Republic vs. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No.

170867
December 8, 2018

Facts:
On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National
Government), through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service
Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines,
Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of
petroleum operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore
northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of
Palawan and 30 kms from the platform. The Provincial Government of Palawan
asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the
proceeds of the project. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its
territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local
Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since
the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory of the
Philippines.

Issues:
a. Whether or not Palawan is entitled to 40% share in the proceeds of the Project.
b. Whether or not the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy Applicable in the Philippines.

Ruling:
a. No. The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial
jurisdiction." Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to
the LGU's territorial boundaries. In the creation of municipalities, cities and
barangays, the Local Government Code uniformly requires that the territorial
jurisdiction of these government units be "properly identified by metes and bounds.”
The intention, therefore, is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as pertaining to
a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. That "territorial jurisdiction"
refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries is a construction reflective of the discussion
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution who referred to the local government as the
"locality" that is "hosting" the national resources and a "place where God chose to
locate His bounty." It is also consistent with the language ultimately used by the
Constitutional Commission when they referred to the national wealth as those found
within (the LGU's) respective areas. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent
of space or surface or a geographic region. The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its
acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be
avoided by the Local Government Unit in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. Clearly, therefore, a local government's territorial jurisdiction cannot
extend beyond the boundaries set by its organic law.
 b. No. Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy is A doctrine of constitutional law
which gives priority to the application of a federal statute where those terms conflict
with the operation of a provincial statute. (In this case, if there is a conflict between
the claim of federal government and the coastal state over the natural resources
found in the area of the coastal state, the claim of the Federal Government is given
priority.) There are several reasons why the foregoing doctrine cannot be applied to
this case. First, the U.S. does not appear to have an equitable sharing provision
similar to Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Second, the Philippines is not
composed of states that were previously independent nations. Third, the resolution
of these cases does not necessitate distinguishing between dominium and imperium
since neither determines the LGU's entitlement to the equitable share under Section
7 of Article X. Fourth, the Court is not called upon to determine who between the
Province of Palawan and the National Government has the paramount or dominant
right to explore or exploit the natural resources in the marginal sea or beyond. Fifth,
adjudication of these cases does not entail upholding the dominion of the National
Government over a political subdivision since ownership of the natural resources is
concededly vested in the State. Sixth, it is settled that dominion over national wealth
belongs to the State under the regalian doctrine. Ownership of the subject reservoir,
therefore, is a nonissue and what simply needs to be determined is whether said
resource is located within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
Palawan.
 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120865-71,
December 7, 1995

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the
said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions
to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

Issue:
Whether or not the LLDA should have jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned.

Ruling:
Yes. LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA
prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a
special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that
the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. In
addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the
Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing
permits for revenue purposes. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
 Tano vs. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997

Facts:
The City Council of Puerto Princesa, Palawan enacted Ordinance No. 15-92
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside of the city for five years. To
implement the law, the Mayor issued an order to inspect on cargoes containing live
fish and lobster being shipped out from air and sea. Thereafter, the Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2 which
prohibit the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years. The Petitioners,
some of whom were criminally charged for violating the ordinances as enacted,
challenged the ordinances on the ground that it deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinances and resolution enacted the local government of
Puerto Princesa and the Provincial Government of Palawan are valid exercise of
police power.

Ruling:
Yes. The Local Government Code provided under Section 16 that every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted or implied therefrom for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of general welfare. Included in the general welfare is to enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology. This is considered by the Court as an explicit mandate
that the local government units are allowed to exercise its powers for the general
welfare. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the LGC is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters which is necessary.
In the present case, the Court see it clear that both Ordinances have two
principal objectives: (1) to establish a “closed season” for covered aquatic animals
for a period of five years, and (2) to protect coral in the marine waters from further
destruction. The accomplishment of the first devolved from fishery laws such as P.D.
No. 1015, while the second falls within the general welfare clause of LGC to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger it.
Hence, the local government units complied with the law of exercising its police
powers under the general welfare clause.
 Senson vs. Pangilinan, AM No. MTJ-02-1430, September 8, 2003

Facts:

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430. September 8, 2003

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant, vs. JUDGE
HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, MTCC,
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondent.

Facts:
On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as “The Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998” by members of the Philippine National Police. The items seized from those
arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c) 1 unit light
(500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container boxes, (g) 4
styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish. On the same day, Criminal Case
No.15019 against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma
Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the
illegal fishing activity, filed an “Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net,” alleging
that the fish net which costs “no less than P600,000.00” was left unattended at the
beach exposed to the elements and movements of the sea which could cause its
early deterioration and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous
objection of the public prosecutor, granted the motion in part, to the following effect -
“To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending resolution of
the above-captioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever has the custody,
are ordered to cause the immediate turnover of the following items to movants who
undertake to produce the same whenever needed in court, as they can only be
properly confiscated in favor of the government upon conviction of the accused.
The respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which
the accused were charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure
of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being
presented since it had sufficient witnesses for the purpose.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the respondent judge is correct in approving the
Urgent motion for custody of Fishing Net.

Ruling:
No, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an
incident to a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”
EFREN R. LEYNES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224804, 21 September 2016, THIRD DIVISION (Perez, J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an outlet (prinsa), and
excavating in the mangrove forest constitute conversion because it altered the natural
structure and form of the mangrove forest.
FACTS
Efren, Alan and Javier, all surnamed Leynes, were charged with the violation of Section 94,
Republic Act No. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) for constructing a one-half
hectare fishpond in a mangrove area, cutting of mangrove trees and for excavating,
constructing a dike, and installing an outlet (prinsa) in the mangrove forest without a
fishpond lease agreement. These acts had allegedly caused damage to the mangrove area
found therein. Efren and Alan both entered a plea of not guilty while Javier, remained at
large. As a defense, Efren and Alan contended that the act punishable under the said law is
"conversion" and that the construction of dikes and installation of an outlet (prinsa) do not
amount to conversion, but a rehabilitation and improvement of the mangrove forest. They
also argued that the mangrove forest was already a fishpond since 1970. Furthermore, Efren
claimed ownership over the mangrove area by presenting a tax declaration issued in the
name of his grandfather, Emilio Leynes. Efren likewise forwards that he merely introduced
improvements in the area covered by a Certificate of Non Coverage issued in his favor by
the Department of Natural Resources. By this according to Efren, shows his good faith.
(RTC) convicted petitioner Efren but dismissed the charge against Alan for the failure of the
prosecution to prove conspiracy between him and Efren and/or participation in the
commission of the offense. (CA) affirmed Efren's conviction.
ISSUE:
Is Leynes, in cutting a mangrove tree, guilty of the crime of conversion of
mangroves under Sec. 94 of R.A. 8550?
RULING:
YES. Section 94, R.A. No. 8550 provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person to convert
mangroves into fishponds or for any other purposes.” For an offense of conversion of
mangrove forest to exist, the following elements must concur: (1) the site of the fishpond is a
mangrove forest; (2) there was a conversion of the mangrove area into a fishpond; and (3)
the appellant made the conversion. The presence of the first and third elements, i.e., the site
of the fishpond is a mangrove forest and the appellant made the conversion, are undisputed.
As regards the third element, conversion means "the act or process of changing from one
form, state, etc., to another." In the case at bar, Efren's acts of cutting mangrove trees,
constructing a dike, installing an outlet (prinsa), and excavating in the mangrove forest
constitute conversion because it altered the natural structure and form of the mangrove
forest. Even if the Court considers Efren's defense that when he inherited the mangrove
forest areas from his grandfather it was already a fishpond, such does not absolve him from
liability. His continued introduction of improvements and continued use of the mangrove
forest area as a fishpond, despite knowledge of the same being a mangrove forest area,
impose upon him criminal liability. In any case, what the law prohibits is not only the
conversion of the mangrove forest into fishponds, but also its conversion into any other
purpose. Indeed, Efren may not have caused the conversion of the mangrove forest into a
fishpond, but his acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an outlet
(prinsa), and excavating in the mangrove forest altered the natural structure and form of the
mangrove forest— an act punishable by Sec. 94 of R.A. No. 8550. Anent his claim of good
faith, the Court, as already held in its past pronouncements, cannot give credence to such
defense. R.A. No. 8550 is a special law. It punishes conversion of mangrove forests into
fishponds and for other purposes. As a special law, failure to comply with the same being
malum prohihitum, intent to commit it or good faith is immaterial. As regards Efren's defense
that the mangrove forest area is covered by a tax declaration, the Court reiterated the
findings of the lower court that the issuance of a tax declaration does not justify Efren's
continued possession and introduction of improvements. In fact, pursuant to Section 75 of
P.D. No. 705, the issuance of a tax declaration of a land not classified as alienable and
disposable is a criminal act. The tax declaration issued in his favor cannot act as a shield
from criminal liability. Lastly, Efren also cannot invoke the Certificate of Non Coverage
issued in his name as a permit to introduce improvements in the mangrove forest. As
correctly held by the RTC: (1) "the issuance thereof shall not exempt the grantee from
compliance with applicable environmental laws, rules and regulations, including, the
permitting requirements of other government agencies, and (2) only the granting of fishpond
lease agreement pursuant to Sec. 45 of R.A. 8550 could exempt Efren from prosecution of
Sec. 94 of the same law." A perusal of the records reveals that Efren is bereft of any
fishpond lease agreement. Absent any fishpond lease agreement, Efren, despite the
issuance of a Certificate of Non Coverage in his name, is not exempted from compliance
with applicable environmental laws, rules and regulations, such as Sec. 94 of R.A. No. 8550.
 Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-8895, April 30, 1987
Facts:
Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places
migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur,
for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of
the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the
depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among
the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in
San Miguel Bay. In response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay. A group of Otter trawl operators took
the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief
with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises. The CFI declared the Executive Order invalid; the
injunction prayed for is ordered to issue;
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the
authority of the Legislature in the said Prohibition.
Ruling:
Yes, Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the
Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion of
the SC that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties
may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions,
regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters. Under
the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate
or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed. The President of the Philippines
exercise that same power and authority according to Section 10(1), Article VII of the
Constitution of the Philippines which states that The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, and according to Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code
which states that Administrative acts and commands of the President of the
Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the
Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties
by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in
executive orders, and Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides
that all executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of
the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are
established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the
performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that
each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and
policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility
for, all activities of the Government under his control and supervision.

Roldan vs. Arca, GR No. L-25434, July 25, 1975

Facts: Respondent company filed with the CFI against petitioner for the recovery of
fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been
seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine
Navy. Respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
with respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied. The CFI set aside its
order and granted respondent company’s motion for reconsideration praying for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took Possession of the
vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ. The
vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of
respondent company. The Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the
Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some
provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. The two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with
dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard
the two vessels. The Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial
Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. There
were filed in the court a couple of informations, one against the crew members of
Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI for illegal fishing
with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to
hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. Respondent company filed
a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against herein
petitioners. it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue,
the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan;
that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent
company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous
violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
settled. October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order
granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the
preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the
release of the two vessels. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied.
Issue: Whether the enforcement of fishing and customs law is exempted in applying
for a warrant before the search and seizure.
Held: Yes, Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same
exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws.
They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing
ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Another exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure
as an incident to a lawful arrest, a police officer or a private individual may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have
committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner
who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary
detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two
vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment
and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
 Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119619, December 13, 1996
FACTS:
A report for illegal fishing was brought on 30 September 1992 at around 2:00pm. The
policemen headed in the place within the shoreline and found the boat of F/B
Robinson, fishing using hooks. The policemen went inside, and advised them that it
is not allowed, and got four fishes as samples to be investigated in the NBI
laboratory. According to the initial laboratory results, the fishes were positive in
containing “sodium
cyanide”, a violent posion, so they filed a case against thirty one out of 35 accussed-
appellants. The trial court found the accused appellants guilty of illegal fishing with
the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly known as sodium cyanide.
The Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the trial court. Accused-appellants
contends that the evidences presented should not be appreciated since it was seized
illegally from them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision was correct in convicting the accused-appellants guilty
of illegal fishing?
HELD:
No, decision was incorrect in convicting the accused-appellants guilty of illegal
fishing. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or
gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous
substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: '(a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device
for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or
(b) when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the
boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It
is generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of
certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then
shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional
infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and
unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must
be part of the crime when committed. The same exception ought to apply to seizures
of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally
powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the
Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our
fishery laws. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for
violations of customs laws have been the traditional exceptions to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted
on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search
warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizures can be
constitutionally effected. According to the Supreme Court, the petition is granted and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set
aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the
Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs. SO ORDERED
Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Appeals and Gonong, GR No. 111202,
January 31, 2006
Sea Lion Fishing Corporation vs. People, GR No. 172678, March 23, 2011
When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party not
liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the
same.
Facts:
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay
officials conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea
Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five
boats and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded the
vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of three
Filipinos and three Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V
Sea Lion.
Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1) Violation of Section 97[7] of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8550[8] against all those arrested, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-
032; (2) Violation of Section 90[9] of the same law against the captain of F/V Sea
Lion, the Chief Engineer, and the President of the corporation which owned said
vessel, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061; and (3) Violation of Section 27(a) and (f)[10]
of RA 9147[11] and of Section 87[12] of RA 8550 against all those arrested and the
President of the corporation which owned the vessel, respectively docketed as I.S.
Nos. 2004-68, 2004-69, and 2004-70. The Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan
nevertheless found probable cause for the remaining charges[13] but only against
the 17 Chinese fishermen.[14] This was after it was found out that the crew of F/V
Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were
rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The
prosecutor concluded that the crew, unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by
language barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their
lives and property which hindered them from asserting their authority over these
Chinese nationals. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion 1 as well as the fishing
paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in committing the crime [are]
hereby ordered confiscated in the favor of the government. Petitioner contends that
F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the registered owner of said
vessel and her captain and crew members were not among those accused of and
convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. To buttress its contention,
petitioner invokes Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. -
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture
of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce
shall be destroyed. Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due process
of law when it was not notified of the judicial proceedings relative to the confiscation
of the fishing vessel. It argues that such notification was necessary considering that
the provincial prosecutor was duly informed of its claim of ownership of the F/V Sea
Lion. Issue: Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was
proper Held: Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since
its motion was only filed after the judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek
all remedies given the sufficient time to do so. The lack of any factual basis for the
third-party claim of ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion
for reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have been
adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new trial or reopening of the trial
on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed for, rather than a mere motion
for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual issue - to be proved by proper
evidence in order to be properly considered by the court - that the vessel is owned
by a third party other than the accused. Article 45 required too that proof be adduced
that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the admission by the accused
through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime,
we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply
inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case
before the court.[ The lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the petitioner
was not denied of due process and gets it failed to comply with the other
requirements provided in the law.