I. Civil Service Law, Subtitle A,Title I, Book V of E.O.

292

Important topics for CSC

Scope of the Civil Service

Appointments in the Civil Service
Classification of positions (under the Civil Service Law/Constitution)

Career and non-career

Competitive and non-competitive

Appointment process

Functions and powers of the Civil Service Commission

Personnel action

The Civil Service, CONST. Art. IX (B);

Javier v. Reyes, 170 SCRA 360 – abanilla

G.R. No. L-39451 February 20, 1989

ISIDRO M. JAVIER vs. PURIFICACION C. REYES
Facts:

This case involves the two appointments approved by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan.

 Isidro M. Javier was duly appointed as Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan by the
then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba on November 7, 1967 as approved by the
Municipal Council. The following day, Javier took his oath of office and thereafter
assumed and discharged the duties of his office.

 On January 3, 1968, the newly elected Mayor Purificacion Reyes recalled the
appointment of Javier from the Civil Service Commission and designated Police
Lt. Romualdo Clemente, a non-eligible as Officer-In-Charge of the Police Dept.

 On May 2, 1968, the Civil Service Commission attested and approved the
appointment of petitioner as such Chief of Police, in its 3rd Indorsement stating
that the appointment of Mr. Bayani Bernardo as Chief of Police of Malolos has
not been confirmed by the Municipal Council, and as the consent of the Municipal
Council is a mandatory requirement under Section 1 of Rep. Act 1551, the said
 appointment is considered null and void. In view thereof, the attached
appointment of Mr. Isidro M. Javier has been approved as permanent under
Section 24 (b) of R.A. 2260.

 Reyes refused to comply with the order of the CSC. Hence, Javier was deprived
of his salary

Issue: which of the two appointments is valid?

SC: Javier was ordered reinstated.

Ratio:

 On appointments: acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.

Based on the facts, Bernardo never assumed office or took his oath.
Apparently, he has not accepted the appointment which makes the same
ineffective, over which Javier’s appointment prevails.

- The fact that Bernardo’s appointment was confirmed by the CSC does
not complete it since confirmation or attestation by the Commission,
although an essential part of the appointing process, serves merely to
assure the eligibility of the appointee.

 Petitioner’s acts amounted to acceptance and gave rise to a vested right to

the office in his favor by going to the CSC to ask for reinstatement and for
bringing the suit of mandamus

Favis v. Rupisan, 17 SCRA 190 – almoneda

G.R. No. L-22823 May 19, 1966

FAVIS, vs. RUPISAN, et al,

FACTS: The PVTA, granted petitioner Godofredo N. Favis, an extended an

appointment to the position of Assistant General Manager, signed by the board-
chairman, and accordingly took the oath of office and thereafter discharged the
functions thereof.

After two years the same board of directors, on the allegation that the petitioner has
committed acts constituting a breach of the trust and confidence of the Board, declared
the position vacant and appointed thereto, Canuto Fariñas, Jr. The latter was sworn into
office on the same day.
Claiming that his removal was made in violation of Section 32 of the Revised Civil
Service Law (Rep. Act 2260), and the appointment of respondent Fariñas to the same
position constituted usurpation and unlawful possession, Favis immediately filed an
action for quo warranto,

The respondents contended that the position occupied by the petitioner is, highly
confidential and therefore, removable at the pleasure of the appointing power and that
even if the position may be considered as belonging to the competitive or classified
service petitioner cannot be said to have been duly appointed thereto, because his
appointment has never been approved by nor submitted to, the Commissioner of Civil
Service, hence, the petitioner is at most a de facto officer, and can be removed from
office even without cause.

ISSUE: Whether Rafis as Assistant General Manager is entitled to the right to security
of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Civil Service law and rules.

RULING : No.

x x x x Considering that the position involved in this controversy is not one of those
enumerated in the law as falling in the non-competitive and exempt classes, it follows as
a logical conclusion that the same belongs to the classified or competitive service.

In this connection, the Civil Service Rules, implementing Section 16 (h) of Republic Act
2260 which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive jurisdiction over
the "approval under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments including
promotions to positions in the competitive service", provide:

RULE VI. APPOINTMENT

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 2 (a) All appointments including promotions to positions in the competitive

or classified service must be made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Service Act and Rules and the WAPCO plans. Said appointments, prepared in
the prescribed form and duly signed by the appointing officer, shall be submitted
to the Commissioner for approval and such approval shall be a sufficient
authority for the payment of salary to the appointee, unless otherwise provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no question, therefore, that for an appointee to a classified position to be

entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal, his appointment must
receive the proper approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service.

In the present case, respondents' allegation that petitioner's appointment was not
approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service has not been controverted. Of course,
we may take judicial notice of the fact that as a matter of practice, the positions of
officials in government corporations are being treated by the offices concerned not only
as non-competitive, but their appointments are considered effective and complete upon
the appointee's assumption of office. And the central personnel agency is merely
furnished with copies of the appointment or of the oath of office — for record purposes
only. This must be the reason why petitioner remained in occupancy of the position,
drawing the corresponding salary therefor, for almost two years without anybody
questioning his right to such possession.

But this situation does not create or bestow upon the petitioner any right to the
position or to the guarantees provided by law. The tolerance, acquiescence or
mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules
on the matter does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval
by the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective and
unenforceable. In the circumstances, for the duration of his occupancy of the position
in question, the petitioner may be considered merely as a de facto officer, and may
consequently be removed from office even without cause.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.

Mitra v. Subido, 21 SCRA 127 - casibua

Appointment

Triste vs. Leyte State College – maguliman

Triste v. Leyte State College

FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari on the vice-presidency of the Leyte State College (LSC). It seeks
to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Trustees of said College ousting and
replacing petitioner with private respondent as Vice-President (VP), as well as the
resolution of the Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17 dismissing
petitioner's appeal.

LSC became a state college by virtue of P.D. No. 44, Section 4 of the decree provides
that "the governance and administration of each College and the exercise of its
corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Trustees and in the
President of the College insofar as authorized by said Board". In addition to its general
powers of administration, Section 6 provides that the Board shall have the power and
duty:

"(c) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of each College, a Vice-

President for Academic Affairs and Development with a position next in rank to
the President of the College who shall assist in the administration and
supervision of the College and who shall automatically assume the presidency of
the College in an acting capacity, with full powers and duties, in the absence of
the President or when the office of the president is vacant."

June 10, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1437 was promulgated to define the
composition and powers of the governing boards of chartered state universities and
colleges and the term of office its Presidents.

One of the governing board's specific powers as laid out in Section 3 of P.D. 1437 is the
following:

"f. To confirm appointments of vice-presidents, deans, directors, registrars, heads of

departments, professors, and other officials and employees of the university or college
made by the president, to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as the governing boards may promulgate, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws; to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing."

Feb. 3, 1984, the Lsc Board passed a resolution confirming the appoinment of petitioner
Triste as Vice-President of LSC and for more than 2 years, Triste discharged her duties
as VP of LSC.

Feb. 1986, there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of the LSC. The
then President of LSC retired and one Purificacion Flores became the OIC.

July 18, 1986, petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper asserting
that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position was not vacant,
the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that of the recommending president
who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board.
Also, she stated that she was qualified as College President.

August 21, 1986, petitioner received a letter from President Flores assigning her the job
of director of the college's research program. A week later, a resolution was passed by
the board replacing her with Dr. Gonzaga as the VP of LSC.

Triste filed a motion for recon, alleging that the appointment of Dr. Gonzaga, in effect
eased her out of her position, contended that her constitutional right to security of tenure
had been violated. Her requests for certified copies of the reso designating Dr. Gonzaga
as VP remained unacted and her motion for recon was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner was merely “designated” and not “appointed” to the College Vice-
Presidency

RULING:
The petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of
petitioner with backwages to the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is
hereby ordered.

In Borromeo v. Mariano, this Court, through Justice Malcolm, noted that "(a)ll authorities
unite in saying that the term 'appoint' is well-known and whether regarded in its
legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of
an individual." We defined "appointment" in Aparri v. Court of Appeals as the "act of
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office." On
the other hand, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the word "designate," when used
by the appointing power in making an appointment to office, is equivalent to the word
"appoint."

Common usage, however, oftentimes puts a distinction between the terms

"appointment" and designation". Perhaps, the reason for this is that the word
"appointment" connotes permanency while "designation" implies temporariness. Thus,
to "designate" a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional
duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or, in some cases, a
public officer may be "designated" to a position in an acting capacity as when an
Undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the
appointment of a permanent Secretary.

Sevilla vs. CA, 209 SCRA 637 - penalosa

Chua v. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA 65 – Ramirez

De los Santos v. Mallari, 87 Phil. 289 – rovero

G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950

EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor, PANTALEON
PIMENTEL, in his capacity as City Treasurer and RAFAEL USON, in his capacity
as City Auditor, respondents.

Nature of the case: This is an original action in the SC. Quo warranto.

Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on
July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began
to exercise the duties and functions of the position.

- On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the

President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the
Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to
the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
- Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other
officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the
salary corresponding to the position.

- Hence this, petition. The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the
Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

In respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified
service."

-That section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61
entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to
remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city
engineer.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner’s removal is legal

2. Whether or not the provision of 2545 of the revised Administrative code is still
in force

Ruling: No, the petitioner’s removal is not legal.

Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, he (Governor-General now

President) may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers," is incompatible
with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." The two provisions are
mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms permits what
the other in similar terms prohibits.

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that this particular provision has
been repealed and has ceased to be operative from the time the constitution went into
effect.

- Article XII of the Constitution which contains the provisions on Civil Service
contemplates the entire Civil Service regardless of whether the employees embraced
therein belong to the classified or unclassified service with the exception of those
positions “which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature,”
This theory is confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November
30, 1936 to implement Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177
explains Civil Service almost in the identical words of that article of the organic law. As a
contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service
as conceived by the framers of the Constitution.

Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and

highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature.
It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments
coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical.

The phrase "for cause" in connection with the removals of public officers has acquired a
well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy
recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes
which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is
implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power
of removal, or without any cause.

Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must
be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and
interests of the public."

With regards to the second issue:

The provision is inoperative.

We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code
unconstitutional. What we declare is that the particular provision thereof which gave the
Chief Executive power to remove officers at pleasure has been repealed by the
Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument went into effect.
Unconstitutionally, as we understand it, denotes life and vigor, and unconstitutional
legislation presupposes posteriority in point of time to the Constitution.

It is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct the effect of
which the Constitution specifically forbids (State ex-rel. Mack vs. Guckenberger, 139
Ohio St., 273; 39 NE. [2d], 840.) A law that has been repealed is as good as if it had
never been enacted, and can not, in the nature of things, contravene or pretend to
contravene constitutional inhibition.
So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and
menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all
intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book
by the Constitution itself by express mandate before this petitioner was appointed.

Ortiz v. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812 – tan

Teologo v. Civil Service Commission, 191 SCRA 238 – abanilla

G.R. No. 92103 November 8, 1990

VIOLETA T. TEOLOGO
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DR. PRUDENCIO J. ORTIZ, DR. JOSE M.
TUPAZ, JR., and MRS. RUBY G. GELVEZON

Facts:

Petitioner VioletaTeologo questions the appointment of private respondent Ruby

Gelvezon, a retiree as Chief Nurse I of Pedro Trono Memorial Hospital claiming that she
has preferential right being that she is in an acting capacity for more than one year and
that she is the next-in-rank and is not disqualified. Gelvezon (Teologo’s allegation) is not
eligible.

Gelvezon was reinstated under CSC memorandum-Circular No. 5, S-1983, which

allows the reinstatement of a retiree only under certain conditions. This reinstatement
was protested by VioletaTeologo, one of the two aspirants for the same position. It was
however, denied y the CSC by Dr. Prudencio Ortiz, Regional Health Director, who
justified the appointment of Gelvezon on grounds of the exigency of the service and
her superior qualifications. The CSC declared that Gelvezon is neither a retiree nor
over-age (57 or over), hence, it alleged that there is no need of prior authority.

Issue: whether or not the Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
in reinstating Gelvezon.

SC: yes.

Ratio:

Under the Civil Service Law, it is the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Health, who can make appointments of key personnel in the Department of
Health. It is presumed that Dr. Ortiz was responsible of the reinstatement and likewise
asked for the authority to reinstate as if he had the power to do such act. It is his
superior who actually has the power to ask the authority of reinstatement.

The assessment of the appointee’s qualifications like the determination of whether the
appointment is demanded by the exigencies of the service should be made by the
appointing authorities themselves, as it is them who understand the needs and
operations of their office and not the CSC.

A retiree cannot just resume where he left off without special qualifications as required
by regulation. Discretion given to the appointing authority is subject to stricter review
where the person appointed is being returned to the Government after voluntarily
retiring and collecting all the benefits appurtenant to such retirement.

The rule expressly allows reinstatement only if the vacancy cannot be filled by
promotion of qualified officers or employees in the agency concerned. As a retiree,
Gelvezon could not be simply reinstated like any new appointee but had to satisfy the
stringent requirements laid down by CSC Memo Circular No.5, S-1983. Finally,
promotions in the Civil Service should always be made on the basis of qualifications,
including occupational competence, moral character, devotion to duty and not least
important, loyalty to the service.

II. Chapter 4: De Leon

Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, et. al. 77 Phil. 635 – almoneda

G.R. No. L-831 November 21, 1946

LO CHAM, vs. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and

FELIPE NATIVIDAD, City Fiscal of City of Manila

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 876 November 21, 1946

ALEJANDRO CANAPE, et al , vs. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First of Manila, and

FELIPE NATIVIDAD, City Fiscal of Manila

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 878 November 21, 1946

PEOPLE , vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and

CONRADO PIRING Y MENDOZA
FACTS: Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer was given an assignment
by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing. He was temporarily detailed to the
Office of City Fiscal of Manila, to assist in the discharge of duties of City Fiscal with the
same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal.

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed information in the aforesaid case
after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for
the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground that Doctor Lantin has no authority
to sign and file information.

ISSUE: Whether a temporarily detailed officer in the Office of the City Fiscal may
exercise functions and authority of the assistant City Fiscal including signing and filing
of information.

RULING:

Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of

Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides:

SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice

may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal
or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the
same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or
Solicitor General.

xxxx x

Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they
were enacted. The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within
its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose
for which the office was created and those which, although incidental and
collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the
principal purposes. (43 American Jurisprudence, 68, 70.) The authority to sign
informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to
be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144 and its predecessors.

xxxxxx

It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to sign
informations. Granting that he does not retain such power, a question which we do not
decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we have
arrived. The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations
and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power "to assist" a prosecuting
attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not
emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred
upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the
office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the
appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the
authority to sign informations, which is inherent in his appointment. In other
words, the clause "with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the
Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not exclude the latter authority. The
former practice of the Attorney General to which we have alluded portrays a distinction
between and separation of the powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney
General to sign informations, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers
legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special provision
authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the Attorney
General's power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing informations.
The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of
the idea that the authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of the
Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person appointed was (1) to
assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney
General in such matters. If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them
would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was
a surplusage.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876 are
denied and dismissed, and the petition in case No. L-878 is sustained. Without costs.

Lao vs. To Chip, 158 SCRA 243 - casibua

Lamb vs. Phipps, 23 Phil. 156 [1912] - maguliman

Aprueba, et. al. vs. Ganzon, 18 SCRA 8 [1966] - penalosa
BF Homes vs. National Water Resources Council, 154 SCRA 88 - ramirez
Sharp International Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299 – rovero

G.R. No. 93661 September 4, 1991

SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (14th Division), LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
and DEOGRACIAS VISTAN, respondents.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the decision o the CA.

Facts: On April 27, 1988, United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) entered into a
Contract to Sell the property to Sharp International Marketing, the agreement to be
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment by the latter of the full purchase
price of P3,183,333.33.

Even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner, through its President Alex Lina,
offered to sell it to the Government for P56,000,000.00, (later increased to
P65,000,000.00).

Although the land was still registered in the name of UCPB, the offer was processed by
various government agencies during the months of June to November, 1988, resulting
in the recommendation by the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution in the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the acquisition of the property at a price of
P35,532.70 per hectare, or roughly P67,000,000.00.

On December 1, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between UCPB and
Sharp by virtue of which the former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated
consideration of P3,183,333.33. The property was registered in the name of the
petitioner ( SHARP) on December 6, 1988.

On December 27, 1988, DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines created a
Compensation Clearing Committee (CCC) to expedite processing of the papers relating
to the acquisition of the land and the preparation of the necessary deed of transfer for
signature by the DAR Secretary and the LBP President.

The following day, the CCC held its first meeting and decided to recommend the
acquisition of the property for P62,725,077.29. The next day, December 29, 1988, DAR
Secretary Philip Ella Juico issued an order directing the acquisition of the estate for the
recommended amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to Sharp.

On January 9, 1989, Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale. On that same day, the LBP received a copy of the order issued by Secretary Juico
on December 29, 1988.

On January 17, 1989, LBP Executive Vice President Jesus Diaz signed the CCC
evaluation worksheet but with indicated reservations.
For his part, LBP President Deogracias Vistan, taking into account these reservations
and the discovery that Sharp had acquired the property from UCPB for only P3.1
million, requested Secretary Juico to reconsider his order.

Secretary Juico then sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as to whether the
LBP could refuse to pay the seller the compensation fixed by the DAR Secretary.

Meantime, on February 3, 1989, Vistan informed Juico that LBP would not pay the
stipulated purchase price.

The reply of the Justice Department on March 12, 1989, was that the decision of the
DAR Secretary fixing the compensation was not final if seasonably questioned in court
by any interested party (including the LBP);

Reacting to Sharp's repeated demands for payment, Juico informed Lina, that DAR and
LBP had dispatched a team to inspect the land for reassessment.

Sharp then filed a petition for mandamus to the court to compel the DAR and LBP to
comply with the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus would lie

Ruling: No, it is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion.

We agree with the respondent court that the act required of the LBP President is not
merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion. The compensation to be
approved was not trifling but amounted to as much as P62 million of public funds, to be
paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier for only P3
million

Respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that

involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of
public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a
body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or
to approve or disapprove a specific application

Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no contract between
Sharp and the Government. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was
incomplete and therefore had no binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot claim
any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition for mandamus.

National Marketing Corporation v. Cloribel, 3 this Court held:

 ... the action for mandamus had no leg to stand on because the writ was
sought to enforce alleged contractual obligations under a disputed
contract — disputed not only on the ground that it had failed of perfection
but on the further ground that it was illegal and against public interest
andGovernment is bound by the official decisions of Secretary Juico and
cannot now renege on his commitment. The Government is never
estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are
erroneous, let alone irregular. public policy ...

Government is bound by the official decisions of Secretary Juico and cannot now
renege on his commitment. The Government is never estopped from questioning the
acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

III. Chapter Five

Cases for compensation

Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384 - tan

Sadueste vs. Municipality of Surigao, 72 Phil. 485 – abanilla

G.R. No. L-47380 June 27, 1941

ZACARIAS DE SADUESTE vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO

Facts:

 The material facts of the present case are contained in the stipulation of the
parties.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
 Pursuant to the provisions of section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Acts Nos. 3257 and 3978, plaintiff, Zacarias D. Sadueste, as
district engineer for the Province of Surigao, was, on March 10, 1936, designated
by the Director of Public Works as sanitary and waterworks engineer for the
same province, the designation to take effect on January 1, 1936, with an
additional compensation of not more than P60 a month payable from the
income of the waterworks system under his supervision. On April 20, 1936,
the provincial board of Surigao, by resolution, approved the designation. From
January 1, 1936 to March 30, 1939, plaintiff rendered services to the defendant
municipality in his capacity as sanitary and waterworks engineer. The municipal
council of the defendant municipality having failed to provide the necessary
appropriation for his services in the aggregate sum of P2,338.06, plaintiff
 instituted an action for its recovery with claim for damages in the amount of
P300.
 Lower court dismissed the complaint holding that sec 1916 have been repealed
by sec.17 of Act No. 4187, otherwise known as the General Appropriation Act for
1936.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner is entitled to receive the additional compensation.

SC: Affirmed lower court’s decision

Ratio:

The last paragraph of section 1916 of the Administrative Code, as amended.

provides:

Upon designation of the Director of Public Works, a district engineer may be

allowed additional compensation with the approval of the provincial board not to
exceed sixty pesos per month to be paid from the income of the waterworks
system supervised by him for services rendered in his capacity as sanitary and
waterworks engineer.

Section 17 of Act No. 4187 reads:

Abolition of additional compensation. - Any existing act, rule or order to the

contrary notwithstanding, no full time officer or employee of the government shall
thereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra
compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the
government, its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created
by law, except (a) officers serving as chairmen or members of boards of entities
and enterprises organized, operated, owned or controlled by the Government,
who may be paid per diems for each meeting actually attended or when on
official travel; (b) auditors and accountants; (c) provincial and municipal
treasurers and their employees; (d) employees serving as observers of the
Wheather Bureau; and (e) those authorized to receive extra or additional
compensation by virtue of the provisions of this Act. This section is hereby made
permanent legislation.

The last provision was repeated verbatim in Act No. 4231, which was the Appropriation
Act for the year 1936.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

It is contended, however, that section 17 of Act No. 4187 is unconstitutional, it being

offensive to Article 3 of the Jones Law, which provides "that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall be expressed in the title of the bill." (This is substantially re-
enacted in the Philippine Constitution as Art. VI, sec. 12, par. 1, and later as Art. VI, sec.
21, of the amended Constitution.) It is not necessary to pass upon the constitutional
question raised for the reason that under Article XI, section 3, of the Philippine
Constitution, "no officer or employee of the Government shall receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. There being no law by
which the appellant is specifically authorized to receive additional compensation for his
services as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim therefore must fail.

The authority granted in the last paragraph of section 1916 of the Revised
Administrative Code is a general authority given to all district engineers. The authority
required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific
authority given to a particular employee or officer of the Government because of
peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of extra or additional
compensation. The purpose of the Constitution is to prohibit generally payment of
additional or double compensation except in individual instances where the payment of
such additional compensation appears to be not only just but necessary.

Peralta vs. Auditor General Mathay, 38 SCRA 256 – almoneda

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26608. March 31, 1971]

PEDRO G. PERALTA, vs. AUDITOR GENERAL ISMAEL MATHAY,

SYLLABUS

1. It is expressly provided in the Constitution: "No officer or employee of the

government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law." This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a
public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he
keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public
service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the functions
entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of
the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further personal
ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted.
That at least is the ideal. There is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or
employee of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as may be
fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious r
circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position. It is an entirely
different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it
that he should receive something more. If it were to be thus though, there must be a law
to that effect. So the Constitution decrees.

2. As is expressly declared in the Constitution, the Civil Service is to embrace "all

branches and subdivisions of the Government * * *." Conformably to the above, the
Philippine Civil Service, by law, includes ''all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations . . . ." Petitioner has not disputed, nor can he dispute that as a trustee, he
was an officer of the government, the GSIS having been established in order "to
promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government of the
Philippines and to replace the [then] pension systems established in [previous acts].'' As
such officer, petitioner cannot receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.

3. Under the GSIS Act. petitioner is entitled as trustee "to a per diem of P25.00 for
each day of actual attendance in session." As in the case of government controlled
corporations, the term ''per diems" was used in the sense the compensation or
remuneration attached to the office of Trustee. Such is not the meaning usually
attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries
Workers Union, (L-24632, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 668). A "per diem" is commonly
identified with the daily allowance "for each day he (an officer or employee) was away
from his home base." Its usual signification is thus that a reimbursement for expenses
incurred in the performance of one's duties. If employ in a statute, as in this case, in the
concept of remuneration, however, there must be, to justify an additional compensation,
a specific law that so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional command is
lacking.

4. A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of a cost of living

allowance. If it could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather
than additional emoluments or perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor
General cannot find support in the Constitution. What was said in an American State
decision has relevance. It was therein categorically stated "that it is universally held that
an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office is not an
increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office." To the same effect is this
excerpt appearing later in the opinion: "A careful and, we believe, exhaustive
examination of the decisions fails to disclose a single case in which it has ever been
held that a legislative act, providing for an allowance, for expenses incurred in the
discharge of official duties, to a public officer, whose salary or compensation was fixed
at a stated sum, was in violation of provisions such as are found in many stte
Constitutions, forbidding an increase of salary during official terms, or forbidding the
granting of 'fees,' 'perquisites,' or 'emoluments' to such officer. Legislative acts which
directly in terms, or as construed, attempted to increase such salaries, have been held
invalid. But no decision has been found or, as we believe, can be found, which holds a
legislative act to be unconstitutional which merely relieves an officer, who received a
fixed salary or compensation, from expending such salary for expenses incident to the
performance of his official duties." It is worth noting that there are specific provisions in
the applicable statutes allowing trustees or directors, traveling expenses which may be
collected by the board of directors of the Philippines Virginia Tobacco Administration;
traveling and subsistence expenses by the members and board of directors of the
Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley Authority; and traveling and other necessary expenses
by the members of the Philippine Medical Care Commission. Such provisions are
prompted by what may appear to be an excess of caution, for the accepted doctrine is
that an allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill
his task cannot be looked upon as an additional compensation. Such a principle does
not come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show that the cost of living
allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to
an additional compensation.

5. It is quite obvious that by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional

remuneration or compensation. The very characterization of what was received by
petitioner as bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to spur him possibly to
more diligent efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being traditionally associated with
the Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice
except to deduct from petitioner's gratuity such items.

DECISION

FACTS: The GSIS, granted the Petitioner, in a resolution duly passed, an optional
retirement gratuity of P40,336.07. Of that amount, he was not able to collect the sum of
P7,032.26, covering P3,982.26 as cost of living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive
bonus, and P1,775.00 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed in audit. the
view of respondent Auditor General being that they should be deducted from his
gratuity, on the ground that they "partake of the nature of additional compensation," a
trustee's remuneration being fixed by law in the form of a per diem of P25.00 for every
board meeting of the GSIS attended. Respondent denied the succeeding motion for
reconsideration. Hence this appeal for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cost of living allowance as well as incentive and Christmas
bonuses paid to petitioner Pedro G. Peralta, a Trustee of the GSIS, partake of the
nature of additional compensation

RULING: Yes.

Under the GSIS Act, he is entitled as trustee "to a per diem of P25.00 for each
day of actual attendance in session." As in the case of government-controlled
corporations, the term "per diems" was used in the sense of the compensation or
remuneration attached to the office of Trustee Such is not the meaning usually
attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries
Workers Union. A "per diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance "for
each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his home base." Its usual
signification is thus that of a reimbursement for expenses incurred in the
performance of one's duties. If employed in a statute, as in this case, in the concept
of remuneration, however, there must be, to justify an additional compensation, a
specific law that so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional command is
lacking.

A similar approach is called for in determining the nature of a cost of living allowance. If
it could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather than
additional emoluments or perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor
General cannot find support in the Constitution. What was said in an American
State decision' has relevance. It was therein categorically stated "that it is universally
held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of
office is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office." x x x
x It is worth noting that there are specific provisions in the applicable statutes allowing
trustees or directors, traveling expenses which may be collected by the board of
directors of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration; traveling and subsistence
expenses by the members and board of directors of the Central Luzon-Cagayan Valley
Authority; and traveling and other necessary expenses by the members of the
Philippine Medical Car Commission. Such provisions are prompted by what may
appear to be an excess of caution, for the accepted doctrine is that an allowance
to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his task
cannot be looked upon as an additional compensation. Such a principle does not
come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show that the cost of living
allowance received by him was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to
an additional compensation.

So it is in the case of the bonuses received by him. It is quite obvious that by its very
nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation. The very
characterization of what was received by petitioner as bonuses being intended by
way of an incentive to spur him possibly to more diligent efforts and to add to the
feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the Christmas season would
remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice except to deduct from
petitioner's gratuity such items.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Auditor General of June 28, 1966, as reiterated in its
order denying the motion for reconsideration of September 1, 1966, is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Personnel Action
Panis vs. Civil Service Commission, 229 SCRA 589 [1994] – casibua

Other rights

Request of CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes, 216 SCRA 728 – maguliman

REQUEST OF CTA PRESIDING JUDGE ALEX Z. REYES

FACTS:

Nov. 24, 1991, Judge Reyes compulsorily retired with 37y, 9mos,7d in govt service.
There was a 7 yr gap in his govt service from 1946-1954.

Dec. 19,1991,he asked for a reconsideration and recomputation of his accumulated sick
leave credits. The SC Administrative Office, in processing his terminal leave application,
did not include his accumulated leave credits.

1. The inclusion of 57.625 days vacation leave and 57.625 days sick leave
which he earned for services with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
from 1941 to 1946, and

2. The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from his total

accredited vacation and sick leaves of 322 days for the period beginning
February 17, 1954 to July 19, 1980, during which he was with the
Department of Finance.

n processing the terminal leave application of Judge Reyes, the Supreme Court
Administrative Office did not include Judge Reyes' accumulated leave credits earned for
services with the AFP, by virtue of the application of a 1st Indorsement dated May 2,
1957 of the then Bureau of Civil Service, which provides:

When transfer of leave credit not allowed— The transfer of leave credit is
allowed only when there is no gap in the service of the officer or employee
concerned.

In his request for reconsideration, Judge Reyes cites Memorandum Circular No. 54 of
the Office of the President dated March 24, 1988, as restated in Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 10 which provides:

Any officer/employee of the government who retires/voluntarily resigns/is

separated from the service through no fault of his/her own, andwho is not otherwise
covered by special law, shall be entitled to the commutation of all his/her leave credits
exclusive of Saturdays/Sundays/holidayswithout limitation and regardless of the period
when the credits were earned; provided that the leave privilages under EO No. 1077 as
herein outlined may be availed of only by concerned officers/employees in the service
as of the effectively thereof on January 9, 1986.
It is evident that said Memorandum Circular No. 54 supersedes the 1957 indorsement
of the Bureau of Civil Service. Under said Circular, government officers and employees
are now entitled to the commutation of all leaves credits exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits
were earned, provided the claimant was in the service as of January 9, 1986.

ISSUE:

The issue which then arises is whether or not the phrase "without limitation and
regardless of the period when the credits were earned" is applicable to the judiciary.
Such phrase may be so applicable on the condition provided in the circucular itself, that
the judiciary is "not otherwise covered by special law."

RULING:

the COURT RESOLVED to:

(1) GRANT the request of Judge Alex Z. Reyes for:

a) The inclusion of 57.625 days vacation leave

and 57.625 days sick leave earned for services
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
1941 to 1946 in his accumulated leave credits.

b) The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays from the total of his accredited
vacation and sick leaves of 322 days for the
period beginning February 17, 1954 to July 19,
1980 during which period Judge Reyes was
with the Department of Finance; and

(2) DECLARE that Memorandum Circular No. 54 of the Office of the President dated
March 24, 1988 shall apply in the computation of the creditable vacation and leave
credit of members the judiciary who retired or shall retire on or after March 24, 1988, the
date of said Memorandum Circular.

The law governing leave credits of municipal judges began with RA No. 843 dated May
5, 1953 which provided for vacation and sick leave, thereby adding a new section to the
Judiciary Act of 1948. RA No. 843 was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 3086 dated
June 17, 1961, Section 3 of which provides as follows:

SEC. 3. Section ninety-eight-A of the same Act, as amended, is further

amended to read as follows:
 SEC. 98-A. Vacation and sick leaves of judges of municipal
courts and justices of the peace. Judges of municipal courts
and justices of the peace shall be entitled annually to fifteen
days vacation and fifteen days sick leaves with pay and in
the computation thereof Sundays and holidays shall be
excluded and such leave privileges shall be cumulated but
not to exceed three hundred days.

Said law, therefore, provides that judges of first instance not specially assigned to
vacation duty shall be on vacation leave while those on vacation duty shall be entitled to
vacation leave at any subsequent time for the same number of days that they spend on
vacation duty. The only limitation is that the judge's entitlement to vacation leave shall
not exceed two months per year, one month of which is cumulative.

The special laws provide the boundaries by which the implementing rules and
regulations to be promulgated by "justices and other governement officials covered by
special law" are to be limited. Again, there is no special law governing the specific issue
addressed by Memorandum Circular No. 54 and Section 26 of the Omnibus Rules. And
absent any implementing rules and regulations yet promulgated, the general provision
must be applied there being no reason to discriminate against the judiciary and deprive
judges of the benefits of commutation without limitation and regardless of the period
when the credits where earned. In other words, there is no special law governing the
commutation of leave credits of judges and, therefore, they are entitled to benefits under
Memorandum Circular No. 54.

Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 - penalosa

Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 614 – Ramirez

People vs. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689 [2000] – rovero

G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Motion to be allowed to discharge duties as Congressman.

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of

Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.

The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of

House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be

rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even
the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation

without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his

suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the
people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to
be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend

sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when

allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty
to perform the functions of a Congressman.

He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the
State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

RULING: No, he is not exempt.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is
to ascertain the applicable law.

All top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties
of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from
arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After
conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Antonio F. Trillanes IV vs. Honorable Oscar B. Pimentel Sr. et.al., G.R. No. 179817,
June 27, 2008 - tan