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18 Chapter I

Chapter I

“I know of no problem more frustrating or more bedevilled by mean spiritedness and
lack of mutual confidence, or of a problem where all concerned would so easily gain
from a reasonable settlement”. 1

Brian Urquhart: The former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations

The Historical Survey of the role of the UN as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict

1.1 Introduction

According to Brian Urquard “more than 50 years have passed since the
internationalization of the Cyprus Question and the adoption by the United Nations General
assembly of resolution 814 (IX) of December 17, 1954”.2 The United Nations (UN) is still
working to solve the Cyprus question with a serious examination of its peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations. This chapter sets out to study the UN’s peacemaking efforts in
Cyprus from 1954 to 2001 and why UN peacemaking efforts failed to bring a peaceful
settlement to the Cyprus problem. The Chapter first examines how this protracted conflict
affected the UN’s peacemaking agenda’s response to its various periods. It is then to
consider why the two communities authorized, tolerated or opposed the UN involvement in
the Cyprus conflict. The chapter will also examine the failure of the UN efforts, which
originates from the intercommunal mistrust, the influence of the international community,
the politics of the great powers and two communities’ political aims and their relation with
the great powers.

These factors would be studied within the framework of the eleven periods of the Cyprus
Conflict: (a) The early UN involvement to Cyprus, 1945-1960; (b) The origin of the UN
presence in Cyprus, 1960-1963; (c) The UN’s Mediation, 1964-1965. (d) The
1
Brian Urquard, “A Life in Peace and War”, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987), p.198.

2
Van Coufoudakis, the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question, (The western political
quarterly, Vol.29, No.3, Sep., 1976), p.457. For a detailed account of the parliamentary diplomacy of the 1954-1958
periods, see Stephen G. Xydis, 1954-1958, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University of
Press, 1967).

19 Chapter I

intercommunal discussions, 1967-1973; (e) The division of the island: the 1974 events in
Cyprus; (f) The Vienna talks and high-level agreements, 1975-1982 (g) The declaration of
the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement, 1982 – 1986; (h) The set of ideas and
Confidence Building Measures 1988 – 1994; (i) The New Actors: European Union
dimension, 1994-1997. (j) The reviving of peace efforts, 1997-2000.

Secretaries-General of the UN have been actively involved in efforts to solve the Cyprus
conflict since the 1960’s. Their peacemaking plans will be the primary focus of this chapter
but it is also to explore circumstances under which the UN became involved in an issue that
at first appeared to be a domestic ethnic dispute.

1.2 The Historical Background to the UN’s involvement with Cyprus

1.2.1 The early UN involvement in Cyprus, 1945 -1960

The mid 1950’s was an important historical period for the Cyprus conflict. It is
identified by the scholars as one of decolonisation and self-determination for the Greek
Cypriots. According to Richmond, “at the end of the Second World War the Greek
Cypriots expected that their old national aspiration of Enosis would be granted in return for
having fought on the side of the British”.3 The Greek word eνωσις (Enosis) means “union”.
It is primarily used to refer to the unification of Cyprus and Greece, and became a political
issue, and a goal of Greek foreign policy, during the years of British colonial rule in Cyprus
(1878-1960). The struggle for Enosis was derived from the concept of Megali the struggle
of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Enosis was part of a much wider Pan-Hellenic
movement which aimed at reconstructing the Byzantine Empire under Greek Hegemony.4
The British Government in 1948 supported the idea of a constitution that granted equality
between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in the island. The suggested

3
Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, “The Work of the UN in Cyprus-Promoting Peace and Development”,
(England: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), p.4.

4
J. Reddaway, “Burdened with Cyprus”, (London: Weiden & Nicolson, 1986), p.14.

20 Chapter I

constitution would end the British rule in Cyprus.5 According to historians “the Ottoman
Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571 and administrated it until 1878 when she assigned its
administration to the UK by the Cyprus Convention in exchange for a tribute and promises
of UK defence in the Caucasus region against Russia. Upon Turkey’s entry into the World
War I, the UK annexed Cyprus. The position was internationally regularised by the treaty
of Lausanne 1923, whereby, in Article 20, Turkey adaptation of such a constitution would
end the British rule”.6 The suggestion was rejected by the AKEL party (The Progressive
Party of Working People) and the church. The AKEL party was established in 1921 as the
Communist Party of Cyprus. The Communist Party supported the independence of Cyprus
and opposed Enosis (union with Greece) which was the main aim of most Greek Cypriot
non-communists. The party became illegal in 1931 when the British colonial government
imposed restrictions on civil rights following a nationalist riot.

The rejection was the turning point in the history of the Cyprus conflict. Hubert Faustmann
stated that “ when faced with British intransigence concerning any change in the status of
the island and in the light of arrests of several politicians (mainly the AKEL partisans), the
Greek Cypriot leaders decided to break the deadlock and internationalise the problem
through the UN in 1949”.7 British Government was intransigent for two primary reasons.
Cyprus was a crucial strategic colony and an important passage for British troops. The
second reason was that it was against the idea of Enosis because of the loss of the other
colonies of Britain. It was incorporated into the UN charter that the Greek Cypriots wanted
to join with Greece on the right of self-determination.

The years from 1949 to 1952 provided hope and frustration for Greek Cypriot society. At
the beginning, all the Greek Cypriot political parties on both the left and right agreed to
defend the concept Enosis. Also on 5 December 1949, the Church announced that it would
hold a plebiscite on Enosis.8 This was a sign that the church and the political parties were

5
Claire Palley, “An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus
1999-2004”, (Oxford, England and Portland, Oregon: Hart publishing, 2005), p.14.
6
Ibid., p.14.

7
Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.4.

8
Ibid., p.4.

pp. Op. the Greek Prime Minister. p. p.. Thirdly.13 Eventually he succeeded and the Greek government reluctantly gave its support to the Enosis. 1960). His election was supported by the United States (US) and Britain.5. p. (London: Quartet Books 1984). (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing 1992). 12 Christopher Hitchen. There was a troubled partnership between the Church and the communist party. Cit. See Glafkos Clerides.. “Cyprus in History: a Survey of 5. 14 Ibid.379-80. p. Op.23.5. AKEL. “I am happy to have the opportunity to express from this official tribune to the Chamber and the whole of the Greek people the demand for the union of Cyprus with Mother Greece. The first reason was the political divisions inside of the Greek Cypriot society. Cit. (Greece: Zeno. gave his famous speech concerning the Cyprus issue.9 The plebiscite had a short life for three main reasons. 13 Oliver P. Alfred Metzner. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. The US 9 Ibid. “The referendum was held in January 1950 and 95. a matter which constitutes the ardent desire both of the Cypriot and the Greek People. 21 Chapter I unified to fight for Enosis.11 Makarios was Archbishop and Primate of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church (1950-1977) and first President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1977).. it was not feasible to obtain international support by lobbying the Greek Cypriot cause.. 1976).25.7% of the Greek Cypriot voted in favour of Enosis”. “Die Zypernfrage: Dokumente XXXIII”.10 Secondly even if the Greek Cypriot society had found some support from the mainland Greek public and the mainland Greek politicians. p.4. p.” The speech of the Prime Minister of Greece Sophocles Venizelos on 15 February 1951 14 Until the early 1950’s it was almost impossible for Greece to make an official request from the UN. The Greek Government changed its policy in 1952 and Marshal Papagos was elected.12 He proposed that the only way for the Enosis to succeed was for him to visit Athens regularly to organize mass rallies in support of his and the Greek Cypriot cause. . See Ludwig Discher. See Doros Alastos. On 15 February 1951.5.5.28. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. Cyprus. 11 Ibid.. the Greek Government at that time did not support Enosis.000 years”. Sophocles Venizelos. 10 Oliver P. My Deposition. (Frankfurt: M. p. p.

(London: Robert Hale ltd. 16 Oliver P.16 Greece wanted bilateral negotiations with Britain..7. 18 Ibid. Op. to present the Greek Case”. On 13 August 1953. 1. France and Greece. UK.. (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing. The domestic pressure on the Greek government increased. p. it was evident that Britain was not willing to discuss with Greece the question of Cypriot independence and Enosis with Greece”. . At the same time. The choice of the General Assembly indicated that “it was the best for the existing international institutions. holding the press conferences and asking for international support for Enosis. 1989). p. In mainland Greece pressure was being applied. Grivas and the story of EOKA”. p. Richmond argues that “by 1954. 19 At the same time in Cyprus the EOKA anticolonial movement was initiated by General George Grivas.73. [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters] 15 Nancy Crawshaw. “the Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece”.7..7..26. Cyprus: my deposition”.18 Richmond stated that “the General Assembly then became a primary political instrument in the search for bilateral negotiations with Britain”. “letter of 18 February 1959 to Averoff in: G Clerides. Cit. Both Cypriot pressure groups and opposition parties for Enosis were forcing the government of Marshal Papagos to appeal to the UN.7. The Greeks appealed to the General assembly to terminate the colonial rule and accept self-determination on the island.17 Archbishop Makarios’ Enosis propaganda worked in Greece. This attitude worried Archbishop Makarios who responded by increasing the international pressure. and public exposure. (England: Allen & Unwin. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. he travelled to the US. The Papagos government had no choice left but to bring the Cyprus question to the General Assembly of the UN. 17 Ibid. Greece had used the UN for the first time as a forum but merely to announce that it did not intend to use it as such..67. Makarios sent a memorandum to the UN requesting that the Cyprus problem be registered on its agenda. in terms of its membership. 19 Ibid. p. See General Grivas. p. p. 15 Papagos was newly elected and he did not want to take the Cyprus issue to the UN. 20 Ford Jones W. From October 1952 to March 1953. proceedings. 20 EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston. “1959. p. 1987). 22 Chapter I supported Papagos because he promised to put an end to a period of internal political instability and the Americans advised Greece to adopt a majority electoral system. 1959). Vol.

1997) p. p. The General Assembly considered the Greek application during five sessions. In this time.21 Denktaş was later became the President of the de facto state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community. .10. the EOKA Guerrillas were attacking the British forces on the island. 23 Chapter I was a Greek Cypriot military resistance organization that fought for self-determination and union with Greece in the mid. “Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A briefing”. as a last desperate effort. which was seen by the Turkish community as a compromise. Polyviou. it would revert back to Turkey. According to Dodd. “Cyprus: the Tragedy and the Challenge”. “the British. later renamed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) in which Denktaş was reputedly involved as a founder member”.to late. The plan would provide the co-operation and participation of Turkey and Greece in a joint effort to achieve peace. 22 Clement Dodd. p. Richmond stated that “The Turkish Cypriots formed VOLKAN.4.63. Taksim envisaged a popular Turkish idea that the island should be divided between Greece and Turkey. progress and prosperity of the island. (London: John Swain & Son. The island would have a system of representative 21 Oliver Richmond. See Polyvios G. the General Assembly considered the Greek government’s application for self-determination of the Greek Cypriots.1950s. (England: The Eothen press. From 1954 to 1958. advanced in 1958 the Macmillan Plan. In the late 1950’s the slogan Taksim (partition or double Enosis) was formed by the Turkish Cypriots in response to the formation of EOKA. The Greek Cypriots also continued their propaganda to the rest of the world and the crucial European organisations such as the Council of Europe. a partnership plan that principally provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor. as they had envisaged that should Britain ever leave Cyprus. which could lead to partition”. 1975). Doctor of Philosophy thesis: “Being Mediated Upon: The Cyprus communities and the United Nations 1964-1994”. (England: University of Kent. The Ankara Government and Turkish Cypriots expressed their objections towards the Greek Cypriot campaign for the liberation of Cyprus. 2002). TMT was a Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization against the EOKA and Enosis.22 This plan was similar to a British political offer in late 1940’s.

The British government partnership plan principally provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor. stressed that “the right to self-determination or independence should be given to both Cypriot peoples”. p. “the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question”. 26 Stephen G.S attempted to blunt the impact of the Greek appeals on the UN assembly and this was achieved by (a) the casting of negative votes on the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the agenda of the General Assembly”. Cit. Op. “Riding the Storm: 1956-1959”.. Vol. Xydis stated that “Archbishop Makarios informed Britain that he was ready to accept independence with guarantees for the Turkish Minorities.24 The rejection of the Macmillan Plan caused diplomatic activity to shift to the UN. (The western political quarterly. Therefore. “U. 24 Van Coufoudakis. April 1971).23 The British Government's proposal was refused both by Greece and Makarios. p.28 23 Harold Macmillan. (England: Macmillan. The Greek Government's new policy was based on an interim period of self-government leading to independence under the UN auspices. F. . The British stand had been to stress that the solution they were seeking was one acceptable to the three Governments and to the peoples of Cyprus and to achieve this end they were ready to enter into discussions with all concerned at the appropriate time”. 1967). p.27 He explained that in Cyprus. p.25 Stephen G.115. Sep. Op. “that status not being subject to alteration without UN consent”.294.115. 115. would have reserved powers to ensure that the interests of both communities were protected”. acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments. (Columbus.460. 25 John Reddaway. 1976). Cit.67. No. p. “there were two separate peoples but not a nation and consequently each of them was entitled to equal rights vis-à-vis independence and self-determination”.26 The Turkish Foreign Minister. Xydis. p..29. Zorlu.3.. “1954-1958-Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation”. 27 John Reddaway. 24 Chapter I Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs. 28 Ibid. The international status of the island would remain unchanged for seven years. Macmillan stated that “the governor. Ohio: Ohio State University of Press.

Cit. 29 Oliver P. . 2001). The resolution expressed its confidence that continued efforts would be made by the parties to reach a peaceful. Op. 31 The agreement was to form the basis of the Republic of Cyprus and Zorlu and Averoff came to London more or less to tell Britain how it was to give up its own colony. 30 Clement H. not Cyprus as a base.30 Dodd stated “the Greek-Turkish talks reached fruition in Zurich in the February 1959 in Zurich when bots sides finally reached on the agreement”. 31 See appendix 2 for the treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of alliance. had considered the question of Cyprus. “Strom Clouds over Cyprus”. In due course. both governments and the Cypriot communities became involved. recalling its resolution 1013 (XI)..38. It urged such a conference to be convened and that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN”.11. Dodd. The British had accepted with difficulty that they would have only bases in Cyprus.29 The General Assembly. In 1958. (Huntington: the Eothen Press. p. p. 25 Chapter I “The adopted final draft called for a conference between the three governments directly concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots and considered that the self-government and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the charter of the UN to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots. the foreign minister of Turkey Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and his Greek counterpart Evangelos Averoff agreed to meet to discuss the Cyprus question. Following this resolution Zorlu's personal approach to Averoff suggesting bilateral talks between themselves was accepted by the Greek Government. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. Averoff accepted the request and the discussions went ahead. democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the UN.

11. 26 Chapter I The Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of Guarantee were prepared with the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus divided into 4 different stages (see figure one). .71.Rüstem & Brother. 33 Clement H. (Lefkoşa: K. and education.32 The Republic of Cyprus was the partnership agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the basis of 70 percent to 30 percent. p. A House of Representatives of fifty members. According to Article 78 (2) any law imposing 32 Metin Tamkoç. 32 Figure 1 The basic elements of a constitution for the new Republic of Cyprus had been drawn up by Greece and Turkey in consultation with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. “the Turkish Cypriot State: Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination: figure 4”. p.. Op. also with a seven-to-three ratio. culture. The constitution established a president. Dodd. were to be separately elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. vice president and veto powers in order to protect the identity and the rights of the minority. The General executive authority was vested in a council of ministers with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. In addition to this the separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of religion. 1988). Cit.

This treaty was signed by the new Republic of Cyprus with Britain. Op. defence and internal security and other matters.. Taksim (partition) and Enosis were banned according to new agreement. The Guarantor powers. and support decolonisation. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme Constitutional Court. Britain. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots would surrender from their political movements: Enosis and Taksim. Cit. Greece and Turkey. p. Richmond stated that “however the General Assembly was still divided between those who encouraged a more active role for the UN and those who favoured a neutral stand and no active international mediation”. Cyprus. managed to prevent any UN involvement beyond a vague statement of support for further negotiations. In the early 1960’s the intercommunal troubles resumed. Nicosia (Lefkoşa). private interview.38. the General Secretary of the National Unity Party (UBP). composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. 36 Oliver P. “they agreed if the terms of the treaty were breached. Both sides reluctantly signed the agreements.34 The legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs. 35 Clement Dodd. police the world. 35 The crisis was over only for three years.. Cit.36 The major powers. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. also guaranteed ‘the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution’. Greece and Turkey. to consult each other. Op. Britain and the US.11. p. . 27 Chapter I duties or taxes would require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote. the date of Interview: 8 July 2005. Dodd stated. 34 Dr Tuncer Arifoğlu. Britain requested permanent British military bases on the island. In the late 1950’s the UN’s involvement in the Cyprus question provided a new way for states to settle their differences. On 11 February 1959 the treaty was known as the London and Zurich agreements. whilst recognising that any one of the guarantor states could if necessary to take action ‘with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the treaty”.

88. Markides stated that “the Republic was established to last only three years and it was unsurprising that most attached very little legitimacy to the new Republic of Cyprus and hoped that the island would eventually be able to unite with Greece”. The British considered the UN involvement as unnecessary. that the ‘1960’ accords were forced upon them and they denied the right of the Greek Cypriot majority to rule the island. Britain. p. private interview. Connecticut: Yale University Press. Markides. 1. Only the Greek side wanted the self-determination. Kyriacos C. . 38 Turkish Cypriots accepted the arrangements. not more than eighteen percent of the population. Cit. p. Date of interview: 5 May 2005. They presumed that the UN’s involvement would preclude it from siding with the Greek demands from the International Community.39 Many Greek Cypriots have claimed since 1960. 39 Professor John Groom. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay. Professor of International Relations in University of Kent. 28 Chapter I The part-involvement of the UN in Cyprus at this time was based on the fear of many member states of the escalation of animosities into a full-blown Greco-Turkish war. Archbishop Makarios became the president and Dr. by force of arms if necessary”. There were other factors. “there 37 The London Tripartite Conference in 1955 and Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals of 1956 were part of such strategic manoeuvres. (New Haven.37 The UN involvement was partly effective in the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by internationalising the Cyprus issue. 38 Kyriacos C. “The Rise and the fall of the Cyprus Republic”. Op. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were against the idea of self-determination. Fazil Küçük became the vice president in the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus became an active member of the UN and the British flag came down as Cyprus ended eighty-two years of colonial rule. According to Dodd. Canterbury. Groom argued that “In 1960’s the extremists within both communities were working to try to bring about Enosis and Taksim.. Oliver P. 1960-1963 On August 1960. including Makarios.2.40. a right to claimed on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriots were a ‘minority’.2 The origins of the UN presence in Cyprus. 1977).

Op. p. 29 Chapter I was also some dissatisfaction on the anti-imperialist left in Greek Cypriot politics that Britain should still retain military bases”. As the British force was hampered by Greek Cypriot opposition because of their perception of a link to the colonial period. The thirteen amendments included the constitutional improvements containing the abandonment of the veto power by both the President and the Vice President. Repeated but unsuccessful attempts were made to solve these disputes by the two community leaders. p. initially rejected the amendments. the creation of separate municipalities and the legislative veto system..41 Following threats of an imminent invasion by Turkey the United Kingdom stepped in to secure the observance of a cease-fire between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in the fracas that erupted. . Dodd stated that “while the Greek Cypriots were determined to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriot community to a protected minority. Turkey readied itself for a military intervention.6. Makarios announced the thirteen-point amendments. Turkey. p. by positioning its forces in areas of high tension. Cit.11. Dodd.11. According to the Turkish Cypriot leadership Dr Fazil Küçük the Vice President of Cyprus and Denktaş (Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber) these problems led to a stalemate in communal and state politics. The amendments were consolidated to remove hindrances in order for the functioning of the political system. The UK soon requested the UN take over. a NATO force had been discounted by Makarios on the grounds of Turkey’s significant role in NATO. on 30 November 1963. the Turkish Cypriots sought the physical separation of the two communities”. as a guarantor state.40 The UN became actively involved in Cyprus after the constitutional crisis was sparked by Archbishop Makarios on 21 December 1963. “At the last moment.42 40 Clement H. 41 Ibid.. There was disagreement over certain constitutional feature of the Republic-taxation. the three Guarantor powers agreed to establish a joint peacekeeping force under British leadership”.. In the weeks that followed tensions grew between the two communities. 42 Ibid. Eventually.

New York: OUP. in consultation with the parties and the Guarantor Powers. Turkey was anxious about the status of the Turkish Cypriot community and renewed its threat to intervene. Op. 464.46 43 Van Coufoudakis. p. 1. The force came to Cyprus for three months but because of the conflict in Cyprus. . (e) the force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months. (b) the composition and size of the force to be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus. p. 44 See appendix 4 for The UN Security Council Resolution (186) of March 4th 1964. which provided for: “(a) the creation with the consent of the government of Cyprus of a UN Peacekeeping Force.43 At the same as it established a peacekeeping force. 45 The definitive texts on peacekeeping in Cyprus are Michael Harbottle. designate a mediator to take charge of formal peacemaking efforts. 46 Ibid.45 Jose Rolz-Bennet was the first candidate for the position of Secretary-General’s representative for Cyprus. (d) the force and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. 1968). (g) a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General in agreement with the four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem”. Turkey rejected him due to his lack of knowledge of the island’s affairs. Great Britain.44 The force itself was to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence in fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. 1964-1965 On 4 March 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186.2. (London. (c) the functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Ohio: Ohio State University.11..3 The UN’s mediation. Stegenga. 30 Chapter I The intercommunal strife continued on this issue. 1970) and James A. (Columbus. “The Impartial Soldier”. the Council also recommended that the Secretary-General. Greece and Turkey. the force has been stationed in the island for more than 40 years. (f) the force to be financed by voluntary contributions. “The United Nations force in Cyprus”.. Cit.

After the rejection of the first plan. 2005). a second version of the plan was offered by the US.49 The suggestion was rejected by Makarios. 51 Polyvios G.47. Plaza described the 1960 constitution as a ‘constitutional 47 Oliver P Richmond and James Ker -Lindsay. Op. p. 31 Chapter I The UN Secretary-General U Thant decided to appoint a Finnish diplomat Sakari Tuomioja. Therefore. Op. . following another Turkish threat to invade. This proposed the following condition: Turkey receives a 50-year lease on a base in Cyprus. Cit. Washington launched an independent initiative under Dean Acheson. (b) two Turkish cantonments are established in Cyprus.48 In July 1964. a former Secretary of State”.11. (England: Palgrave-Macmillan.109. 50 James Ker-Lindsay. It was argued that “Dr. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in early June. There was a war between Turkish Cypriots and the Greek commander Grivas. Polyviou. Polyviou stated that “Plaza supported an independent and unitary Cyprus with effective protection of individual and minority rights”. rather than full sovereignty. Grivas wanted to invade the area in order to stop the Turkish Cypriots receiving military help from Turkey. 48 James Ker-Lindsay. p. Plaza’s 66 pages report. The US had a different perspective. subject to the following conditions: (a) Turkey receives the Greek Island of Kastellorizon..11. 50 This offer was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and Turkey. Cit. Op. p. The US tried to do more to convince both sides to find a solution but no agreement was reached to solve problem under the Acheson Plan.. Op. the Acheson plan was presented to unite Cyprus with Greece.. Galo Plaza Lasso was chosen as a mediator by the Secretary-General U Thant. “EU Accession and UN peacemaking in Cyprus”. Polyviou. p. According to Richmond. p. “Tuomioja thought that Turkey would prefer Enosis with concessions and had a little faith in the potential effectiveness of the UN peacemaking mission”. He argued that giving territory to the Turkish army would be a limitation on Enosis. Cit..42.47 The intercommunal violence erupted between the two sides in 1964 resulting in Turkish warplanes bombing the Kokkina-Mansoura area in the Northwestern part of Southern Cyprus. Ambassador Tuomioja then suddenly died on August. Cit.51 The Secretary-General on the 26th of March 1965 accepted Dr. and (c) a military base is ceded to Turkey. 1964. 49 Polyvios G. Turkish fighter jet planes attacked Grivas army.

12. 2004). .42. “Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation”. “In March 1966. 53 Steven E. the journalist/writer of the Volkan newspaper. This interview was translated from Turkish to English. p. January 17. Date of interview 17 July 2005. According to Ker-Lindsay. The Greek Cypriots accepted the Galo Plaza report and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it. the Greek Cypriots were eager for Enosis and the Turkish Cypriots were demanding a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. “the Greek Cypriots also made it clear that if Galo Plaza resigned they would refuse to accept a replacement”. Lobell and Philip Mauceri. which was sought by the Turkish side.1 The intercommunal discussions. However the Turkish Cypriots were frustrated with the UN peacekeeping mission. 32 Chapter I oddity’ and could not help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority. the private interview. p. 54 At the end of 1965 Plaza resigned from his post.53 According to UN officials. Op. Good offices involve little more than informal contacts and suggestions on the part of the Secretary-General with the disputant.3 The UN Peacemaking efforts in Cyprus 1.52 Plaza also stated that “The UN Charter and Principles also recommended that the establishment of a truly independent unitary Cypriot state with majority rule and safeguarded proportional rights for the minority”. 1. Mr Sabahattin İsmail. The chief editor of the Halkın Sesi: [People Voice] newspaper in the North Cyprus. Date of Interview: 15 July 2005. Cyprus. (England: Palgrave-Macmillan. was not a desperate step in the wrong direction”. Cit. 55 The point of view was approved by Mr Akay Cemal and Mr Sabahattin İsmail. Cyprus. 1967-1974 The years between 1967 and 1973 are known as the normalisation period as a result of the number of UN peacekeepers considerably reducing the intercommunal conflicts. Nicosia (Lefkoşa)... 1st edition. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey accused Plaza of exceeding his mandate and called on Plaza to resign. 55 The Turkish Cypriots believed that the UN peacekeeping force sent to the island in 1964 was ineffective and helpless in defending the Turkish Cypriot community against the Greek Cypriots attacks. Nicosia (Lefkoşa).3. Mr Akay Cemal. p.108. The Secretary-General U Thant initiated the function of the good offices for the two sides. 54 James Ker-Lindsay. the private interview. a more modest effort attempt at peacemaking was 52 Ibid.

The crisis eventually got out hand for both the elected government and King Constantine II and ended dramatically in the early hours of April 21 1967. 1986). the UK.. At the same time Greece decided. Polyviou. “the Secretary General. US and Turkey. Op. p. However Greece was enduring a series of turbulent political events that led to severe uncertainty. 33 Chapter I initiated under the auspices of Carlos Bernades. According to Polyvios G. Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş. “From the very beginning it was mutually agreed that the aim of the local talks would be an exploration of various possibilities for the solution of 56 James Ker-Lindsay. Makarios rejected the declaration and labelled it illegal. Cit. Cit. The result of the meetings was unsatisfactory. Polyviou. 2nd edition.57 On 9-10 September 1967. They were held between the presidents of the communal chambers.59 The Secretary-General’s initiation of talks was supported by Greece. 59 Polyvios G. The Turkish Government responded with the declaration of rejection. after the Turkish bombing. December 11.56 Bernades aimed to encourage the two sides to agree to a settlement through direct dialogue.12. p. 57 Richard Clogg. “A Short History of Modern Greece”. the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers attended two meetings in Thrace.43. The Greek Junta declared Enosis as a solution to Cyprus problem. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 58 Ibid.. Op. Turkey bombed the Greek Cypriot force in response to major attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages in the south of the island. The Turkish Cypriots declared their own provisional administration. having heard various consultations suggested at the beginning of 1968 the commencement of local talks in Cyprus under the aegis of his Special Representatives in Cyprus”. to recall General Grivas and reduce its forces in the island.154. . p. the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Cyprus”. Greece was now forced to abandon the idea of union for the foreseeable future.12.58 In November 1967 the intercommunal violence resumed. p..

. From 1971 to 1974. p.60 The four rounds of intercommunal talks occurred between 1967 and 1974.3. the 1974 events in Cyprus In September 1971 EOKA-B was formed by Grivas. planning to overthrow Makarios and achieve Enosis through violent means. He was angered by Makarios rejection of Enosis in 1959.13.44. Op.61 The second round talks were focused on local government issues and were unsuccessful. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in the first round talks the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several concessions regarding constitutional matters. such as the veto right and the 70:30 ratio. Grivas then took the reins of EOKA-B.62 However they aimed to create a state within a state and the setting up of two completely separate regional administrations.. The Greek Cypriots refused the suggestion of the Turkish Cypriots getting a completely separate regional administration.44. Grivas returned to the island without the knowledge of the Junta in Greece. p. he created EOKA-B in response to President Makarios's apparent failure to deliver on the policy of Enosis. p. The deterioration prompted Clerides to appeal to the US ambassador to Cyprus to persuade the 60 Ibid. 62 Polyvios G. Polyviou. and was further upset when the President reaffirmed this position on his re-election in 1968. unitary and sovereign state”. but Makarios refused to grant them greater autonomy”. The fourth round attempted to find a solution on constitutional issues. When George Grivas returned to Cyprus in 1971. 1.. The final intercommunal talks collapsed due to the events of 1974 in Cyprus. The result of the talks was again failure.1 The division of the island. Op. Cit. Cit. 34 Chapter I the constitutional problem on the basis of an independent. Grivas repeatedly tried to remove Makarios from power. It was supported by the ruling Greek junta which came to power in 1967 having overthrown the legitimate Greek government of George Papandreou. In third round from 1970 to 1971 the Turkish Cypriots agreed to relinquish many of the special rights obtained under the Zurich settlement.. 61 James Ker-Lindsay. EOKA-B was the Greek Cypriot fascist pro-Enosis paramilitary organization formed in 1971.

68 Zaim M. not without some truth. 65 Ibid. Turkey gave five days to achieve a settlement between the two sides.17.82. . 1989). 67 See appendix 7 for the Geneva Declaration (30 July 1974). after fierce fighting. p.66 On 30 July 1974 after five days of negotiations between the guarantor powers the declaration was signed by three ministers of the guarantors’ states. that Kissinger made little attempt to stop the Turkish action.. Cit. The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan refused to join Turkey in attempts to restore the situation to that of 1960.17. including Kyrenia”. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cit. The Prime Minister of Turkey Mr Bülent Ecevit flew to London to try to persuade the British Government to intervene on the island. In July 1974 he was replaced by the ultra Greek nationalist Nicos Sampson. 64 Ibid. unlike President Johnson in 1964”... In July 1974 Makarios tried to persuade the military dictatorship in Greece to leave the island. At the same time the Junta regime in Greece collapsed. p. in the capture of small section of the north of the island. 35 Chapter I Greek government not to try to overthrow Makarios. 66 Zaim M. According to Dodd “some Greek and Turkish Cypriots believe that Kissinger engineered the coup that overthrew Makarios in order to bring about the Turkish intervention and division of the island between two reliable Cold War allies. p.64 On 20 July 1974 Turkey launched the military invasion of the island.17. Yet Ioannidis was determined to remove Makarios from power.. Necatigil.65As a result of the first intervention the three guarantor powers decided to meet in Geneva. “The first phase of action resulted. Op. Necatigil stated that “the Geneva conference ran into difficulties on the second day owing to the conflicting interpretations of the UN”.83. Op. p. In early 1974 Grivas was dead and Brigadier Dimitros Ioannidis took the control of the junta. p. “The Cyprus question and the Turkish position in International Law”.67 According to the agreement the areas controlled by the opposing armed force should not be extended and a security zone should be set up. as allowed under the Treaty of Guarantee. Necatigil.63 Dodd states that “it is asserted.68 63 Clement Dodd.

The foreign ministers also agreed that the negotiations should continue to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of the constitutional government in Cyprus. 2002). (London: I.Cypriots fleeing south from the advancing Turkish army and Turkish-Cypriots gathering in the north”. Vol. 1999). p.71 Today over thirty five thousand Turkish troops are located in North Cyprus. 72 John Reddaway.2 The Vienna talks and high-level agreements. According to Reddaway “history has bequeathed to Cyprus a legacy of strife.72 1. sent a secret letter to the UN. UK. “The Cyprus Conspiracy”. Tauris. It has aptly been observed that the Turkish Cypriots cannot forget those years and that the Greek Cypriots cannot remember them”. See appendix 7 the UN general Assembly Resolution 3212 (1 November 1974). 1975-1982 69 See the appendix 4 UN Security Council Resolution 357 (1974). “Following a Turkish military invasion in 1974 there ensued an internal movement of populations with Greek. 71 George Yiangou. found this request unacceptable. “The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order”. 36 Chapter I Additionally the Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately withdrawn from the occupied Turkish Cypriot enclaves. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.2. 70 O'Malley. According to O’Malley. mainly Makarios.70 The consequence of the division was a disaster. the Secretary-General of the NATO. Joseph Luus. On 8 August 1974. in which the years from 1960 to 1974 have special place. p. Turkey invaded and occupies 36 per cent of the northern part of Cyprus.48. in Switzerland another round of discussions was initiated by the Greek and Turkish representatives. 1987). “Odi et Amo: Vignettes of an Affair with Cyprus”. Brendan and Ian Craig. The Turkish Cypriots persisted on the geographical division of both communities in the island. The Greek Cypriots. the talks ended in frustration. “the letter indicated that America was directly responsible for the coup by EOKA B and for allowing the Turkish invasion take place”. . p. On 14 August 1974.3.83.2.B. (European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) University of Cambridge.69 Within the hours Turkey continued its second military operation in the island.

37 Chapter I On the Turkish Cypriot side.4 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted yes to the constitution. p. . July 1981). 74 The 99. approved by a referendum held on 8 June 1975 and published in the Official Gazette on 17 June 1975”. Necatigil stated that “this was the interim constitution which left the door open for the creation of a federal Republic of Cyprus of which the Turkish Federated State would be one of the components”. the Turkish and Greek Cypriots had a number of meetings in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative at that time. p. the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim initiated a new mission of Good Offices.89. 75 Ibid. the Turkish Cypriot representative stressed that separation of the two communities came about as a result of acts of the Greek Cypriots and that there could be no return to the 1960 constitution. Cit.90. (Cyprus: Public Information Office Nicosia. 77 PIO. p. Necatigil.77 Both sides agreed to talk on humanitarian issues and the powers and function of the federal state. Physical separation was vital to the safety of Turkish Cypriots. 73 Zaim M.73 “A democratic constitution was drawn up by the assembly. Op. the Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration was succeeded by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC). In early 1975. On 28 April 1975. 74 Ibid. noted by the resolution that the proclamation was not intended to prejudge a final settlement. “Cyprus Intercommunal talks: Following the Turkish Invasion of July-August 1974”.89. in fact.. Mr Weckmann-Munoz and exchanged views concerning the basis for the start of talks on the substance of the Cyprus problem. According to Necatigil.89. p. “The Security Council adopted resolution no 376 of 12 March 1975 without vote regretting the decision to declare the part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a ‘Federated Turkish State’ ”..7..76 It was. 76 Ibid.75 In Security Council debates which followed the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot federated State of Cyprus.. which was proclaimed on 13 February 1975. p.

The territorial nature of the government issues was also discussed in the Vienna meetings. The most significant step towards solid progress was the agreement worked out between Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios. p. p. productivity and land ownership”. settlement. “Principles such as freedom of movement. 81 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977. Op.81 An 78 Ibid. . rights of property. Cit. territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Cyprus Republic. During 1976 the negotiations were constantly undermined by the issues of recognition for the Turkish Cypriots while for the Greek Cypriots allegations of the forcible expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the Turkish controlled area of the island were the dominant issues. the Secretary-General was unable to bring the Turkish Cypriots to make concrete written proposals. In 1976. The resolution. Ker- Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 12 February.. inter alia.15. were open to discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties”. Denktaş and Makarios met in Nicosia. called on all states to respect the sovereignty. The two leaders signed a four point agreement confirming that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation made up of two states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal)”. The main obstacle preventing the negotiations from restarting remained the unwillingness of the Turkish Cypriots to present proposals and the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriots to negotiate without having some idea of what the Turkish Cypriot position was.78 At these meetings both sides declared many proposals to the UN.80 The Central government would be given powers to ensure the unity of the state.79 According to High-Level agreement “the territory under each side’s administration would be discussed in the light of economic viability..12. This meeting was organised by the UN Secretary-General Dr. independence. On 12 February 1977. 38 Chapter I Clerides and Denktaş decided to negotiate the humanitarian issues relating to the events of 1974 in Vienna. 80 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977. At the beginning of the Vienna meetings the UN Security Council adopted on the 12 March 1975 resolution 367. Waldheim. 79 James Ker-Lindsay.

92.15.83 The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Greek Cypriot’s plan ignored the essentials of the bizonality and economic viability.93. Op. The Greek Cypriots claimed that the role and the function of the central government would lead to confederation rather than federation and would further separate the two communities. According to Ker-Lindsay “the following November a new twelve-point proposal was drafted by the US. “during the second series of the Vienna talks. According to Farid Mirbagheri. On 31 March and 7 April 1977 the second series of Vienna Talks occurred. external defence.. p. 86 Farid Mirbagheri..84 The plan known as the American-British-Canadian initiative was aimed to establish a federation of the two states. p.. the upper chamber composed of equal numbers of representatives.92. p. 1998). The Turkish Cypriots wanted an effectively autonomous state under a loose federal structure.. On May 1977 Archbishop Makarios died and was replaced by the Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou. and lower chamber proportional to the size of the two populations would be created”. 85 Ibid. the Greek Cypriots submitted proposals on the territorial aspect of the problem and the Turkish Cypriots on the constitutional aspect”. Mirbagheri stated that “a bicameral parliament. p.82 The Turkish Cypriots offered the proposal of federation by evolution. The Cyprus would be reunited as a federation and that both sides would have their own zone of control. According to Plan “the central government would deal with foreign affairs. The Plan had similarities with the Macmillan plan.Hust & Co. “Cyprus and International Peacemaking”. Britain and Canada and presented to the two sides by the Secretary General”.86 The army size 82 Farid Mirbagheri. 39 Chapter I agreement was signed that Enosis and Taksim were officially ended. . (London: C.85 The states would take the responsibility for the issues which was not covered by the central government. currency and central banking interregional and foreign trade”. The second round of these discussions ended with very little progress. 83 Ibid. Op. Cit.15. 84 James Ker-Lindsay. Cit. The plan would allow the Greek and Turkish Cypriot states to join under the weak federation. p.

was deserted. . The Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs.87 The Greek Cypriots rejected the idea. the auspices of the UN Secretary-General is special representative Hugo Gobi monitored the new negotiations. Four topics were discussed in the negotiations: the improvement of the level of goodwill between the two sides. “Most of the modern part of the city. They claimed that the freedom of movement. Secretary-General Waldheim wanted to reinitiate the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by putting forward a proposal for an ‘Interim Agreement’. defence and internal security and other matters. 88 See Republic of Cyprus government web page: www. The agreement was the result of two days of intense negotiations chaired by the UN Secretary- General. This was similar to the 1960 agreements. The aim of the proposal was the reopening of the international airport to civilian traffic. 40 Chapter I of Greece and Turkey on the island would be reduced to 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops. p. Famagusta is a city on the east coast of Cyprus. On 19 May 1979 the ten point agreements was reached between President Kyprianou and Denktaş. Then the new round of discussions initiated in Nicosia failed for two reasons. On 9 August 1980. settlement and the right to own property were not protected on the basis of the plan.cyprus. known as Varosha (in Turkish: Maraş). The UN continued as a broker to find a solution to Cyprus problem.88 The Varosha problem would be solved under the territorial and constitutional aspects.gov. becoming a closed-off military zone. the placing of Varosha under UN administration and the removing the economic embargo imposed by the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots did not want to discuss the Varosha and the concept of bicommunality also was not agreed by the two sides.93. The city was occupied by the Turkish military during the invasion of the island by Turkey in 1974. such as demilitarization and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions. The proposal initiated a series of intercommunal talks.cy (accessed 26 December 2005). the return and resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in Varosha.. something which persists to this day”. constitutional 87 Ibid. The 10-point agreements included a number of new provisions. In summer 1980.

Op. Thus on May 1983 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus..17..89 1.92 The amount of territory to be given back by the Turks would be 8-13 percent. In April 1982 in Geneva he met with both Kyprianou and Denktaş. . August 1983. “however despite positive development hopes 89 James Ker-Lindsay. Op.. 41 Chapter I matters and territorial issues. Perez de Cuellar found it useful to have frequent. this was nowhere near enough of a compromise by the other side. Unlike in the 1960 constitution the legislature was to be bicameral rather than unicameral and each community would vote for its own parliament.93. August 1983. Op. They threatened to proclaim their independence. p.Kyprianou and Denktaş. 90 Farid Mirbagheri. top level meetings with the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. p. According to Secretary-General. Cit. 93 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’. 94 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’. p. 92 James Ker-Lindsay. 13 May 1983. Cit. Cyprus Mail.91 The Turkish Cypriots were angered at the resolution.90 He believed that the intercommunal negotiations were the best available method of continuing the negotiating process. Ker-Lindsay stated that “the Greek Cypriots insisted sovereignty must rest with the central state according to the standard model of federation”. the establishment of a bicameral assembly along the same lines as previously suggested and 60:40 representations in the central executive”.4 The declaration of the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement. reducing the existing 37 percent to either 29 or 24 percent. 1982-1986 Javier Perez de Cuellar became the new Secretary-General in January 1982. 91 The UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253.17. Mirbagheri stated that “in August de Cuellar gave the two sides a set of proposals for consideration that called for a rotating presidency. 93 In the eyes of most Greek Cypriot politicians. Cit. The talks between the two sides failed due to a disagreement on the term bi-zonality.94 The Principles of the proposal were accepted by both community leaders.3. Cyprus Mail.

. In January 1985. The Proximity talks offered similar plans to those of the UN: the Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 percent of their federal state and all foreign troops would leave the island.. and that he could not afford to let the troops leave as a similar situation could arise again. p. Three suggestions were offered by the Secretary-General. Op. the proximity talks began in New York. Denktaş’s view was that Turkey should have intervened earlier than it did. Mirbagheri stated that “Kyprianou insisted that the package was incomplete and vague about important issues such as the time frame for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. 42 Chapter I for settlement was damaged in a few months later”.17.97 He claimed that any future settlement would be truly federal in nature. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General informing him of the decision. These were confidence building measures. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on UDI (Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence). Op. However the draft agreement was rejected by both sides.96 According to the UN the UDI decision upset the possibility of reaching a settlement.17. so he could not agree until these points had been clarified”. Cit. On 10 September 1984. bi-communal and non-aligned federation. p. The new state would be established as a bi-zonal. 96 See appendix 12 for the UN resolution 541 (1983) adopted by the Security Council on 18 November 1983. The Turkish Cypriots took advantage of the post-election political instability in Turkey.98 The Turkish Cypriots appeared to be against an immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops while the Turkish side began to modernise its equipment. p. Denktaş rejected resolution 541. the structure of the federal government and territorial adjustment. On January 95 James Ker-Lindsay. 97 James Ker-Lindsay. Op.. 98 Farid Mirbagheri. the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).95 On 15 November 1983. the two leaders met for their first face to face talks since the 1979 agreements. Cit. The TFSC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus) was changed to the TRNC.96. he insisted that the wore was not intended to kill the settlement hopes”. which was just returning to civilian rule after a military coup in 1980. . Cit.

.Cyprus mail. p. Cit. For example the issue of security and defence were left for later negotiations of new defence treaties. p. 17 April 1986. 102 Farid Mirbagheri. residency.101 The 1986 Draft Framework agreement in many ways was parallel to the failed January 1985 summit proposals. Cit. independent.99 Therefore this time the Turkish Cypriots rejected the agreement. “On the basis of the draft agreement of March 1986 Kyprianou accused the Secretary- General of being influenced by the US favourable position towards Turkey”. but important matters would require separate majorities for each community represented in the parliament”.103 There was also controversy between the Cypriot Government and the UN Secretariat over the Secretary-General’s proposals on the withdrawal of Turkish troops. 101 See appendix 13 for the United Nations resolution the Draft Framework Agreement.1. the three freedoms (movement. Cit. The Greek Cypriots argued that the Draft Framework Agreement on the removal of the Turkish troops. the Greek Cypriots rejected the draft. In August 1985 “Denktaş agreed to discuss the new version of the draft agreement with the Secretary-General revised with the aid of Kyprianou but argued that it contained more negative aspects for the Turkish Cypriots compared with the previous version”.. Therefore.10.17.102 The withdrawal of the foreign troops. Op. According to Mirbagheri.136.17. 29 percent of the amount of territory given the Turkish Cypriots.20.. 43 Chapter I 1985. On 29 March1986 de Cuellar offered a new Draft Framework Agreement. 15 December 1985. The Proximity talks had collapsed. . p. 100 Ibid. non-aligned. New York Times. Op.17.. p. bi-communal. the summit was concluded with no progress achieved. (29 March 1986). 29 August 1985. p. New York Times. Op. p. p. The Secretary-General was enthusiastic to continue his peacemaking mission. 103 James Ker-Lindsay. bi-zonal state in Cyprus was also presented in the Draft Framework agreement. 99 James Ker-Lindsay. “the legislature was the same as that proposed in January 1985. although the leaders of both sides were less optimistic”. 100 This was to be expected since there was already a deep history of disappointment despite some attempts at innovation by both sides. By November the Secretary-General was able to report that “he believed that the two sides were within reach of an agreement.

Further attempts to establish a solution to the problem failed. Cyprus formally applied for full membership to the European Community. the UN offered a new document to the two communities named as the set of ideas. Also the Greek Cypriots believed that the proposed structure of the state was of a confederal nature. Turkey..3. He decided to use a new approach in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.5 The Set of ideas and Confidence Building Measures. in February 1990 the two sides met again in New York. .104 In August 1988. p. in September 1990 the EU Commission accepted the Cypriot application. Denktaş objected strongly pointing out that the so-called Republic of Cyprus had no legal grounds to claim sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots. However. the Secretary- 104 Ibid. bring about union with Greece (Enosis) which the 1960 treaties forbade. which had applied for EC membership in 1987. He disliked the idea of presenting the formal plans to both sides. Denktaş was against the Greek Cypriot application. The Turkish Cypriots had questioned the UN authorities and therefore its legitimacy and consequently Perez de Cuellar decided to end the talks. the Greek Cypriots decided to apply for membership in the EU. The following year Greek- Turkish hostility in the Aegean Sea was tremendously increased which delayed the peacemaking mission of the UN. In response to the EU Commission. 1988-1994 In January 1988. On 4 July 1990. A similar response came from the Turkish Cypriots. George Vassiliou was elected as the new president of Cyprus.18. The set of ideas were rejected by Denktaş who disagreed with the substance of the proposal. However. In June 1989. Denktaş also pointed out that EC membership would. in effect. 44 Chapter I and treaty of establishment) and the question of the Turkish settlers was not clear. Turkey and the TRNC announced a declaration to introduce a customs union and the removal of passport controls. For example according Ker-Lindsay. In 1991. Denktaş wanted the word ‘communities’ to be used in a way that implied a right of self-determination. There were also certain improvements in the relations between Turkey and Greece. was strongly opposed to the application. 1. Switzerland”. “there was the ground breaking meeting between Prime Ministers Turgut Özal and George Papandreou in Davos.

45 Chapter I General reported that “he was focusing on a new constitutional arrangement to regulate the relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a federal.30. He offered Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for the development of goodwill. (b) transferring Varosha to direct UN control. 5 August 1991. bi-zonal and bi- communal basis”. . 25 November 1992.. They argued that the UN was exceeding its authority. In January 1992 Boutros Boutros Ghali was elected as the new Secretary-General of the UN. These were (a) reducing the military forces in the island. However the Greek Cypriots accepted the set of ideas as the basis of the negotiations without any preconditions. Op. secession or union with another state”. p.107 Ghali understood that too many conditions were being demanded from the Turkish side. The offer was rejected by the UN. (c) reducing the restriction on contacts between the two sides.19. Cit.. he presented the Security Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal. 107 Clement Dodd. According to Ker-Lindsay. 108 See appendix 14-15 for the UN Security Council Resolution 789.4. bi- communal federation that would prohibit any form of partition. New York Times. equality in the council of ministers. Glafkos Clerides was elected as the new president of Cyprus. de Cuellar ended his efforts. p. Ghali decided to approach the problem in a different way.105 However the Secretary-General’s arrangements were rejected by both sides.. Eventually the Turkish Cypriots returned to the negotiations on the set of ideas.108 In February 1993. the Turkish Cypriots rejected negotiation on the set of ideas. Five points were offered. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriots demanded direct talks with the Greek Cypriots without UN involvement. p. “Preelection hopes existed that the long standing relationship between 105 Ibid. “the Turkish Cypriots accepted 91 of the 100 UN proposals but they wanted a rotating presidency. the removal of disparities between two states and the retention of 29% plus of the territory”. According to Dodd. In October 1991. (d) undertaking an island- wide census and (e) conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution. 106 Ibid. Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 3 April 1992. He continued to work on the set of ideas. the rotation of ministers. p.19.106 Again.

Op. the UN envoy. “the main idea was for the area of Varosha on the east coast to be ceded to the Greek Cypriots in return for the reopening of Nicosia International Airport”.109 On 24 May 1993 the CBMs were presented to both sides. p. after noting that a settlement would further reinforce its European vocation. According to Dodd. In January 1994 Clerides informed Joe Clark.20. shortly after the election. p.20. 112 Ibid.111 At the end of the CBMs Ghali blamed the Turkish Cypriots for the collapse of talks.. At the same time the Republic of Cyprus took a step towards joining the European Union (EU).113 1. that “discussions could not be resumed on the CBMs as Denktaş refused to move from the position that he had adopted the previous June in New York”. 110 Clement Dodd. Cit. p.4.110 The Turkish Cypriots feared losing its best bargaining counters.4 The New Actors and the UN’s evolution in the Cyprus Problem 1. The Turkish Cypriots rejected the CBMs.. the commission concluded that as soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer it would be ready to start the accession process”. “Instead. 1994-1997 109 James Ker-Lindsay.20. Op. Cit. Clerides then stated that “he could not continue to negotiate on the CBMs as Denktaş still did not accept them”. 113 Ibid..32. Op. 46 Chapter I Clerides and Denktaş might enable the two sides to reach an agreement more easily were seemingly confirmed when.. the two men met for dinner under UN auspices”.1 The New Actors: The European Union dimension. 111 James Ker-Lindsay.112 A few days later Denktaş accused the UN officials particularly the Special representative of trying to force him to accept the CBMs. p. Cit. The European Commission (EC) agrees to start the negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. p. Greek Cypriots thought the CBMs would give some sort of recognition to North Cyprus.20. ..

p. According to Ker-Lindsay.” 117 The Greek Cypriots claimed 114 Stefan Talmon.21. The fighting happened when a number of Greek Cypriot broke through UN barriers and entered the buffer zone near the eastern town of Deryneia. Soon afterwards.21 . This led to the death of a Greek Cypriot. the most serious intercommunal clashes took places in Cyprus.114 The economic activities were restricted to North Cyprus..1.59. p. Op. (Turkish Studies. The EU and Turkish relations were also damaged when Greece blocked the final implementation of a custom union. p. Volume 12. 117 Ibid. held on 24-25 June 1994. the EU officially confirmed that Cyprus and Malta would be included in the next wave of enlargement. (European Journal of law.. Cit. “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union”. Vol. 115 Semin Suvarierol. a paramilitary organisation. Turkey reacted to the situation with rejection. There they clashed with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot youths from the Grey wolves. The Turkish Foreign Minister.115 In July 1996 the EU decided to open full membership talks with Cyprus six months after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). 2003). No. At the Corfu European Council. 2001). warned that the decision could lead to the permanent division of the island and that any integration of the EU and the Greek Cypriots would be matched by Turkey and the TRNC”.4.116 In August 1996. “An anti occupation motorcycle rally erupted into violence and eventually led to the death of two Greek Cypriots. “The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice”. 116 James Ker-Lindsay. 1995. 47 Chapter I Henceforth Clerides concentrated on the issue of EU accession. the procurement of arms and defence with Greece. According to Semin Suvarierol “Therefore Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration on December 28. “Mr Murat Karayalçın. which asserted that they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the EU within the framework of a definite solution of the Cyprus problem”. Shortly after the Corfu meeting the European Court of Justice forced limitations on the export of goods from Northern Cyprus into the EU. Number 4. another Cypriot was shot dead as he attempted to climb a Turkish flag pole.376. p.

” Mediterranean Politics. 122 Semin Suvarierol.3. No. Institutt for fredsforskning (International Peace Research Institute). “The Politics of Property in Cyprus Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities”.. the Greek Cypriots had agreed on a contract with Russia to buy S300 surface to air missiles. 119 ‘World: Europe Turkey declines to pay damages to Greek Cypriot woman’.122 The International community observed the situation as presenting a 118 The Cyprus New Agency. “On the Long Road to Europe and the Short Path to War: Issue-Linkage Politics and the Arms Build-up on Cyprus. pp. p. “Titina Loizidou was awarded around $825.119 For many years.hr-action. It was a legal case regarding the rights of refugees wishing to return to their former homes and properties in Kyrenia. p. 1998. Cit.stm (accessed 5 May 2007). Oslo (PRIO). According to the ECHR decision. Op. The administration claimed that the S300 anti-aircraft missile system was bought for the defence of southern Cyprus. Akin denied the claims: Aktuel. 120 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Özersay. PRIO Report 3.uk/1/hi/world/europe/203362. Cit. available at http://news. The stunning victory by Titina Loizidou against Turkey is likely to impact […] on the UN brokered talks aimed at reuniting Cyprus […] No refugee and/or land owner will surrender their land to facilitate a bizonal bicommunal settlement which will lead to the permanent division of Cyprus”. See Eleni Apeyitou. 24 September 1998. the Clerides administration denied the Turkish complaint.38–51.121 On the other hand. BBC. available at http://www.org/action/ (accessed 5 May 2007). 48 Chapter I to have identified the killer as being Kenan Akın.118 In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded the Titina Loizidou case.59. 121 David Hannay. the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the TRNC. Ankara refused to pay the compensation. Human Rights Action. Vol. For further information on this and the crisis over the S-300 missiles".000 dollars after ruling that Turkey had violated her human rights by denying her access to her property in the Turkish-controlled north of Cyprus”. 28 October. 10 September 1996. p.. see Madeleine Demetriou. 2006. .co. According to commentators “the significance of this case is not so much in its financial impact but in the political repercussions. (Winter 1998). Turkey’.120 In 1997. “The Turkish government protested vigorously when the Republic of Cyprus announced its decision to purchase Russian S-300 missiles with a range of 150km in January 1997”. According to David Hannay. (31 October 1996). Op. The court declared that Turkey was an occupying force in Cyprus. ‘The Case of Loizidou vs.bbc. “It is worth noting that Cyprus is the most militarized island in the world.26.70.3. emphasis added. “the missiles in question had a sufficient range to shoot down Turkish aircraft taking off from their bases in southern Turkey”.

2 The Revival of Peace Efforts. The UN Secretary-General adopted different tactics from those used in 1984-1986 and in 1992. Turkey and TRNC announced that the two states 123 David Hannay. Cit. 124 The Turkish Cypriots decided to leave the meeting when the EU. He decided to soften relations between the two sides and reactivated the peace process mission. that force might be used to prevent the delivery of the missiles from Russia or against them once deployed”.70. towards the end of the Troutbeck meeting. Op..31. According to Dodd.. Dodd stated that “after the Glion talks. Op. . 125 Ibid. decided to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. The UN Secretary-General did not propose a constitution this time. 124 Clement Dodd.4. This also encouraged Denktaş to say “he was only going to Glion to make the point that he could not participate in any meaningful way if the TRNC was not recognized as equal”. Cit.123 1..31. This was a courageous attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. p. although they did not state in terms. Meetings were held in Troutbeck (New York) in July and in Glion (Switzerland) in August. There were difficulties from the outset especially over where sovereignty would be located The Greek Cypriots disagreed with the UN suggestion that sovereignty emanates equally from the Greek and Turkish communities. The TRNC is a de facto state which is only supported by Turkey. Hannay stated that “the reaction in the North of the island and in Ankara was strong and the Turkish foreign minister in particular made some extremely bellicose statements which implied. p. 49 Chapter I dangerous shift in the military balance of Cyprus. “in Glion the UN changed its second draft Declaration mainly in favour of the Greek Cypriot side dropping the shared sovereignty”. He tried to get both sides to agree on principles that would provide the basis for a constitution. p. 1997-2001 In Early 1997 Mr Kofi Annan became the Secretary-General of the UN. Kofi Annan wrote a letter to Clerides and Denktaş to invite them for face to face talks.125 The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey forgot that the UN only recognized the legitimate state of the Republic of Cyprus.

by the fifth round. First Greece sent rescue teams of doctors and nurses to Turkey. The International Community and the UN rejected the proposal.. It was the year that Turkey broke the ice with Greece after years of hostility which had often threatened to assume a military form. p. Greece lifted its veto against Turkey.127 On January 2001 Denktaş declared that he would not attend the sixth round of negotiations.126 On 31 August 1998 Denktaş declared the confederal model as a solution to the Cyprus problem. Then the Foreign Minster George Papandreou and Ismail Cem agreed on a process of rapprochement. 50 Chapter I would pursue a policy of integration in the spheres of economy. The EU decided to conclude the entry negotiations with Cyprus and gave a 1 May 2004 membership deadline for the Republic of Cyprus. In December the Clerides administration declared that the S300 missiles would be installed on Crete. p.128 This was the first time in history that the Turkish Prime Minister used the term annexation in a direct manner. Turkey obtained its candidate status from the EU.. defence and foreign affairs with a joint council to implement an agreement”. . p. Ker- Ker-Lindsay stated that “even though the discussions continued through more rounds held in Geneva and New York. 128 Ibid. 126 Ibid.22. rather than Cyprus. finance. held in Geneva in November 2000. tensions were softened. Cit. Op. 127 James Ker-Lindsay. Prime Minister Ecevit announced that Turkey would not cave in to pressure from the EU to reach settlement on the island. After the huge 1999 earthquake in the south of Turkey Greco-Turkish. Denktaş was increasingly critical of the role of the EU in the process”. On 4 November. In December 1999 in Helsinki. According to Ker-Lindsay.. “If the EU confirmed that Cyprus would join the EU Turkey would even consider annexing Northern Cyprus”. In September 2001. He again requested direct talks with the Greek Cypriots. Annan hoped that the process of negotiations would start again but Denktaş rejected the request.23.31. The UN noted the positive movements between Greece and Turkey and on 3 December UN decided to initiate the proximity talks in New York.

US policy on Cyprus usually supported a prevention of the escalation of the conflict in shape of a Greco- Turkish war. 37. the property issues and the Turkish settlers. Russia throughout the period under review tried to exploit the Cyprus problem for the furtherance of two main objectives: to weaken the southern-eastern flank of NATO and maintain the independence and non-alignment of Cyprus. . and this suited the parties. The process was informal and flexible. The Turkish Cypriots always feared the issues of the removal of the Turkish troops and the function of the new state.60-89. On the other hand. Another factor is that of the time factor.129 129 See Robert Cutler. “M. pp. Vol. The Turkish Cypriot leadership managed to establish their state free from the Greek Cypriot domination. The outside influence on the Cyprus situation was also another major problem for the UN peacemaking agenda. It is possible to observe that since the mid-1980’s finding a solution to the Cyprus problem became more difficult with the 1990’s considered a time of deadlock between the two sides. No.5 Conclusion This chapter demonstrated the important historical events in Cyprus. Domestic and foreign influences on the Policy Making: the Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus conflict”. Throughout the twenty-five years under review the peacemaking efforts of the International Community centred mainly on the UN. 51 Chapter I 1.1. The crucial area of dispute on the Cyprus problem is clearly that of creating a political system that satisfies both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The reader can also see that the UN could not create an objective plan for both sides. The British tried to secure their sovereignty bases. Since 1963. Soviet Studies. There are many phases where the UN tried to break the Gordian knot between the two sides. all the efforts of the UN have ended in frustration. The UN was far more effective in its peacekeeping function rather than its peacemaking mission. January 1985. The US and its allies were very influential on both parties in the last 45 years. The main objection for the Greek Cypriot leadership was the constant presence of the Turkish army. The Greek Cypriots were aware that in fact the new Cyprus would not look like the 1960 agreement. However some of the factors necessary for a successful mediation were present in the peacemaking effort in Cyprus between 1964 and 2001.

After the 1990’s the EU factor also became an important catalyst for both communities. The 1974 Military invasion of Turkey of the island changed Greek policy on Cyprus. This was because of Denktaş’s rejectionist politics on the UN peacemaking agenda and the confederal idea of a solution to the Cyprus problem. However. . the EU changed its policy in the 1990’s deciding to cooperate with the UN. Russia was not directly involved in the problem. The Greece and the Greek Cypriots tried to achieve Enosis but there were many interruptions to their agenda. 52 Chapter I Nevertheless. In this chapter it is possible to observe that the mainland countries had a great influence over both communities and this disturbed the UN. Turkey enjoyed a more direct and uninterrupted cultural and political influence on the Turkish Cypriot community. In the early 1990’s the EU supported the Greek Cypriots. It is also possible to observe that Makarios’ thoughts on the concept of enosis fluctuated.