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Table of Contents
Final Defense Letter............................................................................................................................ 3-4 Individual Development Plan ............................................................................................................. 5-8 Cover Letter and Résumé.................................................................................................................. 9-10 Civic Engagement Project Reflection .............................................................................................. 11-12 Informational Interview Reflection .................................................................................................. 13-14 Public Policy Dialogues on Capitol Hill (PPDC) ................................................................................ 15 Program Specific Project Analysis ................................................................................................... 16-18 Work Samples...................................................................................................................................19-25 Speaker Biographies: Life After START Conferences...................................................................................... 19-25 Class Syllabuses............................................................................................................................... 26-35 Global Policy Issues: the U.S., China, and the World....................................................................................... 26-32 Nuclear Proliferation: History, Technology, and Policy ................................................................................... 33-35 Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 36-49 Professional Reflection #4 .................................................................................................................................... 36-37 Internal Security Working Group ² Chinese Position Paper ........................................................................... 38-39 Essay: China Spends More on Internal Security? ............................................................................................... 40-41 Trust and Its Role in U.S. Assessments toward Chinese Capabilities............................................................. 42-43 Nuclear Proliferation: Questions Week 1 and 2 ................................................................................................. 44-49
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2227 Woodridge Trail, Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130 April 23, 2011 Dr. David Carleton Professor Middle Tennessee State University MTSU Box 245 Murfreesboro, TN 37132 Dear Dr. Carleton: Over the past five months, the growth has been overwhelming. The difference in who I was when I arrived to D.C. in January and now is vast. Looking back, when I arrived I had theoretic knowledge, but was unprepared to put it to action. Whereas now, as I prepare to graduate this May, I understands both, and yet know there is still much more to learn. The Individual Development Goals laid out in the beginning of the semester have remained unchanged. The desired development did take place. The greatest growth was my academic and professional development. The three goals laid out for achievement in these two areas were broad, but focused. This allowed the goals to be reached, yet to a degree I could not have comprehended in the beginning. In the beginning of my internship, I had no clue breathe of the knowledge or desirability to help and educate that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center·s executive director had. Henry Sokolski, a nuclear policy advisor under Reagan and President George H.W. Bush was the key to the amount of growth I have seen this semester. In giving me the opportunity to audit his graduate level course on Nuclear Nonproliferation, I became enthralled with understanding WMD policy and implications. It became clear, however, the limits of my technical knowledge and my writing skills. Mr. Sokolski has pushed me to develop past these limitations. The technical knowledge that I have, while not able to immediately express a given yield of nuclear materials, is substantial enough to understand and express the complexities of nuclear policy. I had a displaced writing style of overwhelming factual knowledge. Mr. Sokolski pushed me to write an oped for Foreign Affairs with the determination that helped to improve my analytical and writing skills. This was accomplished by questioning every example I proposed, forcing me to establish a clear and definite defense of my view. The growth in my professional development is also a result of my internship with NPEC. The various conferences, dinners, and other events that they hold allowed me to meet various individuals from the Senate, House, embassies, DoS, DoD, DoE, and other governmental agencies. Those that I have met, especially Jody Daniels from the State Dept, have offered their advice and help, including writing letters of recommendation for me. The goals of utilizing my leadership skills and becoming more confident with my skills/abilities are quite distinctive because of my internship. NPEC·s events allowed for a unique immersion into a circle of highly important individuals, i.e. ambassadors, political consolers, policy advisors, and chiefs-of-staff. The confidence is apparent compared to earlier in the semester. In the beginning, I had to build-up my courage in order to speak to participants or to discuss important policies. However, it is almost second nature to, for example, speak to a high-ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee about anything. The experience at NPEC and TWC have pressured and
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improved my leadership skills. Especially in coordinating group work with other TWC students or work load with my internship supervisor. Building-up confidence in my abilities had the corollary effect of growing my leadership ability. My civic engagement goals are the only ones that had to be adjusted, slightly. The goals were too ambitious for motivating policy change, but I was still able to learn about African culture. I tutored an African immigrant from Cameroon to improve her conversational English. This facilitated my desire by engaging her to explain her culture background, as well as past life in Cameroon that brought her to the United States. It allowed substantive knowledge to be acquired that could help to improve my understanding of African needs. This is the exception to my overall perceived goal setting abilities. Many of the goals laid out in the IDP were rigorously pursued and accomplished. If it were not for NPEC, the result would have been completely different. The classroom skills gained from Shelton Williams· ´Global Policy Issues: China, the US, and the worldµ (GPI) were uniquely different from my roommates. In discussing what they were doing in their classroom, it sounded like an ordinary class with exams and vague knowledge about U.S. foreign policy by way of history. It seemed their teachers never pressed them to answer the complexities of U.S. foreign policy, and how policy is not always clear-cut. GPI was composed of a Model APEC conference and classroom learning. However, both were aimed not at understanding U.S. policy towards the PRC but rather what the PRC thought of U.S. actions resulting in a need for policy adjustment. By representing the PRC at Model APEC, it forced me to think about policy as one of its members. The correlation between this, my classroom learning, and NPEC was that policy issues are never cut-and-dry. Academia and the media often tout issues as being one-sided. Either one is for or against something. The same is true of nuclear policy. Many tout that the IAEA should hold all rights to, what the Acheson-Lilienthal Report called, ´dangerous materials.µ Others convey that the best non-proliferate is nuclear energy. If every state, including Iran and the DPRK, has ´proliferation resistantµ light-water reactors then we can easily monitor and all will be satisfied. This issue is vastly more complex than this. State sovereignty comes into play, the fact that many ignore that LWRs still produce weapons-useable spent fuel, and the failure of IAEA ´timely warningµ safeguards are among the few complex issues of nonproliferation. This experience has proven invaluable as a capstone for my degree. The network connections, professional experience, and coursework have broadened my overall academic curriculum. As stated earlier, theoretic knowledge is important but where·s the purpose without the ability to understand how to facilitate it and put it into action? NPEC and the TWC experience have given me the skills to do this. Either by pushing me to write op-eds or by offering policy area has to focus on. The experience, especially GPI, has solidified my desire to understand the multi-facets of a situation. It is because of the difference in the person that arrived in January from the person graduating in May that this experience merits academic credit. Sincerely, Jason Courtoy
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Individual Development Plan
Part 1: I envision a wide set of possibilities for my path for the next five to ten years. Since I am going to be graduating after this program/internship, I will be entering the job force soon. The possible careers that I see for the future are an intelligence analyst, a political analyst, or a political writer/columnist. Understanding that it will take a while in order to obtain these positions, my primary goal in the next five years is to become an assistant or to be on the right pathway toward the positions (i.e. the right agency, organization, or academic program). In order to perform well in these various positions, it is necessary to gain the analytical skills needed as well as to improve my editorial and writing skills further. My plan for this is to join the right agency that will allow me to gain entrance into the Defense Intelligence Agency·s Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence program. I also will need to improve some of my weaknesses such as language skills, and being a perfectionist that will be discussed further below. Academic Development My academic strengths are that I am driven, open minded and a realist, a sense of pride in everything that I do, great research skills, and good study habits. The improvement that I would like to see academically is to find an area to specialize. In addition, my intellectual curiosity often times leads me to want to research quite a few different areas, which has hampered gaining a specialty in international relations or political science. I always want to improve my writing, critical thinking, and especially analytical skills. One could never improve too much in these areas. The additional academic training needed is a graduate degree, especially one through which learning a language is a requirement. This of course is not the entirety of the reasons for needing this, as I want to pursue, further my studies in political science and international relations, but a graduate degree is needed to pursue my long-term goals. The long-term goal is, after years of experience and knowledge/expertise, to become teach within the field of either intelligence or international relations. Over the course of undergraduate (from various universities, study abroad, and TWC), I have learned that professors who come from outside academia tend to be better teachers. I plan to fulfill this goal by completing a Master·s or a PhD.
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Professional Development My most valuable skills, abilities, and areas of expertise are writing skills, work ethic, drive and sense of pride in my work, computer/technical skills and knowledge, the ability to work in any type work environment, and the ability to work ´on the fly.µ The areas that need the most work are my ability to make professional contacts, and further perfecting my writing skills. The professional relationships that I need to acquire in order to advance in the international relations field are both mentors and networking contacts that will help to improve my skills and help me to reach my career goal(s). I do not have a preferred work environment per say. However, I do like an office that is jovial yet professional. I also plan to attend professional seminars that will help to develop the necessary professional skills that move me closer to my long-term goal. Civic Engagement Civic engagement to me has always meant volunteering one·s time and efforts for a specific social issue or problem. For a majority of undergraduate I was a volunteer leader for a Christian nonprofit organization called Young Life that mentored high school student. Therefore, social issues have always been something important to me. Other, more political, social issues that concern me are political disengagement, gun rights, and international development. Therefore, my civic engagement will be to work to promote that African state survivability needs to be recognized as a strategic importance component of U.S. national and international security. My work with Young Life gave me many opportunities to help my group·s futures and lifestyles. I was able to give them guidance on the perspective of what exactly the best path was, as well as to encourage them to pursue it. The person who made a major difference in my life was my Young Life leader my junior/senior year of high school, Landon Sessoms. He sacrificed both his time and money to make the same difference I did later in my group. Leadership Traits of individuals with good leadership skills are good communication skills, ability to manage the office, has good technical skills (i.e. good computer skills, understanding of all general programs used to operate services of the office, etc), and a great problem solver. A few of these skills I do have (such as technical skills, communication skills, and problem solving). However, leadership skills are never perfect and always need improvement. For example, my ability to make a group work as a team and think ¶outside the box· these always change because groups always change.
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Personal Growth I measure success as the completion or progress toward a set goal or step, especially seeing the progress along the way. Often what impedes me is the tendency to not see progress or completion along the way in long projects, but rather to focus only on the result. This is definitely something that should and would like to change so that I can measurably see progress along the way, instead of always forgetting about the small victories. Part 2: Academic Development Goal: To become a better writer, specifically in the statistical or quantitative area Action Step: Engage myself in positions, such as a drafting reports and working on research, that will increase my writing ability Action Step: Attend seminars where I can develop my statistical/ quantifiable research Professional Development Goal: To meet contacts or mentors that can help me in the field of intelligence or security Action Step: Attend functions/dinner events/conferences of my internship site hosts, where prominent members attend or speak Action Step: Better develop my power greeting Action Step: Follow up with an email or phone call if I receive a business card or contact Professional Development Goal: To develop greater or better analytical/editorial skills Action Step: Attend seminars in which I can gain analytical skills Action Step: Gain experience from jobs that require analytical assignments Civic Engagement Goal: To promote that African state survivability needs to be of strategic importance for American security Action Step: Sit-in on a seminar or talking points about African state advocacy Action Step: Volunteer for an outreach/advocacy organization for African states Civic Engagement Goal: To learn more about what is being done or should be done about African failed states· ´statenessµ Action Step: Attend events at the Cherry Blossom Festival in which this topic is being discussed Courtoy | P a g e 7
Action Step: Volunteer at the Cherry Blossom Festival event that is focusing on African ´statenessµ Leadership Goal: To better use my skills as a leader Action Step: Take on projects that need a leader to coordinate the acts/works of the team Personal Growth Goal: To be more confident and comfortable with my skills Action Step: Taking on tasks that are outside my considered comfort area, so that I gain an understanding and more comfortable in using them Personal Growth Goal: To be more confident and comfortable with meeting individuals in important positions Action Step: Taking all opportunities to meet and interview several important individuals that would provide comfort and confident by repetitive interaction Part 3: The writing and analytical skills, becoming comfortable with my abilities, and meeting contacts and mentors will help to accomplish my short-term goals. These skills will help to improve and develop me into a better candidate for becoming, if not moving towards, an analyst. The connections that I hope to make in Washington, D.C. will help me to develop relationships of both mentors and recommendations of and for jobs. Volunteering for advocacy groups and better understanding the issues of African ´statenessµ by attending events will allow me to further develop and focus on an area of interest in my studies. By finding, an area to specialize in it will provide me a set measurable pathway towards my long-term goals.
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2227 Woodridge Trail, Murfreesboro, TN 37130 Mobile: (615) 596-8298 Jason.Courtoy@gmail.com April 7, 2011 The Heritage Foundation Job Title: Research Assistant ATTN: Human Resources Washington, D.C. Dear Human Resources, As a Research/Editorial Assistant at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center I have gained the skills necessary to be an excellent candidate for the Research Assistant position. My current job allows me to use my analytical, research, and editorial skills. My interest in the position stems from my desire to learn about a topic and use that knowledge to educate others on the basic application of public policy decisions. As a Young Life volunteer leader, I was responsible for providing mentorship to a group of high school students on life skills and choices. My responsibilities included creating weekly curriculum for group studies to improve study habits for each student. While working for the Murfreesboro City School·s Extended School Program (ESP), my ability to provide an educationally focused environment became the most important element of my position when interacting with eight (8) to twelve (12) 4th graders in the ESP program that came from diverse cultural and economic backgrounds. Use of my oral and written skills as a delegate for the government of China in the 2011 NMUN Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) conference serves as an asset for participation in the internal security working group. Writing the working group statement and negotiating with other delegates on the issues of counter-terrorism financing, corruption and money laundering, and improving the STAR Initiative utilizes skills learned as a volunteer leader. My academic background and professional experience have given me a unique perspective into the complexities of the education field and the needs that the U.S. education system requires. This is why I believe I would be an ideal candidate for the research assistant position. Thank you for consideration. Please let me know if you need additional informational or have further questions. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Jason Courtoy
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Jason Courtoy Mobile: 615-596-8298 Email: Jason.Courtoy@gmail.com
2227 Woodridge Trail Murfreesboro, TN 37130
Graduation Date: Middle Tennessee State University 2011 y Bachelors of Science in International Relations The Washington Center for Internships and Academic Seminars Jan-May 2011 y Student in International Affairs Program y Participated in Model UN-APEC as China on Internal Security CCSA Republic of Ireland Summer 2010 y Studied about the cultural and historical development of the democratic education system of Ireland Educational Papers/Projects ² available at courtizy.wordpress.com y ´Irish Education: the Road to Educate Togetherµ y ´Modern Slavery in the United Statesµ
Skills y PCs, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Works Suite, Microsoft Office Suite, Notetab Lite, HTML code, Adobe Suite, Explorit (Statistical analysis program), Words per minute (WPM): 75 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Jan 24th ² May 5th Leadership/Work Editorial and Research Assistant Experience y Provided help on general administrative activities (e.g. setting up events, copying, reports on events, etc), editorial work on publications, as well as research projects. Murfreesboro Young Life Fall 2007-Spring 2010 Volunteer Leader y Provided leadership, spiritual guidance, consistency and stability through building personal relationships following Young Life guidelines as a mentor in the domestic mission field to high school students. Extended School Program (ESP) Summer to Fall of 2008 4th Grade y Responsible for creating lesson plans that provided an educational environment to a group of eight (8) to twelve (12) 4th grade ESP children.
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Civic Engagement Project Reflection
After finishing a paper entitled ´American Foreign Policy Towards Africa,µ I decided to focus my civic engagement project on learning more about African ¶stateness.· ¶Stateness· simply refers to the act of being a state, i.e. how weak or strong a state is. As for an example, a failed state, such as Somalia, lacks ¶stateness.· However, the United States or the United Kingdom has ¶stateness.· Therefore, I decided to facilitate my civic engagement by volunteering for English tutoring of African refuges where I could increase my knowledge about African issues. At the same time, the tutoring would be helping the refugees to integrate into American society. American policy towards African states has been one of intervention and non-intervention. This response ends up leaving Africa unchanged, and citizens with a disinclination to ask for American intervention. With renewed interest in African ¶stateness· because of the ´War on Terrorµ, many African·s are weary of a repeat of the Clinton administration·s failed intervention in Somalia and the recent non-intervention during Darfur. Three major reasons for African states· lack of ¶stateness· is caused by their inability to develop an effective infrastructure, an undesired overreliance on raw goods, and ineffective governments. The ´War on Terrorµ is an effective means to reestablish a good relationship with African states and people, however, it must be one fixated not on the short-term goal but the long-term goal (as Morgenthau once stated). During the civic engagement I had the ability to help a immigrant from the state of Cameroon develop English conversational skills and to help integrate here into American society. It also allowed me to develop an understanding of life and the civic culture of Cameroon. The group I worked with, African Immigration and Refugee Foundation (AIRFound), also introduced me to various other refugees and as such facilitated my desire to learn more about African cultures and life.
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The engagement itself was over a span of 4 weeks. In which, I meet one on one twice a week for two hours with Josafine, an immigrant from Cameroon. I did not receive any formal training. However, I have had taught education-based tutoring before for an after school program in Tennessee. I structured the tutoring session in a means to improve her conversational English skills. This entailed common American idioms, such as driving me up the wall or that car is a lemon, and more engaging discussion in which she explained to me her life and future. These provided her with an understanding and better grasp of English in a non-formal conversational setting that she uses every day. I was unable to bring up issue at my public policy dialogue. However, the recommendations I would have made start first with developing a long-term policy towards the continent. Included in the long-term policy would have been establishing better relations with African states by appointing ambassadors, which speak and understand the region. Doing so displays American commitment to the region. In addition, increasing Africa·s infrastructure would give African states a long-term improvement. Increasing the actions of our border security training program near the Somalia border would also go a long way to changing the attitude towards the United States on the African continent. My plan for staying in contact with African ¶stateness· is primarily through blogs and news organizations, such as BBC Africa. I also intend to stay in contact with AIRFound after my civic engagement back in Tennessee to continue helping them to develop civic engagement of their clients. It is through my civic engagement and engaging in policy that I hope to improve American policy towards Africa. I hope to raise understanding that Africa can and would be a great strategic partner for the United States in maintaining security and economic trade, i.e. freedom of navigation and trade routes. These are important points for U.S. and world trade security, especially with issues such as Somalia and Gulf of Aden piracy that effects trade across the globe.
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I chose to interview Jody Daniels, a Foreign Affairs Officer with the State Department, because in the future I hope to be an FAO. I selected Jody because we have a similar background in that we both come from Tennessee. He took a year off after getting his Bachelors in Political Science to teach English in Tokyo, Japan. After that initial year, Jody decided to get his Master·s from the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism Studies. He immediately accepted a job at the State Department, and worked his way up to becoming an FAO in the Middle East division of the Bureau of International Security and Nuclear Proliferation. His work deals mainly with all Middle Eastern states, except Iran, as it has its own special division dedicated towards it. The workload and type of work that Jody deals with on a daily basis is always changing. This is due partially to how international affairs occur, spur of the moment and unexpected incidents such as Egypt and Libya now, but also just the case of being a FAO means your work each week could be different. I was able to meet Jody by way of my internships various dinner seminars. These seminars are off the record discussions about nuclear proliferation, and he and another of his colleagues attended several of them. After a brief discussion with him about my academic background (such as my major, study abroad, TWC, and being a military brat that settled in Tennessee), he became extremely enthusiastic about advising me towards becoming an FAO. This is led to this informational interview. In structuring the interview, I drafted various questions in order to understand what was necessary to become an FAO. I was also curious, having a similar background coming from Tennessee, how he became part of the State Department or an FAO. This provided a great degree
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of flexibility in the interview process. Jody was able to narrate his early career and academic pursuits, while at the same time discussing what my goals and dreams were. Jody was extremely courteous and polite during the interview displaying his ability to provide leadership in his field. Already having that connection of both coming from Tennessee, and his parents actually graduating from my university, added quite a deal to the flow of the conversation and its atmosphere. Jody was overwhelmingly happy to provide assistance and advice on my career goals. In fact, he offered to put me in contact with a State Department expert in a field of research that I am currently working on (Korean unification). The most interest piece, which solidified my career goals, was that he agreed that taking a year to work before going for a Master·s degree is essential. It gives one the ability to comprehend practicality versus academic idealism, but also lends toward more maturity in decisions and choices of programs/schools. In this way, the interview confirms my aspirations and goals. I feel that the connection I established early with Jody allowed me to conduct the interview better. It gave us the ability to transition smoothly from one topic to another. However, in future informational interviews it might be more difficult not having that already established connection. It would require more preparation, but I believe that I would be comfortable in the next one.
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The Honorable Diane Lynn Black 1531 Longworth House Office Building United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Representative: I wanted to thank you for taking the time, especially between voting, to meet with me. As a constituent it is always a great opportunity to be able to meet those that are representing the great state of Tennessee on Capitol Hill. I also wanted to thank you for answering my questions on SinoU.S. relations, U.S. debt, and the debt ceiling. I agree fully with your statement that it is far better to have diplomacy from a stance of strength, rather than a stance of weakness (as we are with our ¶banker·). As for the question you were unable to answer, I hope to explain what you might consider if it ever comes before the House Ways and Means Committee. I asked what you thought of ¶islandizing· domestic and forward military bases, essentially taking them off the civilian grid. It is of increasing importance with such a vast number of U.S. military operations requiring information from domestic instillations to remain operational despite a blackout of civilian infrastructure. For example, command centers including drone operators, intelligence and logistical information are vital to the U.S. military superiority in the air. However, the case of the 2003 Northeastern blackout was able to show how vulnerable our systems are. The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) published an article this February 2011 discussing the use of small 300 MWe nuclear reactors to take military bases off the civilian grid. These could, the report said, supply civilian infrastructure with back-up power in the event of a blackout. However, it also stated that these small reactors were ¶proliferation-resistant· because they used low-enriched uranium (LEU) and spent fuel (reactor-grade Pu). These, while not optimal for bomb usage, can be used to create an effective bomb. Therefore, they are not ¶proliferation resistant.· I see these small reactors as useful domestically, but the risk of use at U.S. forward bases is too risky in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. I feel, as the report does, that successfully ¶islandizing· domestic and forward military bases is necessary for national security reasons. Especially with states hostile towards the U.S. developing capabilities to disrupt the civilian grid. A prime example would be the disruption of the flow of fuel through Pakistan to our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past years. There needs to be legislation and action taken to safeguard our second-strike capabilities and our men and women in uniform from foreign threats. Thank you again Congresswoman Black for taking the time to speak to your constituents and representing the great state of Tennessee on Capitol Hill.
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Sincerely, Jason Courtoy
U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Global Conflict
This PLS event sparked my interest because it is an important part of international affairs. As an international relations major, foreign policy has been a cornerstone of my studies. Hearing from an expert who had a serious impact on US policy is what drew me to write on this PLS program. Dr. Korb·s interesting approach of ´choiceµ or ´necessityµ diverges from the traditional ´justµ versus ´unjustµ war theory. This essay will expand on the unique approach that Dr. Korb presented, what I learned from this event, why it is important to international affairs, and how my class and work deal with this issue. The important difference between ´just warµ theory and the ´choice versus necessityµ idea is the associated realist cost and benefit analysis. In ´just warµ theory, a state fights a war on ideological grounds. This measures into whether a state engages in a war or not. In ´choice versus necessityµ or better summarized as cost and benefit analysis, a war is decided in a realist fashion. First, is this war, in terms of vital interests, a matter of necessity or a matter of choice? In deciding either way, an analyst establishes what the costs of engagement are, and what the benefits of engagement and non-engagement are. If intervention is decided to be a matter of necessity, such as fighting Germany and Japan during World War II, the benefits have already been established as being greater than the cost. However, if it is a choice engagement this process allows a state to define whether it is politically and economically feasible to become involved. After establishing that engagement is feasible and advantageous to interests, a state must establish an end game. For the military this is the most important piece because it gives them an objective to accomplish, and in doing so gives them a focus. In the case of Libya, the example that Dr. Korb used, the end game for the US military is to stop Gaddafi from killing people. This is a clear and concise objective that once finished the military can focus efforts elsewhere. However, it Courtoy | P a g e 1 6
also must be stressed that military action should not and cannot be seen as the only means of foreign policy. Over reliance on hard power over soft power leads to a one-sided engagement that if not balanced with soft power can lead to events, such as the Iraq War. Whatever the political views on why we went in the final decision to engage must be placed on the over reliance, by the US, on hard power towards Saddam. Bush II established an ultimatum for Saddam that either open up your sovereignty to US inspection ´or elseµ. Since Saddam was stubborn, despite the fact that he stated not having WMDs, and did not open up for inspection, Bush II had no choice but to engage. The US had to ´save faceµ by engaging. If they did not then the US would have lessened its effective hard power capabilities. The definition of international relations, essentially and simplistically, is the foreign policy of states toward each other. This is precisely why understanding foreign policy is vitally important to understand international affairs. Understanding why the US engages in certain world affairs, Iraq and Libya, and ignores others, Somalia and the continent of Africa is important to understanding how the world works. Part of this is understanding international and policy history. For instance, the Somalia debacle of the Clinton administration created what is known as the ´Somalia Complexµ in issues dealing with engagement. The ´Somalia Complexµ simply refers to a principle of engagement that if the cost to American lives will be too high, the American public is against it. Therefore, understanding this concept it becomes clearer why the US is more hesitant to engage in contingencies, such as Darfur, than before. This topic is in direct connection with my internship site and my class each. My internship site, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), deals with what US foreign policy is and should be related to the issue of strategic weapons proliferation. It provides a structured, yet specific, approach to policy goals and points out any analysis that is misleading. For example, much research explains that light water reactors (LWR) are ´proliferation-resistantµ because it only uses lightly enriched uranium (LEU) and produces a low-grade of plutonium not suitable for bombs. Courtoy | P a g e 1 7
However, NPECs research has shown that LWRs can quickly switch from producing LEU to highly-enriched uranium (HEU) that is suitable for bomb usage, but also the plutonium that is within lightly irradiated spent fuel is sufficient for the creation of a crude nuclear weapon. This has vast foreign policy implications because it changes the cost and benefit analysis of spreading nuclear energy technology to various countries. My class, Global Policy Issues: China, the US, and the world, provides students with how to assess the foreign policy and thinking of the PRC. It teaches students how to think in PRC terms, which allows creators of and analysts of foreign policy to avoid international embarrassment or incidents, like the Cuban Missile Crisis. This event touched on various important aspects that are important to international affairs. The emphasis on ´choiceµ or ´necessityµ theory over ´just warµ theory allows policy-makers to establish real cost and benefits analysis towards a rising contingency. In doing so, it allows the military to have and accomplish an end game, while at the same time emphasizing that military action is not the only tool of foreign policy. The study of foreign policy actions during times of crisis allows analysts and policy-makers to understand events, such as the ´Somalia Complex,µ which place boundaries on public willingness towards certain objectives or interests. The connection of foreign policy both to my internship and to my class was a major reason, along with my major, why I chose to write on this topic.
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LIFE AFTER START: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES
A CONFERENCE CO-SPONSORED BY THE CARNEGIE NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM AND THE NONPROLIFERATION EDUCATION CENTER
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 2011
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036
8:45 AM - 5:00 PM
Speaker Biographies Panel 1: Asian Challenges Title: China and the Emerging Pacific Strategic Competition in Long-Range Precision Strike and Space Capabilities Speaker: Mark Stokes, Project 2049 Institute Mark Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. Previously, he was the founder and president of Quantum Pacific Enterprises, an international consulting firm, and vice president and Taiwan country manager for Raytheon International. He has served as executive vice president of Laifu Trading Company, a subsidiary of the Rehfeldt Group; a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and member of the Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. A 20year U.S. Air Force veteran, Stokes also served as team chief and senior country director for the People·s Republic of China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University, and graduate degrees in International Relations and Asian Studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a fluent Mandarin speaker.
Commentator: Jim Thomas, CSBA Jim Thomas is Vice President for Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He oversees CSBA·s research programs and directs the Strategic and Budgetary Studies staff.
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Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before that, Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development of the Defense Strategy, conventional force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. He spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of the QDR Report to Congress. Jim began his career in national security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, analyzing foreign technological lessons learned from the first Gulf War. After serving as research assistant to Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Jim joined the Department of Defense as a Presidential Management Intern in 1993 and undertook developmental management assignments across the Department of Defense over the next two years. From 1995 to 1998, he managed a NATO counter-proliferation initiative and wrote three reports endorsed by Allied Foreign and Defense Ministers to integrate countering-WMD as a mission area into NATO post-Cold War force planning. From 1998 to 1999, he was seconded to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, where he wrote Adelphi Paper 333, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Jim worked in the Secretary·s Strategy Office, playing a lead role developing the Department·s Defense Strategy and force planning construct for the 2001 QDR. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2003. Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 for his work at NATO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Department·s highest civilian award, in 2006 for his strategy work. Jim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a B.A. degree with high honors from the College of William and Mary, an M.A. degree from the University of Virginia, and an M.A. degree from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. A former Reserve Naval officer, Jim attained the rank of Lieutenant Commander.
Title: Asian Drivers of Russian Nuclear Force Structure Speaker: Jacob Kipp, former Deputy Director, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Jacob W. Kipp retired from federal service in September 2009 and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the University of Kansas and a weekly columnist on Eurasian Security for the Jamestown Foundation. He received his PhD. in Russian History from the Pennsylvania State University in 1970. From 1971 to 1985 he taught Russian and Military History at the Kansas State University. In January 1986 he joined the newly founded Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, as a senior analyst. In 1991, SASO became the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). In 2003, Dr. Kipp became director of FMSO and served in that capacity until October 2006, when he joined the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)s as Deputy Director. He has published extensively on Russian and Soviet naval and military history. Topics have included Russian naval reform in the 19th century, Soviet naval history and analysis, operational art in theory and practice, and foresight and forecasting in Russian and Soviet military affairs. Dr. Kipp is a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. He is married to Professor Maia A. Kipp
Commentator: Phillip Karber, Georgetown University Phillip Karber is a professor at Georgetown University and a trustee at the Great Meadow Foundation. Panel 2: Potential Remedial Approaches Courtoy | P a g e 2 0
Title: Realizing Ronald Reagan·s Other Dream: Eliminating Nuclear-Capable Ground-launched Missiles Speaker: Henry Sokolski, NPEC
Henry Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policy-makers, scholars and the media. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., and served as a member of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Mr. Sokolski previously served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of Defense, for which he received a medal for outstanding public service from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. He also worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, and as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Group. In the U.S. Senate, Mr. Sokolski served as a special assistant on nuclear energy matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), and as a legislative military aide to Dan Qualye (R-IN). Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of works on proliferation, including Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom (Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007); Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); and Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). Commentator: Dennis Gormley, University of Pittsburgh Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Fellow at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Lecturer on the faculty of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and a Research Associate at the University's Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. During 2002, he was a Consulting Senior Fellow for Technology and Defense Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Mr. Gormley served as a senior vice president for 20 years with Pacific-Sierra Research (PSR), where he founded PSR's Defense Policy Group. From 1989 to 1992, he directed PSR's Washington Operations staff of 140 scientists, engineers, and policy analysts in providing analytical studies and applications software to government clients and served as a member of PSR's Board of Directors. Mr. Gormley has chaired or served on many U.S. Department of Defense advisory committees, including chairing a 1997 Summer Study for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy on Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Military Affairs; at present, he serves on a panel assisting the Deputy Director of National Intelligence (Analysis) plan and implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for improving intelligence integration. He frequently furnishes expert testimony to Congress and has served as a consultant to Sandia National Laboratories and The RAND Corporation, among many others. He has also been a Visiting Scholar at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland. Before joining PSR in 1979, he was head of foreign intelligence at the U.S. Army's Harry Diamond Laboratories in Washington, D.C. Mr. Gormley received a BA and MA in history from the University of Connecticut in 1965 and 1966 and attended Office Candidate School at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, where he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, serving on active duty from 1966 to 1969.
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He is the author of three books, including Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (Oxford University Press, 2001) and has contributed frequently to leading journals and newspapers internationally.
Title: Space Keep Out Zones: Arms Control that Might Just Work Speaker: Paul Kozemchak, DARPA Paul Kozemchak is currently the Intelligence Liaison of DARPA. Also works in DARPA as a Special Assistant in the Defense & Space Industry.
Commentator: Jeff Kueter, George C. Marshall Institute Mr. Jeff Kueter works with scientists to help improve the understanding and awareness of complex scientific topics to the public, the media, and policy makers. Focused on national security and the environment, Mr. Kueter manages the day-to-day operations of the George C. Marshall Institute, authoring its policy papers and analyses and engaging the public and the policy making community. He received his B.A. in Political Science and Economics at the University of Iowa, where he graduated with honors, and an M.A. in Political Science and another M.A. in Security Policy Studies and Science & Technology Studies, both from George Washington University. He has served as Research Director at the National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing (NACFAM) and at Washington Nichibei Consultants. Lunch Discussion: Plutonium, Proliferation, and Radioactive-Waste Politics in East Asia Speakers: Jungmin Kang, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research; Thomas Cochran, Natural Resource Defense Council; John J. Tkacik Jr., China Business Intelligence Dr. Jungmin Kang Jungmin KANG is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and currently a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has authored and co-authored papers on the proliferation-resistance of advanced fuel cycles, spent-fuel storage, plutonium disposition, converting Russian icebreaker reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, etc. He received a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from Tokyo University, Japan, and M.S. and B.S. degrees in nuclear engineering from Seoul National University, South Korea. He worked in Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security for 1998-2000 and at International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University for 2006-2008. Dr. Thomas B. Cochran is a senior scientist in the nuclear program and holds the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC. He served as director of the nuclear program until 2007. He initiated NRDC's Nuclear Weapons Databook project. He also initiated a series of joint nuclear weapons verification projects with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These include the Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project, which demonstrated the feasibility of utilizing seismic monitoring to verify a low-threshold test ban, and the Black Sea Experiment, which examined the utility of passive radiation detectors for verifying limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. He has served as a consultant to numerous government and non-government agencies on energy, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear reactor matters. He is a member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. Previously he served as a member of DOE's Environmental Management Advisory Board, Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Board, and Energy Advisory Board; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on the Cleanup of Three Mile Island; and the TMI Public Health Advisory Board. Dr. Cochran is the author of The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Environmental and Economic Critique (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1974) and coeditor/author of the Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Press, 1984); Volume II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production (1987); Volume III: U.S. Nuclear Warhead
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Facility Profiles (1987); Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (1989); and Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995). In addition, he has published numerous articles and working papers, including those in SIPRI Yearbook chapters, Arms Control Today, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has coauthored (with Dr. Robert S. Norris) the article "Nuclear Weapons" in the 1990 printing of The New Encyclopedia Britannica (15th edition). Dr. Cochran received his Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt University in 1967. He was assistant professor of physics at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, from 1967 to 1969; modeling and simulation group supervisor of the Litton Mellonics Division, Scientific Support Laboratory, Fort Ord, California, from 1969 to 1971; and, from 1971 to 1973, a senior research associate at Resources for the Future. Dr. Cochran has been with NRDC since 1973. He is the recipient of the American Physical Society's Szilard Award and the Federation of American Scientists' Public Service Award, both in 1987. As a consequence of his work, NRDC received the 1989 Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Award by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Dr. Cochran is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the AAAS.
John J. Tkacik Jr. is currently working for China Business Intelligence. He is a 23-year veteran of the U.S. State Department; John Tkacik joined the The Heritage Foundation in 2001 as research fellow in the foundation·s Asian Studies Center. His career in the Department of State began in 1971 and included tours at the US Embassy in Taipei, the US Liaison Office in Peking (Beijing), and the U.S. Consulates General in Hong Kong and Guangzhou. In 1992 he worked as the Chief of China Analysis in the State Department·s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He retired in 1994 and worked in Hong Kong for RJRNabisco China as vice president for external relations, and returned to the U.S. in 1997 where he did business consulting for U.S. companies doing business with China and Taiwan. Additionally, he served as publisher of Taiwan Weekly Business Bulletin, a newsletter produced for China Online and the U.S.-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council. Panel 3: Stability in Southwest Asia Title: Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan Speaker: Thomas W. Graham, Brookhaven National Laboratory Thomas W. Graham currently works for Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Commentator: George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation, with a focus on South Asia and Iran, and on the problem of justice in the international political economy. He is the author of the award-winning book India's Nuclear Bomb (University of California Press, 2001). He is co-author of the Adelphi Paper, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, published in September 2008 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This paper is the basis of the book, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, which includes 17 critiques by 13 eminent international commentators. Perkovich is also co-author of a major Carnegie report, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, a blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The report offers a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials to ensure global safety and security. He served as a speechwriter and foreign policy adviser to Senator Joe Biden from 1989 to 1990. Perkovich is an adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
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Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy.
Title: Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures Speaker: Zachary Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Dr. Zachary S. Davis specializes in technical intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. He has broad experience in intelligence and national security policy and has held senior positions in the executive and legislative branches of government. As Group Leader for Lateral Proliferation at Z Division (the field intelligence unit at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) he was responsible for technical intelligence assessments of proliferation networks and weapons of mass destruction programs involving several foreign countries. Much of his research has focused on Pakistan. Dr. Davis began his career at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress and has served in the State Department, Congressional committees, and the National Security Council. In 2006-2007 he was Senior Advisor at the National Counter Proliferation Center, in the office of the Director of National Intelligence. He is the author of numerous government studies and reports on technical and regional proliferation issues. His academic publications include articles in Asian Survey, Arms Control Today, Security Studies, and chapters in several edited volumes. He was editor of the 1993 book The Proliferation Puzzle: Why States Proliferate and What Results. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the University of Virginia. Zachary Davis is currently Visiting Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School where he is developing a training curriculum on WMD interdiction issues and managing South Asia programs for the Center for Contemporary Conflict. Dr. Davis is writing a book on President Eisenhower·s strategic thought. He is married and has two young sons, Max and Sam. Commentator: Ashley Tellis, Carnegie Endowment Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as senior adviser to the ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia. Prior to his government service, Tellis was senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and professor of Policy Analysis at the RAND Graduate School. He is the author of India·s Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001) and co-author of Interpreting China·s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (2000). He is the research director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR and co-editor of the seven most recent annual volumes, including this year·s Strategic Asia 2010²11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose. In addition to numerous Carnegie and RAND reports, his academic publications have appeared in many edited volumes and journals. He is frequently called to testify before Congress. Tellis is a member of several professional organizations related to defense and international studies including the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the United States Naval Institute, and the Navy League of the United States.
Panel 4: Nuclear Developments in the Middle East
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Title: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and Key Determinates of Nuclear Developments in the Middle East Speaker: Douglas Frantz, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Douglas Frantz is the chief investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is the former managing editor for the Los Angeles Times. He is also the former Istanbul, Turkey bureau chief for the New York Times.
Commentator: Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy Patrick Clawson is deputy director for research at The Washington Institute, where he directs the Iran Security Initiative. Widely consulted as an analyst and media commentator, he has authored more than 150 articles about the Middle East and international economics as well as eighteen books or studies on Iran. Dr. Clawson appears frequently on television and radio, and has published op-ed articles in major newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He has also testified before congressional committees more than twenty times and has served as an expert witness in more than a dozen federal cases. Prior to joining The Washington Institute, he was a senior research professor at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and a research scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Title: The First Blink: Kissinger and Nixon Give Israel·s Nuclear Weapons Program a Pass Speaker: Victor Gilinsky, former Commissioner 1976-1982, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Victor Gilinsky is an independent consultant on energy matters. He has been deeply involved in nuclear power, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear fuel cycle and waste issues. Gilinsky served two terms as Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where he played an important role in tightening U.S. nuclear export standards. He was previously Head of Rand Corporation·s Physical Sciences Department, dealing with a wide range of scientific and technical matters, both civilian and military. Most recently he has been a consultant to the State of Nevada in relation to the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.
Commentator: Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Council on Foreign Relations Sasha Polakow-Suransky is a Senior Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sasha PolakowSuransky holds a D.Phil in Modern History from St. Antony's College, Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar from 2003-2006. He has written for the American Prospect, the International Herald Tribune, and Newsweek, and is the author of The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa.
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The Washington Center for Internships and Academic Seminars SS11-4443 Global Policy Issues: The US, China, and the World Shelton L. Williams, Ph.D. Spring 2011
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Global Policy Issues: US, China and the World Instructor Name Shelton L. (Shelly) Williams Contact Information (phone number & email) 301-704-5538, firstname.lastname@example.org Course Date (day and hours) Tuesdays, 6:00-9:00 PM Course Description The Obama Administration came into office seeking a Strategic Dialogue, if not partnership, with the People's Republic of China. This course will discuss how the Administration now approaches a multitude of issues with China ranging from trade to security to environment to multilateral institutions. In addition to lectures, expert visits, and readings, the students will also prepare for and engage in the National Model Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, presenting the economy of China. This event will occur March 10-13, 2011, and will feature interaction with the actual senior leaders of the APEC economies convening in Washington that same week. Students should expect an interdisciplinary course covering basic US Foreign Policy toward Economics, security, human rights and environmental topics. Course Objectives This course will provide the student with background knowledge on a wide range of topics in USChinese relations and at the same time afford students the opportunity to meet current and former decision-makers . One of the highlights of the course will be the opportunity to represent a variety of nations at the National Model UN-APEC and thus to engage in research negotiations, and public speaking on a wide array of global policy issues. Learning Objectives The Global Issues course is a 15-week academic course in Washington, D.C. It is designed to prepare young leaders from with a better understanding of the complexity of global issues and to help them develop tools for solving problems. Students will have the opportunity to interact with some of the foremost practitioners of US diplomacy, taking advantage of their presence in Washington, D.C. The experience will prepare these young leaders for careers with civic, economic, government and political responsibility. Specific objectives of the course are to prepare students to: Gain in depth knowledge and understanding of American Foreign Policy; Gain detailed understanding of multilateral organizations; Acquire detailed knowledge of global public policy issues and other nations· views on the issues; Further develop research, public speaking, and negotiating skills. Required Texts Michael David Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Suspicion in US-Chinese Relations, Bureau of Asian Research, July 2010:
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http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Free/2010_U.S._China.pdf CRS Report: Comparing Global Influence: China and the US http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/wysiwyg/WP2008-PartI.pdf APEC Background Guides: http://nmun.org/apec_committee_guides.html APEC at a Glance: http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=1077 Recommended Secondary Readings Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World (Norton, 2008) Course Requirements Class Participation APEC participation Weekly Essays
40% 20% 40%
Presentations APEC speeches and negotiations in class at the conference Participation Weekly discussions Classroom and Grading Policies Just listening is not an option. Get involved. Ask questions, make comments, raise issues Class Schedule Week 1: January 25: Introduction to US-China Relations, Model APEC, and Foreign Policy Dynamics Week 2: February 1: Introduction to Model APEC and China (Readings for period up to APEC) http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/t15264.htm http://nmun.org/apec_committee_guides.html http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/2607/t15290.htm http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2604/2606/t172477.htm Guest: Julie Petruzzi, State Department expert on China Week 3: February 8: APEC Preparation Guest: Ryan MacFarlane, US Department of State, Far East Bureau Week 4: February 15: APEC Preparation Model APEC Rules and Procedures, Position Papers Guest: State Department expert on the Working Group Week 5: February 22: Model APEC Preparation The Dynamics of APEC Negotiating Guest Expert: Shawn Trumbo, Osgood Center Week 5: March 1: APEC Preparation Rules, Reports, Strategies Guest: Mike Aguilar, Secretary General, Model APEC Week 6: March 10-13: Model APEC, Washington Plaza
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Week 7: March 15: No Class Week 8: March 22: Overview of US-Chinese Relations under Obama Michael David Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Suspicion in US-Chinese Relations, Bureau of Asian Research, July 2010: http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Free/2010_U.S._China.pdf, pp. TBA President Hu, ´Common Groundµ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/16/AR2011011601920.html Guest: Carla Freeman, Johns Hopkins SAIS Week 9: March 29 Chinese Decision-making CRS Report: Comparing Global Influence: China and the US http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/wysiwyg/WP2008-PartI.pdf Guest Shanshan Mei, American University PhD candidate Week 10: April 5 US-China Security Issues Gates in China: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12146922 Lampton, pp. TBA Guest: TBA Week 11: April 5: US-China Security Issues Bureau of Asian Research: http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=469 Guest: Lawrence Wilkerson, GW professor and former Chief of Staff for Colin Powell Week 12: April 12: China and Human Rights US Policy and Human Rights: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/index.htm Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: http://www.fpif.org/reports/human_rights_and_us_policy Human Rights and China: http://www.fpif.org/reports/human_rights_and_us_policy Guest: Helen Lowman, Osgood Board April 19: No Class Week 13: April 26: China, the US and Climate Change The Cancun Consensus: http://neronline.co.uk/blogs/environmental/2010/12/15/the-cancunconsensus/ China and Climate Change: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68N19220100924 Week 14: May 3: Intellectual Property Issues NERA Consulting: IPR Trends and Legislation in China http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=74520 Google http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html Guest; Steve Adkins, Orrick, partner
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Week 15: May 10: Energy and Resources China·s Energy Needs: http://www.iags.org/china.htm Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/1130_china/20091130_chin a.pdf Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/09_us_china_energy_cooperation_lieberthal .aspx May 17 Final Evaluation and Wrap up TWC Course Policies For a detailed list of all TWC policies, please refer to your student handbook. Professionalism We strongly encourage students to be professional at all times. Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action The Washington Center actively subscribes to a policy of equal opportunity in education. Class Cancellation Students are expected to attend every class period as scheduled unless there is an unavoidable circumstance or illness. Classes do not meet on federal holidays; however, your professor may elect to reschedule the class for another evening to make-up time and work. If you miss two classes, your instructor will notify your program advisor. Verbal, Sexual, Ethnic/Racial Harassment The Washington Center does not tolerate harassment of any nature. Verbal, sexual, ethnic and or racial harassment in nay way of its students, staff, and faculty are prohibited. The Washington Center advises students to notify their Program Advisor if they believe they may have been exposed to sexual or verbal harassment. Disability Services If you are a student who is defined under the American with Disabilities Act and requires assistance or support services, please inform The Washington Center's disability coordinator, by emailing email@example.com. The coordinator will organize such services as note takers, readers, sign language interpreters, etc. If you need course adaptations or accommodations because of a disability, if you have emergency medical information to share, or if you need special arrangements in case the building must be evacuated, please make an appointment to speak with disability services upon arrival. Disability services information is available on online at ww.twc.edu/disability_services.shtml. Academic Misconduct 1. Plagiarism ² the use of ideas or writings of another as one·s own. Students are expected to submit original evaluations, essays and papers, and to cite all appropriate sources. If requested, students should be prepared to provide original notes, previous drafts, pr other materials to indicate original research or intellectual ownership of an assignment.
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2. Cheating ² the use of notes or books when prohibited, and the assistance of another student while completing a quiz or an exam, or the providing of information to another individual for this purpose, unless such collaboration is approved by the course instructor. 3. Falsification ² the improper alteration of any record, document or evaluation. 4. Obstruction ² behaving in a disruptive manner or participating in activities that interfere with the educational mission of The Washington Center at lectures, courses, meetings or other sponsored events. 5. Absenteeism ² the chronic failure to attend program components (including internship, internship courses, or other scheduled activities) without a valid reason or prior notification. Student Grievances If students have a problem with their instructor, the course material, class format, or other aspects of the course, they should speak to the instructor first. If that is not possible or they choose otherwise, students should speak with the course coordinator who will arrange a conference in consultation with the managing director for academic affairs. If students wish to make a formal complaint, they must submit it in writing to the course coordinator, the senior vice president, Dr. Eugene Alpert, who will investigate the situation and will consult the relevant parties and inform the student of the progress of the investigation in order to come to a resolution of the situation. Disclaimer Readings, assignments, and due dates may change due to unforeseen circumstances. Your professor will advise you of any changes and present them to you in writing. TWC COURSE POLICIES (FOR A DETAILED LIST OF ALL TWC POLICIES, PLEASE REFER TO YOUR STUDENT HANDBOOK) PROFESSIONALISM We strongly encourage students to be professional at all times. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION The Washington Center actively subscribes to a policy of equal opportunity in education. CLASS CANCELLATION Students are expected to attend every class period as scheduled unless there is an unavoidable circumstance or illness. Classes do not meet on federal holidays; however, your professor may elect to reschedule the class for another evening to make-up time and work. If you miss two classes, your instructor will notify your program advisor. VERBAL, SEXUAL, ETHNIC/RACIAL HARASSMENT The Washington Center does not tolerate harassment of any nature. Verbal, sexual, ethnic and or racial harassment in nay way of its students, staff, and faculty are prohibited. The Washington Center advises students to notify their Program Advisor if they believe they may have been exposed to sexual or verbal harassment. DISABILITY SERVICES Students with Special Needs: If you are a student who is defined under the American with Disabilities Act and requires assistance or support services, please inform The Washington
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Center's disability coordinator, by emailing firstname.lastname@example.org. The coordinator will organize such services as note takers, readers, sign language interpreters, etc. If you need course adaptations or accommodations because of a disability, if you have emergency medical information to share, or if you need special arrangements in case the building must be evacuated, please make an appointment to speak with disability services upon arrival. Disability services information is available on online at ww.twc.edu/disability_services.shtml. ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT Plagiarism ² the use of ideas or writings of another as one·s own. Students are expected to submit original evaluations, essays and papers, and to cite all appropriate sources. If requested, students should be prepared to provide original notes, previous drafts, pr other materials to indicate original research or intellectual ownership of an assignment. Cheating ² the use of notes or books when prohibited, and the assistance of another student while completing a quiz or an exam, or the providing of information to another individual for this purpose, unless such collaboration is approved by the course instructor. Falsification ² the improper alteration of any record, document or evaluation. Obstruction ² behaving in a disruptive manner or participating in activities that interfere with the educational mission of The Washington Center at lectures, courses, meetings or other sponsored events. Absenteeism ² the chronic failure to attend program components (including internship, internship courses, or other scheduled activities) without a valid reason or prior notification. STUDENT GRIEVANCES If students have a problem with their instructor, the course material, class format, or other aspects of the course, they should speak to the instructor first. If that is not possible or they choose otherwise, students should speak with the course coordinator who will arrange a conference in consultation with the managing director for academic affairs. If students wish to make a formal complaint, they must submit it in writing to the course coordinator, who will then advise the Director for Academic Affairs, Mr. Kevin Nunley.
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NPEC Course Syllabus Nuclear Proliferation: History, Technology and Policy
27 January Course overview Victor Gilinsky, How Will the Nuclear Weapons Story End? http://www.npolicy.org/files/20060924-GilinskyBeijingRemarks.pdf Controlling the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2010 http://www.npolicy.org/files/IIGG_WorkingPaper3_Nuclear_ Control.pdf Introduction, Best of Intentions Class 2 Nuclear Energy Primer Xeroxed materials Class 3 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Primer Xeroxed materials Gilinsky, et. al., ´Fresh Examinationµ http://www.npolicy.org/files/20041022-GilinskyEtAlLWR.pdf Class 4 First Attempts at Controlling Nuclear Energy Acheson Lilienthal Report http://www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.AchesonLilienthal.html ´The Baruch Plan,µ and ´Atoms for Peaceµ chapters in Best of Intentions Class 5 The IAEA and NPT Cochran, Lyman, and Zarate in Falling Behind http://www.npolicy.org/Books.asp%3FBookID%3D1009596920 Sokolski, ´Building Support for the Agency·s Safeguards Mission,µ November 2, 2010, presentation before the IAEA.
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http://www.npolicy.org/files/Building_Support_for_the_Agen cys_Safeguards_Mission_More_Transparency_Funding_and_Sa feguards_Candor.pdf ´The NPTµ chapter in Best of Intentions Introductory chapter to Reviewing the NPT http://www.npolicy.org/reviewingthenpt#intro Steven Kidd, ´Nuclear Proliferation Risk: Is It Vastly Overrated?µ Nuclear Engineering International, July 23, 2010 http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931 Class 6 Nuclear Economics, Intelligence, and Future Restraints Introduction to Nuclear Power·s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100602Nuclear_Power_Carbon.pdf John Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 129-42. Chow and Wohlstetter, ´Arms Control that Just Might Workµ The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB893 .pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&page=481 Sokolski, ´Missiles for Peace,µ Armed Forces Journal, July 2, 2010. Available at http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100708Missiles_for_peace.pdf ´Nonproliferation Games,µ National Review Online, August 3, 2010, available at http://www.npolicy.org/files/20100805_Nuclear_Nonproliferation_Games.pdf ´Fighting Proliferation with Intelligenceµ ORBIS, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm Victor Gilinsky, ´First Blink: Kissinger and Nixon·s Handling of Israel·s Nuclear Weapons Programµ
Class 7 Class 8 Project Ideas
Student Presentations Student Presentations/Final
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Document previous efforts to prevent nuclear fuel making for Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, Japan Tally predictions of when Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea would get their first bomb against data available at the time suggesting that they had already acquired or were close to having nuclear arms. Catalog conflicting goals of the IAEA and conflicting restraints on IAEA safeguards procedures List the predominate small nuclear reactor projects and assess their economic and nonproliferation claimed benefits and risks Henry Sokolski: Home office: 703-271-9852, cell 571-277-1815 email@example.com
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Appendix: Professional Reflection #4 North-South Korean Conflict: The Sunshine Policy
The topic of the conflict between the DPRK (Democratic People·s Republic of Korea) and ROK (Republic of Korea) is so vast that I decided to focus on the Sunshine Policy implemented by ROK·s President Kim Jae-Dung. The importance of this topic for international affairs is because it has consequences for the relationship for the Korean peninsula and the surrounding region. The two main viewpoints are that the continued use of the Sunshine Policy was a means to rebuild the DPRKs infrastructure and relationship. The second view is that it did nothing but fund the DPRKs nuclear program. The primary policy of the ROK from Kim Jae-Dung until the current president, Lee Myung-bak, was that of aid towards the DPRK. The primary goal of the Sunshine Policy was to help to rebuild their infrastructure and to give food to the Koreans in the North. It was seen as a means to increase unification between the two governments, which the result was the closest relationship between the two sides that had ever existed. It proposed that the ROK would not attempt to absolve the North, but also would not tolerate DPRK aggression. This set a clear strategy and plan for the DPRK to understand and to follow creating a partial stability between them, which lead to the first Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000. The critics of the Sunshine Policy point out that the aid given by the ROK to the DPRK was funneled into their nuclear program, rather than actually going to the North
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Korean people. The argument for this is that the regime continues to starve its people in order to develop its WMDs, which the underground nuclear tests and the missile test over Japan shows to be true. However, this argument does not explain why relationships between the two governments were so close and why the first Inter-Korean Summit talks on unification started, supposedly, because of the Sunshine Policy. The relationship between the DPRK and the ROK is an issue for all Asia/Pacific nations because there are consequences for both sides. As was seen in the Korean Wars, the result is the same a collapse of the ROK would mean US troops and a collapse of the DPRK would mean PRC troops. It also has serious consequences for the nonproliferation regime in the region, since Japan is capable of create nuclear weapons within months. Another major concern is raised in comparing the Korean peninsula to Pakistan. The implication of collapse or worse due to instability poses a serious question, what will happen to the DPRKs nuclear program.
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Global Policy Issues ² Classwork
Delegation from China Represented by The Washington Center
Position Paper for the APEC Internal Security Working Group (ISWG) The problems set before the ISWG are Enhancing Regional Cooperation through Counter-Terrorism Financing; Applying Mechanisms for Combating Corruption and Money Laundering; and, Re-Evaluating the STAR Priorities for 2011: The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative. I. Enhancing Regional cooperation through Counter-Terrorism Financing The air cargo terrorist plot in late September made it clear how important it is to increase cooperation among APEC members to prevent terrorists, as defined by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendation (SR) II ´Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money launderingµ, from acquiring and/or using funds for terrorist acts. The cooperation of all member economies is important to reach the 1994 Bogor Goals, which call for free and open trade and investment in the region. Increased attention should be paid to improving cooperation between the private and public sector, as well as full implementation of all of FATF·s nine (9) SRs. There are three main areas of development or enhancement that the ISWG should work towards: 1) improved cooperation between the private and public sector; 2) full integration of the World Customs Organization (WCO) standards on and international level with all member economies, capacity-building in maritime/aviation security provided by the CTTF, and full implementation of the UN·s Terrorist Financing Convention, Global CounterTerrorism Strategy; and 3) FATF·s nine (9) SRs (especially SR five (5). China·s signing of the UN·s Terrorist Financing Convention, as stated by Ambassador WANG Guangya, ´illustrates the long-standing position of the Chinese Government to resolutely fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and the determination of the Chinese Government to combat terrorism through international cooperation in accordance with the relevant national and international law.µ China·s position is that regional cooperation will strengthen relations with member states, improve trade of all member economies, and provide developing APEC states with the capacity to establish a security and growing economy. II. Applying mechanisms for Combating Corruption and Money Laundering
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The primary hindrance of global trade is corruption and money laundering. APECs role has been in establishing effective and universal business standards of both the public and private sector, as a means to establish preventative systems. The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the driving force behind many of APECs action in this area. It is the first binding document on corruption, but more importantly it outlines specific preventative measures to combat corruption. This document led to: the APEC Transparency Standards, which make it mandatory of APEC members to publish all laws and regulations on the subject of fighting corruption; and the Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency, which established a consensus desire to implement all measures of UNCAC and to establish cooperation between APEC members. The Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts Task Force (ACT) has been instrumental in developing codes of conduct for both the public and private sector, administrative officials, and establishing measures that would improve cooperation between member economies. China sees that it is instrumental for member economies to implement all standards on corruption and money laundering that have been addressed by the aforementioned documents. In compliance with the 2002 Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth China rejoined the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML) and is considering joining the Egmont Group Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). In addition, full cooperation and implementation of FATF·s Forty (40) + Nine (9) SRs, and a full commitment to China·s 2009 Counter-Terrorism Action Plan (CTAP). III. Re-evaluating the STAR Priorities for 2011: The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative The Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative has been the primary antiterrorist component of APEC. Having been ratified by all twenty-one (21) members, the universal understanding that increasing security of trade, both of people, goods, and services, is the utmost importance. The III and IV STAR Conferences established that in order to increase security private business and the public sector must work together in harmony doing so that follow the objectives of the IV STAR Conference stating that all economies agreed to see the private sector as more than providers but as important partners in establishing trade security. The V, VI, and VII STAR Conferences express that cooperation, coordination, and communication are needed in order to enhance regional security in all areas of trade including: maritime, aviation, cargo, people, and money. Although the III, V, and VI STAR Conference addressed the issue of cooperation and private-public partnership, they remain areas that are still weak and vulnerability to attack, especially maritime security. The cargo attack attempts in the United States in September of 2010 shows just how pertinent the issue still is, and how much of APECs mission remains to be accomplished. China sees that these issues must be at the forefront of APECs agenda.
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China Spends More on Internal Security?
The Chinese spend more on internal security than defense. This statement is very truthful, yet the Chinese people are happy with the ´direction of the country.µ Why is this possible? Some would explain it as the results of an oppressive regime. However, this essay will explain that it is a result of the Chinese social contract; China is still a developing nation; and China·s choice of non-intervention. The Chinese social contract is based upon economic development. The social contract of the United States is based on security of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In principal, if a government fails to agree to the social contract the people can create a new one. This is even truer in the case of the PRC. Therefore, the Chinese people care less so about the military expenditures as long as they still grow economically. The Chinese people also fear the results of the collapse of the PRC. The legend says that once a regime loses the favor of the gods, the land dissolves into regional warlords. With this in context, the Chinese see that the PRC has brought China back to greatness. It is because of this that the Chinese are happy with the direction, even if that means more internal security spending than defense. Many in the Western world see China as an emerging superpower, but China technically is still a developing nation. This explains why they spend more on internal security than defense. China is a vast nation with many regions still not fully controlled by the PRC, both on the mainland and off. In last week·s lecture, it was stated that China·s foreign principal is to secure the mainland before involving itself abroad. Until China is fully under the control of the PRC and its rulings able to be enforced on all, internal security will be more than defense spending.
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The Chinese foreign policy is one of non-intervention. From the last lecture, it is a win-win scenario. These are policies and relations that China likes. It means going into a country, say Ecuador, exchange to give them the technology to refine oil, while China gets all the oil. It is an idea of get in and get out. This allows China to keep its external military expenditures down. The US military budget is because they are involved quite extensively in the world. This calls for a massive military force, i.e. expenditures. China on the other hand, only needs to protect its borders and sphere of influence. This is a very light expenditure. If you included the policy of non-intervention, China has no need to build a military that has to secure a foreign region.
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Trust and Its Role in US Assessments toward Chinese Capabilities
Lack of trust in Sino-US relations is inherent, but something never understood. The US believes that it understands why the PLA is building up its military in the AsianPacific region. However, they fail to understand that the principle cause is the PRC feeling of encirclement by the US and its allies. This essay will portray this point by examining how miscalculations, misunderstandings, and zero-sum strategies exacerbate the problem creating a security dilemma. Miscalculations and misunderstanding are a result of governments lacking trust in one another. For example, the US-Soviet relations that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis were caused by misunderstandings and miscalculations. In this example, the US misunderstood why Russia was in Cuba, while Russia miscalculated the response of the US. The same can be said for Sino-US relations in the Asian-Pacific region. The US sees an increase in Chinese military expenditures as a means to secure more power in the region. This statement is true. The PRC want more power in the region, but not because it simply wants to dominate the region. It feels threatened by US encroachment. In the article this week, it makes the point that Robert Gates, after his meeting with the Chinese Defense Minister, is going to meet with the various military leaders of US allies. The PRC sees this as the US increasing their influence in the region and encircling them. The US must understand these correlations. Zero-sum strategies have been the lens that US policy-makers have seen relations with the PRC. However, this strategy only exacerbates mistrust in Sino-US relations. The PLA military build-up of so-called ´carrier killersµ and the Chinese stealth fighter have
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created some zero-sum strategies among US military leaders. In the article, Gates states that the US must stay up to date on its military capability vis-à-vis the PLA. This policy, while truthful and important, is a zero-sum strategy. It states that any military build-up by the PLA must be met by a build-up in the United States. It is a recipe for a security dilemma. The US must learn from the mistakes of the Cold War. Principally, that lack of trust caused by misunderstandings, miscalculations, or zero-sum strategies need to be eliminated. Misunderstandings are something easily fixed by increasing discussions between states and by raising concerns that can be clarified. If states have, a degree of mistrust between each other relations will always be strained. It breeds miscalculations that create zero-sum policies that exacerbate the issue into a security dilemma scenario.
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Nuclear Proliferation ² Class work Questions Week 1:
1. Which of the following types of reactions requires the most energy to initiate: Fission, fusion, or chemical? Which requires the least? Nuclear fusion requires the largest amount of energy of the three. The larger energy cost is needed in order to overcome the electrostatic repulsion field in order to fuse the two atoms. Fission on the other hand takes much less energy than that because one only has to split an already unstable element into a much more stable one, such as Uranium or Plutonium into Kryton and barium. Chemical reactions take the least amount of energy because they only require the smallest spark, such as TNT only requires a short fuss. 2. When uranium is fissioned to produce other elements, such as barium and Kryton, these elements have higher binding energies among their neutrons and protons in their nuclei than uranium does. What is the source of their higher binding energy? a. the loss of a small portion uranium nucleonic matter (atomic weight), which is converted to energy b. the gain of electronic binding energy in the outer electron shells of the resulting fission products c. the shift in atomic numbers from the large atomic number associated with uranium to the two smaller numbers associated with barium and krypton d. all the above 3. What is the yield in kilotons (i.e. the amount of energy released in tons of high explosive equivalent) of a. The 10t Grand Slam conventional bomb used in World War II -- 0.01 kilotons b. The Hiroshima fission bomb -- 13 kilotons 4. Advanced fission bombs in the very early 1950s were boosted with thermonuclear fuels to produce yields of .5 megatons. Roughly how many times greater is this yield than that of a nominal 10-kiloton firstgeneration fission bomb? In the mid 1950s, Russia exploded a 50 megaton nuclear weapon. Roughly how many times greater was its yield than the Grand Slam of World War II? A 0.5 MT bomb would be roughly 50 times greater in yield than a 10 kt firstgeneration fission bomb. A thermonuclear-fueled bomb of 0.5 MT is
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approximately ~5,000 times greater in yield than the Grand Slam of World War II. 5. Detail at least four different ways a bomb designer can reduce the amount of fissionable material needed to make a fission nuclear weapon of a given yield. The four primary ways expressed in the handout are: a neutron reflector, increasing the density of weapons material, increasing the speed at which the two critical masses come together, and encasing it in a heavy metal casing. However, increasing the speed that they are brought together causes a major risk that the bomb might fissile before there is enough material separated. 6. Why are fission bombs made with plutonium prone to predetonate and bombs made with HEU not? How did the Manhattan project bomb designers overcome this plutonium predetonantion problem? Name two advanced bomb technologies that can be used to help offset this problem even further. Fission bombs made with plutonium are made with Pu239, which is ideal for nuclear fission. However, it is extremely hard to produce without creating Pu240, which is comparatively active and prone to release neutrons that can cause Pu239 to prematurely fission. HEU on the other hand has a low level of neutron emissions that make it possible for weapon designs like the gun barrel, in which conventional ballistics are used. In order to overcome this problem the Manhattan Project designers created a new method of detonation called implosion, which consists of using an explosive to crush a hollow subcritical sphere into a dense ball of critical mass plutonium. This method allowed the designers to overcome the issue of Pu240 needing to be brought together faster than the gun model could. They also designed a neutron source generator that would increase the volume of material in the area during fission; in addition, designers encased bombs (such as the Fat Boy) in steel, and a neutron reflector to mitigate the Pu240 premature emission. 7. What nuclear bomb material is the enrichment process used to produce? What nuclear bomb material is the reprocessing process used to produce? Which process is chemical? Which process is isotopic? U235, which is in nature a rare isotope of uranium, is produced to WGU by a form of enrichment called the gaseous diffusion method and is isotopic. This method produces U235 by turning natural uranium into UF6 and capturing the lighter U235. On the other hand, plutonium is produced by chemically reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium. 8. How many kilograms would the sphere critical mass be of a weapon using a thick neutron reflecting uranium shell and a crude weapons design using: a. uranium that contains 50% U238 and 50% U235? ~50kg
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b. uranium containing 100% U235 and 0% U238? ~17kg c. plutonium containing 50% Pu240 and 50% Pu239? ~10kg d. plutonium containing 100% Pu239 and 0% Pu240? ~4kg 9. According to recent analysis, the amount of fissile material needed to produce a weapon of a given yield varies according to the sophistication of the weapons design. How many kilograms of plutonium are needed for a 10kt bomb using a low technical capability weapons design? How many is needed for the same yield using a high technical capability weapons design? For a low technical capability weapon design, one needs 5 kg of plutonium, whereas for a high technical capability weapon design one only needs 2 kg. 10. Had the first US nuclear device been made using reactor grade plutonium it: a. Would have produced a yield that would have exceeded 1 kt b. would have not produced any nuclear yield c. would have produced a weak yield of less than .01 kt
Questions Week 2:
1. What key provisions in Acheson-Lilienthal Report/Baruch Plans were not reflected in the Atoms for Peace program and the IAEA? A major provision that was not in the Atoms for Peace program or the IAEA is the idea of establishing, under the Atomic Energy Agency, dangerous nuclear facilities in each nation so that if an aggressor takes one facility it would be considered an attack on the UN. The complete and total control of all means of nuclear production was another provision left out of the IAEA and Eisonhower·s program. This provision stated that inspections alone were not enough that the authority must have complete control, but the Atoms for Peace and IAEA dropped this for international inspections of state owned facilities. The Atoms for peace program did call for the slow transfer, or contributions, from states to the IAEA, but it never came to fruition. 2. What did the Acheson-Lilienthal Report consider to be clearly safe nuclear activities and which activities did it believe were clearly dangerous? The Acheson-Lilienthal Report noted ´safe activitiesµ as three broad points. The broadness was designed to express the development in nuclear technology that the writers saw would come in the future. In other words, they did not want to hamper innovations but at the same time to safeguard the diversion to weapons production. The three main safe activities noted are: 1) the use of radioactive tracers as they have a clear use in the scientific fields; 2) small, low powered nuclear power plants that use denatured Pu and U235; 3) and large scale, high Courtoy | P a g e 4 6
power reactors in which the Pu and U235 is used in the absence of uranium or thorium. The Report expressed ´dangerous activitiesµ as three main categories as well. These are the mining and/or processing of raw uranium (as they labeled it ´provision of raw materialsµ), the use of facilities for the production of nuclear weapons (i.e. reactors and separation plants, anything that needs only minor changes to create weapons), and any action to produce nuclear weapons. These definitions of ´dangerous activitiesµ are quite broad, but as shown above there are exceptions to these rules. An example is that not all reactors are in use for nuclear weapons, as expressed that even high power reactors are accepted. However, there is a fine line between safe and dangerous is the essential piece gathered from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. 3. What view did the original Acheson-Lilienthal Report have regarding how safe power reactors might be? What did the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal report mean when they referred to denatured uranium, to denatured plutonium? The authors of the report qualified their views regarding the value of denaturing as a safeguard April 9th. What did they say regarding the value of denaturing plutonium and what were the implications regarding the reports· original view regarding how safe power reactors were? The original Reports view on power reactors was that the production of ´safeµ reactors meant that there had to be a ´dangerousµ reactor in order to produce the material needed for production. They expressed desires and recommendations to create an international agency that would oversee and run the production of the ´dangerousµ reactors, allowing for the free development by public and private entities (companies) to construct and run ´safeµ reactors. As far as what the authors meant by denatured uranium and plutonium, by denatured uranium they meant the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) which is not optimal for weapons use. The report focused primarily on the case of plutonium, seeing that they saw uranium 235 was extremely scarce. This observation was wrong, later it was found to be abundant on the planet. In the case of plutonium, the focus of the Report, they wanted to use a blend of depleted uranium (U238) and ´denaturedµ plutonium (e.g., Pu239 and Pu240). Despite knowing that these isotopes could be used to create a bomb, the authors pushed on (even though Oppenheimer wanted to expose this issue, it was posted as an attachment to the original report). The April 9th view states that the value of denaturing plutonium is not a principal safeguard and should not be considered an effect all-in-one. It instead is something to guarantee that there is a minimum of one-year worth of ´timely warningµ before a state can develop a nuclear weapon. They also stated that there is no means of creating nuclear energy without the use of raw uranium. Essentially, this means that there is no complete and total safeguard for fissile material but one can reduce the effectiveness of materials to a point that it takes a large amount of effort in order to produce a single bomb·s worth of material. 4. What is the difference between the IAEA requirement for ´timely detectionµ and the view the Acheson-Lilienthal Report gave as to what ´time adequateµ (a.k.a., now ´timely warningµ) required?
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The IAEA·s ´timely detectionµ safeguard simply requires that it be found before a state is able to create a single nuclear weapon (i.e., a SQ). This means that the IAEA is concerned principally with detecting a nuclear program before a bomb is created. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report·s ´timely warningµ requirement is that the international agency detects a states diversion of materials and/or position to do so. In other words, if the state seems to be moving in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons that agency should send out a warning signal to the international community. 5. What did the Baruch Plan mean by condign punishment and how did this concept differ from what the Acheson-Lilienthal report laid out as an approach to enforcement? The condign punishment that the Baruch Plan spoke of was a broadly undefined punishment, yet it was very sharply pointed out that any attempt made by a nation for seizure or producing a bomb should be met swiftly with said punishment. It called forth that an amendment be made to the UN Charter in regard that the IAEA have the authority to punish ANY nation, whether one of the big five (5) or not. The purpose was sound, but too far-reaching for any state to agree to. It simply meant that in the event of a state, such as the USSR, seized an IAEA plant to produce weapons; the USSR should not have the ability to veto their punishment. Otherwise, the IAEA has little authority (keep in mind this is a Cold War scenario, since the major powers are the USSR and the US). This directed and sharp punishment is the largest difference between the Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report expressed that it would take at least a year for a state to develop nuclear weapons, and therefore it left punishment to the realm of diplomacy and international sanctions. 6. What does the IAEA safeguards term ´significant quantityµ refer to? ´Conversion timeµ? The IAEA·s term ´significant quantityµ refers to the estimated amount needed to create a single nuclear weapon. The reasoning is that they want to prevent states from creating not just nuclear weapons, but from creating a single weapon. The IAEA·s term ´conversion timeµ refers to the time that a state needs in order to prepare material for use and insert it into a weapon. This period is highly conservative and so takes less than is actually noted by the IAEA. 7. Are the IAEA timeliness detection goals longer or shorter than the conversion times for A. separate plutonium, B. HEU, C. mixed oxide fuel, and D. LEU? (Give your answer for each case). A. Separate plutonium ² In the case of separate plutonium, the amount of time is 7-10 days, and a 1-month timely detection goal. Like HEU, this is far too infrequent. B. HEU ²HEU has a conversion rate estimated at 7-10 days, and a timeliness detection goal of 1 month. The timeliness detection goal is much longer than the conversion rate, and it is troublesome because a state could create more than enough nuclear weapons from the time inspectors leave until the next month when they visit again.
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C. Mixed oxide fuel (MOX) ² This conversion rate time is estimated at 7-21 days with a timely detection goal of a month. While this is a far greater timetable for inspectors· actual detection, the range at which MOX can be converted merits a more frequent inspection time. It is greater than the conversion rate, but not by much. D. LEU ² The conversion rate is 3-12 months and the timely detection goal is 1 year. This timely goal allows for inspections and for sanctions (such as the cause of Iran). It is far greater to exact in the conversion/detection time gap. 8. Given that the IAEA has surveillance cameras and radiation sensors at fresh and spent fuel storage ponds at all the light water reactor sites it safeguards, how might a nation still divert these materials without the IAEA knowing? The principle way would be during a regular spent-fuel evaluation in which the rods are taken away from the site for inspection. A significant amount of material could be taken off-site to a reprocessing plant that is too small for the IAEA to detect. The state could also use a method in which they claim less material made it to the site, than was suppose to receive. 9. Given the IAEA·s desire for nations to agree to more intrusive inspections by having them adopt the Additional Protocol, is the IAEA proposing to increase or decrease the frequency of inspections of nations to adopt this protocol? In this regard, the IAEA is proposing to reduce the frequency in exchange for more states to adopt the Additional Protocol, which mandates states give over more information about their nuclear facilities, including information about their manufacturing facilities for enriching uranium. 10. Assuming you used a levitated pit design or 2x the assembly speed of the Mark I solid pack design used in the original Trinity shot in 1945, how much of a difference is there in the probability of achieving a 1 KT yield using fuel-grade rather than weapons-grade plutonium? And for a 5 KT device? In the case of a 1 KT yield the probability between FG (83%) and WG (93%) is only 10%. Whereas for 5 KT, the difference between FG (58%) and WG (83%) is 25%. Assuming that in the 2x Trinity Technology charts, the first grade (4.5%) is super WG, the second (6%) is WG, and the third (14%) is FG. 11. What must a nuclear safeguard be able to do to meet the ´timely warningµ criteria? Do small research reactors be safeguarded to meet this criteria and, if so, why? What of reprocessing, enrichment, MOX fabrication plants? In principle in order to meet the ´timely warningµ criteria, the value of detection must be less than the conversion rate. This gives the IAEA and other states time to inflict sanctions against nations diverting material for weapons. No, most nuclear production facilities do not meet the ´timely warningµ standard because the conversion rate is much faster than the detection time. This means that the rate of frequency of visits is too long and allows virtual nuclear-weapon states to divert fuel in between IAEA visits.
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