Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince

Author(s): Marcia L. Colish

Source: The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, Central Renaissance Conference
(Winter, 1978), pp. 80-93
Published by: The Sixteenth Century Journal
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80 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

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SixteenthCenturyJournal
IX,4 (1978)

Cicero'sDe Officiisand Machiavelli'sPrince

Marcia L. Colish
OberlinCollege

Machiavelli's classical sources are a subject which studentsof his

politicalthoughthave scarcelyneglected.The Roman historians,Polybius,
Homer, Aristotle,and Seneca have all receivedtheirdue. The subjectof
virtu,or, more loosely, Machiavelli'sethicalthought,has also stimulated
extensivescholarlyinterest.2 to notethat
This beingthecase, itis surprising
no one has exploredsystematically the connectionsbetweenCicero's De
officiisand Machiavelli'sPrince.This oversightis indeedcurious. The De
officiiswas read and copied morefrequently thanany othersingleworkof
classical Latinprose in theMiddle Ages and Renaissanceand it played an
importantformativerole in the ethos of the Florentinecivil humanists.
Scholarshave by no meansignoredCicero'splace in thethoughtof trecento
and quattrocentoFlorentines.Yet, the commentators who have compared
Machiavelli with Cicero have confinedthemselvesto isolatingparallels
On Machiavelli's education see Felix Gilbert,Machiavelli and Guicciardini:Politics
and Historyin Sixteenth-Century Florence(Princeton,1965), pp. 162 ff.,318-22; Roberto
Ridolfi,Life of Niccolo Machiavelli, trans. Cecil Grayson (Chicago, 1963), ch. 1. On his
classical sources see in general Georg Ellinger, Die antiken Quellen der Staatslehre
Machiavelli's, Sonderabdruck aus der Zeitschriftfur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft
(Tubingen,1888) and FriedrichMehmel, "Machiavelli und die Antike,"Antike und Aben-
dland, 3 (1948), 152-86.On Machiavelliand Tacitus see KennethCharlesSchellhase,"Tacitus
in the PoliticalThoughtof Machiavelli,"II PensieroPolitico, 4 (1971), 381-91and his more
recentTacitus in RenaissancePolitical Thought(Chicago, 1976), ch. 1; on Machiavelli and
Livysee J.H. Whitfield, "Machiavelli'sUse of Livy,"in Livy,ed. T. A. Dorey (London,1971),
pp. 73-96; on Machiavell and Frontinussee Neal Wood, "Frontinusas a Possible Source for
Machiavelli'sMethod,"Journalof theHistoryof Ideas, 28 (1967), 243-48;on Machiavelliand
Seneca see Niccolo Machiavelli,II principe,ed. L. ArthurBurd(Oxford,1891), p. 335 note2;
Allan H. Gilbert,Machiavelli'sPrinceand Its Forerunners:The Princeas a TypicalBook De
RegiminePrincipum(Durham, 1938), p. 150; Neal Wood, "Some Common Aspects of the
Thoughtof Seneca and Machiavelli,"RenaissanceQuarterly,21 (1968), 11-23;on Machiavelli
and Homersee JohnH. Geerken,"HeroicVirtue:An Introduction to theOriginsand Natureof
a RenaissanceConcept," Yale Ph.D. dissertation,1967 (Ann Arbor: UniversityMicrofilms,
1968), esp. ch. 4-6; his conclusions are summarizedin "Homer's Image of the Hero in
Machiavelli: A Comparison of Arete and Virtu," Italian Quarterly,14 (1970), 45-90; on
Machiavelli and Polybius see Arnaldo Momigliano, "Polybius' Reappearance in Western
Europe,"in Polybe, Entretienssur l'antiquiteclassique,20 (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1974), 347-
72, whichsupercedesthehypothesesof J.H. Hexter,"Seyssel,Machiavelli,and PolybiusVI:
The Mysteryof the Missing Translation,"Studies in the Renaissance,3 (1956), 75-96 and
GennaroSasso, Studisu Machiavelli(Napoli, 1967), pp. 161-280.

2Seein particularJ.H. Whitfield,"The Doctrineof Virtu,"ItalianStudies,3 (1946-48),

28-33 and Neal Wood, "Machiavelli'sConcept of VirtuReconsidered,"Political Studies,15
(1967), 159-72. Excellentreviewsof the most recentliteratureon this topic are providedby
JohnH. Geerken,"MachiavelliStudiessince 1969," JHI,37 (1976), 360-63and RussellPrice,
"The SensesofVirtuin Machiavelli,"EuropeanStudiesReview,3 (1973), 315-45.
82 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

betweenhis writingsand theDe officiis.Theirreadingof theDe officiishas

been all too casual and they have generally stressed the idea that
Machiavelli made a decisivedepartureboth fromthe De officiisitselfand
fromitsuse by hismedievaland Renaissancepredecessors.
However,a sustainedanalysisof theDe officiisin comparisonwiththe
Princewill show thatCicero's workwas capable of providingMachiavelli
withmuchmore thana few isolated topoi or withan ethicalideal against
whichhe could formulate his own, morepragmaticposition.The De officiis
could supplyMachiavelli with thesethingsbut it also could providehim
witha way of defininghis ethicalterminology and a structuralframework
for the analysis of the ethicsof public life. Machiavelli could, and, it is
arguedin thispaper, did apply thisCiceronianbequestin a positiveas well
as in a negativeway, consciousof how his simultaneously straightforward
and ironicuses of Cicero would resonatein theears of his contemporaries.
This contentionrequiresa close readingof theDe officiis, sinceit is thisside
of the comparisonthathas receivedshortshrift.We need to see what is
actuallygoingon in thistreatisebeforewe will be in any positionto assess
*theextentto whichMachiavellimay be standingCicero on his head in the
Prince.
The aspect of thisthesisthatis theeasiestto demonstrateis thesheer
accessibilityof theDe officiisin theMiddle Ages and Renaissanceand the
intimatefamiliarity withitthatcharacterized Florentinethoughtup through
Machiavelli's day. The evidence to this effect,from the manuscript
tradition,from the directand indirecttestimonia, and from the flood of
both handwritten textsand printededitionsin thefifteenth centuryis, in a
word, overwhelming.3 More than 600 manuscriptsof the De officiissur-
vive. It is one of a handfulof classicalLatinworkswhose textualtradition
can be tracedwithconfidenceback to antiquity.The indirecttraditionis so
massiveand complexthatitis too intractableto be usefulto modemeditors
in establishingthe text.Vernaculartranslations,no less than Latin texts,
abounded in the Middle Ages, includingItalian, German, and Icelandic
versionsand thirty-eight in Old Frenchalone. The multiplication of Latin
manuscriptsreached its high-watermark in the Renaissanceand no less
than thirty-four printededitionswere publishedin the fifteenth century.
Florentinereadersin thatperiod would have faced no difficulties in con-
30n what follows in the next two paragraphssee in particularPaolo Fedeli, "Il 'De
officiis'di Cicerone:Problemie attegiamenti della criticamoderna,"Aufstiegund Niedergang
der romischenWelt: Geschichteund Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neuerenForschung,ed.
HildegardTemporini(Berlin,1973), IV, part1, pp. 357-427;N. E. Nelson,"Cicero'sDe officiis
in ChristianThought:300-1300,"Essays and Studies in Englishand ComparativeLiterature,
University ofMichiganPublicationsin Languageand Literature, 10 (AnnArbor,1933), pp. 59-
160; Marcus Tullius Cicero, Les Devoirs, ed. and trans.Maurice Testard(Paris, 1965), I, pp.
67-77,86-92. Of morelimiteduse are J.T. Muckle,"The Influenceof Cicero in theFormation
of ChristianCulture,"Proceedingsand Transactionsof theRoyal Societyof Canada, 3rdser.,
42 (1948), pp. 113-25 and EttoreParatore, "Cicerone attraversoi secoli," Marco Tullio
Cicerone, Scritticommemorativipubblicati nel bimillenariodella morte, Istitutodi studi
romani,Centrodi studiciceroniani(Firenze,1961), pp. 243-46.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 83

suitingtheDe officiis.The catalogueof thelibraryof San Marco, compiled

at theend of thefifteenthcentury,listsfourquattrocentomanuscriptcopies
and one printededition,publishedin Venicein 1482.4
Evenmoreextensiveare theuses to whichtheDe officiiswas put from
thepatristicage up throughthe quattrocento.Duringthe Middle Ages, it
was the most authoritative,most frequentlycited, and most commonly
imitatedtreatiseon classical ethics,consideredboth in itselfand in con-
junctionwith Christianethics. Cicero's influenceoutstrippedthat of all
other classical authors on topics such as social utility,civic virtue,the
application of moral rules to times,places, and circumstances,and the
relationsbetweenvirtueand expediency.From the days of St. Ambrose
onward the De officiiswas a popular model for treatiseson the dutiesof
churchmen.Fromthedays of Lactantiusonward it providedguidelinesfor
theethicsof statesmanship and public service,a themereformulated in the
genreof the mirrorof princesas early as the Carolingianperiod. By the
thirteenth centurytheDe officiiswas beingused withincreasingfrequency,
along withAristotle'sPoliticsand thepseudo-Plutarchan InstitutioTraiani,
by Italian lay authors seeking models for governancein the city-state
republics.Florentines,or menin theemployof Florence,led thefield,from
GiovanniNanni to Albertanoda Bresciato BrunettoLatinito Dante.
It was Petrarchwho launchedCicero on thedistinctivecoursehe was
to sail in the Florentinehumanist tradition.Cicero was importantto
Petrarchformanyreasons--asa stylisticand formalmodel, as an exponent
of the union of wisdom, virtue, and eloquence, and as an existential
analogue of his own tensionsover theactiveversusthecontemplativelife,
no less thanas a defenderof republicaninstitutionsand as an authorityon
theattributesof thevirtuousand successfulstatesman.5As is well known,
this constellationof ideas was assimilatedby a series of Florentinecivic
thinkersin thefourteenth and fifteenthcenturies,who combinedPetrarch's
Ciceronianismwitha numberof othercomplementary sources.6One of the
4Berthold L. Ullmanand PhilipA. Stadter,The PublicLibraryofRenaissanceFlorence:
Niccolo Niccoli,Cosimo de' Mediciand theLibraryofSan Marco, Medioevo e umanesimo,10
(Padova, 1972),cat. numbers864, 874, 876, 878, 883. The lastnotedis theprintededition.

5The best study of Petrarch'suse of Cicero in this connectionis Arpad Steiner,

"Petrarch'sOptimusPrinceps,"Romanic Review, 25 (1934), 99-111. (I am indebtedto Ben-
jamin G. Kohl forthisreference.)In moregeneraltermssee also Aldo S. Bernardo,Petrarch,
Scipio and the"Africa":The BirthofHumanism'sDream (Baltimore,1962), pp. 5, 9-10,98-102
and passim; and WalterRuegg,Cicero und der Humanismus:FormaleUntersuchungen uber
PetrarcaundErasmus (Zurich,1946), pp. 7-63.

6Hans Baron, "Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early
Renaissance,"Journalof theJohnRylandsLibrary,22 (1938), 73-97; The Crisisof theEarly
Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanismand RepublicanLibertyin an Age of Classicismand
Tyranny,rev. ed. (Princeton,1966), pp. 121-34;"La rinascitadell'eticastatalenell'umanesimo
fiorentinodel quattrocento,"Civilta moderna,7 (1935), pp. 3-31; "FranciscanPovertyand
Civic Wealthas Factorsin theRiseofHumanisticThought,"Speculum,13 (1938), pp. 1-37.
84 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

most impressivefeaturesof theuse of theDe officiisfromtheMiddle Ages

up throughthequattrocento,a featureof thistraditionthathas sometimes
been ignored,is its preservationof the values of politicalrealismand ex-
pediency,itsstresson theactivelifeof public service,and itsconceptionof
virtueas decisiveand energeticactivityand not merelyas an innermental
intentionality.Therewas also a moreidealisticuse of Cicero,reinforced by
the medieval theologianswho had appropriatedthe De officiisfor more
strictlyecclesiasticalpurposes. This theological traditionelevated the
honestumovertheutileand placed thevalue ofexpediencyundertheruleof
a higherlaw, whethernaturalor divine.Some scholarshave triedto confine
the medieval and Renaissance influenceof the De officiisprior to
Machiavelli to the theologicalstrandin the tradition,underestimating its
otheraspect,an approachthathas led themto see Machiavellias effecting a
sharp break with his classical, Christian, and humanisticforebears. 8

Correctivesto this one-sided interpretation have been provided by a

number of recent studies which have examined the medieval and
Renaissancetraditionof theDe officiisin a moreevenhandedmanner.But,
sinceMachiavelliwas at thesame timefullycapable of usingtheDe officiis
directly,we mustalso go back to Cicerohimself.
Several attemptsto assembleparallelsbetweentheDe officiisand the
Princehave been made, althoughthe scholarswho have assembledthem
have been disinclined to do very much with them once having
acknowledgedtheirexistencesThe one most frequently noted is Cicero's
referenceto thelion and thefox,undertherubricof theruler'sneed to play

7Theseaspects have been noted by Isaiah Berlin,"The Originalityof Machiavelli,"

Studies in Machiavelli,ed. Myron P. Gilmore(Firenze,1972), pp. 163, 180, 200; Geerken,
"Heroic Virtue,"58-73, 79, 304 n. 7, and appendix 4, althoughhe attributesthis position
primarilyto Homericinfluence;Nelson, "Cicero'sDe Officiis,"loc. cit., 62 and passim; J.H.
Whitfield,Machiavelli (Oxford, 1947), pp. 99-101, 103; "The Doctrineof Virtu,"loc. cit.;
Wood, "Machiavelli'sConceptof Virtu," loc. cit.,p. 160.

sThe mostimportantstatements of thisview are FelixGilbert,"The HumanistConcept

of the Princeand The Princeof Machiavelli,"Journalof ModernHistory,11 (1939), pp. 449-
83, esp. part II; "Machiavellism,"in History:Choice and Commitment(Cambridge,Mass.,
1977), pp. 155-56; GioacchinoPaparelli,"Virtue fortunanel medioevo,nel rinascimento e in
Machiavelli," Cultura e scuola, 9 (1970), pp. 76-89; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses,
trans.LeslieJ.Walker,witha new intro.and appendixby Cecil H. Clough (London,1975), II,
p. 288.

9The most exhaustivelist is providedby Walker, op. cit., II, table 13, pp. 277-79.
Walkercontradictshimselfin a mostpeculiarmanner,however.Despite thecitationshe lists,
he asserts,on the one hand, "that in the Prince thereis no referenceto Cicero at all, . .
.(suggesting)thatwithCicero'sworksMachiavellihad no acquaintance,"II, p. 277; whileon
the otherhand, he says, "It would seem,then,to be almostcertainthatMachiavellihad read
theDe Officiisbut theresultwas not thathe foundhimselfin agreementwithCicero'sdoctrine
... butthathe took up on themainissuea diametrically opposed position,"II, p. 288.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 85

the role of thebeast on occasion.l Next is theparallel idea in Cicero and

Machiavelli thatcircumstancesaltercases, suspendingat timesthe moral
rules that would otherwisebe binding." Other parallels include the
questionofwhetheritis saferto rulethroughlove or fear2and whetherand
how the rulershould exerciseliberality, '3 along with the advice that he
should refrainfromseizing otherpeople's property'4and the ideas that
people are generallyselfishI5and that prudenceconsistsin choosing the
lesserevil as good. 16 Like themaxim"fortunafortesadiuvat,"whichCicero
citesin his TusculanDisputationsand whichmostof theRoman historians
repeatin one formor anotherand whichMachiavellirecyclesin thetwenty-
fifthchapterofthePrince,thesenotionsare notwhatany readerconversant
withtheclassicswould regardas shattering new insightsintopoliticsor the
humancondition.They are essentiallycommonplaces,recognizedand used
as suchby all concernedfromCicero'sday to Machiavelli's.
Much more importantis Cicero's overall argumentin the De officiis,
the way he defineshis terms,and the resonanceswith Cicero's personal
situationwhichMachiavellimay well have feltat thepointin his own life
when he was writingthe Prince.' Cicero had attainedthe consulate,the
oMarcusTulliusCicero,De officiis1.11.34, 1.13.41., ed. Testard:Niccolo Machiavelli,
II Principe18, in II principee altriscritti,ed. GennaroSasso (Firenze,1963). Amongscholars
who have noted thisparallel see Burd, op. cit., 301 n. 1, 302 n. 2; Ellinger,op. cit., 49-50;
Mehmel,"Machiavelliund die Antike,"loc. cit.,159; GiuseppePrezzolini,Machiavelli,trans.
Gioconda Savini (New York, 1967), 98-99; Sasso, comm.on hised. ofII principe,151 notes2,
7. EricW. Cochrane,"Machiavelli: 1940-1960,"1. ofMod. Hist.,33 (1961), 129, describesthis
parallelas a generallyrecognizedone, althoughhis citationto therelevantpassage of De off.is
incorrect.

IDe off.1.10.31-32:II principe25. Noted by Berlin,"The Originalityof Machiavelli,"

loc. cit., p. 200; Whitfield,Machiavelli,pp. 68, 70-71, 74, althoughWhitfieldattributesthe
citationto Book 4 oftheDe off.,whichhas onlythreebooks.

2De off.2.7.23: Il principe17, 19, 20. Noted by Burd, op. cit., p. 355 n. 2; A. H.
Gilbert,op. cit.,p. 150.

"De off.,1.14.42-1.16.52,2.15.52-2.18.64: Il principe15-16. Noted by Burd,op.cit.,

Machiavelli,124.
pp. 286-87n. 15; A. H. Gilbert,op. cit.,89; Whitfield,

-De off.1.14.42: II principe16, 17, 19. Noted by Ellinger,op. cit.,pp. 50-51.

5De off.1.25.46, 3.17.70: Il principe18. Notedby Burd,op. cit.,p. 303 n. 9.

6De off.3.13.53-3.15.61:'Ilprincipe21. Noted by Burd,op. cit.,pp. 344-45n. 8.

IAan excellentanalysis of the De off. with a guide to the literatureon this work is
supplied by Klaus Bringmann,Untersuchungen zum spaten Cicero, Hypomnemata,29
(Gottingen,1971), pp. 229-50. Other good recentassessmentsinclude Domenico Romano,
"Motivi politicied autobiografici nel 'De officiis'di Cicerone,"Annali del Liceo classico "G.
Garibaldi"di Palermo,n.s. 5-6 (1968-69),21-31and Testard,intro.to his ed. of De off.,I, pp.
52-66. The existentialparallel withMachiavelli as the authorof the Princehas been misun-
derstoodby the Machiavelli scholarwho noted it thus far, MartinFleisher,"A Passion for
Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli," in Machiavelli and the Nature of
PoliticalThought,ed. MartinFleisher(New York,1972), p. 118.
86 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

highestofficein theRoman Republic.But JuliusCaesar's riseto power had

relegatedhim to the statusof a political outsider.It took Cicero several
yearsto internalizethisstateofaffairs,althoughitmaybe doubtedwhether
his personal and partisanhopes were ever completelydimmed. He was
forcedto spendhis last yearsin retirement, writinga seriesofphilosophical
works on politicaltheory,law, theology,cosmology,and ethics.In these
works he sought simultaneouslyto console himself,to advertise his
qualificationsfor public office,to accuse his enemies,to advocate the
republicanformof government,and to develop a rationaleforotiumlit-
terariumas the conductof statecraft by othermeans. The De officiiswas
Cicero'slast workand it reflectsall of theseconcerns.It is also thelast in a
series of ethicalwritingsin which he soughtto formulatehis own moral
philosophy.For thispurpose he drew heavily on the ethicsof Stoicism,
particularlyon the middle Stoic Panaetius,18but he redefinedStoic ter-
minologyand criteriasignificantly in thelightof othermoralvalues which
he prizedand as a functionofhis own personalvisionofpolitics.'9
The De officiisconsistsof threebooks, thefirsttreatingthehonestum,
the second treatingthe utile,and the thirdseekingto reconcilethem.At
least, that is Cicero's ostensibleprogram. The initialproblem and ter-
minologyare Stoic. Had he used his termsin a Stoic sense he would have
definedthe honestumas thesummumet unicumbonumand the utileas a
synonymof theStoic preferables, or adiaphora,conduciveto virtueunder
certaincircumstances but,takenby themselves,as morallyneutralen bloc.
The reconciliationof the honestumand theutilewould be achievedsimply
by assertingthatthehonestum,beingintrinsically good and an end in itself,
should be the changelesscriterionby which the admissabilityof the utile
should be judged. However,thisis not the argumentwhichCicero in fact
puts forthin theDe officiis.Instead,he elevatestheutileto thelevel of an
ethicalcriterionin its own right,makingit thenormof the honestum.He

-De off.1.1.2, 1.2.6; Ad Atticum420.4, ed. and trans.D. R. ShackletonBailey,6 vols.

(Cambridge,1965-68).

90n Cicero's sourcesforthisworksee theintro.to theliterature providedby Testard,

intro.to his ed. of De off.,I, 25-49; also Fedeli,"Il 'De officiis'di Cicerone,"loc. cit.,pp. 361-
75; PhilippFinger,"Das stoischeund das akademischeFuhrerbild in Cicero'sSchriftDe officiis
(1. Buch)," Neue larhbucherfurAntikeund deutscheBildung,5 (1942), 1-20; Hans Armin
Gartner, Cicero und Panaitios: Beobachtungen zu Ciceros De officiis, Berichte der
HeidelbergerAkademie der Wissenschaften, philosophischhistorische Klasse, 5 (Heidelberg,
1974); HeinrichJungblut, "Cicero und Panatius im zweitenBuch uber die Pflichten,"Beilage
zum Programmdes Lessing-Gymnasiums zu Frankfurt a. M. Ostern1910 (Frankfurt, 1910);
Georg Kilb, "EthischeGrundbegriffe der alten Stoa und ihreUbertragung durchCicero," in
Das neue Cicerobild,ed. Karl Buchner,Wege derForschung,27 (Darmstadt,1971), pp. 38-64.
Quinto Cautadella, "Sulle fonti del 'De officiis'di Cicerone," Atti del I congresso in-
ternazionaledi studi ciceroniani,Roma, aprile 1959 (Roma, 1961), II, pp. 479-91 stresses
Platonic sources and EttoreLepore, II princepsciceronianoe gli ideali politicidella tarda
repubblica(Napoli, 1954),p. 387 stressesAristotelianism.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 87

also redefinesthe honestum itself,treatingit not as Stoic virtue,whichhe

sees as inhumanand unattainablein practice,but as themediumofficium,
theintermediate dutyof thepublicman, whichcan be achievedin thereal
worldand whichpertainsto theusus vitae, theneedsofdailylife.20
Cicerobeginshis scalingdown and redefinition of thehonestumin his
discussionof the fourcardinal virtuesin Book One. Wisdom is not the
leadingvirtuein the group,since the othervirtuesare more directlycon-
cernedwith those thingson which the practicalbusinessof lifedepends,
"quibus actio vitae continetur."2 Still, he says, wisdom, as the quest for
truth,has itsapplicationin theavoidanceofcredulityand excessiveconcern
forsubjectsthatare obscureor useless.22Ratherthanjudgingwhatis useful,
wisdomitselfis thussubjectedto thenormof utility.Justice,forCicero, is
theparamountvirtue,forthedutiesflowingfromit above all "pertinent ad
hominum utilitatem."23Cicero combines the traditionalPlatonic and
Aristoteliansuum cuique formulawiththedefenseof privaterightsdrawn
fromRomanlaw. Justicepreventsus frominjuringothers,exceptwhenwe
are punishinginjuries,and it leads us to use commonpossessionsforthe
commongood and privatepropertyforprivateinterests.In applyingthese
principlesCicero stressesat some lengththat circumstancesalter cases.
Thereare some occasionswhencrueltyis in orderand whenwe are excused
fromthe normal obligationsof trust,truthfulness, and good faith.One
criterionwhich Cicero invokes in this connectionis equity and common
sense. Buta secondcriterionwhichhe invokesis prudenceand necessity.In
particular,politicallifefrequently requiresus to apply the latterrule. We
should conductwar and peace withoutguile or violence,if possible. But,
while such strategiesare bestial ratherthan human, we may have to use
themas a last resort.This is the contextin which Cicero mentionsthe
famous analogy of the lion and the fox.24 Cicero also treatsthe topic of
beneficenceand liberalityas a subspecies of justice, applyingthe same
generalnorms.25 We shouldbe liberal,he says, so as to harmno one and so
as to benefitourselvesand our friends,measuringour generosityaccording
to the servicesthat the recipienthas renderedor is likelyto render"ad
nostras utilitates.26 The needs of the recipientare the least important
consideration.Thus Ciceroadjustshismajorvirtue,justice,to expediency.
2-De off.1.3.7-10.

2 De off. 1.5.17.

22De off.1.6.18-19.

23De off. 1.43.155.

24For this whole discussionof justice,De off. 1.7.20-1.13.41, with the lion and fox
passageat 1.13.41.

2'De off. 1.14.42-1.18.59.

88 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

The same kindof analysisholds trueforcourageand temperance.For

Cicero courage is practicalnot only because it endows its possessorwith
equanimitybut also because it enhanceshis wealth and familyposition,
"cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusqueet sibi et suis comparandis."27
While,on theone hand, Cicero assertsthatno one attainstrueglorywho
has achieveda reputationforcourageby treachery,28 he observes,on the
otherhand, that courage bespeaks the desire to performdeeds that are
simultaneouslygreat and usefulin the highestdegree,"res geras magnas
illas quidemet maximeutiles."29 Strikinga noteofpersonalpropaganda,he
adds that statesmanshipand scholarshipmay be more courageous than
militaryservice,underlining thepointby quotinga line fromthepoem he
wroteon his own consulship,"cedantarma togae,concedatlaurea laudi."30
The finalvirtue,temperanceor decorum,whichgovernstheexerciseof the
otherthree,is orientedto physicalexertionand not merementalactivity,
"actio quaedam, non solum mentisagitatio."3' Temperanceis usefulin that
it enhances our reputationand wins public approbation.32 In applying
temperanceto oneself,Cicerocounsels,one shouldrememberthatthe"finis
est usus" and thatone's vocation should be "non mediocrisutilitas."33 It is
clear from Cicero's definitionsand applications of these four cardinal
virtuesthathe does not regardthemas ends in themselvesor as theirown
rewards. His firststep toward reconcilingthe honestumand the utile
therefore has been to reformulate thehonestumitselfas a mode oftheutile.
Cicero proceeds to reshuffle his ethical terminologyalong the same
linesin Books Two and Three.Each of thesebooks is designedto show that
thehonestumand theutileare not in conflict.In Book Two Cicero seeksto
prove thispointby arguingthattheutileis itselfa worthyend and thatthe
honestumis a practicalmeansto thatend. The utilia,he says, are valuable
because theyenable us to manipulateothersin our own interest.All of the
virtues,and most especiallyjustice,inspireconfidenceand respectin our
fellowmen.Thus, ifwe possessthesevirtues,we willbe able to bend others
to our will mosteasily. It is in thiscontextthatCiceroraisesthequestionof
whetherit is betterto rule throughlove or fear. He assesses thesealter-
26De off.1.14.45.

27De off.1.5.17.

2sDe off. 1.19.62.

29De off.1.20.66.

3oDeoff.1.22.77.

3 De off.1.5.17.

32De off.1.28.98.

33Deoff.1.39.138, 1.42.151.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 89

nativesin termsof theirimpacton politicalstabilityand thepower of the

ruler.Fear,he notes,is a poor safeguard.Those who ruleby fear,in a state
hithertofree,will findthemselvesespeciallyin dangerinsofaras freedom
suppressedand thenregainedbiteswithsharperteeththanfreedomnever
interrupted.34Sincevirtueis useful,he continues,it is importantto make it
visible to others. Cicero provides a long list of ways in which virtuous
personscan effectively publicizetheirreputations,beginningthissectionof
thebook withtheinjunctionthatthevirtuesone seeks to advertisemustbe
virtuesthatone actuallypossesses.The essenceof theproblem,he says, is
to be what we wish to be thoughtto be. Hypocrisywins no glory;but,
equallyimportant,it simplydoes not work.35Sooner or laterthehypocrite
will be foundout. In thelong run, it requiresless effortto possess virtue
thanto tryto fakeit.
In Book ThreeCicero continueshis reconciliationof thehonestumand
the utile, this time fromanotherdirection.In the second book he had
argued that virtueis expedient;here he argues that immoralityis inex-
pedient.Thereare certainactions,such as tyrannicideand some formsof
civildisobedience,whichare good and expedienteven thoughtheyviolate
themorallaw.36But, in general,Cicero seeks to show thatinjuringothers
benefitsneithertheindividualwho commitstheinjurynor societyat large.
The advantagethatseemsto be servedby wrongdoingwill emergeas only
apparent,not real, or as easily lost, or as prone to boomerang. Moral
obloquy bringsshame,not glory:"If officeis soughtforthesake of glory,
crimeshould be avoided, for therecan be no gloryin crime;but if it is
power for its own sake that is sought,by whatevermeans, it cannot be
usefulifitis associatedwithinfamy."37Honestyis therefore thebestpolicy,
foritalone getsresults.
In the De officiisCicero is clearlytakinga giantstep away fromthe
defenseof thehonestumas a higherlaw thatgiveswhateverlimitedvalue it
can to theutile.Instead,as we have seen, he has assimilatedthehonestum
to the utileby recastingthe traditionalmeaningof the terms.Yet, the De
officiiscannot be seen as an exercisein unadulteratedpragmatism.For
Cicero the honestum,or the common good, and the utile, or individual
interest,cannotconflictbecause man is part of a largersocial and moral
whole, which makes radical individualismunacceptable as a basis for
ethicalaction.In cases wherethetwovalues appear to conflict,utility,to be
-4Deoff.2.7.23-24.Forthiswhole topic,2.3.9-2.12.43.

-'De off.2.12.43-2.13.44.Forthiswholetopic,2.9.31-34,2.11.39, 2.12.43-2.25.89.

36De off.
3.4.19-20,3.5.21-3.7.33.

37Deoff.3.32.87: "Si gloriaecausa imperiumexpetendumest,scelus absit, in quo non

potestesse gloria; sin opes expetuntur
quoquo modo, non poteruntutilesesse cum infamia."
Forthiswholetopic,3.4.19-3.22.87.
90 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

sure,is thenorminvokedto resolvetheconflict.But it is utilityon a social

level, utilitasrei publicae. Even in cases whereexceptionscan be made tc
thisrule,thespiritoftherule,thatis, social utility,providesthegroundsfor
departingfromit.38 Cicero'sstresson thenormof social utilityis evidentin
his definitionsof the cardinal virtuesno less than in his analysis of in-
dividual advantage. In the case of thevirtues,he recognizesprivaterights
thatdo not have to be sacrificedso long as theydo not interfere withthe
rightsof others.In thecase of personalinterests, theycannotbe promoted
withoutvirtue,whichmustreallybe possessedin orderto be trulyuseful.
Cicero believesthata sound publicorderwill maintainand protectprivate
rightswhile a sound moral order will eliminateconflictbetween the in-
dividual and thegroup. It is truethathe removestheconflictbetweenthe
honestumand the utileby treatingthemboth as formsof the utile.In that
sensehe seeksto bringtheStoic ideal down to earth.But it is also truethat
the harmonybetween public and private goods which he envisions is
predicatedin turnon a politicaland ethicalideal ofhis own, a good society
in whichtheindividualand thepublicgood would trulybe reciprocalifnot
identical.This good societyis bound indissolublyin Cicero'smindwiththe
Roman Republic.
Both Cicero's defenseof expediencyand his associationof civic virtue
withan ideal republicanconstitution findtheirresonancesin Machiavelli's
Prince. Machiavelli's double use of Cicero's De officiiscan be seen most
clearlyif we keep two well known featuresof the Princein mind: first,
Machiavelli'sapparentcontrastbetweenthequalitiesthatmake forsuccess
and thosethatmake forglory,and, second, thefactthathe excerptedthe
Princefromhis Discourses,positingone setofpoliticaland moraldynamics
forprincipalities and anotherforrepublics.
In the firstcase, Machiavelli leans heavily on the structureused by
Cicero in Books Two and Threeof theDe officiis,raisingsome of thesame
questions:Should therulerbe liberalor frugal,cruelor merciful? Should he
rule throughlove or fear?Should he rule throughgood faithor trickery?
Like Cicero, Machiavelli emphasizes the utile and treatsthe virtuesas
means to theends of theruler'spower and security.Like Cicero, he thinks
that times and circumstancesalter our moral obligations.His advice is
sometimesdiametrically opposed to Cicero's.Thus, he arguesthatfrugality
is preferableto liberality.39 A stillmore strikingdeparturefromCicero is
Machiavelli's advocacy of dissimulation.Where Cicero asserts that all
effortsto fake the virtuesare doomed to failure,Machiavelli insiststhat
people judge by appearances and results,and that the prince should
therefore not hesitateto imitatethosevirtueswhichare usefulbutwhichhe

3"Deoff.3.3.12-3.4.17,3.4.20, 3.5.21-3.6.32,3.7.34-3.9.39.

39II principe16.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 91

does not himselfpossess. It is not necessaryto have all the virtues,he

argues, but it is necessaryto appear to have them.40On the otherhand,
Machiavelli'sadvice is oftenquite similarto Cicero's. Thus, he agreesthat
crueltyis sometimesdesirableas thelesserof two evils,4 thattherulermust
know how to act as the lion and the fox, thatbreachesof faithmay be
reasonable in certainsituations,42 and that it is importantforthe rulerto
avoid thepeople'shatred.43
In thelatterconnection,he also agreeswithCicero thatthebestway to
avoid hatredand to gain popularityand reputationis to act in ways that
promotethe commonweal. Machiavellihereadvises theprinceto respect
privaterights,to be firmand consistent,to performgreat deeds, to be
generous,to patronizetheartsand sciences,to fostercommerce,industry,
and agriculture,and to underwritepublic festivals.44 In otherwords, he
counsels.therulerto practicethevirtuesof justice,magnanimity, courage,
beneficence,and concernfor the culturaland economicwell-beingof the
community.He also observes that the prince should choose confidential
ministers who are wise men,addingthatitis impossiblefora rulerto obtain
good advice unlesshe is wise himself.For if theprincelacked wisdom,he
would be incapable of assessingthe qualityof the advice givenand of the
men who give it. Nor would he inspirewise men to serve him unless he
showedhimselfworthyoftheirconfidenceand respect.45
It thusemergesthatMachiavelli,like Cicero, thinksthat,in the long
run,thebestway to achievetheappearanceof virtueis actuallyto be what
one appears to be. And, like Cicero, he argues thatthe virtuesshould be
cultivatedbecause theyare usefuland thattheywill prove most usefulto
theprinceifhe cultivatestheones thatyieldsomebenefitto societyat large.
At the beginningof the PrinceMachiavelli raises the questionof whether
successand glory,and the strategiesapposite to them,are in conflict.He
seemsto answerin theaffirmative. Reviewingthepoliciesof Agathoclesof
Syracuse and other new princes, ancientand modem,he says thatit cannot
be called virtueto kill one's fellowcitizens,to betrayone's friends,to lack
fidelity,mercy,and religion.Such traitsmay enable a rulerto gain power,
but notglory.46Butat theend of thePrince,havinggivenhis own advice to
the ruler,he observesthat the reputationwhich the princegains through

40IJ principe 15, 18.

4III principe17.

42II principe18.

4-II principe17, 19.

44II principe19, 21.

45II principe22-23.
92 The SixteenthCenturyJournal

policiesconduciveto thegeneralgood will bringgloryto himand general

happinessto his people.47Both Machiavelli'sconceptionof the honestum
and the utilein thiscontextand the way in whichhe harmonizesthe one
withtheotherhave a greatdeal in commonwithCicero'sposition.
The principaldimensionthat is presentin the De officiisand which
Machiavelli deliberatelyomits fromthe Prince is the dimensionof civic
virtue.This topic fascinatesCicero to the point of obsession and it is, of
course, a themethat Machiavelli analyzes and agonizes over again and
again in theDiscoursesand theHistoryof Florence,in his efforts to locate
this virtuepreeminently in republicanconstitutionsand in his persistent
inabilityto account for the factthatpolitiesof thistypehave repeatedly
failedto preservetheirliberty.48On theone hand, a republicanconstitution
is no guarantee of civic virtue, a conclusion which Machiavelli feels
compelledto drawfromthehistoricalevidencebeforehis eyes,thusparting
company with Cicero and with his predecessorsin the civic humanist
tradition.On the otherhand, he is deeply committedto republicanin-
stitutionsand sincerelywants to believe thattheyalone engenderthekind
of civicethoswhichhe values. As he putsit in thefamouspassage fromthe
Discourses:"It is notprivateinterest but thecommongood thatmakescities
great.And, withoutdoubt thecommongood is observedonlyin republics,
fortheycarryout everything thatadvances it."49 Now a principalitymay
have a rulerwho possesses virtu,but it cannot have a population that
functionsas a moral communityin a positive sense, possessingthe cor-
porate attributeof civic virtue.The leaderswhom Cicero addressesin the
De officiisare an aristocracy,but in his own mind theyrepresentand in-
spire the virtues that the whole communitycan and should manifest.
Machiavelli,by contrast,has difficulty envisioningsuch an organicmoral
relationshipbetweentherulerand theruledin a principality.Or, perhaps
moreprecisely,he has difficulty envisioningitin thecase oftheMediciruler
forwhomthePrincewas intended.His omissionof thetopos of civicvirtue
fromthe Princetherefore can be seen as an ironiccommenton princes,in
generaland in particular.It is certainlyan omissionwhichcontemporary
readers,steepedas theywerein Cicero'sDe officiis, werebound to notice.

`II principe8.

4II principe26. The subjectofgloryhas beengivenexhaustivestudyin therecentpaper

by RussellPrice,"The Themeof Gloriain Machiavelli,"RenaissanceQuarterly,30 (1977), esp.
pp. 594-99,606-31,althoughhe does not see any connectionbetweenMachiavelliand theDe
officiison thistopic.

480n this question see most recentlyMarcia L. Colish, "The Idea of Libertyin
Machiavelli,"JHI,32 (1971),330-50and theliterature
citedtherein.

49Discorsi 2.2, ed. SergioBertelli,in Niccolo Machiavelli,Opere, 8 vols. (Milano, 1960-

65), I, p. 280. My trans.is given.
 Cicero and Machiavelli 93

One would liketo thinkthat,as eveningfelland Machiavellishook the

dustand grimefromhis clothesaftera day passed in thedesultoryactivities
that occupied him at Sant' Andrea, when he put on his curial robes and
retiredto communewiththeancients,one of thoseancientswas Ciceroand
thatMachiavellihad a copy of theDe officiis at hand. It seemsunlikelythat
he would have failedto notice the analogies betweenCicero and himself,
politiciansill-usedand in exile,cutofffromthelifethatwas meatand drink
to them.The similarities in conceptualizationand argumentbetweentheDe
officiisand the Prince are too strikingand too extendedto be dismissed
undertheheadingof Machiavelli'suse of thecommonplacetradition.They
are certainlysubstantialenoughto refutetheview thathe was referring to
Cicero merelyin orderto turnhiminsideout. Untestedassumptionsabout
theethicalcontentand directionality of Cicero'sargumentin theDe officiis
seemto have been responsibleforthismisapprehension. The remedyis for
Machiavellischolarsto read Cicero withas knowing,as sympathetic, and
as criticalan eyeas Machiavelliand his contemporaries directedat him.