1 Michael T. Pines (SBN 77771) 701 Palomar Airport Rd. Ste. 300 2 Carlsbad, Ca.

92011 Telephone: 760-453-0131 3 Facsimile: 760-301-0093 4 Email: michaeltpines@gmail.com 5 Inactive Attorney for Plaintiff In Pro Per 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. COMPLAINT DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

8 MICHAEL T. PINES, an individual; 9 10 v. 11 CITY OF CARLSBAD, PAUL EDMONSON, CITY OF SIMI VALLEY, 12 CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, COUNTY 13 OF SAN DIEGO 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendants. Plaintiff,


1 2

OVERVIEW The financial institutions and their co-conspirator loan servicers, real estate investors, real

3 estate brokers, and attorneys (Collectively “Banks”) have turned law enforcement into criminals. 4 Law enforcement knowingly engages in a common practice of violating the law. 5 People are being wrongfully evicted from their homes in the millions. Instead or protecting

6 citizens from this criminal conduct, law enforcement aids and abets it and even arrests the victims 7 instead of the criminals. 8 Plaintiff is a public figure and reputed to be one of the original experts in foreclosure and

9 related law and one of four attorneys that originated legal and public movements against the 10 “Banks”. 11 He has been arrested on numerous occasions for perfectly legal activities and never

12 prosecuted. 13 Plantiff was also the subject of proceedings by the State Bar which is corrupt and conspired

14 with the Banks. 15 16 1. JURISDICTION AND VENUE This Court has subject matter jurisdiction based upon federal question under 42

17 U.S.C. §1983. This is an action asserting violations of federal statutes commonly known as the Civil 18 Rights Act, with additional claims under California law. These claims all arise out of the same 19 controversy and sequence of events. 20 2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), in that all, or a

21 substantial part, of the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in this judicial 22 district as to the City of Carlsbad and the claims against the City of Simi Valley are related and it 23 would be in the interests of judicial economy to have the matter heard in one proceeding. 24 25 26 4. 3. This Court has jurisdiction over state claims by virtue of pendant jurisdiction. PARTIES Plaintiff, Michael T. Pines, is an individual with his principal residence and place

27 of business in San Diego County, California. 28




Defendant City of Carlsbad, is a city which has a policy, custom, and practice of

2 illegally aiding and abetting in the criminal eviction of residents from their homes and arresting 3 victims instead of crminals. 4 6. Defendant Paul Edmonson is an assistant City Attorney for the City of Carlsbad

5 who knowingly and intentionally engaged in acts or omissions to aid and abet criminal conduct. 6 7. Defendant City of Simi Valley, is a city which has a policy, custom, and practice

7 of illegally aiding and abetting in the criminal eviction of residents from their homes. 8 8. Defendant Newport Beach, is a city which has a policy, custom, and practice of

9 illegally aiding and abetting in the criminal eviction of residents from their homes. 10 9. Defendant State Bar of Califonia has policies, practices, and customs that violate

11 the law. and intentionally engaged in acts or omissions to aid and abet criminal conduct. 12 10. Defendant County of San Diego, is a county which has a policy, custom, and

13 practice of illegally aiding and abetting in the criminal eviction of residents from their homes. 14 15 16 12. 11. Each Defendant aided and abetted the Banks in criminal activity. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS The core of this action arises out of the biggest criminal fraud in history –

17 predatory lending, the unlawful securitization of real proerty loans, and criminal fraud in real estate 18 loan servicing and collection. 19 20 13. Predatory Lending It is of such common knowledge that the Court can take judicial notice of the

21 fact that the entire nation was victimized by Pedatory Lending. 22 14. The specific facts are set forth in, “The Monster, How A Gang of Pedatory

23 Lenders And Wall Street Bankers Fleeced America – And Spawned A Global Crisis, Michael W. 24 Hudson, Times Books, Henry Holt and Co. LLC., 2010 (“Monster”). 25 26 27 28


Monster is complete with legal citations, annotations, and irrefutable legal proof.


1 2 16.

Securitization Real property loans throughout the United States were securitized in the

3 “RMBS” market (Residential Mortgage Backed Securites) and the “CMBS” market (Commercial 4 Mortage Backed Securites), 5 17. As is typical when a loan is securitized, the funds Property Owners borrowed

6 did not come from any source that Property Owners could readily identify. Instead, the money came 7 from “Investors,” the identity of whom was concealed by those involved in originating the loan 8 (“Originators”). Notably, Investors all over the world who actually loaned Property Owners money 9 in the first place have filed countless of their own legal actions based at least in part on the very 10 same allegations of predatory lending Property Owners were subjected to. Some examples are: New 11 Orleans Employees’ Retirement System et al v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, et al., 12 United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, Case No: 2:09-cv-0013413 MJPE. Even quasi-federal agencies that invested are filing actions. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan 14 Bank of San Francisco v. Credit Suisse, CGC-10-497840 and Federal Home Loan Bank of San 15 Francisco v Deutsche Bank, CGC-10-497839, San Francisco Superior Court (collectively all of the 16 above investor actions are the “Investor Cases”). The Federal Home Loan Bank of New York, 17 reputed to be the largest and most powerful banking institution in the world has publicly it’s 18 intention to file similar suit against Bank of America. The U.S. Government has also filed suit. 19 18. Even before the loans were made, the “Securitizers” had planned and arranged to

20 securitize the loans. In the course of securitizing the loans, Securitizers had a practice of taking more 21 money from the Investors than was loaned to the Property Owners and the Investors. In addition, 22 there were usually “credit enhancements” which could take several forms including such things as 23 “excess spreads”, over collateralization, reserve accounts, surety bonds, wrapped securities, letters of 24 credit, and cash collateral accounts. (See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_enhancement for a 25 more detailed description). The well-known problems with American International Group (AIG) 26 relate to credit enhancements. Both the Property Owners and the Investors have claims to the credit 27 enhancement funds as well as undisclosed fees taken by the Originators and Securitizers and 28 possible credits and offsets for other items.




As to Property Owners, such funds should be credited against their loans. But it

2 is even worse. For example, according to Property Owners’ records they overpaid at least tens of 3 thousands of dollars were not actually owed. Property Owners allege that once a proper accounting 4 is done and proper credits applied, it will be shown that Property Owners will owe nothing on their 5 loans making the unlawful detainer action used to evict them simply a part of the ongoing fraud. The 6 Defendants had actual knowledge of this, yet, Defendants decided to aid and abet in the fraud. 7 8 20. Securitization Of Mortgage Loans Including Property Owners Securitization is intentionally complex and the details and even some of the

9 mathematical calculations involved cannot be succinctly set forth in a complaint. 10 21. As set forth in the Investor Cases, the securities that the “Securitizers” (anyone

11 involved in securitization) sold are so-called asset-backed securities, or "ABS," created in a process 12 known as securitization. More specifically, they involved a complex financial instrument product 13 known generically in the securities industry as collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”). “Synthetic” 14 CDOs are even more complex instruments that are “derivatives” based only indirectly on the CDOs 15 (i.e., Credit Default Swaps). 16 22. Securitization begins with the sale of bonds to Investors (usually they are sold

17 “forward”) meaning they are sold to the investors before the Investors’ funds are given to mortgage 18 borrowers such as the Property Owners. Only some of the funds were then used to fund loans such 19 as Property Owners. Investors were led to believe all of their funds except for reasonable fees were 20 forwarded, but this was false. 21 23. The entities involved in making the loans are known as the Originators. The

22 process by which the Originators decide whether or not to make particular loans is known as the 23 underwriting of loans. During the loan underwriting process, representations were made to the 24 Investors that the originators would apply various criteria to try to ensure that the loan will be repaid. 25 However, they did not do so and instead, the way the securitization scheme was structured, it was 26 actually in the best interests of the “Securitizers” (including Originators) for the loans to fail. They 27 were clearly not acting with the interests of Property Owners or the Investors in mind. 28




Until the loans are securitized, the borrowers on the loans sometimes make their

2 loan payments to an Originator, but this may never occur or only be for a very short time. 3 Collectively, the payments on the loans are known as the cash flow from the loans. 4 25. A large number of loans, often of a similar type, were supposed to be grouped

5 into a collateral pool. The Originator of those loans claims it sells them (and, with them, the right to 6 receive the cash flow) to a special purpose vehicle called a trust by the Securitizers. The trust is 7 supposed to pay the Originator cash for the loans. As mentioned, the trust raises the cash to pay for 8 the loans by selling bonds, in the form of certificates, to Investors. Each certificate purportedly 9 entitles its holder to an agreed part of the cash flow from the loans in the collateral pool. 10 26. There are tranches of investment bonds sold. Typically, “Tranche A” is a veneer

11 of conventional mortgages where the borrowers appear creditworthy. Other tranches had much less 12 credit worthy borrowers. Using the creditworthy borrowers, the Securitizers obtained ratings on the 13 bonds that were inaccurate at best. Securitizers conspired with the rating agencies to mislead 14 investors. Thus, schematically, these are some of the steps in a securitization in no specific order: 15 16 17 18 “safe”. 19 20 21 d. e. f. Investors pay money to the trust. The trust issues certificates to the Investors. The trust pays money to the parties up the chain toward the borrower/property owner a. b. c. Investments are created for Investors usually in the form of Bonds. Credit Enhancements are obtained. Rating agencies are provided misleading information and paid to rate the Bonds as

22 through the Originators. 23 g. Only part of the funds are used to fund mortgage loans such as the one made to

24 Property Owners. 25 h. The rest of the money is kept by the Originators and Securitizers in the scheme. In

26 other words, by way of example, the Investors might think they are funding a loan for $1 million, 27 however, only $500,000 is actually loaned to borrowers such as the Property Owners, and the 28 Securitizers keep the rest through a complex series of transactions.


1 2 3 pools. 4


The Originator and Securitizers plan in advance for the loans to default.

j. Loans made to persons like Property Owners are purportedly placed into one or more


The Originator was supposed to assign to the trust the loans and in particular the

5 promissory notes, which were to be placed into a collateral pool, including the right to receive the 6 cash, but a proper assignment/transfer was never done. 7 l. The trust is supposed to collect cash flow from payments on the loans in the collateral

8 pool; however it has no legal right to do so even under the lengthy, complex documents used in 9 securitization. 10 m. When the mortgage loans go into default, the Securitizers demand that payment be

11 made to the Investors by the “credit enhancements.” 12 n. In “Credit Default Swaps” the Securitizers also placed “bets” that the loans would not

13 pay off (as was planned) in order to cover the difference between what was loaned to borrowers such 14 as Plaintiff and what was funded by the Investors and make another hidden profit for the 15 Securitizers. According to some published reports, these unregistered securities were frequently 16 more than 30 times the principal on the mortgage loans (such as Property Owners’). Thus, if the 17 borrowers such as Property Owners did not perform on the loans, the Securitizers would make more 18 money than if they did. 19 o. After default, even though the mortgage loan is technically paid in full if a proper

20 accounting were done, and legally the Securitizers have no right to collect, the Securitizers, usually 21 through “servicers”, pretend the loan is still owed by the borrowers. They pretend and represent to 22 persons such as Property Owners money is owed on the loans to the original named “beneficiary” on 23 the deed of trust, and try to foreclose on the mortgage and steal the mortgaged real property from 24 borrowers such as the Property Owners. The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”) 25 was often used as a part of the scheme named as the “nominal beneficiary” to pretend it had the right 26 to transfer the mortgages and/or collect money from the borrowers such as Property Owners. 27 28




Securitizers hire law firms such as Defendants who know or should know collection

2 of loans such as the Subject Loan is improper and routinely conceal information concerning such to 3 the courts. (In Re Nosek) 4 q. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that these law firms are liable in class actions

5 under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 6 LP, et al., 130 S. Ct. 1605; decided April 21, 2010). 7 27. At the risk of being redundant, but also more specific and adding that the

8 taxpayers are paying for this, the order of things is usually as follows: 9 • The first transactions that occurred were the sale of securities to unsuspecting

10 investors. 11 • The second transaction that occurred was that the investor money was put into an

12 account at an investment banking firm. 13 • The third transaction was that the investment banker divided the money between fees

14 for itself and then distributing the funds to aggregators or a Depository Institution. 15 • The fourth transaction was the closing with the borrower. The loan was funded with

16 the money from the investor after deducting large undisclosed fees and also because of the disparity 17 between the interest payable to the investor and the interest payable by the borrower, a yield spread 18 was created, adding huge sums to what the investment banker took without disclosure to the 19 investors or the borrowers. 20 • The fifth was the assignment and acceptance of the loan generally into between 1 and

21 3 asset pools, each bearing distinctive language describing the pool such that they appeared to be 22 different assets than already presumed to exist in the first pool. 23 • The sixth was the receipt of insurance or counter-party payments on behalf of the

24 pool pursuant to the documents creating the securitization structure. 25 26 times. 27 • The eighth was the federal bailout payments and receipts allocable to the balances • The seventh was the re-securitization of the pooled assets between one and three

28 owed on the loans that were claimed to be part of the pool.



The ninth are the foreclosures by parties who never provided any money which is

2 often the original named beneficiary on the trust deed. 3 • In the alternative fraudulent and forged assignments were made, so it could be alleged

4 the law firm defendants represent investors (“robo-signing”) occurred which is currently the subject 5 of criminal investigations. 6 7 • • Lastly, attorneys are hired to evict the Home owners such as Property Owners. After eviction, the house is sold to a new Home owner who is also defrauded since

8 they are told none of this, and no one knows at this point where the proceeds from the sales go. 9 • It is unlikely it goes back to the government which has at least indirectly funded all

10 this through “bail outs”. 11 28. Securitization involves many documents. In broad brush, it involves the closing

12 documents between loan Originators, Servicers, Special Purpose Vehicles, Aggregators, etc. 13 including the Pooling and Service Agreements, the Assignment and Assumption Agreements, the 14 Master Service Agreements [if separate]. None of these include the borrower as party or references 15 any specific debtor or borrower because the debtor is unknown when the securitization structure is 16 created. 17 29. Each securitization has a Sponsor, a prime mover of the securitization.

18 Sometimes the sponsor is the Originator or an affiliate. In Originator-sponsored securitizations, the 19 collateral pool usually contains loans made by the Investors. Sometimes, the Sponsor may be an 20 investment bank. 21 30. The two important documents in the mortgage loan made to the Home

22 owner/borrower are the promissory note and the mortgage (usually a deed of trust as in Plaintiff’s 23 loan in California). 24 31. The Sponsor is supposed to arrange for title to the mortgage loans to be

25 transferred to an entity known as the Depositor, which then was supposed to transfer title to the loans 26 to the trust, including the promissory notes. 27 32. As mentioned, the assignment of the notes and mortgages never properly

28 occurred and this is the subject of countless lawsuits by the borrowers such as Property Owners.




The obligor of the certificates in a securitization is supposed to be the trust that

2 purchases the loans in the collateral pool. However, this cannot be true because title to the mortgage 3 loans was never perfected. The trust is a mere conduit that has no power to do anything, and has no 4 real trustee. 5 34. The Pooling and Service Agreements provide certain time deadlines by which

6 transfers were to be made, and these were not met. 7 35. When a trust has no assets it cannot satisfy the liabilities of an issuer of securities

8 (the certificates). According to the Investor Cases, the law therefore treats the Depositor as the issuer 9 of an asset-backed certificate. 10 36. According to the Investor Cases, securities dealers, represented that they would

11 underwrite the sale of the certificates. Most important, securities underwriters provided to potential 12 investors the information that they need to decide whether to purchase certificates. 13 37. Because the cash flow from the loans in the collateral pool of a securitization is

14 purportedly the source of funds to pay the holders of the certificates issued by the trust, the credit 15 quality of those certificates, if this were true, would be dependent upon the credit quality of the loans 16 in the collateral pool. According to the Investor Cases, the most important information about the 17 credit quality of those loans is contained in the files that the Originator develops while making the 18 loans, the so-called loan files. For residential mortgage loans, each loan file normally contains the 19 information in such important documents as the borrower's application for the loan, credit reports on 20 the borrower, and an appraisal of the property that will secure the loan. 21 38. Collateral pools usually include thousands of loans. Instead of potential investors

22 individually reviewing thousands of loan files, the securities firms that would underwrite the sale of 23 the certificates in a securitization were supposedly responsible for gathering, verifying, and 24 presenting to potential investors the information about the credit quality of the loans that will be 25 deposited into the trust. 26 39. As was alleged in the Investor Cases, the Securitizers sold to the Investors

27 certificates in securitizations the information that was presented to Investors contained many false 28 statements that were material to the mortgage/loan transactions.


1 2 40.

Criminal Loan Collection The “Sevicers” of the subject loans are now under criminal investigation nation

3 wide and their criminal conduct is well documented and established. 4 5 41. Law Enforcement’s Role And That of The California State Bar Defendants are involved in law enforcement and/or admistrative regulation of

6 Plaintiff. 7 42. In arresting, searching, and seeking to impose discipline on Plaintiff, Defendants

8 and eacy of them have aided and abeted the Banks in their criminal conduct. 9 10 11 12 43. 44. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants For Violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above. Between about October 2010 to the current time, Plaintiff has been advising

13 Property Oweners they have the right to re-take possession of real property taken from them 14 illegally. 15 45. In some instances, Plaintiff accompanied clients to their property, often advised

16 law enforcement and/or the press ahead of time, and tried to, or did re-enter. 17 18 46. 47. On numerous occasions Plaintiff was arrested. In many instances this was after Defendants had actual knowledge that their

19 conduct was illegal and amounting to aiding and abetting others in criminal conduct. 20 48. The Defendants have policies and procedures in place and have for many years

21 that call for Defendants to routinely aid and abet in the theft of people’s real and personal property. 22 49. More specifically, Defendants through law enforcement, execute Writs Of

23 Possession they know were obtained through criminal fraud and have and continue to aid and abet 24 the criminal activity. This is true even after being put on actual notice that other law enforcement, 25 including but not limited to the Sheriff of Cook County Illinois has stoped and at least tried to 26 differentiate between lawful court orders and those basedon criminal conduct. 27 50. In arresting Plaintiff, Defendanst were themselves engaging in criminal conduct

28 and such arrests were completely unlawful and without probable cause.


1 2

51. 52.

Plaintiff has never been prosecuted criminally. As a proximate result, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages, and general

3 damages. 4 53. Defendants conduct was knowing, intentional, and malicious entitled Plaintiff to

5 punitive damages. 6 7 8 9 54. 55. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants For Unlawful Arrest) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above. The arrest of Plaintiff was wrongful and Plaintiff was damaged as set forth

10 above, entitling Plaintiff to damages. 11 12 13 14 56. 57. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants for Wrongful Search) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above. The search of Plaintiff was wrongful and Plaintiff was damaged as set forth

15 above, entitling Plaintiff to damages. 16 17 18 19 58. 59. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants for Negligence) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above. The arrest and search of Plaintiff was wrongful and Plaintiff was damaged as set

20 forth above, entitling Plaintiff to damages for negligence. 21 22 23 24 60. 61. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants For Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above. The search of Plaintiff was wrongful and Plaintiff was damaged as set forth

25 above, entitling Plaintiff to damages. 26 27 28

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Against All Defendants For Violations Of California Business & Professions Code § 17200) 62. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained above. 11



Defendants committed unlawful, unfair and/or fraudulent business practices, as

2 defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17200, by engaging in unlawful, unfair and 3 fraudulent business practices as alleged herein. 4 64. As a result of Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiffs have suffered various damages and

5 injuries according to proof at trial. 6 65. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from engaging in unfair

7 business practices described herein.Plaintiff further seeks costs of suit, reasonable attorneys’ fees, 8 and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 9 PRAYER 10 11 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, inclusive, as follows: 1. For an order requiring Defendants to show cause, if any, why they should not be

12 enjoined as set forth below, during the pendency of the action; 13 3. For a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction preventing

14 Defendants, or anyone acting in concert with them, from aiding and abetting the Banks in their 15 criminal conduct to wrongfully evict property owners; 16 17 4. 5. For an order stating Defendants engaged in unfair business practices; For damages, and injunctive relief under California’s common and statutory law of

18 unfair business practices; 19 20 at trial; 21 7. For exemplary damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants’ 6. For compensatory and statutory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs according to proof

22 misconduct; 23 8. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

24 Respectfully submitted, 25 26 27 28


1 Dated: 2 3 4 5

May 4, 2011



/s/ Michael T. Pines Michael T. Pines Inactive Attorney for Plaintiff In Pro Per

6 A JURY TRIAL IS DEMANDED 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28


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