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(COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss HOUSING COURT DEPARTMENT EASTERN DIVISION REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, as Managing Agent for NEXTPAGE, LLC Plaintiff . DOCKET NO. 17-SP-4013 (“The Summary Process Action”) EYETTE GREEN, DASHAWNDA BARRETT and AHMED LEWIS Defendants JANET AVILA and DAVID E. BOUDREAU, SR. Plaintiffs ve DOCKET NO. 21-CV-0528 (“The Civil Action”) DR. BISOLA OJIKUTU, Executive Director of the Boston Public Health Commission, RITA NIEVES, as Interim Director and Agent of the Boston Public Health Commission, and KIM JANEY, as Acting Mayor of the City of Boston Defendants MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON THE DEFENDANTS’ MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS RELATIVE TO THIS COURT’S ORDER CONCERNING THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCABILITY OF THE ' EVICTION MORATORIUM IN THE CITY OF BOSTON BACKGROUND On August 31, 2021, the Boston Public Health Commission (“BPHC”), through its Interim Executive Director Rita Nieves, issued a Temporary Order Establishing an Eviction Moratorium in the City of Boston (“the Boston Moratorium”). On November 29, 2021, this Court issued an Order which determined that Paragraph 1 of the Boston Moratorium is invalid and unenforceable. The defendants promptly appealed. ‘Notwithstanding this Court’s finding that the BPHC lacks authority to issue a unilateral revocation of Massachusetts General Laws relative to evictions and utterly lacks authority to revoke this Court's power to enforce its judgments, the BPHC filed a motion to stay the enforcement of this Court’s Order pending appeal. The individual tenants involved in these ‘consolidated cases also filed motions to stay the enforcement of their cases (and the cases of all other tenants who may be facing imminent eviction) claiming “irreparable harm.” Finally, the City of Boston’ filed a motion to dismiss as to the City-related defendants on the asserted grounds that the BPHC — not the City - issued the moratorium, On December 8, 2021, all parties appeared for a hearing on all pending motions. This memorandum of decision addresses each of these motions. A. CITY OF BOSTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS ‘The City of Boston secks to be dismissed from this action claiming that it is not responsible for the Boston Moratorium insofar as that order was issued by the BPHC, an “independent commission.” This claim is belied by the City of Boston’s joinder in BPHC’s appeal, representations on the record by BPHC’s attorney that the BPHC is composed of persons appointed by the Mayor and governed by the City’s “Board of Health,” verbiage of the Boston Moratorium which states that the BPHC’s “Executive Director may seek the assistance of other City of Boston agencies in ensuring compliance with this order,”? and the signature line of ‘The Court shall hereafter refer to defendant “Kim Janey as Acting Mayor of Boston” and her suecesson(s) in interest as “the City of Boston.” a As shall be discussed later in this decision. The Boston Moratorium contains no enforcement mechanism. The only prescribed method of enforcement provided under the Boston Moratorium is the BPHC’s reliance on other City agencies to force landlords and constables into complying with the Boston Moratorium. This Court infers that these City agencies expected to coordinate with BPHC to enforce the Boston Moratorium. The plaintiffs argue that these agencies, lacking any prescribed power to enforce, were expected to use threats, intimidation or monetary 2 BPHC’s Executive Director which asserts identifies herself as “Interim Executive Director Boston Public Health Commission as Agent of the Board of Health.” To the extent that the BPHC’s Interim Executive Director claims to have been acting as an agent of the Board of Health, this Court could draw the conclusion that, if true, the Board of Health of the City of Boston - presumably under the governance of the Mayor of Boston - was the principal directing the agent to act on its behalf, ‘The City’s claim of non-involvement is further called into question by statements by the current elected Mayor of Boston widely disseminated in the print and broadcast media (which this Court could not avoid) that she was “disappointed with” this Court’s decision invalidating the Boston Moratorium and would likely seek to appeal it. (When asked during the hearing whether the current Mayor was aware that the City of Boston was seeking to be dismissed from this action, the attorney for the City of Boston said, “I don’t know. I can find out.”) ‘Whether the City of Boston, its Mayor, and its agencies bear responsibility for the issuance and enforcement of the Boston Moratorium is a material question of fact which cannot be determined in the absence of further litigation. ‘The City of Boston’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. b. THEBPHC AND CITY OF BOSTON’S MOTION TO STAY THIS COURT’S ORDER PENDING APPEAL Rule 6(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the issuance of stays pending appeal. Mass.Appellate Rule 6(a) is patterned on Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 which allows deprivations against property owners and constables to force compliance. The plaintiffs argue that this “in terrorem"” ‘mode of enforcement discouraged landlords from challenging the Boston Moratorium for months. 3 first the lower court, then the appellate court to grant such relief as may be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the appeal. A stay is not a matter of right, but “an exercise of judicial discretion,” and “[fJhe propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Virginian Ry Co. v. US., 272 US. 658, 672-673 (1926). Moreover, the party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion. Clinton v, Jones. 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). ‘The United States Supreme Court established the standard for determining whether a federal court should issue a stay of an order pending appeal. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987), This Court finds the Hilton standard applies here.? The factors which this Court shall consider are: (1) whether the stay applicants (BPH and the City of Boston) have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the BPHC and the City of Boston will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Hilton, at 776. Asto the first prong of the Hilton test, which requires a likelihood of suecess on the merits for motions for stay pending appeal, the BPHC and the City of Boston do not need to convince this dubious lower court judge that she will be overturned on appeal. That burden ‘would be nearly unachievable, Rather, these moving parties must establish that the appeal raises serious and di ficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat . ‘The U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts has relied om the Hilton factors in civil cases including, ‘Canterbury Liquors é& Pantry v. Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144, 149-52 (D. Mass, 1998).The Massachusetts Appeals Court has referred to the Hilton standard in deciding other cases. See ¢.g,, Cartledge v. Evans, 67 Mass.App.Ct 577, 579 (2006); Custom Blends, Inc, v. Pear}co of Boston, Inc., 64 Mass. App.Ct. 1108 (2005). unclear, See Exxon Corp. v. Esso Worker's Union, Inc., 963 F, Supp. 58, 60 (D. Mass. 1997); Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v, Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144, 149-52 (D. Mass. 1998). The BPHC and the City of Boston must present a substantial case on the merits when a serious egal question is involved and show that the bulance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Biochemists, Ine., 435 F.Supp.3"* 281 (1* Cir. 2020); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (Sth Cir. 1981) (citing Providence Joumal Co. v, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (Ist Cit. 1979) (“Where ... the denial ofa stay will utterly destroy the status quo, irreparably harming appellants, but the granting of a stay will cause relatively slight harm to appellee, appellants need not show an absolute probability of success in order to be entitled to a stay.”) See also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986); 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2904, at 503 & n.11 Qd ed. 1995 & Supp.1997). ‘The BPHC argues on Page 5 of its motion to stay that the issue of whether the BPHC had the authority to issue the Boston Moratorium “is novel and delves into uncharted legal territory.” ‘The BPHC further seems to argue that itis entitled to a stay so long as the BPHC’s appeal meets the bare criteria of being “meritorious,” i.e, “one which is worthy of judicial inquiry that is deserving of some investigation and discussion, and worthy of presentation to a court, not one which is sure of success.” (Cormmonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394, 403 (2020).] ‘This Court disagrees. The BPHC needs to do more than distinguish its appeal as not frivolous. Even if the BPHC has what could be defined as a “meritorious appeal” — one which requires some minimal showing of “one appellate issue of sufficient heft that would give an appellate court pause” and ultimately Jead to a “dialectic discussion among an appellate panel where both sides find some substantive support,” [Jd., at 404.], a meritorious appeal alone does not rise to the standard of “probability of success.” The BPHC has not presented a “substantial case” that demonstrates a “serious legal question.” In its oral argument, BPHC contended that ~ under compelling circumstances - it has the sweeping power to issue “reasonable regulations” which directly contradict and override Massachusetts laws and alter a court’s procedures. After making this broad claim, the BPHC could net cite to even one example of another “reasonable” regulation issued by the BPHC which has done so, From this Court's perspective, this is unsurprising. What is novel about the Boston Moratorium is not any issue of unsettled aw in “uncharted legal territory,” but rather the BPHC's bald overreach in issuing an Order which flies in the face of well-settled law. This Court finds nothing in Massachusetts General Laws or the Massachusetts Constitution which supports the BPHC’s position. “The second prong of the Hilton test ~ whether the BPHC and the City of Boston will be irreparably harmed absent a stay - is similarly unmet. Neither the BPHC nor the City offered anything suggesting that the'ageney or municipality would suffer any harm if the Boston Moratorium were not enforced. Indeed, the BPHC couid not describe to the Court how the Boston Moratorium was to be enforced, if it were enforceable. The plain language of the Enforcement section Boston Moratorium* contains no actual enforcement mechanism which could be applied (or stayed) by a Court. Nothing in the Boston Moratorium enforcement section suggests that a court should stop rendering judgments : ‘The Enforcement section of the Boston Moratorium states as follo “All reasonable efforts will be mace to secure voluntary compliance with this Order, however this Order ‘may be enforced through any and all mechanisms afforded by the authorizing statutes above, including an order of ‘court of competent jurisdiction. The Executive Director may seek the assistance of other City of Boston agencies in ensuring compliance with this order.” and issuing executions on those judgments. Nothing suggests that the courts must recall executions already issued. In reality, there is no directive within the plain language of the Boston Moratorium which instructs courts on what to do to enforce the Boston Moratorium. ° ‘To the extent that the Boston Moratorium is enforceable®, those who would be affected by “lack of enforcement” would be the City’s tenants who failed to prevail in their summary process cases. Nonetheless, even these tenants - whom the Boston Moratorium was intended to protect - would not suffer “irreparable harm.” All tenants continue to have the option to ask a court for a stay on the levy of the execution based on the particular exigencies of their cases, This Court routinely hears emergency motions to halt physical move-outs. Bach request for a stay is considered on its merits by a judge who crafts an order reflecting the circumstances of each case, This Court’s pattern and practice of hearing motions for a stay on a levy with ‘minimal notice would not change even if the “blanket” Boston Moratorium, which does not take into account the unique circumstances of each case, were not enforced, Moreover, this Court sees no “deprivation of tenants’ rights” here. Tenants in Massachusetts cannot be evicted without due process. Massachusetts law provides significant protections to tenants facing eviction, including the opportunity to assert defenses and counterclaims, to demand a trial by jury, and — in these COVID pandemic times — to assert the protections of Chapter 257 of the Acts of 2020. £ moral argument, BPHC’s attomey suggested forthe first time that this Court should “just stop issuing executions.” This “suggestion” is not contained in the plain language of the Boston Moratorium and is contradicted by BPHC’s memorandum in which it argues thatthe Boston Moratorium merely stays the levy on Executions. Even if the Boston Moratorium were within the power of the BPHC to issue and a court were bound to follow the directives of the BPHC concerning court operations (and not the other way around), this Court eannot be reasonably required to create an enforcement mechanisin where none exists. . ‘The various plaintiffs argue that the BPHC and the City have been able to enforce the Boston Moratorium ‘through veiled threats and intimidation. What they apparently mean by this is that the City’s agencies could retaliate by failing to issue licenses, permits, and commissions to homeowners and constables who “defy” the moratorium. 7 ‘Those who do not prevail in their summary process cases after going through the prescribed procedure normally have a reasonable expectation that they must move out or be moved out. These same tenants cannot be “harmed” where, as temporary beneficiaries of a stay ‘which was not within the power of the BPHC to grant, they received the gift of a stay, but will no longer be gifted a further indefinite stay. ‘The third prong of the Hilton test is whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding. The BPHC'argues that landlords are not being ‘“imeparably harmed” by the Boston Moratorium; they “merely” need to wait “temporarily” to levy on their Executions, This characterization of the Boston Moratorium’ s effect on landlords is rather disingenuous. ‘The Boston Moratorium has no end date, The expiration of the Boston Moratorium is not tied to any COVID-related metrics concerning numbers of COVID cases, severity of the illnesses, numbers of immunizations and the like. ‘The expiration of the Boston ‘Moratorium is apparently left to the sole discretion of the Executive Director of the BPHC, acting on whatever criteria she may decide to use, as no criteria are identified, More critically, as a result of the open-ended Boston Moratorium, landlords have no assurance that the remedy which they sought and was awarded by a court of law will be carried out, In this Court’s view, depriving a judgment holder of its substantive right to levy on its execution is a violation of due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the ULS. Constitution. See, e.g. Kronz v. Kronz, 393 Pa.Super. 227, 234 (1990). ‘The deprivation due process rights, even “temporarily,” is a substantial injury.” 7 _Ashas often been said in many contexts, justice delayed is justice denied. 8 Finally, the fourth factor to be considered under Hilton is where the public interest lies. In this Court’s view, the preservation of civil society requires confidence in our court system and its unique role as the third branch of government, “Massachusetts is one of only a few States to articulate an explicit separation of powers in our Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 301, 10 N.E.3d 1081 (2014). Article 30 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides, “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or cither of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of Jaws and not of men.” ‘Thus, any order by an executive agency purporting to impede a Court’s ability to do its work is in direct conflict with the Massachusetts Constitution. ‘As a more practical (less esoteric) matter, the public needs to have confidence in our Court’s ability to deliver speedy justice. To avoid the chaos which would occur if landlords took the law into their own hands, litigants must have faith in our court system to deliver fair and swift adjudication and resolution of claims, and that judgments will be enforced. Landlords cannot come to believe that delay interposed by the Boston Moratorium will drain their judgments of their value. Similarly, tenants cannot be encouraged to believe that this Court's judgments and orders are ineffectual and mere suggestions, The cost to the credibility and effectiveness of our court system is incalculable when any litigant doubts the power of the Court, ‘This Court finds no justification under any of the Hilton criteria to issue a stay on the Boston Moratorium. Accordingly, this Court will not stay the enforcement of the Boston Moratorium, such that it is even enforceable by a court. c. Eyette Green’s Motion for Stay* | Eyette Green argues that that she will be “irreparably harmed” if the Boston Moratorium is not stayed, She argues that she is entitled to a stay to maintain the status quo ante. It bears pointing out that this summary process action concerning residential premises at 21 Ashton Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts (“the Premises”) was commenced in 2017 with the original trial date scheduled for October 12, 2017. ‘The trial date was repeatedly continued by the parties for over 8 months. ‘The parties resolved the summary process action by entering into an Agreement for Judgment on July 19, 2018 in which the landlord agreed to make certain repairs and the defendants including Eyette Green agreed to make payments and provide access to the Premises for repairs. ‘On September 20, 2019, the landlord filed its first motion for the issuance of Execution, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants, including Fyette Green, caused damage to the Premises and refused access upon reasonable notice for repairs. This motion was not acted upon. On December 23, 2019, the landlord renewed its motion for the issuance of Execution. After a number of continuances, the parties resolved their dispute concerning the issuance of the Execution by entering into an Amended Agreement for Judgment on February 13, 2020. Under that Amended Agreement for Judgment, Eyctte Green agreed to vacate the Premises no later than May 31, 2020. COVID intervened and a statewide moratorium on evictions was put into place Chapter 65 of the Acts of 2020. Eyette Green received a reprieve from eviction under that statute. * “The procedural history set forth below is drawn from this Court's review of the docket (via MassCourts) of Real Property Management v, Byette Green et al, Eastem Division Housing Court, Docket No. 17-SP-4013. 10 On October 21, 2020 at the expiration of the statewide moratorium, the landlord filed a request for issuance of the execution. Eyette Green contemporaneously filed a motion which sought a further stay on the execution for reason that her serious health issues left her unable to mount an effective housing search during COVID times and she would require additional time to find alternative housing with her Section 8 voucher, By an Order dated February 1, 2021, this Court (Malamut, J.) issued an order effectively staying the issuance of an execution for at least two months and requiring Eyette Green to engage in a verifiable housing search. On April 2, 2021, the parties entered into an Agreement for Judgment which required Eyette Green to vacate by July 31,2021. That Agreement for Judgment allowed for no further stays unless Fyette Green had secured another apartment and entered into a lease which, presumably, would begin soon after July 31, 2021. (On July 20, 2021, Eyette Green filed a motion seeking more time, Soon thereafter, the landlord sought issuance of a new execution. At the hearing on Eyette Green’s motion for a further stay held on September 16, 2021, this Court was presented minimal evidence that the defendant had engaged in a sufficiently robust housing search to secure another apartment in the time contemplated in the April 2021 Agreement for Judgment. Nonetheless, in an Order issued on September 16, 2021, this Court ordered a stay through September 30, 2021 and contemplated no further stays unless “the defendant presents a signed lease with a tenancy to commence no more than two weeks later.” Now, in mid-December 2021, Eyette Green continues to occupy the Premises and has demonstrated little effort to comply with this Court’s multiple orders — issued over the course of 1 two years - to secure alternate housing in a timely manner and vacate. Any motivation which Eyette Green may have had to comply with this Court's orders apparently disappeared upon the issuance of the Boston Moratorium. She now claims that she will be “irreparably harmed” if the Boston Moratorium is not enforced; she obviously fails to recognize how she has been gratuitously benefitted by circumstances which prevented the long-expected outcome of her case. From this Court’s point of view, Eyette Green is not solely responsible for her non- compliance with this Court’s orders. She likely would have moved out and onward by now if she had not found refuge in the Boston Moratorium and her belief that she could remain at the Premises indefinitely with no consequence. Despite this Court’s skepticism about this defendant's efforts to secure housing in accordance with this Court's orders, this Court effectively issued a brief stay in its Order dated ‘November 29, 2021. The Clerk's Office was ordered to schedule a status conference on the earliest available date to evaluate Byette Green’s efforts to secure housing. Until then, the plaintiff could not levy on its Execution. At this juneture, the Clerk’s Office shall issue a status conference on the earliest available date in January of 2022 for the purpose of ascertaining (a) the status of Byette Green's efforts to secure alternate housing, (b) whether Byette Green may be equitably granted a further stay so that she may avoid homelessness, and (c) whether a new Execution must issue to the plaintiff. In the meantime, Byette Green and her various housing search workers are urged to use this time wisely and to secure housing by the date of the next hearing, Until the hearing date, a stay shall remain in effect on the levy of any outstanding execution for possession. This shall maintain the status quo ante. 2 d. Veronica Watson's Motion for Stay” Defendant Veronica Watson, who intervened in this matter as an “interested party,” is the defendant in the pending summary process action entitled Janet Avila v. Veronica Watson, Eastern Division Housing Court, Docket No. 19-SP-4210 (“the Summary Process Action”). The Summary Process Action was commenced in October of 2019 seeking possession of premises located at 31 Deering Road, Unit 3 Mattapan, Massachusetts (“the Property”) on aecount of non-payment of rent. At the time the Summary Process Action was filed (which was several months prior to the commencement of the COVID-19 pandemic), Veronica Watson owed $12,000.00 in unpaid rent, The Summary Process Action was resolved through an Agreement for Judgment dated December 18, 2019 by which time her arrearage had grown to $14,600.00. ‘The parties agreed that judament for possession and $8,000.00 would enter in favor of the plaintiff, Janet Avila, and that Veronica Watson could continue to occupy the Property provided that she make on-going use and occupancy payments and certain payments toward the judgment amount, On January 21, 2021, Janet Avila filed a motion to issue Execution on the Summary Process Action claiming that Veronica Watson failed to comply with her payment obligations under the Agreement for Judgment and that Veronica Watson actually owed almost $9,000.00 more than she owed at the time she entered the Agreement for Judgment. On March 25, 2021, after a hearing, this Court (Malamut, J.) issued an Order finding that the plaintiff was entitled to > ‘The procedural history set forth below is drawn from this Court’s review of the docket (via MassCourts) of Janet Avila v. Veronica Watson, Eastern Division Housing Court, Docket No. 19-SP-4210. 13 issuance of the Execution because Veronica Watson failed to comply with the Agreement for Judgment. Nonetheless, the Court found that both the CDC Moratorium and stay available under Chapter 257 of the Acts of 2020 applied to this case. Thus, the Execution did not issue at that time, Ultimately, after it appears that no third party funds were ever paid to the plaintiff and Veronica Watson’s arrearage continued to grow, a final judgment entered for possession and the amount of $28,828.72 on August 2, 2021. The Execution issued on August 31, 2021, but was not levied upon because of the Boston Moratorium. On November 16, 2021, Veronica Watson filed in the Summary Process Action her Emergency Motion for Stay and/or Recall of Execution. ‘The hearing on that motion in the ‘Summary Process Action was held on December 3, 2021 before Judge Malamut. On December 6, 2021, Judge Malamut issued a thoughtful 12-page long decision reciting the long history of the case, and finding that Veronica Watson remained at the Property long after the statutory period allowed for stays under G.L. c. 239 §§ 9-13. He found that she failed to “begin a housing search (a tenant requirement under G.L. c. 239 §§ 9-13) seriously until August 2021.” After careful analysis of the facts and the law, Judge Malamut found that Veronica Watson “has no legal or equitable right to remain” in the Property He thereupon denied the recall of the Execution,'° but allowed Veronica Watson a brief stay through December 31, 2021 “in deference to the Winter Holiday Season and to provide Tenant some brief additional time to redouble her efforts at re-housing in all reasonable alternative locations[.]” This stay was also subject to any decision concerning the validity of the Boston Moratorium by this Court or on appeal. 10 In fact, he allowed the plaintiff to return the expiring Execution and allowed a new Execution to issue. crs On December 8, 2021, just two days after Judge Malamut rendered his decision concerning a stay in the Summary Process Action, Veronica Watson argued before this Court that she was entitled to an indefinite stay under the Boston Moratorium because she would suffer “irreparable harm” without such further stay. This Court does not find Veronica Watson’s argument credible in light of the history of her case. Under any reasonable application of existing Massachusetts General Laws, Veronica Watson is not entitled to continue her occupancy of the Property. But for the gratuitous stays she received on account of the operation of Chapter 65 of the Acts of 2020 (the state-wide moratorium on evictions) and the CDC moratorium on evictions, it appears that Veronica Watson would have been obliged to vacate the Property a year ago. The Boston Moratorium has provided Veronica Watson yet another opportunity to delay vacating the Property to the obvious further harm of Janet Avila. This Court defers to Judge Malamut’s decision concerning a stay on the levy being appropriate until December 31, 2021 This Court shall issue no further stay. ORDER Based on the foregoing, this Court ORDERS as follows: 1, The motion by the Boston Public Health Commission and City of Boston for a stay on the enforcement of the Boston Moratorium is DENIED. This Court will not issue a stay to permit enforcement of the Boston Moratorium for the reasons that the Boston Moratorium fails to meet the criteria required under Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). 15 2. The motion to dismiss by Kim Janey, as Acting Mayor of the City of Boston (and her successors in interest for the City of Boston ) is DENIED. 3. With respect to Eyette Green’s motion for a stay in the Summary Process Action, Real Property Management as Managing Agent ic LLC v. Eyette Green et al., Docket No. 17-SP-4013, the motion is ALLOWED as follows: the Clerk’s Office shall schedule a status conference on the next earliest available date in January to ascertain (@ the status of Eyette Green's efforts to secure alternate housing, (b) whether Eyette Green may be equitably granted a further stay so that she may avoid homelessness, and (©) whether a new Execution must issue to the plaintiff. 4. With respect to Veronica Watson’s motion for a further stay in the Civil Action, Janet Avila et al, v. Dr, Bisola Ojikutu, Executive Director of the Boston Public Health Commission et al, Docket No. 21-CV-0528, this motion is DENIED. This Court defers to Judge Malamut’s December 6, 2021 Order in the summary process action, Janet Avila vy. Veronica Watson, Eastern Division Housing Court, Docket No. 19-SP-4210, in which Veronica Watson is granted a stay until December 31, 2021. SO ORDERED: ASSOCIATE JUSTICI 19/3/2031 ce: Mitchell J. Matorin, Esq. Jordana R. Greenman, Esq. Jason Carter, Esq Batool Raza, Esq. Katherine Jones, Esq. Zoe Cronin, Esq. Gary Klein, Esq. 16

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