appearing on World Class¶s first License to Sell. ISSUE: 1. 2010 SPOUSES NORMAN K. the agreed completion date of December 15. 2003. 1191. or even August 1998. World Class¶s obligation to execute a Contract to Sell had not yet arisen. in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. and (4) certiorari is not the proper remedy. Even applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code. x x x x.M. at the time GG Sportswear filed its complaint on June 10. JR.000. However. CERTEZA. was still a long way out. PS Bank instituted on May 8. and MA. No reason still exists to rescind the contract.00 loan from respondent Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank). On January 20. 2009 found that1) the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function. vs. and rescission under this provision of the Civil Code was premature.. an auction sale was conducted where PS Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. the subsequent issuance of the writ of possession is likewise regular and valid. 1997. Petitioners failed to pay the outstanding obligation despite demands of PS Bank. 190078 March 5.255. (2) there was no irregularity in the foreclosure sale. 2005 decision denied the motion for intervention and to stay for intervention to stay the implementation of the writ. It seeks to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for alledgedly having been conducted in contravention of the procedural requirements prescribed in A. 3135 as amended. Consequently. 2005 petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Stay Issuance or Implementation of Writ of Possession. CERTEZA. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK. when GG Sportswear filed its complaint. PS Bank was granted by the RTC of Quezon City a Writ of Possession after the period of redemption for the foreclosed property had expired. secured by a two parcels of land (TCT Nos. No. AND AMADA P. . World Class had not yet breached its obligation. JR. World Class¶s obligation was to finish the project and turn over the purchased units to GG Sportswear on or before the completion date. G. Petitioners. Subsequently.R. including all buildings and improvements existing thereon.208770). The RTC on its March 3. Accordingly. attaching therein their Petition-in-Intervention pursuant to Sec. (3) the denial of the motion to intervene is proper. Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure of sale as well as the issuance of the writ of possession is regular and valid? RULING: The extra-judicial foreclosure of sale conducted in this case is regular and valid. Thereafter. VILLAMAYOR and HERMINIO VILLAMAYOR. On February 18. 1998. The CA. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in denying their motion. A corresponding Certificate of Sale dated February 20. In other words. Respondent FACTS: Petitioners obtained a 1. N-208706 and N. No. ROSANILA V. Notably. GG Sportswear had no basis to claim that World Class breached this obligation. 8 of Act No.
1961 the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Republic and the latter was ordered to pay Lozada the fair market value of the Lot 88 at 3. 7-2002 dated January 22. BERNARDO LOZADA. no longer prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. or to prevent it from bringing a fair price.00 as payment. and the HEIRS OF ROSARIO MERCADO. the Bureau of Aeronautics. Thereafter. of the date of the auction (Act 3135. 99-10-05-0. It was originally owned by Anastacio Deiparine when it was subjected to expropriation proceedings initiated by the Republic of the Philippines for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. A. On December 29. The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid.m. as amended. respondent Bernardo Lozada Sr. Petitioners. We further held that "Except for errors or omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders. the then Court Administrator (now Associate Justice of this Court) Presbitero J. the lots were already been occupied by the U.. Army and was turned over to the Surplus Property Commission. Velasco. MARIO M. LOZADA. SR. formerly CAA. represented by MARCIA LOZADA GODINEZ. BERNARDO L. the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.018. acquired the lot form Deiparine under TCT No. 2010 MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE. and 4 p. has an area of 1. Lot No. 25057. While the expropriation proceedings are still pending. VIRGINIA L. G. DOLORES GACASAN. 9045. 99-10-05-0. JR. 31 2002.R. in Philippine currency.. Because of this. proposed a compromise settlement where the owners of the lot that was affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport. as amended by the Resolutions of January 30.017 square meter located in Lahug.Pursuant to A.m. the National Airport Corporation and then to the CAA. MARCIA L.00 per square meter with consequential damages in the form of legal interest computed from November 16. 2001 and August 7. to depreciate the value of the property.M. the subject of this case. Lozada received 3. As early as 1947. The bidding shall be made through sealed bids which must be submitted to the Sheriff who shall conduct the sale between the hours of 9 a. The property mortgaged shall be awarded to the party submitting the highest bid and in case of a tie. 176625: February 25. VICENTE LOZADA. 2001. Section 5(a) of the said circular states: Sec. LOZADA. issued Circular No. pursuant to an established policy involving similar cases. 4). namely. No. an open bidding shall be conducted between the highest bidders. No. The affected land owners appealed. While on appeal. the Air Transportation Office (ATO). Respondents FACTS: Lot No. with the other landowners contacted CAA and requested to repurchase the lots as previously agreed since the projected improvement and expansion plan of the Lahug Airport did not pursue but then CAA replied that there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport as a DC-3 airport . vs. Lozada. 2002 which became effective on April 22. 1947. No. Payment of the winning bid shall be made either in cash or in managers check. SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA. 88-SWO-25042. Cebu City.. Jr. within five (5) days from notice.M. GODINEZ. Sec. Lozada did not pursue his appeal. simple mistakes or omissions are not considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto". 88 was registered under the Republic under TCT no. FLORES. 5 : Conduct of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale ± a.S.
If the fulfilment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due. the rationale thereof being as follows: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless it has been in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. YES. of Transportation directing the transfer of the general aviation operations of Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and upon such transfer. for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in litigation. Art. a trust by virtue of law is established. On appeal with the CA the CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC. R-1881 ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to the respondent the possession and ownership of the land upon payment of the expropriation price and cancelling TCT in the name of the petitioner and issuing a new title in favor of the respondents. Sometime in 1990. was never actually initiated. On June 4. realized or implemented. he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him. 1989 upon the issuance of the memorandum of President Aquino to the Dept. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport. the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them. if a contract has been totally or partially performed. Lahug Airport was closed. The public purpose of the expropriation that is expansion of the airport. By reason of such assurance made in their favor. petitioners conveyed Lots No. . RA 6958 passed by Congress creating the Mactan -Cebu International Airport Authority.but then again reiterated with assurance that the Office will give priority to the former owners should the office dispose and resell the properties once the said properties may be found necessary as an airport. petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot 88 when RTC 57 Cebu City ruled in Civil Case no. Whether or not the Statute of Frauds invoked by petitioners valid? Whether or not the respondent¶s have the right to claim for reconveyance? 2. 2. ISSUE: 1. The Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts. cannot apply. the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith. transferring to the Authority of existing assets of the Mactan international Airport and the Lahug Airport and vesting the Authority the power to administer and operate said International Airport. However. petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. furthermore the old airport was converted into Ayala IT Park. On November 29. otherwise. responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby. and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed. In the case at bar. and. 88. NO. RULING: 1. subject to the President¶s approval. evade the oblig ations. 1996. invoked by petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for the reacquisition of Lot No. The Statute of Frauds. failing to keep its bargain. the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. respondents re lied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee. Instead the old airport was converted into a commercial complex and Lot 88 became the site of a jail while a portion was occupied by squatters. at the same time.
. the debtors made a total payment of 134.00. Respondent.000. the debtors obtained a third loan from MBTC in the amount of 50. MBTC filed a complaint for sum of money against the debtors with RTC of Manila. The debtors through its promissory note promises to pay in four semiannual instalments of 62. 2010 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. EDGARDO D. Erlinda Viray-Jarque president of Rico Shipping. Together with respondent in their own personal capacity and as solidary obligors (the three parties collectively known as debtors) obtained two separate loans from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) in the amount of 250. On its due date.00 to be paid on November 14.054 leaving a balance of 115. 162218: February 25. The two loans were subsequently r newed and secured by one e promissory note. vs.500 starting 23 January 1980 with 15% interest and 2 % credit evaluation and supervision fee per annum. VIRAY. No. Once again debtors failed and refused to pay on due date. On June 5.000 to be paid on November 5. Under the note. the debtors again f iled to pay the loan despite a demands to pay by MBTC. 1981 the debtors again executed another promissory note and obtained a loanfrom MBTC amounting to 50. FACTS: On July 1979. 1981.G. 1981 at16 % interest and 2% credit evaluation and supervision fee per annum. 1981 at 16% interest and 2% credit evaluation and supervision fee per annum. On September 3.000.946 which remained unpaid despite MBTC demands.R. On 28 April 1983 the RTC rendered a judgment in favour of MBTC. Petitioner. Inc.
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