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Author(s): G. A. J. Rogers
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1978), pp. 217-232
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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LOCKE'S ESSAY AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA
BY G. A. J. ROGERS*
I. Introduction.
There is a standard picture of the relationship between John Locke
and Isaac Newton which might be expressed in the following way:
Locke's intellectual and philosophical attitude was molded by what he
saw in the Newtonian achievement and was largely responsible for the
general tone and nature of Locke's philosophical position. According to
this view in the interaction between the two men Locke was the indebted
partner,learning much from his younger colleague, whilst Newton learnt
little, if anything, from the older man. It is indeed sometimes claimed
(see below) that Newton's Principia completely changed Locke's intel-
lectual stance, whilst Newton, it is assumed, was not greatly influenced
by Locke at all. Such opinions of the relation between Locke and
Newton are to be found amongst historians of science especially, though
philosophers too, writing on the history of their subject, have sometimes
been inclined to see the influence of Newton as very substantial. There
are many passages in commentaries on Locke and Newton which reveal
this attitude but I shall draw attention to only four, though all are
recent and reflect positions held by respected scholars. The first is taken
from the notes to Newton's Correspondence,Volume III, by H. W. Turn-
bull. Of Locke, Turnbull wrote: "JohnLocke (1632-1704), philosopher,
... He became a friend of Newton through reading the Principia and
he early introduced its philosophical principles into his writings. . . ."
The implication is clearly that there were specific Newtonian influences
to be found in Locke's work and that these influences were considerable.
The second example is taken from a broadcast discussion on Newton's
Principia between I. Bernard Cohen and Peter Laslett. Locke, Laslett
rightly said, read the Principia just after he had written the Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding. Laslett went on:
Locke, then, had writtena traditionalphilosopher'sreview of the world and
was preparingit for the press when he was suddenlyfaced with this astonish-
ing book of the greatestintellect amongsthis contemporariesand convinced
thathe didn'tunderstandthe naturalworldat all. The resultwas, in my view,
*
Support for research in connection with this paper was provided by a grant
from the Royal Society. I am very grateful to the following for their comments on
earlier versions of this paper: R. I. Aaron, A Rupert Hall, John Harrison, Peter
Laslett, D. T. Whiteside, and J. W. Yolton.
1 The Correspondence of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1959-), Vol. III, edited
by H. W. Turnbull, and J. F. Scott, 76.
217
218 G. A. J. ROGERS
that he wrote the very remarkable epistle to the reader in the Essay on Human
Understanding, in which he says: "I am only an under-labourer. Newton,
Huygens, are those who really understand the world. My function is to clear
away the rubbish. This is a complete revisal of the social and the intellectual
position of the philosopher. And this could be said to be historically the
beginning of the two cultures .. ."2
We shall turn later to a more detailed look at Laslett's statement. For
the moment, let us just note that once again we have the view expressed
that the Principia had a very substantial influence on Locke's philosophy.
Once again there is no suggestion that Locke's philosophy had any influ-
ence on Newton. This general position is summarized by A. R. and M. B.
Hall: Newton, they write, "is commonly regarded as furnishing the
scientific substratum of Locke's philosophy."3 It is a view from which
the authors do not dissent. My fourth example is taken from John
Herman Randall's The Career of Philosophy:
Locke's Essay stands with Newton's Principia as the fountainhead of British
and French thought in the eighteenth century, as a classic illustration of the
application of the Newtonian "geometrical" or "analytical" method to human
nature.4 . . . In point of fact, Locke assumed to begin with and without
question the whole of Newtonian science, both its verdict on the nature of
science and on the nature of the world.5
2
Published in The Listener (9 December, 1971), 792.
3 A.R. Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac
Newton (Cambridge, 1962), 81.
4 John Herman
Randall, Jr., The Career of Philosophy. Vol. I. From the Middle
5 Ibid., 601.
Ages to the Enlightenment (New York and London, 1962), 595.
5a In a
second, and subsequent papers, I shall argue that there was some mutual
influence, and suggest that Locke's philosophy may have had a positive influence
on Newton's own thought.
6
Recently James L. Axtell has done much to set the record straight and to
add to our knowledge of the interaction between Locke and Newton. His papers
on this are: "Locke, Newton, and the Elements of Natural Philosophy," Paeda-
gogica Europae, I (1965), 235-45; "Locke's Review of the Principia," Notes and
Records of the Royal Society of London, 20 (1965), 152-61; "Locke, Newton and
The Two Cultures," John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge, 1969);
also the introduction to Axtell's edition of Locke's Educational Writings (Cam-
bridge, 1968). I do not always share Axtell's conclusions, however. J. E. McGuire
in his writings on Newton has also noticed that Locke may well have been an
influence upon Newton's thought. Thus, in his "The Origin of Newton's Doctrine
of Essential Qualities," Centaurus, 12 (1968), 238-39, McGuire suggests that
LOCKE'S ESSA Y AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA 219
Locke may well have modified Newton's views on the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities. See as well McGuire, "Atoms and the 'Analogy of Nature':
Newton's Third Rule of Philosophizing," Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, 1 (1970), esp. 32-35.
7 I
give three examples where the lack of proper dating has led to either a flat
mistake or a wrong emphasis about the connection between Locke and Newton.
Example 1. In his Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations
(Cambridge, 1917, reprinted in 1960) J. Gibson, in discussing Locke's views on
space, wrote: "Since the distinction between 'space in itself', as something 'uniform
and boundless', and the extension of body which is presented to us in sense per-
ception, can hardly be regarded as the direct product of Locke's own principles,
it is natural to look for some external influence to account for the doctrine of the
Essay. Now we know that Locke was a diligent student of the less mathematical
portions of Newton's Principia, which was published in 1686, four years before
the Essay. We can hardly, it would seem, be wrong in connecting Locke's recently
acquired views about 'space in itself' with Newton's exposition of 'absolute space'
. ." (251). But we now know that this distinction was made by Locke as early
as 1676. It is to be found in his journal entry for March 27th. This is now pub-
lished in An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, Together With Excerpts from his
Journals, edited by R. I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford, 1936), 77. Gibson
assumed that Locke had read the Principia when he wrote Essay, II, 15, but it
had not then even been published.
Example 2. In his Isaac Newton (Clarendon Biographies, Oxford, 1967) J. D.
North writes: "The Opticks, on the other hand, was tolerably easy reading, and,
strangely enough, it was through this work that many had their only first-hand
220 G. A. J. ROGERS
encounter with Newton's thoughts on gravitation. John Locke, the philosopher, was
much influenced by it ..." (24). As we have noted above, the Opticks was not
published until just before Locke's death. The ultimate source for North's view is
probably the passage from Desaguliers, quoted p. 7. See also note 31 below.
Example 3. Jonathan Bennett, in his Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Central Themes
(Oxford, 1971) writes: "Locke inherited from Descartes, or borrowed from Newton
and Boyle, a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities" (89). The
distinction is made by Locke as early as 1671 (cf. An Early Draft, 73-74). There
is no reason to believe that Locke was influenced by Newton at all in his formula-
tion of the distinction.
8 The earlier 1671 Draft
(Draft A) is in the Houghton Library, Harvard
University. The later 1671 Draft (Draft B) is in the Bodleian Library. The draft
of 1685 is in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York. There is a different ver-
sion of the first draft in the Shaftsbury Papers in the Public Record Office. (Cf.
Peter Laslett in Mind [Jan. 1952], 89-92.) On all of these drafts see Aaron, John
Locke (Third edition, Oxford, 1971), 50-73. Draft A has been published in An
Early Draft of Locke's Essay Together with Excerpts from his Journals, edited by
R. I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford, 1936). Draft B has also been published as
An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent, edited
by Benjamin Rand (Cambridge, Mass., 1931). Draft C has not yet been published,
but is to be included in the forth-coming volume Drafts for An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch in The Clarendon Edition of
the Works of John Locke series.
LOCKE'S ESSAY AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA 221
till since this last partwas done, I find the ill effectsof writingin patchesand
at distanttimes as this whole essay has been.9
We do not possess the draft which Clarke received from Locke.1? But
Draft C does tell us quite a lot about the composition of the Essay in its
later stages even though it is a draft of only the first two books. What it
indicates in a very clear way is that on substantial points the published
work argued the same position as that put forward by Locke in 1685.
There are differences, some of them of considerable interest. But the
differences which do exist show no sign at all of the impact on Locke of
reading Newton's Principia. The only recognition accorded Newton in
the first edition of the Essay is in the famous "Epistle to the Reader"
where Locke clearly places Newton as the greatest among contemporary
scientists.
That Locke does not accord Newton any other recognition shows
that whilst he was revising the Essay for publication Locke was not at
all inclined to alter it to take account of the Principia." In no way did
Locke feel that Newton's work called into question any parts of his major
arguments. Nor can Locke's attitude be explained by either his unfamil-
iarity with, or lack of understanding of, the Principia. (Both of these
points are taken up below.) If there are any conflicts between what is
said in the Essay and what is said in the Principia then it is fairly safe to
assume that either Locke did not notice them or he did not believe that
they were worth following up. There is in fact only one major point of
potential conflict in the two books and that is in the respective treatment
each gives to the notions of space and time. Locke never accepted
Newton's absolutist position on space.l2 It is a sign of some of the very
9 The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke, ed. Benjamin Rand
(London, 1927), 177.
10Here I follow Aaron in believing that Draft C as we have it was not the
draft which Clarke received from Locke. It is likely that Draft C never reached
England. Cf. Aaron, John Locke, 57.
11We know that Locke was indeed revising the Essay as late as 1689 for that
is the date which appears in Essay, II, XIV, 30. The passage reads: "Hence we see
that some men imagine the duration of the world from its first existence to this
present year 1689 to have been 5639 years .. ." (Quotations from the Essay will
either be from the first edition of 1690, as this one is, or from the Everyman edition,
edited by John W. Yolton [London, 1961], 2 vols.) Since commencing work on
this paper the Clarendon Edition of Locke's Essay, edited by P. H. Nidditch has
been published and it has proved an invaluable guide to the Essay and its history.
In Draft C Locke had written: "Hence we see that some men imagin ye duration
of ye world from its first existence to this present year 1671 to have been 5619
years...." Cf. also Draft B ? 120. It is odd that Locke does not make the right
correction to the figure for the duration of the world.
12 Aaron
(op. cit., 156f.) has already drawn attention to the fact that it is
wrong to view Locke's account of space as Newtonian, and he rightly places
important weight on the discussions of space in the drafts of the Essay and in
222 G. A. J. ROGERS
Locke's journals. Another potential point of conflict was not apparent from the
first edition of the Principia. That was their differing views on the primary-
secondary quality distinction. This topic would require a separate paper, but see
McGuire's paper cited in Note 6. In the first edition of the Principia Newton does
not include what in the second edition was to become Rule III.
13 On this see G. A. J. Rogers, "Locke, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists
on Innate Ideas," JHI (April 1979).
14 In the Scholium to Definition VIII Newton
begins: "Hitherto I have laid
down the definitions of such words as are less known, and explained the sense in
which I would have them to be understood in the following discourse. I do not
define time, space, place, and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must
observe, that the common people conceive those quantities under no other notions
but from the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain
prejudices, for the removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish them into
absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common." Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy, Andrew Motte's translation revised by Florian
Cajori (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1934), 6. It might be said that, roughly,
Locke's view of space and time was, and remained, the view of the "common
people." Whether the common people were wrong was to be much debated in the
ensuing centuries. It is of some significance that Locke's notes, which he made in
September 1687 and March 1688, and which are preserved in the Bodleian Library
(Mss. Locke c.33, fols. 19-20 and c.31 fols. 99-100) make no reference to Newton's
commitment to absolute space and time. An account of the differing views of Locke
and Newton on space and time, and their import, is something that I plan to give
elsewhere. Dr. D. T. Whiteside has pointed out to me that the commitment to
LOCKE'S ESSAY AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA 223
Descartes that matter and space were the same thing. It was just one
among very many positions which they held in common.15
III. Locke's Scientific Background. 6
We can say with confidence that the first edition of Locke's great
work was not in any sense influenced by Newton. But what then of
Laslett's statement that reading the Principia convinced Locke that he
did not understandthe natural world at all? (Quoted above, Section I).
The fact is that Laslett offered us no evidence for this view. It is my
belief that the evidence points in another direction. The fact is that Locke
was acknowledged by his contemporaries to be an excellent and learned
virtuoso. By the 1680's he had behind him a substantial record in sci-
entific activity. It is not my intention to give a detailed account of Locke's
many scientific qualifications, but some key points are these. Locke had
been educated at Oxford just at the time when that university was very
much concerned with the new science centered on the group around John
Wilkins at Wadham College. Locke went up to Christ Church in 1652.
In the years that he was there he was to become well acquainted with
many of the very great scientists of the seventeenth century including
Robert Boyle, John Wilkins, Thomas Willis, John Wallis, Robert Hooke,
David Thomas, and Richard Lower. More important still, he was to
become a collaborator with some of the most distinguished. From
Locke's notebooks of the period we learn that even as an undergraduate
he was beginning to take a keen interest in experimental physiology,
probably through the influence of the physician Richard Lower.17 His
interestin medicine developed rapidly;he attended the lecturesof Thomas
Willis and seriously considered taking up medicine professionally. Later
Locke's views on this see especially Essay II, XIII 12-16. Newton's views
on matter were not clearly formulated in the first edition of the Principia. Rule III
of the Regulae of the second edition has no corresponding hypothesis in the first
edition, but Newton's rejection of the Cartesian position is manifest, and was of long
standing. It is, for example, powerfully present in his paper De Gravitatione et
Aequipondio Fluidorum, probably written between 1664 and 1668. Cf. A. R. Hall
and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge,
1962), 89-121.
16 There has in recent
years been much important work done on the scientific
background to Locke's thought. Particularly relevant are: Maurice Cranston, John
Locke. A Biography (London, 1957), Kenneth Dewhurst, John Locke (1632-
1704): Physician and Philosopher. A Medical Biography (London, 1963); the
many articles by Dewhurst on Locke's medical researches too numerous to list
here; the three articles by Axtell already cited.
17
Bodleian Library, MS Locke e4.
224 G. A. J. ROGERS
he was to collaborate with Lower when the latter was making some of
his most importantexperiments,'8and later still Locke was to collaborate
with Thomas Sydenham.19Locke, indeed, was a distinguished physician,
but his interest in science was by no means confined to medicine.
Medicine required chemistry and this Locke set out to master.
Through his interest he soon became acquainted with Robert Boyle and
by 1663 they were actively working together on scientific projects. Boyle's
Memoirs for the Natural History of the Humane Blood (1683-4) is
addressed to "the very Ingenious and Learned Doctor J. L."20
Later Newton and Locke were to be of mutual assistance in chemistry.
When Newton showed interest in an experiment of Boyle's involved
some "red earth" Locke sent him some, more, in fact, than Newton
required. Newton wrote to Locke:
You have sent much more earththan I expected. For I desiredonly a speci-
men, having no inclinationto prosecutethe process. For in good earnest I
have no opinion of it. But since you have a mind to prosecuteit I shall be
glad to assist you all I can ....21
There is undoubtedly a question-markover Locke's early mastery of
mathematics, physics, and astronomy. Although Fox Bourne reports
Locke as having attended lecture courses by both John Wallis and Seth
Ward,22we have no clear evidence of how much Locke really knew in
these areas. Axtell, however, has gone a long way to establishing that
Locke was capable of following much of the Principia when it was first
published23and has certainly supplied sufficient evidence for rejecting
the traditional picture of Locke as a man totally ignorant of the mathe-
matical sciences. It is often taken as conclusive evidence of Locke's lack
of mathematical knowledge that he is said to have consulted Huygens as
to whether the proofs in the Principia were mathematically sound.24 But
in the light of Axtell's work this allegation must surely be treated with
caution. It is well worth remembering that several other contemporaries
of Newton admitted they could not follow all his mathematics, and some
of those were mathematicians. David Gregory, later to be Professor of
Mathematics in Edinburgh, wrote to Newton in September 1687 con-
gratulating him on the Principia, but noting that "few would understand
30
Despite my admiration for his important contributions to a correct under-
standing of the relation between Locke and Newton I cannot therefore agree with
Axtell's judgement that in the Essay "there is considerable evidence-both internal
and external-that Locke was deeply influenced by Newton's achievements, but
especially by the whole methodology that lay behind the Newtonian synthesis."
("Locke's Review of the Principia," 159-60.) It is sometimes suggested that the
really important effect of the Principia on Locke was that it made him aware of
the power of mathematical deduction, and therefore of deduction generally. I can
ifind no support for this in the Essay, and evidence to the contrary. Those passages
in the Essay where Locke speaks of the power of deductive knowledge are often
clearly anticipated in drafts of the Essay written in 1671. Thus in Essay IV, II, 9-
14, Locke says that "demonstration" (i.e., deductive reasoning as exhibited in
geometry) can be carried into other areas. This argument is anticipated in Draft
B, ? 45 and 46.
31 As well as in the Desaguliers reference, already cited in Note 24, the story
is reported in Sir David Brewster's Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries
of Sir Isaac Newton, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1815), I, 339.
228 G. A. J. ROGERS
Huygens' attitude towards the Principia was judicial in his Discours sur la
32
cause de la Pesanteur (1690) but he was less polite in a letter to Leibniz. Cf.
Oeuvres completes de Christiaan Huygens publiees par le Societe hollandaise des
Sciences (The Hague, 1888-1950, 22 vols.), IX, 538.
33When Locke first read the Principia in 1687, he was in Rotterdam. Huygens
was also then in Holland, and it is probable that they met there. It is possible that
they first met much earlier, in 1677, when they were both in Paris. It may be
objected that what is not possible is to understand the Principia without understand-
ing the mathematics, for the simple and sufficient reason that it is a work of
mathematics and nothing else. It must, however, be remembered that Desaguliers
was himself attempting to show that it was possible to understand Newton's philos-
ophy without understanding mathematics, and he tells the story about Locke
precisely to illustrate that possibility.
34Bibliotheque Universelle & Historique de l'Annee 1688, 439. The review
which covers pages 436-450 is over 2000 words in length. For contrasting assess-
ments of it see Axtell, "Locke's Review of the 'Principia'," cited in Note 6, and
Cohen, An Introduction to Newton's 'Principia', cited in Note 27, 145-47. Although
LOCKE'S ESSAY AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA 229
This underlines the fact that Locke was well aware that Newton was
basing his argument on what he took to be well established empirical
concepts, once again entirely in keeping with the empiricist approach
of Locke himself.
The suggestion is, therefore, that what Locke found in the Principia
was the exemplification of a method to which he himself already sub-
scribed. He already believed that a combination of observation, general-
ization or induction, and deduction was the only route to knowledge of
nature and that the Principia exhibited just that method in its most
fruitful manner.35 It was thus perfectly natural for him to turn to it as
an example when he wished to stress that, contrary to the Ramist tradi-
tion, but entirely in keeping with that of Bacon, there was a great differ-
ence between "the method of acquiringknowledge and of communicating,
between the method of raising any science and that of teaching it to others
as far as it is advanced."36It was not on maxims that Newton's science
rested, said Locke, but on showing by a chain of related ideas how one
idea was necessarily connected to another.
Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated
several propositions,which are so many new truthsbefore unknownto the
world, and are further advances in mathematicalknowledge;but, for the
discovery of these, it was not the general maxims, What is, is or The whole is
biggerthan a part, or the like that helped him.... but by findingout inter-
mediate ideas that showed the agreementor disagreementof the ideas as
expressedin the propositionshe demonstrated.37
these assessments have rather different objectives I would tend to support Axtell's
rather than Cohen's. Cohen rather underplays the function of the review in the
Bibliotheque Universelle. It must be remembered that Locke was in a sense trying
to sell the Principia to a Cartesian-orientated public, who were, nevertheless,
unlikely in general to be mathematically sophisticated. It is worth emphasizing
that the non-mathematician, Locke, grasps immediately a crucial aspect of Newton's
presentation which, notoriously, the mathematician Roger Cotes, in his Preface to
the second edition of the Principia, completely missed, much to the annoyance of
Newton. It is possible to doubt that Locke was the author of the review for there
is no conclusive final evidence that he did write it. However, as Axtell argues,
the comparison between Locke's manuscript notes and the published review, the
presence of Locke in Holland, the known fact that he did write reviews for the
journal, and the lack of any other candidate makes quite a strong case.
35 It is worth
underlining the fact that mathematics was for Locke not a
discipline which had a unique method. It was exactly on a par with any other
deductive argument which moved from idea to idea via necessary connection. It
was precisely because of this that Locke believed that it was in theory possible to
have deductive systems of physics in areas which were not mathematical. Once
this is taken, then the otherwise puzzling remarks in Essay, IV, II, 9 ff. become clear.
36 Essay, IV, VII, 11. On the Ramist tradition and on Bacon see, for
example,
Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge,
1974) esp. chapters 1, 2, and 3.
37
Essay, IV, VII, 11.
230 G. A. J. ROGERS
It would thus appear that to read the Principia was not for Locke any
sort of traumatic experience. Quite the contrary. It confirmed for him
all his own methodological conclusions. The only way in which natural
philosophy could be advanced was by the methods of observation and
deduction, and, although there were definite limits to what could be
learnt by the application of such techniques, Newton had shown that
they were, nevertheless, capable of producing the most wonderful results.
The Principia was for Locke the vindication of a general methodological
approach to which he had subscribed for perhaps twenty years.
IV. Locke and Newton: their personal acquaintance.
There is no evidence to suggest that Locke met Newton prior to the
former's return from Holland in 1689 after his absence since 1683. It
is, however, just possible that they did meet before Locke's departure.
Locke was elected Fellow of the Royal Society in 1668 and remained
in London until November 1675, except for a month which he spent in
France. Newton was elected a Fellow in January 1671/2, but he had
been in London in 1669 and in February 1675. Whether on either of
these occasions they did actually meet can only be a matter of conjecture.
I have been able to uncover only one piece of documentary evidence
which connects them prior to Locke's stay in Holland. In one of Locke's
commonplace books for the years 1676-94 there occurs the following
entry: "Aqua the weight of water to air is as 950 to one. Mr. Newton."38
The entry is dated 1680. But it is unlikely that this information was
conveyed personally to Locke from Newton. As it appears to have no
published source, it is probable, that it was conveyed to Locke via a
third party, and the most likely third party is Robert Boyle with whom
Newton was then in correspondence, and with whom Locke was then
collaborating.39 By this stage Locke would already be familiar with
Newton's work in optics which had been published in the Royal Society
Transactions in 1672.
Whatever the truth about their earlier contact, Locke and Newton
did not become friends until much later, for it was not until after Locke's
return from Holland at the beginning of 1689 that they became well
38
Bodleian Library, MS Locke C.42A f.244.
39 AlthoughBoyle is the most probable source he is not the only possible one.
Isaac Barrow was another. Locke met Barrow in 1672 and Barrow gave Locke a
copy of his Lectiones Geometricae (1670). The book is inscribed "Ex Dono
Authoris Viri cujus eruditiones pars minima est mathesis laudis doctrina." On this
see John Harrison and Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke, 2nd ed. (Oxford,
1971), 44-73. It is totally unlikely that Barrow would have conveyed this informa-
tion from Newton to Locke, but Barrow's acquaintance with Locke at this stage
establishes a contact between Locke and Trinity College. For Barrow's influence
on Newton's views on space and matter see E. W. Strong, "Barrow and Newton,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8(1970), 155-72.
LOCKE'S ESSAY AND NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA 231
40
Fully to document the claims made here in respect of the shared hostility to
Cartesian methodology and the shared support of the method in science which
found expression in the Royal Society would itself require a long paper. There
are, however, some brief pertinent remarks which may be made. Both Locke and
Newton rejected the Cartesian view that a theory in science can be accepted as
established if it can be shown that the theory is compatible with all known empirical
data. Descartes claimed in the Principles of Philosophy (Part IV Principle CCIV)
that "I believe that I have done all that is required of me if the causes I have
assigned are such that they correspond to all the phenomena manifested by
nature." It was precisely this type of hypothetical explanation, which found
expression in the work of many Cartesians, such as Rohault and Huygens, to which
Newton was so strongly opposed. Newton's rejection of this "hypothetical" method
not only found expression in the Regulae, the General Scholium of the Principia,
and the 31st Query of the Opticks, but also in his manuscripts. The following two
passages are, I believe, representative examples, both taken from drafts for the
later Queries: 1. "Could all the phenomena of nature be (evidently) deduced from
only three or four general suppositions there might be great reason to allow those
suppositions to be true: but if for explaining every new Phenomenon you make a
new Hypothesis if you suppose yt ye particles of Air are of such a figure size and
frame, those of water of such another, those of vitriol of such another, those of
Quicksilver of such another, those of flame of such another, those of Magnetick
effluvia of such another. If you suppose that light consists in such a motion pres-
sion or force and that its various colours, are made by such & such variations of
the motion & so of other things: your Philosophy will be nothing else than a
systeme of Hypotheses. And what certainty can there be in a Philosophy wch
consists in as many Hypotheses as there are Phaenomena to be explained. To
explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age.
Tis much better to do a little with certainty & leave the rest for others that come
after, than to explain all things by conjecture without making sure of anything:
And there is no other way of doing any thing with certainty than by drawing con-
232 G. A. J. ROGERS
clusions from experiments & phaenomena untill you come at general Principles
& then from those Principles giving an account of Nature. Whatever is certain in
Philosophy is owing to this method & nothing can be done without it." (U.L.C.
Add MS. 3970 f.479.)
2. ". .. if without deriving the properties of things from Phaenomena you feign
Hypotheses & think by them to explain all nature you may make a plausible systeme
of Philosophy for getting your self a name, but your systeme will be little better
than a Romance." (U.L.C. Add MS. 3970 f.480.)
These quotations do not, of course, establish that Newton did in fact practice
the method he preached. There is mounting evidence that often he did not. See,
for example, R. S. Westfall, "Newton and the Fudge Factor," Science, 179 (1973);
D. T. Whiteside, "Newton's Lunar Theory: From High Hope to Disenchantment,"
Vistas in Astronomy, 19 317-28. But I believe that at least we can say that Newton's
"logic of justification," in contrast with his "logic of discovery," was entirely at one
with principles argued by Locke and widely accepted amongst the early members
of the Royal Society.
CALIFORNIA
Nature and the The Spirit of Laws
ian
~A s
\r* * Compendium of the First English Edition
Victori3an Togetherwith an English translation of
Imagination "An Essay on Causes Affecting Mind and
Characters" (1736-1743)
Edited by Montesquieu
U.C. Knoepflmacher Edited,with an Introduction,Notes, and Appendicesby