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Purposes and Limits of Family Law
Pg. 17: Are the Tinkers married? They are acting like married people, but they don¶t have the legal
certification of being married.
How important is this«
ACCORDING TO THE STATE? In the eyes of the state, the Tinkers are not married because
they do not have the legal certification of being married. The State does not care about the Tinkers
because they are part of one of the neglected classes.
ACCORDING TO THE CHURCH? The priest would¶nt marry them because he wanted to get
paid and the Tinkers didn¶t have the money to pay him.
ACCORDING TO THE WIFE? She thinks society will look badly upon her for not being
married: ³People all over the world were beginning to equate legitimacy with legality´

D



 


 
[

 A zoning ordinance had a narrow definition of family, which prevented
unrelated college students from living together.

  
 A zoning ordinance, which excludes more than two unrelated people from
living together does not violate the United States Constitution.


 The village of Belle Terre (Plaintiff) restricts land use to single family dwellings, excluding
lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple dwelling houses. µFamily¶ in the
ordinance means those related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
unit. Two people living together but not related by blood, adoption or marriage will constitute a family.
Six college students leased a house, and were not a family under the ordinance. They seek to declare
the ordinance unconstitutional.

 Is an ordinance which limits the number of unmarried people who can live together
unconstitutional?

!  No. The ordinance involves no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Instead, it
deals with economic and social legislation, and will not violate equal protection if the law is reasonable
and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. It is permissible for the legislature to
draw lines, which limit the number of unmarried people who can constitute a family. The ordinance
does not ban association because a family within its guidelines may entertain whomever it likes. A
quiet neighborhood is a permissible goal of a legislature. The police power includes zoning an area to
promote family values, youth values, and quiet seclusion.

" The freedom of association is often entwined with the right to privacy. The right to establish a
home is an essential part of the Fourteenth Amendment. The choice of household companions involves
deeply personal considerations as to the relationships within the home. That decision falls within the
protection of the right to privacy. The zoning ordinance creates a classification, which impinges upon
fundamental personal rights, so it can only withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing
that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest.
The means chosen to accomplish the purpose of a quiet neighborhood are both over inclusive and
under inclusive.

" How to define a family is not a constitutional right, so as long as a zoning ordinance
restricting types of households is rationally related to a permissible state objective, the ordinance will
be constitutional.

In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

‰If legislation is passed, it must be REASONABLE
‰In this case, a constitutional right is involved, therefore the law must be REASONABLE and must
FURTHER AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVE
‰The standard used in this case was the RATIONAL BASIS TEST, meaning that all they had to do
was step over this low bar. They are saying that this ordinance keeps Belle Terre quiet and livable for
families
‰The Majority felt that no constitutional matters were at stake

A
  


[

 A Cleveland statute made it a crime for a dwelling to contain members of more
than one family, and limited the definition of family to a basic nuclear family. Appellant was convicted
under the statute when her son, grandson, and a grandson from another child all lived with her.

  
 The right to live as a family unit is protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.


 Appellant, Mrs. Inez Moore, lived in an East Cleveland home with her son, her son and her two
grandsons. The two grandsons were first cousins rather than brothers, with one of the grandsons
moving in with his appellant after his mother¶s death. Appellant received notice that she was in
violation of a Cleveland criminal statute that limits occupants of a dwelling to members of a single
family. Appellant¶s family did not meet the definition required for a single family, and she was
convicted and sentenced to 5 days in jail and a $25 fine.

 Does the Cleveland statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

!  The right infringed upon is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and the statute
does not sufficiently advance legitimate state interests. Therefore, the statute is
unconstitutional. Unlike previous precedent upholding limitations on housing units that affected only
unrelated individuals, the present statute declares that certain categories of relatives may live together
while others may not. This constitutes an intrusive regulation of the family protected by the Due
Process Clause.
The city justifies the statute as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking
congestion, and avoiding undue financial burden on the school system. While these are legitimate
goals, the statute serves them only marginally because large groups of people can still live together so
long as they meet the statutory definition of a single family. The city also tries to distinguish this case
from other precedent that has provided for constitutional protection of family rights by suggesting that
such rights extend only to the nuclear family. This Court finds that the force and rationale of these
precedents are applicable in the present case.
Caution, rather than abandonment, is the proper way to move forward when the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to substantive liberties without the guidance of more specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights. Clear lines cannot place the limits on substantive due process, rather an examination of
the teachings of history and recognition of the basic values that underlie society should serve as
guidance.

" Justice Stewart, Justice Rehnquist. Appellant contends that she has a constitutional right to
share her residence with whomever she pleases, but precedent in Belle Terre says otherwise. Although
appellant¶s desire to share her dwelling with her extended family involves private family life, the
desire cannot be equated with interests previously found to be constitutionally protected. Appellant
also cannot claim constitutional rights on equal protection grounds because the city¶s definition does
not offend the Constitution. The pluralities¶ decision extends the limited substantive contours of the
Due Process Clause beyond recognition.

c Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall. This concurrence is separately written to underscore
the fact that such family units are important to immigrant, minority, and disenfranchised families as a
means of survival.

" This case demonstrates different opinions between the plurality and the dissent on how far
to extend the rights protected by substantive due process.

In Moore v. City of East Cleveland

‰This ordinance limited the amount of family members that can live in one dwelling
‰City told Moore that she had to kick her grandson out because eneither of his parents lived in the
house
‰Moore argues that this goes against freedom of personal choice which is covered by the Due Process
Clause because this is a ³private realm of family life where the state cannot be involved´
‰City says that because this is not a nuclear family and is rather an extended family living together,
their action is justified
‰Court placed heavy emphasis on grandparents being instrumental in raising children, and that it has
an interest in family to step into keep their family members off the street
‰ Families remain proxies for stability

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 A Connecticut provision outlawing the counseling of others to use
contraception, as well as the use of contraception, was found unconstitutional under strict scrutiny
because it violated the Due Process Clause.

  
 The right of marital privacy lies within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
Therefore, it is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny is the standard of judicial review.


 Appellant, Ms. Griswold, was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut (´League´). Appellant and the Medical Director for the League gave information and
instruction and medical advice to married couples about birth control. Appellant and her colleague
were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized counseling, and other medical treatment to
married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories
and fined $100 each. The state appellate courts affirmed.

 Whether the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a
couple¶s ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?

!  Yes. Judgment of the state appellate court affirmed. The Bill of Rights has a penumbra
expanding the right of privacy. The present case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. It also concerns a law that, in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot
stand in light of the familiar principle that a ³governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.´ Thus, the Connecticut statute conflicts
with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.

" The government has a right to invade one¶s privacy unless there is a specific constitutional
provision prohibiting such invasion. The law in this case is a silly one. However, the Court is not
asked if it is silly. Rather, the Court is asked whether the law violates the constitution. There is no such
general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, this law does not violate the
Constitution. Concurrence. The unenumerated right of privacy in the marital relation is ³a personal
right µretained by the people¶ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.´ Therefore, it is among the
fundamental liberties that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the
states. The proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because the enactment violates basic values ³implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.´ The ³liberty´ of the Due Process Clause is a rational continuum which
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. A ban on the
use of contraceptives by married couples does not reinforce the state¶s ban on illicit sexual
relationships.

" The plurality holding in this case introduced the concept of penumbras in order to expand
the liberties of the Bill of Rights to include the right of privacy within the marital relation.

Jurisprudence of Family Law Rights to Privacy

The states were trying to regulate what happened behind closed doors, and the supreme court is trying
to say to the states, ³no´
‰Cases to use to keep the states out of citizen¶s bedrooms:
*Meyer (1923): Parents¶ rights to have their kids learn German is a ³right to privacy´ (Supreme
Court says that states cannot have a say in this matter)
*Pierce (1925): Parents¶ rights to have children in private school rather than public school
³because the children do not belong to the state´
*Griswald (1965): Plaintiff staged the litigation so that they could challenge the statute.
Connecticut was the only state where there was a complete ban on contraceptives (even for
married people!)

Majority in Griswald
Finds a privacy connection within all of the amendments in the Bill of Rights: each amendment has
PERIPHERAL RIGHTS that give the enumerated rights a meaning
‰Calls these peripheral rights, ³emanations´
‰Majority goes through the Amendments to illustrate a broader zone of privacy
*[First Amendment] ´Privacy´= right to associate and express one¶s opinions without
government
*[Third Amendment] protects physical privacy of one¶s home from soldiers during times of
peace
*[Fourth Amendment] privacy from government security agents
*[Fifth Amendment] personal privacy against self-nomination (government cannot force you to
say that you¶re guilty of a crime when you¶re not)
*[Ninth Amendment] f a right is not specifically enumerated, it doesn¶t mean that this right is
not afforded to citizens

Goldberg Concurrence in Griswald

‰Ninth Amendment is enough because it acknowledges natural rights. One doesn¶t even have to
analyze the rest of the Bill of Rights to come to the same conclusion

Harlan Concurrence in Griswald

‰Look at history and tradition, and it will show the fundamental right of privacy. He understands why
the Majority analyzed the Bill of Rights, but still says that they do not need to go into such great detail.

Stewart Dissent in Griswald

‰Saying, yes, this law is silly, but we can¶t find how this law violates the Constitution. He says that it
is not a function of the court to determine a bias based on community standards.

  

[

 The Appellee, Baird (Appellee), was arrested for lecturing on contraception to a
group of University students and distributing contraceptive foam to a student after the lecture.

  
 The State may not discriminate between married and unmarried individuals
in prohibiting the distribution of contraception.


 Massachusetts law created three classes of people receiving contraceptive devices and drugs: (1)
married persons could receive contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or druggists
on prescription; (2) single people may not receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy
and (3) anyone may receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent the spread of disease.

 May the state .discriminate between married and unmarried couples in prohibiting birth control
methods?

!  No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) notes that ³if the
right to privacy means anything, it means the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.´

" Chief Justice William Burger (J. Berger) argues that there is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) that suggests birth control must be made
available on the open market.
" A right to privacy is again recognized in Eisenstadt. Here, the right to contraception is
extended to unmarried individuals, as well.

How does Œisenstadt use Griswald?

‰Equal Protection says that similarly situated people need to be treated the same, unless there is a
rational reason not to, and there is not.
‰´If privacy means anything at all, it has to be applied to the individuals within that couple´
‰Poor reasoning of Œisenstadt: PAGE 55: ³the argument based on Equal Protection is µincongruous¶
with other Supreme Court holdings´
‰Under Griswald, peripheral rights related to those specified under the Bill of Rights are identified and
extended to privacy rights in a marriage, the question following this is: DOES ³MARRIAGE´
INCLUDE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES?
‰Œisenstadt uses equal protection to extend the right to use contraceptives not only to married people,
but to unmarried people as well. Even though the law tends to treat married people differently (i.e. tax
treatment), the holding in Œisenstadt highlighted individual rights rather than rights afforded only to
married couples

How do the following cases help us justify privacy for same-sex couples?
*Griswald: privacy scaffolding, Ninth Amendment implicit rights to privacy, Fourteenth
Amendment¶s Due Process Clause
*Œisenstadt: equal protection for married and unmarried people
*Hardwick: violation of Georgia sodomy statute. Does the constitution give homosexuals the
fundamental right to engage in sodomy? This case said NO
Dissent in Hardwick: The Majority framed the issue too narrowly

How is Hardwick like Griswald in supporting the right to be left alone?

‰Œisenstadt says equal protection should be afforded to both married and unmarried people
‰Griswald is about the right to privacy in a marriage, whereas Hardwick is about non-married people
‰Griswald protects what consensual adults do behind closed doors

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Two Main Critiques to the Rights to Family Privacy
1) Has served as a barrier hiding spousal and child abuse (obviously not the purpose of this right)
2) Negative- all it says is that the state should stay out of the family realm, which could prevent
certain services that could help to be used
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 James Mylen Hall executed a will that was not properly witnessed. The will
revoked a prior will and he instructed his wife to tear up the first will. The trial court admitted the will
to probate and one of James Hall¶s surviving daughters appealed.

  
 A document that is not properly witnessed by two people who see the
testator sign the will and also sign themselves may be probated if the proponent of the document
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended that document to be his will.


 James Mylen Hall executed a will on October, 23, 1998. Thirteen years later, he and his wife
Charlotte Rae Hall executed a joint will and their attorney notarized it. James Hall asked his lawyer if
the will was valid and the lawyer assured him that it was valid. James Hall However no witnesses were
present. On their way home, James Mylen Hall told his wife to tear up the first will. His wife tore up
the first will. When James Hall died, the trial court admitted the will to probate. One of James Hall¶s
surviving daughter appealed.

 Whether a proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a decedent intended a
second will to be his will where he the deceased revokes all prior wills in his second will and told his
wife to revoke his first will.

!  Yes. A proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that decedent intended a
document to be his will where he revoked his first will in second will and instructed his wife to tear up
his first will. Testamentary intent may still exists where there is evidence that the testator did not give
the will to anyone because he said it was not finished because the testator may have wanted the will to
stand until his attorney provided for a final will.

" Clear and convincing evidence of testatmentary intent there is evidence that the testator
did not want his first will to be valid and attempted to execute a valid second will. Furthermore, the
testator gained the attorney¶s assurance that the second will would be valid as it was.


 D
 

Juan Vargas has two families at the same time. In 1969, he died in a car accident, intestate. The
probate court divided the assets equally between the two spouses. The first wife, Mildred, appeals,
claiming that there is not enough evidence to make second wife, Josephine, a putative spouse, and even
if there WAS enough evidence, an equal division of assets is erroneous. Mildred and Juan married in
1929, but did not collect assets until 1945. Josephine and Juan married in 1945. Josephine worked for
Juan¶s business, without pay, for the entirety of the marriage.
Was Mildred a putative spouse? Was an equal division of the estate between both wives
appropriate?
! )Yes. Evidence shows that Josephine WAS a putative spouse. Yes, equal division was
appropriate in order to achieve equity and justice.
 An innocent participant who has duly solemnized (in good faith) a matrimonial union which is
void because of some legal infirmity acquires the status of putative spouse
  
Two conflicting legal theories: A) When a marriage is determined void or voidabe and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court
shall declare such parties to have the status of putative spouses. Property acquired during the union is
³quasi-marital property.´ B) The innocent putative spouse is in partnership or joint enterprise with the
spouse. Thus, accumulated property held in effect in tenancy in common in equal shares. Upon death
of the husband, only his half of the interest is considered community property, to which the rights of
the lawful spouse attach.
9
Courts tend to resort principals of equity to affect a just result. Depending on which of the
above theories are used, both Mildred and Josephine have valid or plausible claims to at least ¾, or
possibly all of Juan¶s estates. Probate court did the right thing in splitting in half between both wives.
Affirmed. Justice Compton concurred.


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 A Wisconsin Statute forced individuals to receive court permission in order to
marry if they have a minor issue not in their custody which they are obligated to pay support for.
Appellant was unable to receive court permission under the statute and brought suit on behalf of all
residents similarly situated.

  
 If a statute significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental

constitutional right, it must be supported by sufficiently important state interests and closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests. Such interests are subject to strict scrutiny or ³critical examination.´


 Appellee Redhail was unable to enter into a lawful marriage under a Wisconsin statute that
did not permit a resident to marry without court permission if he has a minor issue not in his custody
which he is obligated to pay support by court order. The statute allowed court permission only if the
marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and additionally
demonstrates that the children covered by the support order are not then or likely thereafter to become
public charges. In 1972 when appellee was a minor high school student he was found to be the father
of a baby girl born out of wedlock and ordered to pay monthly support. Appellee was unemployed and
indigent until 1974, and unable to make payments. In 1974 appellee applied for a marriage certificate
with appellant Zablocki, a county clerk. The application was denied due to appellee¶s failure to obtain
the required court order. It was stipulated that appellee was in arrearage on his payments and his child
had been a public ward since birth, therefore he was unable to satisfy the requirements for a court
order. Appellee filed his complaint on behalf of himself and all similarly situated Wisconsin
residents.

 Is a Wisconsin statute that provides that members of a certain class of residents cannot marry,
within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry
constitutional?

!  The statute is unconstitutional because it significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right and is not supported by sufficiently important state interests and is not closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests. The court employs a critical examination of the state
interests advanced in support of the statute because the right to marry is of fundamental importance.
Previous court decisions have confirmed that the right to marry is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although reasonable restrictions that do not significantly interfere with the right to marry may be
imposed, the present statute absolutely prevents some in the protected class from obtaining the
required order, and places sufficient burdens and significant intrusions on others.
Appellant claims that the statute supports the State¶s interest in counseling the applicant as to the need
of fulfilling his prior support obligations and protects the welfare of the out-of-custody children. The
first claim is faulty because even if counseling is provided there would be no interest in continuing to
withhold permission to marry after counseling is completed. The second is faulty for two reasons.
First, if the individual is unable to meet payments, the statute simply prevents marriage without
providing any money to the minor children. Second, the State has numerous other means for extracting
the payments.
There is also suggestion that the statute prevents applicants from incurring new support obligations.
However, this is underinclusive because it limits only the new financial commitments arising out of a
marriage and overinclusive because in many cases the income from the new spouse may increase the
applicant¶s ability to pay. The statute may only result in more children being born out of wedlock.

c Justice Stewart. The majority¶s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause is misplaced
because it is intended to deal only with invidiously discriminatory classifications. The Due Process
Clause protects the liberty right to marriage, and protection of the State¶s interests must fall short of
not permitting poor people to marry.
Justice Stevens. The Wisconsin Legislature incorrectly assumed that (a) only fathers would be affected
by the legislation and (b) they would never marry employed women. The Statute cannot withstand
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

" The majority finds the statute to violate constitutional protections under both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Concurrences appear to differ mainly on which of these two
clauses is more applicable.

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 Plaintiff married Defendant knowing that he was extremely frugal. Defendant
provided Plaintiff with only meager amounts of money and Plaintiff was often forced to work
individually to pay for needs. Plaintiff brought a suit to recover maintenance and support money.
  
 A spouse cannot maintain a suit in equity to secure support or alimony
when the parties are not separated or living apart. For the courts to inquire into the living standards of a
family would be contrary to public policy.


 Plaintiff, Lydia McGuire, married Defendant, Charles McGuire, on August 11, 1919. At the
time of marriage Defendant was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age and had a reputation of extreme
frugality, of which Plaintiff was aware. Plaintiff had been previously married and had inherited a one-
third interest in 80 acres of land from her previous husband. Plaintiff brought an action against
Defendant to recover suitable maintenance and support money. Plaintiff testified that defendant was a
poor companion and that he would give her only small amounts of money on request. Plaintiff worked
the fields and did chores. For several years she had raised chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy
clothing, things she wanted, and groceries. The house was not equipped with a bathroom, bathing
facilities, or an inside toilet. Plaintiff was privileged to use all the rent money she wanted from the 80
acres of land. She used this money to visit her daughters, and Defendant provided no fu nds for such
use. Plaintiff had three abdominal operations for which Defendant paid, but Plaintiff was no longer
able to raise chickens. Defendant had land in the value of $83,960, bank deposits in the sum of
$12,786.81, and income of $8,000 or $9,000 a year. Defendant appealed the trial court¶s ruling in favor
of Plaintiff, alleging that the decree was not supported by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to
law.

 Was the trial court correct in its finding that when a wife is abandoned by her husband, without
means of support, a bill in equity will lie to compel the husband to support the wife without asking for
a divorce decree?

!  To maintain such an action the parties must be separated or living apart from one another,
therefore the trial court erred. The trial court found that it was well-established law that it is the duty
of the husband to provide for his family with support and means of living such as fit his means,
position, and station of life. Previous case law had held that a wife may bring a suit in equity to secure
support and alimony regardless of if the action is for divorce.
In the present case the marital relationship continued for over 33 years with no complaint from the
Plaintiff regarding her support. The parties were not separated or living apart at any time. Public policy
requires that the standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts
to determine. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife the
husband is legally supporting the wife.

" Without a showing of a termination of the marriage the Court found that it would be
contrary to public policy to force the husband to make specified payments to the wife.

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 Appellant, husband, and plaintiff, wife, led a marriage in which plaintiff
provide for financial stability and husband only provided limited domestic work. Appellant challenged
the trial court¶s division of marital property and failure to award maintenance upon divorce.

  
 The sex of the parties should have no effect on the division of marital
property and allowance of maintenance.


 Appellant, husband, and respondent, wife, were married in 1972 and separated in 1987. In
1972 the parties moved to Arkansas were respondent was going to work for Southwestern Bell Corp.
and appellant worked as a reporter for a local newspaper. Respondent received a promotion and moved
to St. Louis, where appellant eventually was fired from Maritz, Inc. The couple agreed he would not
seek outside employment, devoting his time to writing fiction. Respondent received another promotion
and the parties moved to Oklahoma City, where appellant continued to pursue a writing career. He
later abandoned his effort without having written a chapter. He then worked briefly in a food store and
spent 8-9 months working in free-lance public relations. When not employed, the couple agreed
appellant would be responsible for the general upkeep of the house and preparation of dinner. He spent
several hours per day preparing the meal, but respondent claimed that his other domestic chores we re
very lax. In the two years the couple lived in Oklahoma City, he drove respondent to work. In 1984
respondent was transferred to St. Louis, where appellant continued to cook dinner and periodically
took respondent to work. At the time of trial respondent was earning over $70,000 per year with
appellant receiving $75 per month in interest.

 Did the trial court err in its division of the marital property and failure to award appellant
maintenance?

!  The trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property and failing ot award
rehabilitative maintenance to appellant. Missouri statute directs the trial court to divide the marital
property in a just manner, considering all relevant factors. The guiding principles inherent in this
statute are that property division should reflect the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise similar to
a partnership; and, should be utilized as a means of providing future support for an economically
dependant spouse.
Throughout the marriage appellant has become economically dependant on the respondent. Although
the Court does not find that appellant¶s contributions entitled him to an equal division of the marital
property, it finds that the trial court¶s determination that appellant made not substantial contribution to
the marriage resulted in an abuse of discretion in dividing the marital property.
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in awarding no maintenance to him for the time he needs
to obtain necessary education and retraining to gain satisfactory employment. Maintenance is awarded
when one spouse detrimentally relies upon the other to provide monetary support for the marriage.
Rehabilitative maintenance is appropriate in situations such as this where there is substantial evidence
the party seeking maintenance will or should become self-supporting.

" Accepting the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise, this husband had a negative impact
on the marriage. He is unwilling, rather than unable to support himself

" The majority finds that the sex of the parties should have no effect on the division of
marital property and allowance of maintenance regardless of reversed gender roles. The dissent did not
believe that the husband provided sufficient support either financially or domestically.

 

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 A spouse sought to have a professional license declared as marital property,
thus subject to equitable distribution.

  
 An interest in a professional or professional career potential is marital

property, which may be represented by direct or indirect contributions of the non-title holding spouse.


 Plaintiff and Defendant married. They moved to Mexico so Plaintiff could go to medical school
full-time. Defendant taught school and contributed her earnings to their joint expenses. They moved
back to America so Plaintiff could finish school. Two months after Plaintiff received is license, he filed
this action for divorce.

 Is a professional license of one party subject to equitable distribution in a divorce?


!  Yes. Marital property is subject to equitable distribution. It is property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage regardless of the form in which title is held. New York recognizes that
spouses have an equitable claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship and classifies
them as subject to distribution by focusing on the marital statue of the parties at the time of
acquisition. An interest in a professional or professional career potential is marital property, which
may be represented by direct or indirect contributions of the non-title holding spouse. Few
undertakings during a marriage better qualify as a joint effort than contributions toward one spouse¶s
acquisitions of a professional license. Working spouses make great sacrifices and forgo the acquisition
of marital assets that could have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed rather
than occupied with the study and training necessary to acquire a professional license. Here, most of
the marriage was devoted to Plaintiff getting his license. Defendant played a major role in that effort.
Here contributions represent investments in their partnership and the license is a product of the parties¶
joint efforts, so should be considered marital property. Concurrence. A professional in training who is
not finally committed to a career choice when the distributive award is made may be locked into a
particular kind of practice simply because the monetary obligations imposed by the distributive award
made by the court. The equitable distributions of the law were intended to provide flexibility so that
equity could be done.

" The court reads a broad definition of property to include professional licenses acquired
during the marriage. They believe that a professional license is obtained through a joint effort of
spouses, not the work of one.

    

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 Wife supported her husband financially while he attended school. The spouses
filed for divorce and the issue became whether the husband¶s degree was marital property that could be
divided.

  
 An educational degree is not encompassed by even a broad interpretation of

property.


 Mr. and Mrs. Graham were married for six years. During that period, Mrs. Graham worked
full time and Mr. Graham worked part time and obtained a Bachelor¶s degree as well as Masters in
Business Administration (MBA). As part of the divorce proceeding, the trial court ruled that the MBA
was divisible property and estimated its worth and future earnings potential. The appellate court
reversed and Mrs. Graham appealed.

 Whether a M.B.A constitutes marital property that can be divided in a divorce proceeding.

!  Affirmed An educational degree is not encompassed by even a broad interpretation of property.
It does not have any of the characteristics of the concept of property. An educational degree cannot be
transferred. It has no exchange value on the open market and terminates upon death.

" The dissent focused on the fact that the husband¶s increased earnings potential was the most
valuable µasset¶ obtained during the marriage. Equity, the dissent argued, demanded that the court seek
extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice.

" The court discussed the purpose of dividing marital property as allocating to each spouse
what equitably belongs to each. The court noted that the legislature wanted the definition of property to
be broad, but that there must be limits. The court went on to note that a spouse that provides support to
a spouse obtaining a degree is not without remedy. She or he can obtain relief when the court takes this
fact into account, when dividing the marital property.

  

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 Appellant moved from New York to Iowa and one month later brought suit for
divorce in Iowa. Appellant¶s husband challenged the jurisdiction of the Iowa court.

  
 A durational residency requirement is constitutional in that appellant was

not permanently foreclosed from obtaining a divorce and the State¶s interests in the requirement are
legitimate.


 Appellant, Carol Sosna, married Michael Sosna in 1964 in Michigan. They lived together in
New York from 1967 through 1971, after which they separated but continued to live in New York. In
August 1972, appellant moved to Iowa, and the following month petitioned the Iowa district court for
dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the
Iowa court. The Iowa court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Michael was not a
resident of Iowa and appellant had not been a resident of the State for one year preceding the filing of
her petition as required by an Iowa Statute.

 Is the Statute unconstitutional because it establishes two classes of persons and discriminates
against those who have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa?
Is the Statute unconstitutional because it denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individualized
showing of bona fide residence and therefore denies such residents access to the only method of legally
dissolving their marriage?

!  The Statute passes constitutional muster under both inquiries. Previous precedent has
invalidated durational residency requirements in areas such as qualification for welfare payments,
voting, and medical care. However, none of these cases suggested that the States could never impose
durational residency requirements. Appellant was not irretrievable foreclosed from obtaining some part
of what she sought. Additionally, Iowa¶s requirement may be reasonably justified on grounds other
than the purely budgetary or administrative considerations claimed in the previous precedent. Such a
requirement recognizes that both spouses are interested in the proceedings, avoids officious
intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount interest, and minimizes the
susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack.
Furthermore, the failure to provide an individualized determination of residency does not violate the
Due Process Clause. Such a determination would be fruitless, as Iowa requires not merely domicile,
but residence in the State for a year. Appellant¶s claim is not total deprivation of a divorce decree,
which has been ruled unconstitutional, but only delay.

" The majority neglects to address the question of if the right to obtain a divorce is of sufficient
performance that its denial to recent immigrants constitutes a penalty on interstate travel. In my
opinion, it meets this standard, and Iowa¶s durational residency requirement should be scrutinized to
determine whether it constitutes a reasonable means of furthering important interests asserted by the
State. The majority¶s analysis ignores the severity of the deprivation suffered, in that the requirement
prevents remarriage and locks both partners into what may be an intolerable, destructive relationship.
Furthermore, the critical importance of the divorce process weakens the argument for a long residency
requirement, and the protection of a State against invasion by those seeking quick divorces could be
protected by a simple requirement of domicile.

" The majority found that the Iowa¶s residency requirement was reasonably justified by
legitimate State interests.

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 Appellee separated from appellant and moved to California. After their children
joined her in California, appellee attempted to bring a divorce suit in California against appellant, who
still resided in New York.

  
 In order to establish personal jurisdiction a defendant must have certain
minimum contacts with the forum State so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.


 Appellant Ezra Kulko married appellee Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during appellant¶s three-
day stopover in California en route from a military base in Texas to a tour of duty in Korea. At the time
both parties were domiciled in and residents of New York. Appellee immediately returned to New
York after the marriage, as did appellant after his tour of duty. The two lived in New York for 13 years
and then separated. Appellant remained in New York with their children, while appellee moved to
California. She briefly returned to sign a separation agreement providing the children would live in
New York. Immediately afterward appellee flew to Haiti and procured a divorce incorporating the
terms of the agreement. In 1973 appellant¶s daughter told her father that she wanted to remain in
California after her Christmas vacation. Appellant bought her a one-way ticket. In 1976 appellant¶s
other child called his mother and told her he wanted to live with her in California. She sent h im a
plane ticket unbeknownst to his father, and he flew to California and took up residence with his mother
and sister. Less than a month later, appellee commenced this action against appellant in the California
Superior Court seeking to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment; to modify the
judgment to award her full custody of the children; and to increase appellant¶s child-support
obligations. Appellant appeared specially and moved to quash service of the summons on the ground
that he was not a California resident and lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the State to warrant
assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court summarily denied the motion to quash, and
appellee sought review. The California Supreme Court sustained the lower court rulings.

 Did appellant have sufficient minimum contacts with California to allow California to assert
personal jurisdiction over him in this matter?

!  Appellant¶s act of permitting his daughter to spend more time in California did not amount to his
purposefully availing himself of the benefits and protections of California¶s laws so as to permit
California to assert personal jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court found that personal
jurisdiction may be exercised when a nonresident defendant caused an effect in that State and
jurisdiction over causes arising from that effect is reasonable. It found that appellant had purposefully
availed himself of the protections and laws of California by sending his daughter to live there with her
mother.
The Due Process Clause operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts over nonresident
defendants. In order to exercise such jurisdiction certain minimum contacts must be established so as
to not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In reaching its decision the Court did not rely on the appellant¶s glancing presence in the State or his
marriage there, nor could it have. It did not rely on the fact that at separation appellant ha agreed to
allow his children to live in California 3 months per year because it would discourage parents from
entering into reasonable visitation agreements and it could arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any
State the other parent chose to spend time while having custody.
The purposeful act of allowing his daughter to spend more time in California than required under the
agreement is insufficient to show that he purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of
its laws. California¶s assertion of personal jurisdiction was unreasonable in that it involved an
agreement entered into with virtually no connection to the forum State.
Basic considerations of fairness favor appellant¶s State of domicile as the proper forum. It was the
State of the marital domicile where his entire family resided prior to the separation. The single act of
allowing his daughter to spend more time in California is not one that a reasonable parent would
expect to result in the substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigation in a forum 3,000
miles away. Jurisdiction in such cases would impose an unreasonable burden on family relations.

" The Court found that the single act of permitting his daughter to spend more time in
California than required under a separation agreement was insufficient to establish the minimum
contacts with California such that it would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice to assert personal jurisdiction over appellant.

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