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Security kritik 1nc 3 Impact links: economic competitiveness link humanitarian assistance link environmental security link environ. security t/o solvency critical inequality link inequality link - discrimination inequality link - discrimination inequality link – international / capitalism Link helpers Agent links: Sovereignty link Hegemony link Soft power link Governmentality link International norms/Rulemaking link Representation links Terrorism discourse link AT: Terrorists are irrational Borders link Borders link - realism AT: Borders key to security Area links: South China Sea link Middle East Link North Korea Link China link- threat China link – economy/competitiveness China link – hostile rise / power vacuum Russia link Epistemology links: Peace link Positivism/empiricism link Positivism link - state Root cause link Neorealism link Prolif specific: proliferation link proliferation link - state proliferation link – weapon label proliferation link –stability proliferation link – ‗wildfire‘ / cancer metaphor proliferation link – weapons spread proliferation link – peaceful/ military distinction proliferation link – rogue states/ loose nukes proliferation link – rogues/ monitoring proliferation discourse turns case 14 15 18 19 20 IMPACTS: Securitization bad – kills criticism Securitization bad – violence Securitization bad - resentment Heg bad-imperialism Myths impact Kritik turns case-war ALTERNATIVE(S): 2NC Alt solves Alt solves - violence Alt solves - sovereignty Alt solves - Epistemology Alt solves – metanarratives Environ security alt - exclude securitization FRAMEWORK: Discourse shapes reality/policy Discourse shapes reality – metaphor security = speech act Discourse 1st AT: Rational actor 2NC: AT: No impact to representation AT: Perm- positivism AT: Case outweighs AT: Predictions/Scenario planning good AT: Realism inevitable AT: Realism good AT: Realism good: nuclear war AT: Realism good- Hobbes AT: realism good - critical reasons AT: Securitization key to action AT: Post-structuralism bad AT: Criticisms that make fun of post-structuralism AT: Environmental securitization good AT: Link turns – aff stops seeing x as enemy AT: Link turn – we establish alliances AT: Kritik is ideological 56 57 58 59 60 63 64 65 66

LINKS: Security generic links: Threat construction link Realism/ psychological motives link Threat construction link – positivism Threats to homeland link Crisis management link Securitization of non-military link

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ENDI 2010 Security K ******AFF****** Framework – AT: Discourse first AT: Reps first Positivism good AT: Scenario planning bad AT: Predictions Fail 2AC Cede The Political AT: State links AT: Threat construction AT: psychology links AT: Middle East Link AT: Terror Link 2AC impact calc - Consequences First 2AC impact calc – AT: Value to life AT: Value to life AT: Structural Violence Impact 2AC-Permutation Critical realism perm 2AC- Alt fails Realism good 109 110 112 113 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 129 130 131

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Security is a speech act that manufactures low probability threats and worst case scenarios in order to build up the state‘s defenses and defend its territory
Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie, prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz, ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End,‖ On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]
What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The

logic of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking,
the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out. 3 Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings

of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response . Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the capabilities will not be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats . Threats, in this context, thus become what might be done, not, given the "fog of war," what could or would be done, or the fog of bureaucracy, what might not be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus usually generates a proportionate response , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state . Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears . It is important to recognize that, to
the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to imagine how those capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor

might behave; they are also reflections of what our intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place. . . . and so on, ad infinitum . Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our
quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

Indeed. less often noted in international relations. nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing). for example." In its name. prof of political science at Brown. The demise of a bipolar system. the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom. not merely an animal species. and most recently. That it was.the axiom of Inter-state security relations." 1 From God to Rational Man. But I also think that things have gone one stage further. in short. Marx. and economic constellations.ciaonet. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics. chaos. which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified. popularized for example. Politics of Security.‖ ed. within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics. and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. metaphysical belief in it. and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy.ENDI 2010 Security K 4 Wave 1 SECURITY KRITIK 1NC The affirmative’s securitizing representations reduce human freedom and agency to a calculation. where everything up to and inclduing self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. ―The Value of Security: Hobbes. until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well. http://www. is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is. characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. Yet the center. an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread. weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. sovereign states. and Baudrillard On Security. We have inherited an ontotheology of security.and that this found its paradigmatic expression for example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War." 2 One immediate response. the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict. And. no longer holds. .html] No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch. rogue powers such as North Korea. as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us. inducing either despair or the surender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. the diffusion of power into new political. that is. peoples have alienated their fears. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species.this is uniquely dehumanizing and destroys the value to life Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster. all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature --as well as from other gods.org/book/lipschutz/index. then. through strategic discourseeven if the details have changed. Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. has now become possible. Nietzsche. and difference. that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to socalled laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America. nor commands the disciplinary power of "security. from Empire to Republic. Yet. Iraq. and sovereign states. emperors. Ronnie Lipschutz. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that oplitical arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon. And within the Washington beltway. order. p. In its name. emperors. change itself--have induced a new anxiety. and which a world made uncreasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to require. capital and information flows. treating security as an a priori legitimizes the WMD suicide pact and billions of deaths Der Derian 1998 [James. but a mere species of calculation. the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall. the unthinking reaction.the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible. 26) Everything. in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted . rights and powers to gods. I think. the acceleration of everything --transportation. And. The enemy is instability. national. never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority. In this vein. for history is never so linear.

"10 How does this relate to the link that is generally made between "power" and the political? Following Lefort again. the question of what gets to count as "politics" (in the narrow sense) is part of "the political" (in the broader sense): It is a political process.. events. what we call "politics" is an area of activity that in modern Western society is "depoliticized" or "technologized.ENDI 2010 Security K 5 Wave 1 SECURITY KRITIK 1NC The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s appeals to securitization. but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured. "What change in the principles of legitimacy. We are not talking about an absence of the political through some sort of lapse or mistake but an express operation of depoliticization or technologization: a reduction to calculability. "The personal is political" was their slogan. but the latter is perhaps more useful as a term because of the sense it conveys that what is going on is something positive. I outline how the authors whose work I discuss later in the book see processes of technologization and depoliticization. wars." but this is not because relations of power should be seen as autonomous and automatically defining "politics. It is ideological. this time with the phrase "the personal is international. the political is taken to be that sphere of social life commonly called "politics": elections. For a political analysis. concerning the legitimacy of the social order. 1-3] Ironically. international agreements.. then." These two terms are more or less synonymous (as far as my usage here goes). historically specific account of what counts as politics and defines other areas of social life as not politics. does not "exist" in any sort of naked form. the state apparatus. as well as a certain type of representation . not natural . revealed. what is important about power is that it establishes a social order and a corresponding form of legitimacy. . the doings of governments and parliaments. what needs to be called into question are the conditions of possibility that produced or made conceivable this particular representation of power. "the phenomenon of power lies at the centre of political analysis. and one of the fields where its perils can be seen is international politics. institutions of which states are members (such as the United Nations). contingent on a particular organization of the social order. "the political is ." Rather. Power. Questioning the conditions of possibility for power relations created through the affirmative’s representations refuses to participate in calculative and depoliticizing worst case scenario predictions. what reshaping of the system of beliefs. It is the result of contestation. enabled such a representation of power to emerge?"12 . too. As James Donald and Stuart Hall point out. for Lefort. A similar extension of international politics has been advocated by Cynthia Enloe. before legitimation: Rather. the political is concerned with the "constitution of the social space. in the broadest sense. p. it is because "the existence of a power capable of obtaining generalised obedience and allegiance implies a certain type of social division and articulation. Postructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. and other phenomena acquire political status in the first place. In the final section of this chapter."" In other words. Edkins 1999 [Jenny."8 In the broader sense. and in the case of "international politics.6 Donald and Hall refer to the struggle in the 1970s and 1980s by the women's movement to extend the range of politics to include. POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL The distinction I employ here between "politics" and "the political" is similar to that between what is sometimes called a "narrow" meaning of the political and a broader one. "the political" has to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a particular. for example. not in what we call political activity. and the actions of statesmen and -women." treaties. "the political" refers to the frame of reference within which actions. For Claude Lefort. Or in Fred Dallmayr's words. In this context ideology is the move that conceals the depoliticization of politics and hides the possibility-the risks-of "the political. . what gets to be counted as politics in this narrow form is not in any sense given. relations of power within the home or between men and women more broadly.. "Whereas politics in the narrower sense revolves around daY7to-day decision making and ideological partisanship ."9 It is central to this process that the act of constitution is immediately concealed or hidden: Hence. As examples. in the way of apprehending reality. Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. of the form of society. "7 In other words. The question is. political -parties. In the narrow sense. diplomacy." Technologization has its dangers.. the ideological processes of legitimation produce certain representations of power. I examine briefly the technologization of famine relief and the notion of securitization as a form of extreme depoliticization.

or it can be a form of critique in which one opposes prevailing representational practices with alternatives. War. then. and themes through which the political world is constructed.debating the affirmative’s representations is key to overcoming dominant descriptions of agents and objects in international relations Der Derian 98 (James. making use of an insurrectional textuality. one that questions the privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects. Such analysis can be a form of interpretation in which one scrutinizes the effects on behavior or policy that the dominance of some representational practices enjoy. we can appreciate the intimate relationship between textual practices and politics. criticism or resistant forms of interpretation are conveyed less through an explicitly argumentative form than through a writing practice that is resistant to familiar modes of representation . second. To appreciate the effects of this textuality. that any "reality" is mediated by a mode of representation and. To textualize a domain of analysis is to recognize. by. It is the dominant. and Peace Project and the Global Media Project. in short. that representations are not descriptions of a world of facility. p. Modes of reality making are therefore worthy of analysis in their own right. “International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖. acts. but this does not imply that an approach emphasizing textuality reduces social phenomena to specific instances of linguistic expression. one that is self-reflective enough to show how meaning and writing practices are radically entangled in general or one that tends to denaturalize familiar reunites by employing impertinent grammars and figurations. Their value is thus not to be discerned in their correspondence with something. Therefore. accordingly. In order.ENDI 2010 Security K 6 Wave 1 SECURITY KRITIK 1NC Language matters. but rather in the economies of possible representations within which they participate.13) Once we give adequate recognition to the texts within which the world emerges and provided an understanding of politics that focuses on such impositions of meaning and value . but are ways of making facility. In as much as dominant modes of understanding exist within representational or textual practices. it is necessary to pay special need to language. a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology. . objects. Lexington Books. to outline the textualist approach. a concern with textuality must necessary raise issues about the texuality (the meaning and value effects) of the language of inquiry itself. first of all. we must develop further our understanding of the language analysis. surviving textual practices that give rise to the systems of meaning and value from which actions and policies are directed and legitimated . A critical political perspective is.

It is therefore the image that enables the practices through which these actors respond to the problem of proliferation. The key to answering these questions is to identify the way in which the problem is represented or. my argument is that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world. Campbell's argument shows the way in which the interpreting subject-in this instance the United States-is itself created by those acts of identifying danger. Constructing threats necessitates an other to fear and respond to Lipschutz 95. Barry Buzan has pointed out that ―There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is ‗unable to escape‘. the image that is used to frame the issue in question. through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them . It would be difficult to argue that interests remain fixed when the bearer of those interests does not. Marx. in the past. The focus of Writing Security is not. If we can accept that both the threats and the subjects of international security are created in acts of interpretation. Rather than take the objects of study as given. security has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats. therefore. moreover. nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions. and the specific practices through which proliferation is confronted. Nietzsche. but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. Der Derian. These discourses of security. is understood. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discoursed of security. 8-9 1995) Conceptualizations of security-from which follow policy and practice-are to be found in discourses of security. to identify the actors. but also struggles over security among notions. discourses delimit the range of policy options. Jutta Weldes has made the case with respect to interests: In contrast to the realist conception of "national interests" as objects that have merely to be observed or discovered. Rather. national interests emerge out of the representations . Security. . on the way in which danger is interpreted. of struggles for power within the state. This image serves to construct the object of analysis or policy. As Karen Liftlin points out. as well.ENDI 2010 Security K 7 Wave 1 THREAT CONSTRUCTION LINK Security threats are created through acts of interpretation—representations enable securitizing actions Mutimer 2000 [David. and Baudrillard‖) points out that. a sort of trap. More specifically. pg 16-17] A further point is to be made concerning Campbell's work.the manner by which the interpretation of risk and the consequent creation of threat occur. to use the language I deploy later. To secure oneself is. as the chapters in this volume make clear. Hence. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. The Weapons State. it should be clear that the interests those subjects pursue are also consequences of these same acts . particularly the international system and the place of the state in it. These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat. 13 These "representations through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them" are central to my argument in this book. thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes … The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought – an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices. in fact. however clearly articulated. for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks.Professor of Politics and Associate Director of the Center for Global.. How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of historical origins of the concept. I ask questions about the construction of a particular object. (Elsewhere. James Der Derian (Chapter 2: ―The Value of Seurity: Hobbes. points out that this ―other‖ is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference – the state of fear – rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive potential of difference. and to define their interests. a particular set of identities and interests. ―As determinants of what can and cannot be thought. . International and Regional Studies at the UCSC ( Ronnie D. then. of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. is meaningless without an ―other‖ to help specify the conditions of insecurity. but rather the products of historical structures and processes. along the lines of the conventional definition. Lipshutz: On Security Pg. citing Nietsche. there are not only struggles over security among nations.

occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. whereby change-oriented agents tried.of this modern human condition. As Egbert Jahn put it. to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense. then. The clearest illustration of this phenomenon. This is also why. the ―state‖ can claim a special right. therefore. That way we may get some clues to some ways of thinking that are not metaphysical. something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so: and because the End of this Institution [the Leviathan. because we cannot be pre-metaphysical at the end of metaphysics. however. But it is only by virtue of the fact that our (inter)national politics of security has come to this end that we can in fact begin to consider the relationship between its end and its beginnning. and to the globalization of its (inter)national politics. where ―order‖ was clearly. specifically in the sense of the historical possibilities of the obligatory freedom of human being now terminally endangered globally by its very own (inter)national ‗civilising‘ practices. By saying it. measuration of calculabilty . culture. a staterepresentative moves a particular development into a specific area. Neither does this turn disguise some covert nostalgia for a phantom past. that those who administer this order can easily use it for specific. in a sense. Thinking about chainge in the East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant.and of the profound danger. that is to say human being‘s own obligatory freedom. and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. In this usage. and disturbances of the same. By uttering ―security‖. Through this we do not. giving a promis. and also of the hindrances.on which I will elaborate below. our (inter)national politics of security is no longer even distinguished or driven by humanistic considerations. rying to bring about change without generating a ―securitization‖ response by elites. however. As part of this exercise. rason d‘ etat). correspondingly requires that we attend to metaphysics‘ own continous process of deconstruction. Moreover. attention is turned towards consideration of what is entailed in the preparation and inception of continuous new political growth. and so on. Not because they hold an answer that is now lost but because. a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of ―intervention‖ or ―interference in domestic affairs‖. One does not have to be persuaded of the destinal sending of Being. something is done (as in betting. p. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it. International. to whatsoever Man. The will to security is an incitement to violence. antecedent to metaphysics. To bring the value of security into question in the radical way required by the way it now. Politics of Security. By definition. we now know that the very will to security-the will to power of sovereign presence in both metaphysics and modern politics. through international law. security is not of interest as a sign that refers to somethingmore rea. instead. both before hand. we go beyond mere doubting. is that the whole question of emergence and origination. to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible. For the political truth of security is the metaphysical truth of correspondence and adequation in declension to mathesis.ENDI 2010 Security K 8 Wave 1 THREAT CONSTRUCTION LINK The term security is used to allow states to use whatever means necessary to eliminate the threats they have created Lipschutz 95 (Ronnie D. go back to anything at all. Ultimately. ironically.is not a prime incitement to violence in the Western tradition of thought. the mere. to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means. as politics. and various kinds of politics.only a break from the politics of security gives meaning to international relations Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster. at the limit. that is why in doubting the value of security. Consequentally.have the threshold negotiated upward. in the final instance. of the very possibility of repeating ourselves. It is a security simply ordering to order. and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. of the relationship which obtains between them. they make us think about the very liminal character of origins and limits. nor. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political chance on a ruling elite is similar to playing a gam in which one‘s opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. indeed. In doing this. a Professor of Politics and Codirector of the Center for Global. but actually engenders danger in response to its own discursive dynamic. radically endangers us. one that will. and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done. diplomacy. On Security. . the task was to turn threats into challenges. More importantly. is the Peace and Defense of them all.and find non-apocalyptic ays of affirming and so continuing to enjoy and celebrate (in)security. this means: In naming a certain development a security problem. naming a ship). therefore. and doubting in a Nietzschean mode better than Descartes. 19) We now know that neither metaphysics nor our politics of security can secure the security of truth and of life which was their reciprocating raison d‘ etre (and. by prevention of Discord at home and thus. which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted. and Regional Studies at the University of California–Santa Cruz . but rigorously insistent. premetaphysical. in ways that are not utterly determined by metaphysics. Rather. economy. or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty. we can regard ―security‖ as a speech act. as the criss of (inter)national politics is a crisis of thought. and of what proceeds from them. we are also enjoined by the circumstances of this critical conjunction of the philosophical and the political to doubt metaphysical truth. systematically. for the preserving of Peace and Security. has right to the Means. it is useful to think about these origins and limits again. it belongeth of Right. That. and whosoever has the right to the End. to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered. to be persuaded of the profundity. 9-10) Operationally. but also self defeating. What then is security? With the help of language theory. now. What happens. in that it does not in its turn merely endanger. the utterance itself is the act. the Sovereign]. p. opens-up again. always be defined by the state and its elites. is why the crisis of Western though is as much a fundamental crisis of (inter)national politics. after all. self-serving purposes is something that cannot be easily avoided‖. actors had to keep their challenges below a certain thershold and/or through the political process-wheter national or international. is the mere counterpart of the desire for certainty.which.

we can also move in the direction of disclosing the more cryptic modes of legitimating for public (and "foreign") policy. providing a way of reading the script of modernity. The psychological approach to international relations. we argue that it is more enabling to understand how understandings are situated in domains of practice. To note that modern individuals have "beliefs" is not to take cognizance of a fact about persons. that we must resist many of modernity's professional and academic discourses that have produced modern "man" as psychological being (as Pltilip Rieff pointed out a few decades ago). Lexington Books. . in their contributions to the meanings shaping public life. but rather as socially and temporally situated beings. Rather than focusing on individual beliefs or other cognitive components. are a kind of data. War. Beliefs. By analyzing this practice for constituting the modern self. among other things. we offer a brief reading of what could best be termed the politics of fear.18) What poststructuralist approaches have shown so far is that the orthodoxies of our social and political worlds are recreated in the process of writing. We begin this reading with the recognition that individuals. analysis itself is a textual practice that is intimately related to the political practices it aims to disclose. it is useful once again to turn to a contrast between a textually oriented mode of reading and the more familiar. In order to exemplify analysis as a form of textual practice. at the same time. has focused. rather than an analytic device aiding interpretation. as an identity for persons. among other things. but to notice the contemporary way of constructing them. on the cognitive components through which individuals "perceive" aspects of policy. And no form of writing is exempt. locating beliefs in the context of the history of practices related to the management of danger. Instead of exploring people's beliefs. Were we to treat this psychological identity as a fact rather than as a historically produced text. cannot be understood simply as mentalistic information processors. “International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖. our analysis would be paralyzed in the same way as are these psychologizing practices. demonstrate the difference in problematization between a psychological and textual approach. This means. In order to textualize political psychology and. p. connected to each other in a network of practices. political psychology.ENDI 2010 Security K 9 Wave 1 REALISM/ PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES LINK We should critically analyze the very idea of beliefs and psychological motivations in order to destabilize the modern subject Der Derian 98 (James. for example. and Peace Project and the Global Media Project. we can do a genealogy of belief itself. a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology. then. in the style of the texts through which our dominant understandings of the world have been constructed.

Schlesinger. Finally. p. the redefiners proposed that the ―real‖ threats to security were different from those that policymakers and defense authorities were generally concerned about. Matthews.. those individuals who. This legitimation. 1989). . second. but they did not question the logic whereby threats and security were defined. a Professor of Politics and Codirector of the Center for Global. After Authority: War. legitimate those responses that validate their construction of the threat (see. lacking an integrated institutional base or intellectual framework (a situation that has slowly changed during the 1990s). define the threat as they see it and. in sharing a particular political culture. 1991). Most tended to see consensual definitions and dominant discourses of security as failing to properly percieve or understand the objective threat environment. 1983. ch. in turn. International.g. 56) To return to an earlier question. helps to reproduce existing policy or some variant of it as well as the material basis for that policy. 3. but the threats were ―really out there‖. and Regional Studies at the University of California–Santa Cruz. To repeat: this does not mean that threats are imaginary. who constructs and articuates contesting discourses of national security? Among such people are mainstream ―defense intellectuals‖ and strategic analysts. and Global Politics in the 21 st Century. their analysis is framed in such a way as to. can agree on a common framework for defining security threats and policy responses (what might be called a security ―episteme‖). While their discourse is constructed around the interpretation of ―real‖ incoming data. Rather they are imagined and constructed in such a way as to reinforce existing predispositions and thereby legitimate them. first. Peace. we might ask why ―redifine‖ security? Who advocates such an idea? During the 1980‘s at the time this argument was first made (Ullman. e. (Ronnie D. the individuals compromising this group were an amorphous lot.ENDI 2010 Security K 10 Wave 1 THREAT CONSTRUCTION – POSITIVISM LINK Threats are imagined and constructed in order to legitimate existing political dispositions and responses Lipschutz 2000. In other words.

Professor of Theory Today.ENDI 2010 Security K 11 Wave 1 THREATS TO HOMELAND LINK Constructing threats to the homeland as coming from the outside is the basis of statist identity construction and the legitimation of steps toward security Tickner 95 . (Walker 1990) David Campbell suggests that security the boundaries of this statist identity demands the construction of 'danger' on the outside: Thus. Campbell claims that the state requires this discourse of danger to secure its identity and legitimation which depend on the promise of security for its citizens. the sense of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty. For this reason. as protection against outside military threats. its ties to state sovereignty must be severed. In individual. which strengthens the boundary between a secure community and a dangerous external environment. those the present international system. if security is to start with the who are critical of state-centric analysis point to the dangers of a political identity constructed out of exclusionary practices. H. . Carr argued for he retention of the nation-state to satisfy people's need for identity. many critics of realism claim that. 189) When national Policy at Holy Cross University (J. rather than any citizens. Ann Ticknery: International Relations security is defined negatively. Citizenship becomes synonymous with loyalty and the elimination of all that is foreign. Walker argues that not until people. security is tied to a nationalist political identity which depends on the construction of those outsides as 'other' and therefore dangerous . While E. threats to security in conventional thinking are all in the external realm. are the primary subjects of security can a truly comprehensive security be achieved. Underscoring this distinction between citizens and people reinforced by these boundary distinctions. p.

ENDI 2010 Security K 12 Wave 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT LINK Realist decisionmaking to protect the homeland shifts into crisis management. defending national security: these are the economic. presiding over their sovereign realm. all of which require that politics stop at the water's edge and that loyalty reign supreme at home lest the forces of disorder be emboldened. The IR struggles to secure the well being of their polity occupy the stage upon which is played out the drama of the realist tradition. a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology. "Get Smart. and statesmen. Textual Strategies of the Military. p. we have witnessed the advent of decision- making inquiries in a conceptual at tempt to understand the formerly posited unity o f a monolithic realist state. there are people who populate the state: real-life kings and queens. I speak here of the various means by which the state is supposed to maximize the well being of an undifferentiated populace." This arises from more general dichotomies such as "the self ' and "the other.101) Strategic discourse is the mode of coordinating and disciplining that peacelessness that reigns without. as the intellectual sphere within which these practices of "organized peacelessness"13 became standard operating procedure." the realist bifurcates domestic "control" and foreign "chaos. and military spheres attended to by the state. Mercantilism. Like the popular television show of the mid-1960s. diplomats. Traditionally. political. Out of this arose a set of practices that have continued to exercise a decisive hold upon the theoretical imaginations of contemporary realists. The first is a kind of statist monism. Internationally. 10 an architecture of bureaucratic Leviathanism that in its absolutist form was celebrated as the embodiment o f domestic reason and interests writ large. they alone are accorded a freedom of action that is quite literally heroic in its scope. command and control. Domestically. Here we find a thoroughly articulated political apparatus that presides over civil society. Contemporary neorealist has modified this somewhat." of the one and the many. visionary statesman. one finds a proliferation of techno strategies and techno diplomacies that have displaced the drama of the heroic. Witness the gallant. rendering more austere and technocratic the exercise of state power. Situated atop. drawing the boundaries between self and other and quelling political opposition Der Derian 98 (James. the visionary statesman. and Peace Project and the Global Media Project. globetrotting Kissingerian figure who has transcended the limits of bureaucratic structure and circumvented all manner of domestic accountability. beyond the borders of the sovereign state: "over there" in bordering or far distant regions where strange forces of otherness well u p to challenge domestic order. and centrally coordinated war-fighting from computer-laden bunkers. “International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖. 9 of domestic order and international anarchy. Lexington Books. . realism has negotiated this political terrain in terms of two strategies. intelligence gathering. II And this is the second strategy of realism: the military genius. Of course. War. pursuing the national interest. dutifully carried out by attached-case carrying military staff. ll This is where strategic discourse achieves its hegemony. replacing him with the avatars of a disciplinary politics in the form of crisis management. cabinet members.

played out against the concept and practices of state security. neither individual security nor international security exist . it is also x and y and z"--has the unfortunate effect of expanding the security realm endlessly. however. The concept of security refers to the state. . ―Securitization and Desecuritization.ENDI 2010 Security K 13 Wave 1 SECURITIZATION OF NON-MILITARY LINK Securitizing things outside of the military defense of the state gives the state free reign to endlessly expand its military agenda until it has swallowed politics and social relations Waever 1998 [Ole. University of Copenhagen. no philosophy. Ullman's "Redefining Security. the security of the state. Richard H. as such. and not because we think of the everyday word "security. a tradition. To the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality labelled "security" it is because we think of national security and its modifications and limitations." and Jessica Tuchman Mathews's "Redefining Security" are. ed." "also" and "more than" arguments. is the name of an ongoing debate.ciaonet.‖ On Security. 6 This reveals that they have no generic concept of the meaning of security--only the one uncritically borrowed from the traditional view. but not by propagating unclear terms such as individual security and global security. This is not. the "security" of whomever/whatever is a very unclear idea. that other threats and referents have any meaning. saying that "security is not only military defense of the state. An abstract idea of "security" is a nonanalytical term bearing little relation to the concept of security implied by national or state security. There is no literature. accepting that "security" is influenced in important ways by dynamics at the level of individuals and the global system. National security. it seems reasonable to be conservative along this axis. and multiplied and extended to new fields. an established set of practices and. http://www.org/book/lipschutz/index. that is. The problem is that. abundant with "not only." The discourse on "alternative security" makes meaningful statements not by drawing primarily on the register of everyday security but through its contrast with national security. it is only as a critical idea. professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. consequently. no tradition of "security" in non-state terms. Thus. the concept has a rather formalized referent. conversely. just an unhappy coincidence or a temporary lack of clear thinking. until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda.html] Widening along the referent object axis--that is. Books and articles such as Jan Øberg's At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed . Ronnie Lipschutz. as concepts.

‖ International Studies Quarterly. It is a question whose tentative resolution. 3. the sovereignty of a "discipline" -in response to events that put an institutional order in crisis and in doubt. 34. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. the question is one whose naming and explicit deliberation would preclude its practical resolution. (Sep. ―Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. viewed as a practical political problem. 1990). rationally deliberated. .tions for works of thought that would speak in reply to the opportunities and dan. Arizona State University. As we shall suggest. As we shall also want to suggest. Associate Professor of Political Science. They offer helpful examples of a widely practiced strategic art by which the effect of sovereignty-be it the sovereignty of a territorial state or the sovereignty of a "state of the discipline"-is produced under conditions of crisis wherein notions of space. What occasions this strategic labor of art? What does it labor to do? How does it do it? What are the conditions of this art's effective performance? Can this strategic art any longer be effectively performed in a discipline or culture in which territorial bound.gers of political life today? Developing this third line of reply. we shall show that the question of sovereignty. Department of Political. time.aries are everywhere in question and a sense of crisis is acute? What are the implica. is an intrinsically paradoxical problem that can never be named. 367-416. labor to produce the effect of a sovereign center of judgment-in this case. can depend upon aesthetic practices alone. including their construction of a double bind. if resolution there be. Vol.ENDI 2010 Security K 14 Wave 1 SOVEREIGNTY LINK The invocation of sovereignty is an aesthetic and political practice that should be questioned for its constructed content Ashley and Walker 1990 [Richard. and political identity are shaken to the core . pp.. No. Whether one speaks of the sovereignty of a disci. Tempe. the aesthetic practices of these and similar critical readings. RBJ. and solved . jstor] Developing this third line of reply at some length. we shall explore these questions. the aesthetic practices at work in these critical readings are instructive in far wider scope.pline or the sovereignty of a modern state. Science.

Ferguson's thesis suggests should not exist under the hegemony of the tutelary power . rejection of dialogue. It seems to offend their "realism". despite the considerable barrage of propaganda we are daily subjected to designed to counteract this emergent globalism of one world and one humanity (like the whole "clash of civilisations" creed). paranoiac survivalist refuges from the largely fantasised gathering Hobbesian gloom of the surrounding world and society) . it's beginning to look virtually medieval inside those walls). dismissal of scientific evidence not in conformity with policy. Kagan. the cooking of intelligence. They have become an obsolete type. What he has described as the Hobbesian condition in the absence of a hegemon is really a condition of speechlessness -. Ferguson and Fukuyama. and speech is super-natural. They look alike. What lunacy! It's like the Dance of St. neoconservative. of endemic rapine in the world's no-go zones. and those identical interests are what makes dialogue possible at all. This is unprecedented. abhors a vacuum" and therefore "the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal". They speak. That human beings might be something more than Newtonian forces of nature living on the brink of a Hobbesian condition of "the war of all against all" just never seems to cross their minds.But the real mendacity of Ferguson's either/or proposition is the way he overlooks the situation in the US itself . America's erstwhile neglected "backyard" and the site of much US military and political meddling. and intimidation of the press all conspire to produce the very conditions of darkness and speechlessness and atrophy of dialogue that Ferguson claims belong only to the Hobbesian darkness "outside"! Like Robert Kaplan.. and not power relations. forces of nature -. as one ferocious military planner put it -. that defines us as human beings.an objective almost realised. Into the "vacuum of power" may global dialogue flow! Human beings may have different interests. the Bush Administration's emphasis on unilateralism. Ferguson's "power vacuum" is actually a "speech vacuum". "warrior politics" and a return to the good old "pagan ethos" of the Roman emperor Tiberius. and a truly Hobbesian state of nature would indeed prevail. designed as it was to bomb North Vietnam "back into the stone age". Yet. which he presupposes is already lurking beyond the walls of Fortress America. Saskatchewan. subordination of the universities to political objectives. at least in terms of the universal madness of groupthink). Where speech does not exist. "We tend to assume that power. Mr. in fact. never intrudes to stain the spotlessness of his cogitations. and neosocialist are virtually indistinguishable. resort to propaganda.html] The recent history of American interventions around the globe doesn't suggest that Mr. Honours. Canada. or Blair and Bush themselves. who warns of The Coming Anarchy and prescribes US imperialism. History can indeed be a guide to the present. 2005 [Scott B. but they are also creatures with identical interests too.the gated community of the contemporary mind. We now live in an interconnected world. only violence can restore order amongst human beings. Roberts Cooper. Human beings are not. the Inquisitions of the Patriot Act..What bothers me about Ferguson's damn fool either/or treatment of the situation is that all-too-typical tendency of the modern mentality to aspire to grand abstractions of history in the famous "25 words or less".or at least. Our perceptions of reality are (at least in part) no longer guided by official gatekeepers and authorised guardians of conscience keeping watch at the portals of the mind. In some ways. Speech is already effective power and the organisation of power. in the US today. Vitus (and in that sense Ferguson is right. Mr.ca/blog/_archives/2005/2/22/363696. and therefore the past is no certain guide to the present or the future (thank God). and Michael Ignatieff. They call this their "realism" and they are proud of their little realities. Communications. The cookie-cutter minds of the modern mentality seem to have no inkling and no self-consciousness at all of their self-devouring tautological mentations and ruminations. contempt for dissenting views.belief in inevitable US dominance as necessary to protect the globe is based on inaccurate IR assumptions and sanitizes violence to protect our regime Preston. languishing in the Hobbesian gloom of that dark age that Mr. Central America. still lies outside the umbrella of American benevolence. the proposed solution conspires to produce the very barbarism and Dark Age it is alleged to ameliorate. It always strikes me as suspicious how the modern "mentality" simply overlooks human speech as if it just wasn't there. Ferguson relies on the precedents of history to support his contention that "a world with no hegemon at all. The notion that American imperialism might itself precipitate the Dark Age. pre-emption. amongst other things. Neoliberal. the precedents of history offer no guide to the unprecedented condition in which we find ourselves today. Regina. Yet it is speech. could turn out to mean a new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism. American government efforts to roll back or preclude social revolution and the struggle against history in some of the darkest areas of the world seems to fly directly counter to Ferguson's (mis)representation of affairs .A. CONTINUES… . They sound alike. Violence is a disease of speech.darkage. of economic stagnation and a retreat by civilisation into a few fortified enclaves" (presumably something like " Fortress America" and the gated communities of entrenched mentality in North American suburbia. even if from inside the walls of Fortress America it might look like the proverbial "jungle out there" (while to those of us on the outside of Fortress America peering in. not entirely so.. Messrs. It's a self-devouring logic and a tautology.the absence of dialogue. after all. University of Regina. However. http://www. Kaplan. it truly is a Global Village. Nor does the history of US military intervention in Southeast Asia inspire much confidence in the thesis. Dark Age Blog 2-22. Ferguson's thesis has much merit.ENDI 2010 Security K 15 Wave 1 HEGEMONY LINK Hegemony is an organizing myth in our culture. They all possess in common what I call a "mentality" -. like nature.

and implicitly. BA Brandeis. an Arab civil war may re-ignite. ." To some of us. and its concomitant role of global enforcer. 2002." he allows . Dissent has not joined the rush to avert attention from the endgames of the Iraq conflict. Still. wars are wrong because of the destruction and distortions that they spread both abroad and at home they countervail against one of the subtle but hopeful tendencies in the world today . as the authors seem to realize. acceptance of a hyper-militarized America. often passes without question For those of us who challenge this view invasion was wrong for fundamental political and moral reasons.. it seems. Packer inveighs against those seeking a quick exit for American forces. master hegemon or . For those of us who opposed the war.S. leaving before America sets things straight would be irresponsible. like himself. O'Leary allows that the invasion hasn't quite unfolded as he might have wished: ".. quandaries of America's departure from a country that it did a great deal to break. in this same article. it's controlled by the furthest reaches of the American Left O'Leary also stresses responsibility The purpose was to extirpate a regime that the United States had built up but that had morphed into an obstacle to this country . ambassador to the United Nations.in Afghanistan. Often conveying the doctrine are code words referring to special "responsibilities" of the United States to guarantee world "stability. notions of . Certainly the United States bears profound responsibilities to protect Iraqis at risk from their collaboration with or employment by American forces .the movement away from sole reliance on brute state power to resolve international conflict and toward supranational authorities. Thomas L. These . it has had to impose vast demands and distortions upon its own domestic life . Violent US leadership is wrong methodologically. Yet even for thinkers who identify themselves as being on the Left. and nihilism was the result of a deliberate propaganda of obfuscation. and ethnic the deeper." The America occupiers have sometimes proved "blindly repressive. " . Their problems with the Iraq invasion ." Brendan .who gave us the Iraq invasion in the first place. no one in high places has declared repetitions of such exploits "off the table those on the democratic Left look to the future with unease. For in order to make itself the kind of country capable of "projecting power" anywhere in the world. future American military exploits of the same kind . : George W. he notes. too.. . an invasion that leaves such possibilities simmering after six years of American-sponsored death and destruction itself seems more than a little irresponsible. We hear this thinking most outof-the-closet form from neoconservatives But its roots in American history lie at least as far back as Manifest Destiny a particularly aggressive form of American exceptionalism.fate.and for that matter. it may yet get it all right. means by this continued readiness to apply U. from Packer's standpoint. Divine Providence. I once thought this duplicity. not the larger vision of American power that inspired the enterprise Their words strike an eerie resonance with those of Friedman. Versions of this idea are pervasive among thinkers who would disclaim identification with the neocons Accepting this view of America as the ultimate and rightful arbiter of global affairs . aimed at revamping entire countries to fit the dictates of the invaders. that removing the genocidal Baathists was overdue. incompetence of American direct rule. The Spring 2009 edition features a section of articles under the rubric "Leaving Iraq..S.. as Madeleine Albright. as we might wish [the war] had never happened at all. becomes clear when you recall his efforts to discredit Americans' resistance to the war in the months before it began.S. The antiwar movement. But. indeed obligations.American foreign policy elites. MA Oxford. Even under a reputedly liberal president. "If we have to use force. I hold. without a longlingering presence of Americans as enforcers. will be a very big order . "After the United States exits. not because the Iraqi Army was disbanded. The modern mentality has become selfdevouring.ENDI 2010 Security K 16 Wave 1 HEGEMONY LINK CONTINUED… seem to have been cast from a single mould. But at the same time. apparently. before the invasion occurred he favored war as "a job worth doing.an aggressive war of choice. keep resurgent Sunni and Shiite forces from each other's throats." he avers. if only Friedman's sensibilities could have guided it. Yet . its predictable effect was to promote these things. or special "moral clarity" ." Or. Albright's effusions in this direction stopped short of support for invading Iraq . not repressive enough. the effects are even more insidious.making hegemony work ―better‖ simply greases the wheels of future interventions. and these men don't have the slightest consciousness of their condition. Bush's "audacious" plan . corrupt.. he has no difficulty in principle with the notion of remaking Iraq by outside military force: "Reasonable historians should judge . Its key inspiration is . This was Iraq was a defining moment the kind of war that many Americans believed formed no part of this country's repertoire . He. in the horrors and brutalities that have followed. But making good on any of these estimable goals." The essays focus on the moral and political . More important: . to use less upbeat terms ." he wrote." To her credit.. If the United States just keeps trying. he holds.. and establishment of powers above the level of states At home." Still. though he did so for the wrong reasons.something that cannot be said for the so-called liberal hawks. and preserve the autonomy of the Kurds. numerous errors of policy and imagination . as America has done so unsuccessfully in Iraq. Among nations." in the New York Times Magazine in December. The Military State of America and the Democratic Left. for example. Just the same. mostly unstated assumptions underlying these authors' proposals ought to strike a chill throughout the democratic Left. Iran or venues yet undisclosed the thinking that gave us the American invasion of Iraq in the first place has not gone away. Its aim was not to stop some wider conflict or to prevent ethnic cleansing or mass killings.. unnecessary and arrogant occupation .indeed Not because too few troops were dispatched.and to replace it with one that would represent a more compliant instrument of American purpose.especially given America's record thus far. . the of Iraq . hypocrisy. to help repair damage to the country's infrastructure resulting from the invasion. America will have obligations as well as interests in Iraq for a long time to come. the global responsibilities of this country are apt to require action like that taken in Iraq. We stand tall. .aggressive. To its credit. he concludes that "much . Even in the wake of the Iraq fiasco. . We are the indispensable nation. communal. a look at the proposals put forward there makes it clear that George .. Dissent Vol. Winter 2010 The invasion of for the United States. kind of in its . then U. the war was a demonstration of American ability and willingness to remove and replace regimes anywhere in the world. 57 No 1. not because the occupation was incompetent. And certainly this country should do everything possible to prevent regional. It was wrong because wars of this kind are always wrong . .. "they might even be able to explain the connection between the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism . "The younger groupings from exploiting a U.. stated. and often criminally negligent.of a conflict that has consistently brought out the worst in this country. multilateral decisi on -making.. . opportunistic wars of choice. we have reason to worry about new versions of Iraq . he wrote has a serious liability . " who took what he considered a more enlightened view: The "liberal hawks could make the case for war to suspicious Europeans and to wavering fellow Americans. . but where its ability to repair things is rapidly diminishing. To judge from his words. for America to set things straight on a global scale. coercion to manage Iraqi domestic politics. and valuable progress undone. Some of the aims invoked by Packer and O'Leary are beyond reproach.as world superpower triggers the weightiest implications and consequences Nearly all of them run in collision course to the best aims and directions of the democratic Left. In short. and those who would guide them . I have since come to see it as the pathological condition of the late modern "mentality" itself. . it is because we are America. . Some higher power has created opportunities. Bush made up for his father's mistake. there is obvious relief at the conclusion . This country must now manage the political forces set in motion by its invasion according to O'Leary's exacting formula: defend the federalist constitution. It‘s essential to challenge the neoconservative logic of their advantage to demilitarize American politics James B Rule. PhD Harvard. . another contributor to Dissent's Spring 2009 "Leaving Iraq" section.we hope ." America's violent remaking of Iraq would have been entirely acceptable." He goes on. as well as Kurdish-Arab conflict. pullout to oppress others.. to envisage a quite different role for those on the Left.have to do with execution. Obviously playing to the sensitivities of Dissent readers. The balance of power among Iraq's domestic forces could easily be upset The sense of all this.but sometimes.to use the expression favored by this country's foreign policy elites." but only "if we can do it right the continuing mission of the United States as maker and breaker of regimes around the world remained unquestioned When any country gets seriously in the way of American power. grotesque mismanagement of regime-replacement . Not because it was mismanaged. oblivious to their own petty tyrannies and hypocrisies and duplicities and the deep nihilism they seem determined to pin and blame on others. We see further into the future. indeed. Pakistan.

International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer. but any particular authority depends on the even higher authority of the principle that the states system itself must survive in order to enable sovereigns to claim the highest authority. the primary difficulty is to know how to judge between hegemony in a system of states. first and a plurality. Yet while sovereigns may be supreme in this respect. .‖ International Studies Review. even a univer. even before any consideration of the dynamics associated with modern capitalism as a specific form of economic life that thrives on the production of inequality as a condition of its own dynamism. 7-24. The difficulty with this instantiation of modern discriminations between unity and diversity is that the pluralities that are enabled are inherently unstable. In this sense. largely because it has seemed reasonable to hope that the absence of empirical equality in a system of formally equal states would be a primary pillar of an interstate order rather than a fundamental threat to the balance between unity and diversity that sustains that order. In this context. pp.ENDI 2010 Security K 17 Wave 1 HEGEMONY LINK Unilateral hegemony is a unique form of state sovereignty that perpetuates the myth of stability in the international system Walker 2002 [RBJ. The other problem has remained largely in the background. The modern states system is always susceptible to war. and a hegemony. jstor] Sovereigns make the final discrimination. All of which is to say that the problem of inequality is already deeply inscribed in our modern accounts of the international. or anarchy. the states system affirms a unity. It is also susceptible to processes through which the states system itself dissolves into something else: into empire. an inequality that implies unequal responsibilities. 2. Vol. or a unilateralism.sality. only second. or an empire of some kind that finally turns the constitutive principle of sovereign equality into little more than a token gesture. to the necessity of sovereigns declaring a state of emergency and an exception to all norms. No. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. Most accounts of international relations have been preoccupied with the problem of war. they are neither alone nor universal. and thus of modern politics. ―International/Inequality. and the substitution of a vertical hierarchy for a horizontal field of spatially differentiated political communities. Sovereigns depend on the system of sovereigns that enable their particular sovereignty. 2002). Sovereignty may be the highest authority within a particular territory. 4. and quite properly so.

In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U. the idea of liberty. that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society. of Pennslyvania. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century.S.' Let's just be ourselves. of anarchy and chaos. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states. 2003 [Amy.S." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U. muse] Another dominant narrative about empire today. As Ignatieff writes. built on colonies. the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty. racial codes and colonial Orientalism.S. war in Vietnam. not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present. the "indispensable nation. Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law. This is also a narrative about race." 11 others.‖ p. one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose. and in showing how U.masks implicit racism and violence Kaplan. According to this logic. the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one.S. Those characteristics include basic political stability. which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism.1. reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power. recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves. . It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom. it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention . In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire. As scholars of American studies. These narratives of the origins of the current empire—that is. I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. but a process of transnational exchange. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote." in Madeleine Albright's words. American Quarterly 56. in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty. the accusation of terrorism alone." the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. literary. and democracy." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street. "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U. liberalism. and representative government. economic freedom. respect for property. democracy. and its view of corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings. we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world. and American power only. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. imperial actions. and liberty. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best. the embodiment of universal values of human rights. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. is that of the "reluctant imperialist." in his other nations and peoples to enter modernity. of failed modernity. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here. war against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago." 12 have much in common. is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule. the neoconservative and the liberal interventionist— Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past. the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy. As part of the "coming-out" narrative. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability.S.S. that America is the apotheosis of history. of English @ Univ. it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. and transformation.S.ENDI 2010 Security K 18 Wave 1 SOFT POWER LINK Soft power is the velvet glove of hegemony‘s iron fist. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. told by liberal interventionists. those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. past and present. rather. which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts. the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. At this This narrative does imagine limits to empire. without due process and proof. may have something to do with the world's problems." 13 the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U. which gained special resonance during the U. backed by unparalleled force. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration.S. as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The images of an unruly world. culturally understood. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms. then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U. ―Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today. yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U. In this logic. conquest and the white man's burden. "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and Today's desires. Prof. pragmatically conceived. from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for that it proclaims and applies to others. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for moment in time it is American power." 10 In this version. their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign—one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American." or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society. conflict. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history." Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act.

opportunity. Thus.[ 34] More specifically. welfare. for science and for policy science. and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. As a particular kind of intervention into life. we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. Now. security. where there is a policy problematic there is expertise. skills. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy. Issue 1: Global Governance. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions . All aspects of human conduct. it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth. selected. global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. too. Liberal Peace. any encounter with life. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy. but in terms instead of the management of population. resources. poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty. lecturer on international relations and professor of political Science at King‘s College in London. sexuality. a policy problematic will emerge. In principle. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. as Foucault noted. where there is an operation of power there is knowledge. there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. Any problematization is capable of becominga policy problem. governmentality. and Julian. and where there is expertise there." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated. Here. to evade its ponderous. bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these. in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. too. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems. global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. from Alternatives. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations . Here discursive formations emerge and. . poverty. and so on. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. formidable materiality." and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation . or otherwise have them officially adopted. and Complex Emergency] As a precursor to global governance. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. as do traditional accounts of power. culture. Professor of Political Science at Lancaster and internationally renowned author. to gain mastery over its chance events. is problematizable. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed. health. according to Foucault's initial account. This manifests itself in a never-ending cycle of responses to ―emergencies‖ that are doomed to fail Dillon and Reid 2000 [Michael. Volume 25. and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled.ENDI 2010 Security K 19 Wave 1 GOVERNMENTALITY LINK The 1ac is an example of governmentality – its the intersection between the desire to control populations and the desire to maintain a global order. demographics.

1-2) Our final thesis placed the study of geopolitical reasoning within the context of the study of hegemony in a nonstatist. an ordering of international space which defines the central drama in international politics in particularistic ways" (195). for hegemony IS more than the primus inter pares power of a state. in the period from 1945 to 1985. the rules governing world order were overwhelmingly shaped by the institutional power and disciplinary power/knowledge apparatuses headquartered in the United States. the administrators. Critical Geopolitics p. Gramscian-inspired sense. regulators and geographers of international affairs. One can have a condition of hegemony without a hegemonic state. .ENDI 2010 Security K 20 Wave 1 INTERNATIONAL NORMS/RULEMAKING LINK Setting international norms is a hegemonic practice seeks to order international space Tuathail 96‘ – Associate Professor of Geography at VT and Professor of Government and International Affairs (Gearoid O Tuathail. Their power is a power to constitute the terms of geopolitical world order. What is important here is the activity of rule making and rule following rather than state dominance. Those occupying positions of power within the United States "become the deans of world politics. although. A hegemonic power like the United States is by definition a "rule writer" for the world community.

or a terrorist. and hiding in terms of the evocation of particular discursive representations. a freedom fighter. The first epithet downplays the high political office of the individual in question and hides her former terrorist activity. even the "discursive connections they create are never entirely stable. it is not difficult to imagine that someone who would happily sit at a table with a person described as a Nobel Prize winner might refuse the invitation to sit with a former terrorist . a role highlighted by the entailments of terrorist. in other words. We might expect that this example means there is a person who is each of these things. the epithet terrorist downplays or hides the person's prime ministerial role. she will base her actions on the image created by that description .2' Lakoff and Johnson have been criticized for betraying a biological bias. however. for example. Each epithet relates to a particular discourse or set of discourses and can be seen as an indicator of a discursively constituted identity. and indeed they have been applied to at least one individual.only refusing securitizing discourse avoids this Mutimer 2000 [David. whereas using the epithet freedom fighter evokes a different discourse and a different set of entailments . the use of freedom fighter downplays the role of the individual in perpetrating acts of violence." "in" and "out" are based on our experiences of the world-we have an inside and an outside. they also allow for social rather than biological grounding: "In other words. Not only will the image of the other discussant be altered in relation to each descriptor. Even if we reject the possibility of the prediscursive. This difference in the entailments of the same label in different circumstances is important. however. these 'natural' kinds of experience are products of human nature. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. These labels are identity markers constituted in particular discourses rather than in any particular features of the individual in question or her activities. so do those of my discussant. downplaying. This is most obvious in the relation between terrorist and freedom fighter . a prime minister. I have invited a prime minister to the discussion. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. Generally. The description. that her characteristics are prediscursive. This is not always the case.ENDI 2010 Security K 21 Wave 1 TERRORISM DISCOURSE LINK Using ―terrorist‖ labels discursively shifts the perceived meaning of a particular actor and shapes other actor’s responses Mutimer 2000 [David. Indeed. because it demonstrates that not only does metaphor link discourses but that the production of those links depends on the discursive context in which the metaphor is evoked. we can think of the distinctions among highlighting. we can retain all that is important in this argument. There is a fairly serious concern with Lakoff and Johnson's formulatiou of the role of metaphor in our understauding. Thus. I have invited a noted freedom fighter to the discussion. I have invited a former terrorist to the discussion. however. The Weapons State. pg 21-22] It is not difficult to imagine a similar set of descriptors of direct relevance to international relations: I have invited a Nobel 'prize winner to the discussion. spatial metaphors of "up" and "down. forms a key part of the image of her fellow di~cussant. without social mediation. They speak of "grounding" our conceptual system in terms of simple elements of our everyday lives that we can experience directly. we stand erect. to make use of their iusights into metaphor."29 Nevertheless. In other words. Indeed. but so will that person's conversational strategies and interests. The use of freedom fighter by the Reagan administration in the 1980s meant that in certain circles the term has come to be a pejorative and not only entails the role of the individual so named in perpetrating acts of violence but marks those acts as violence in the cause of a reactionary politics. while others will vary from culture to culture. and although they clearly want to ground metaphors in part on our unmediated physiological experience of the world. Metaphors are not grounded in a real or literal experience. Similarly. given to another member of the group. further. if we accept that nothing exists outside discourse. Imagining Security 21 These four descriptors could all be applied to a single individual. We do not need to accept this possibility of presocial knowledge. To use the epithet terrorist is to evoke one discourse with a certain set of entailments that go along with it. the very idea of grounding tends to assume a hierarchy of knowledge and the possibility of preconstituted experience that is not socially mediated. as well as her status as a Nobel laureate. . Just as each of the epithets Lakoff and Johnson apply to their hypothetical dinner guest highlights and downplays or hides various parts of the person in question. pg 22-23] Consider again the earlier example I derived from Lakoff and Johnson: the individual described as a Nobel Prize winner. The Weapons State. having no other image on the basis of which to frame behavior toward this person. No risk of a turn: using the terrorist label constructs an image not based on the real but its redeployments are unstable and can still be used to demonize certain actors and populations. Some may be universal. we sleep lying down and rise when we awaken.

although this chapter does attempt a better understanding of the terrorist in situ. where he completed a M. or even preferable. terrorist studies became a fortress-haven at the edge of the social sciences. but it is US national identity. it proved increasingly difficult to find. 69-70 RC) It is more difficult . many have come to accept the ubiquity o f the terrorist threat as well as tale on the identity of the victim. even in polls taken immediately after a terrorist strike. reason for the intractability of terrorism: it has been subsumed by the traditional gambit of defining and unifying a national identity through the alienation of others. many preferred the non-identity of a silent but safe majority when it comes to taking on an enemy that is fearsome but faceless. anywhere and nowhere.at the moments of highest tension when sober thinking is most needed . or of one course of action when it comes time to think and act collectively against the terrorist threat. This is not to claim that one must sympathize with terrorism in order to understand it. collaborationist. although this chapter does try to reconstruct our knowledge and to critique current practices of terrorism and anti-terrorism.and certainly less popular .ENDI 2010 Security K 22 Wave 1 TERRORISM DISCOURSE LINK Rethinking the epistemological and ideological foundations of how we understand terrorism is necessary to understand the roots of violence." or worse.6 Common sense probably plays a conservative role: if polled. most Americans would probably not (for similar reasons) endorse surgical air-strikes on automobile plants or bee colonies to lessen the chances of an unlikely death. Nor is it to pretend that a total comprehension of terrorism is possible. even contorted feat. Rather. of stepping outside of the one – dimensional identities that terrorism and the national security culture have implanted in both sides the conflict. As others have noted.responses other than instant excoriation and threats of retaliation are seen as "soft. and join in the chorus of condemnation.Phil. Reflecting the diverse and highly individualistic forces behind terrorism. The second obstacle is ideological: to gain official entry into the terrorist debate one must check critical weapons at the door. in international relations (James Der Derian. there will indeed be external dangers. of one identity.nor can we be . remedial. During the 1980s. foe. as Gorbachev worked hard to improve relations with the United States. the majority of Americans are reluctant to endorse military retaliation. In the future. this is very reminiscent of the regimentation of critical thinking by threat-mongering that marked Cold War I in the 1940s and 1950s and the most morbid moments of Cold War II in the early 1980s.Phil.or risk suspicion of having sympathy for the terrorist devil.to assess the intellectual and structural obstacles blocking an inquiry into terrorism. or even a bee sting. we are not . it is to argue at the outset that any productive reading of terrorism requires difficult. and as the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate. What the polls probably reflected is that after Vietnam (and before another Lebanon debacle). an automobile accident. ontological.of one mind. Here lies the third. typologies. In spite of the odds that we are more likely to die from a lightning strike. The terrorist discourse Yet. . that it is truly at risk. a positivist's armory of definitions. and databases to be wielded as much against the methodological critic as the actual terrorist who might call into question the sovereign reason and borders of the nation-state. The affirmative‘s call for a hard approach merely obscures the conditions that cause retaliatory violence to begin with Der Derian – Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. uniform. let alone maintain the credibility of an alien. What this means is that following a rash of terrorist incidents . Let Oliver North remind us once again: "It is very important for the American people to understand that this is a dangerous world that we live at risk and this nation is at risk in a dangerous world‘s However. The first obstacle is epistemological: even the most conscientious and independent student of terrorism faces a narrowly bounded discipline of thought. But I suspect something beyond common sense is at work. and D. not the United States as a nation. Critical practices in international theory: selected essays p.

the majority of America ns who perceived a high threat of future terrorism in the United States (but were not overly anxious) supported the Bush administration‘s antiterrorism policies domestically and internationally. and these reactions shape support of government policies designed to combat terrorism. Based on a review of the literature below. terrorists may have a good grasp of psychological reality. Anxiety. 49. Moreover. Conversely.. Raghunathan and Pham 19999) whereas external and perceived threat increase support for outwardly focused retaliatory action (Hermann. 3 (Jul. consistent with terrorist‘ typical aims. Gallya. pp. The political importance of this distinction between perceived threat and the anxiety rests on their typical psychological effects: anxiety leads to an overtimaniation of risk and risk-averse behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000. with the need of governments in vulnerable countries to take forceful action against terrorists. expensive. Long argues that terrorists often ―use the unreasonable fear and the resulting political disaffection it has generated among the public to intimidate governments into making political concessions in line with its political goals‖ (1990. Charles. . there is persuasive agreement that the effects of terrorism extend well beyond its immediate victims and physical destruction to include a much broader target population (Crenshaw 1986. this anxiety then places pressure on political élites to negotiate and make concessions with terrorists on order to mollify their frightened citizens (Friedland and Merari 1985. Terlock.Department of Political science at stony university. Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav. 593-608) The perception of threat and the experience of anxiety are distinct but related public reactions to terrorism. Wilkinson 1987). Anxiety increases risk aversion. 2005). Stanley. The intended effects of terrorism are consistent with the psychological link between anxiety and risk aversion. Leonie. Stanley Feldman. Wardlaw 1982). A major function of terrorist violence is to instill anxiety in a target population. Professor and Associate Director. White 2002. and Visser 1999. and favored increased American isolationism. Associate Professor. potentially undercutting support for dangerous military action. Long 1990). tough antiterrorist policies require firm public revolve because they can be long lasting. In an area of research characterized by disagreement over the definition and objectives of terrorism. and Support of Antiterrorism Policies‖. As Berry puts it: ―A target that is incapable of responding to terrorism will lose public support and lessen its capabilities and confidence to thwart terrorism in the future‖ (1987. No. But this response may be undercut by heightened anxiety and an associated increase in the risk aversion among affected individuals. Findings from a national telephone survey may confirm the differing political effects of anxiety and perceived threat. Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University. Department of Political Science. The distinction between perceived threat and anxiety is intimately tied to the major objectives of terrorists and governments in countries targeted by terrorism. These motives contrast starkly. 296). we draw a critical distinction between perceived threat and the anxiety it can elict. Center for Survey Research. Vol. The minority of Americans who experienced high levels of anxiety in response to the September 11 attacks were less supportive of aggressive military action against terrorism. Jentleson and Britton 1998). ―Threat. 2001. in line with the objectives of targeted governments (Jentleson 1992.ENDI 2010 Security K 23 Wave 1 TERRORISM DISCOURSE LINK The aff reacts to the threat of terrorism through exaggerated anxiety created by political elites. Jentleson 1992. A serious threat to national security typically promotes support for military action. This encourages retaliatory violence and animosity—terror talk leads to war Huddy et al 05 (Leonie. a Professor. 5). American Journal of Political Science. perceived threat increases a desire for retaliation and promoters animosity toward a threatening enemy inline with the usual goals of effected governments. Jentleson and Britton 1998). There are differing psychological reactions to external threat . Psychological reactions to terrorism play a pivotal role in understanding public support for government antiterrorist policies. In this sense. however. however. and intrusive (Long 1990. As Crenshaw argues: ―The political effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by a psychological effects of violence on audiences‖ (1986-400). In contrast. less approving of President Bush.

family. and Etheredge (1979)...ENDI 2010 Security K 24 Wave 1 AT: TERRORISTS ARE IRRATIONAL The psychology of terrorism proves it is the result of rational frustrations and victimization. as well as the macro environmental issues involved in the relationships between groups. Therefore. . Psychologists may tend to see political or religious goals as an arena in which emotions originating elsewhere are stimulated and played out. ―Psychology of Terrorists: 4 types‖. Situational conformity theory concentrates on what is happening in the microenvironment. violent mob . Dollard (1939) and others have formed the basis for more politically oriented work. The use of force or the threat to use force usually implies the use of some form of violence.com/support-files/psychology-of-terrorists. Jeanne Knutson‘s research (1981) resulted in her belief that victimization is the motive force behind much political violence in the contemporary world. or all three. and ethological). This will give rise to a ―fairly specific internal inclination to be aggressive. Clinical & Forensic Psychologist.g. A common assumption is that terrorists use force or threat of force instrumentally in a conscious and premeditated fashion because they misguidedly think that it will enhance their probability of achieving a certain political or religious goal or set of goals. So. painful events or frustrations). Political psychologists are inclined to look at instances of the use of force or the threat of force in terms of both of these perspectives instrumental and expressive. Each act is usually based on some mixture of instrumental motivation and underlying psychological dynamics. These can be roughly divided into three categories: (1) biological theories (psychophysiological. 6/17. This general. focuses on what happens inside the individual. p. as well as Dollard and his associates. Ph. concentrates on the impact of both the microenvironment and the macro environment on individual behavior . sociobiological. initially nonaggressive arousal can . try to ascertain the particular mixture of the underlining acts of political violence. Ted Robert Gurr (1970) has developed a theory of revolutionary behavior based on frustration-aggression theory. scholars have advanced a wide variety of theories of human aggressiveness.What nonpolitical frustrations or drives are at the base of the behavior ? Berkowitz (1969) points out two basic variations on this theme. The question of the origins and triggers of human violence has intrigued students of human behavior at least since the earliest days of written history. Yet. which may consist of entire cultural or national collectivities. The classic example is that of a large group of people that suddenly turns into an angry. Ethnocentrism focuses on the dynamics of the micro environmental interactions within groups. not the pathologized evil the affirmative attributes to acts of terror Hamden 06 (Raymond H. Victimization is a personally experienced injustice which the victim knows to be unnecessary and which creates a basic fear of annihilation. we may see personal motives verses motives of principle.under appropriate conditions . During the twentieth century. Freud.be channeled into political violence. community. Discrete victimization events that have the strength to change the victim‘s perception of the world can cause the victim to act in defense of him or herself and his or her group in order to reduce the chances for further aggression against the self. Berkowitz‘s second variation (1975) is that a person may merely be excited or aroused. as well as Knutson‘s victimization theory. and (3) the discipline of political psychology (generating many theories to better understand terrorism and international violence).‖ which can be triggered by some political situation or event. Social learning theory. (2) there are the psychological and social-psychological theories (from Freudian theories to theories of situational conformity). http://www. First is the situation in which an individual is suffering from the effects of very unpleasant present or past conditions (e.D. terrorists are seen as psychopathic or having a religious or political cause. the psychologist may ask .all-about-psychology. 1-2. Knutson and Etheredge have emerged in direct response to events in the political world of psychological understanding. if we look at the individual players.pdf) Commonly.

http://www. it is possible to draw the conceptual boundaries that establish difference between two states and that also define a range of permitted behavior and beliefs. with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict. . the rise in absolute number of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place. Refugees continue to be generated by ―ethnic cleansing‖ campaigns in the Balkans. Within the context of this struggle. the power of royal authority over space was extended and deepened by newly powerful court bureaucracies and armies. the process by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested . economic collapse in Cuba. The results in many instances were often violent. and displacement. an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests. security is about specifying. as the jurisdictional ambitions of total authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. In regions both within and beyond the nominal domain of the Crown. with low levels of interaction. and Sudan. genocide in Rwanda left over 500. 7 It is either very confident of its ability to ward off the efforts of others to penetrate it. centralizing imperial state. a closed state is either very sure of itself and its purpose in the world. It was not a noun but a verb. In 1993 The United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees estimated that roughly 1 in every 130 people on earth has been forced into flight because of war and state persecution. the one most successful in excluding outside influences by drawing boundaries that can be secured. and xenophobic terror in many other states . today that figure is well over 18. Critical Geopolitics p. The aff‘s invocation of borders reifies geographic boundary drawing as a violent practice of mastery that leads to war and displacement while marginalizing those without the power over mapping Tuathail 96‘ – Associate Professor of Geography at VT and Professor of Government and International Affairs (Gearoid O Tuathail. Ronnie Lipschutz. this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers. To the opponents of the expansionist court. and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics . In addition an estimated 24 million people are internally displaced within their own states because of conflict. ed. Whether we accept such boundary definition as justifiable or not is beside the point. and very sure that it has the undying loyalty of its citizens. ethnic wars in the Caucus. the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the contradictions of marginalized peoples and nations .‖ On Security. Geography was not something already posses by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding.5 million refugees in the world. Indeed.ciaonet. and rebellious margins and dissident cultures. ―geography was a foreign imposition. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin. on the on hand. Imperial systems throughout history. a geo-graphing. The most secure state is. occupy. is still with us. under these conditions. While almost all of the land of the earth has now been territorialized by states. exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space.2 million. a "closed" state. a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along the lines established by royal authority. as friendly or hostile.org/book/lipschutz/index. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. in Barry Buzan's terms. But. the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name ―geography‖ in the early modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. Or. Although often assumed to be innocent the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize. From Chechnya to Chiapas and from Rondonia to Kurdistann and East Timor. state repression in Guatemala. it is so weak and insecure that. as Buzan's analysis suggests. war. Turkey. and administer space. In 1970 there were 2. could also be a part of this boundary-drawing. as in the case of North Korea. Specifying the goals of other states' behaviors. on the other hand . the centralizing states of the ―new monarchs‖ began organizing space around an intensified principle of royal absolutism.html] As a speech act. through discourse. the state is clearly the referent of security as speech act and as behavior. administration. or very insecure about its viability. In 16th century Europe. More than five hundred years later. closure is the only way to ensure that the state and its citizens will not be subverted and "turned" by external influences. so that no social and economic intercourse is desirable or necessary. Iraq. More recently.000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refuges from that state into surrounding states. ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End. from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world. the permitted conditions under which acts that "secure" the state can take place. Struggles over the ownership.ENDI 2010 Security K 25 Wave 1 BORDERS LINK Recognizing and naming boundaries is an essential component of securitization strategies Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. In a world of relatively autonomous states.1-2) Geography is about power. Indonesia.

depoliticizing criticism Edkins 1999 [Jenny. As R. that of "sovereignty" erases the traces of its own historicity. Postructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. The concept of sovereignty plays a crucial part in delimiting domestic "politics. it traces its origins and analyzes its Westphalian genesis. J." As with the master signifier "politics. p. as well as the conditions under which alternatives to the present have been rendered implausible or even unthinkable. a sharp delineation of here and there. 139 ] Theories of international relations can be complicit in this process of concealment. B. Walker has pointed out. with the domestic realm within the sovereign state being seen as the realm of "political community" and the international arena as the domain of anarchy. international relations theory is a discourse that systematically reifies an historically specific spatial ontology. "79 Theories of international relations contribute to the depoliticization of the international and the domestic every time they take for granted the separation of the two.ENDI 2010 Security K 26 Wave 1 BORDERS LINK .REALISM Realist theories of IR rely on a historically specific spatial ontology that delineate political communities according to inside/outside dichotomies. Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. In Walker's words again." however.80 . This separation is for some (but by no means all) scholars the very self-definition of the "discipline. a discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state as the only ground on which structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can be revealed. they are "expressions of the limits of modern politics [that] reveal some of the crucial conditions under which modern political life is possible at all." and it claims a past as well as a present. where political or ethical community is replaced by power politics in some raw state of nature.

Phil. where he completed a M. a correspondence theory of truth. non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled. and D. national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay. posing as a realistic worldview. reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. However. Based on linear notions of causality. Indeed. have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations. distortions. a prisonhouse. technologies and armies. national. quantum effects. but the capacity of conventional language itself. like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the avian virus? How. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for the unprepared and inadequately defended. in international relations (James Der Derian. there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. 2001.edu/articles/1430/ RC) It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. But this parochial fear. and global. we continue to expect (and. emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be. but. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters. assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media. understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts. and the materiality of power. http://hir. upon entry to Baghdad. Worse. and lies can close this gap. we place our faith in national borders and guards. terrorist attack. To keep us safe. or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex. in the absence of a credible alternative. has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11. bureaucracies and experts.ENDI 2010 Security K 27 Wave 1 AT: BORDERS KEY TO SECURITY Borders don‘t enhance security and realism does not predict security problems—they are unprepared for contemporary security dilemmas and construct them in ways that create selffulfilling prophecies Der Derian 05 – Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. unprecedented nature. for instance.harvard. Predicting the President. the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War. who. what if the ―failure of imagination‖ identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if CONTINUES… the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the ―ultra-catastrophe‖ that did? What . And if language is. The intractability of disaster. However. they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the ―big one‖—a force-five hurricane. realism. as Nietzsche claimed. between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis. erodes not only the very distinction of the local. and before Hurricane Katrina. especially its unexpected. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. unplanned. realism is its supermax penitentiary. flapping of a butterfly‘s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War. His use of hyberbolic terms like ―ultra-catastrophe‖ and ―fall-out‖ is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities. how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes. the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security. Bush. a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East.Phil. pandemic disease—have become part of the problem. not the solution.

bi-. security. But what if the state. but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix. national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. and disaster exercises—as well as border guards. master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: ―The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means. religious.ENDI 2010 Security K 28 Wave 1 AT: BORDERS K SECURITY CONTINUED… if worse-case scenarios. However. in other words. for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political. is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the (global event. or multi-polar. as the United States has done since September 11. these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology. and repetitively gamed. if necessary. interests. It might well be uni-. changing not only how we interpret events. and strength. Carl Schmitt. defining friend from foe. As Paul Virilio. but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events.‖ What. continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany. Varying in identity. facing the global event. once declared. democratic means. it will necessarily exercise the sovereign ―exception:‖ declaring a state of emergency. when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety. simulation training. and well-being through legal. and cultural boundaries. then. eradicating the threat to the state. ―planned disasters. and.‖ . cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the ―planned disaster‖? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can. and go it alone. bureaucratically installed. economic. concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as ―negative synergy‖ and ―cascading effects‖ —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as ―normal accidents‖ are built into new technologies—from must ask whether ―ultra-catastrophes‖ are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management.

they are not a common item in Chinese security studies journals (Stenseth 1999. 34). Zheng Degang 1999. in fact there is little actual conflict there. China is involved in the age-old process of "writing security" (Campbell 7yg8a). i99). Chinese actions in the South China Sea are quite predictable. and there is little sign of the promised petrochemical riches. there is no "there" there: in addition to a lack of military conflict. 11. Wh-2). As Walker puts it. The South China Sea disputes thus show how the primary purpose of state security is not to secure a particular nation-state. but to secure the limitation of politics to the spatio-temporal demarcations of state sovereignty that limit identity to citizenship. National maritime territory has to be created to manufacture threats to national security that are tied to writing the security of the newly discovered ancient "sacred territory. . PAGE 71-74] China further formalized its claim in February 1992. Although the South China Sea is commonly seen as one of the main "security problems" in East Asia. Through its military and diplomatic narratives. which creates the subjectivity of the state.ENDI 2010 Security K 29 Wave 1 SOUTH CHINA SEA LINK Threat of war in the South China Sea is a falsely constructed maneuver of securitization CALLAHAN 2004 [PROF IR AND DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES U DURHAM. Whiting 1998. rather than on bigger guns (Ling Xingzheng 1998. Erected structures and equipment lying on an area of 60o square meters of the construction site were swept away" (Hu Zhanfan rgg4. fisheries are depleted. and under what conditions? (Walker i997. CONTINGENT STATES: GREATER CHINA AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS. 7i-72. the main enemy in the South China Sea is the sea itself: "In October 1993. Penghu Islands. the Diaoyu Islands. the Chinese press. As in the Kasmiri conflict between India and Pakistan. W/T-z). As the newspaper articles tell us. China-like the other states in the dispute-is creating a problem in the South China Sea to craft and manage borders that otherwise do not make sense. Campbell z998a. The very active project of transforming China from a continental power to a maritime power serves as a cogent example of security not defending us so much as "tell[ing] us who we must be" (Walker 1997. the sun will: "[W]e heard of instances of asphalt felt melting and thermometers bursting under the scorching sun of the Nansha islands" (Hu Zhanfan 1994. when the National People's Congress passed the "Law of the People's Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas. where the greatest casualties are to altitude sickness and frostbite (Krishna 1996. 3r2). as the relevant countries have signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea . When the sea does not get you. that has made "a relatively peaceful area into one of serious security concerns" (Zha. "The situation in the South China Sea area has been basically stable. Dongsha Islands. The right to defend this sovereignty through military action is included in this law. both sympathetic and critical readings of China's diplomacy in the South China Sea reaffirm that China is being converted to the Westphalian notion of the sovereignty of nation-states. 78. Once again. The "Nansha Spirit" describes enduring the hardship of the weather conditions. "the subject of security is the subject of security" (Walker Ty97. The White Paper on China's National Defense Zoo2 declares. although the South China Sea disputes are a hot topic in English-language security studies journals." This action disturbed the region because it unilaterally made a legal claim for ownership not just of the islands in the South China Sea but also for Taiwan. Campbell r9y8a. Daojiong zooi. m)."In other words. Zo hit the main pillbox. there is no substantial territory to defend . High waves rolled over the rooftop of the three-story-high building. i9g). To rethink security-and to rethink the "problem" and "solution" of the Spratly Islands disputes-we have to "rethink the character and location of the political" by asking who or what is to be secured. Indeed. Hence equipment upgrading concentrates on stronger air conditioners and better fresh water supplies." It is the conceptualization of "security" itself. Typhoon No. and to safeguard state security as well as its maritime rights and interests" ("Law on Territorial Waters" BBC/SWB 28 November 1992. Austin i998. But even this aggressive unilateral action is still phrased in the familiar language of state sovereignty: the law is "to enable the PRC to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial waters and its rights to exercise control over their adjacent areas. and popular histories. rather than surviving the horrors of battle. zoo-ZOi). To put it another way. in the South China Sea soldiers do not fight each other so much as storms and sunstroke.ti9). 36). z99). and "other islands that belong to the PRC" ("Law on Territorial Waters" BBC/SWB 28 November i99z.

S. which. Think of that ―Afghan face‖ mask. It‘s the language — behind which lies a deeper structure of argument and thought — that is essential to Washington‘s vision of itself as a planetstraddling goliath.' and 'above all. And yet. a statement like this seems so obvious. can be dangerous indeed. If they think we are there for our own purposes. power. the phrase is revelatory — and oddly blunt. there‘s really only one way to understand it (not that anyone here stops to do so). what does it mean to ―put a face‖ on something that assumedly already has a face? In this case. It‘s hardly surprising that the Secretary of Defense would pick up such a phrase. Now. runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch. . it helps normalize American practices in the world. American-style. essentially passes unnoticed here.ENDI 2010 Security K 30 Wave 1 MIDDLE EAST LINK Desire for stability in the middle east represent violent unconscious desires for global control Engelhardt 9 Tom Engelhardt.‖ U. in fact. really wrong in Iraq. there must be an Afghan face on this war. but it also has the potential to blind us to those realities. part of Washington‘s everyday arsenal of words and images when it comes to geopolitics. then we will go the way of every other foreign army that has been in Afghanistan. in our world.S. is not the one most Afghans want to see. as part of the flotsam and jetsam that regularly bubbles up from the American imperial unconscious. quite correctly. it has to mean putting an Afghan mask over what we know to be the actual ―face‖ of the Afghan War — ours — a foreign face that men like Gates recognize. 'The Afghan people must believe this is their war and we are there to help them. and war. Largely uncommented upon. is part of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates‘s before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: recent testimony on the Afghan War U. ―The Imperial Unconscious‖ Google Here. Of course. this is Empire-speak. in perilous times. military and civilian officials used an equivalent phrase in 2005-2006 when things were going really. comfortably shielding us from certain global realities. 3/1/09 Foreign Policy In Focus. make no mistake. co-founder of the American Empire Project and contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. So let‘s consider just a few entries in what might be thought of as The Dictionary of American Empire-Speak. so reasonable as to be beyond comment. After all. according to Bloomberg News. As an image. words create realities even though such language. in all its strangeness. And yet. realistic. goals in Afghanistan must be 'modest. It was then commonplace — and no less unremarked upon — for them to urgently suggest that an ―Iraqi face‖ be put on events there. stop a moment and think about this part of it: ―There must be an Afghan face on this war. Evidently back in vogue for a different war.' Gates said.com.

Department of International Relations Bilkent Univ. in following a policy of dual containment US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient to US interests. it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health (see Mernissi 1993). 1 Throughout the twentieth century.the geopolitical inventions of security. PhD International Politics.ENDI 2010 Security K 31 Wave 1 MIDDLE EAST LINK Representations can’t be divorced from policy actions. this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. The Cold War approach to regional security in the Middle East was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. What is more. In the aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq. mainly the United States. During the Cold War what was meant by 'security in the Middle East' was maintaining the security of Western (mostly US) interests in this part of the world and its military defence against other external actors (such as the Soviet Union that could jeopardise the regional and/or global status quo). The sanctions regime adopted to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction has caused a problem of food insecurity for Iraqi people during the 1990s. In the aftermath of the events of September 11 US policy-makers have focused on 'terrorism' as a major threat to security in the Middle East and elsewhere. Rather. while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity at the same time hinder others. Traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the US approach to security in the 'Middle East'. The way to enhance regional security. it is estimated that if it were not for the monthly basket distributed as part of the United Nations' 'Oil for Food' programme. people are still far from meeting their daily needs. were designed for this purpose. it lays out the contours of a framework for thinking differently about regional security in the Middle East. 'approximately 80 percent of the Iraqi population would become vulnerable to food insecurity' (Hurd 2003). For example. US policy so far has been one of 'confronting the symptoms rather than the cause' (Zunes 2002:237) as it has focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect of the socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war on Iraq) in addressing these threats. Iraqi world politics. Such concerns rarely make it into analyses on regional security in the Middle . During the 1990s. Prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in the security concerns and interests of Western states. it is difficult to exaggerate the signifcance of Middle Eastern insecurities for By adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the Middle East. was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. the cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regional Security in the Middle East p. the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were made insecure not only by the threat caused by Iraq's military capabilities. and (conceptions and practices of) security. Iran (until the 1978-79 revolution). the study argues that the current state of 'regional security' often a euphemism for regional insecurities . Besides.has its roots in practices that have throughout history been shaped by its various representations . University of Wales. 2005 [Pinar. Let us take a brief look at these characteristics. many Arab policy-makers begged to differ. Yet. The implication of this Western bias in security thinking within the Middle Eastern context has been that much of the thinking done on regional security in the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions of 'security'. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup). they argued. Aberystwyth.they establish a framework for thinking about the Middle East. For. the measures that are adopted to meet such military threats sometimes constitute threats to the security of individuals and social groups. Israel and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent. East. This is not to underestimate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regional security. As the recent developments in Israel/Palestine and the US-led war on Iraq have showed. the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon. but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women's rights under the cloak of religious tradition. Saudi Arabia. see Sosland 2002).. This was (and still is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused. societal and environmental problems caused by resource scarcity do not only threaten the security of individual human beings but also exacerbate existing conflicts (as with the struggle over water resources in Israel/Palestine. the Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955). directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. In the eyes of British and US defence planners. Western security interests in the Middle East during the Cold War era could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices. They selectively reveal and conceal aspects of the Middle East to represent it as conflict prone Bilgin. the Middle East remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. Two security umbrella schemes. communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threats to security in the Middle East during the Cold War. In doing this. the point is that these top-down perspectives. and the maintenance of 'friendly' regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. Focusing on the constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions. Indeed.

12-5 Reflecting upon the history of US engagement with the Middle East. Little (2002:314) writes: Although there is greater appreciation for the complexities of the Muslim world than a generation ago. Department of International Relations Bilkent Univ. Douglas Little identifies representations of the region as the problem behind policy failures . In his later works (see Said 1994b. According to Little. which is informed by this representation. in turn. one newspaper columnist warned: 'Middle East is not Europe' (Zaharna 2003). According to Thompson. Such awareness . when they deserved a better fate. Thompson and Said are pointing to are the different impact representations have on those who produce the representations and those who are represented. Little's argument builds upon that of Edward Said in his 1978 book Orientalism. this should not be taken to suggest that the Middle East is destined to relive its insecure past. . Aberystwyth. one is reminded of the numerous attempts made by US policy-makers during the Cold War to generate reform and modernisation movements in the Middle East.ENDI 2010 Security K 32 Wave 1 MIDDLE EAST LINK Representations are the root cause of policy failures and middle east conflict Bilgin. it helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. films and news reports depicting Arabs as demonic anti-Western others and Israelis as heroic pro-Western partners and having watched in horror the events of 11 September. would enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security to help constitute an alternative future whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security. According to Said. Having been fed a steady diet of books. Thompson's observation on the impact British historical representations of India have had on Indian politics (Said 2001:44-5). (quoted in Said 2001:45) Reading Thompson. By way of adopting this spatial representation. writings on India in English 'simply left out the Indian side of things' thereby deepening the irreconcilability between Indians and the British. have failed. 1995b. as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject . 2001) Said went on to show how contemporary representations of the Middle East (and Islam) in the media (as well as academia) have reduced it to terrorism and very little else. In the immediate aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq. Those measures. and (conceptions and practices of) security is not mere intellectual exercise. Libya and Iran) (Little 2002:193-227). Thompson wrote: Our misrepresentation of Indian history and character is one of the things that have so alienated the educated classes of India that even their moderate elements have refused to help the Reforms [of colonial policy]. has reflected the Cold War security concerns of the great powers while neglecting that of regional states and peoples . speak and act meaningfully' (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:45). the American public understandably fears Osama bin Laden and cheers Aladdin. 2005 [Pinar.P.. What all share is the damaging effect representations have had on both groups of actors. some of which attempts have backfired (as with Iraq. Regarding the future.no longer lions but their fierceness . because of this sullenness. it is 'American Orientalism' defined as 'a tendency to underestimate the peoples of the region and to overestimate America's ability to make a bad situation better' that has often misled US policy-makers in their dealings with the region. Said's point was that the academic discourse of Orientalism (defined as 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ―the Orient‖ and [most of the time] ―the Occident‖' [Said 1995a: 2]) had not only helped to make the Middle East what it has become but also made it difficult to become something else: a book on how to handle a fierce lion might … cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions. Hence the argument that the current state of regional insecurity in the Middle East has its roots in practices that have been informed by its dominant representation: the 'Middle East'. Indeed. force it to be fierce since that is what it is. Such representations that emphasised Middle Eastern insecurities without reflecting upon their roots have had the effect of privileging certain security practices (such as the 1998-99 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme) whilst marginalising others (such as the adoption of a more comprehensive long-term policy of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East). and that is what in essence what we know or can only know about it. Yet. the origins of fierceness. What Little. PhD International Politics. Becoming aware of the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics' (Dalby 1991:274) and exploring the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions. Regional Security in the Middle East p. where the author pointed to the relationship between representations and practice . 1997. Similarly.we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion's fierceness be handled will actually increase its fierceness. The Middle Eastern security discourse. the Middle East has been categorised in terms of its politics (as the region that 'best fits the realist theory of international politics' [Nye 2000:163]) and the type of foreign policy its 'nature' demands. and so forth. and how they think security should be sought in this part of the world. (Said 1995a: 94) This is because the Orientalist discourse does not merely represent the 'Orient' but also lays down the rules that enable one to 'write. the Middle East as a spatial representation has been repressive in that it has had 'the kind of authority … [that] doesn't permit or make room for interventions on the part of those represented' (Said 2001:42). what they view as referent object(s). Said's argument is in line with E. University of Wales. most Americans still view radical Islam as a cause for instant alarm.

―Like his father. does not preclude the continued deployment of representational practices along the axis of responsibility. As historian Barbara Tuchman once noted. ―Missile defense. As such.‖ ―moral‖).org/contents/library/0210. even by most orthodox accounts. the Iraqis. for Europeans. ―What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of http://www. is the effect created by the use of the opening phrase. What. represent.‖ The CIA official continues in his assessment: It is easy to caricature Kim Chong-il – either as a simple tyrant blind to his dilemma or as a technocratic champion of sweeping change. in diametric contrast. ―is for Americans. compassionate. just such a pristine identity is often adduced as the universal ideal to which all nations and peoples are presumed to aspire – a point made forcefully in the earlier cited ―end of history‖ thesis popular in mainstream political debate at the close of the Cold War. secret treatises. or wishful thinking.‖ we are told. The reality is more complex… Like his father. at least those parts that are ―rational. choice of predicates. and for all peace-loving peoples on the face of the Earth.sipri. the ―shrewd‖ Kim makes ―bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy‖ – an indication of chronic irresponsibility in North Korea‘s international relations. of course – done much the same thing with foreign fears of renewed famine and the chaos that could accompany any unravelling of his regime. we knew the [Pyongyang] regime was brutal within its borders and a menace beyond.65 In other words. Equally interesting is the notion that authoritarian or rogue-state leaders. and not only its leaders or certain individuals. innocent. We may note here the likely intrusive influence of another discourse.‖ one congressman averred. Otherness. spheres of influence. is the norm in these enlightened times. In terms of exclusionary practices. particularly that on nineteenth-century European diplomacy as it figures in American intellectual and popular culture.pdf] America.ENDI 2010 Security K 33 Wave 1 NORTH KOREA LINK Claims of Korean ―instability‖ are rooted in exclusionary racism Seng. triple alliances‖64 and other such forms of Machiavellian intrigue for which America. But evaluation of the missile threat from North Korea. This is not to imply that this intelligence estimate on Kim was essentially all caricature and thereby shorn of ―truth.69 Hence the tenuousness of such constructions of identity through excluding contradictions and tensions that are as much a part of Self as it is of the Other. or (most recently) the Afghans. has been realist – in both its prudential as well as ignoring or denying North Korean complicity in the light of its sizeable transfers of missile technology to the Middle East. Its commando raids into South Korea and its assassination attempts against successive South Korean presidents – including the 1983 bombings in Rangoon that killed 21 people – were clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders. this effacement stands out starkly in the light of resistant discourses – mostly but not exclusively from European sources – which portray America as a rogue state68 given the apparent lack of ―strategic restraint‖ in its post-Cold War foreign policy. Kim Chong-il. irresponsible. ―Like everyone else‖? To who exactly does ―everyone‖ refer? That this or its ruinous forays abroad. nowhere in his words does Wolfowitz imply that there are as such no immoral or irresponsible Americans. and their ilk – epitomize the darkest of the dark metaphysics of human nature. ignorance. But the extreme views of him tend to be the product of bias. for instance. and righteous identity – had no place. He knows that proliferation is something we want to stop. altruistic – the polar opposite of all that rogue states. July. can be expected to harm the US at the slightest provocation – a representation of danger that finds easy resonance with American policymakers because of its familiarity rather than any likelihood of such an eventuation. To be sure. responsible/irresponsible – axis.67 Indeed. Thus. what is effaced or erased by the above statement are plausible illustrations of bad behaviour in American foreign policy: a policy orientation that. That (and here we are left to infer) ―North Korea‖ or ―Iraq‖ is ruled by such roguish elements can only mean that such states can. however. . And roguish as such are their foreign policies. Further. analysis is intelligible at all depends upon the presupposition that this particular reading – an American reading. that the enumerated acts above were those perpetrated by Kim Il-song and not by his son. Against these inscriptions of immorality or amorality stand. In his rogue states are therefore roguish. Kim Chong-il has tried to drum up outside assistance by trading off international concerns about his missile programs and sales.63 The evident attempt at nuance in the above analysis. for Russians. for most Americans the notion of diplomacy carries with it ―all the wicked devices of the Old World. alternatively. besides lacking in rationality and viewing problem solving as a form of weakness.62 Again. and possibly even China and Russia.‖66 Without what those exclusionary practices produce is the materializing effect of a Pyongyang regime that. Indeed. say. indeed they should. in Wolfowitz‘s rendition. Machiavellian aspects – throughout much of the Cold War period. Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore. (by proxy) the Palestinians. not accidental.‖ of the analytical level of state/regime connotes that all America. therefore be properly referred to as rogue states. the deputy CIA director asserted: Like everyone else. idealized as the New World – a seemingly virginal. is also discursively constituted along a moral/immoral – or. to be precise – is universally accepted by one and all. 28. But this is clearly not the case as implied by the vociferous and potentially violent tide of militant Muslims in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East. are ―ruthless and avaricious‖ – an intentional. he has been shrewd enough to make bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy. if anything. who hold Washington in contempt for the latter‘s alleged ―brutality‖ and ―menace‖ toward. is thereby kind. Kim Chong-il. after all. or just plain evil given the damning evidence of dastardly deeds that proffer ―clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders. in the case of ―democracies. seems not to matter in this analysis. balances of power. it bears reminding that the argument here does not refuse the historical ―reality‖ and tragic consequences either of Pyongyang‘s oppressive policies at home interpretive conclusions concerning the brutality of the Pyongyang regime cannot be separated from the morality axis on which this particular statement turns. Nor does he even hint that all citizens of the discursive effect is such that we are left with the impression that leaders of rogue nations – Saddam Hussein.‖ ―responsible. however. He has – more subtly.‖ Further. the discursive effect of the preceding constructions is the naturalization of the Pyongyang regime as immoral. IDSS Commentary No. what is good for America is obviously good for the whole world (or. moral ―America.‖ And here the unequal adoption by Wolfowitz‘s discourse. 2002 [Tan See. political correctness. although it is the latter Kim‘s government with whom the Bush Administration must deal.

because – as it is argued – practices of problematization hegemonized the ways of thinking. right or good are negotiated and defined (Torfing 2005a: 14. thus. it was treated as a fact. that is. Hajer 2005). when meaning is fixed. which are based on material capabilities. the exclusive character of a hegemonic discourse makes it unintelligible to make sense of North Korea‘s nuclear program in terms of. i. The hegemonic discourse regarding North Korea provides the framework for a specific interpretation in which the words . said or done in a meaningful way. 13 Applied to this case. the role of intellectuals (―men of letters‖) such as philosophers. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA. diplomatic activity and efforts to hegemonize and secure this certain kind of reality. As Jacob Torfing argues ―a discursive truth regime […] specifies the criteria for judging something to be true of false‖. which involved and enabled certain implications and material consequences such as the public criticism of North Korea.14 Basically. good or true. . Referring to the productive character of discursive hegemony. in order to be interpreted and represented in a certain way (Campbell 1998: 3). what he calls. That is to say. in terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 105). so that it is accepted as common sense or reality. are problematized. Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies.com/meta/p253290_index. which is used here. actions or policies of it are attached with meaning. also Jackson 2005: 20. but also what kinds of action are possible. In other words.ENDI 2010 Security K 34 Wave 1 NORTH KOREA LINK Representations of North Korea are rooted in ideological hegemony not objective data Shim. 2008 [David. if you can mark someone or something with a specific label. Discursive hegemony can be regarded as the result of certain practices. energy needs. in which a particular understanding or interpretation appears to be the natural order of things (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). then certain kinds of acts become feasible.e. In 1999 US intelligence agencies indicated to preparing measures taken by North Korea to test fire a missile. what can be thought. and further states. not only one is able to define what is right. cf. rely on a notion developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971). by introducing inter-subjective and ideological aspects into this concept. to build a broad majority to confirm this view on North Korea. to become a material fact. the issuance of statements. This naturalization consolidates a specific idea. hegemonized. common sense resembles a hegemonic discourse. Although the action was not yet executed. His merit was to conceptualize hegemony in terms of power without the use of force to reach consent by the dominated class Laclau and Mouffe‘s (2001: chapter 2) concept of hegemony. In other words. Accordingly. However.e. important to note is. peasantry) in terms of the former. The process of fixing meaning. journalists and artists (Gramsci 1971: 5-43). that is. for instance. which is a dominant interpretation and representation of reality and therefore accepted to be the valid truth and knowledge. is hegemonic. through education and. Cox 1983. since it reduces the range of possibilities and excludes alternative meanings by determining the ways in which the signs are related to each other. the practices events does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for hegemonizing interpretational and representational practices because of problematizing North Korea took place even before an action was done. that within such a discursive framework the criteria for acknowledging something as true. acting and speaking about North Korea. www. i. also Mills 2004: 14-20). 19. But the existence of real actions do not need to be carried out. when an element (sign with unfixed meaning) is transformed through articulation into a moment (sign with fixed meaning).html] Gramsci broadened the traditional notion of hegemony beyond the view of mapping hegemony in terms of leadership and dominance. it can be stated that discursive hegemony depends on the interpretation and representation by actors of real events since the interpretation of non-existent facts would not make sense.allacademic. hegemony contains the ability of a class (bourgeois) to project the world view over another (workers. if one is able to define this yardstick. the Six-Party Talks can be regarded as an outcome of the dominating interpretation of reality (cf. which is taken for granted by involved actors and makes sense of the(ir) world. it determines. As Hall (1998: 1055-7) argues. Suh Jae-Jung (2004: 155) gives an example of this practice. Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia. Production.

passive descriptions of reality. Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment.S. associated with the first assumption. oriental studies. I want to argue that U. and ought to be." their debates have been underpinned by some common ground. followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other. the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. (4) Yet. security-conscious nation. which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography. Lampton. More specifically. . meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U. namely. empirically revealed by scientific means. To perform this task. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. David M. In other words." That is." (2) Like many other China scholars. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U. indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object. (1) While U. it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral. it is self-fulfilling in practice.S. and international relations.China Relations.S. I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. Finally. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. As such. so far. especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. the "China threat" literature. This is reflected.S. international relations community.S. suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today. Firstly. former president of the National Committee on U. whose reality can be. political science. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is. particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident. and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. they are not value-free." (3) Secondly. where it might be going. I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate.S. they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is. And thirdly.-China relations.S. but are better understood as a kind of normative.THREAT Representations of China as a threat ignore the normative value-judgments inherent to the process of claiming to empirically know Chinese national and political identity—this makes security threats self-fulfilling prophecies Pan 04‘ – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: ―The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics‖. international relations literature. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today." nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. For example. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China.S. this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U. for example. after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China. the China field in the West in general and the U. for example). preexisting Chinese reality out there. in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. objective descriptions of an independent. Rather. In doing so.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. anthropology.ENDI 2010 Security K 35 Wave 1 CHINA LINK. in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States. and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world. Alternatives RC) China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.

S. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U. as Edward Said points out. the U. multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that. absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U. [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. from a discursive construction of otherness. strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. Like orientalism. 305 -307 RC) By now. In this respect. power preponderance in the post–Cold War world can still be legitimated. as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested." a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate. almost by its mere geographical existence. in turn. Little wonder that for many U.-China relations. self. self-imaginary.S. 305 -307 RC) I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U. China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States.S. at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false.‘s role in global politics Pan 04‘ – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global.S.ENDI 2010 Security K 36 Wave 1 CHINA LINK . but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. a concern central to the dominant U. Political."93 . Because of this. but this may not work in the case of China.S. it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. to construct as a threat Pan 04‘ – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global.S. it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening. Vol. so that U.S. IR literature is derived.S. concerned with absolute certainty and security."62 At this point. 29 Pg. 29 Pg.S. tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking. Rather. self and on a positivist-based realism. Vol. Indeed.THREAT The characterization of China has a threat robs it of subjectivity and makes it only strategically useful for the U. in many ways. Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war. China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other. and hard-line stance in today's China. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union.S. nationalist extremism. Within these frameworks. "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds. "China" in U. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States." Such an account of China. China specialists. Local. "64 China threats are products of narcissistic understandings of the U. Political.S. primarily. Local. "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us.

" (6) 
 
 One such challenge is thought to be job losses in the United States. Pan 04‘ – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: ―The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics‖. it also poses challenges for other countries. which. China expert Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution suggested that "the pace of China's industrial development and trade expansion is unparalleled in modern economic history. wealthier China would have greater where-withal to increase its arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs and to increase their lethality through improvements in range.S.. Congressman Bob Schaffer claimed that China's military buildup. as they put it. according to Time magazine journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro. in some quarters it evokes much more aggressive analogies." (9) 
 
 In this context. and survivability. For many. was aimed at the United States .8 billion in 1995. is 
 
 a function of a Chinese strategy to target certain industries and to undersell American competition via a system of subsidies and high tariffs.S. (8) 
 
 For many. First and foremost. congressional panel found that at least 760. (7) Associated with this economic boom is China's growing trade surplus with the United States.S." He went on: "While this has led to unprecedented improvements in Chinese incomes and living standards.5 billion in 1988 to roughly $33. manufacturing jobs have migrated to China since 1992.S. (11) . this "threat" is obvious for a variety of reasons concerning economic. such as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Greater Germany. A recent study done for a U. . accuracy. If China continues its rate of economic expansion. absolute growth in Chinese nuclear capabilities should be expected to increase.ENDI 2010 Security K 37 Wave 1 CHINA LINK – ECONOMY/COMPETITIVENESS Representations of China‘s advanced economic competitiveness construct it as a threat to the U. As Denny Roy argues: "A stronger. This trade imbalance. also frightening is a prospect of the emergence of so-called "Greater "Although [Greater China] was originally intended in [a] benign economic sense. cultural. military. believe that China's economic challenge inevitably gives rise to a simultaneous military threat.. Alternatives RC) That China constitutes a growing "threat" to the United States is arguably one of the most important "discoveries" by U. already under way at an alarming rate. U. Hong Kong. increased nearly tenfold from $3. and political dimensions.000 U.S. As Harry Harding points out. IR scholars in the post-Cold War era. And that is why the deficit is harmful to the American economy and likely to become an area of ever greater conflict in bilateral relations in the future. and Taiwan)." (10) Furthermore. much of today's alarm about the "rise of China" resolves around the phenomenal development of the Chinese economy during the past twenty-five years: Its overall size has more than quadrupled since 1978. some China" (a vast economic zone consisting of mainland China.

and political "reality.S. . While there are debates over the extent to which the threat is imminent or to which approaches might best explain it. it is argued. as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world. to have a better understanding of how the discursive construction of China as a "threat" takes place. Political. perhaps. if only with regard to international prestige and respect. China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals.ENDI 2010 Security K 38 Wave 1 CHINA LINK – HOSTILE RISE / POWER VACUUM Predictions of China‘s hostile rise are not objective realities but discursive constructions of China‘s otherness designed to bolster U. inevitably foster growing friction with Japan. China. This. from this perspective. it seems there has been enough reason and empirical evidence for the United States to be vigilant about China's future ambition. dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking order." some commentators arrive at a similar conclusion based on the historical experience of power realignment as a result of the rise and fall of great powers." (21) 
 
 For this reason. hegemony Pan 04‘ – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global. when they claim that "China can pose a grave problem. Japan)." Betts and Christensen are convinced that they are merely referring to "the truth. the "China threat" literature is best understood as a particular kind of discursive practice that dichotomizes the West and China as self and other. 29 Pg. 305 -307 RC) Apart from these so-called "domestic" reasons for the "China threat." (24) Similarly. Richard K. self-evidentiary attitudes that underpin it. is regarded as the most likely candidate to fill the power vacuum created by the end of U.-Soviet rivalry in East Asia. India or the United States. the "objective" quality of such a threat has been taken for granted. Vol. Local. In my view. a continental power surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker (with the exception of the United States and. I want to question this "truth." (25) 
 
 In the following sections." (23) For Huntington. self-imagination. the rise of China has often been likened to that of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan on the eve of the two world wars. In this sense. Betts and Thomas J. Therefore." and. per se. according to Kenneth Lieberthal at the University of Michigan (and formerly of the U. the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and strategic thinker at the University of Pennsylvania. (22) 
 
 At this point. a bustling country with great expectations. Russia. economic. more generally. the challenge of "Greater China" to the West is simply a rapidly growing cultural.S.S. Christensen argue: 
 
 Like Germany a century ago. it is now necessary to turn attention to a particularly dominant way of U.S. question the objective. which have always forced realignment of the international system and have more often than not led to war. recognizing the "China threat" is "commonsense geopolitics. "will inevitably present major challenges to the United States and the rest of the international system since the perennial question has been how the international community can accommodate the ambitions of newly powerful states. the "truism" that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality. For example. In the words of Walter McDougall. State Department). The quest for a rightful "place in the sun" will.

partner and ally. engagement with Russia. foreign policy agenda.S. ―Normalizing U. once reborn as a stable. The United States is equally disappointed with Russia‘s lack of focus.S. the United States should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests. policymakers to ignore. ranging from regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment.S. national security agenda. Enfant Terrible Russia. **Richard D. National Defense university. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone. and disintegration are falsely constructed and create self-fulfilling prophecies Rumer and Sokolsky 01 (*Eugene B. the United States should focus its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues. Rumer served at the State Department.ENDI 2010 Security K 39 Wave 1 RUSSIA LINK Russian threats of accidents. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline. The Need for Normalcy Russia‘s external weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an effective interlocutor. nationalist regime is remote. Therefore. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches: Forget Russia. Georgetown (MA). Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda. The prospect of Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian.-Russian relations have not been realized. It is also disappointed by its experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions. and failure to implement major reforms at home. and welcoming of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence and thus not worth our attention. The Enfant The Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. This path will sometimes lead toward partnership with Rus.sia and at other times toward competition. strategic nuclear capabilities. The Forget Russia view holds that Russia is too weak. Undoubtedly. to Forget Russia is clearly not an option: the country‘s geographic expanse. it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore need not be feared in earnest. The Russia First view holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U. on the staff of the National Security Council. the United States is already on a collision course with it and might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. Renewed competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing principles.S. The Russia First view is not Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. This view presupposes the existence of an important U. inability to engage effectively abroad. either as partner or competitor. The Evil Russia view holds that Russian courtship of Cuba. After 10 years of trying to help Russia. competition or containment. however. Iran. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russia‘s diminished capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. is limited. After a decade of failure. can be a U.S. Iraq. and too chaotic to matter. nuclear use. The Enfant Terrible view holds that. Institute for national strategic studies. and Russia First. foreign policy agenda. in much the same way we deal with most other countries. too corrupt. Sokolsky served as the director of the Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations in the Department of State. nuclear arsenal. President Vladimir Putin‘s visits to Cuba and North Korea. He holds degrees from Boston University (BA). prosperous democracy. He has published numerous articles on foreign and national security policy in leading journals and newspapers. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. there is little at this stage to justify making relations with Russia a top priority.S. Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. Given Russia‘s evil purposes. U. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet empire. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues. Therefore.S.S. Russia looks back at the decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world‘s sole remaining superpower. Given its size. fears of a deliberate surprise (attack on the United States are unjustified. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the driving element of the relationship. Evil Russia. grounded in reality. Except for geography and nuclear weapons. April 2001.S. history. the United States should actively assist Russia in its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with renewed vigor and creativity. courtship of Slobodan Milosevic. military and political/ideological weakness makes it an unlikely target of either U. and at the Rand Corporation. Russia‘s economic. The record of the 1990s has left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. and MIT (PhD). There are shortcomings in all of these approaches. and North Korea is a deliberate effort to undermine U. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and that Russia.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. RC) Ten years after the end of the Cold War.S. but its status as a regional power is in doubt. one is tempted to overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of the U. Not only is Russia no longer a superpower. with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative.-Russian Relations‖ Published in Strategic Forum. Thus. and future potential. it should be clear that neither the specter of Russia‘s past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of the U. and proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U. . although Russia has been an irresponsible and irritating partner. mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in U.

Ph. if it is true that political power puts an end to war. respectively. 'Once again. Maintainence of global civil peace is a front in the perpetual war that structures dominant social relations FOUCAULT 1976 – PROF PHILOSOPHY COLLEGE DE FRANCE POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS. The third. More and more dangers are the product of our own actions. it is a time for peace' (quoted by Rasmussen 2001: 341). Security in turn. The political battle would cease with this final battle. Bush's address on 7 October 2001 ended with 'Peace and freedom will prevail'. This goes for forms of production and their effects on the environment. the reign of peace in civil society. With the 'end of history' in sight. Only a final battle of that kind would put an end. Western actions in relation to Middle East peace processes.. Furthermore. It consists in seeing politics as sanctioning and upholding the disequilibrium of forces that was displayed in war. though not the way it is often implied in fast politicians' statements about the post-Cold War irrelevance of peace research. the alterations in the relations of forces. to be decided in the last analyses by recourse to arms. in the bodies themselves of each and everyone of us. namely. When the task of the West changed from fighting a Cold War to building a 'new world order'. and final. while 'security' is potentially the name of a radical. Today. The war on terror after 11 September 2001 has surpris. this by no means implies that it suspends the effects of war or neutralises the disequilibrium revealed in the final battle. rather than analysing it in terms of cession. liberalism mutated back from scepticist. subversive agenda. it is always the history of this war that one is writing. The famous 'New World Order' speech at the end of the Gulf War (March 6. on this hypothesis. pg. . to the exercise of power as continual war. meaning to be assigned to the inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism. Peace has become the overarching concept of the two examined in this chapter. The short-term reaction to the 11 September attacks on the USA in 2001 might be a re-assertion of single-minded aspirations for absolute security with little concern for liberty and for boomerang effects on future security (Bigo 2002). factions and displacements in that same war. with power. or functionally in terms of its maintenance of the relations of production. is perpetually to reinscribe this relation through a form of unspoken warfare. 'Security studies' and 'peace research' were shaped in important ways by the particular Cold War context. Popperian Cold War liberalism to the more evolutionary and optimist belief in its own truth. a war continued by other means. We have seen during the last twenty years a spread of the originally specifically international concept of security in its securitisation function to more and more spheres of 'domestic' life. the 'risk' way of thinking about international affairs is making itself increasingly felt. and it goes for international affairs. 'Peace research' might be dated because peace is so apologetic as to be intellectually uninteresting. the favouring of certain tendencies. contract or alienation. This reversal of Clausewitz's assertion that war is politics continued by other means has -a triple significance: in the first place. is gradually swallowed up into a generalised concern about 'risk'. 'Peace research' and 'security studies' (or rather 'strategic studies') meant. in language. to oppose or to accept the official Western policy problematique. NATO enlarge. where it is hard to see the war on terrorism as a pure reaction to something coming to the West from elsewhere. but in general debates. the conflicts waged over power. and fewer and fewer attributable to forces completely external to ourselves – thus threats become risks (Luhmann 1990). Dangers are the product of our own actions forcing peace threats to become risks of security Waever 2004 [Ole. The 'absolute' concept was revalued when it seemed closer to realisation. with a second hypothesis to the effect that power is war. President Bush senior declared in 1989. Society's reflections on itself are increasingly in terms of risk ('risk society'). ―Peace and Security‖. The role of political power. according to which power is essentially repression. in war and by war. it implies that the relations of power that function in a society such as ours essentially rest upon a definite relation of forces that is established at a determinate.ENDI 2010 Security K 40 Wave 1 PEACE LINK Peace is the overall concept of security.. peace reappeared as a Western concept. that is to say. that is. there is a second reply we might make: if power is properly speaking the way in which relations of forces are deployed and given concrete expression. once and for all.ingly few references to either peace or security – operation 'Enduring Freedom' – but President George W. PAGE 90-91 Then again. 2002) in terms of a 'threat to peace'. conflict and war? One would then confront the original hypothesis. the concepts of peace and security are changing places in these years. for power. historically specifiable moment. it suddenly remembered that it actually had a long-term vision of peace as democracy (and/or liberalism) (Rasmussen 2001. is that the end result can only be the outcome of war . that come about within this `civil peace'-that none of these phenomena in a political system should be interpreted except as the continuation of war. GORDON. should we not analyse it primarily in terms of struggle. and now society takes its revenge by transforming the concept of security along lines of risk thinking (Waever 2002).62-63] After the end of the Cold War. religion. that it installs.D. or tries to install. to re-inscribe it in social institutions. They should. that none of the political struggles. the reinforcements etc. Even when one writes the history of peace and its institutions. 1991) was phrased mostly in terms of peace – 'enduring peace must be our mission'.ment is so hard for Russia and others to oppose because it is presented apolitically as the mere expansion of the democratic peace community (Williams 2001). But there is also something else that the inversion signifies. etc. Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research. be understood as episodes. migration and global economic policy are part of what might produce future terrorism. Williams 2001). ED. of a contest of strength. in economic inequalities. and the (in)famous 'axis of evil' was presented (29 January. So this would be the first meaning to assign to the inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism that war is politics continued by other means. Politically. it is the other way round. in Political Science and Professor of International Relations at COPRI.

that calls to mind the best images of themselves. Never mind that the darkly pessimistic side of Morgenthau. the followers quickly experience a sickening jerk as the whole project is yanked too soon into closure.. 2 (Spring.tually preparing for war. this ar. The advance of human reason and under. Through the advancement of knowl. For neorealism's power is largely due not to its truth or the consistency of its logic but to its capacity to elicit the collective recognition of women and men. re. True. neorealism's followers glimpse in this caricature of past revolutions an image that reflects well on them.ence of peace. Awakened is a remembrance of a naturalistic model of science. is not uncontrollable passions but ignorance. "the ghosts of revolutions past" are neorealism's main allies. Objectivity. Wight. Such reflections suggest that a serious problem awaits the critic of neo. thereby reducing the chances of miscalculation. self-centered. pp. An offspring of modern science and the Enlightenment. "state-as-actor. the embodiment of this faith in reason and science. ―The Poverty of Neorealism. 38.‖ International Organization. humanity can learn to master the blind forces and construct a sci.standing will not end this power struggle.8' Like the French gazing upon Louis Bonaparte. its idealism. most of all the behavioral revolution in the Cold War study of international relations. including its long-standing resistance to behavioralist methods..quences. but it does make possible a more enlightened understanding and pursuit of national self-interest."82 How painful this is: the revolutionary science of peace has become a technology of the state! Was it always so? By the time this awful realization comes. neutrality. of course. overcommitment. it is too late for such reflections. 225-286. neorealism succeeds in its illusion of greatness because it at once cues and caricatures the ghosts of revolutions past. Yet like the French. and its emptiness. Political realism is. so they appear. making all of their conclusions products of confirmation bias Ashley 1984 [Richard. With Gilpin." Its discourse is now frozen in acquiescence to the Cold War conditions of the revolution it recalled: competition among states mu. No. The neorealist caricature of science has not deployed its revolutionary images to "fire the imagination. neorealism ennobles its followers.realism. The neorealist orrery has spun its followers into its arc.evitable conflicts of autonomous. and Herz does not square with the behavioralists' optimism. neorealist orthodoxy will not be dislodged from its lofty status by the force of logical criticism alone.alism holds that through calculations of power and national interest statesmen can create order out of anarchy and thereby moderate the in." a "technology of peace"-these were among the slogans. Vol.vated and stable world order. At least. one can remember classical realism not as an embodiment of a continuing dialectical struggle between absolutist darkness and bourgeois Enlightenment but only as a product of the latter: Embedded in most social sciences and in the study of international relations is the belief that through science and reason the human race can gain control over its destiny. and their sometimes disastrous conse. As Gilpin writes. A "grotesque mediocrity" reigns. 1984). and competitive states.edge.ENDI 2010 Security K 41 Wave 1 POSITIVISM/EMPIRICISM LINK Positivist epistemology ignores the roots of scientific assumptions about international relations in the memory of the Cold War. but it also increases the power available for political struggle. jstor] Despite its errors. who must somehow organize their expectations and coordinate their practices in light of commonly remembered experiences. professor of political science at Arizona State University. as I have noted. [T]his faith that a 'science of international relations' will ulti. too. Recollecting this heroic revolutionary project. "The advance of technology may open up opportunities for mutual benefit. Through an understanding of the sources of our actions and the consequences of our acts.. Never mind that the faith in the naturalistic science and the harmonizing force of reason implicit in these memories do violence to the very core of classical realism's internationalist thought. The fundamental problem faced. neorealist theory is like all intellectualist theory in that it contains no terms that would allow it to reflect critically on the practical social basis and limits of its own power. is a one-time revolutionary faith that the light of science will illuminate the conditions of state action. the very model in whose name the behavioral revolutionaries marched. Everywhere the collective remembrance of the study of international politics is on neorealism's side . Awakened." or to "glorify the new struggles. scientists mostly. Carr." but to seal discourse within a continuous "parody of the old. Yet the fact remains.gument continues. Despite its serious flaws and totalitarian nature. human rationality should be able to guide statesmen through the crisis of a decaying world order to a reno. detachment. Summoned forth once again is the sense of urgency of darkest days of the Cold War. .mately save mankind still lies at the heart of its studies.

for it relates to neorealist "structuralism"-the neorealist position with respect to structures of the international system.ENDI 2010 Security K 42 Wave 1 POSITIVISM LINK . and solver of the free-rider problem in the name of winners and losers alike. Despite neorealism's much ballyhooed emphasis on the role of hard falsifying tests as the measure of theoretical progress. jstor] The issue. the state is ontologically prior to the international system. not the protective clauses that individual neorealists deploy to preempt or deflect criticisms of that discourse's limits. protector of citizens' welfare. like economic markets. For the neorealist. say. one might expect the neorealist to accord to the structure of the international system an identity independent of the parts or units (states-as-actors in this case). In other words. spontaneously generated. No.intended. professor of political science at Arizona State University. and actions. Two implications of this "state-centricity. ―The Poverty of Neorealism.32 Or. 225-286. not macrotheory. is the theoretical discourse of neorealism as a move. As a frame. "International-political sys.‖ International Organization. one refuses to be deterred by the mountainous inconsistencies between the state as a coalition of coalitions (presumably in opposition to the losing coalitions against which the winning coalition is formed) and the state as a provider of public goods. For the neorealist.microtheory. Much as the "individual" is a prism through which methodological individualists comprehend collectivist concepts as aggrega. deserve emphasis. so also does the neorealist refract all global collectivist concepts through the prism of the state. The first is obvious. 38."35 . neorealism immunizes its statist commitments from any form of falsification.ment. one of the unexamined assumptions from which theoretical discourse proceeds. or the interests of humankind-can be granted an objective status only to the extent that they can be interpreted as aggregations of relations and interests having logically and historically prior roots within state-bounded societies. Once one enters this theoretical discourse among neorealists. Like Waltz.tions of individual wants. one simply assumes that states have the status of unitary actors . accords recognition to. the identities of the units would be supplied via differentiation. Reflecting on the fourth element of structuralist ar. this means that neorealist theory implicitly takes a side amidst contending political interests. is the historically testable hypothesis that the state-as-actor construct might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimize and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule.gument presented above. Knowing that the "objectives and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions . is classical economic theory. beliefs. for instance. like Gilpin. The system's structure is produced by defining states as individual unities and then by noting properties that emerge when several such unities are brought into mutual reference .dividual neorealists might be. The neorealist orrery disappoints these expectations.34 Importantly. neorealist theory cannot accord recognition to-it cannot even comprehend-those global collectivist concepts that are irreducible to logical combinations of state-bounded relations. how." itself an ontological principle of neorealist theorizing.ever. however. the state-as-actor model needs no defense. Whatever the personal commitments of in. the state-as-actor assumption is a metaphysical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism. 2 (Spring. 1984). This proclamation is the starting point of theoretical discourse. In short. as Waltz points out. are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units.STATE Positivism in IR falsely presupposes the naturalness of states as prior to IR system Ashley 1984 [Richard.work for the interpretation of international politics. Excluded. pp. The second implication takes longer to spell out. and un."3 one nonetheless simply joins the victors in proclaiming the state a singular actor with a unified set of objectives in the name of the collective good . The proper analogy.tems. global collectivist concepts-concepts of transnational class relations. needs." They "are individualist in origin. it is impossible to describe international structures without first fashioning a concept of the state-as-actor. As Waltz puts it. neorealist theory allies with. It stands without challenge. and gives expression to those class and sectoral interests (the apexes of Waltz's domestic hierarchies or Gilpin's victorious coalitions of coalitions) that are actually or potentially congruent with state interests and legitimations. Vol. It implicitly opposes and denies recognition to those class and human interests which cannot be reduced to concatenations of state interests or transnational coalitions of domestic interests.

" "developed. Reference to such a tradition may be justified as a simple practical convenience." or "modernized. of treating "the tradition" as both somehow naturally given in the "great texts" and largely irrelevant to the analysis of modern human affairs. This claim has been subject to relatively little attention-especially in the United States." we are just as likely to be bemused by histories as seduced by Geist. and judged . p. of myths of origin. The story to be told has to begin somewhere. origins shift and recede. Lexington Books. 2 The identification of a tradition of international relations theory has now become especially problematic. defining the human community according to the boundaries of modernization and development and excluding all others Der Derian 98 (James. Reified temporal horizons give meaning to where we think we may be going. “International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics‖. it remains almost a truism to claim that there is an identifiable tradition of international theory against which current tendencies in both theory and practice can be situated.26) Enormous literatures now exist on both the proliferation of research orientations and the claim that the substantive character of international relations is being transformed. Even where the history of political thought is taken seriously. The Hegelian trek to universality still echoes as "progress/' "development. These horizons seem increasingly tenuous. a Watson Institute research professor of international studies and directs the Information Technology. Even from the centers of fading empires. ."[and] to be distinguished from "they" who have not. and where the difficulties in the way of understanding any particular text are well known. measured. We live in a world in which there has been a proliferation not only of research paradigms in the academic analysis of international relations. Other points of departure are closed off." but living within "modernity. "we turn out to be those who have "progressed. but more generally. certainly inadequate as a way of orienting either serious academic analysis or progressive political practice. if only because the identification of a point of origin depends on where we think we are now." or "modernization. Thus. both literatures rest upon a stance toward the prior claim that there is a tradition. a practical convenience is always liable to turn into a powerful myth of origin. characteristic of political science in general. where the analysis of international relations has absorbed the unfortunate habit. They also provide a sense of who this‖ we. However. But it is not always easy to begin at the beginning. War.ENDI 2010 Security K 43 Wave 1 ROOT CAUSE LINK Identifying root causes relies on a teleological understanding of progress. and Peace Project and the Global Media Project. and ample evidence of fundamentalist self-righteousness about past and future.‘ All too often.

do tend to regard the structure that they describe in the singular. the snake says that it reproduces itself.‖ International Organization. 1984). Vol.turalism. there are definite isomorphisms between aspects of neorealist thought and structuralist principles. At the same time. and it swallows more of its tail. then. From start to finish. With apologies to E. From start to finish. The head of the snake is an unreflective state-as-actor. For what it means is that neorealism gives us the worst of two worlds. too. are those that reflect the power and interests of the powerful and interested . Autonomy is the state-as-actor's privilege of not having to reflect because the whole world bends to its unreflected projections of itself. I would suggest that there is a certain "snake-like" quality to neorealist structuralism. is no compliment." In neorealism. 225-286. And what of autonomy? In a final gulp. for it is now a wriggling knot. Finding its own unreflectiveness clearly reflected in others. and the system is thus defined. In neorealism we have atomism's super. it gets its own tail into its mouth. P. professor of political science at Arizona State University. for a time. Neorealists do tend to grant to the international political system "absolute predominance over the parts. Waltz's is an atomistic conception of the international system. jstor] The autonomy of the neorealist whole is established precisely from the hypostatized point of view of the idealized parts whose appearances as independent entities provided the starting point of the analysis. 2 (Spring. diachrony is subordinated to synchrony. No.has an answer for this. It slithers around hissing "self-help" and projecting its own unreflectivity onto the world . as noted earlier. Thus. Thompson. pp.ficiality combined with structuralism's closure such that. projected onto the whole in a way that at once necessitates and forgives that power. the snake answers. the snake answers. however."68 . more properly. of power? The snake-or what is left of it. we never escape or penetrate these appearances. the dominant coalition) that can afford the illusion that it is a finished state-as-actor because. This. ―The Poverty of Neorealism. they do attribute to it some of the qualities of structure in structuralist thought. the props without which the whole physical structure could never have been erected . It is the statist idealism developed from the point of view of the one state (or. which knows itself only to rely on itself and which will not recognize its own limits or dependence upon the world beyond its skin. the basic material. we are condemned to circulate entirely at the surface level of appearances. once we are drawn into the neorealist circle. it is positioned such that the whole world pays the price of its illusions. 38. And neorealists. though. of the values or norms of this system? The values and norms. "Plop! The snake has disappeared into total theoretical vacuity. once neorealists do arrive at their physicalistic notion of structure.ENDI 2010 Security K 44 Wave 1 NEOREALISM LINK Neorealism falsely atomizes states while naturalizing and forgiving violent uses of power—it is locked into a self-perpetuating state-centric paradigm Ashley 1984 [Richard. Asked to describe the system so defined. and change is interpretable solely within the fixed logic of the system. as in struc. like structuralists. And what an idealist circle it is! What we have in neorealism's so-called structuralism is the commonsense idealism of the powerful. What. Power is rooted in those capabilities which provide a basis for the state-asactor's autonomy. What.

What is more. A problem-for example. On the other hand.. the U. Practices . A practice such as waging war. that of the proliferation of weapons-is not presented to policymakers fully formed. adjudged. function within a discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and thus creates reality. It carries with it certain standards. To understand how an image shapes interest and policy. As Taylor concludes. If we investigate state action in terms of practices. because the reality that is created in this discursive space involves the identification of the objects of action."19 The image of majority voting constitutes the practice of voting by enabling the actors and actions necessary for the practice and defining the relationships between the actors and those between the actors and the practice. it was recognized by the society of states to be waging war.S.''1' All those who participate in the practice must share an image of the practice in which they are engaged . This framing is fundamentally discursive..20 Intersubjectively held meanings establish the conditions under which war may or may not be waged. as well as establishing which violent conduct is and which is not to be counted as war. War on Drugs was recognized by those same states to be metaphorically warlike rather than an instance of the practice of waging war. of valid and invalid voting. shows the process by which the discourse of proliferation shapes the actions and interests of agents in order to precipitate and incentivize the spread of nuclear technology Mutimer 2000 [David. this practically constituted image of a security problem shapes the interests states have at stake in that problem and the forms of solutions that can be considered to resolve it . despite its subjective labeling of the violence as a police action. . when the United States went to war in Vietnam. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. "21 At this point I reconnect to the argument with which this chapter began. despite the use of military and paramilitary violence. If intersubjective meanings constitute practices. pg 18-19] Charles Taylor has provided a clear example of the nature of constitutive intersubjective meanings in practices: "Take the practice of deciding things by majority vote. perhaps the definitive practice of the traditional study of international relations. about the world these practices make through reproducing meaning. is conducted in terms of certain standards. without which it would not be the practice that it is.ENDI 2010 Security K 45 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK The affirmative takes the supposed problem of proliferation as a given—refusing to take it for granted. and the interests that are pursued. They must share a certain collection of rules for fair and unfair voting. the actors. it is useful to consider the place of metaphor in shaping understanding. The Weapons State. it is necessarily _tied to the language through which the frame is expressed. As Roxanne Doty has argued. as images that frame a particular reality. Thus. engaging in practices involves acting toward the world in the terms provided by a particular set of intersubjective meanings. adapting Boulding's usage. The image constitutive of war is socially held. we can ask questions about the constitutive intersubjective meanings. we say that the practices which make up a society require certain self-descriptions on the part of the participants. Weapons proliferation as a problem does not slowly dawn on states but rather is constituted by those states in their practices. The intersubjective understandings that constitute practices can be thought of. and taught. as well as knowing what essential behaviors they are expected to perform. They must also understaud that they are independent agents but also parts of a collective who can decide as a whole through the aggregation of independent decisions. "Policy makers . however. contested. "In this way.can therefore be said to carry with them sets of meanings. which are the object of study in international relations. and valid and invalid results. as is voting. The same is true for the practices in which states engage.

and hide other images that are operative in any given area of social life. of grouping those "like" as self and those "different" as other. antipersonnel land mines. I argue. It is important to recognize. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. Counterfactual arguments are always difficult to make. for example. say something as mundane as writing with a pencil. the actors and practices of security. and nuclear weapons testing. This process can occur because image schemas have an inherent 'logic' which provides potential metaphorical entailments that speakers mayor may not specify."38 The entailments of images can therefore provide resources for the political contestation of international practices. The formulation and reformulation of metaphors is a crucial part of the production and contestation of mental models. How we act in such a relationship also depends on what kind of "we" we are. I intend to show not only the entailments of the "proliferation" image. and hides. illnesses." The coherence is revealed across a series of formerly distinct issue areas-the spread of nuclear technology. Images therefore tie discourses together. pg 25] There is therefore no need to deny the materiality of bodies. that these problems are produced through acts of interpretation and.we need to look at the way the objects and identities of those engaged have been constructed : What kind of thing is weapons proliferation. I argue that social life is framed in terms of a particular image. An important means of revealing what is hidden by the emergent proliferation discourse is to tease out the alternatives that were immanently possible but that were not tried. 36 It is through this act of categorization.ENDI 2010 Security K 46 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK The construction of proliferation threats is as much about the construction of the self as the other—engaging in anti-proliferation discourse reveals a particular understanding of ourselves and national identity that is based on otherization Mutimer 2000 [David. Every time we see something as a kind of thing. that identity is also the result of categorization. This means. the actions being taken by states and others in response to the problem of weapons proliferation are founded on an image that has constructed that problem in the first place. emotions. downplays. Whenever we intentionally perform any kind of action. hammering with a hammer. we are using categories. I will show the emergence of a relatively coherent discourse centered around the image of "weapons proliferation. Anti-proliferation images construct frames that are the conditions of possibility for the construction of and response to threats Mutimer 2000 [David. international engagement with weapons proliferation. action and speech. perception. As Paul Chilton noted: "Concepts do not exist as determinate essences. to assert that there is nothing olltside of discourse. and therefore only in terms of this image can action be taken . That image identifies the objects of social action and the identities of the relevant actors as objects and subjects of a particular kind. In detailing this image I reveal the resources from which it is built and thus the discourses it highlights. however. that an object is constituted as an object for the purposes of engagement . . that object must enter into discourse. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. that practices can be seen to instantiate the images that enable them and thereby become a central object of study in an analysis such as this. and how they were made impossible by the proliferation discourse. but also to draw attention to these discursive re"ourc'" and to the possibilities for contestation. Whenever we reason about kinds of things-chairs. either in the physical world or in our social and intellectual lives. downplay. we must recognize that to know an object or to act on it or in relation to it. If we want to understand a particular form of engagement. The concepts I have developed in this chapter form the analytic basis for the rest of the book. chemical and biological anus. How we act toward an object depends on what kind of object it is. how they were possible. Therefore. we could not function at all. as well as what was hidden and downplayed. or of any other object. any kind of thing at all-we are employing categories. nations. our identity is crucial to understanding that engagement. Arguing from a rather different position from that of Campbell or Butler.for example. or ironing clothes. which seeks to reveal the images constitutive of international life. Rather. George Lakoff comes to remarkably similar conclusions in his more recent work: Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. by creating certain links and not others and by creating these links in particular ways. we are categorizing. major conventional weapons systems. and of what kind are they? How are the various elements of the proliferation agenda referred to. my overarching goal is to show the effects of the proliferation image. a tree. but I hope to show where the possibilities lay for such alternatives. There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought.. draw on discursive resources to tie the things imagined within the frame to other discursive frames-linking that which is framed to other things we understand in particular ways. pg 25-26] This chapter's primary claim is that threats or policy problems do not dawn on states. To make use of these claims to examine the contemporary concern with weapons proliferation.'7 By detailing what was highlighted in the proliferation discourse. The images that frame policy problems and thereby produce those problems. what is more.. The way in which other discussants will engage with the prime ministerial terrorist will vary just as much by how each identifies herself as by which epithet is used to characterize the other. that the states or other actors that threaten or are threatened are also produced in these same interpretive acts. The Weapons State. by contrast. for example. it is important to recognize the political nature of the image-making process.. which are productive of the practices of proliferation control. but are produced and contested. and therefore into what discursive contexts are they set? These are questi~ns I address in the remaining chapters of this book. and what is it not? Who is involved in the proliferation agenda. Throughout. Without the ability to categorize. as Charles Krauthammer would have us believe the problem of proliferation dawned on the West. or naming. metaphors highlight. in turn. That is. Only in terms of this image can policymakers or analysts know an international policy problem. The Weapons State.

are made possible by being stated by the state. however. pg 6] Following the Security Council's call to arms-or. what is stated by the state-or by states when they gather as something like the Security Council-often has the greatest importance. Proliferation has become a primary security concern of the post-Cold War era. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies.STATE State discourses about proliferation construct it as a threat Mutimer 2000 [David. More than that. As with the creation of a threat by its being stated as a threat by the United Nations and other authoritative speakers. weapons proliferation has itself been constructed as a problem of contemporary security . proliferation is a construction that begins with what is said and continues with how that saying is embedded in the actions it makes possible . . because it has been stated authoritatively to be a threat. Proliferation is a threat. perhaps more appropriate.ENDI 2010 Security K 47 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK . The Weapons State. The weapon state and the state of weaponry. its call away from arms-considerable action seems to have beeu taken to prevent the spread of technology related to research for and production of arms. as well as the weapons and states themselves. Because of the privileged position of the state in international relations.

' he argues. Both images suggest dangers that must simply be avoided. a pit and a nemesis.ENDI 2010 Security K 48 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – WEAPON LABEL Labeling nuclear devices as weapons makes them appear to only be a particular kind of weapon used in strategic circumstances Mutimer 2000 [David.' but their significance greatly transcends war and all its causes and outcomes. point directly to the constructed nature of the weapon framing of nuclear weapons." those with the initial access to them categorized them as devices of a particular kind. not managed so they can somehow be lived with and certainly not put to the kind of use that carries the high value placed on providers of security or peace. actions and hopes.' Explicit bizarreness would seem to be a peculiar attribute to cons~der as an 'analytic virtue. This characterization of nuclear devices as weapons leads to conventionalization and downplays their massive power Mutimer 2000 [David. thinking of nuclear weapons in conventional terms.--as weapons-leads to dangerous strategies because it ignores the lessons of the nuclear revolution. because not all technologies of killing were discursively constructed as weapons: exceptions include poisons administered through food. They grew out of history yet threaten to end history. atomic explosives were further constituted as particular weapons to fulfill particular functions through their articulation in strategy. most notably in the odd position of nuclear weapons being accepted as weapons whose only use is in their nonuse. for example. The central characteristic of nuclear explosives--that they are extremely powerful explosives seems to deny their coherent consideration as weapons at all. as weapons . yet they threaten to annihilate man.' They understood the devices in terms of discourses that constituted the range of technologies with which people had killed each other in certain circumstances." For Jervis. would entail a very different set of containing practices from those entailed by the image of weapons for war. yet this is how they are primarily conceived. There were possibilities for framings of nuclear weapons less extreme than Schell's but that would still have denied any notion of their being weapons for use in a practice as instrumental as war. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. or the hangman's noose. however. Atomic explosives have been conceived. "This is a conclusion that even Hoag himself seems to find difficulty in believing. 'suffers from the political defect. Williams cites a wonderful example of the result of the contradictions of deterrence. This latter point is important."4 The images Schell suggests.2 Although this may appear little more than a statement of fact. atomic weapons were never removed from the preserve of the militaries in states that developed them. in the first instance. . pg 31-32] The military developed atomic weapons in the context of a war and with the expressed intention of using them as part of a campaign of strategic bombardment.'''9 the contradiction between weapons and deterrence with regard to nuclear weapons has also led Robert Jervis to make one of the most trenchant critiques of nuclear strategy: that it suffers from what he calls "conventionalization. This contradiction is seen in a number of ways throughout the strategy debate. pg 33] A considerable contradiction is implied in the dual framing of nuclear explosives as weapons and as instruments exclusively for deterrence. The Weapons State. as doomsday devices-human creations that allow us to exercise the power of God in ending creation-an image that would still have entailed potential use but not a military-strategic use. to say nothing of justifying: 'Such a policy. They are a pit into which the whole world can fall-a nemesis of all human intentions. They were therefore thought of. which produced the possibility of strategies of mutual deterrence in the first place. the conventionalization critique in particular. but analytic virtue. Having been imagined as weapons. Jonathan Schell appeared to recognize the contingency of these devices' labeling at the beginning of The Fate of the Earth: "These bombs were built as 'weapons' for 'war. lO These contradictions. and one with considerable power. By labeling nuclear explosives as "weapons. The Weapons State. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. Although the remarkable destructive power demonstrated over Japan led to calls for their elimination or for tight international control. They were made by men. of explicit bizarreness. it is a categorization or a representation. for example.

Crisis instabilities were even more dangerous. The practice of "arms control" relied heavily on this understanding of balance and the need to maintain stability. Their centrality. First. a greater incentive would exist to launch a MIRVed missile than one with only one warhead because of this unfavorable ratio. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. defense and the development of countenneasures. made the notions of balance and stability important resources in the reimagination of security following the end of the Cold War. was criticized for introducing crisis instabilities. for it tended to prompt both an increase in the Soviet arsenal to overwhelm any U. Again. pg 39] Arms race instabilities resulted from the acquisition of weapons seen to trigger a new round of arms building by the other side. as they were changes that increased the'likelihood of nuclear war in the event of a crisis-that is. the argument ran. notions of balance and stability were crucial in differentiating "arms control" as a practice from those practices warranted by the ~'disannament" image. It was also considered possible. This use of balance and stability has two important implications. changes that could lead to the dangerous tumble into war and then to nuclear war. which could then escalate into a nuclear war.28 . is a crucial element of the "arms control" framing. The U. The affirmative’s representation of a stable world free from nuclear war is rooted in strategic arms control discourse Mutimer 2000 [David. Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. On the ground. however. pg 37] Finally. however. those understandings have much deeper roots in international relations. another derivative of deterrence theory. The hot line agreement addressed one such back-door route by attempting to prevent a misunderstanding from resulting in a war neither side wanted. I think. Although arms control depended very specifically on the understandings of stability in deterrence theory. that single missile could strike 10 targetsSoviet missile silos. Once lannched. "Star Wars" proposal was arms race destabilizing. The notion of stability. relying on these resources when framing other security problems tends to reproduce the dyadic structure of the Cold War and of balance-of-power theory in international relations.the US MX. however. both to the theory of deterrence and to the practice of arms control. and some form of protection from the "back door" into war is needed. It is no exaggeration. mutual assured destruction ensures that one of the states will avoid launching a nuclear war if it is confronted with a simple choice: nuclear war or no nuclear war.S. The Weapons State. for instance. Arms control agreements aimed to create stable balances between the arsenals of the two poles and to establish mechanisms that would prevent crises from destabilizing the central balance of power. Second. strategic discourse counseled maintaining strategic stability. and has important implications for the "proliferation" image of the post-Cold War era. Wars do not always begin so neatly. that a crisis would escalate into a nuclear warparticularly because nuclear deterrence was supposed to deter all sorts of things other than nuclear war. for example.27 A condition is stable changes to that condition are unlikely to cause it to topple into war . to maintain that without an understanding of balances privileging stability. a missile with 10 MIRVed warheads. the practice of arms control would have been impossible. In a crisis.ENDI 2010 Security K 49 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK –STABILITY The emphasis on strategic stability in the face of proliferation reproduces the Cold war us-them dichotomy in international relations Mutimer 2000 [David. and the consequent need to if maintain balances.S. for example-could be destroyed by a single incoming warhead. The Weapons State. To prevent a tumble into war. underlying all of the practice of arms control is the notiou of strategic stability.

Similarly. and it is the mother who is proliferous. The budding of cells. begins with a single. that is. of course. reproducing by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application .ENDI 2010 Security K 50 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – ‗WILDFIRE‘ / CANCER METAPHOR Metaphors of proliferation as spreading rapidly falsely attribute it to a single source. . they attempt to provide the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly transfer and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in the "cancer" of a prolific number of nuclear weapons . both to produce a single tumor and to create a number of separate tumors throughout the host body. In other words. Hence. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. which gives rise to the proliferation of some plants and. cell and spreads from there -in the case of a cancer. the dominant response to nuclear proliferation has been the creation of supplier groups-the Zangger Committee and the NSG. Although animal reproduction involves two individuals. the father is quickly forgotten. The Weapons State. to paraphrase Murray and Hnnt. the problem of weapons proliferation is one of a source or sources proliferating. This form of imagining highlights the transmission process from source to recipient.that seek to control the spread of nuclear technology. or source. failing to understand the dynamics that drive the spread of weapons technology Mutimer 2000 [David. pg 60] The first implication is that something imagined in terms of "proliferation" is seen to grow or multiply from a single source. cancers.

To begin with. external controls are required. the outward flow-of this same technology. particularly following the war in the Gulf. the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread but are spread-and. The supporting supplier gronps jointly impose controls on the supply-that is. Finally. the image downplays the politics of security and threat. Alternatively. justifying western countries’ claim to legitimate violence and controlling all others Mutimer 2000 [David. which has constituted the object of those practices as a "proliferation" problem. and even desirable. To permit the benign spread of technology while preventing the dangerous conclusion to that spread. The goal in both cases is to stem or at least slow the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques. and so the metaphor of proliferation applied to the development of nnclear technology highlights the antonomy in the growth of that technology and its problematic weapons variant. economic. pg 61] A "proliferation" image produces a particular kind of object. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. apolitical policy by casting the problem as a technical one. The image of "proliferation" thus privileges a technical. a series of control practices has been established around the range of military technologies. and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons. The result is a neatly closed circle it is simple to reify-we face this particular problem with these practices. they are not spread by some form of external agent-say. pg 61] The second implication of the proliferation metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread is an extreme technological determinism. This image. What has happened since the late 1980s. the text from which this quotation is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the proliferation metaphor. social. It is worth recalling Frank Barnaby's words: ~'A country with a nuclear power program will inevitably acquire the techuical knowl. moving outward from an identifiable origin by relentlessly multiplying. the contingent becomes seen as the natural. The Weapons State. Read in either direction. the forms of control that can be applied are constrained . Put another way. Because the object of "proliferation" is imagined in this fashion. a human being or a political institution. . Second. The image imagineses this technology as essentially benign but with the possibility of excess production is natural.ENDI 2010 Security K 51 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – WEAPONS SPREAD The notion of weapons spread perpetuates the notion that the weapons themselves spread and takes responsible agents out of the analysis of international relations Mutimer 2000 [David. downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to internationaJ security.. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. It imagines a technology that reproduces rationally and autonomously. naturalizing the security dilemma to the point that it is considered an automatic dynamic. and structural factors that tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. are spread largely by the Western states. expected. these practices are employed. the particular imagination of the object of "proliferation" enables a specific series of control practices. in fact. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: NuclearWeapon Proliferation in the 1990s. but prolific reproduction is dangerous. so we are facing this problem. Animal reproduction is an internally driven phenomenon. The reverse is also true: creating given practices will construct the object of those practices in particular -ways. for the implications are so deeply ingrained in our conceptnal system that they are not recognized as metaphorical . The NPT controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. the image downplays-to the point of hiding-any of the political."19 In fact. has been the reimagining of all forms of military technology in terms of the "proliferation" image and the embedding of that image in a series of control practices. edge and expertise. by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread. Notice that the weapons themselves spread. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed. The Weapons State. The notion of spread creates a division between allowable and unallowable weapons use and development.

and hence a problem of the spread of constituent technologies. in turn. As a doctor would monitor the growth of cells for signs of cancerous proliferation and would intervene to regulate healthy growth and. ." the practices used to control nuclear proliferation have been re-created in these other areas. reproduce the underlying understandings of the "proliferation" image. In such a context a supplier control group makes little sense. prevent the cancerous spread. The formation of the Australia Group depended on the prior reframing of chemical weapons in terms of "proliferation. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. for as these practices are transported to other technologies of concern they tend to constitute their object in the same way nuclear proliferation practices constitute theirs. pg 64-65] The particular practices of nuclear proliferation control were made possible by the understanding of the problem provided by the "proliferation" image. The group sought to coordinate its members' export control policies on technology and material related to the creation of chemical weapons in exactly the same way the NSG and the Zangger Committee aim to control the movement of nuclear technology. By imagining the problem in terms of a largely autonomous. together with permission for (even the promotion of) healthy trade in the constituent technology. but the immediate response was the 1987 creation of the Australia Group. not of technological spread. the images by which the various military technologies had been or could be imagined have been downplayed . so the IAEA and nuclear suppliers monitor and intervene to allow for the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while attempting to prevent harmful nuclear proliferation. As questions of military technologies have come to be reimagined in terms of "proliferation." The "taboo" frame in which CW had been imagined constituted a problem of use. Efforts at international control had therefore involved codifying and strengthening the nonuse norm through legal restrictions on the preparation for and execution of chemical warfare. would states turn to forming a supplier group. The result is a set of practices that begins with an international nondissemination norm. "proliferation" privileged a set of practices that focused on the monitoring and control of the constituent technologies. if possible. it might be supposed that the technology was already well spread. underpinned by international monitoring and technology controls by suppliers.ENDI 2010 Security K 52 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – PEACEFUL/ MILITARY DISTINCTION The distinction between peaceful and unauthorized use of nuclear power is rooted in the desire to control and monitor the use of technology by others while justifying military use and development—the framing of proliferation as a problem in this context is the key representation Mutimer 2000 [David. In the process. These practices. the issue of chemical weapons began to be imagined in terms of the "proliferation" image. technologically driven process that would inevitably result in the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Considering that chemical weapons use extends at least to the nineteenth century. formed as a supplier group for chemical weapons technology. Only when the problem is reimagined as a "proliferation" problem. The Weapons State. By 1993 this had resulted in the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is important for my purposes. With the interpretation of reported chemical weapons use by Iraq in its war with Iran as indicative of the weakening of the taboo against CW use.

the rogue who risks political standing through personal indiscretion occupies another. This understanding of balance.and higher-order masses into the metaphorical balance. at once dangerous and admired for the rugged individualism they portrayed. Similarly. Even then. was under intense U. and the world order during the Cold War. who use the image. U. that the accumulation of (conventional) anns should not be excessive and. Little of this romanticism seems to remain in the use of rogues in official discourse. This notion of maturity is then reflected in academic commentary on temporary security. indeed even little boys. The regional security systems that today are of greatest "proliferation" concern to those. for instance. pg 88-89] At its 1992 Summit. the use of rogue carries with it marked condescension. Iraq.S. to produce important subject positions within the "proliferation" image. however. To imagine third parties as autonomous would be to introduce problematic third. Foucault examines ways in which discourses of normality establishes the confines in which the subject may operate. Through his work. a repeated concern in the literature has that new nuclear states would lack the maturity to control their weapons adequately. As I argue in Chapter 3. in turn. that the spread of arms should not disrupt regional or global stability. romantic Western literature. the practice smacks of Star Trek's Prime Directive. the United States. and threaten human and environmental disasters. as often as not. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not seem to admire the rugged individualism of potential rogues . There are two indications in the council's communique of what makes proliferation a threat: first. transgressions thus. During the Cold War the dyadic understandings of balance were reasonably appropriate to the superpower confrontation. Normal behavior is defined largely through identification of the fonns of abnormality that constitute its limits. particularly of balance of power. One of many ironies that emerge in stories of proliferation is that at the same time the primary international rogue.S.27 The idea of stability as the normal condition in international life also reveals academic complicity. pressure because of its refusal to allow UNSCOM unfettered access to its presidential palaces. the proliferation image constitutes the space for the sort of state behavior that will cause serious concern for the guardians of international probity. and hence abnormality (or behavior that causes serious concern) in terms of threats to or disruptions of that stability. the U. It is a constitution of the normal international subject policed by the UN Security Council and by the advanced industrial states through their export control regimes. "Some the President's intimates note his remarkable ability to compartmentalize his life: The policy wonk who genuinely admires his wife resides in space. Balances need to be maintained. in turn. mainly in the North and West. as Charles Krauthammer's characterization of weapon state threat illustrates: "relatively small. are rigidly policed . gives rise to stability as the normal condition of international life. when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "nuclear weapons give rogue states disproportionate power.4' . rendering non-European states and regions either as invisible or as mere appendages to the superpower confrontation . "40 Put another way. as two roughly equivalent superpowers were anchoring two roughly equivalent alliances. weapons of mass destruction more readily available and there are fewer inhibitions on their use. the image downplays and hides those outside the central balance. In this era. in other words."41 Similarly. however. The work of Michel Foucault increasingly defines the way in which we think about the constitution of the subject in modern society. security. which.S. second. The use of rogue to label states behaving in ways deemed unacceptable identifies those states as immature compared with the mature states doing the labeling-foremost aruong these the United States. destabilize entire regions. the mature adult resides on the one side and the rather indiscreet little boy on the other.26 By characterizing the threatening effects of proliferation those that disrupt stability. young men. the definition of rogue as rascal. having been produced and reproduced by the discipline of international relations. unlike the old nuclear states. who acting naughtily-in the former case often in a sexual manner. the outlaw is a common figure in U. It begins. president was being labeled a rogue for reports he had perhaps allowed too much access to presidential parts."39 Nevertheless. One notable feature of Foucault's accounts of the constitution of the modern subject is the complicity of various academic disciplines in defining the contours of the normal. Outlaws roamed the frontiers of the central United States. Such an entailment fits well with the practices established for proliferation control. instabilities upset these balances and produce disorder. They can turn local conflicts into serious threats to our security. those states that act to upset stable balances can be labeled in some way deviant. for example. I argue in Chapter 3 that the most important implication of framing security problems in terms of a balance that needs to remain stable is that it highlights dyadic relationships. By extension. The mature elders gather together to determine which states are sufficiently responsible to be trusted with advalaced technologies and military equipment-indeed.S. a particular characterization of balance has been defined in the practice of international relations scholarship largely with reference to the relationship among the Soviet Union. but world. The proliferation discourse defines normality in terms of regional and global stability.ENDI 2010 Security K 53 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – ROGUE STATES/ LOOSE NUKES The representation of potential nuclear weapons states as rogues incapable of developing their own weapons is based on Western-centric constructions of subject positions-it is racist and infantilizes these states while ignoring the West’s complicity in the same practices Mutimer 2000 [David. peripheral and backward states will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional. the UN Security Council determined that the pn'lif'eration of weapons was a threat to international peace and security. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. Rogues are. The Weapons State.

The Weapons State. India has established itself as the preeminent critic of the proliferation discourse in the Third World. that causes concern to those who make the rules. Not surprisingly not all Third World states are entirely happy with the "proliferation" construction. finds itself abiding by the rules of NPT membership. The second line marks those who do follow the rules from those who refuse-the rogues from the herd. if they do behave in ways that cause concern to the privileged. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. Even if they do not become rogues. for it is rogue behavior that a threat. Thus the recipients' are accepted as part of the community of the law-abiding and have access to prized technology the suppliers can provide . The first marks the distinction between those who can be trusted to make the must follow the rules signalled by inclusion in the ranks of suppliers-and those who follow the rulesthe recipients. and so it is sanctioned. policing difference through monitoring and sanctioning supposedly rogue states Mutimer 2000 [David. they are labeled enemy and heavily sanctioned. for example.ENDI 2010 Security K 54 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION LINK – ROGUES/ MONITORING Proliferation discourse draws lines between acceptable and unacceptable proliferators. In Chapter 6 I examine the alternative frarnings produced in this resistance and elsewhere to see the possible objects and identities hidden by the "proliferation" image that could serve as a basis for political opposition to that image. . This policing gives in to the temptation of othering difference Connolly discussed. This second line marks the emergence of an enemy in this discourse of military security. rules that are supposed to guarantee its access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. they are not permitted inside the privileged Northern club. The proliferation image constructs states in the Third World as outsiders. but they are to be labeled as potential enemies and sanctioned as such. India does not accept the problem as it has been constructed by the insiders and it does not accept the practices to which the construction has given rise. Iran. Their behavior must be policed through export control and compliance monitoring to ensure that they conform to the rules and do not become rogues. Not only are those not included in the supplier groups to be marked as different. its behavior-in this case the domestic politics of government---causes concern among members of the supplier groups. are also potential rogues. however. The recipients. Nevertheless. pg 97] The proliferation image creates two clear lines of difference. the out from the law-abiding.

That circulation takes place through the practices of states that reproduce the discourses out of which those representations flow. In other words. the very process of developing and responding to a "proliferation" agenda in the past few years has reproduced and reinforced the discursive construction of what it means to be a sovereign state in the contemporary world. which. In other words. Similarly. . is driven largely by iterests found in the representations of state and sovereignty that circulate throughout the contemporary international system. pg 140] This connection between sovereignty-statehood and weaponry raises the greatest irony of the proliferation agenda. the United States played a central role in building proliferation as a primary international security threat and the rogue state as its central villain. which is of such concern to states of the West. in turn. high-technology military capable of fighting two or more wars simultaneously. associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies. To produce that military posture in the post--Cold War world. status. The spread of military technology. when the United Kingdon: "ring-fences" the Trident program in its defense review. and that particular form of military organization and equipment. it strongly reinforces the relationship among statehood. it is reproducing the nuclear arsenal as a marker of status in the international system. The Weapons State.ENDI 2010 Security K 55 Wave 1 PROLIFERATION DISCOURSE TURNS CASE The discourse of proliferation reproduces and reinforces the discursive construction of sovereignty which in turn incentivizes and precipitates the spread of nuclear technologies Mutimer 2000 [David. when the United States revises its military posture in the aftermath of the Cold War on the basis of a need to maintain a fully functional. is central to the spread of advanced weaponry and related military technologies.

Not only can others acquire these technologies. The former approach may slow down technological development.html] The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security. First. Second. legitimacy. although this begins to include pretty much everybody. ed. are critical to economic strength and military might . it is not enough to invoke the mantra of "competitiveness". in all three cases. (Note. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. in doing so. competition with someone is also critical. but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system. and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that. Doves. In Europe. state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain. it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz. this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). however. absent a persuasive threat. and not military.) What. All else being equal. they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. Thus. On Security. under state direction. albeit declining. the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market. is the solution to this "new security dilemma. they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although. Finally. Karel Van Wolferen. that must follow ? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again? . potentially unreliable. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold wars and the remobilization of capital. and Michael Crichton." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed ? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks. they might also seek to restrict access to them. imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non-)Pacific conquest. that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States. which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect. in the United States. or the trading partners of potential enemies.ciaonet. that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. then. Ronnie Lipschutz. They are. forces.org/book/lipschutz/index." as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford. How can a state generate the conditions for legitimating various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly. Both contingencies could be threatening. it is often argued. they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain. notwithstanding budgetary stringencies. they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies. http://www. therefore. the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets.ENDI 2010 Security K 56 Wave 1 ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS LINK Discourses of economic competitiveness are based on the securitization of financial loss and the construction of new economic enemies Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz.

To the extent. Liberal humanitarian efforts have at their core the desire for security and complicity with the system that has put it in place Dillon and Reid 2000 [Michael. that currently manages Bosnia--might be secured. become politicized. Increasingly. which impacted on the fringes of liberal internationalism." These of course provide many significant conduits for aid. for example. The vexed relation between liberalism and capitalism is also at issue once more since clearly. as the traditional principle of political formation whose science is law. Volume 25. This incendiary brew is currently also fueled by a resurgent liberal moralism. leading to a securitization of society itself Dillon and Reid 2000 [Michael. the policies and practices of "political conditionality" are also suborning them. The transformation is therefore to be effected according to the current efficiency and performance criteria of good governance-economically and politically--set by the varied institutions of global liberal peace. and their classification as nongovernmental is sometimes equally so. . Liberal Peace. that they comply--and their very capacity to resource themselves and operate may be intimately dependent upon their good standing with these governmental and international agencies--their "impartiality" and humanitarian ideals are compromised. Liberal Peace. and Complex Emergency] Liberal humanitarians have. governments and international organizations must secure the compliance of the large number of nongovernmental organizations that populate the zones of "complex emergency. Professor of Political Science at Lancaster and internationally renowned author. Issue 1: Global Governance. they run the deadly risk of becoming identified as active participants in conflicts rather than impartial ministers to the needy and afflicted that are created by them. In order both for policylevel practices and local political arm twisting to work. and sometimes warlike in pursuit of liberal peace. together with the advent of intractable development problems and civil conflicts as well as adaptation to the structural-adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s. for example. Volume 25. however. however. Effecting political conditionality requires their participation. In the proces s. The vast majority of them are. At a policy level. too. Professor of Political Science at Lancaster and internationally renowned author. Issue 1: Global Governance. That moralism generates its own peculiar forms of liberal hypocrisy. and Julian. and Julian. from Alternatives. is being supplemented by a network-based account of social organization whose principle of formation is "emergence" and whose science increasingly is that of complex adaptive systems. These include: the calling for intervention by the international community against Indonesian actions in East Timor while liberal states furnished Indonesian armed forces with the very means of carrying out those actions.[ 5] These ensure that the political issue posed by Stiglitz rarely progresses beyond an afterthought. Deals and contracts have inevitably to be struck with local political groupings in order that aid might be delivered to the needful in areas of political turbulence. and Complex Emergency] Pursued as a deliberate policy of comprehensive social transformation. lecturer on international relations and professor of political Science at King‘s College in London. While the formula complex emergency arose in the general context of the of the politics of bipolarity and the advent of liberal peace. it did so in the specific context of the dramatic weakening of state structures and the exaggerated ideals of sovereign statheood. more than this local pragmatism. The conflation of established distinctions between civil and military as well as between the humanitarian and the geopolitical that has taken place as a result has proved confusing and disturbing to all participants in global governance and liberal peace. and of power projection. and seeking to proscribe child soldiers while failing to address the global arms economy that furnishes the children with their weapons. Political conditionality is. In such circumstances. effectively the subcontractors of governmental organizations and of international agencies. it means calibrating the delivery of aid to effect the internal politics and maneuvering of warring groups so that political settlements sought by international coalitions--such as the one. however. At a local level. Their prized independence is problematic. it refers to the ways in which government and international-aid agencies are increasingly making the delivery of aid conditional on the recipients meeting the good governance criteria that global liberal politics specifies for them. development becomes allied in novel ways via global liberal governance with geopolitical military and economic institutions and interests. sovereignty. They have also found themselves in alliance with the institutions of international political economy and governance as well as with branches of the military. geopolitically ambitious.ENDI 2010 Security K 57 Wave 1 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE LINK Developmental assistance and humanitarian aid are inextricably linked to securitization – the liberal moralism at the root of the action fuels the threats they seek to solve. from Alternatives. the globalization of markets and of capitalism is intimately involved in the "complex emergencies" that global liberal governance seeks to police. lecturer on international relations and professor of political Science at King‘s College in London.

Thus.‖ On Security. As a result.htm In the previous section we have seen that transboundary nature of environmental threats makes it difficult to categorize them. at the moment. Third Secretary of Lithuania to the United Nations.org/book/lipschutz/index. In the third part of the essay. nobody wants to challenge the principle of sovereignty .J. http://venus. 2 I begin by considering security as a concept and a word. At the same time. we increasingly realize that the traditional forms of national sovereignty are challenged by the realities of ecological interdependence . Ronnie Lipschutz. as Waever rightly points out. that despite its length. security. Securitizing the environment justifies the state protecting it through military means Waever 1998 [Ole. allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms After all. ed. we are not yet ready to sideline the principle of national sovereignty. in the final analysis.the fundamental principle on which the rest of international relations is constructed. The security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a way that. Finally. security discourse remains entangled with state politics. I ask whether we might not want to use "security" as it is classically understood.B. that we are all rendered increasingly vulnerable to processes that are planetary in scale. it is worth quoting:…[E]ven if we admit that we are all now participating in common global structures. As societies come to recognize the planetary scale of destruction of the environment. Notwithstanding the fact that they are merely local normative arrangements for promoting the good of humankind in the area of the world where they are located.ENDI 2010 Security K 58 Wave 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY LINK Securitization of the environment perpetuates the notion of the nation-state and perpetuates geopolitical borders Rasa Ostrauskaite. or humanity is not. or the globe.uw. I describe four cases of securitization and de-securitization . Despite some calls for a complete rejection of sovereignty[29] or warnings against the privileging of national security in the face of global problems. http://www. . The present-day political map of the world is a map of independent states.edu. since. states will remain the main providers of security. in spite of all the changes of the last few years. ―neither individual security nor international security exists‖ [32].ciaonet. This is not always an improvement. why not try instead to put a mark on the concept itself .[31] In this context.html] Still. The state is a political category in a way that the world. and that our prost parochial activities are shaped by forces that encompass the world and not just particular states. carries with it a history and a set of of security? connotations that it cannot escape. especially if we try to do so in the framework of national security. professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. I discuss security as a speech act .pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2. The task becomes even more complicated when it comes to labeling them ―for securitization‖. University of Copenhagen. ―Securitization and Desecuritization. Why not turn this procedure upside down? In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of "security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage. and so long as conventional understanding of security prevails. This view has been so eloquently expressed by R.ci. Walker. December. by entering into and through its core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than criticizing it from the outside. it seems reasonable to be conservative about national security as the security of the state. world security cannot be understood . as with any other concept. or the planet. 2001 Rubikon Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol: Can We Securitize the Environment?. it is far from clear what such an admission implies for the way we organize politically. Next. addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense. after all.[30] we are not ready to give up conventional political arrangements of nation states.

i. humanity. asymmetries in causes and effects might seriously impede securitization moves at the global level. to desecuritize an issue is to remove it from the realm of the politics of survival and to allow for a more open and fruitful debate on it[49]. which are close in both time and space to the European states. rather than if enveloped in the national security. these interests can be and usually are in conflict. however. rather than effects. however.edu. First.ci. Even climate change. Thus. since the focus should be on the causes. and even those who maintain the existence of such linkages. has recently been defined as ―at least a 100-year problem. The only reason to feel tempted to keep environment ―off limits‖. subtle and not always predictable. SECURITY T/O SOLVENCY Securitization of the environment makes solvency impossible by focusing on the effects as opposed to the causes of environmental collapse Rasa Ostrauskaite.ENDI 2010 Security K 59 Wave 1 ENVIRON. point out. while to securitize an issue is to declare it being ―off limits‖. And this could be applicable to the logic of international environmental relations among the states. much is happening. According to supporters of the environment-security linkage. EU Political Advisor in the Office of the High Representative for BiH. Therefore.htm Having demonstrated the ambiguities of the environmental security discourse.‖[51] signaling that. Moreover. states may choose to cooperate to prevent or minimize environmental threats for which they share responsibility. which. in the environmental security discourse. To agree upon collective strategies to reduce environmental vulnerabilities would be easier.uw. Yet tacking the security label to environmental issues deserves more than a word of caution. the collective approach frequently entails negotiating treaties that commit states to limit certain activities within their jurisdiction. might prove to be a complicated task. As Buzan et al. http://venus. it is ―analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat. would be the possibility to have more resources allocated from the state budget. albeit indirect. if at all. slow progress has been made towards addressing the causes rather than effects of environmental threats. For this reason. ―in terms of politicizing causes. if decision-makers first desecuritized environmental degradation. that once a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is established. Unfortunately. With the exception of already discussed securitization of the threats posed by nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe. unless environment is securitized. environmental degradation should be placed under the umbrella of national security. but most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitization‖[50]. effects rather than causes tend to be securitized. As rightly pointed out by Waever. It is at these crucial junctures of conflict that the issue of environmental degradation becomes worthy of a ―security‖ label. arguing against this linkage. however. If one of the motives for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to national security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a sense of urgency. the future generations or the nature ? As we have seen in the previous sections. it seems that environmental concerns could be better addressed if they constitute part of ‗normal politics‘. desecuritization renders the issue amenable to more cooperative forms of behavior. It could be pointed out. if the issue is declared to be ―off limits‖. whose interests should be secured: those of the state. .e. which. might prove to be more difficult to achieve. inter alia. admit that environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate conflicts[47]. the linkage between environmental degradation and violent conflict could not be easily established. it is very unlikely that permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior could be supported for a long time. which is a global problem that requires a coordinated global response. Nevertheless. I shall specify the link between environment and security. Second. It is probably accurate to say that one of the biggest difficulties for securitization of environment is posed by the fact that causes and effects of environmental issues differ in time and space. the answer to the question whose interest should be secured becomes self-evident.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2. since one state‘s unilateral efforts may have little effect. Another motive for securitization of effects rather than causes is a recognition that crises call for resolution during which the patience of society can be mobilized. Yet the question remains whether the benefits of increased attention of environmental issues to be gained through association with security are worth the harms caused by negative connotation and effect. 2001 Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol[1]: Can We Securitize the Environment? Rubikon. especially if requires some personal sacrifice[52]. December. environmental degradation is as severe as the military threats and thus deserves to be lifted to the ―high politics‖. because the traditional focus of national security has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions ‖[48].

to be specific.ingly come to be understood in relation to the globalizing dynamics of contem. the "Other . is the worry that while hegemony might indeed be necessary for the maintenance of interstate order.tinguish both between the international and the global and between the eco. 4. always implicit but now again increasingly explicit. Here we would have to engage with the core principles expressed in what has come to be known as the theory of international relations. No. or they might be understood as challenges to the legitimacy. military force and the pursuit of various unilateralist policies by the second Bush administration signal less a quantitative adjustment in a familiar world of hegemons in a states system than a qualitative shift to structures of global power and authority fundamentally at odds with a system of sovereign states. 2002). professor of political science at the University of Victoria. as well as about the capacity of modem states. and to legitimize greater or lesser degrees of economic inequality as a necessary aspect of social life under explic. of the international. and thus between friends and enemies. largely in the mid-twentieth century. patterns that while difficult to delineate or evaluate in precise detail are clearly at odds with the claims to formal equality in the system of modern sovereign states which constitutes the primary ground of modern political life. we might focus on the constitutive value field in which the inter.S. an account of those who are to count as proper human beings and those who are notand of the sovereign capacity to decide who gets to count as the former rather than the latter. dynamics that are in uneasy tension with the political authority of sovereign states. and thus with questions about how we are supposed to dis. These questions usually lead us to engage with various legacies of liberal. ―International/Inequality. or with the conceptual ambiguities buried in claims about "hegemony. it simultaneously threatens to undermine the most fundamental principles of the international system by crossing the vague but crucial line that distinguishes a great power from an empire. we might focus on the capacities of specific kinds of political com. Moreover. jstor] The relatively simple but often ignored point I want to make to begin with is that the international is already constituted through the legitimation of spe. properly democratic states and failed states and all the other tropes through which we have been encouraged to read the process of internationalization simultaneously as a process of modernization." In the background. we might focus on accounts of the principle and historical experi. devel. or the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.munity to participate in anything more than a formal or even token way in the modern system of sovereign states.national is judged as the negation of the positive values ascribed to statist forms of political community.nomic and the political. International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer.ence of the "great powers" as a guarantee of international "order. Marxist and other traditions that have sought to reconcile tendencies toward unequal economic accumulation and distribution with the normative ambition for political equality that has been a defining feature of most modern political ideologies.porary capitalism. with broad readings of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.mate authorities given the contradictions and convergences between these logics. and I will only seek to suggest a few lines of thinking about what these questions might imply. a broad range of contem. a discourse that draws its primary conceptual resources from an insistence that modem politics is organized around a capacity to distinguish between competing sovereignties. to sustain their functional capacities and legiti. in most of the world. 7-24. we might focus on worldwide patterns of global economic inequality. This implies that new forms of inequality might be understood in terms of the categories through which the international has been constituted historically. and perhaps even the possibility.ENDI 2010 Security K 60 Wave 1 CRITICAL INEQUALITY LINK The affirmative’s focus on inequality is narrowly conceived within the confines of democracy or capital accumulation and anxieties about US hegemony—this reproduces the evocation of danger at the heart of otherization Walker 2002 [RBJ. 2. In this context we are likely to engage with various traditions of international or global political economy. thereby enabling consequent distinctions between North and South.tional conflict and the so-called war against terror.porary anxieties about the degree to which U. usually of various mechanisms of democratic representation . and I will not say much about them. Hence all the long-standing uncertainties about the relation between the determining logics of the modern states system and a globalizing system of capitalism. The first option permits some familiar accounts of what it means to identify and respond to inequality in an international context. under distinctly uneven conditions. and with the strange duopoly of the Cold War and the even stranger unipolarity that followed. It is in this context that claims about inequality are likely to refer less to the principle of modern political life expressed in claims about state sovereignty. In this way we might be drawn to look at how the process of internationalization worked as both a form of inclusion and a form of exclu. Here we might engage with the institutional distinction between the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Hence. The prevailing tendency here has been to define equality in rather narrowly conceived political terms.cific forms of inequality. pp.oped and underdeveloped.itly capitalist conditions. Third. Vol.bus and Vasco da Gama and forward to contemporary predictions of civiliza. Here we might look at the historical pro." again in relation to the formal claims to equality expressed in the system of sovereign states. Here claims about inequality are always in danger of reducing to an absolutist and radically dualist account of all values. claims about political equality have been articulated primarily in relation to the domestic communities of sovereign states whereas processes of economic accumulation and distribution have increas.cesses of colonization that accompanied the construction of a modern system of sovereign states first in Europe and later.sion." . The second option opens out a range of questions that are much more difficult to evaluate. Second. Fourth. than to various claims about "civilization" and its absence that might be traced back to the Crusades or the voyages of Christopher Colum.‖ International Studies Review. First .

stand inequalities as aberrations from that norm that might somehow be eradicated in order to bring us back to our proper normative principles.ings of the legitimate relationship between equality and inequality that is already expressed in the principles of a political life that is somehow international . legal.empirical. Vol. to initiate analysis on any one of the specific grounds identified here. and thus to under. in order to engage with claims about novel forms of inequality in an international context it might be possible. Such a brief and broad sketch necessarily effaces many indispensable but also problematic categories of class. while it is often tempting to assume that modern politics is pred. four seem fairly obvious.tant points.‖ International Studies Review. This might take us initially into discussions about the different meanings of equality.ENDI 2010 Security K 61 Wave 1 INEQUALITY LINK Claims about addressing international inequalities assume a relationship between equality and inequality that is rooted in modern sovereignty and capitalism Walker 2002 [RBJ. it is necessary to understand how "the international" is already constituted. even though each of the four themes I have identified expresses very powerful assumptions about what equality must involve.icated on assumptions about equality as a regulative norm. as a normative account of the proper relationship between equality and inequality. . Finally. though necessarily misleading. opportunity-oriented or outcome-oriented. individual or collective-that are at play in the practices of modern states. in the ways principles of sovereign equality and "domestic jurisdiction" are reconciled with princi.ples of great-power hegemony and various kinds of "intervention". On the contrary. Second. and especially in the practices of the modern state. it is necessary to understand the specific understand.corporation of a linear account of history as modernization and "development" into a structural account of international order that depends on various historical practices of exclusion that render specific practices of inclusion necessary and natural. It would certainly take us eventually into dense debates about the practices of modern sovereignty. 4. 7-24. in the in. International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer. race. No. philosophical. and in the way the most basic premises of the states system affirm the primacy of the internal as the ground on which to affirm the inferiority of the external. such a sketch is sufficient to underline several impor. Third. no universal standard against which to measure the equal and the unequal. ―International/Inequality. Nevertheless. in prin. Again. there is no single ground on which we can speak about inequality. jstor] Obviously much can and has been said about all these ways of beginning to think about (in)equality and the international. gender. professor of political science at the University of Victoria.ciple. we have a range of accounts of how the relationship between equality and inequality ought to be expressed in the primary constitutive practices of modern life. It expresses this relationship in the various ways politics and the state are distinguished from economics or "the market". and obscures most of the crucial debates among different theoretical traditions that are at play in each of these four contexts. culture and technology. pp. 2. 2002). First. but quite difficult to take them all into account at once. before trying to make sense of claims about new forms of inequality in an international context.

The limit condition of modern political life is marked by a capacity to declare an excep.ilization and so on). The key difficulty posed by contemporary accounts of inequality is that they tend to suggest that the dis.uct of new relations of production distribution and exchange. or theological. ." to use Martin Wight's term. This limit condition is widely felt to be unacceptable. to affirm a specific set of practices of dis. Modern political life tends to affirm the natural necessity of a world that can be organized partly as a system of horizontal inclusions/exclusions and partly as a set of vertical hierarchies within these inclusions/exclusions. jstor] To think about the practices of discrimination and the ways in which these practices have been authorized in specific ways under specific conditions is to get some sense both of the practices through which claims about inequality and the international have been constituted historically and of how these claims can be understood in relation to what seem like four quite distinctive framings of how the relationship between inequality and the international must be under. 4. or. the most worrying case. Vol. or.stood. especially by privileging the sovereign authority to deny or permit the freedom of particular subjects or by privileging the capacity of particular subjects to constitute a sovereign author. in the system with no overarching authority. a life in which democratic practices of some sort make it possible to reconcile freedom and equality. civ.istic individuals. Other forms of hierarchy. the world of a proper politics within states. among other things. Within modern states politics came to be organized around a series of prob. Let me work backwards. Between states. Modern accounts of what it must mean to invoke categories of equality and inequality also express these practices.tions with other sovereigns. International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer.sequences of putting these two principles into motion as a competition for desire after desire. war remains the final resort .national anarchy. Although some people with an excessive fondness for the elegant models (and models of elegance) favored by certain forms of economics often speak of an inter. This has generated much of the dynamism of modern democratic societies. that is. pp. hardly anyone imagines that they are thereby referring to two hundred or so agents acting in the way portrayed in Hobbes's account of atom. it is only within a defined community that it is possible to live a properly political life. or aristocratic. the flat territorial spaces expressed by modern states and modern subjec. Hierarchy was thus rewritten in a modern abstract scale reaching from the many individual subjects to the unitary sovereign that both constituted and was constituted by many abstract subjects. sovereigns had rela.lematic relations between the sovereign and the subject. gender. and thus to various puzzles about how these different expressions might be related or reconciled.ENDI 2010 Security K 62 Wave 1 INEQUALITY LINK Their criticism of inequality overlooks the intrinsicness of hierarchy to the modern political order—the ability to distinguish between legitimate nad illegitimate discrimination allows sovereigns to declare states of exception and go to war to eliminate enemies Walker 2002 [RBJ. Not surprisingly. This modern world of sovereign subjects generated new problems.emonic status and the possibility that hegemons would start acting like "world powers. Hierarchy emerged here precisely because sovereigns were not as equal in practice as they might have claimed to be in principle . in a more modern format.7 "hyperpowers" to use a term of current European diplomatic usage. Modern politics is conventionally understood in relation to some version of a story about the gradual dissolution of medieval. At least from Hobbes's account of the anarchical con. and not least from Marx's analysis of the inequalities deriv. No. we are led to think about ways of dividing up the world which have been expressed partly in a vertical plane (the inequalities of economic accumulation and class antagonisms.tices of alterity associated with categories of race. perhaps. At least this is the story that stands as the regulative ambition affirmed in the standard claims of modern states and the most refined (Kantian) accounts of what it means to be a modern subject free from dependence on other subjects. Indi. and always fearful that the system of states that enabled them to sustain their claims to universality in a field of particularities would collapse . Sovereigns came to monopolize authority in their own territory. these definitive principles of modern political life have been understood to be radically at odds with each other. colony. culture. Whether read as anarchy or as hegemony. and in a crucial sense inferior to. 7-24. as well as the characteristic puzzles of liberal political theory.criminations that enable modern politics to sustain its characteristic inclusions and hierarchies seem less and less persuasive to the contemporary political imagination . could therefore be tolerated so as to permit some kind of stability and order in the system despite the dangers associated with competition for heg. Both claims came to have foundational status as definitive principles of modern political life. were largely orga. or theological forms of social organization and obligation and its replacement by. the discrepancy between sov. to a capacity to internalize universal reason within their own particularities.ereign equality and great-power hegemony) and partly in a horizontal plane (the inclusionary/exclusionary logics of the system of territorial states and prac.‖ International Studies Review.stood to be radically different from. In a tradition that might be taken back to the classical polis. or coalitions of states. Between states. not the least of which being how to reconcile claims about freedom with claims about equality. however. sometimes the prod. emperors.ity to limit particular freedoms. though they do so mainly by focusing on hierarchies in a vertical plane rather than the horizontal inclusions/ exclusions that make these hierarchies possible. an organization understood primarily in terms of a story about democ.vidual subjects came to aspire to autonomy. 2002). sometimes feudal.sented in the deliberations and decisions of the unitary sovereign that successfully claim to speak for the (particular) many. sometimes coexisting. the international is under.racy and the mechanisms through which the (particular) many might be repre. sometimes exercising sov- ereign capacities to declare an exception to normal life and go to war.crimination. or mutation into. the contradiction is rather more straightforward. a relationship that could be constructed in some now familiar ways. In relations between states.tivities.ing from the necessary contradiction between the value of human labor and the value of exchange in a capitalist market. 2. ―International/Inequality. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. or feudal. or even quasi-institutional regimes generated by coalitions of states. however.tion to all domestic norms and to inscribe an absolutist discrimination between friend and enemy on a spatial ground of statist inclusions and exclusions. The hegemonic role of particular states.nized so as to fit in with this new abstract relation between sovereigns and subjects. in a responsible and authoritative manner.

conceived largely as a constitutional. abstraction.DISCRIMINATION The affirmative buys into a modern sovereign determination of establishing limits to discrimination. and an affir. is crucial to the mysteries of political authority. modern poli.sis across many scholarly disciplines and traditions.courses work with questionable concepts of discrimination.larly vulnerable to suspicions about the ways in which modern political dis. 4. is crucial to the mysteries of political power. or is not. 2002).ence.‖ International Studies Review. All these established entries to the politics of modern discriminations and the discriminations of modern politics are undoubtedly important. It works especially on the basis of constitutive distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy. or. It is this that marks Hobbes as the most important textual expression of the convergence between specifically modern forms of discrimination and the practices of modern polit. legitimized and sometimes subverted. cultural or democratic sources of legitimation.tics ultimately affirms a claim that the capacity to act. of discriminations enacted between the legitimate and the illegitimate. it is. the West and the rest. As such. to follow Carl Schmitt's awesome summation of our Hobbesian legacy in this respect. 2. and to claim to act legitimately. rests with the sovereign. pp.tity and subjectivity are enacted. Vol. which legitimizes ―justifiable‖ discrimination and draws boundaries between deserving and undeserving subjects Walker 2002 [RBJ. and that ensures his centrality to contemporary attempts to come to terms with the limits of modem politics. Here one might want to privilege Locke's fateful distinction between "the world that God gave to man in common" and the right to private property. between the properly political and everything else. They enable and are enabled by specific political practices. that is. as well as the subsequent reworking of this theme in Marx's theory of value on the one hand and the marginalist school of market economics on the other.3 For all that accounts of political power might be informed by the capacity of states to make a difference. Or we might think about the ways in which the discriminations of modern politics enact novel ways of making discriminations. rulers and unruly. It was perhaps Hobbes who most clearly articulated the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical as an achievement of modern sovereignty. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. No. we are likely to become aware very quickly that modern politics expresses the demand for some sovereign power/authority to distinguish that which is properly political and that which is not. modern politics enacts systems of discriminations that in turn enable sequences of subsequent discriminations. and constitutive. through which characteristically modern accounts of political iden. Among many other things. however. jstor] Claims about (in)equality are simi. or has come to be. International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer. The capacity to act on the basis of differences made. and for all that accounts of legitimate authority might be informed by claims about the ethical. that which is the general rule and that which is the exception to the general rule. or between public and private ethics despite the stubborn elusiveness of any clear distinction between public and private. including those that tell us when we should and should not discriminate. a sovereignty. Or one might prefer to privilege the struggles between sacred and secular authority that continue despite the stakes buried in God's long dead ghost. Or perhaps one might begin to unravel the reified dualisms of male and female. or when we should and should not challenge the discriminations that make all subsequent discriminations possible. expressed not in the body of any particular being but in the abstract embodiment of a particular ensemble of beings. The capacity to make a differ. insiders and outsiders.ENDI 2010 Security K 63 Wave 1 INEQUALITY LINK . In whichever direction we go. a practice that tells us what politics is. . a modem challenge to a world that could envisage Plato carving nature at the joints or Saint Thomas filling in the gaps between time and eternity articulated by Saint Augustine. Thinking about modern practices of discrimination can take us in many directions and to many engagements with many different forms of analy. ―International/Inequality. or under what conditions we might consider ourselves to be discriminating. to act in such a way that differences are made. to mobilize physical force and administer the differences made. Modern politics-that is.ical authority. and thus a practice that has to be understood in terms of how it has come to be defined rather than in terms of stipulative definitions of what it is. the human and the animal and so on.mation of the need to impose names and definitions on a phenomenal world that does not conveniently disclose itself through a name. the kind of politics we associate with the forms of statist political community in a system of statist communities that took shape in post-Renaissance Europe-is explicitly constructed as a precise and intricately articulated system of discriminations. 7-24.

tiated within structures in which the "North" and the "developed" have indeed been distinguishable from the "South" and the "undeveloped. dependency. the shift that expresses all the most seductive rhetorics about progress and growing up. jstor] Human life. 2. 2001 illustrates the tenacity of modern theories of international relations as a set of claims about the temporal incorporation of all others into modernity quite as much as a set of claims about the consequences of sovereignty in a system of sovereign states. Many con. The most influential narratives here derive from Kant's articulation of the possibility of a cosmopolitan his. cannot be reduced to a simple binary of friend and enemy. Entry into the modern system of states enables any particular sovereign to decide on an exception to the norms of human conduct within a particular territory. and an open door to rabble-rousing cliches about a "coming anarchy" or a "clash of civilizations. neocolo. about the potential unity of humanity to be realized in a universalizing History. unless one is suspicious of a human society that is afraid of dependence on others and celebrates a conform. this is always a beguiling story. Some of the most powerful modern stories about equality and inequality start here. International Relations and the New Inequality (Summer. Vol. 4. .its of modern politics in a more serious way and recognize the fundamental antagonism.ENDI 2010 Security K 64 Wave 1 INEQUALITY LINK ." Various tradi. This antagonism is usually framed in temporal rather than spatial terms. 2002). political life in the modern state is itself shadowed and enabled by a constitutive antagonism at the limit of the modern system of states. would confront the statist lim. ―International/Inequality. pp.DISCRIMINATION The affirmative establishes a teleological narrative about discrimination in which the advancement of modern states depends on who they bring under their protection—this exaserbates the divide between inside and outside Walker 2002 [RBJ.nialism.‖ International Studies Review. 7-24.ical analysis. Told from the inside. it is not difficult to argue.matic expression of modern racism. or simply assume that the limits of the modern state are not the limits of modern politics. In whatever form." 8 The key difficulty here. especially on the basis of a rich tradition of liberalism and humanism. however. however. The regulative antagonism between friends and enemies that both defines and limits.tory. and valorization. Many others wish that modern polit.ern states system as its key legitimation. the bringing in of an historically excluded outside into a system of states that is itself constituted as a structure of insides and outsides. and especially modern liberalism. or at least of modern liberalism.ror or Islam after the violence of September 11. as the necessity for modernization as a process that will bring all societies into the system of sovereign states that guarantees their membership in a particular sort of community of humankind. the temporal story. that enables us to speak of equality on a political ground that insists on the priority of the particular (even if universalizing) state/community/friend over all other states/anarchies/enemies. claims about inequality have been framed largely as a pattern of spatial exclusion that expresses a quasi-Kantian narrative about the necessary process of inclusion into the mod. a temporal shift to a condition of maturity and independence. it offers a paradig. Yet what is widely considered to be unacceptable is in fact the constitutive condition enabling the modern account of a political community within a sovereign state. A story about time enables a story about space that in turn enables a legitimation of inequality . professor of political science at the University of Victoria. Kant simply affirms Hobbes in this respect. is a condition of the possibility of the modern international. Told from the outside. enables and threatens. Many people wish they would simply go away.tradictions are at play here. Indeed. No.ist egoism as a model of autonomy. center-periphery relations. the rearticulation of capital-state relations and so on. imperialism.tions have tried to explain these structures-accounts of colonialism. The relative ease with which various kinds of liberalism have converged with ostensibly illiberal invocations of ter. is less the genealogy of a set of categories than the historical practices through which these categories have been instan.

.lematic relationship between higher and lower was articulated symbiotically with two crucial framings of inclusion and exclusion. to read all forms of inclusion and exclusion as a relation between friends and enemies. this leads us to think about the shift to a modern quantitative understanding of scale. In part it leads us to think about the ways in which this prob. But this common ground is traversed by sharp limits. by massively institutionalized capacities to discriminate between the inside and the outside. 225-286. pp. 1984). ―The Poverty of Neorealism.ern into modernity. 2 (Spring. one involving the spatial limits of the modern system of states. professor of political science at Arizona State University. 38. and to treat inequality as a problem. of bringing the unmod. those who are capable of becoming equal because they are unequal and those who seem to be incapable of becoming equal because they are unequal. Vol.ENDI 2010 Security K 65 Wave 1 INEQUALITY LINK – INTERNATIONAL / CAPITALISM Claims about international inequality occur within a specificially modern discursive field that naturalizes modern binaries between friend/enemy and savage/modern Ashley 1984 [Richard. or to use all the half-buried tropes of civilizational difference as a way of building up a statist logic of friends and enemies into a battle between the civilized and the damned. is to work with a specifically modern discursive field. In part. and compared across jurisdictions. No. Part of the brilliance of Hobbes's story of the shift from state of nature to a state of society is that it conflates these two very different narratives of inclusion/ exclusion into a single story about before and after.tocratic) society. to use concepts like equality and inequality. and either to leave the temporal process of modernization. anarchy and community. the primitive and the modern. and the degree to which fundamental notions of higher and lower have largely been recast as a problem rather than as a condition of a properly ordered (aris. to some other discourse. whether between friends and enemies within and between sovereign states or between those who can be brought into the system of states and those who cannot or will not. one involving the spatial limits of the modern state. jstor] First. Theories of international relations are thereby enabled to treat the international as synonymous with the world as such. Modern accounts of equality and inequality assume a common ground on which something can be measured.‖ International Organization.

professor of psychology at the University of New Mexico. and Cookie White. 90-103] To recapitulate existing claims and findings.. and Eran Halperin. the Role of Percieved Security Threats in Promoting Exclusionist Politics. or natural resources (Bobo 1988. Second. Huddy et al. Levine & Campbell. they will have a prominent impact on exclusionist attitudes. Political Research Quarterly. 2002. An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice] The first types of threats included in our model consist of realistic threats composed of the outgroup . 2002). al.1 Dominant groups create perceived threats and prejudice towards others in order to maintain control Stephan and Stephan 2000 (Walter G. we focus on subjectively perceived conflict between groups. we contend that perceived threat to the security of one's reference group might have a significant impact on attitudes toward out-groups. regardless of whether or not the threat is ―real‖. Intense fear may induce generalized attribution to the minority group. Huddy 2003. delegitimization of the out-group members. political violence).g their health). see Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006). Sniderman.g through welfare). which challenge the in-group's norms and values. Sherif 1966). terror attacks included (Huddy et al. In such cases. 1972. a assistant professor of political science at the University of Haifa. We further assume that the role of economic versus symbolic threat is dependent on the specific contexts of the relationships between the out-group and the in-group. and eventually exclusionist and other aggressive political attitudes toward them (for a literature review. crime). Our concept of realistic threat differs from the idea of threat emphasized in realistic group conflict theory in two ways. and threats to the physical or material well-being of the ingroup or its members (e.. Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination. our focis is broader. Realistic threats are threats to the very existence of the ingroup ( e. . rather than personal threat (e.ENDI 2010 Security K 66 Wave 1 LINK HELPERS Securitizing minority groups leads to their exclusion and violent reaction against dominant groups Cannetti-Nism et. Hagendoorn. Vol 61 Number 1 March 2008pp. was primarily concerned with conflict for scarce resources. Pocketbook or Culture. the rationalization under lying the perceived threat is based on fear stemming from involvement of members of a minority group in actions (violent and nonviolent) undermining the existence of the host state. We emphasize that economic and security threats are different facets of realistic threat.g. and distinct from symbolic threats. such as territory. wealth.g. Life. as developed by Levine and Campbell and by Sherif.. 2008 (Daphna. It should be noted that this study focuses on collective security threats (e.a professor of Sociology at the University of New Mexico. This theory. Gal Ariely at the National Security Studies Center. based on a challenge to the group's economic or physical well-being. Following recent post-9/11 political studies (e.g. Thus. encom[assign any threat to the welfare of the group or its members. First. The concept of realistic threats has its origins in realistic group conflict theory. threats to the political and economic power of the ingourp. the Deputy Director of Political Psychology at IDC with a PhD in political science from the University of Haifa. the question we raise is. We emphasize perceived realistic threats because the perception of threat can lead to prejudice. economic (realistic) and symbolic threats are quite common explanations for exclusionist attitudes toward minorities. In a post-9/11 world. a topic with which we deal in the fol lowing section. hatred. what is the relative impact of each of the three sources of threat on political exclusionist attitudes toward different types of minorities? We assume that because security threats are threats to life itself. and Prior 2004).

Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy. Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. and even the existence of such matters is concealed. requiring government decision and resource allocations or.55 Buzan." they are even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form. Ole Waever. The state as a form of society has defined itself in large part around what it will consider as "security threat" and what mechanisms it will adopt for dealing with it. When issues are "securitized. And that constraint is even more firmly denied. "part of public policy." it becomes for me part of "politics" and hence. and de Wilde's use of "politicized" is quite distinct from what mine would be. Certain questions can no longer be asked. Securitization is technologization par excellence. and Jaap de Wilde explain how they see "securitization": "Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." this changes the terms of the debate. but for me that direction is one of depoliticization. Issues of "security" are more removed from public debate and decision than issues of "politics".54 Securitization. p. Postructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat. in most cases these issues are secret. . removes it from one arena within which it is debated or contested in a certain way and takes it to another. requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). 10-11 A second example in the field of international politics is the process of securitization. or claiming that something is an issue of national security. as they say. Once something has been "securitized." Barry Buzan.ENDI 2010 Security K 67 Wave 1 SECURITIZATION BAD – KILLS CRITICISM Securitization closes off and depoliticizes criticism Jenny Edkins. more rarely. In the security studies literature. requiring government decision and resource allocations." I would agree that securitization is a further step in the same direction. 1999. Waever. securitization is seen as a further step beyond what is called there "politicization. Decisions about them are taken in technical terms. "depoliticized. where the priorities are different. following the advice of experts in military affairs or defense. as I have argued above.56 What they call "politicization" I would call "depoliticization": When an issue becomes.

no matter how inchoate. Moreover. . and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical. and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways. Date accessed May 10. Or in metaphoric terms. David Campbell\Michael Dillon. December. the reply before we proceed should be brief and 'hard-nosed' enough to match any realist.they fail most because they are not good enough practically to match our circumstances. Michael Dillon has formulated the appeal to security as necessarily implying a ‗specification. of the fear which engenders it‘ and hence calls for ‗counter-measures to deal with the danger which initiates fear. Neither is there anything in the history of the technology of political violence to warrant the claim that the political rationalisation of violence diminishes its sway. Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics. The war logic of security is thus likely to lead to a paradoxical story. we have briefly to re-visit again an aspect of the early formation of the terminus in which we are located. the ‗extraordinary measures‘ of the CoS." a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it. 2001 [Claudia. but it has never been the only ratio. elimination or constraint of that person. this approach is highly ambiguous for a political community predicated upon the friend/enemy differentiation. Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force by modern political authorities has helped bring human being to the threshold of planetary survival. Our critique turns all their practicality claims. Should the old objection be advanced that a return to the ethical represents a retreat from the hard violent choices entailed in the political. Elimination of enemies or their circumscribing is the ultimate goal of war. group.[16] This process of demarcation of friends and enemies.ci. The enemy needs to be eliminated and at the same time the very identity of society.[13] These countermeasures are directed at the other. depends on enemy construction. to use Jef Huysmans‘ favorite analogy society-garden.in a way that would not matter very much if they did not so impoverish our political imagination .htm] Survival refers not only to the fear of death. Department of War Studies. In this political community constituted upon the logic of war. however. The injunction to preserve the internal order of the modern harmonious garden has targeted both internal and external enemies. 17-18 To broach this task anew. It is not a matter of getting knowledge 'to represent reality truly' (we shall see later how modern reality has become a function of its technologies of representation). Research Associate in the Centre of International Relations. in which security is only likely to breed more insecurity and eventually violence. As the ‗war on drugs‘ will clearly illustrate.[14] The metaphor of war is constitutive of what both Ashley and Campbell have called the ‗paradigm of sovereignty‘. for example. and for the neutralization. threatens those who threaten us and in this sense it has disquieting effects on the political community. sovereignty signifies ‗a center of decision presiding over a self that is to be valued and demarcated from an external domain that cannot and will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign domain‘. object or condition which engenders fear‘ .uw. King‘s College London.edu. counter-measures refer to unearthing the weeds threatening the harmonious growth of the garden . RUBIKON. 1993. 2007. Thus the sovereign logic of security ultimately endangers. the weeds that need to be rooted out for the benefit of the political community. securitizing moves are only liable to breed insecurity. pp. but implies countermeasures. the enemy to be eliminated. intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses. Human perdurance cannot afford the cost of the politics of political and ethical forgetting charged by the technologising of the political as violence.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2. Realist and neo-realist answers not only fail intellectually .ENDI 2010 Security K 68 Wave 1 SECURITIZATION BAD – VIOLENCE The war logic of securitization leads to the violent elimination of enemies Aradau. Their realist conception of international relations guarantees extinction--it fails to encompass the reality of the political subject of violence. http://venus.[15] In Campbell‘s formulation. ―The end of philosophy and the end of international relations. provider of security within its boundaries and preserver of ‗law and order‘. the mutual constitutiveness of threats and threatened objects leads to a spiral of enemy constructions. but of acquiring 'habits of action for coping with reality'. The technology of modernity's political settlement realises its end in the real prospect ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction.‖ The Political Subject of Violence. delineation of boundaries of order versus disorder has been the prerogative of the sovereign state.

The "influence of timidity. which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference. or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes. and Baudrillard On Security. unusual. "Trust. to the causally sustainable . liberating and relieving.ciaonet. and is sustained by. In The Gay Science . Marx. Unlike the positive will to power. the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. not predictable. in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self . the surest protection against contingent forces. to serve as a cause. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown.org/book/lipschutz/index.ENDI 2010 Security K 69 Wave 1 SECURITIZATION BAD . the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable. The "why?" shall. . is excluded as a cause. Nietzsche. not certain. he feels strong in being able to trust. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before." and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses. the unknown becomes identified as evil." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. and excited by. to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god. cause and effect are confused. Ronnie Lipschutz. and questionable. and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. prof of political science at Brown.html] The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us. or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true. of course. only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case. In short. not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting. ." as Nietzsche puts it." 40 For Nietzsche. something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life. ―The Value of Security: Hobbes. creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change. full of mistrust and evil experiences." the "good. but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange.RESENTMENT Securitization produces resentment of difference and constructs scenarios through causality and rationality Der Derian 1998 [James. http://www. the security imperative produces. if at all possible. reasonable . the feeling of fear. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true." 41 .‖ ed. . isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar. Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look. and everything true. the will to uncover everything strange. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon. transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul. The strange and the alien remain unexamined.

Rather than generating a new "Pax Americana" the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts. which has so worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades. it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests . The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves. now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale--something that no one really expected. . was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history.. causing global war and unleashing new global holocausts. both in the United States and globally. attempt to seize global control.S. as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. As Istvan Meszaros observed in 2001 in Socialism or Barbarism.ENDI 2010 Security K 70 Wave 1 HEG BAD-IMPERIALISM US hegemonic imperialism will cause devastation on an unprecedented scale." * This new age of U. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United States to gain greater control of these resources--at the expense of its present and potential rivals. fall 2000). Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. South Africa. the U.an absurd and unsustainable way of running the world order.org. Promotion of U. corporate interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities of the U. and will prove to be its own--we hope not the world's--undoing. which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999. We must reject this endless cycle of violence. which is inherent in the workings of capitalism and imperialism.S.‖ Monthly Review 55. The growth of the antiglobalization movement. but also a rapidly increasing proportion of total reserves." and this hunger for foreign markets persists today.S.futurenet.. Vote negative to resist imperialism Foster 2003 [John Bellamy Foster is co-editor of Monthly Review.S. which are diffused ever more widely. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances lies in a rising tide of revolt from below.3] At the same time.S. the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. But U. The Vietnam Syndrome." www.S. and the Netherlands Antilles ("Prison Industry Goes Global. Bechtel and the war on Iraq. Canada. This more than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run. multinational corporations "to control as large a share of the world market as they do of the United States market. corporations and the U. state . ―The new Age of Imperialism.S. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically modified food. amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence.S. state is to the world at large. is now threatening humanity with the "extreme violent rule of the whole world by one hegemonic imperialist country on a permanent basis. and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. imperialism will generate its own contradictions. resorting to similar belligerent means. "it is the professed goal" of U. Microsoft and intellectual property. professor of sociology at the University of Oregon. Flo rida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization contracts in Australia. imperial ambitions do not end there. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons. the United Kingdom. since they are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. As Harry Magdoff noted in the closing pages of The Age of Imperialism in 1969. It would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this dual expansionism of U. New Zealand.

what Ziiek calls "social fantasy. The role of ideology here is to conceal the illegitimate. where there is a sense of openness. is forgotten: de-scribed or un-written by the "writing" of the history of the new state. They are also moments that constitute the social or symbolic order." viewed as one of the subsystems of all the systems that go to make up the social order. The act of the subject "succeeds by becoming invisible-by 'positivising' itself in a new symbolic network wherein it locates and explains itself as a result of historical process."39 This is where the notion of ideology as social fantasy.ENDI 2010 Security K 71 Wave 1 MYTHS IMPACT Foundational myths naturalize state authority and violence as teleological outcomes of history and constrain subjectivity Edkins 1999 [Jenny. unfounded nature of what we call social reality. are both moments of the political and moments in which subjectivity is called into play. are safely caged and their teeth pulled. through the presupposition of the existence of a new social system. comes in. of decision." What is more. Once the new symbolic order is in place. the subject as such disappears. Or rather. "Politics as subsystem is a metaphor of the political subject. defines its own conditions. 8-9] Thus. within the social space. moments at which."41 In other words. and our criticism is restricted to the technical arrangements that make up the "politics" within which we exist as "subjects" of the state. which I discuss in detail in Chapter 6. p. The contingency of its origin is concealed. moments of transition. retroactively produces the grounds which justify it. where there was a brief openness. At that moment. what mustfall out if this space is to constitute itself." Ideology supports the principle of legitimacy upon which the new state is "founded" and conceals its "impossibility. thus reducing itself to a mere moment of the totality engendered by its own act."40 Or as 2iiek expresses it more provocatively. Not only is the new society founded." It does this in part by defining "politics" as a subsystem of the social order and obliterating "the political"-its unfounded founding moment: "'Politics' as 'subsystem. of the Political as subject. The political subject and the international subject. but it is produced as inevitable."38 This happens when events are "read" backward or retroactively: at that point it is easy to explain "objectively" why certain forces were effective and how particular tendencies "won. the contingencies that gave rise to it are obliterated-they disappear-and a new version of social reality is established. that enables us to escape or forget the lack of "the political" and the absence of the possibility of any political action. authoritative. the interregnum. represents within society its own forgotten foundation. it is "politics. . Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. too. so to speak. We are confined by this process to activity within the boundaries set by existing social and international orders.' as a separate sphere of society. such a system is brought into being. Postructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In." Indeed the Lacanian definition of "act" is just this: "a move that. and with it the "political"-to be replaced by "politics. and legitimate: as if it has always already existed or been prophesied. its genesis in a violent abyssal act-it represents. once the foundational myth of the new social or symbolic order is (re)instated.

ENDI 2010 Security K 72 Wave 1 KRITIK TURNS CASE-WAR The kritik turns the case – nation-state securitization perpetuates the violence and wars the aff attempts to solve. reconstitution and reconstruction as a necessary condition for the enthronement and durability of peace and security‖ (Jinadu. As shall be discussed in the next section. 2005 [Charles Professor of International Relations at Obafemi Awolowo and scholar at the Centre for African Studies. as well as the difficult and contentious questions of choice which scarcity poses. especially the dialectics of the social psychology of human interactions. . in part. the quest to redirect security towards human centred concerns raises several problems. given human nature and the reality of scarcity. 2000: 2-3). is that NEPAD must first resolve the underpinning motivation of power and militarism. as he pointed out is ―[If] humankind cannot create a perfect society. suggesting that non-political threats ―become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries. the problem of peace and security ―cannot and should not be divorced from the dialectics of domination and subjection. Another criticism is that ‗human security‘ is far too universalistic.pdf] Howbeit.org/Links/conferences/general_assembly11/papers/ukeje. serving predatory group interests. 2004). containing ―conceptual flaws‖ that raises false priorities and hopes regarding the securitization of human beings. which requires in many cases. Niukerk. He explained that the problematic of peace and security is ―intrinsically bound up with human nature. therefore. and in doing so. The crucial question. either focusing on the internal or external dimensions to insecurity. excluded economic. Ukeje. environmental. In the first instance. and itself becoming part of the problem. Accordingly.much the same way that environmental security did over the last decade. in order words from considerations of superordinate/ subordinate relations at the community. national and global levels‖ (Jinadu. http://codesria. under conditions of scarcity and choice‖. and regime survival‖ (Vayrynen. Rethinking Africa‘s Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century. the core avenue of contention and conflict. Adele Jinadu (2000) offered further perspectives on how human security suffers in the attempts by custodians of the state to retain and extract compliance through the instrumentality of force and coercion. what needs to be done to create a less imperfect society? Under what conditions can such a less imperfect society expected to emerge and thrive? He argued that the ―modern state…continues to be the pre- eminently contested terrain of hegemonic groups in national and international society. what the above implies. Another limitation of the concept of human security is that it cannot be fully consummated for as long as the quest for peace and security remains tied to the authoritarian values and motivations of those in power. scope and utility. of superordinate and subordinate. cultural and other non-political threats. It puts the state (and politics) at the centre of the conceptualisation of security. a major obstacle to peace and security. The orthodox conception of security. tend to restrict the concept to the political survivability and effectiveness of states and regimes. human security would continue to suffer breaches and abuses as regime/ state security further allows official violence to multiply (Sabelo. a major impediment to structural reform and. Submitted at 11th CODESRIA General Assembly. The concept is criticised for overstretching the traditional notion of security. 1995: 260). ―human security‖ is still heavily contested in its definition. 2003: 306. 2000: 1). state institutions.

then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. Security politics is. it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism. in which people might come to believe that another world is possible . 185-6] Neocleous. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues. in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated. most notably the constructive conflicts.never could be told . must be open to debate. and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties. debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams. Professor of the Critique of Political Economy."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever."' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings. debates and discussions that animate political life. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order. reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination.that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed.to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. worse. 2008 [Mark. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion. part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. Critique of Security.ENDI 2010 Security K 73 Wave 1 2NC ALT SOLVES Rejecting securitization opens up space for emancipatory political engagement more likely to deal with real world problems & History Brunel Univ. what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else. an anti-politics. despite the fact that we are never quite told . That is. it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition. Security politics simply removes this.what might count as having achieved it. but bracketing it out and handing it to the state. it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically."' . in this sense. but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether . and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics. Head of Department of Politics The only way out of such a dilemma. What this might mean. co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want.as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security. to escape the fetish. the grounds of security. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. in which the latter asks: if you take away security. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security'. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. We therefore need to get beyond security politics. not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. precisely. anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end . ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human.

social. to reinterpret --and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers. Third. I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best.VIOLENCE Reject the affirmative to expose the their role in the genealogy of securitization. you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is. but that everything is dangerous. to assess its economy of use in the present. Second. to remember its forgotten meanings. . I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself.ciaonet. I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme. if most nullifying. I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic. To preempt a predictable criticism. then we always have something to do . and hyperreal. Marx. I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security.html] What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security. analysis of security in late modernity. however. and fluid identities. other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept. prof of political science at Brown. Ronnie Lipschutz. what I want to do is not the history of solutions. And finally. In short." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger. who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought. I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations.‖ ed. You see. Nietzsche. and Baudrillard On Security. that of Marx and Nietzsche. 10 The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. ―The Value of Security: Hobbes. the Hobbesian episteme of realism. interpretive. Problematizing the aff allows new conceptions of security that do not rely on the elimination of difference Der Derian 1998 [James.org/book/lipschutz/index. http://www. My point is not that everything is bad. multiple meanings. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative ." 9 Foucault. gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative.ENDI 2010 Security K 74 Wave 1 ALT SOLVES .

p.SOVEREIGNTY Rethinking the sovereign individual as the political subject unsettles the foundational claims of IR’s security constructs. and a reexamination of boundaries of various kinds constructed to keep subjects in their place. and ideology to a consideration of the political.ENDI 2010 Security K 75 Wave 1 ALT SOLVES . The challenge to international relations comes not only from a realignment and reexamination of subjectivity that leads to a rearticulation of fundamental political questions but also from a reassessment of "the political" itself. Edkins 1999 [Jenny. Postructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. albeit still within a postcolonial world. Discursive analysis is necessary to prevent a depoliticized technocracy. can we still draw the line between politics within and anarchy without? Or is the political moment over once the frontier is in place? As we shall see in Chapter 1. . what is "the political" about? If the boundary between the international and the domestic is insecure in more than the traditional sense. If the unsettled subject can no longer be seen simply as friend or enemy. The unsettling of the subject (of theory as well as of politics) has taken place in parallel with a freeing of the colonized subject. xi-xii] The rethinking of the political that is taking place in contemporary theory (and that has indeed been taking place for some time) involves an unsettling of the view of the "subject" of politics. At one time the political subject was assumed to be the sovereign individual. Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth. discourse. Much of what we call "politics" is in many senses "depoliticized" or technologized: the room for real political change has been displaced by a technology of expertise or the rule of bureaucracy. This concept of the subject has been decentered and the notions of existence and temporality on which it was founded problematized. preexisting politics itself. a reassessment of what we might mean by these terms leads a number of writers to make a distinction between "politics" and "the political." It also leads to an analysis that acknowledges the importance of questions of language.

Arizona State University. issuing from the margins of the discipline. ―Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. Department of Political. put simply. Our answer can be baldly stated: dissident works of thought elicit attention and prompt critical readings because these works accentuate and make more evident a sense of crisis.‖ International Studies Quarterly. jstor] Our first step is to attend to the circumstances in which these critical readings occur. 3.ingly self-evident notions of space. In short. Only thus can we understand their strategic situation and what. a superior framework. Vol. Associate Professor of Political Science. should critical readers even care? The answer cannot be that dissident works of thought promise to provide a better method. They put the discipline's institutional boundaries in question and put its familiar modes of subjectivity. RBJ. . expose questions and difficulties. is insufficient. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. Why. and they thereby make it possible to traverse institutional limitations. There must be another answer. No. their critics often indict them for the eschewal. and conduct in doubt. Science. (Sep. What prompts these critical readings is dissident works of thought. like those reflected in the present essays. and progress uncertain. At first the answer to these questions would seem to be obvious. dissident works of thought help to accentuate a disciplinary crisis whose single most pronounced symptom is that the very idea of "the discipline" enters thought as a question. a problem. These works eschew heroic promises such as these. a matter of uncertainty..EPISTEMOLOGY The alternative provokes an epistemological crisis within IR studies that puts the boundaries the affirmative falsely draws in question Ashley and Walker 1990 [Richard. they render its once seem. and explore political and theoretical possibilities hitherto forgotten or deferred . their aesthetic practices labor to do. and as we have seen. Tempe. objectivity. what one might call a crisis of the discipline of international studies. What occasions these critical readings? What prompts into action the aesthetic labors they exemplify? Only by attending to this question can we render intelligible the problem of sovereignty to which these readings reply.ENDI 2010 Security K 76 Wave 1 ALT SOLVES . 34. a more powerful way of producing more convincing answers and more certain solutions to questions and problems that a discipline readily poses. This obvious answer. pp. time. though. as strategies. 367-416. 1990). We need to know what it is about dissident works that prompts attention to them.

ciaonet. and uncertainties that mark the age of speed. Can we not interpret our own foreign policy in the light of Nietzsche's critique of security? As was the case with the origins of an ontotheological security. oceans and borders became less of a protective barrier to alien identities.‖ ed.html] If security is to have any significance for the future. cold war. once isolationist. and as reconstructed by the first. surveillance and simulation.org/book/lipschutz/index. as protected by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. and subsequent National Security Council meetings of the second. that would require a moment of enlightened universal certainty that crumbled long before the Berlin Wall fell. We found a stronger one in national security . some not--in two World Wars? Did not our collective identity. ambiguities. We can no longer reconstitute a single Hobbesian site of meaning or reconstruct some Marxist or even neo-Kantian cosmopolitan community. it must find a home in the new disorder through a commensurate deterritorialization of theory. did not our debt to the Founding Fathers grow "to monstrous dimensions" with our "sacrifices"--many noble.ENDI 2010 Security K 77 Wave 1 ALT SOLVES – METANARRATIVES We should bring disorder to the concept of security in order to reject universalizing metanarratives or single flawed epistemologies Der Derian 1998 [James. internationalist. and a new international economy required penetration into other worlds. and Baudrillard On Security. as embodied and institutionalized in the National Security Act of 1947. http://www. Marx. neutralist and patriotic. dialectical or scientific process to overcome or transcend the domestic and international divisions . national interest became too weak a semantic guide. Ronnie Lipschutz. Nietzsche. . that was born and fearful of a nuclear. Nor can we depend on or believe in some spiritual. prof of political science at Brown. ―The Value of Security: Hobbes. become transfigured into a new god. interventionist power? The evidence is in the reconceptualization: as distance. This is why I believe the philosophical depth of Nietzsche has more to offer than the hyperbolic flash of Baudrillard.

Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity. or one will be pulled into the process as co-securitizer. ―Securitization and Desecuritization. professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. We also have to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms. by society . http://www. and the security quality of the phenomenon understood. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat . the approach I have proposed above points toward a study of the mechanisms leading to securitization of certain issues related to identity. With the "as much security as possible" approach. that is.html] Finally. but leave them unsecuritized.EXCLUDE SECURITIZATION We can take action without securitizing non-military issues—the plan and the permutation legitimize the social construction of danger Waever 1998 [Ole. ed. to take on the problems. especially when and how these problems are handled. .ENDI 2010 Security K 78 Wave 1 ENVIRON SECURITY ALT . This process of social construction can be studied. but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as security issues.org/book/lipschutz/index. this is hard to handle: one will have either to denounce such issues as not being security phenomena ("misperceptions").‖ On Security. in security terms. University of Copenhagen. Ronnie Lipschutz. without thereby actually legitimizing it.ciaonet.

that redefining security in a conventional sense. among states. 17 Ole Wæver (Chapter 3: "Securitization and Desecuritization") illuminates this aspect of security. "create" each other. the tools applied by the state would look very much like those used during the wars the state might launch if it chose to do so. On Security. the `state' [claims] . ed. but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs ." enunciated by elites in order to securitize issues or "fields.ciaonet. These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat. This process can also expand the jurisdiction of alreadyexpansive states as well. out of discursive practices within states and." 15 These discourses of security. As Wæver puts it. only secondarily. Ronnie Lipschutz.ciaonet. Discursive contexts determine the outcomes of policies Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. . AND. In other words. there are not only struggles over security among nations . enemies. To the extent that they act on these projections. Marines in Somalia in December. . Hence. according to Wæver. The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought--an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices. Demonstrably. On Security. "As determinants of what can and cannot be thought." thereby helping to reproduce the hierarchical conditions that characterize security practices. discourses delimit the range of policy options. not between them—it is a precursor to the legitimation of state violence Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. their relationship is intersubjective. as well.org/book/lipschutz/index. while these interests. 21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real. This does not mean that Wæver thinks that "security as a speech act" should not be applied to anything at all. policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests. to a not-insignificant extent. a special right [to intervene]. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. 22 . Ronnie Lipschutz.html] Conceptualizations of security--from which follow policy and practice--are to be found in discourses of security . ed. of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions . Thus. however clearly articulated. there was a question of matching force to force in this case. http://www. a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. all of which grow. framing it not as an objective or material condition. threats to each other acquire a material character. . prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. but the ostensible goal of humanitarian assistance took on the appearance of a military invasion (with the added hyperreality of resistance offered only by the mass(ed) media waiting on shore). nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions. and scenarios have a material existence and. to a great degree. via the projections of their worst fears onto the other. This contradiction was apparent in the initial landing of U. ed. risks applying the traditional logic of military behavior to nonmilitary problems. . therefore. as the chapters in this volume make clear. On Security. material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats. in part. http://www. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security. nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination. in this respect. of struggles for power within the state." 20 But. "By naming a certain development a security problem. to put Wæver's argument in other words. 19 To be sure. perhaps. but also struggles over security among notions . a real import for state security.org/book/lipschutz/index. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz.ciaonet. Enemies. 1992.ENDI 2010 Security K 79 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK: DISCOURSE SHAPES REALITY/POLICY Security discourse shapes reality and policy Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. Ronnie Lipschutz. either to encompass new sources of threat or specify new referent objects. but as a "speech act. should remain outside (but this struggle to redefine a concept can also be seen as an effort by heretofore-excluded elites to enter the security discourse). but rather the products of historical structures and processes. much of the agenda of "redefining security" is a process of bringing into the field of security those things that. . or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes. only that it is necessary to consider with care what is implied or involved if we are indiscriminate in doing so.html] Security is. http://www. As Karen Litfin points out." In intervening.html] What this process suggests is that concepts of security arise. and possible scenarios. presumably. out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there.S.org/book/lipschutz/index. this outweighs their policy impacts-securitization happens within state discourses. 18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. He warns. plausible enemies.

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FRAMEWORK: DISCOURSE SHAPES REALITY
Our dissident analysis of the affirmative affects all political life
Ashley and Walker 1990 [Richard, Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political. Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, RBJ, professor of political science at the University of Victoria, ―Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,‖ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Sep., 1990), pp. 367-416, jstor]
Introduction The essays in this collection, like so many of the texts that sustain them, speak from the margins. They are instances of increasingly visible works of dissident thought proliferating in international studies today. Yet marginality and dissidence, upon being brought to the attention of a discipline, invite a tried and all-too-familiar mode of interrogation and interpretation. They invite a strategy of reading and response that would assign to these and other marginal works a location in a scholarly culture, a place and function in political life, a range of possibilities allowably explored, and a set of standards by which their merits and claims of seriousness must be proven or shown to be lacking. This interpretive strategy deserves attention. For

what is at stake is not just the way in which the discipline receives these dissident works of thought-or puts them in their place. Far beyond the matter of academic privilege, there is a question of considerable theoretical and practical import involved. It is a question that the present essays take very seriously. It is also a question that resonates in all the far reaches of global political life today, wherever and whenever time, space, and politi- cal identity are put in doubt and the territoriality of modern being is uncertain. And yet it is a question to which the discipline must turn a deaf ear-which it must presume to be already answered-so
long as the interrogation of marginal and dissident events, including the present essays, is controlled by a certain strategy of reading and response. In a word, it is the question of sovereignty. In offering an essay to close this issue, we do not try to bring the question of sovereignty to a close. We do not pretend to gather up and express an implicit consensus among contributors as to how the question of sovereignty might or should be answered. No such consensus exists. Indeed, if the present essays exhibit anything resembling agreement on the question of sovereignty, it is only that it must be regarded as just that, a question. In contrast to the vast preponderance of writings appearing in the Quarterly over the years, the essays in these pages share a suspicion of all assertions of sovereign privilege, and they assert none of their own. These essays do not presume to speak a sovereign voice, a voice beyond politics and beyond doubt, a voice of interpretation and judgment from which truth and power are thought to emanate as one. Instead, their marginality consists in their disposition to maintain their distance from all presumptively sovereign centers of interpretation and judgment. Their dissidence consists in their readiness to regard every historical figuration of sovereign presence-be it God, nature, dynasty, citizen, nation, history, modernity, the West, the market's impartial spectator, reason, science, paradigm, tradition, man of faith in the possibility of universal human community, common sense, or any other-as precisely a question, a problem, a contingent political effect whose production, variations, and possible undoing merit the most rigorous analysis. In this concluding essay, we shall explore some of the implications of this dissident attitude, this insistence on regarding sovereignty as a question. These implications are far-reaching, connecting the immediate reality of disciplinary crisis not only to

all the unsettled zones of global political life today but also to all those historical in- stances of cultural crisis to which the "great texts" of the discipline have replied. There is, though, another task. If we are to explore the implications of the present essays' attitudes toward the question of sovereignty, we need to address ourselves to the strategy of interpretation invited by dissident works of thought at the margins of the discipline. We need to understand how this strategy works and what it does. In
particular, we need to understand that it labors to produce a silence on the question of sovereignty-a silence that always marks the time and place that sovereignty would be.

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DISCOURSE SHAPES REALITY – METAPHOR
Security metaphors shape reality- they determine how we structure images of threats and take actions to eliminate them
Mutimer 2000 [David, associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies, The Weapons State, pg 19-20] It is not entirely common to think that metaphor has much to do with the making of policy in general and of security policy in particular. Security policy concerns the serious matter of war; its subject is troops, not tropes. Nevertheless, it would seem even policymakers bent on waging war recognize the occasional utility of an apt metaphor . Hidden in a footnote is a report by Chris
Hables Gray on a small change in the language surrounding the war in the Gulf: "Originally, the attack on Iraq and occupied Kuwait was to be called Desert Sword, but it was decided to portray the war as more of a natural force."22 Gray's contention rings true, as Desert Sword fits more obviously with the prior operation, Desert Shield, than does Desert Storm. Somebody in the Pentagon, however, recognized that swords are wielded by hands whose owners can then be held responsible; storms are acts of nature or of God, not of people. Although the clear intention of this use of metaphor is political in the narrowest sense-we might even say it is meant as public relations-the means by which metaphors function is independent of such intention. Swords and storms carry different meanings; that is, they have different entailments and as such shape a labeled object, such as a military action, in different ways.23 Paul Chilton recently used metaphor as an analytic starting point to examine the heart of Cold War security discourse. In the conclusion to Security Metaphors, Chilton explains how metaphor relates to policy: Metaphor is an element in the discourse of policymaking; it does

not drive policy.... It would be absurd to reduce the Cold War to the influence of metaphor. However, both cognitive analysts of policymaking and historians of the Cold War have noted the part played by analogical reasoning and by metaphor. Whatever distinctions might be drawn between the two terms "analogy" and "metaphor," they can both be treated as manifestations of the cognitive process whereby one thing is seen in terms of another.24 The common understanding of metaphor is that it is a literary technique, allowing an author to provide descriptive depth and allegorical commentary by establishing a relationship between two separate objects' or ideas. Chilton argues that metaphors are much more than this, that metaphor is "an indispensable ingredient of thought itself."25 Policymakers address problems by means of what I have called images-that is, the student or policymaker constructs an image of a problem, of an issue, or even of other actors. This image relates the thing imagined to another, in terms of which the first is understood. This act of relation is crucial both to understanding and to the scholarly act of interpretation that follows. Metaphors
compose the images used to structure and support our understanding of a problem and therefore our respouse to that problem. The choice of Desert Storm over Desert Sword is designed to foster political support for a policy problem by imagining the operation in terms of a force of nature it would be nonsensical to oppose. We might decry the devastation caused by weather, but we would look a bit foolish marching on Washington to bring an end to hurricanes. The general relationship~among the image of a policy problem, the condition of the problem itself, and the policy solution to that problemhowever, allow these ideas to be given a much wider scope than they would receive as a form of public relations. In Security Metaphors Chilton provides a detailed and rigorous examination of the role of metaphor in Cold War security. Specifically, he explores the way in which three metaphors were central to the understandings that gave rise first to the Cold War and later to its end. He looks first at how the metaphor of security and then the related metaphor of containment emerged from attempts within the U.S. state to make sense of the postwar era. In the final part of his book, Chilton turns to the end of the Cold War and to the place of architectural metaphors, particularly the common house, in producing the Cold War's end. The metaphors of security,

containment, and the common house did more than simply support a policy choice; they structured the way in which we can think about problems and thus shape that choice in the first place.

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FRAMEWORK: SECURITY = SPEECH ACT
Security is a speech act that shapes reality—its evocation gives the state unending permission to secure itself against existential challenges
Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, ―Securitization and Desecuritization,‖ On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html] we can regard "security" as a speech act . In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). 23 By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. 24 The clearest illustration of this phenomenon--on which I will elaborate below--occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War , where "order" was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about change in EastWest relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, trying to bring about change without generating a "securitization" response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted. Consequently, to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain threshold and/or through the political process--whether national or international--have the threshold
What then is security? With the help of language theory, negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of "intervention" or "interference in domestic affairs," whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible. Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the word "security" is the act ; the utterance is the primary reality. Second, the most radical and transformational perspective-which nonetheless remained realist--was one of minimizing "security" by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied (as with the European détente policies of the 1970s and 1980s). After a certain point, the process took a different form and the aim became to create a speech act failure (as in Eastern Europe in 1989). Thus, the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning:

Security is the conservative mechanism--but we want less security! Under the circumstances then existing in Eastern Europe, the power holders had among their instruments the speech act "security." The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do . Under these circumstances, a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders. Unless or until this operation were to be brought to the point of failure--which nuclear conditions made rather
difficult to imagine 25 --available avenues of change would take the form of negotiated limitations on the use of the "speech act security." Improved conditions would, consequently, hinge on a process implying "less security, more politics!"

and who make a persuasive call for the adoption of (iv) emergency measures to counter this threat(e. declaring (ii) a referent object (such as a state) to be (iii)existentially threatened (e. the tanks can be hostile but also part of peace-keeping force.lu. Example. If a securitizing actor can convince the referent object that their identity.lub. It is important to underline that this in itself is only a securitizing move not a securitization. It is the act of giving the promise that is the actual event or act. 1998 s 26f). It is only when an issue is presented with the logic and grammar of the speech act that we can talk about securitization. A speech act is not referring to an actual event. etc. A securitization does not require that extreme measures are actually taken but that the argumentation for a securitization has created a platform from which it would be possible to legitimize emergency measures that earlier would not have been possible (Buzan et al. declare war or impose a curfew)‖ (Elbe 2006 p 125f). Even if tanks were to rush over your border you cannot be sure if it is a threat or not unless you know the socially constituted relationship between the tank and the referent object. http://theses. For something to be security. (1998) to the speech act of theoretical linguistics. Instead it is the speech act itself that is the event.g. Head of Department of Political Science: Peace and Conflict Studies at Lund Univerity. This is why we rarely see successful securitization on the global level as it is very difficult to unite all of mankind to perceive a threat in the same way (Buzan et al.). If it (read they) do not accept and tolerate these emergency measures that under normal circumstances would be illegitimate there is no securitization. uttering the issue and the word security in the same sentence will simply not do (Buzan et al. Obviously meaning that there will not be anything left as this threat threatens our very existence. According to all of this there is no such thing as objective security.. This because it is on these levels we find the strongest collective identities.g. 1998 p 23) .se/archive/2007/05/30/1180512652-29760128/Uppsatsen. 1998 p 30f). For this we need four components ―(i) securitizing actors (such as political leaders. Health and Security: HIV/AIDS in Post-Apartheid South Africa. is threatened a securitization process is likely to succeed.6-7. 1998 p 25). 2006 [Niclas. what makes them who they are.ENDI 2010 Security K 83 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK: SECURITY = SPEECH ACT Securitization is a speech act--acceptance maintains the politics securitization – rejection allows for a deconstruction Ivarsson. However certain events can aid the securitization process as facilitating conditions. Securitization is more likely to succeed on the state and nation level. p. The final component that is needed for a successful securitization is an acceptance from the people. What will happen if we take action and what will happen if we do not? Security is an arena were objective standards are practically impossible to apply. claim that security is always about the future and therefore hypothetical and about counterfactuals. by an imminent invasion).Buzan et al. For a securitization to take place the emergency measures adopted to counter the existential threat must be accepted by the referent object. This can be compared to giving a promise to someone. The rhetoric of securitization would therefore sound something like ―if we don‘t take action against this threat now everything else will become unimportant‖. Unless you say it there is no promise. intelligence experts..PDF] The process of securitization is often compared by Buzan et al. Securitization is therefore essentially an intersubjective process ―as with all politics‖ (Buzan et al.

Similarly. inject into issues by publicly portraying them as existential threats (Buzan. For them (1998:26) security ‗‗is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real.ise. the ‗‗[u]se of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem. giving a prom. for example. as a development issue. as Wæver (1995:65) put it elsewhere. Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex. . leaders of international organizations can choose whether they portray HIV/AIDS as a health issue. p. for Buzan. . ‗‗It is a choice to phrase things in security . as they have done more recently. it is the utterance itself that is the act.‘‘ The leader of a political party. By saying the words. something is done (like betting. Wæver. a decision for conceptualization in a special way. not an objective feature of the issue . as an international security issue. .‘‘ (Buzan. . and de Wilde. such as intelligence agencies. and international organizations. that is. March. . and then seek to ascertain empirically whether an issue genuinely represents a security threat. naming a ship). can choose whether to portray immigration as a security issue or as a human rights issue.13 but rather as a particular form of performative speech act.ENDI 2010 Security K 84 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK: DISCOURSE 1ST Securitization is a speech act: the affirmative’s speech act should be rejected prior to consideration of the desirability of their policy Elbe 2006 [Stefan. terms. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. for securitization theory the designation of an issue as a security threat is primarily an intersubjective practice undertaken by security policy makers. government officials. and de Wilde 1998:204). revolving for example around the deployment of armed force in world politics. Whereas more traditional approaches to security operate within a specific definition of security. 124] By way of extension. or. Wæver. security is a social quality political actors. it is also a political choice.‘‘ Security is thus not viewed by these three scholars as something that exists independently of its discursive articulation. . Wæver. labeling an issue a security issue also constitutes such a performative speech act. and de Wilde 1998:211). or.

1988. Bachelor of Social Science (QUT). we hear more than just sound waves'. 14-15 The positivist paradigm informs an idealized rational actor understanding of the policy-making process. insufficient emphasis on the participants in the process (and their conflicting interests) and the 'ideal type' nature of the models themselves (Dalton et al. As Yanow (1996. 1996. 'rationality' and 'truth'. 'positivist knowledge does not give us information about meanings made by actors in a situation. Instrumental rationality in policy-making can be defined as follows: 'in any organization there might be a number of ways of reaching goals. The idealistic representation of policy as a form of 'rational decision making' between available choices and options is problematic for a number of reasons. p. By focusing on 'objective' outcomes and grand narratives of 'progress'. . p. While not denying the place of positivist informed research in social planning. how regulatory functions of the state are being transformed and how policy actors represent and articulate policy problems and solutions. Exploring the discursive dimensions of policy-making requires alternative theoretical frameworks and epistemologies that are able to capture the processes of subjectification and the relationship between agency.6) argues.14). or how conflict over policy meanings is manifested within specific policy environments.this makes policy making useless Marston. and when faced with the need to make a choice between alternatives the rational decision maker chooses the alternative most likely to achieve the desired outcome' (Ham and Hill. When we read a policy we see more than just marks on a page.77). The limitations of rational approaches to policy-making arise from an insufficient account of the political context. This idea of reason without values is maintained through instrumental and technical rationality. The rational approach to policy-making is an extension of particular forms of positivism and neo-positivism that seek to purge the social scientist of values (Bryman. Hillyard and Watson (1996. this paradigm is limited when it comes to understanding questions of power as experienced in the production. p. A positivist view of policy-making asserts policy solutions as universal truths waiting to be discovered by the so-called policy 'expert'. a positivist epistemology is not an adequate position for researchers and policy analysts aiming to explore and understand how policy meanings are discursively constructed.17). identity and discourse in local policy contexts.324) argue that this perception denies the constitutive role of discourse. we remain blind to the multifaceted nature of policy-making processes. The various strands of critical social theory and post-structuralism are areas of theorizing that offer social policy researchers different ways of thinking about language and culture.ENDI 2010 Security K 85 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK: AT: RATIONAL ACTOR Their model of a "rational actor" relies on specific positivist epistemologies. p. Positivist accounts of the social world do not recognize the constructive nature of discursive processes that produce knowledge and identities. PHD (UQ) Social policy and Discourse Analysis . p. reproduction and transformation of policy agendas. p. 2004. In short. 1993.

the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located." The goal-of-analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured. p. and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South. Mere is no such thing as a delivered presence. ―a "rescue. for example. ―and SO on.ENDI 2010 Security K 86 Wave 1 AT: NO IMPACT TO REPRESENTATION Representations aren’t harmless. but rather to examine bow certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and. or representation. they shape policies and cause the harms the aff attempts to alleviate. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices-that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth. Doty. understanding the former as purely linguistic. mind matter. Against this. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada‖ to the geographic space that meaning is created. troops march into Grenada. word/world. is linked to representational practices 1 am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a 'reality' whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the ‗first world'.that a critical genealogy calls into Question. assistant professor of political science at Arizona state university. when U. 56] This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. 1996 [Roxanne Lynn. Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political. and economic power . a 'show of force. is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion ." "training exercise. AS Said (1979: 21) notes.S. military. 'In suggesting that global politics. SO. subjective/objective . this is certainly "real : though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices. Imperial Encounters. What the physical behavior itself is. assumes a series of Dichotomies – thought/reality appearance essence. but there is a re-presence. identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. though. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world.

POSITIVISM Our positivism links outweigh. as positivists. 2 (Spring." They are further able to do so because. we think we cannot say otherwise. or ends. We might not like it. We adopt the posture of Waltz's utter detachment. jstor] Despite the contradiction between neorealists' util. professor of political science at Arizona State University. loyalties. 225-286.ENDI 2010 Security K 87 Wave 1 AT: PERM.‖ International Organization. No. but this is the world that is. the system will appear to us. As scientists. 1984). We are given to feel that our complaints have no scientific standing. At the very moment we begin to question this state-as-actor conception. we join them in excluding from the realm of proper scientific discourse precisely those modes of criticism that would allow us to unmask the move for what it is. we worry. Gilpin's fatalism. And so. we shall lack any scientific point of entry into a meaningful understanding of the international system." Without an actor model. we swallow our questions. into the realm of personal ethics.buying into false scientific epistemology blocks the efficacy of our criticism Ashley 1984 [Richard. or Keohane's We. Krasner's wonderment. as positivists. we are given to feel that we have stumbled beyond the legitimate grounds of science.odologically predisposed to look for precisely the kind of model they "reveal. values. ―The Poverty of Neorealism. we somehow sense.national system. . as a meaningless swirl of "disembodied forces.berian resignation with respect to the powers that be. Vol.itarian conception of politics and their statist commitments. They are able to do so because. 38. pp. we say. as scientists. neorealists are able to perpetuate the state-as-actor illusion in their conception of the inter. we are meth.

but to engage with and challenge the extremities that constitute the conditions of possibility for a certain understanding of the middle ground. Second. Critical realism highlights the conditions of possibility for a resolution of many of the theoretical. 2 (Jun. 44. We are not simply the people who employ discourses of security. Indeed. the boundaries of negativity and boredom are not diametrically opposed. In this section we aim to show how both are embedded upon a discourse of philosophical anti-realism. and praxiological cul-de. we locate a common structure to both the boundary of boredom and the boundary of negativity. by the language we use. we are the people who are ensnared in and used by them. What we mean by ontology is a philosophical ontology. through the philosophies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. for example. we are used.‖ International Studies Quarterly. Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki. It is not simply a scientific ontology we mean here. pursue. the theory "problem-field" within which they are constituted. Don‘t ask what a people is.ENDI 2010 Security K 88 Wave 1 AT: PERM The perm ensnares us in the trap of securitization by treating it as an ordering principle of the political order Dillon 1996 (Michael is a professor of politics at the University of Lancaster. a "problem-field" that. we try to show the difference that critical realism might make to a more ontologi. First. p. the genealogist would argue. Finally. and prosecute order under the various names of security. This is not to say that ontological considerations do not play a role in current understandings. methodological." while the other berates its mirror image for making the world "all in here" and all the while a third position claims legitimacy in terms of its "middle-groundedness. we indicate how critical real. Here lies one of the benefits of metatheoretical inquiry to IR. ―After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism. In this section we argue against the incommensurability thesis and in favor of epistemological pluralism and opportunism. .ism has also normative implications for the study of IR. And. 1996). we argue.1 We suggest that critical realism can incorporate many of the recent epistemological developments and at the same time move the debate forward due to its focus on ontological matters. that of the privileging of epistemological questions over ontological ones. From a critical realist perspective and contrary to the dominant understandings within IR theory. s/he would emphasize that security is a principal device for constituting political order and for confing political imagination within the laws of necessity of the specific rationalities thrown-up by their equally manifold discourses of danger Searching for a middle ground obscures both epistemological and ontological investigations into the foundations of securitization Patomaki and Wight 2000 [Heikki. in particular. we develop a very brief account of our proposed alternative. It is here that we think that the philosophy known as critical realism can be of benefit to IR scholars (for some of the key texts see Archer et al.ings of IR take on an altogether different hue. ask how an order of fear forms people. pp. This can only be achieved through an examination of the boundaries of boredom and negativity." Given that the debate. Colin. In this piece we wish to engage in just such a metatheoretical investigation in the hope of throwing some light on some of the important contemporary problems facing IR scholars. as in theo.cally attuned IR. 213-237. serves to construct a particular understanding of IR theory with a very particular and restricted understanding of its own possibilities. Politics of Security. an inquiry into which is logically prior to the development of any scientific or social ontology (Bunge. critical realism. but share much in common. professor of political science at University of Wales. how this anti. but we argue that where they have played a role these ontological issues have been based on epistemological considerations. And fourth. Third. jstor] A synthesis based on two problematic metaphysical systems produces only a synthesis of two problematic metaphysical positions-not an improved metaphysical position. we attempt to show. Drawing on this analysis we discuss the agent-structure problem and suggest how the social world can be decomposed into causal and ontological elements. No. 2000).realism constitutes what we call the "problem-field" of IR. Any attempt to locate oneself in the centre of current epistemological debates without considering the ontological problematic risks duplicating the worst of both extremes. or better. we think that when viewed from an ontological perspective current understand. so also any individual political transformation would manifest its own particular order of fear. We also challenge what we consider to be the misleading manner in which IR theory currently understands the levels of analysis problem. the genealogist of security might sat. bearing the imprint of the wat determinations of what is political have originated in fear. 1998). 16) Hence we are not only users of language.. Vol. The key to any move forward is not simply to take the middle ground.. The problem is how to move forward? How do we move beyond a sterile and debilitating debate where one side chastises the other for its naive belief in a world "out there.retical disagreements over whether states are the most important actors. We try to revive causal theorizing by redefining causality in realist terms and by arguing that both meaningful reasons and social structures are causally efficacious.sacs international relations theory currently finds itself in. In this respect we want to reverse a long-standing Western philosophical dogma. tends to be primarily epistemological perhaps a more ontological focus could facilitate a move forward . as currently framed. Just as there therefore could be no hisotry of security without a history of the (inter)national politics that seeks to define.

there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. too. 03043754.ENDI 2010 Security K 89 Wave 1 AT: CASE OUTWEIGHS There is no status quo. Liberal Peace." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated. Michael. a policy problematic will emerge. By: Dillon." and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. Global Governance. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems. Julian. Julian. where there is a policy problematic there is expertise.the 1AC advantages are just random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it . or otherwise have them officially adopted. 25. . Local. global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. is problematizable. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. In principle. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy-compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy --and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Alternatives: Global. More specifically. Vol. Issue 1 ] forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. The impact is that solvency is a rigged gameconstruction of the advantages presupposes the necessity of the plan-risk assessment means you vote negative to avoid error replication Dillon and Reid.. opportunity. Here. Thus. too. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. They merely take a snapshot of a dynamic status quo and attempt to portray it as a static universality. for science and for policy science. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. 2000 [Michael. As a particular kind of intervention into life. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. All aspects of human conduct. bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these. Jan-Mar. we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs. any encounter with life. and Complex Emergency. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reid. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. and where there is expertise there. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge. Political. it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth.

MA Oxford. we see the rise of vast bureaucracies dealing in essentially secret knowledge intelligence about military matters and a host of other subjects held vital to national security. There has to be a better way . more lately. it reappeared as part of the axis of evil . from weapons of mass destruction to terrorist dangers. for that matter. as Winston well knew. Dissent Vol. But that was merely a piece of furtive knowledge which he happened to possess because his memory was not satisfactorily under control. In a dangerous world. China rises and falls in Washington's official designations . A few decades ago. and even weapons move about the earth more and more readily. or invocation of national security to rebuff all challenges to the exercise of government power could. Iraq was America's ally. will be proclaimed essential to repress these demons of the future? The one thing we can be sure of is that the supply of ugly movements and regimes around the world shows no sign of running short. even while acknowledging that these things can go wrong. In no public or private utterance was it ever admitted that the three powers had at any time been grouped along different lines. If their sheer presence suffices to justify a hypermilitarized America and concomitant suppression of countervailing voices in domestic life.as against reliance on unilateral intimidation and worse. Such conditions can facilitate terrorism. Mobilization of such knowledge in turn requires a high-tech establishment of civilian and military experts whose activities cannot readily be monitored by outsiders. PhD Harvard. deadly international conflict and narrowing attention to domestic well-being are far more alarming. Pakistan under its last dictator was a stalwart participant in the so-called War on Terror. 57 No 1. the state may change the menu of deadly enemies from year to year but continue the same strictures on public inquiry and dissent. but the direction of movement is unmistakable. One is globalism . The democratic Left properly welcomes the risks of broader and deeper democracy. or domestic restrictions. But nor.affirmative scenarios are Orwellian disaster porn. economy. can anyone authoritatively deny that such measures might actually make matters much worse. with the next shake of this country's foreign-policy kaleidoscope? And who can say what new military exploits. however incrementally. more recently an ally in the quest for Asian "stability" and indispensable supporter of the U. Nor can anyone deny that relentless surveillance of domestic communications. environmental responsibility.S.because the alternative risks of endless. for example. We on the democratic Left must be quick to take risks on behalf of these ends . It seeks to build. The Military State of America and the Democratic Left. No one can absolutely rule out the possibility that a steady diet of aggressive American military action abroad might forestall disasters yet unseen. As the Iraq adventure has demonstrated. conceivably on a scale well beyond what the world has yet witnessed. technologies. we are embarked on a long journey in the direction of 1984. BA Brandeis. supranational structures of authority and conflict-resolution . Who can say with confidence what demonic qualities will be ascribed. and education. to any of America's present-day allies. Oceania was at war with Eurasia and in alliance with Eastasia. Winter] At this moment. for neglecting health.sometimes a feared twenty-first-century competitor. conceivably. Many trends since Orwell's lifetime have aggravated the hazards that he anticipated. On the state side of the equation. in 1 984 (if it was 1984). soil. Political programs are defined as much by the risks they are willing to accept as by the values they seek to promote. it was only four years since Oceania had been at war with Eastasia and in alliance with Eurasia. It counsels more government openness and broader public engagement in governance. But that country could any day be redefined (with some justification) as a threat to the civilized world. Endorsing the alternative entails categorically less risk than constant mindless promotion of militarism and enemy creation Rule.as we on the democratic Left should be the first to proclaim. are not easily challenged in public debate.S.that is. so that people. until it is too late. yet supposedly too sensitive for public disclosure. shrewd state manipulation of strategic information makes it possible to defuse criticism and discredit public skepticism. employment. As Orwell warned. One result is that government claims about matters of vital public concern.ENDI 2010 Security K 90 Wave 1 AT: CASE OUTWEIGHS Rational impact assessment goes negative. help block further terrorist acts on U.the growth of an ever-moretightly connected world. We are not there. at home and abroad. perhaps quite accurately. any course of action bears risks. It refuses to let American fixation on worldwide dominance to serve as an excuse for not building a strong nation at home . 2010 [James B. Actually. ideas. .

" There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons.the ones we don't know we don't know. there's no point in listening to them. we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes . it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. Second. . Fourth and finally. you can. internationally renowned security technologist and author. in combination with a physical attack." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. If we don't build it.recognition of our ignorance makes us more secure then their fatalistic scenario planning Schneier 2010 [Bruce. there are known knowns. risks and rewards. it's based on flawed logic. Every decision has costs and benefits. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me. It isn't really a principle. a sociology professor at the University of Kent. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. we might destabilize the Middle East. the government and institutions should organize their life. organs won‘t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. worst-case thinking validates ignorance. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt. If we don't. it focuses on what we don't know -. and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking. bad systems design. it plays directly into the hands of terrorists. against the power grid. Risk assessment is devalued. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments. and almost everything else. creating a population that is easily terrorized -. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions. It substitutes imagination for thinking. Instead of focusing on what we know. which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios. it can be used to support any position or its opposite. Of course. 3-13 http://www. If we do. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal. leading to widespread violence and death.ENDI 2010 Security K 91 Wave 1 AT: PREDICTIONS/SCENARIO PLANNING GOOD Worst case predictions cause worst case policy making. MA CS American Univ. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking.html At a security conference recently.even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. when you can fill that ignorance with imagination. Basically. You can't be too careful! Actually. First. When someone is proposing a change. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. speculation for risk analysis. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong. and annihilating the planet is bad. Frank Furedi. and then acting as if that is likely to happen. not all fears are equal. But there are also unknown unknowns -. the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA. and fear for reason . It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. technology is hard to understand and therefore scary. Rather than making us safer. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness.and what we can imagine. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. Even worse. If we don't invade Iraq. the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. and bad security. it can be a call to action. An extension of the precautionary principle. there are things we know we know.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case_thin. because as we know." Even worse.schneier. that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile. We also know there are known unknowns. You can't wait for a smoking gun. writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public. If we build a nuclear power plant. it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats. our children need to be protected at all costs. it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. planes will crash and people will die. Third. against the financial system. it could melt down. which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. so you act as if the gun is about to go off. it's only half of the cost-benefit equation.

The second implication takes longer to spell out. how. Once one enters this theoretical discourse among neorealists. are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. http://www.gument presented above. In short.ENDI 2010 Security K 92 Wave 1 AT: REALISM INEVITABLE Realism isn‘t natural or inevitable—it has to be constantly re-articulated Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. 2 (Spring. the identities of the units would be supplied via differentiation. The orderly practices of the world of international relations embodied in neorealist discourse--the practices of power.‖ International Organization. needs. Ronnie Lipschutz. Positivism in IR falsely presupposes the naturalness of states as prior to IR system Ashley 1984 [Richard. like economic markets."35 .intended. and un. The proper analogy. spontaneously generated. The neorealist orrery disappoints these expectations. not macrotheory. On Security. For the neorealist. not the absence of disorder--require constant reiteration and reification in mantra-like fashion. neorealist theory allies with. beliefs. As Waltz puts it. deserve emphasis. Reflecting on the fourth element of structuralist ar. is the theoretical discourse of neorealism as a move. jstor] The issue. and its modes of production thus become a means of stanching the dikes not against the external forces of chaos but the internal dynamics of state disintegration. This proclamation is the starting point of theoretical discourse. even as they become increasingly problematic in the hyperreality of the non-place and time bound worlds of transnational society. and their idealized decisionmakers.ment. Security.tions of individual wants. Vol. 1984). In other words. pp. one refuses to be deterred by the mountainous inconsistencies between the state as a coalition of coalitions (presumably in opposition to the losing coalitions against which the winning coalition is formed) and the state as a provider of public goods. 38. professor of political science at Arizona State University.32 Or. Like Waltz. the state is ontologically prior to the international system. accords recognition to. say. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. It implicitly opposes and denies recognition to those class and human interests which cannot be reduced to concatenations of state interests or transnational coalitions of domestic interests. and actions. for instance. one might expect the neorealist to accord to the structure of the international system an identity independent of the parts or units (states-as-actors in this case). global collectivist concepts-concepts of transnational class relations. Knowing that the "objectives and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions . its discourses. Despite neorealism's much ballyhooed emphasis on the role of hard falsifying tests as the measure of theoretical progress. so also does the neorealist refract all global collectivist concepts through the prism of the state. 225-286. for it relates to neorealist "structuralism"-the neorealist position with respect to structures of the international system. matter only insofar as they help to shore up a crumbling world view .org/book/lipschutz/index."3 one nonetheless simply joins the victors in proclaiming the state a singular actor with a unified set of objectives in the name of the collective good ." They "are individualist in origin. For the neorealist.dividual neorealists might be. it is impossible to describe international structures without first fashioning a concept of the state-as-actor. Whatever the personal commitments of in. is classical economic theory. Much as the "individual" is a prism through which methodological individualists comprehend collectivist concepts as aggrega. Two implications of this "state-centricity.ever. one simply assumes that states have the status of unitary actors . ed. No.ciaonet. however. one of the unexamined assumptions from which theoretical discourse proceeds. Excluded. the state-as-actor model needs no defense. The place-bound concerns of neorealists. The first is obvious.html] In this latter scenario. The system's structure is produced by defining states as individual unities and then by noting properties that emerge when several such unities are brought into mutual reference . "International-political sys. as Waltz points out.work for the interpretation of international politics. protector of citizens' welfare. and gives expression to those class and sectoral interests (the apexes of Waltz's domestic hierarchies or Gilpin's victorious coalitions of coalitions) that are actually or potentially congruent with state interests and legitimations. almost all conventional wisdoms about security no longer hold . like Gilpin.tems.34 Importantly. neorealism immunizes its statist commitments from any form of falsification . not the protective clauses that individual neorealists deploy to preempt or deflect criticisms of that discourse's limits. It stands without challenge. neorealist theory cannot accord recognition to-it cannot even comprehend-those global collectivist concepts that are irreducible to logical combinations of state-bounded relations. is the historically testable hypothesis that the state-as-actor construct might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimize and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule.microtheory." itself an ontological principle of neorealist theorizing. the state-as-actor assumption is a metaphysical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism . and solver of the free-rider problem in the name of winners and losers alike. ―The Poverty of Neorealism. this means that neorealist theory implicitly takes a side amidst contending political interests. As a frame. or the interests of humankind-can be granted an objective status only to the extent that they can be interpreted as aggregations of relations and interests having logically and historically prior roots within state-bounded societies.

John Vincent (1983) is undoubtedly right to warn us that the study of change in the abstract. to speak of change at all. or taken as yet another benighted footnote to dualisms inherited from classical Greek philosophy. for example. 1987). Unfortunately. realist or otherwise. be analyzed more critically in terms of the historical context in which it arose.2 The analysis developed here is primarily critical in intention. whether abstractly or with reference to some particular social process. On the contrary. Ashley (1981. structure and history as mutually exclusive oppositions . who work on the basis of a much greater sensitivity to the historicity of our existence. does much to confront this paradox in a sufficiently serious way. like Kenneth Waltz (1979). This paper explores the terrain that has been opened up by the recent confrontation between structuralist and historicist forms of political realism.ENDI 2010 Security K 93 Wave 1 AT: REALISM GOOD Arguments about realism being key to change are based on historically situated understandings of the idea of change that should be interrogated to expose the fractured multiplicities of realism Walker 2002 [RBJ. A number of other complex issues are at stake here. like Robert Gilpin (1981. It seeks to clarify the theoretical and philosophical issues that are at stake in the critical response to neorealism in particular. Those. puzzles that have more of an ontological than an epistemic character. are taken to task for being unable "to account for . metaphysical disputes.' The most obvious difficulties that have arisen in this context are readily apparent in the writings of some of the most influential recent exponents of a realist position. Those. 1984). To the extent that such differences have been ignored or covered over. or even to describe the inost important contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system" (Ruggie. R. the analysis is concerned with the conditions under which any resistance to realist claims is so frequently condemned for its utopian tendencies. being and becoming. it takes the position that realism and utopianism as we have come to know them in international political theory reflect similar difficulties. including the form taken by realist theories in different eras. Moreover. At a more general level. I will argue. John Ruggie (1983) recommends greater attention to "diachronic processes" as well as "synchronic articulations. if anything. is a rather fruitless exercise. and of recent forms of structural or ''neorealism " in particular. mystifications around which our understanding of political realism has coalesced. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. Yet the plain common sense of this view depends primarily on an epistemological interest. It argues that political realism must be understood less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes. We have become especially attached to treating stasis and change.. it is not immediately obvious in this case that an appeal to an ahistorical theory of rational choice. However. Vol. No.‖ International Studies Quarterly. this paper will suggest that the way in which change is conceptualized provides the most powerful point of entry into a critical analysis of claims to political realism in general. tempt us with the paradox that the world of humankind is in a state of constant flux and change. The critics of neorealism argue that the structures of the international system that neorealists treat as more or less universal and eternal are in fact the specific consequences of particular historical conditions. more hermeneutical and practical approach to the study of international politics." Robert Cox (1981) draws on a variety of historicist writers to insist that the study of international politics itself. ―Realism.point. analyzed as a reworking of dilemmas originating between Judeo-Christian and Hellenic civilizational impulses. and. 1983: 273). Berki's (1981) extended discussion of political realism also derives its critical force from writers with strong historicist sympathies. 1984) sees in the more historicist or "classical" version of political realism a more authentic. These oppositions are central to the claims. In all these contexts. 31. pp. 65-86. The interest in change among analysts of international politics. realism becomes less a hard-headed portrayal of international realities than a systematic evasion of the critical skills necessary for a scholarly analysis of those realities. claims to realism in international political theory carry meanings and implications from a much broader discourse about politics and philosophy. It does not help us to know very much. . Whether situated against the early 20th century crisis of historicism. on the one hand. These difficulties underlie much of the recent debate about realism and neorealism in international political theory. jstor] In fact. This debate has centered on a confrontation between defenders of various forms of structuralism and several kinds of historicism. Change. 1 (Mar. N. This analysis is most emphatically not an attack on realism from a utopian stand. does raise a number of daunting theoretical and philosophical problems. without some idea of what it is that is supposedly changing. and International Political Theory. that is. who cling most tightly to the promised certainties of atemporal structuralisms and positivist method. the conceptualization of "change" has been crucial. and a broad cyclical theory of hegemonic wars on the other. Against Waltz. is to do so within theoretical and philosophical categories that have been constituted in historically specific ways. and yet a Thucydides reborn would have little difficulty in explaining our contemporary agonies. It explores the way claims to political realism in international politics have drawn on quite different and fundamentally conflicting philosophical traditions.

―The end of philosophy and the end of international relations. The limit of its thinking. And it is there that strategies for defending it are persistently elaborated: The overriding characteristic of claims about political realism in international relations since mid-century. More recently. Berki's (1981) study of political realism in general. this is what we mean by the end of international relations. pp. Change. In effect. in need only of marginal updating and some terminological revision" (Berki. the term political realism is taken to encompass a very wide array of themes. Augustine. 1981: 69). on its limit.. moreover. truth and beauty within. aspiring to represent its truth while complicit in its production of the real through a persistent defence of its reality principle: While theories of international relations address themselves explicitly to the extremes of violence on the colliding edges of modem states. The charge here. 1987). Machiavelli.larly powerful vision of progressivist history. For that reason we return to the question of the ethical in a postface. but how to bear the inescapable fate of modernity in ways that do not condemn us to the self-immolation threatened either by its facile affirmation or rejection. that have attracted the fiercest rage for epistemological order in the name of empirical social science. before the demands of a citizenship which is the affirmation of 'inclusive identities within particular states' that continue to make universalist claims to truth and the good. Indeed. 1 (Mar. In the event. anarchies. and continues to give way. but that political realism contains polarities and contradictions of its own . but not the least of them concerns Hegel's transformation of earlier concepts of time and change into a particu. and the vantage point from which. however. Everyone else can then ignore the constitutive place of violence in the construction of universalizing ambition. there is clearly a much more serious struggle with important philosophical issues visible in some of the writings of some of the more prominent realists. for example. Just to emphasise the point made at the beginning of this Introduction. international relations is the place to which the violence of modernity may be legitimately deferred . To the extent that deeper roots are sought. in fact. . John Herz. Carr. In Berki's analysis. E. human. N. has been the transformation of historicist claims about contingency in time into structuralist claims about anarchies in space . 42-3 Above all. Such an appeal must be refused. But beyond this. the aim of its thinking. and Hegel-are enough to remind us that political realism has to a large extent been informed by deeply rooted conceptions of time.. Walker concludes for us. as a site for repeating the formula that attempts to resolve characteristically modern spatio-temporal political and ethical contradictions in largely spatial terms. a number of grounds on which one can dispute the claim that Hegel provides the "still valid standpoint of political realism.‖ International Studies Quarterly.. Yet this continuity of historicism and political realism is obviously not all there is to it. Vol. effectively. also. when the task is to figure-out not whether one says yes or no to our modern condition. ―Realism. It thereby serves. at least politically'. change. There are. with classical and medieval. the possibility of common humanity gave way in political modernity. they shy away from the violence immanent in a civilization that requires the violent edges of modern states to guarantee claims to goodness.‖ The Political Subject of Violence. unless universalizing ambition runs up against the presence of other universalizing ambitions. It is just this structuralist orientation that has tended to predominate in the more recent literature . as well as more modern. it is contemporary international relations that regularly insists upon this resolution. pp. jstor] As it informs a rather large and influential literature on geopolitics and military affairs. it has become quite apparent that not only can realism be understood as one pole of a broader discourse about international politics. Morgenthau. the connection between realism and historicism is brought out in a particularly useful way in R. These polarities and contradictions have been seriously obscured by a continuing appeal to a single tradition of realism located somewhere among the classic texts of the history of political thought. and war once again reveals the double standards inherent in universalizing ambition. 'it is an obsession informed by a priori admissions that we are not after all. and International Political Theory. with Walker. Realist theories of international relations obscure the violence of universalizing norms of civilization in order to guarantee the preservation of inter-state anarchy David Campbell\Michael Dillon. and history. But it is the general problematic of historicism that forms the main backdrop for discussion. and Raymond Aron who all wrote in the shadow of the early 20th century crisis in German historicism. in which idealism is posed as the opposite pole. 65-86.ENDI 2010 Security K 94 Wave 1 AT: REALISM GOOD The form of realism they advocate is an excuse for maintaining status quo justifications for force and violence and discouraging historical or political thought Walker 2002 [RBJ. 1993. H. Even the names of the theorists who are taken to be most important for the reconstruction of a more viable orientationAristotle. 'For all that modernity has come to be understood as an obsession with universal reason'. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. the realisation or fulfilment of its thinking. 31. as modernity's safe-depository of political thinking. is that international relations is little more than a cheer-leader for modernity. No. we can see it as an edifying problematisation of political modernity. the search often comes to a rather abrupt halt with an arbitrary theology of the fall of man or the ritual invocation of some seemingly incontestable ancient text. We can consequently reconfigure international relations. realism has often degenerated into little more than an antipolitical apology for cynicism and physical force. formulations. The problem of change lies right at the heart of these struggles. Some of the most powerful forms of realist analysis in international political theory draw upon traditions that are less concerned with change and history than with stasis and structure. This was particularly the case with writers like Hans J. as if we had any choice in the matter of already being modern.

that is. mediated by the particular interests of the national security state. the medium becomes the real-time message . In this book I argue that new technological practices and universal dangers. In other words. they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and political horizons‘ [3]. In short. They have proven to be resistant if not invisible to traditional methods of analysis. which. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement.ENDI 2010 Security K 95 Wave 1 AT: REALISM GOOD Conventional IR can’t grasp new relations of diplomacy-poststructuralism is a superior epistemology DER DERIAN 1992 [JAMES. privileges and legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalising others. informs. to which I have given the name antidiplomacy. the image resembles the object. A prior work of mine. ‗theories do not simply explain or predict‘. about their relationship to ourselves. more ―real‖ in time than in space. have generated a new antidiplomacy. They do not ―fit‖ and therefore they elude the traditional and the re-formed delimitations of the International Relations field: the geopolitics of realism. included a genealogy of the conflict between particularist states and universalist forces which gave rise to an earlier ideological form of antidiplomacy. the structural political economy of neorealism. Vote negative – the alternative can bypass realist dichotomies and re-invent understandings in IR BILGIN 2001 – PROF IR BIKENT ALTERNATIVE FUTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. ‗They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention. in turn. This is not to say that theories ‗create‘ the world in a philosophical sense of the term. FUTURES. and speed (the acceleration of pace in war and diplomacy'. The three forces challenging traditional diplomacy that I will examine are spies (intelligence and surveillance). From a critical perspective. a poststructuralist analysis is called for. I believe that poststructuralism can grasp – but never fully capture – the significance of these new forces for international relations.the less we see of ourselves in the other. critical approaches to international relations view the future of world politics as open. With Hegel as my guide. but they can be reinvented. enables. PROF INT‘L STUDIES @ BROWN. NO 33 Critical approaches to international relations seek to bypass these unhelpful dichotomies of pessimism/optimism and realism/idealism by pointing to the constitutive role theories play. for they believe. I attempted to show how a universal alienation. and the problematic is late (or post-) modern because it defies the grand theories or definitive structures which impose rationalist identities or binary oppositions to explain international relations. the possessive institutionalism of neoliberalism. when mediated through particular interests. Their discursive power is chronopolitical and technostrategic. produces new and often violently antithetical forms of diplomatic relations. mediate and often dominate relations with other states. but that theories help to organise knowledge. In this book I will examine three forces that stand out for their discursive power and shared problematic. pace of space in their political effects. it is so that we might better understand late modern challenges to traditional diplomatic practices. what distinguishes late modern antidiplomacy from earlier forms is how it constitutes and mediates estrangement by new techniques of power and representations of danger. PAGE 3-4] If this book attempts to open up a field known for its closure. but also to tell us. and produced and sustained through the exchange of signs rather than goods. over time‖ [4]. To clarify: they are ―chronopolitical‖ in the sense that they elevate chronology over geography. The problematic they have generated can be simply put: the closer technology and scientific discourse brings us to the "other" . the more that the model is congruent with the reality. Theoretical reflection loses out to techno-scientific reification. as Steve Smith has maintained. and they have generated a late modern problematic for a system of states which increasingly seems resistant to comprehension by traditional styles and systems of thought. in Ken Booth‘s words. they are ―technostrategic‖ in that they use and are used by technology for the purpose of war. they have a discursive power in that they produce and are sustained by historically transient discourses which mediate our relations with empirical events. that is. to show us how these new technological and discursive practices. how their power is manifested in the boundaries they establish for what can be said and who can say it with authority in international theory. that ―social inventions like international relations cannot be uninvented overnight. Hence. terror (global terrorism and the national security culture). These new techniques of power are transparent and pervasive. . ANTIDIPLOMACY: SPIES TERROR SPEED AND WAR. In contrast.

more particularly. It endeavors to reduce international relations to a sytem of abstract propositions with a predictive function. the practical consequences of their theoretical deficiencies are likely to be more serious than those of the predecessors. invisible to the naked eye. of military strategy in the interest of predictable and controlled results. In historians with a philosophic bent. such as the Kelogg-Briand Pact and non-aggression treaties. which refused to recognize territorial changes brought about by violence. Yet both Wight‘s and my orientation are historical. Its aim is not the legalization and organization of international relations in the interest of international order and peace but the rational manipulation of international relations and. This theorizing is abstract in the extreme and totally unhistoric. which. What Professor Wight has noted of international law applies with particular force to these theories: the contrast between their abstract rationalism and the actual configurations of world politics. Such a system transforms nations into a stereotyped symmetric or assymmetric relations. the configurations of the balance of power. p. They create the illusion of the viability of the nation-state in the nuclear age. The ideal toward which these theories try to progress is ultimately international peace and order to be achieved through scientific precision and predictability in understanding and manipulating international affairs. as the statesmen of the interwar period failed when they acted upon the progressivist theories of their day. ―The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory‖.ENDI 2010 Security K 96 Wave 1 AT: REALISM GOOD: NUCLEAR WAR Realism can’t address nuclear threats—the notion of autonomous. In view of their consistent neglect of the contigencies of history and of the concreteness of historical situations that all these theories have in common. and it is this historical orientation that sets us apart from the present fashionable theorizing about international relations. However. which were incapable of collective action. these theories create the illusion that a society of soverign nations thus armed can continue the business of foreign policy and military strategy in the traditional manner without risking its destruction. that is. the result of the reliance upon the inner force of legal pronouncements. of legal agreements. was a political scientist who taught at the University of Chicago and at the Graduate Center at the City University of New York. the history of foreign policy appears as a mere demonstration of certain theoretical assumptions which are always present beneath the surface of historical events to provide the standards for their selection and to give them meaning.what distinguishes such a history of international politics from a theory is not so much its substance as its form. they are destined to share the fate of their progressivist predecessors: they must fail both as guides for theoretical unerstanding and as precepts for action. edited by James Der Derian. that lends itself to theoretical sysemization. I would also hesitate to equate international theory with philosophy of history. such a the League of Nations. dispensing with the historical recital. . With that pretense. The straits in which the Western democracies found themselves at the beginnning of WWII were. 41-42) It is this repetitive character of internationa politics. Theory is implicit in all great historiography. If statesmen should take these theories as their pseudoscientific word and act upon them. such as Thcydides and Ranke. makes the theory explicit and uses historic facts in bit and pieces to demonstrate his theory. gives form and function to the body. The scientist theories of our day pretend to be capable of manipulating with scientific precision a society of soverign nations that use weapons of total destruction as instruments of their respective foreign policies. such as the Stimson Doctrine. In such historians of international politics. The historian presents his theory in the form of a historical recital. in good measure. The theoretician. using the chronological sequence of events as a demonstration of his theory. they would fail. theory is like the skeleton. and of international organizations. We are here in the presence of still another type of progressivist theory. self-interested nation states is not viable in the nuclear age Morgenthau 95 (Hans. International Theory: Critical Investigations.

Morgenthau himself did not explicitly acknowledge his debt to Weber until late in life.rogatives and obligations of "great powers. Hedley Bull (1981: 720-721) for example. change. he appeals to the possibility of establishing a temporary home for man. Temporality became history. even though Hobbes himself wrote very little explicitly on international politics as such. the seminal sources of realism in international political theory were acutely aware that the clash between "Enlightenment and Despair" (Hawthorn. 1987). . "7 On this account. 1981. pp.HOBBES Hobbes isn’t even a realist Walker 2002 [RBJ. There is. has reiterated the feeling that we are "entitled to infer that all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men in the state of nature may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another. The usual focus is inevitably on the proposition that relations between states are analogous to the relations between individuals in Hobbes' state of nature. jstor] It becomes redefined in terms of time: time as the context of political life.‖ International Studies Quarterly. But Hobbes has not been accepted as a genuine realist without considerable equivoca. the most interesting move was to take the nation-state-the German nation-state in particular-as the absolute value by whch the dilemmas and mysteries of relativism could be resolved. and the stress on temporality and process once again generated the specter of relativism. They are arguably the most significant figures through whom the Machiavellian stress on time and change as the essential political reality has been passed on to the contemporary realist traditions of international political theory. Vol." there is. including the various attempts to reestablish the ground for epistemology in different genres of neo. Given that states are not as vulnerable as individuals. History collapsed into historicism. states are led to war because of competition for material possessions. " Indeed the institution of the contract itself implies that relations between states are necessarily quite different from relations between individuals. therefore. Resistance to this trend took many forms. mistrust. the central assumptions of Hobbes' state of nature concern the autonomy and equality of the individuals in it. one linked less to Machiavelli than to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes does remark (1968: 188) that war between sovereigns is relatively tolerable: "there does not follow from it. and can at least ensure some security from the subjects for whom he is the source of justice and right. International politics provided a particularly compelling case for despair. to difference through time. and the pursuit of glory. 1976). or of the barbarities of a war to end all wars. Hans J. for example. Thus it can be argued that states are less vulnerable than individuals and cannot be so easily removed with a single blow. The state of war can even stimulate the domestic economy and thus in some way "improve" life in civil society. constituted the starting point for almost any serious discussion of politics. however.3 In taking its cue from Machiavelli. although it has not been lost on two of the most influential of modern realist writers. After all." is itself seen as a principle of order. and which also attract the indictment of relativism. Hobbes has been the subject of a rather large recent literature in international political theory. principles of sovereignty and non. prudence and fear suggest not the necessity of a global Leviathan but the need for some rules of coexistence. temporal images as the source of new vocabularies of political thought within a discourse dominated by universals.. Even where he appeals to the possibility of fixing political life within a spatial form-lo stato-it is a spatial form with its own temporal contingency. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. In this "international state of nature. only the natural right of self preservation among equals. A rather different set of ideas is often implied by an appeal to political realism. In teasing out these themes.intervention. At best. No. 31. an assumption which makes little sense in the international context where inequality and hegemony. The Sophistic movement is perhaps relevant here. or mechanisms like the balance of power. 65-86. Both Meinecke and Weber took up the Machiavellian problematic directly and explicitly.ENDI 2010 Security K 97 Wave 1 AT: REALISM GOOD. Hobbes begins to slide out of the realist camp and becomes a prime example of a theorist of the international system as a kind of society. Vincent. But even those who are content to stress the state of nature argument acknowledge that there are some problems in applying it to inter. one that even the greatest efforts of republican virt?u are unable to insulate from inevitable decay over time. rather than an anarchy (Bull. fear. and illusions as the distillation of political knowledge. and International Political Theory. with fear being the prime motive in that it supposedly leads to a concern to secure what we already have . in the form of the pro. between philosophies of history grounded in Enlightenment optimism and their radical rejection.4 This has been rather obscured in Weber's case by the rather selective way in which his work has been received into the conventional sociological canon. ―Realism.tion. The sovereign is able to make reasonable calculations about relative strategic forces. 1 (Mar.Kantian natural science. but the general problematic had a much wider application. and there is a commonly identified "Hobbesian tradition" in this field. It is possible to go even further with this line of reasoning. that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men. But by the late 19th century. Morgenthau and Raymond Aron. The most important figures here are Friedrich Meinecke and especially Max Weber. and maxims about how to cope with time. 1981). Whether in terms of the Nietzschean challenge to prevailing theories of progress. From the point of view of international political theory. more to it than even this degreee of ambiguity. To begin with there are the general problems that there is a good deal more to Hobbes than his evocation of a state of nature. History became the cunning of reason. and that his overall position is susceptible to radically different interpretations. but it is the historicists of late 19th century Germany who have been most important for the specific forms of realism that have been influential in international political theory in this century. Furthermore.national politics. the cunning of reason no longer seemed persuasive. but the fairly obvious connection has usefully been underlined in a recent study of the way Weber's work has been received and reinterpreted by later commentators that can be identified. Change. political realism resonates with all those other discourses that have also given priority to temporality.

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Realism is bankrupt as a critical instrument and locks in the status quo
Ashley 1984 [Richard, professor of political science at Arizona State University, ―The Poverty of Neorealism,‖ International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286, jstor]
Fourth, despite its spirited posturing on behalf of political autonomy and in opposition to the alleged economism of other traditions, neorealist historicism denies politics. More correctly, neorealism reduces politics to those aspects which lend themselves to interpretation exclusively within a frame- work of economic action under structural constraints. In so doing, neorealism both immunizes that

economic framework from criticism as to its implicit political content and strips politics of any practical basis for the autonomous reflection on and resistance to strictly economic demands. It thereby implicitly allies with those segments of society that benefit from the hegemony of economic logic in concert with the state . Politics in neorealism becomes pure technique: the efficient achievement of whatever goals are set before the political actor. Political strategy is deprived of its artful and performative aspect, becoming instead the mere calculation of instruments of control. Absent from neorealist categories is
any hint of politics as a creative, critical enterprise, an enterprise by which men and women might reflect on their goals and strive to shape freely their collective will. Taken together, reflections on these "four p's" suggest that neorealist struc- turalism represents anything but the

profound broadening and deepening of international political discourse it is often claimed to be. Far from expanding discourse, this so-called structuralism encloses it by equating structure with external relations among powerful entities as they would have themselves be known. Far from penetrating the surface of appearances, this so-called structuralism's fixed categories freeze the given order, reducing the history and future of social evolution to an expression of those interests which can be mediated by the vectoring of power among competing states-as-actors.76 Far from presenting a structuralism that envisions political learning on a transnational scale, neorealism presents a structure in which political learning is reduced to the consequence of instrumental coaction among dumb, un- reflective, technical-rational unities that are barraged and buffeted by technological and economic changes they are powerless to control.

Neorealism prevents critical interventions into history or state-centeredness
Ashley 1984 [Richard, professor of political science at Arizona State University, ―The Poverty of Neorealism,‖ International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286, jstor]
Again, though, none of this is to say that neorealist "structuralism" is without its attractions. For one thing, and most generally, there

is something remarkably congenial about a structuralism that pretends to a commanding, objective portrait of the whole while at the same time leaving undisturbed, even confirming, our commonsense views of the world and ourselves . As compared to Wallerstein's conception of the modem world system, for in- stance, neorealist structuralism is far more reassuring as to the objective necessity of the state-as-unit-of-analysis convention among students of politics.77 It thus relieves this particular niche in the academic division of labor of responsibility for reflection on its own historicity. Its pose of Weberian detachment can be preserved. For
another thing, this strange structuralism finds much of its appeal in the fact that it complements and reinforces the other three commitments of the neorealist orrery. As already noted, neorealism's atomistic understanding of structure gives priority to-and then reconfirms-the commitment to the state-as-actor. One might also note that neorealism employs the only form of structuralism that could possibly be consistent with its utilitarian and positivist conceptions of international society. Anchored as they are in the ideal of rational individual action under

meaningless, quasinatural constraints, these conceptions would be radically challenged by modes of structuralism that question the dualism of subject and object and thus highlight the deep intersubjective constitution of objective international structures. Neorealism is able to avoid this radical challenge. It is able to do so by restricting its conception of structure to the physicalist
form of a clockwork, the philo- sophical mechanism so dear to the heart of the Industrial Revolution's intelligentsia.

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And, their positivist epistemology is circular and self-perpetuating
Ashley 1984 [Richard, professor of political science at Arizona State University, ―The Poverty of Neorealism,‖ International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 225-286, jstor]
3. The ghost of the old revolution The "secret world," John le Carre writes, "is of itself attractive. Simply by turning on its axis, it can draw the weakly anchored to its center."78 The same, we can now note, might be said of the neorealist orrery of errors. Having seen its several elements whiz by-statism, utilitarianism, positivism, structuralism, and statism yet again-we sense that there is a strange unity of contrarieties here. We sense that the whole machine exerts a centripetal force that is difficult to defy. To be sure, when we slow and examine the elements we find that errors and absurdities abound. We find, for example, that the utilitarian interpre- tation of international order presupposes a conception of the state-as-actor- a conception that a utilitarian would want to disown. We find, too, that neorealist statism runs contrary to any genuinely structuralist understanding of the international system. We find that neorealism appeals to a Weberian interpretation of positivist method, a method that parades as the end of ideology even as it subordinates all criticism to a scientifically indefensible commitment to technical rationality's objectivity and neutrality. And we find that despite neorealism's pretensions to the status of a political struc- turalism, neorealist theory is as economistic as they come. Yet the neorealist orrery is meant never to be held at rest. It

presents itself only in motion. And thanks to this, its countless errors become not damning indictments but counterweights to other errors, balancing and perpetuating the motion of the whole. The limits of positivism obscure the errors of statism in a state-as-actor conception of international order, which reduces systemic analysis to a physicalist structuralism, which in turn propels us into the utilitarian world of technical reason and necessity, which brings us around to positivism once again .
Around and around it spins, eroding and then consuming the ground upon which opposition would stand. Around and around it spins, until we lose sight of the fact that it is only motion. Like le Carres secret world, this neorealist orrery has no center at all.

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Actions resulting from securitization falsely construct a world community in the name of which violence occurs on a global scale
Kelstrup 2004 [Morten, Writer and editor for Sage Publications, ―Globalisation and Societal Insecurity‖,Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg.113-4] Perhaps it is more fruitful in social systems with -no clear or generally accepted institutionalisation of normality to see securitisation as attempts to create 'formative moments', situations in which new norms and maybe new kinds of agency can be constituted and legitimised. Securitisation can be regarded as appeals for legitimacy in extraordinary situations for new kinds of action and maybe also for new actors. Thus, talking about threats towards civilisation and of responses from 'the world community' implies that the 'world community' is somehow articulated as a rather strong identity, and that actions are legitimised with reference to the defence of this entity. The securitisation can in this view be seen as a quest for a new basis for legitimacy or for 'extraordinary' legitimacy. This leads us to the last point in this chapter: the securitisation of terrorism after 11 September can be seen as a turning point in which a new strategy is launched, not only a strategy for security, but a new strategy for governanceance in the global system. The securitisation in the global system can be seen as an attempt to legitimise such a new, global strategy.

Securitization in all forms is a replication of violence, death, and war.
Aradau, 2001 [Claudia Research Associate in the Centre for International Relations at King‘s College London, December, Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization /Desecuritization Techniques, Rubikon, Quarterly Academic Journal, http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm] Securitization has been defined in performative terms, either as a speech act[7] or as a principle of formation that does things[8]. In its discursive and non-discursive forms, securitization has profound social and political implications. It functions as a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden rupture in the routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences of the real possibility of violent death.[9] Initially restricted to the possible ‗violent death‘ of the state and therefore focused on its survival, security practices can be expanded to include concerns for the survival of other different objects: larger or smaller communities or even individuals. The logic of war is translated invariably from state to society or the individual. ‗Security‘ can thus be inscribed on a discourse on the basis of this underlying logic or what
Barry Buzan has called a ‗specific rhetorical structure‘ (survival, priority of action, the securitized issue is presented as an issue of supreme priority).[10] In the 1998 book, the CoS define the rhetoric or grammar of security as a plot that includes an existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible way out to which they add ‗the particular dialects of different sectors‘, such as identity for the societal one.[11]

poststructuralism is not. subjecting to a single. hut to construct alternative hierarchies that support modifications in relations between identify and difference. Critique of totalist theory can be constructive DER DERIAN. adjudicate. ultimate theory that can prove. hegemonic act. a truth. Both use and are used by language: meaning endlessly differs and is deferred through the linguistic interaction of theorist and text. 1992 [JAMES. not to root a theory in a transcendental ground. PROF INT‘L STUDIES @ BROWN ANTIDIPLOMACY: SPIES TERROR SPEED AND WAR. in a demonstrative. give order to it. Rationalists cling to the faith that there is an object. PAGE 7-8] But more is needed. the realities of world politics increasingly are generated. closed theory . been confused as such. logical inconsistencies and interpretive inadequacies. but to elaborate a general reading that can contend with others by broadening the established terms of debates. supreme epistemology. make sense of. but to contribute to a general perspective that might support reconstitution of aspects of international life. always dream of fixing.. further distancing and alienating them from some original. Poststructuralism differs from rationalist approaches in that it does not hold that international theorists mirror the reality of world politics through their intellectual analysis. the political theorist William Connnollv outlines the features of a constructive theory in poststructuralism: One might seek. not merely to invert hierarchies in other theories (a useful task). in short.ENDI 2010 Security K 101 Wave 1 AT: POST-STRUCTURALISM BAD Turn – there’s a difference between denying all reality and critically exposing meaning. simulated by technical means of production. it is to refute the claim that there is an external being. reducing. Poststructuralism is not simply a negative critique – although it has. PAGE 7-8] First. transcendentalist. that make. unproblematic meaning. that is waiting for the right method to come along and in the name of scientific progress make use of. Even in the more radical applications of deconstruction it takes aim at totalist. Lending critical support to an essay by Richard Ashley. A poststructuralist approach proceeds by recognizing and investigating the interrelationship of power and representational practices that elevate one truth over another." but not one which assumes that the object of research is immaculately reproduced by the program. confirm an existence independent of its representation. Such an investigation requires a semio-critical approach. as many critics have claimed. This book does in fact contain a "research program. mediated. It is this very heterological nature of discourse that the traditional theories of IR. inherently anti-empirical. Moreover. . monological meaning. one discourse matter more than the next. In most cases – and certainly in the case of Foucault – it clears but does not destroy or deny the existence of the ground for a constructive theory. Poststructural analysis recognizes the representational force of IR theory DER DERIAN. one that might problematize and dismantle empirico-positivist categories by revealing their interdiscursive origins. no values.not all theory. not to create a transformation of international life grounded in a universal project. not to impose one reading on the field of discourse. nor to claim there is no truth. This is not to reduce IR to a linguistic practice. Rather. PROF INT‘L STUDIES @ BROWN. a reality out there. ANTIDIPLOMACY: SPIES TERROR SPEED AND WAR. that subject one identity to another. no reality. 1992 [James. by its more modish uses. but to problematize the grounding any theory presupposes while it works out the implications of a particular set of themes.

In keeping with the fourth observation. the possession of firm evaluative standards versus the relativism of a postpositivist void. that she must take responsibility for the choice she makes. On the other hand. of favoring relativism. it will be opposed to the difficulties. they deprive their audience of any basis for the choice it is called upon to make. ethical commitment versus the radical abolition of all ethical codes. then it would seem to pass over to the side of the dissidents who are the objects of critical judgment . They invoke the ideals of truth and literal meaning. Tempe. and that even a failure to choose counts as a choice in the demand. 34. 3. a forthright facing up to global problems versus a diffuse and disabling skepticism. the audience chooses to question these critical readings and the supposed discipline or culture they defend. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. 1990). Associate Professor of Political Science. RBJ. But if the audience chooses to embrace these critical readings and the judgments they make.ENDI 2010 Security K 102 Wave 1 AT: POST-STRUCTURALISM BAD Criticisms of post-structuralist dissidence falsely draw boundaries between positivism and criticism. These commentaries invoke the idea of disciplinary standards at one with a perspective against the spectre of relativism. but they ask to be received in an attitude of immediate and unquestioning familiarity. and they exhibit no dedicated scholarship.ing circumstances of the moment.. even as critical commentaries such as those considered here urge this choice. the foun. and they honor no perspective save one that knows it needs a perspective. it can reflect no certain perspective. dangers. and it must be a choice that defers all encounters with the question of truth.cally detached and dedicated scholarship. transparency of language versus impenetrable elitist jargon. they create for their audience a role of one who must make an either/or choice with respect to the critical readings themselves: for or against the position taken. Arizona State University. of lacking or concealing a perspective. it must be a relativistic choice. And the audience is supposed to understand that in taking up this position. the accomplishments of modernity versus a reckless repudiation of these accomplishments. critical readings of works of dissidence produce for their audience a similar double bind. Depending upon the specific example considered. (Sep. the choice is presented as one of disciplinary authority versus a gathering of mar. and so on. and of being unconcerned about matters of truth. pp. but they recur to no standard save the idea of standards. jstor] As texts in their own rights. It at least potentially stands convicted of being dubious about rational standards. ―Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. a dedication of energies to productive scholarly labors versus the spending of energies in fleeting pleasures. they do so by effecting the postures of what De Man (1979:245) calls "exhortative performatives that require the passage from sheer enunciation to action"-postures that make it plain that just here and now in this active moment of judgment at the discipline's edges.dations of rational thought and argument supposedly prevailing at the center of the discipline simply do not and cannot apply. the maturity and wisdom of elders versus the bravado of tawdry youth. They invoke the abstract image of analyti. Vol.ginal challengers of unproven legitimacy. The audience is also supposed to understand that it is called upon to choose this alignment. then its choice can be based upon no rational standard. On the one hand. a commitment to a position or perspective in history versus a lack (or concealment) of a position or perspective. Department of Political. It is the role of one who understands that she has the freedom to make this choice. 367-416. What is the audience to make of this? If. in the exercise of its freedom. but they put the question of their own truth in abeyance as they engage in figural play. Considering such oppositions. that it would be irresponsible not to choose. No. the audience is supposed to understand that a critical reading of marginal and dissident works aligns with the first term in any such pair . reason versus irrationality.‖ International Studies Quarterly. and illicit seductions connoted by the second term in each instance. ignoring the judgments and constructions implicit in any claims to objective truth Ashley and Walker 1990 [Richard. too. . belief or disbelief in the judgment cast. Science.

RBJ. a review essay. They do not. On still other occasions. such commentary is offered as parenthesis. our revolutionary energies. and they thereby seduce the revolutionary mind. Second. they approach them in a way that privileges the reader as one possessed of a certain identity bound up with an [CONTINUED] . We think these fragments suffice. to illustrate a considerable range of likely critical responses that spans from left to right. and ultimately nullified by this insistent questioning . when the addressee of these critical readings cannot yet be presumed to be a mature member of the profession. they are typically pro. at its edges. No. who are we? Our commitment to a cause. Peter Dews (1987) is right: what we have here is a "logic of disintegration.. that the difference between outside and inside is already given.ing reflection on the question.‖ International Studies Quarterly. we must aspire to the big picture . such as conversations between teacher and student. Arizona State University. equanimity often gives way to exasperation tinged with embarrassment. but surely a celebration of marginality must signal a retreat from ethical and political commitment. and reply to works of dissidence that speak from disciplinary margins. when critical comments such as these are offered. First. proper activity of a discipline or tradition. collected. in the field of international politics especially. They indicate. They adopt the juridical posture of "male response criti. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. How playful. ―Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies. in the same stroke.cult to ignore. How else are we to respond to problems of war and poverty. And how very conservative. all I want to do is roll over. 367-416. Associate Professor of Political Science. Five things about these snippets are notable. How enticing. even to the heroic. it follows that these critical commentaries do not come to the relationship between reader and text and effect a posture befitting the situation of marginality presupposed by the texts themselves. must earnestly recite. and that the discipline." a disciplinary center.sources so that that which represses and endangers us may be defined and overthrownall of this is relativized. the "everybody who knows and agrees with this reading" is already assuredly there ." a "community. jstor] Example 7: Skepticism about the hubris of hegemonic paradigms is all very well. when dissident events disturb a sense of direction or when marginal works of thought pose questions that are diffi. like all members. Instead of reading from a situation of marginality in which the reader's own position and identity are understood to be in process and in dotubt-instead of "reading as a woman -these critical fragments adopt the attitude of one who is called upon to speak on behalf of a fixed and proudly certain "we.nar. such critical commentary is not typically offered or received as the normal. as if the commentary were roughly compa. our ability to focus and mobilize our re. an air of cool detachment might be replaced by a tone of sobriety. scattered. These postures indicate that such critical remarks belong not at the center of the discipline where its serious and productive work is proudly presented and logically weighed. As gestures in themselves. and catch a nap. they at once presuppose and indicate the same location. even indifference. a modern culture. exasperation." After reading these essays. however that discipline or tradition be defined. however."3 They do not effect an attitude in which the reader regards her own identity and experience as a kind of text in the process of being written and. but in the end.sal. It is put forth as a pause that is occasioned by the passing encounter with the moment of dissidence and that is bracketed and set off from the real projects to which the commentators and their audiences are soon to return . environmental degradation or the internationalization of production? Example 8: How avant garde.bles nor quavers with self-doubt. I'm spent. the tradition. this imprecise language of literary allusion. adopt a posture that is is sometimes called "female response criticism. Vol. 1990). our rational standards of choice and judgment. Third.tions-are somehow oblivious to the obvious things that truly refined scholars should already know. they induce an antipolitical slumber brought on by a diffuse. that reminds the potentially wayward novice that the reading is a kind of vow that he. but at its boundaries. On such occasions. directionless.nounced in a cool. to the univer.rable to a remark about the shrubbery overgrowing the side of a highway one travels. 3. however. smoke a cigarette.ENDI 2010 Security K 103 Wave 1 AT: CRITICISMS THAT MAKE FUN OF POST-STRUCTURALISM Criticisms of post-structuralism in IR are based on the false demarcation of boundaries and disciplines and NOT the objective positivism they claim to deploy Ashley and Walker 1990 [Richard. 34. Tempe. interrogate.cism. this posture of self-assurance takes the form of nonchalance. our prospects for concerted political strategy. at the thresholds or checkpoints of entry and exit. a reading semi. a contribution to the occasional symposium on the discipline's future. a legitimation of quietism and navel-gazing in the face of the real perils of global political life. In brief. a sense that it would be better if these things did not have to be said. (Sep. Sometimes. even solemnity. is given to question her own political and theoretical position and assumptions even as she reads and criticizes a text. Yet all these reading postures-nonchalance. No doubt other examples could be offered. Department of Political. An air of nonchalance is difficult to sustain. that the discipline's territorial boundaries are already marked. and ultimately paralyz. These fragments of critical readings provide but a few examples of increasingly familiar ways in which scholars of international relations and the social sciences in general often interpret. in view of this. solemnity during the rite of passage-have something in common. Such commentary is typically encountered in a footnote. or the banter and sideplay of professional conferences." Regarding the texts as objects ofjudgment. Science. pp. What do such forms of scholarship have to say about the great problems and dangers that confront us? Surely. Rarely is it encountered as the main theme of a refereed journal article or a formal research presentation at a professional meeting. All dressed up in a stylish garb. irrational. for example. a regret that voices of dissidence-though sometimes raising interesting ques. self-assured voice of an "I" or "we" that neither stum. these works flirtatiously whisper the radical code of resistance.

4 . an offering that would immediately open up not only the question of the faithfulness of the representation to the text but also the epistemological question of the justification of the position from which representation proceeds. They do not pre. Not questioning this supposedly pre-given reader's experience. these fragments do not really deserve to be called arguments or interpretations-not. evoke familiar orientations or dispositions. a tradition. intertextual. too. that is. and as replies to challenges of dissidence immediately encountered. upon the ways in which they draw upon a variety of metaphors and other cultural re. as postures of exemplary "men of action" who must pass judg. nuanced readings of the texts to which they refer. Showalter (1979). Jardine (1985). Although those who claim authorship of such critical commentaries on works of dissidence might exhibit a keen concern for methodological transparency and operational reproducibility in their published research reports to the discipline. They do not put themselves forth as profound and thoughtful arguments or knowledge claims whose depths one is invited to mine. Not raising this question.tative ground and standard in terms of which the texts must either prove their merits or be shown to fall short ." as what it. a point of view.tend to the status of careful.ENDI 2010 Security K 104 Wave 1 AT: CRITICISMS THAT MAKE FUN OF POST-STRUCTURALISM [CONTINUED] already. Jardine (1985) offers a particularly astute interdisciplinary. as "what must be done. Kristeva (1975. 372 Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline Fourth. these readings depend for their significance not on a reconstructable logic of argument recurring to authoritative first principles. posture. as active labors of art. 1986ab). 1980. at least. and inter. these critical readings put the ques. Finally. in much the same vein. as a question that here and now need not be entertained. An excellent collection relating the diversity and excitement of Anglo-American feminist replies to the question is Showalter (1985). for example. and thereby work to cultivate an exemplary and iterable attitude. they invoke it as if it provided an authori. and critical introduction to the problem of the literary text and its relations to the concerns and perspectives of feminist practice. or style of interpretation and conduct that an audience will immediately and unquestioningly receive as right for the circum. is already disposed to do in answer to the difficulties and dangers posed by dissidence at the margins. They offer themselves as intimately familiar instances of doing without reflecting on being.tion of their own truth in suspension. but on the way in which they work as cultural practices.given experience and position that is outside the text and presumably shared with other members of a discipline.sources. Irigaray (1985). these critical readings put their audience in the structural situation of a double bind: a situation in which an audience is given the freedom to choose and is called upon to make a choice even as it is deprived of any basis for doing so.cultural analysis of the Franco-American debate in feminist literary theory. Simply stated. in action. in the flow of conduct already underway. in a scholarly sense. And like all such instances. Moi (1986) offers a detailed. Felman (1975). or whose logic one is urged critically to explore . For introductions of French Feminist thought to American audiences. these critical commentaries instead offer themselves as performances to be appreciated entirely on the surface. as mimesis.ment on the exigencies of the times. no such concerns are reflected in their critical readings of works at the margin. whose assumptions and definitions one is encouraged to examine. and Spivak (1980. 1983). theoreti. Their practical significance depends. 3On the question of reading as a woman see.cally sophisticated. They do not offer themselves as theoretical representations of a referent text. see the volumes edited by Marks and Courtivron (1980) and by Eisenstein and Jardine (1980).stances.

a decision for conceptualization in a special way. the practices resulting from the slogan might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment. Buzan suggests that such values are already emerging as new norms of international society. it is also a political choice. When a problem is "securitized. Ronnie Lipschutz. professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science." and argues that this. however. because it is an effective way of dramatizing environmental problems. unresolved . that is.ENDI 2010 Security K 105 Wave 1 AT: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION GOOD Securitizing the environment hurts their cause in the long term and is politically un-strategic Waever 1998 [Ole.‖ On Security. when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula? 51 Use of the slogan "environmental security" is tempting. militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense." the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: Threat. instead. should be the basis for mobilization. 54 . more lyrically. defense. University of Copenhagen. in a metaphorical sense.org/book/lipschutz/index. http://www. In the longer run. talks about ecological awareness being linked to "a powerful set of values and symbols" that "draw upon basic human desires and aspirations. and often state-centered solutions. 52 Use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem. and not regressive security logic. As his basis for optimism. leaves the environmental agenda. We might find it more constructive. with its labelling problem. This. ed. One alternative is to view the emerging values of environmentalism as establishing their own moral basis. ―Securitization and Desecuritization. where decisions are actually interlinked. as a threat/defense problem. 53 Deudney.html] These observations point back toward a more general question: Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of. for example. to thematize the problem in terms of an economy-ecology nexus. of course.ciaonet.

the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved. Lose Yourself Some years ago. the speech act. In the post-bipolar world. not predictable. basic infrastructure. the United States. 12 But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that boundaries be drawn somewhere else. acting through international institutions. Ronnie Lipschutz. South Slavs against the Hapsburgs. history. groups of people are defining themselves collectively. language.ENDI 2010 Security K 106 Wave 1 AT: LINK TURNS – AFF STOPS SEEING X AS ENEMY Securitization leads to the demarcation of us vs. there were others to be found. inasmuch as the disappearance of the only Other that counts leaves no other Others that can credibly fill its place." but also. them. in some instances. is something of an illusion). necessarily a threat in terms of one's own continued existence.html] Security. as was the case prior to World War II. ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End. to a large degree. losing one enemy was not a problem. 10 How can we explain this puzzling phenomenon? Much of the analysis that currently purports to explain these wars revolves around the concepts of ethnicity and sectarianism : Increasingly." 9 At the time. The security dilemma that had resulted in the manufacture of more than 50. Without the Soviet Union as an enemy. according to a now almost-apocryphal story. as forty years of Cold War had definitively established. or Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union). about "who we are" and whom we do not wish to be.org/book/lipschutz/index. A new Concert of states. is about the drawing and defense of lines and boundaries. diplomat was approached by a Soviet colleague and told. and not-becoming. however." 13 How else to account for the life and death character of the distinctions among Serbs. and Muslims in Bosnia. which the untutored eye can hardly detect? 14 As James Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume. of accepting the Other's characteristics as a legitimate alternative and. spiraling into a neverending cycle of new enemy creation even when old ones are re-evaluated. Lose an Enemy. make no mistake about it: While the myths underlying American identity are many. technological innovation.000 American troops and a comparable number of Soviet soldiers in Europe. "The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us. as something of a catastrophe for an identity based on that Enemy. and that security. therefore. a new era in international cooperation could begin. of being taken over by the Other. We are going to deprive you of an enemy. inasmuch as the world now seems to be rent by conflict and war to a degree that would have been difficult to imagine in 1989. consequently. sotto voce . because doing so raises the possibility.‖ On Security. relative to others. the security dilemma has been domesticated and brought into the state (and. Defining security involves establishing a definition of the collective self vis-à-vis other collective selves. not certain. it does not take much to be "turned. in this sense. It is not only about "who is against us. the clarity of those last days of bipolarity. http://www.000 nuclear weapons. of course. would help to wind down the regional and civil wars fostered by the East-West conflict. religion. and so on. as the observation offered at the beginning of this chapter suggests. This is not something new. a U. about boundaries of difference that are increasingly difficult to specify and negotiate. however remote. not neighboring states. This proves we need to rethink the entire problematic of security Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. too. Croats. both individually and collectively. Today's wars are mostly between literal neighbors. under these circumstances. and about exclusion and. specify another Other (as in. 11 Defining oneself in such terms requires defining someone else in different terms. There are always implicit risks in the peaceful acceptance of an Other as a legitimate ontology.S. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. In a world dominated by Great Powers and balance-of-power politics. largely of a quite unanticipated character: They are mostly intrastate and social . But analyses based on the construction and application of ethnicity generally ignore the importance of the Other --whom one is not--in fostering the sense of collective identity so important to action centered on ethnicity or sectarianism. And. origins. Financial resources allocated to the defense sector by the two superpowers and their allies could now be redirected to social welfare. and it opens up a search for a new Other that can function as the new Enemy.ciaonet. and environmental protection. during the Cold War the strongest one had to do with not-being. In retrospect. the story had a certain appealing charm to it: The Soviet Union was the primary threat to. It is . "We are about to do a terrible thing to you. ed." 15 The loss of an Enemy can be seen. These wars and conflicts are. down to the household level). differentiation thus draws a boundary between the self and the Other. Communist. the Cold War appears to have been a period of great stability (although this. was illusory. about limits. in terms of certain shared or acquired characteristics such as appearance. although ethnicity can and does become securitized . only a few short years ago. Given this epistemology of threats. for example. and the annual global expenditure of close to $1 trillion could be eliminated. and enemy of. This Other is not. the very ideas of nationalism and the nation-state are based on such differences. at first. it is the quintessential "speech act" described by Ole Wæver. rather than interstate and political . . the deployment of 300.

The strange and the alien remain unexamined. but at great political cost to those who pursued this formula .org/book/lipschutz/index. one had to believe that." as Bruce Larkin has stylized them. it is the disappearance of the Other that has vanquished that power. The threat of nothingness secured the ontology of being. not secure." Der Derian argues that "A safe life requires safe truths. security. we are more open to penetration by others. the unknown becomes identified as evil. It was the existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power. where there is no constructed threat. as in practice of extended deterrence in Europe.ciaonet. were the Other to cross the line. .html] Nuclear deterrence depended on lines on the ground and in the mind: To be secure. inasmuch as to be reliant means depending on others who are potential Others. But where are these boundaries to be drawn? I have suggested above that they are drawn between the self and the Enemy. outside threats are carved out as dangerous Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. 25 In other words. If we are poorer and less secure. in Nietzsche's words.org/book/lipschutz/index. 23 in defining the parameters of their "national interests. "alien and weaker. as Ole Wæver might put it. we must become more self-reliant. deterrence has ceased to wield its cognitive force. The search for new rationales for security leads.ENDI 2010 Security K 107 Wave 1 AT: LINK TURN – WE ESTABLISH ALLIANCES Securitization inevitably draws boundaries between self and other—even in the prsence of alliances.html] What. corporations establish strategic alliances with their Japanese counterparts. As James Der Derian points out. then. ed. To be less competitive means our survival may be threatened. but these were fixed and all there were or could be. paradoxically. not to security redefined but to endless iterative loops.‖ On Security. http://www. both the self and the Other would cease to exist.S. or China and Israel. because we see no need to be secured. who might well take us over. we are.‖ On Security.S. U.S. By 1989. And so on through this new Hall of Mirrors. policymakers fret over competition. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz. To forego the fruits of collaboration means that we become less competitive. ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End. but that capability has no meaning in terms of U. Where Russia is now concerned. The practitioners of national security and security policy conventionally drew these boundaries between states. however. But the same is true for France and Britain." They might extend their national boundaries in order to incorporate allies. and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. If we were more like the Japanese. between tame zones and wild ones. To be secure. Enemies and threats were. To depend on others means that they are more competitive than we are. between the realm of safety and the realm of danger . poorer and less secure than others might be. There were many "international" boundaries. prof of politics at UC Santa Cruz." 22 The boundary between known and unknown is reified and secured. the books closed for good. and the lines in the mind and on the ground have vanished. the United States and Russia do not launch missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation. if nothing else. http://www. Ronnie Lipschutz. Ronnie Lipschutz. it is the drawing of lines between the collective self and what is. is security? The contributors to this volume have told us.ciaonet. we would be the equal of Japan and secure. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the United States. that it irreducibly involves boundaries. Since 1991. we would be less like Americans and therefore insecure . ―Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End. While U. as Beverly Crawford's essay suggests. but if we were more like the Japanese. Securitization relies on threats of annihilation to define and construct the Other—the end of the Cold War proves that the concept of security does not secure us against all real threats but only chooses ones based on the violent distancing of difference—the idea that our allies are not threats to us despite their ability to annihilate us proves the social construction of security Lipschutz 1998 [Ronnie. the roster of states had been fixed. But to be less reliant means that we forego the fruits of technological collaboration with others. always across the line. there is no security problem. ed. States might draw imaginary lines. The "new economic security dilemma" is more of a contradiction than a dilemma. or "bordoids. To be sure. in spite of repeated efforts to draw them anew. or between groups of states.

many of the characteristic moves of ideology-critique. . 1971. remote and abstract. This is the typical pose of rationalism. 1 (Mar. the very refusal to take the issues that arise from these two contexts seriously is of at least some minor signifi. For poststructuralists. continues to haunt contemporary social and political theory in its search for new horizons. Both enterprises seem. to ahistorical laws and explanations.of history is excluded. Historicist positions lean towards the categories of hermeneutics and practice. between identity and difference in time. 1981). Ricoeur. and hermeneutics or understanding comes to oppose the reifying methodologies of positivistic science (von Wright. This momentous formulation of a radical opposition between eternity and history. Gadamer. the real problem is the prior framework in which truth and illusion are assumed to guarantee each other . Structural invariables are distinguished from the mere succession of events.‖ International Studies Quarterly. Vol. pp.ment science or Marx's critique of the pretentions of the bourgeois economists are fairly typical. 31. meaning of praxis. In one direction. whether in space or in time. professor of political science at the University of Victoria. 1987). of "trace" and "difference . and. and in some senses certainly are. In some forms. Change. the latter having identity and reality only through participation in the former. "9 But whether on the ground of history. ―Realism. yet remain somehow enduring. and continues to be reproduced. 65-86. Structuralist positions generally aspire to scientific status. has inherited the claim to transtemporal. It is with Plato in particular that we conventionally locate the crystallization of a fundamental difference between metaphysical universals and a realm of becoming. whether of the many or of the realm of becoming. Insofar as it is a critical category. in the more extreme versions we then get a vision of the synchronic structure of universal mind in which the lived meaning. No. nor even the more familiar problems of interpreting long dead political thinkers are usually of much interest to analysts of modern world politics. Neither the more arcane intricacies of contemporary debate about structure and history. The absolute priority of universal structure has given way to an absolute priority of temporal process. transspatial abstract universalisms . the standpoint of identity can be used to judge the illusory nature of the plural world of change. Here the many critiques of Enlighten. The key issue here is ideology. structuralism and positivistic science. history itself becomes the antithesis of structure. and reconstruct. The truth of the one is opposed by the illusions of difference. 1978. In another direction. The problem of identity is raised in terms of time and change. rather than a descriptive term.carice in the processes through which the "reality" of modern international politics has come to be. Yet in another sense. Here the analysis of change tends towards a reification into ahistorical and universal laws. In other forms. it is just this lived meaning of history that is then championed as the alternative ground on which to construct. Hegelian or post-Hegelian temporality opposes the atemporal structuralisms of Kant. like the great Cartesian and Kantian rationalisms before it. or of the deconstruction of Western "logocentricism. Not surprisingly. structuralism has mutated into post-structuralism. jstor] The general problem has a more specific version: all things become other than they were. the claim to universality is itself challenged as a mere parochialism. the stress is on the historically constituted meaning of human experience. a more appropriate account of human affairs. divorced from the pressing concerns of state policy and global conflict.. More recently. hence. These moves are central to the tension between structuralism and historicism in modern social and political theory.ENDI 2010 Security K 108 Wave 1 AT: KRITIK IS IDEOLOGICAL All theories of international relations are rooted in ideology—its just a question of which is more epistemologically sound Walker 2002 [RBJ. and International Political Theory. our understanding of ideology is also rooted in the underlying problematic of identity and difference." modern social and political theory has become intimately concerned with the dilemmas and horizons set up by a discourse about change organized as a specific form of an opposition between identity and difference. Here structuralism. between being and being-in-the-world.

ENDI 2010 Security K 109 Wave 1 ******AFF****** .

Theoretical practices. This could therefore imply that national communities might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of identity questions in order to handle the stress from Europeanization. Ronnie Lipschutz. they are. as well as any political ones.‖ On Security. As Hannah Arendt pointed out. 79 In the present context.html] From a more Nietzschean perspective. Post-structuralists have usually been arguing that their project is about opening up.ENDI 2010 Security K 110 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK – AT: DISCOURSE FIRST You can only determine the value of policies by their outcomes and not intentions or premises Waever 1998 [Ole. Whether such an act is "good" or "bad" is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises. ed. politics and responsibility can involve prevention and limitation and. instead. too self-reproducing. possible speech acts . I should also mention that politics always involves an element of exclusion. It is thus not impossible that a post-structuralist concerned about risks of power rivalry and wars will end up supporting a (re)securitization of "Europe" through rhetorics such as that of integration/fragmentation. "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller. interaction and. at times. to the backward glance of the historian. have to risk their own respectability and leave traces. in which one has to do violence to the inherent openness of situations. about forcing the stream of history in particular directions . Under such circumstances. the tool of securitization may seem necessary .org/book/lipschutz/index.ciaonet. http://www. ―Securitization and Desecuritization. therefore. that is. to impose a pattern--and one has not only to remember but also to forget selectively. letting posterity tell the story about the meaning of an act. The purpose of this would be to impose limits. 77 To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact. . for forcing things in one direction instead of another . University of Copenhagen. but it would have as a side-effect some elements of state-building linked to the EU project. an element of coincidence). never be risk-free. moving issues into a security frame so as to achieve effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a nonsecurity mode. professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science." Neither of these two moves are reflections of some objective "security" that is threatened. and "progressiveness" is never guaranteed by one's political or philosophical attitude. but by its effects (which depend on the actions of others. implicitly arguing that a situation was too closed. Politics is inherently about closing off options. consequently. there might emerge a complementarity between nations engaging in societal security and the new quasi-state engaging in "European security." 78 Acting politically can.

but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. it has produced better social science theory. they face many competitors for attention. newspapers or blogs. and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Even when academics supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals. http://www. but few high-ranking political scientists have been named." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past. government and one in the United Nations). to some extent.washingtonpost. but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. . professor at Harvard 2009 University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago. but many add a bias provided by their founders and funders. the editors of a recent poll of more than 2. funding. showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years. Scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world . the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy.html 4-13 President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration. Few people can keep up with their subfields. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Not many top-ranked scholars of international relations are going into government." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. such engagement can enhance and enrich academic work. the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. and thus the ability of academics to teach the next generatio n.S. Moreover. the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction. only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U. by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260_pf.700 international relations experts declared that "the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high.ENDI 2010 Security K 111 Wave 1 FRAMEWORK – AT: DISCOURSE FIRST Debate should only include discussions that are policy relevant. Former Chair National Intelligence Council. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas. think tanks are heterogeneous in scope. PhD Harvard. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century. while only a handful did so after 1967. academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can.their K self maginalizes itself out of politics and is therefore useless Joseph Nye. The 2008 Teaching. Departments should give greater weight to realworld relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. ." As citizens. one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal . Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models. that path has tended to be a one-way street. and that this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant. and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. BA suma cum laude Princeton. much less all of social science. you know who he is. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation. As a group. or by consulting for candidates or public officials. But the danger is that academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll. Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Some academics say that while the growing gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy. The fault for this growing gap lies not with the government but with the academics. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession. ideology and location.200 think tanks in the United States provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment or consult at a moment's notice. The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself. In fact. "the growing withdrawal of university scholars behind curtains of theory and modeling would not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. One could multiply such useful suggestions. Also. Former Asst. If anything. More than 1. new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers.

The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. or commitment to activism. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics.. 664.. Second. argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic. which are in the physical world. I do not disagree with Dalby‘s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‗Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken. and injustice. military and economic structures. and the budgets that fuel them. racism. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life. To this assertion. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?).(pp. A focus on representations destroys social change by ignoring political and material constraints Taft-Kaufman. Political. troops and material moved and war fought‘-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities.ENDI 2010 Security K 112 Wave 1 AT: REPS FIRST Changing representational practices hinders understanding of policy by overlooking questions of agency and material structures Tuathail. however. Although the material their fulfillment. an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. or any Third World population. sexism. Robinson (1990) for example." and "difference. Gorbachev‘s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self. Dalby‘s book is narrowly textual. not the Reagan administration. institutions. first. p. 255). rather than in a world of ideas or symbols. Political Geography. but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. agencies. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas." unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects. an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Clarke replies: contemporary forms. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage. and economic injustice. in other words. 15(6-7). (p. In short. it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history. the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. health care. housing.solving. Southern Communication Journal. Both here and earlier. will. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision. because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism. those who have limited access to good jobs. Dalby‘s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist. their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict. as Clarke (1991) asserts. most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist.. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. institutions. there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological. 299). Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts. and.(4) Nutrition. In general. that his book is about the CPD. theory-averse. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities. Spring. concrete situation" (p. policy-making subculture. as well as to the media that depict them. should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‗poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative. 170). Third. at Central Michigan University. the materialist and the cultural. therefore. and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod. and transportation. poverty. 96 (Gearoid. shelter.structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Critical geopolitics. 1987). postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects." "Otherness. of us (p. Dalby‘s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. 571).makers are quite different. Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential. with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people. professor. This is not. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are . to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. food. the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision. white women. Unlike . homophobia. despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition. aligns them with the political left. let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post. creates a solipsistic quagmire. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities. West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. science direct) While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics. proquest) The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality. we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate falls apart. Ideas have consequences. so different that they constitute a distinctive problem. not just textual" (p. the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant.interested. Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. In response to Dalby‘s fifth point (with its three subpoints). Yet. 95 (Jill. He analyzes certain CPD discourses. it is worth noting.

it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. However. although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely. Thus. how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and. for a certain class of problems. It encourages this view because the turn to. and so a potentially vicious circle arises. this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. loosely deployed or not. the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. .. helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value). wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. I will suggest. such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has.6 Moreover. Yet.4 However.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. of Southampton. this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‗whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry. as Shapiro points out. It may. this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches. it is by no means clear that it is. not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry‘. namely. Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. an image of warring theoretical approaches with each. ‗theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‗dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory‘. one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems. ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right. the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action. and prioritisation of. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. if this is the case. In other words. In one respect.empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Wæver remarks that ‗[a] frenzy for words like ―epistemology‖ and ―ontology‖ often signals this philosophical turn‘. the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action. for example. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles. while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement. yet. despite occasional temporary tactical alliances. from this standpoint. rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.e. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro.ENDI 2010 Security K 113 Wave 1 POSITIVISM GOOD There are no prior questions to problem oriented IR. dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry. Emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action David Owen. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers. in contrast. 655-7 Commenting on the ‗philosophical turn‘ in IR. event or phenomenon. it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that. be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i. Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. of course. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‗the Highlander view‘—namely.

Aarhus Univ. . But the fact that anarchy is a historically specific. ahistorical. But that possibility is tied in with the historically specific social structures (material and non-material) of the world. Review of International Studies 24.scient. which are comfortable within the given order'. this 'assumption of fixity' is 'also an ideological bias . sectional or class interests. Reification is produced by the transformation of historically specific social phenomena into given. of course. That view is hard to distinguish from utopianism and wishful thinking. for example.IR Theory after the cold war p. it is not the acceptance of the real existence of social phenomena which produces objectivist reification . which follows from their metatheoretical position. the actual insights produced by non-post-positivists. . 1998 . social science (1983) (Trans national Corporations and Economic Development) Dr. . In a world of sovereign states. . or so it seems. Steve Smith has confronted this problem in an exchange with Øyvind Østerud. He considers neorealism to be a 'problem-solving theory' which 'takes the world as it finds it. Robert Cox makes a similar point in writing about critical theory: 'Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order. . anarchy is in fact out there in the real world in some form. But extreme post-positivists have their own problem with change. The second problem with post-positivism is the danger of extreme relativism which it contains. then radical post-positivism is metatheoretically compelled to embrace any conceivable change project. There is a dialectic between social structure and human behaviour . Problem-solving theories (serve) . In short. . In other words. In the absence of at least some common standards it appears difficult to reject that any narrative is as good as any other.22 At the same time. then the door is. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order'. . . In Marxism. social change ( e.ENDI 2010 Security K 114 Wave 1 POSITIVISM GOOD Positivism is essential to any epistemology—relativism fails to define and address real problems GEORG SØRENSEN. possible to appreciate the shortcomings of neorealism while also recognizing that it has merits. It is.23 In sum. Anything goes. then. but that does not mean that it is without merit in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view. any change project is not possible at any time. Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order. natural condition to which the only possible reaction is adaptation. their emphasis is on 'continuity and repetition'.pol. MA. If neorealism denies change in its overemphasis on continuity and repetition. The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination' . but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world . particular national.25 The final problem with extreme post-positivism I wish to address here concerns change. are the more general problems with the extreme versions of the postpositivist position? The first problem is that they tend to overlook. objectivist theory such as neorealism contains a bias. but they are enabled and constrained by the social structures in which they live. or downplay. ahistorical. socially constructed product of human practice does not make it less real. . neorealism. . natural conditions. possible. Humans can change the world. A brief comparison with a classical Marxist idea of change will demonstrate the point I am trying to make.26 The understanding of 'change' in the Marxist tradition is thus closely related to an appreciation of the historically specific social conditions under which people live. Nor has any postmodernist I have read argued or implied that "any narrative is as good as any other"'. open to anything goes.21 Despite their shortcomings. including the factors in play in balance-of-power dynamics and in patterns of cooperation and conflict. If there are no neutral grounds for deciding about truth claims so that each theory will define what counts as the facts. neorealism and other positivist theories have produced valuable insights about anarchy.g. revolution) is. International Politics and Economics. such as. 87-88 What.24 But the problem remains that if we cannot find a minimum of common standards for deciding about truth claims a postmodernist position appears unable to come up with a metatheoretically substantiated critique of the claim that the earth is flat. Revolution is possible under certain social conditions but not under any conditions. how can post-positivist ideas and projects of change be distinguished from pure utopianism and wishful thinking? Post-positivist radical subjectivism leaves no common ground for choosing between different change projects. as the given framework for action . (1993) (Democracy and Development. but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. with the prevailing social and power relationships . political science (1975) PhD. We noted the post-modern critique of neorealism's difficulties with embracing change.) Professor. Such insights are downplayed and even sometimes dismissed in adopting the notion of 'regimes of truth'. because radical post-positivism is epistemologically and ontologically cut off from evaluating the relative merit of different change projects. Smith notes that he has never 'met a postmodernist who would accept that "the earth is flat if you say so". of course.28 . One way of doing so is set forth by Robert Cox. It is entirely true that anarchy is no given.27 That constraint appears to be absent in post-positivist thinking about change. at least in principle.

The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946. to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence . Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. Europe and emancipation. (ibid. and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles.g. 2k International relations theory and the politics of European integration. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics..even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e. In line with he classical revolutionary tradition. I know that it is to the detriment of an other. Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed'. take part. and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946.ENDI 2010 Security K 115 Wave 1 AT: SCENARIO PLANNING BAD Their alternative fails. In the case of the current European configuration. Rorty 1996). 'Security' is not a way to open ( or keep open) an ethical horizon. If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone. in what terms)? Often. violence and mutual vilification. of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends. To take a position. etc. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction. the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations. politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. p. However. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility. security is not that kind of call. otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks and the question of how to handle them. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions . The ethical response is to engage in scenario planning and try to minimize violence Ole Weaver. Should we treat security in this manner? No. 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). 284-285 The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. particular. banal conflicts and controversies.security as a specific concept can’t be deconstructed. but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice. Therefore. our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics. Should developments be securitized (and if so. after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. . we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics. As a security/securitization analyst. only with the large one (cf. this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns.

Survival. in ‗an environment that lacks clarity. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded. The greater the ambiguity. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ. a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. Even at their best. they remain only beliefs and premises. and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic.. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely.makers. ―The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning‖. the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy.ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making.. Accordingly. He invites ambiguity. variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Washington DC defense analyst. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply. and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity. deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. abounds with conflicting data. the greater the impact of preconceptions. not long-term strategic planning. what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Ambiguity is a fact of life. but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts. . As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur.ing.ENDI 2010 Security K 116 Wave 1 AT: PREDICTIONS FAIL Turn—rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decisionmakers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts Fitzsimmons. takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation.prise. online) But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng. and scepticism of analysis is necessary.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves. Winter 06-07.‘16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis. At their worst. then. All the same. 07 (Michael. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‗rigorous assessment‘ can illuminate strategic choices. If not sufficiently bounded. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision. that in planning under conditions of risk. ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation . the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. where analysis is silent or inadequate. rather than rational judgements. It should follow.

1996 of Baron The failure AND Saltaire. Karl Mannheim. Review of international Studies (22) of the Weimar Republic to establish its legitimacy owed something to the irresponsibility of intellectuals of the right and left.32 (308-9) . Former IR Prof London School of Economics. preferring the private certainties of their ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises of democratic politics.ENDI 2010 Security K 117 Wave 1 2AC CEDE THE POLITICAL Their alternative cedes the political. and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it. was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge. PhD Cornell.Weimar proves Lord William Wallace. Total Badass. encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so contribute to undermining the republic . The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies have a responsibility to the society within which they live: to act themselves as constructive critics. 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x The followers of Nietzsche on the right and those of Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar.

1 It may also depend on how the state came into being: in Giddens's typology. the structures of government and society may be quite distinct (Chinese-controlled Tibet) or tightly interwoven (USA). Canada. and territory can have long and deep connections (Japan). The essential meaning of the term refers to autonomous. PhD Harvard. whether it is classical (France). the State. but it is also true of people across Africa and in many parts of Asia. and on the relationship between the holders of coercive power and the holders of capital. . postcolonial (Nigeria) or modernizing (Japan). though there will always be a relationship between rulers and subjects. Tsarist Russia). Dissent Vol. professor of IR at the London School of Economics. Iraq. and Palestinians. But Jim wants to get past state sovereignty.‖ On Security. Within this definition lies a very wide array of possible sociopolitical constructions. but not all. colonized (United States).org/book/lipschutz/index. Ronnie Lipschutz. http://www. he never tells us how or where this is "happening. there can be virtually infinite diversity in how the internal components of the state are constructed and arranged . How society. society. to close and strongly connected at the other (contemporary Scandinavia). Maybe one day there will be pleasant pastures "beyond" the state. without effective police. and a societal realm (or realms) as well as a political one. Right now.html] There can be no question that the object we refer to when we use the term "state" is not fixed in character. but very common for large sections of society to be alienated from the government. This is obviously true for Tibetans.ENDI 2010 Security K 118 Wave 1 AT: STATE LINKS The neg essentializes states with infinite unpredictability and unique vulnerabilities Buzan 1998 [Barry. Sri Lanka. or they can be superficial and ephemeral (Jordan. Winter He thinks that the most important thing happening in the world today is the growth of international institutions and the erosion of state sovereignty. no political leader in his right mind would entrust the safety of his people to any international organization. cases there will also be relations with other autonomous political entities. states will face security problems arising from the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities among them. as in Sudan. 57 No 1. there is only a wasteland. In the world as it is today. Yugoslavia. Right now. But.Response to: The Military State of America and the Democratic Left. only sovereign states can provide these services. 2 Abandoning the state worse than endorsing it Michael Walzer. Chad). ed. ―Security. to have a complete divorce between government and society. except in colonies. Turkey and many others.ciaonet. a territorial domain of some sort. Similarly. In most. Pakistan. territorially organized political entities in which the machinery of government is in some sense recognizably separate from the organization of society. government and territory are organized depends heavily on the nature of the prevailing social and material technologies. the "New World Order. Afghanistan. . living in failed states. States are distinguished from tribes and other less complex forms of "stateless societies" by this differentiation of the political from the societal. The relationship between rulers and subjects can range from remote and detached at one end of the spectrum (imperial China. what the most oppressed and impoverished people in the world most urgently need is a decent and effective sovereign state. 2010 BA Brandeis. Beyond these basics." and Beyond. Government. ruled by warlords. without welfare systems or functioning schools." Right now. Kurds. It is uncommon. Where this is so. again.

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Literature and psychological bias runs towards threat deflation- we are the opposite of paranoid
Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, ―Unanswered Threats A
Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,‖ International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject . Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable
observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival . There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems . Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about —and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them . At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political

costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to
threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

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Their psychology claims are nonsense- can‘t explain the actual track record of war
Kagan, 1985 [David, Former Dean of Yale, currently Sterling Professor of Classics and History at Yale MA Brown, PhD Ohio State, NATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM ISSUE NUMBER 78 - WINTER 1985] This essay is typical in its rejection of the particular in favor of the general , in its search for unconscious and uncontrolled motives to the neglect of the conscious and purposeful motives of people, in its rejection of the willed and rational in favor of the non-rational or irrational. Its authors make no claim to originality, and allow that their theory may seem to be nothing more than enlightened common sense. But in fact it is an attack on common sense. The reader may have thought wars were the results of ignorance, bad character, or evil intentions—I mean fear, suspicion, greed, jealousy, and hatred—but they are really the results of inevitable ambivalence leading to morbid anxiety which is transformed into displaced or projected aggression, over all of which the individual has no control. And if this seems arcane, the reader can fall back on the real teaching of this essay—that wars are caused by various things. Like the other scientizing students of society, the authors leave the crucial questions not only unanswered but unasked. Presumably, people are always repressing, displacing, and projecting their aggressive feelings. Why do these processes lead to war at some times and not at others? And if we leave cloudcuckooland for a moment, we soon recognize that the decisions that produce wars are not made by great masses of psychologically disturbed people but by a small number of leaders charged with the conduct of foreign affairs. A proper theory ought to consider what moves such people to bring on war. If they are moved by forces such as those I have discussed, it should be possible to show that they are, and to show how they are. If they merely respond to popular feeling, we should be told precisely how, when, and why they do. Statesmen who make decisions usually offer reasoned explanations for their actions. If the stated reasons are false, as they often are, should we not seek unstated reasons before abandoning reason altogether? (p. 5051)

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Multiple factors make critical theory the wrong approach for the middle east

Bilgin, 2005 [Pinar, PhD International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Department of International Relations
Bilkent Univ., Regional Security in the Middle East p. 9-10]

The Middle East is arguably a hard case for critical approaches to engage in. It has for long been viewed as a region that 'best fits the realist view of international politics' (Nye 2000:163); or 'an ―exceptional‖ case eternally out of step with history and immune to trends affecting other parts of the world' (Aarts 1999:911). 'While the rest of the world worries about new and non-traditional threats to national security', argued one author, most countries in the Middle East are still poised to counter the same old, traditional threats . In the Middle East,

to use Thomas Hobbes's famous line, 'there is continuall feare, and danger of violent death' and 'the life of man' (and woman) is still 'poore, nasty, brutish and short'. The Cold War has had a revolutionary impact on the security agenda of most states in the world, with the exception of the Middle East. (Shehadi 1998:134) Accordingly, it has been argued that whereas critical approaches to security may have relevance within the

Western European context, in other parts of the world - such as the Middle East - more traditional approaches retain their validity (see Ayoob 1995:8-12). The Gulf War (1990-91), the US-led war on Iraq (2003), the stall in Arab-Israeli peace-making and the seeming lack of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity, especially when viewed against the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in security relations in other parts of the world (see, for example, Rosecrance 1991; Hettne and Inotai 1994; Alagappa 1995; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Lake and Morgan 1997; Hettne and Söderbaum 1998), does indeed suggest that the Middle East is a place where traditional conceptions and practices of security still prevail.

SQ Failures result from a failure to utilize realism- the plan moves us back towards the right track
a visiting professor of political science at MIT. American Prospect Sept

Leverett 06 [Flynt, a senior fellow and the director of the geopolitics-of-energy initiative at the New America Foundation. He is also
The basic flaw in the Bush administration's Middle East strategy is that it departs from the essential propositions of foreign-policy realism. In his days as the principal architect of American foreign policy under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger established a paradigm for U.S. grand strategy in the Middle East. In this paradigm, American policy should seek always to empower moderates and marginalize radicals. The best way to do this was through careful management of the region's balance of power, primarily through diplomatic means. The essence of such diplomacy is "carrots-andsticks" engagement--credibly threatening negative consequences for regional actors who work against U.S. goals, but also promising strategically significant benefits in exchange for cooperation. This paradigm guided U.S. policy in the Middle East throughout Kissinger's tenure in office and through subsequent administrations. At the height of the Cold War, for example, the realist paradigm guided American efforts across three administrations to draw Egypt out of its alliance with the Soviet Union and into a strategic partnership with the United States, which provided subsequent administrations a dramatically improved platform for projecting political influence and, when necessary, military power in the region. By taking Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli military equation through the U.S.-brokered Camp David accords in 1978, the realist paradigm also fundamentally strengthened Israel's security by rendering impossible a recurrence of a generalized Arab-Israeli war like those of 1948,1967,

and 1973. Similar logic animated America's ongoing strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and, after the first Gulf War, the launch of a more comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace process at the 1991 Madrid conference. Although the Clinton administration's efforts to broker peace treaties between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and Syria in the late 1990s proved unsuccessful, the peace process

nonetheless bolstered the American and Israeli positions in the region by establishing conceptual frameworks for an ultimate resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also provided a practical framework for keeping a lid on "hot spots" such as southern Lebanon and, as a result of Israeli-Palestinian security
cooperation in the late 1990s, significantly reducing the incidence of anti-Israeli terrorism by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Terrorists' opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U. Third. Moreover.000. the organization was actively training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future terrorist operations.‖ http://www. former head of the CIA's terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts. 2001. not about what is objectively possible. Second. Specifically. killing thousands of citizens. they have examined the evidence.be it New York or Moscow. President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact of a single nuclear bomb. nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons.could kill hundreds of thousands of people.foreignpolicy. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. Graham. The U. was not just unlikely. we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. London or Paris -. Thinking about risks we face today. into the World Trade Center." Summarized in a single sentence. especially nuclear. but only by realistic recognition of the threat. As is now evident. no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment." The consequences. was. our economies. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go. In 2007. he discovered that indeed they could.including 2 million children. who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden." however.He said: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -. so it's not going to happen. would "destabilize our security. Both propositions are wrong. the idea of international terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland. the commission found. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism "the single most important national security threat that we face" and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?" Why the unanimity among those who have shouldered responsibility for U. Security Council. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: "It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction.com/articles/2010/01/25/a_failure_to_imagine_the_worst?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full.S. the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253. if it is going to happen. Rather. ―A Failure to In his first speech to the U. It was inconceivable. "the main threat is the nuclear one. JMP) Allison. assault on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. using planes as missiles. borders illegally last year. 2001. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped. and our very way of life. who has declared his intention to kill "4 million Americans -." Leaders who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics' presumptions.S. 11." For most Americans. In a nutshell. Prior to 9/11. who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on the American homeland that would kill more citizens than Japan did at Pearl Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission: "No one could have imagined them taking a plane. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence.S. Tokyo or Beijing.S. a "failure of imagination. 11. these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable.S.." Before the Sept. terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. this question is more urgent than ever. much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf MowattLarssen. U.N. many Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993. U. Either it hasn't happened. only states are capable of mass destruction. . Congress established a successor to the 9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. are propositions about our minds. First." When asked recently what keeps him awake at night. and relentless determination to pursue it. In the commission's unanimous judgment: "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. and much of which remains classified. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. he noted." Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima. national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. "men in caves can't do this" was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. a clear agenda for action.ENDI 2010 Security K 122 Wave 1 AT: TERROR LINK Believing that a nuclear WMD terrorist attack is possible is necessary to prevent it from happening Imagine the Worst: The first step toward preventing a nuclear 9/11 is believing it could happen. slamming it into the Pentagon . or." The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to. and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed almost 250 and injured nearly 6. there's nothing we can do to stop it.. 10 – professor of government and director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard (1/25/10. how unlikely was a megaterrorist attack on the American homeland? In the previous decade.

A social movement too weak to prevail in armed conflict. The pacifist vision of a world free of the threat of war can help build support for the development of an ordered community at the international level that is able to resolve conflicts peacefully and justly. pacifist activity could be both morally pure and politically relevant."6 Individual perfection is not a basis on which to build a political platform. the proper course for him is to remain silent. whereby lives and interests other than one's own are defrauded or destroyed. The pacifist is entitled to participate in the political process and to propose policies like any other citizen. that when he enters the policy arena he must adopt standards of judgment distinct from those he applies in his personal life . In view of the fact that pacifists are usually a small minority of a country's population. Smith College. They recognized that not only would it have been undemocratic to try to stop a war that their nations had democratically decided to wage. that unilateral disarmament is the sole moral option. such as Solidarity in Poland. however. but that to do so would help bring about the triumph of a political system of unparalleled evil. that is usually not possible . and the University of Massachusetts Pacifism and Citizenship. like all policies.CONSEQUENCES FIRST Personal pacific beliefs have no place in policy making circles-consequences key Lewy."7 No one expects pacifists to be active supporters of nuclear deterrence. or even of military aid to weak regimes facing the threat of foreign-sponsored subversion. when truly and consistently committed to the supreme value of nonviolence. [Guenter has been on the faculties of Columbia University. "The morality of political judgment must include a consequential criterion.ENDI 2010 Security K 123 Wave 1 2AC IMPACT CALC . "Let those who are revolted by such ambiguities have the decency and courtesy to retire to the monastery where the medieval perfectionists found their asylum. Indeed. In the real world. The decision whether to choose a nonviolent response should be made within the context of likely consequences. "invariably betray themselves into a preference for tyranny. is not an act of prophetic witness but a moral absurdity. for an individual to sacrifice his life rather than to participate in the defense of order and justice. I would argue. (18-20) . be judged in terms of foreseeable results. this condition is satisfied in most cases. The personal "No!" of the pacifist. the pacifist's commitment to nonviolence can inspire others to abandon force and coercion. he ceases to speak as a pacifist and becomes subject to what Weber called the "ethic of responsibility. often will opt for nonviolent tactics of resistance for strictly prudential reasons. 2005. Niebuhr insisted." which takes account of the realities of power and the likely consequences of political decisions. I am suggesting that when pacifists act as citizens. the national policies proposed by pacifists should . Reinhold Niebuhr argued during World War II. When the pacifist's conscience does not allow him to support policies that utilize force or the threat of force. would leave his country undefended or would tip the balance of power in the world in favor of expansionist and aggressor nations. But neither should pacifists obstruct all such policies that the democratically elected government of the United States pursues in order to assure its own survival as a free society. I repeat the central point of my argument: I am not suggesting that pacifists stop being citizens. but they have no right to sacrifice others for the attainment of this vocation. for example. To do otherwise leads to follies like Gandhi's advice to the Jews of Europe to use satyagraha to prevent the Nazis from carrying out their plan to destroy the Jewish people. is morally unassailable if this act of refusal does not jeopardize the well-being of others. As George Weigel has correctly pointed out. ambiguous methods and ambiguous answers are required. He should not urge a course of action that. if implemented. It may be noble . they. even if its results would be to make war more likely. I argue that pacifists should return to this view of their role in a democratic society. He should recognize. For example. On the other hand.Can they Coexist?] Pacifists. remind the rest of us who are not pacifists of the link between means and ends. However. When pacifists present their language of the heart as a political alternative to the pressures and compromises of the political order. of the use of force against terrorists. the moment the pacifist enters the political arena to seek to influence the policies of his nation. In the best of all possible worlds. To argue. to abstain from taking a stand on that policy. To prevent misunderstandings. a prudential criterion should always be employed . representing an act of conscience. Pacifists may choose nonviolence as an absolute moral imperative. they should take into account the fact that their pressure for disarmament in the Western democracies has no counterpart in the Soviet Union."5 Similarly. they should accept the test of consequences to which all public policies must be subject. but they should not mislead others into thinking that nonviolence will stop all acts of aggression and evil. although pacifists will not necessarily be the only ones to urge a course of nonviolence. They should look at the foreseeable consequences of their actions. Pacifists in World War II accepted this verity. A historical precedent for such a stance is the withdrawal of Quaker politicians from the government of the province of Pennsylvania in 1756 because they wanted neither to interfere with nor be party to war against the Indians. Their personal "No!" to killing carries an important ethical message. Pacifists have every right to avoid the moral dilemmas posed by the world of statesmanship and statecraft and to seek individual salvation through ethical absolutism and purity. " For the moral ambiguities of history and the world of politics. as Niebuhr noted. But one cannot ignore the "distinction between an individual act of self-abnegation and a policy of submission to injustice.

com/news/article... in a detailed memorandum explaining the Nazi aims regarding the German penal code. thus providing valuable information that promised to improve the nation's health.. Their "quality of life" was considered low by everyone's standards. rather than determined in light of traditional moral." Unfortunately.. These were socially disturbing individuals incapable of providing for themselves whose "quality of life" was considered by the public as irreversibly below standard. the most popular of which were entitled "Ich klage an (I accuse)" and "Mentally Ill. an object lesson in what the quest for 'quality of life' without reference to 'sanctity of life' can involve . The medical profession gradually grew accustomed to administering death to patients who. whose TV presentation has lately been harrowing viewers throughout the Western world. psychiatric patients. (life unworthy of life). an essential consideration has been left out – namely. in the interest of true humanity. the socially unproductive and those living on welfare or government pensions. forsaken individuals were needed by no one and would be missed by no one. today announced its intentions to authorize physicians to end the sufferings of the incurable patient. revealed that Germany's trend toward atrocity began with their progressive embrace of the Hegelian doctrine of "rational utility. upon request. too. felt their low "quality of life" rendered their lives not worth living. the political enemies of the state. based on a novel by a National Socialist doctor.ENDI 2010 Security K 124 Wave 1 2AC IMPACT CALC – AT: VALUE TO LIFE Sanctity more important than quality of life Federer 2003 [William. These individuals also were a source of "human experimental material. insane..asp?ARTICLE_ID=35138] Even before the rise of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich... handicapped." as they were viewed as having an extremely low "quality of life. prisoners. . This precipitated the 1939 order to cut federal expenses. scientific and legal nature. which reached astronomical proportions." allowing military medical research to be carried on with human tissue. which increasingly convinced the public to morally approve of euthanasia." The moving biography of the imprisoned Dietrich Bonhoffer chronicled the injustices. blind." both published in The Human Life Review. stealing from those who worked hard to pay the taxes to support them." it was stated: "The Ministry of Justice. Euthanasia . that the origins of the Holocaust lay. C. for whatever reasons. actually won a prize at the world-famous Venice Film Festival! Extreme hardship cases were cited. ethical and religious values." The transformation followed thus: The concept that the elderly and terminally ill should have the right to die was promoted in books. The Catholic newspaper Germania hastened to observe: 'The Catholic faith binds the conscience of its followers not to accept this method. . entitled "Nazi Plan to Kill Incurables to End Pain.. It was labeled an "act of mercy" to "liberate them through death. The next to be eradicated were the ideologically unwanted. bums. In Lutheran circles. In this televised version. [namely] the great Nazi Holocaust. newspapers. for those that have eyes to see. entitled "The Slide to Auschwitz." One euthanasia movie. German Religious Groups Oppose Move. inmates and convicts.. was described in an article written by the British commentator Malcolm Muggeridge entitled "The Humane Holocaust" and in an article written by former United States Surgeon General. "This proposed legal recognition of euthanasia – the act of providing a painless and peaceful death – raised a number of fundamental problems of a religious. Double and triple digit inflation crippled the economy. a best-selling author and president of Amerisearch Inc. These lonely.. The next whose lives were terminated by the state were the institutionalized elderly who had no relatives and no financial resources. In an Associated Press release published in the New York Times Oct.. Their unproductive lives were a burden on the "quality of life" of those who had to pay the taxes. gypsies." The Nuremberg trials. and they were a tremendous tax burden on the economically distressed state. epileptic. but in pre-Nazi Weimar Germany's acceptance of euthanasia and mercy-killing as humane and estimable. 1933. Everett Koop. which included the support and medical costs required to maintain the lives of the retarded.. thereby enabling the victors in the war against Nazism to adopt the very practices for which the Nazis had been solemnly condemned at Nuremberg. the non-rehabilitatable ill and those who had been diseased or chronically ill for five years or more. No life still valuable to the State will be wantonly destroyed. exposing the horrible Nazi war crimes. but contributed nothing financially back.." Nationalized health care and government involvement in medical care promised to improve the public's "quality of life. religious extremists and those "disloyal" individuals considered to be holding the government back from producing a society which functions well and provides everyone a better "quality of life." leeches. the way for the gruesome Nazi Holocaust of human extermination and cruel butchery was being prepared in the 1930 German Weimar Republic through the medical establishment and philosophical elite's adoption of the "quality of life" concept in place of the "sanctity of life. 10-18 http://www. not in Nazi terrorism and anti-Semitism. we have been accorded. This gradual transformation of national public opinion. has become a widely discussed word in the Reich. 1977 and 1980 respectively. senile.. They drew financial support from the state. deaf. proposed that it shall be possible for physicians to end the tortures of incurable patients. promulgated through media and education. The liquidation grew to include those who had been unable to work. or as it was put. "It took no more than three decades to transform a war crime into an act of compassion. M. the cost of maintaining government medical care was a contributing factor to the growth of the national debt." as well as being a tax burden on the public. . as even school math problems compared distorted medical costs incurred by the taxpayer of caring for and rehabilitating the chronically sick with the cost of loans to newly married couples for new housing units. The public psyche was conditioned for this. The next to be eliminated were the parasites on the state: the street people. Muggeridge stated: "Near at hand. hopelessly poor.D.' . 10. The national socialist government decided to remove "useless" expenses from the budget. in addition to the fact that they were a nuisance to society and a seed-bed for crime. life is regarded as something that God alone can take.worldnetdaily." where an individual's worth is in relation to their contribution to the state. They were looked upon as "useless eaters. lebensunwerten Lebens. beggars. The memorandum . Continues… . literature and even entertainment films. resulting in the public demanding that government cut expenses..

2001.. if left unchecked. were less evolved and needed to be eliminated from the so-called "human gene pool. which eventually results in the Hegelian utilitarian attitude of a person's worth being based on their contribution toward perpetuating big government. however. "Those of you who are not vegetarians are responsible for taking a life every time you eat.ENDI 2010 Security K 125 Wave 1 AT: VALUE TO LIFE Continued… Finally." he said. This philosophy which lowers the value of human life. Oct.. adding that he does not believe a newborn has a right to life until it reaches some minimum level of consciousness. being more advanced in the supposed progress of human evolution.." Dr. could easily lead to a repeat of the atrocities of Nazi Germany. .000 German aged. is in stark contrast to America's founding principles. The "mercy-killing" movement puts us on the same path as pre-Nazi Germany." Singer's views. and in particular the Jewish race." Can this holocaust happen in America? Indeed. The "quality of life" concept. 5. shocked attendees at the Governor's Commission on Disability. The Associated Press reported Singer's comments: "I do think that it is sometimes appropriate to kill a human infant. You can say that if the first step is moral then whatever follows must be moral. or "Aryan. I am concerned about this because when the first 273. if not something worse. in Concord. "For me. Species is no more relevant than race in making these judgments." ensuring that future generations of humans would have a higher "quality of life. justifying their actions on the purported theory of evolution. what makes it so seriously wrong to take a life?" Singer asked. The important thing. N." race as "ubermenschen. and it was not far from there to Auschwitz. the Nazis considered the German. Koop stated: "The first step is followed by the second step. infirm and retarded were killed in gas chambers there was no outcry from that medical profession either." supermen. it has already begun. as they heard the absurd comments of Princeton University professor Peter Singer. . the relevant question is. The idea of killing a person and calling it "death with dignity" is an oxymoron. This resulted in the twisted conclusion that all other races.H. is this: Whether you diagnose the first step as being one worth taking or being one that is precarious rests entirely on what the second step is likely to be.

While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ‘service in calling attention to a problem. produce violence. especially in social systems. any more. and the moderately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temperate zone is stable The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff . but unfortunately Galtung‘s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. pg. there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression. or a mixture of the two. or oppression. and revolutions which we cannot really afford. deprivation. The record of peace research in the last generation. 83-4 Finally. destitution. Where. all these things. we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ‘structural violence‘ and ‘positive peace‘. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies. and for that very reason are suspect. such as arms races. ~the other is the diminution of the strain. Violence. Boulding p. However. taboos. culture. and even though this I must confess that conventional wisdom is not wholly wise. As a result. changes in relative economic position or political power. It is very hard for people to know their interests. low expectations of life. a condition in which more than half the human race lives. then. desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off. coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which reinforced this new theoretical framework. [1990 Kenneth E. enough so that we do not have to worry about it. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do. ill health. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous. -or it is ‘like‘ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. It still remains true that war. 1977 [Kenneth Prof Univ. although like everything else in the world. The metaphor is that poverty. that is. in the modem world at least there is not very much. whether of the streets and the home. compared with the period 1929 to 1932. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence.ENDI 2010 Security K 126 Wave 1 AT: STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE IMPACT Structural violence obscures analysis necessary to reduce poverty and violence- Boulding. 75 p. 14." remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race. but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over. The strength of systems involves habit. They are metaphors rather than models. deprivation. Journal of Peace Research. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience. indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence. We have had the beginnings of detente. or injustice. the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action. and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. but at some threshold boiling over will take place. Violence. and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes. wars. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. (347-8) . occurs when the ‘strain‘ on a system is too great for its ‗~s~trength‘. It has not been able to prevent an arms race. and sanctions. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. There has been some improvement. is ‘like‘ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related. not the ‘real‘ interests. one is the increase in the strength of the system. In the international system. The alternative can‘t change the system and negative peace outweighs Boulding. which. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ‘breaks‘ in the system rather than uniformities. for it is both persuasive and wrong. and misery. While there is some truth in the metaphor. was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. simply because of everybody's ignorance. the arms race may well be another catastrophe. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character. mutually stimulated hostility. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people‘s behavior. though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence. and not always the most important part. however. Ed: John Burton. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ‘it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. is one of very partial success. therefore. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system. however. 40-41 ] when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce something like the Keynesian revolution in economics. there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. is a very different phenomenon from poverty. rather like the boiling over of a pot. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence. of the police. or of the armed forces. by somebody else. Strength and strain. Violence in the behavioral sense. which are often hard to identify.Prof UC Boulder Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution. whatever these may be. not through the structural ones. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty. and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others). a danger to human survival far greater than poverty. everything is somewhat related to everything else. or of the guerilla. an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed. what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn‘~t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy . of Michigan and UC Boulder. for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. most certainly for the good. it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer. I suppose we might say. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. however unintentionally and unknowingly. whether between persons or organizations. is a ‘threshold‘ phenomenon.

which therefore means that its purpose is ‗conservative‘. The best example remains Ashley‘s famous piece on the poverty of neorealism. Realism. but it is also. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known. Cox‘s distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between ‗orthodox‘ and ‗critical‘ approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau‘s ideas. what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. It is also.4 Problem-solving theory. because it stands in the path of different. it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz.8 To be fair. Ashley‘s analysis remains. but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. realism is a state-centric approach. more emancipatory modes of political organisation. while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some ‗latent normative elements‘. In 1992. While Morgenthau‘s conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected. problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings. not least because it ‗has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism. it demonstrates that for Morgenthau. and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the ‗ideological apparatus‘ of one particular ruling group.10 (emphasis added) The ‗picture‘ of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension. States and World Orders‘. being ‗critical‘ in IR means being openly normative. not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision of what realism stands for – Cox himself. the role and function of scholars in society. MA (King's College London). it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label ‗critical‘. While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length.3 Thereafter in his famous article ‗Social Forces. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length. . he thus accepted that ‗classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful. and that its ‗non normative quality is however. and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force. it is. ‗serves particular national sectional or class interests. as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism: it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers. and held very specific views about. and insecurity as an integrating principle. 34. only superficial‘. which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. In most cases then. while realism. Normative theory. the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism. however. what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually ‗post-positivist‘) or ontological assumptions they may share. A typical example of this is the success of Cox‘s famous distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory. in some of his later works. 5–27] This article concentrates on Morgenthau‘s views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. that of statesmen. challenging the status quo. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism ‗is . First then. fundamentally. MA (Sciences Po Paris). with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. it can incorporate critical insights COZETTE 2008 [MURIELLE BA (Hons) (Sciences Po Paris). However diverse these recent approaches may be in their arguments. It is therefore legitimate to claim that. implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo‘. is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‗sustain[s] the existing order‘. a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo. and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters‘.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory. As the ‗organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be ‗value free‘. This clearly amounts to an insidious high-jacking of the very adjective ‗critical‘. Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term ‗neo-realism‘. recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power‘. indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially. where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. Review of International Studies (2008). most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous. Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity. however. and that it is a ‗deceptive and dangerous‘ theory.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to ‗bringing about an alternative order‘ and because of its openly normative stance. says Cox. Indeed. fundamentally. self-named ‗critical‘ approaches.9 He did not. however. realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. PhD (LSE) is a John Vincent Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of International Relations. Feminism. . . by contrast. to persevere in the face of doubt. as a scholar himself. as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical. From this. and seeking to advance human emancipation( s). The Continues… . Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) ‗takes the world as it finds it . while by contrast. classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the ‗private sphere‘ from public responsibility.2 Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project. which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. Morgenthau wrote at length. and rarely questioned. which are comfortable within the given order‘. which are intrinsically linked: it is supposed to explain international relations. pretends to be objective and to depict ‗things as they are‘: but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very ‗reality‘ they pretend to ‗describe‘. the distinctive trait of ‗critical theory‘ is to ‗stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about‘. as the given framework for action‘. As he writes: It is a tradition whose silences and omissions. a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions . Unsurprisingly.ENDI 2010 Security K 127 Wave 1 2AC-PERMUTATION Their K incorrectly essentializes realism-it’s not a static entity. its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten or underestimated by the more recent. . providing a more nuanced analysis of the school. however this concept is to be defined. investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth. it is also argued. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical. who are described as ‗American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory‘.

. which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists‘ arguments. This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical ‗self-righteousness‘ from these ‗critical‘ approaches. The article is divided into two parts. The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order. the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-thatbe. the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau‘s works. political science is always. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project. For Morgenthau. a revolutionary force whose main purpose is to bring about ‗change through action‘. Morgenthau‘s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force. which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous. In complete contrast to what ‗critical approaches‘ consistently claim. challenge the status quo. In order to challenge the use of the adjective ‗critical‘ by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project. Second. and consistently opposed. constitute a ‗betrayal‘ of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda). which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. it focuses on some features which. and realism is denied any critical dimension. His commitment to truth in turn explains why.ENDI 2010 Security K 128 Wave 1 2AC PERMUTATION continued… meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. according to him. and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar‘s voice. IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth. First. against power if needed. which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power. it investigates Morgenthau‘s ideal of the scholarly activity. for Morgenthau. by definition. and in doing so.

. Vol. these are not always manifest in experience. but also of underlying structures. We want to now situate a different "problem. We have attempted to show how the boundaries of both negativity and boredom share a common "problem-field. states of affairs. For critical realists this under. "all philosophies. in effect. We have also argued that those beyond the boundary of boredom tend to be empirical realists and those beyond the boundary of nega. First. Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki. professor of political science at University of Wales. puts it.ENDI 2010 Security K 129 Wave 1 CRITICAL REALISM PERM Adopting critical realism gets past exclusive focus on discourse or events to address the structural possibilities for the status quo Patomaki and Wight 2000 [Heikki.field": one that takes the possibility of a deeper realism to be a condition of possibility for both empirical and linguistic realism. The form of realism we advocate can be called critical realism (for essential readings. For both the underlying reality that makes experience pos. 44. The question is not of whether to be a realist. for critical realism the different levels may be out of phase with each other. empirical and linguistic realists collapse what are. Second.tivity tend towards linguistic realism. cognitive discourses and practical activities presuppose a realism-in the sense of some ontology or general account. Colin. see Archer et al. experiences. but of what kind of realist to be. and tendencies that exist.tion and this power exists irrespective of being actualized. jstor] Critical Realism Every theory of knowledge must also logically presuppose a theory of what the world is like (ontology) for knowledge (epistemology) to be possible. 213-237. of complex things (includ. by virtue of their struc. of the world-of one kind or another" (Bhaskar. There are two distinct ways in which critical realism differs from empirical and linguistic realism.tures.sible and the course of events that is not experienced/spoken are reduced to what can be experienced or become an object of discourse. whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse . Or as Bhaskar. in part. this power is itself based on more than that which we directly experience. impressions. No.‖ International Studies Quarterly. or even for that matter realized. 2 (Jun. ―After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism." which is structured by various forms of anti. 1998).lying reality provides the conditions of possibility for actual events and perceived and/or experienced phenomena. according to critical realism the world is composed not only of events. different levels of reality into one (Bhaskar. powers. What we mean is that although the underlying level may possess certain powers and tendencies. A nuclear arsenal has the power to bring about vast destruc. potentials. The world on this view consists of more than the actual course of events and experiences and/or discourses about them . and capacities to act in certain ways even if those capacities are not always realized. According to critical realists. possess certain powers. pp. and discourses. inverting a Hegelian aphorism. 2000).realism/scepticism. 1989:2).. The conception we are proposing is that of a world composed.ing systems and complexly structured situations) that. 1975:56). Moreover. .

the academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.html One is also required to ask: If war is "not the answer. PhD Harvard. And because many formal conjectures are often untested. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world. war. Wars of self-defense. But the "antiwar" movement (I put it in quotation marks because any kind of appeasement this time will only make a bloodier future war inevitable) is happy to use celebrities for its own purposes. Crow's remarks seem to acknowledge no such distinction.wars that have to be fought to defeat a greater evil. to preserve their wealth and empire. The alternative can‘t address a root cause or end enemy creation. It would have been far more lucrative for the Brits to have made a deal with Hitler." as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour. Where would that fit into Ms. And so their presence in the debate has to be acknowledged. politics. If formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles. In this sense. Mercifully. "War is based in greed. or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). Crow even asks herself that. academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems that may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. ― http://www. brain-dead peacenik in sequins. these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important real-world security issues. So let's decry this moronic celebrity convergence.[111] Such fields are prone to become "method-driven" rather than "problem-driven.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative. or by ideology. Are you sitting down? Here it comes: "I think war is based in greed and there are huge karmic retributions that will follow.com/opinion/sullivan/2003/01/15/crow/index. lost their entire imperial project and ransacked their own domestic wealth. its close connection to real-world issues--could be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda . I think war is never the answer to solving any problems. I should ignore her. And the karmic retributions are gonna be harsh. or by expansionism. By contrast. 1-15-3 " Sheryl Crow." what exactly is the question? I wonder if. Walt 99 (Stephen. the character. out of hatred or fanaticism or ideology. It's bad. they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions . Like. much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance " that pervades much of contemporary social science. but the field as a whole has retained considerable real-world relevance. man. socially useful ideas. policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid . or strategy. Perhaps if she did -. Although formal techniques produce precise.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period. Take Britain's entry into the war against Nazi Germany." Wow. The pirate wars of the 17th century. The weak arguments of the appease-Saddam left just got a little weaker. much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history." Some wars. but its agenda has been shaped more by real-world problems than by methodological fads. Bad karma. they waged war. the future role of nuclear weapons. ―Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies. Ms. the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. And many wars have seen their protagonists not enriched but impoverished. Crow provides us with what she believes is an argument. Ms. Wars against tyrants. and strength of the democratic peace. Does wishing that these crazed religious nuts were not our enemies solve any problems? I'm taking her too seriously. ahem." Let's take this bit by bit. Instead.it only causes war Andrew Sullivan. There's only one word for this kind of argument: Asinine. Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University. Like. causes. These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods. Crow's worldview? And then there's the concept of a just war -. Way harsh. But all wars? The United States' intervention in the Second World War? The Wars of Religion in the 17th century? Many wars are fueled by nationalism. . the potential contribution of security institutions. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse.we might have an inkling about what her "answer" might actually be. what if you have no choice in the matter? What if an enemy decides.let's say the question is about the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists -. logically consistent arguments. 11. Does she believe that removing Hitler from power solved nothing? That preventing further genocide in the Balkans solved nothing? That ending 50 years of Soviet tyranny meant nothing? Apparently so. Early British forays in the Far East and India. the causes of ethnic conflict. Then we have this wonderful insight: "The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies. wow. The best way to solve problems is to not have enemies.‖ International Security. Ms. in her long interludes of geopolitical analysis.salon.[114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studies--namely. Saddam's incursion into Kuwait. Instead of using their expertise to address important real-world problems. But. and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others.ENDI 2010 Security K 130 Wave 1 2AC. 23(4). Crow was on Sept. simply to attack you? I'm not sure where Ms.) Taken together. surely. But the enemy made its point palpably clear. 2001. recent formal work in security studies has little to say about contemporary security issues.ALT FAILS The alternative fails to offer a solution to policy-makers—this makes solvency impossible. Wars of prevention. if only to be decried. of course.

for example.co. am I asking George to develop a "research project" along positivist lines. the Middle East. Zeppa. it may not be a whole lot worse than current realist approaches. No alternative to realism. 02 (Terry . International Relations and the third debate. Srebrenica. or East Timor. Indeed. Bihac. Ogoniland.110 Until a fundamental change in human nature occurs. I suspect. 79-80) In fact. received a great deal of criticism from the international community. How will internecine conflict be managed? How do postmodernists like George go about managing conflict between marginalized groups whose "voices" collide? It is one thing to talk about the failure of current realist thinking. and proved wanting.109 Neither has the end of the Cold War showed any sign that such conflict will end. realism will continue to dominate the discipline of international relations. This is not a fatuous point. he would find that teaching the Bosnian Serbs about the dangers of modernism. there is little in his work to show that he has much appreciation for the kind of moral dilemmas that Augustine wrestled with in his early writings and that confront human beings every day. even hypothetically. the Haitian and Somalian cases are hardly in the same intransigent category as those of Bosnia or the Middle East. therefore. George wants to suggest that students of international politics are implicated in the trials and tribulations of international politics. warrior states. Post-modernism can provide no practical alternatives to the realist paradigm. Indeed. is concerned about the violent.iss. Tuzla. But even so. if we explore the depths of George's writings further. failing to engage with practical issues beyond platitudes and homilies. In this regard it has to be pointed out that from the end of World War II until 1992. True. On the contrary. but there is absolutely nothing in George's statements to suggest that he has discovered solutions to handle events in Bosnia. and KwaZulu-Natal all bear testimony to the folly of such a view. however. indeed. Goma. Australian. Institute for Defence Policy Published in African Security Review Vol 5 No 2.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence. We know what a realist world looks like (we are living in one!). Chechnya. Nor. And rightly so. Saying that they will is not enough. I am merely asking him to show how his position can make a difference to the "hard cases" in international politics. we find remarkable brevity in their scope.white picture of the study of international politics. hundreds of major conflicts around the world have left some twenty million human beings dead. Realism remains the single most reliable analytical framework through which to understand and evaluate global change. envy. dangerous and war-prone character of the present international system. George. that were George actually to confront some of the dilemmas that policymakers do on a daily basis. universalism and positivism. George would not have painted such a black-and. After all. and interventionism do apparently have a place in George's postmodem world. especially given that the outcomes of such strategies might cost people their lives . it is interesting to note that George gives conditional support for the actions of the United States in Haiti and Somalia "because on balance they gave people some hope where there was none" (George. Were this the case. But surely the problem of violence is not banished from the international arena once the global stranglehold of realist thinking is finally broken? It is important to try to determine the levels of violence that might be expected in a nonrealist world. the Americans pulled out of Somalia as soon as events took a turn for the worse and. but what does a post-modernist world look like? As long as humanity is motivated by hate. . especially for those who suffer the indignity of human suffering beneath tyrannous leaders. Human Security Project. greed and egotism. I wonder how much better off the international community would be if Jim George were put in charge of foreign affairs. My point is thus a simple one. lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia.ENDI 2010 Security K 131 Wave 1 REALISM GOOD Abandoning realism doesn’t eliminate global violence—alternative worldviews will be just as violent or worse O'Callaghan. Postmodern approaches look as impoverished in this regard as do realist perspectives. Despite George's pronouncements. By the end of 1993 a record of 53 wars were being waged in 37 countries across the globe.the alt results in civil war Hussein Solomon Senior Researcher. Brute force. The world is a cruel and unforgiving place. Would George have done the same thing? Would he have left the Taliban to their devices in light of their complicity in the events of September 11 ? Would he have left the Somalians to wallow in poverty and misery? Would he have been willing to sacrifice the lives of a number of young men and women (American. All of us should be willing. and asking them to be more tolerant and sensitive would not meet with much success . and greedy self-serving elites. in the process. ed: Jarvis. 1994:231). realism will continue to be invaluable to the policy-maker and the scholar. The most fundamental problem with post-modernism is that it assumes a more optimistic view of human nature. p. to accept such a role. 1996 http://www.html The post-modern/critical theory challenge to realism has been tested. power politics. or whatever) to subdue Aidid and his minions in order to restore social and political stability to Somalia? To be blunt. French. 2002. but the point is that George has not demonstrated how his views might make a meaningful difference.

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