N E W S TAT E S PA C E S

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New State Spaces
Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood

Neil Brenner

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan South Korea Poland Portugal Singapore Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Neil Brenner 2004 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-927005-8 (hbk.) ISBN 0-19-927006-6 (pbk.) 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Kolam Information Services, Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India. Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk

P R E FA C E

This book represents a synthesis of theoretical and empirical work I embarked upon in the mid-1990s. At that time, as a graduate student in political science at the University of Chicago, I became frustrated with the apparent indifference of state theorists, comparative political economists, and political sociologists to the role of territoriality, spatiality, and scale in modern political life. The translation of Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space in 1991 exposed me to the conception of the state as a ‘spatial framework’ (Lefebvre 1991: 281) and inspired me to inquire further into the geographies of state power under modern capitalism. I subsequently slogged my way through Lefebvre’s un´ translated, 4-volume work De l’Etat (1976–8). Upon reading the remarkable chapter on ‘Space and the State’ in vol. iv of that book (recently translated as Lefebvre 2003a), with its provocative but tantalizingly incomplete analysis of ´ ‘state space’ (l’espace etatique), I knew I had begun an intellectual journey that would preoccupy me for some time into the future. The opportunity to study in UCLA’s Department of Geography during the 1995–6 academic year enabled me to explore the cutting edge of critical sociospatial theory, politicaleconomic geography, and urban studies, and provided me with solid foundations on which to pursue my goal of developing a spatialized approach to the contemporary state. Equipped with a more thorough grasp of critical geographical political economy and a rejuvenated excitement about the possibilities for importing some of the insights of this remarkably vibrant research field into the ‘non-geographical’ social sciences, I returned to Chicago in the summer of 1996 and began outlining a dissertation project. During my year at UCLA, I had written an extended research paper on the restructuring of urban governance in western European global city-regions. The paper was critical of the tendency among global cities researchers to postulate a declining role for national states under contemporary conditions. Against such assumptions, I attempted to demonstrate that western European national states had played key roles in facilitating the process of global city formation, and that they were in turn being transformed, both functionally and geographically, through this role. After leaving Los Angeles, I remained convinced that globalizing city-regions would provide fascinating sites in which to investigate such transformations of statehood more systematically. I was drawn, in particular, to the idea of comparing the interplay between global city formation and state spatial restructuring in different national and local contexts. I settled on Frankfurt and Amsterdam, two of Europe’s major second-tier global city-regions, as suitable field sites and, a year later, dissertation fellowships from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung and the Social

vi Preface Science Research Council enabled me to pursue such an inquiry. During the second half of the 1990s, debates on metropolitan institutional reform had exploded in each of these city-regions. Although efforts to install a ‘Regional County’ (Regionalkreis) in Frankfurt and a ‘city province’ (stadsprovincie) in Amsterdam ultimately failed, I found that struggles over metropolitan governance were an important expression and medium of significant changes in local, regional, and national regulatory configurations. In both city-regions, changes in state spatial organization were being justified, from a variety of ideological perspectives, as a means to enhance locally and regionally embedded socioeconomic assets, and thus to attract mobile external capital investment within an integrated European economy. And, in both city-regions, the major strategies of metropolitan institutional reform, whether of neoliberal or social democratic varieties, were premised upon a significant intensification of previous, locally focused forms of economic development policy and ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey 1989a). My dissertation devoted considerable attention to the task of comparing the very different institutional orders, regulatory arrangements, and political alliances that underpin German and Dutch capitalism at national, regional, and local scales. One of its more surprising conclusions, however, was that broadly analogous processes of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring had unfolded in each country’s most globally integrated city-region during the course of the 1990s. The research left me wondering whether similar transformations of statehood and urban governance were occurring in other city-regions as well, both within and beyond the European context. I completed my Ph.D. thesis in the summer of 1999, and then relocated to New York University, where I found a new (trans)disciplinary home in the Department of Sociology and Metropolitan Studies Program. I had initially intended to write up my case studies of Frankfurt and Amsterdam in the form of a comparative, book-length monograph on global city formation, urban governance, and state rescaling. However, as I returned to the manuscript, I was continually distracted by a desire to work on a more abstract level, in pursuit of additional theoretical insights into the nature of contemporary rescaling processes and the associated transformation of state space. Meanwhile, as I broadened my knowledge of the European situation, I became increasingly convinced that the processes of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring I had observed in German and Dutch city-regions were not, in fact, unique to those contexts, but were unfolding in strikingly analogous, if contextually specific forms, throughout the western European city-system. A new book project thus began to take shape in my mind—one that would attempt systematically to forge appropriate theoretical categories for the study of state rescaling while delineating the broadly shared patterns of state spatial restructuring that have emerged in major western European cityregions during the last thirty years. Though they are absolved of all responsibility for the final outcome, discussions with Bob Jessop, Roger Keil, and Nik

and local settings. state rescaling. The theoretical framework and macrohistorical perspective developed in this volume are intended to serve as a foundation for this type of variation-finding comparative investigation. and urban governance restructuring in western Europe. I was able to make considerable progress with the writing of this book during the summer and fall of 2002. Thanks to a Goddard Faculty Fellowship from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at NYU. my greatest intellectual debts are to radical scholars Henri Lefebvre. Germany. these ideas have been reformulated completely for purposes of this book. and the Netherlands. Margit Mayer and Roger Keil have provided invaluable critical feedback on my evolving research agenda. The remainder of the writing was completed during the summer and fall of 2003. but it has been revised and expanded extensively for inclusion here. My year at Harvard also enabled me to reflect more systematically on the challenges of combining the key insights developed in my two favorite contributions to state theory— ´ Henri Lefebvre’s chapter on ‘Space and the state’ from vol. France.Preface vii Theodore convinced me that such a book would be viable. and rescaling processes have provided much theoretical inspiration for my own efforts. A James Bryant Conant fellowship at Harvard’s Center for European Studies during the 2000/1 academic year provided me with the requisite time and space. iv of De L’Etat (1978) and Bob Jessop’s State Theory (1990a). As will be evident from my extensive citations to their work. While initial formulations of some of its arguments were published in various academic journals and edited volumes during the late 1990s and early 2000s. and have been embedded within a synthetic theoretical and empirical framework. state restructuring. since the postwar period. These authors’ ideas on state spatiality. Italy. . This book is intended as a first installment on what I hope will become a longer-term. much work remains to be done in order to decipher. and Erik Swyngedouw. This book thus draws together approximately eight years’ reflection on state theory. The vast resources of Harvard’s Widener Library enabled me to explore in greater detail the trajectories of state spatial restructuring and urban policy change in Britain. their mentorship. An early version of Chapter 2 has been published elsewhere (Brenner 1999a). comparative investigation of the diverse pathways of state rescaling that have crystallized across the older capitalist world since the global economic recession of the early 1970s. and embarked upon the new project. Bob Jessop. both within and beyond western Europe. Whereas this book is devoted to the tasks of theorizing the process of state rescaling and explicating major panEuropean trends. in which to embark upon this project. coupled with a truly superb library infrastructure. and to explain. perhaps even valuable. regional. Ever since I began working on urban political economy and state theory in the mid-1990s. the contextually specific forms in which state rescaling processes have unfolded in divergent national. among other European countries. I thus set aside my case studies of Frankfurt and Amsterdam.

and everyday cheerfulness of my tireless colleagues. Nathan Sayre. sincerest thanks are due to Bob ¨ Beauregard. Bill Sewell. Christian Schmid. Bill Sewell. My collaborative work with these remarkably creative. Nitsan Chorev. I have had the good fortune to work in the Sociology Department at New York University. Andy Merrifield. Andrew ¨ Kirby. who has been a steadfast advocate. a wonderfully constructive critic. Pieter Terhorst. I owe a particularly massive intellectual and personal debt to my erstwhile dissertation chair. Jessica Sewell. a number of friends and colleagues have helped me grapple with various theoretical and empirical problems during the period in which I was working on this book. Danny Walkowitz. despite my often stubborn resistance to his good intentions. Stefan Kratke. Bill Sites. and Gary Herrigel. For this. and Kevin Ward. Gordon MacLeod. Moishe Postone. Klaus Ronneberger. and often unbeknownst to them. While I doubt that the present text will live up to his high standards. enthusiasm. I would also like to thank the participants in colloquia held in the Political Science Department at York University. and to complete. Julie-Anne Boudreau. Neil Smith. and stimulating intellectual environment for research and teaching. Jamie Peck. and Ed Soja at UCLA. Additionally. NYU’s Metropolitan Studies Program has been an exciting postdisciplinary space. Helga Leitner. Jurgen Essletzbichler. tolerant. John Friedmann. Sean O’Riain. Bill has been a staunch defender of clear prose. and Nik Theodore. this book. Susanne Heeg. Allan Pred. sincerest thanks. . and it proved essential to my ability to undertake. More recently. Steve Graham. Martin Jones. Mark Purcell. I was privileged to work with a number of generous but intellectually demanding scholars— including Nick Entrikin. Jamie Gough. Dick Walker. I have been extraordinarily lucky to be able to rely upon the intellectual comradeship of Bob Jessop.viii Preface encouragement. Toronto (November 2002) and in the Geography Department at Rutgers University (February 2003) for their incisive critical reactions to some of the key arguments developed in this book. and a consistently reliable adviser ever since I first met him over a decade ago. and George Steinmetz at the University of Chicago—each of whom deserves my warmest. Participants in my graduate seminar on ‘State/Space’ in NYU’s Sociology Department deserve special thanks for their enthusiastic critical engagement with many of my ideas on state theory during the spring of 2002. Peter Marcuse. through his embarrassingly frequent notation of ‘JA’ (‘Jargon Alert’) on more of my writings than I care to remember. Saskia Sassen. and friendship have helped me maintain my momentum throughout the long gestation of this project. During my meandering foray through graduate school. diligent. which has provided a supportive. Ngai-Ling Sum. Since the fall of 1999. Andrea Kahn. thanks in no small way to the seemingly boundless energy. Stefan Kipfer. In addition. Allen Scott. and dedicated scholars has been a formative intellectual and personal experience. Harvey Molotch. Anssi Paasi. I can only hope that Bill’s influence on my thinking and writing will be evident.

Ronni and Sandy Brenner. In addition. questions. N. I will always be grateful to Manu Goswami for the many years in which. New York January 2004 . Cycling wizard Chris Griffin deserves special thanks for inspiring me to ratchet up the pace. Howard Harrington. and kept me laughing. Ted Hamm. even from afar. Of course. Deepest thanks go to my brothers and sisters—Clayton and Michael. I assume full responsibility for all remaining errors of fact or interpretation and for any other limitations in the final text. Jeremy Bendik-Keymer. Stephen Collier. and reliable editor at every stage of this project. Moira Egan. Sylvia Brucker. Ruth Horowitz. patient. have sustained me in more ways than they will ever know. For helping me do so. during the final push to finish this book. likewise deserves my sincerest gratitude for grappling with the unwieldy formatting dilemmas presented by the many figures and boxes included in this book. Duncan Watts. Eric Klinenberg. I eagerly look forward to an opportunity to return their generosity. Eric Klinenberg. Brooklyn. companionship. Nathan Sayre. at inexcusably short notice. Their detailed suggestions. I am endlessly grateful to Sara Nadal for giving me so much of her vie quotidienne. Corinna Hawkes.Preface ix A particularly massive thank you is due to Nitsan Chorev. Steve Monte. Esan Rodney. Paul Cleal. for dutifully and meticulously reading all or part of the final manuscript. and also to Morgan Jones and Matthew Murphy. Warmest thanks are due to Richard Malenitza of the NYU Digital Studio for expertly and patiently scanning the maps. through the crazy twists and turns of life. and laughter. a number of truly good friends and comrades—including ¨ Antonio Bellisario. Their unconditional love and support. Design Manager at OUP. who has been a supportive. she sustained me in life and in work. I dedicate this book to my wonderful parents. for inspiration and encouragement. and Liz Workman. Peter Dodds. Djibril Sinayoko. Doug Guthrie. for bringing so much more light into my world. Andy Merrifield. John Shovlin. Sandra Smith. helped me stay focused. Jill and Tracey—for remembering not to take me too seriously. It has been a genuine pleasure to work with Anne Ashby of Oxford University Press. Bob Jessop. Andrea Kahn. and for preventing me from wandering astray in so many ways. Last but not least. I am deeply grateful to Nitsan Chorev. and criticisms helped me navigate my way through a final round of revisions in the early winter of 2004. Jurgen Essletzbichler. I would like to thank my grandmother. Her young sidekick. Lula Martini. Tara Murphy. Beyond New York City. It took me a little while to get into the groove of life in New York City. Nathan Sayre. and Caitlin Zaloom—contributed countless good vibes and helped me keep my balance beyond the world of book-writing. and to my nephew Jonah. through her love. Andy Merrifield. who provided research assistance at various stages of my work. B. and Nik Theodore.

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19: ‘Urban Networks Pilot Project’ (NB The urban networks shown on the original map are only those networks that were studied with the scope of a research project commissioned by the Federal Ministry. p. 20490 no. p. ´ Map 4. 1981. Raumordnung in Deutschland. no.2 From Federal Ministry for Regional Planning. ß Kluwer Academic Publishers B. 251 (article by Roger Brunet). Reproduced with kind permission of the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Reproduced with permission. Paris: La Documentation Francaise. Reproduced with permission. 96. 5: ‘Prevailing Settlement Structure’. 1964. 28.5 From ‘Landsplan perspektiv: Development perspective towards the year 2018’ (Ministry of the Environment. 1996. 27) ß John Wiley & Sons Limited.3 From L’Espace Geographique. 79 ß RECLUS 1990. Map 4. p.2. Building and Urban Development. Reproduced with permission.4. p.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author and publisher are grateful for permission to reproduce the following material: Chapter 2 From a very early version published in Theory & Society. 388). Reproduced with permission. Bonn. ´ Map 5. There are also other urban networks in Germany). p. Bauwesen und Stadtebau.3 From Bundesministerium fur Raumordnung. ¨ ¨ Map 5. 2 (1999): 39-78: Beyond State Centrism? Space. ¸ Map 5. p. ß Grafische Beeldvorming Rijksplanologische Dienst. Map 4. The Netherlands. Une contribution au debat sur l’amenagement du territoire’ (Paris. Conseil Regional Ilede-France. Guidelines for Regional Planning. Map 5. With kind permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.2 From Hugh Clout Regional Development in Western Europe (Chichester. 1992). Ile-de-France: tendances et perspectives.1 From DATAR Brunet: Les Villes ‘Europeenes’. Copenhagen. 48) ß IAURIF. Map 5.V.6 From ‘France. Reproduced with permission. Reproduced with permission. p. John Wiley & Sons.1 From Robert E. Territoriality and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies by Neil Brenner.4 From Kamerstukken Tweede Kamer 1987–1988. Bonn. 1993. 1973. 1993. . Map 5. Dickinson City and Region: A Geographical Interpretation (Routledge. ß BfLR Bonn 1992. London.

Chevin.7 From Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin: Splintering Urbanism (New York and London: Routledge 2001. published by the Documentation francaise ¸ February 2002. Mass. . Reproduced with permission.xii Acknowledgements Map 5. reproduced with permission.) European Spatial Planning (Cambridge. ß Building.1 From Bas Waterhout Polycentric development: What is behind it?’ in Andreas Faludi (ed. ‘All the right connections’. cartes et communication. 101: Amenager la France 2020. p. Building 19 ( July 1991). ß AEBK. p.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 2002. 98). 325). Map 6. reproduced with permission. adapted from D. ß DATAR ´ ´ ` ´ ` ´ (Delegation a l’Amenagement du Territoire et a l’Action Regionale): ‘Tentative ´ ´ ´ pour une definition spatiale des zones d’integration mondiale peripherique’ ´ p. 47.

The Globalization Debates: Opening up to New Spaces? 3. Interlocality Competition as a State Project: Urban Locational Policy and the Rescaling of State Space 6. and the ‘Explosion of Spaces’ 2. The State Spatial Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis 4. Introduction: Cities. States.C ONT E NT S Acknowledgements List of Boxes List of Figures List of Maps Abbreviations and Acronyms 1. Urban Governance and the Nationalization of State Space: Political Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 5. Alternative Rescaling Strategies and the Future of New State Spaces References Index xi xiv xv xvii xviii 1 27 69 114 172 257 305 341 .

Britain.1 5.5 5.1 1.11 Reworking the politics of uneven geographical development: the case of spatial planning in post-unification Germany 6.8 5.4 5. and Italy in the 1980s Endogenous development strategies and the new politics of place in the 1980s The Single European Market and the new interspatial competition Key state spatial projects promoting urban locational policy Key state spatial strategies promoting urban locational policy Intergovernmental reform in the Netherlands: the quest for bestuur op niveau 8 9 12 128 135 136 139 148 150 158 173 175 182 186 195 202 215 218 223 225 233 270 281 289 5.1 4.LIST OF BOXES 1.10 Towards central government localism? Intergovernmental reform and urban locational policy in Thatcherite Britain 5.7 5.6 5.2 1.4 4.7 5.1 6.5 4.9 Approaching the scale question Theorizing scale and rescaling processes: core propositions Key elements of the new political economy of scale Key axes of regulation under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism Key state spatial projects promoting spatial Keynesianism Key state spatial strategies promoting spatial Keynesianism Intellectual foundations: regional economic theory and the logic of spatial Keynesianism DATAR and the rise of nationalized spatial planning in France Public enterprise as a means of regional policy: the case of the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) Rotterdam’s Rijnmond: a typical case of metropolitan governance under spatial Keynesianism Key perspectives on the post-Keynesian competition state The rescaling of regulatory forms after Fordism Global city formation in western Europe The return of the ‘regional problem’: North/South divides in Germany.2 6.3 5.3 Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives: selected western European examples Cooperation and competition in the new metropolitan regionalism Interurban networking initiatives: selected western European examples .3 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.2 5.

and the nationalization of state space in postwar western Europe Kaldor’s model of automatic stabilizers: alleviating uneven development? Saunders’s ‘dual state’ thesis: mapping the scalar division of state regulation under spatial Keynesianism The end of the ‘golden age’? Output.7 3. 1960–89: average annual percentage rates of growth .1 2.4 2.6 The scalar architecture of state regulation under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism State spatial selectivity under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism: the case of spatial Keynesianism Urbanization.4 4.3 3.12 The production of new state spaces? A research hypothesis 3.2 3.5 4.11 Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (3) 3.10 Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (2) 3.13 Conceptualizing the dynamics of spatial restructuring: spatial divisions of labor and spatial divisions of state regulation 4.2 2. and productivity growth in the EU.8 3.9 Levels of abstraction considered in this book The epistemology of state-centrism: three key geographical assumptions Globalization as a process of rescaling: two key concepts The epistemology of global territorialism: schematic overview Rescaling the geographies of capital Rescaling the geographies of statehood The epistemology of deterritorialization approaches: schematic overview Beyond state-centric approaches to the study of state space The state spatial process: key dimensions Decoding state scalar configurations: narrow and integral dimensions Strategic-relational state theory: foundations State projects and state strategies Dimensions of state selectivity under capitalism: a schematic summary A strategic-relational approach to state spatiality: a conceptual hierarchy Structural and strategic moments of state spatiality Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (1) 19 38 46 53 59 62 65 74 80 82 86 88 90 91 94 97 102 104 106 109 130 132 134 146 154 162 3. employment.3 4.1 2.LIST OF FIGURES 1.6 3. spatial Keynesianism.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.1 3.5 2.2 4.1 4.

1 5.4 5.2 6.6 5. 1980–8 Corporate headquarters in various European global cities as of 1990 The differentiation of urban economies in western Europe Disparities in GDP per inhabitant among European regions.3 5.xvi List of Figures 4.7 4. and locational policy Urban locational policies and the transformation of state spatial selectivity Urbanization.3 6.5 5.5 Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs The new metropolitan regionalism in western Europe: an overview of recent trends Metropolitan reform initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs Interurban networking initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs Alternative rescaling strategies and the ‘second-cut’ interpretation of RCSRs: synthesis .1 6.10 Reworking spatial planning in post-1980s western Europe: from nationalization to metropolitanization? 5. and the rescaling of state space in post-1970s western Europe 163 170 179 179 183 185 188 191 206 214 217 229 245 273 276 283 291 296 5.7 5. locational policy.4 6. 1980–8 The changing European urban hierarchy Three approaches to urban governance: spatial Keynesianism.8 5.2 5.11 State spatial strategies and the production of large-scale infrastructural configurations 6. endogenous development strategy.9 The crisis of North Atlantic Fordism and the destabilization of state scalar configurations Emergent contradictions of spatial Keynesianism during the 1970s The decline in manufacturing employment in the European urban system Per cent unemployment in major European cities.8 5.

1 The nationalization of urban hierarchies in western Europe c.6 The ‘Grand Bassin Strategy’ in France 5.2 Targeting city-regions: the metropolitanization of national spatial planning in the FRG 5.LIST OF MAPS 4.5 City-centric spatial planning in Denmark 5.2 Geographies of compensatory regional policy in postwar western Europe 4.1 Mapping the new territorial disparities 5.7 Premium infrastructural networks and the differentiation of state space 6.1950 4.3 German ‘city networks’ as forms of urban locational policy 5.4 Rescaling national spatial planning in the Netherlands 5.1 ‘Global integration zones’ in the European Spatial Development Perspective 122 138 144 189 231 232 235 238 241 252 303 .3 Compensatory regional policy in postwar France 5.

A B B R E V I AT I O N S A N D A C R O N Y M S APEC ASEAN BCR CODER CPRE DATAR DGXVI DoE EMU ESDP EU EURACOM EZ FINE GA GATT GLA G8 HRA IGO IMF INTERREG IRI LDDC LPAC MERCOSUR METREX MILAN NAFTA NGO ODC OECD OLR ORA ORI PSEP quango RCSR RECITE REPC ROG Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference Association of South East Asian Nations Bestuurlijke Commissie Randstad ´ ´ ´ Commission de Developpement economique regionale Regional Economic Planning Committee ´´ ´ ´ Delegation pour l’Amenagement du Territoire et l’Action Regionale Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion Department of the Environment Economic and Monetary Union European Spatial Development Perspective European Union European Action for Mining Communities Enterprise Zone Fashion Industry Network Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ‘Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Greater London Authority Group of Eight (leading nations) Raumordnungspolitischer Handlungsrahmen International governmental organization International Monetary Fund Community initiative concerning border areas Institute for Industrial Reconstruction London Docklands Development Corporation London Planning Advisory Committee Mercado Comun del Sur Network of European Metropolitan Regions and Areas Motor Industry Local Authority Network North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement Nongovernmental Organization Ørestad Development Corporation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Openbaar Lichaam Randstad Raumordnungspolitischer Orientierungsrahmen Overleg Ruimtelijke Investeringen Provincial Socio-Economic Plan quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization Rescaled Competition State Regime Regions and Cities for Europe Regional Economic Planning Council Raumordnungsgesetz .

Abbreviations and Acronyms RoRo SDAURP SDR SEM SEM SERPLAN SMP SPZ TGV UDC VINEX WRO WTO ZAC ZUP Randstad Consultation on Spatial Planning ´ ´ ´ Schema Directeur d’Amenagement et d’Urbanisme de la Region Parisienne ´ ´ Schema Directeur Regional Single European Market ´´ ´ Societe d’Economie Mixte London and South East Regional Planning Conference State mode of production Simplified Planning Zone ´ Trains a grand vitesse Urban Development Corporation Fourth Report Extra 1990 Wet op de ruimtelijke ordening World Trade Organization ´ ´ Zone d’Amenagement Concertee ´ Zone d’Urbanisme en Priorite xix .

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Ansell 2000. O’Riain 2000. Cox 1987. international political economists. is elaborated in Ch. more generically. Evans 1997. and their associated epistemological assumptions. Representative works include Agnew and Corbridge 1994. and Weiss 2003. scholars have explored the ways in which diverse arenas of national state power. politically uncontrollable forces of global economic integration. post-Fordist states. In recent decades. Jessop 1999a. R. During the last decade. catalytic states. as post-Keynesian states.1 Within this emergent interdisciplinary literature. A more detailed examination of state decline arguments. Peck 2001a. and sociopolitical struggle are being redefined in response to both global and domestic pressures. Gill 1995. See. b. and other students of contemporary politics. and the ‘Explosion of Spaces’ we find ourselves faced with an extraordinary. among other sources. Scholte 1997. Helleiner 1994. under contemporary geoeconomic conditions. Hirsch 1995. contradictory space they have produced . network states. from pro-globalization boosterists (Ohmae 1995) to anti-globalization critics (Hardt and Negri 2001. b. . and Whitfield 2001. political sociologists. The new forms of statehood that are resulting from these wide-ranging transformations have been variously characterized as competition states. and not dismantled.2 1 The literature on the restructuring of national states under conditions of contemporary globalization has grown rapidly during the last decade. Keil 1998a. R. States. little-noticed phenomenon: the explosion of spaces. however. policy formation. Jessop 2002. Wade 1996. Cox 1987. 2 These labels have been used pervasively in the interdisciplinary literatures on contemporary state restructuring. . Sassen 1996. many scholars have forecast the imminent demise of national state power due to the purportedly borderless. this issue has attracted considerable attention among globalization theorists. 2. Panitch 1994. Strange 1996).ONE Introduction: Cities. McMichael 1996. internationalized states. Henri Lefebvre (1979: 290) This book is an attempt to decipher the transformation of statehood under contemporary capitalism. post-national states or. a significant strand of political-economic research has advanced the counterargument that national states are being qualitatively transformed. . Boyer and Drache 1996. Across the political spectrum. Weiss 1998. Evans 1997. Cerny 1995. Neither capitalism nor the state can maintain the chaotic. workfare states.

and economic globalization. standardized administrative structures throughout their territories and mobilized redistributive spatial policies designed to alleviate intra-national territorial inequalities by extending urban industrial growth into underdeveloped. that transformations of urban policy have figured crucially within a fundamental reworking of national statehood since the early 1970s. This project of spatial Keynesianism (Martin and Sunley 1997) continued into the 1970s. European integration. but was widely abandoned during the subsequent decade. and various putative challenges to national state power associated with geoeconomic integration. rather than through centrally steered programs. Meanwhile. Rather than treating cities and cityregions as mere subunits of national administrative systems. scholars of contemporary state restructuring have investigated. national. more generally. the increasing internationalization of national policy systems. post-Keynesian spatial policies intended to reconcentrate productive capacities and specialized. Subsequently. welfare state retrenchment.2 Introduction While these recent. and local governments mobilized new. most western European states established relatively uniform. The core of this analysis focuses upon a major realignment of urban governance and state spatial policy that has occurred across western Europe during the last three decades. this book is intended to broaden and deepen the geographical imagination of contemporary state theory by investigating the major role of urban regions as key sites of contemporary state institutional and spatial restructuring. major urban regions were equipped with place-specific . they have invariably focused upon two overarching geographical scales—the national and the supranational. My claim is not simply that the institutional infrastructure of urban governance is being redefined but. ‘transformationist’ approaches have contributed valuable theoretical and empirical insights to the study of contemporary statehood. As of the early 1980s. the crisis and reorganization of the Keynesian welfare national state. I suggest that urban policy—broadly defined to encompass all state activities oriented towards the regulation of capitalist urbanization—has become an essential political mechanism through which a profound institutional and geographical transformation of national states has been occurring. regional. peripheral regions. growth-oriented approaches to urban and regional policy in an effort to promote economic development from below. high-performance infrastructural investments into the most globally competitive city-regions within their territories. as policymakers became increasingly preoccupied with the challenges of urban industrial decline. A geographically attuned and scale-sensitive approach to state theory is required in order to decipher the new state spaces that are being produced under contemporary capitalism. among other institutional shifts. For instance. in a shift that has been famously characterized by Harvey (1989a) as a transition to entrepreneurial urban governance. national states began to introduce new. Against the background of such studies. During the 1960s. the consolidation of new supranational institutional arrangements.

each with their own unique. infrastructural configurations. in which a single scale—be it European. or localization. Mittelman 2000). but has been enabled by. and supervising urban policy initiatives. and developmental trajectories. We are witnessing. customized regulatory arrangements. Second. I argue. first. rather. flexibility. coupled with a restructuring of subnational institutional configurations—are as fundamental to the contemporary remaking of political space as the forms of state upscaling that have been examined at length by international political economists (Gill 1998a. that cityregions have become key institutional sites in which a major rescaling of national state power has been unfolding. and by a growing differentiation of national political space among distinctive urban and regional economies. The long-entrenched primacy of the national scale of political-economic regulation has been destabilized as new scalar hierarchies of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity have been forged. implementing. even as the primacy of the national scale of political-economic life is decentered. by the intensification of interspatial competition between urban regions. decentralization. and local state strategies to position major urban economies optimally within global and supranational circuits of capital. Within these rescaled configurations of state power. The highly polarized national political-economic geographies that have resulted from these realignments are characterized by the diffusion of neoliberal discourses emphasizing market-driven growth. From this point of view. regionalization. place-specific economic profiles. One of the central agendas of this book is to trace this fundamental rearticulation of urban policy and to explore its multifaceted implications for the nature of statehood in post-1970s western Europe. coordinating. a fundamental transformation of state scalar configurations. a wide-ranging recalibration of scalar hierarchies and interscalar relations throughout the . regional. which were increasingly seen as a crucial institutional basis for enhancing global competitive advantages and attracting mobile capital investment. or local—is replacing the national scale as the primary level of political-economic coordination.Introduction 3 forms of state administration and special-purpose. institutional arrangements. and locational competitiveness. processes of state downscaling—the devolution or decentralization of regulatory tasks to subnational administrative tiers. I argue that national state institutions continue to play key roles in formulating. the erosion of spatial Keynesianism has not generated a unidirectional process of Europeanization. regional. For this reason. and has in turn accelerated. major urban regions have become important geographical targets for a variety of far-reaching institutional changes and policy realignments designed to enhance local economic growth capacities. b. The postwar project of national territorial equalization and sociospatial redistribution has thus been superseded by qualitatively new national. The intensified national targeting of local and regional spaces for economic (re)development strategies during the last two decades has not occurred within a fixed institutional framework.

in the struggle for Palestinian. such as those associated with the national welfare state. withering. Chapter 3 elaborates this conceptualization in greater detail. the singular concept of the state misleadingly implies that the institutions in question converge.3 While we shall see that political strategies to establish a centralized. for instance. regional. While the notions of the local state. By contrast.’ Therefore. and non-isomorphic configuration of statehood is created. they are today being widely superseded as a more polycentric. national. or Kashmiri statehood. In my view. I have attempted. . italics in original) explains. the regional state. state institutions. Consequently. secessionist. to minimize references to ‘the’ state. As deployed here. multiscalar. at once on supranational. As Peck (2002: 332. because it does not ontologically prejudge the configuration of state scalar organization. by definitional necessity. or nationalliberationist struggles—as. Ruggie 1993). 3 The term ‘statehood’ is often used to denote the goal of anti-colonial. new conceptual vocabularies are required in order to transcend some of the entrenched assumptions about state spatial and institutional organization that have been inherited from the Westphalian geopolitical epoch (Agnew 1994. I attempt to confront this task systematically by developing and deploying an explicitly historicized. and urban scales. upon a single (national) geographical scale and are subordinated to a single (national) political center. as much as stylistically possible. I believe that the generic concept of the state has become increasingly problematic. are not simply being moved around. in contrast to analyses that forecast a linear denationalization of statehood—whether through the strengthening of supranational institutional blocs or due to the enhanced regionalization or localization of state regulatory capacities—this book underscores the continued importance of spatially reconfigured national state institutions as major animateurs and mediators of political-economic restructuring at all geographical scales. and the national state remain appropriate for referencing specific tiers of state power within a multiscalar institutional hierarchy. In the chapters that follow. and scale-sensitive approach to the production and transformation of statehood. ‘Contingently scaled functions [of state power].4 Introduction state apparatus as a whole. or demise. the term ‘statehood’ is understood in its more literal sense—much like the German term Staatlichkeit—to connote the distinctive ensemble of social relations embodied in. or the degree of institutional isomorphism among state agencies. and expressed through. therefore. not to imply its erosion. the notion of state rescaling is intended to characterize the transformed form of (national) statehood under contemporary capitalism. the level of state centralization. Kurdish. throughout this book. as a singular noun. spatialized. they are undergoing a process of qualitative transformation through rescaling. The notion of statehood seems to me a more precise basis for describing modern political institutions. nationalized hierarchy of state power have indeed played a key role throughout much of the twentieth century.

the dismantling of various legal constraints on cross-border financial transactions. and other virtual regulatory spaces (Cameron and Palan 1999). Knox and Agnew 1995). the liberalization of trade policy. money. While considerable disagreement persists regarding the appropriate interpretation of economic globalization. These trends have intensified since that period. and everyday life were being thoroughly destabilized and rewoven. most scholars would agree that we are currently living through a phase of significantly intensified geoeconomic integration that is destabilizing inherited national economic formations. composed of Euromarkets. contours. Daniels and Lever 1996. as a transformed configuration of globalizing. Albritton et al. free trade areas. Throughout the social sciences. and urbanizing capitalism has crystallized (Brenner and Theodore 2002a). state power. urbanism. consequently. Charles Maier (2000: 809) My point of departure is the proposition that historically entrenched forms of national state territoriality are being systematically unraveled and. that diverse sociopolitical struggles to reorganize the institutional geographies of capitalism are proliferating at all spatial scales. tax havens. export processing zones. Under . the French social theorist Henri Lefebvre (1979: 290) vividly described this situation as an ‘explosion of spaces’ in which established geographies of industrialization.Introduction 5 From the scale question to the new political economy of scale Epochs of world history hinge not only upon the rise and fall of great powers or the successive struggles among mobilized social groups but on the attributes of political space. National territorial economies are becoming more permeable to supranational. whether weakened or strengthened or rescaled into larger or smaller commanding units. Writing in the late 1970s. the massive expansion of foreign direct investment. the development of advanced informational. neoliberalizing. new offshore economies have emerged. and implications of these shifts remain a matter of considerable controversy (for overviews. Global economic integration. and transportation technologies. and the intensification of international labor migration have combined to generate what Castells (1996) has famously termed a ‘space of flows’ that appears to lie beyond the territorialized national economic systems inherited from previous phases of capitalist development. 1. the origins. trade. Nonetheless. some initial evidence that inherited nationalized and territorialized formations of political-economic space are today being significantly reworked can be gleaned from a cursory examination of three contemporary worldwide trends. During the last thirty years. continental. see Amin 1994. and global flows of investment. With the expansion of foreign direct investment and speculative cross-border financial transactions. and labor (Dicken 1998. communications. 2001).

Scharpf 1999). 3. the World Bank. Precisely under conditions in which geoeconomic integration is rapidly intensifying. As debates on the contemporary ‘local–global interplay’ (Dunford and Kafkalas 1992) proliferate. industrial districts.6 Introduction these conditions.and intra-bloc trade and investment flows (Gill 2003). innovative capacities. as national economies become at once more permeable and more tightly intertwined on a global scale. technological infrastructures. and MERCOSUR to the IMF. localized agglomeration economies have acquired a renewed importance for major fractions of industrial. institutional networks. Hocking . a local and regional renaissance has been unfolding as ‘super-clusters of producers come into being in the shape of dense agglomerations (typically forming large metropolitan areas or world cities). These trends have been articulated in conjunction with an intensification of horizontal networking. and the GATT—has also been enhanced throughout the world economy (Larner and Walters 2002. Grabher 1993. and service capital (Storper 1996. financial. In conjunction with the crystallization of offshore economies. nationally scaled territorial units. Mittleman 2000). tied functionally together in a global division of labor’ (Scott 1996: 400). The consolidation of new supranational and cross-border institutions. consequently. the G8. The regulatory significance of supranational institutions and multistate regulatory arrangements—from the EU. B. translocal linkages. APEC. NAFTA. and sociocultural milieux upon which the leading sectors of transnational capital depend. learning regions. Sassen 1996). purely territorialist models of economic life—with their rigid distinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of state borders—are losing intellectual plausibility (R. Consequently. 2. J. the expansion of global trade relations and the worldwide integration of capital markets. Walker 1993. ASEAN. Scott 2001). specialized skills. A huge literature on global cities. They have also underpinned the development of new forms of multilevel governance grounded upon dense interdependencies between various tiers of political authority. and cross-border cooperation initiatives among local and regional states and other non-central governments (Perkmann and Sum 2002. Urban and regional resurgence. This resurgence of urban and regional economies cannot be adequately appreciated on the basis of state-centric models that encage economic activity into self-enclosed. in establishing the political preconditions for the expansion of inter. the role of urban and regional economies as engines of industrial growth is being more widely acknowledged. both above and beneath national state institutions (Caporaso 1997. and other new industrial spaces has proposed that these subnational territorial production complexes today represent the ‘regional motors of the global economy’ (Scott 1996) insofar as they harbor the socioeconomic assets. offshore financial centers. locally embedded economic interactions have become basic preconditions for globalized capital accumulation (Sassen 1991). Such supranational institutions have played an instrumental role in institutionalizing neoliberal ideology and.

free trade zones. Such developments suggest that capitalist economies no longer represent coherent. Fordist-Keynesian configuration of statehood and the contested consolidation of qualitatively new scalar hierarchies of state regulatory activity across the western European political-economic landscape. new forms of institutional organization. and the global—have been destabilized and rearticulated (Swyngedouw 1992a). political authority. Most crucially for the present study. existing scalar vocabularies are rather poorly equipped to grasp the complex. and so forth are used to demarcate purportedly separate territorial ‘islands’ of social relations. nationally focused models have become an inadequate basis for understanding the rapidly changing institutional and geographical landscapes of capitalism. the continental. Thus. A key agenda of this book is to investigate the origins. national. regional. insofar as terms such as local. sectors. etc. perpetually changing interconnections and interdependencies among geographical scales. urban. global. supranational regions. and economic coordination appear to be proliferating above and below the national scale of state power. these wideranging institutional and geographical realignments have been intimately intertwined with processes of rescaling through which entrenched scalar hierarchies—stretching from the urban and the regional to the national. regional. 470). Investigations into contemporary rescaling processes pose some daunting methodological challenges. Foremost among these is the need to develop a theoretically precise yet also historically specific conceptualization of geographical scale as a key dimension of social. multiscaled institutional forms. As this abbreviated sketch of contemporary political-economic transformations indicates. neatly self-contained geographical units. they mask the profound mutual imbrication of all scales. etc. international regimes. The essential task. Under contemporary conditions. and even small but well-specialized localities’ (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997: 472. These difficulties are . the ‘institutional arrangements that at one time were congruent at the national level are now more dispersed at multiple spatial levels’. Relatedly. localization. A reification of scale appears to be built into everyday scalar terms (for instance. purely territorialist. globalization. and economic life.) insofar as they represent distinctive socio-territorial processes (for instance. urbanization. in this context. a ‘multifaceted causality runs in virtually all directions among the various levels of society: nations.Introduction 7 1998). For. large cities. leading to a ‘complex intertwining of institutions at all levels of the world. meanwhile. urban. and consequences of such rescaling processes in contemporary western Europe.) as if they were static entities frozen permanently into geographical space. is to examine the dissolution of the nationally centered. dynamics. but are today being permeated by new types of vertical and horizontal linkages among diverse. political. nationalization. regionalization. from the global arena to the regional level’ (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997: 470). local. above all with reference to the rescaling of state spatial regulation and urban policy.

or globalization) rather than as a permanently fixed. this task is now being directly confronted. international relations. scalar hierarchies are not fixed or pregiven scaffolds of social interaction. 4 . regional. national and global events and processes. ‘scales and their nested articulations become produced as temporary standoffs in a perpetual transformative sociospatial power struggle’. 1992a. 1990. In the rapidly expanding literature on the social production of geographical scale. Far from The literature on the social production of spatial scale has expanded rapidly during the last decade. however. nation- alization. of localization. regionalization. not fixed universals of social experience.8 Introduction exacerbated still further by the circumstance that much of the social-scientific division of labor is organized according to distinctive scalar foci—for instance. Conceptualizing the intrinsic relationality of all geographical scales and their embedd- edness within broader interscalar hierarchies. as Swyngedouw (1997: 141) has proposed.1). and so forth—which systematically obstruct efforts to explore the intricacies of interscalar relations.4 As contributors to this literature have convincingly argued. Approaching the scale question Today the question of scale inserts itself at the outset—at the foundation. pregiven thing. As Smith (1995: 60–1) explains: Geographical scale is traditionally treated as a neutral metric of physical space: specific scales of social activity are assumed to be largely given as in the distinction between urban. Key methodological challenges: . ] Geographical scale is socially produced as simultaneously a platform and container of certain kinds of social activity. italics added). see Smith 1993. Conceptualizing scale as a process (for instance. . nor are they an arbitrary methodological or conceptual choice [ . For foundational statements. but are themselves produced and periodically modified in and through that interaction. see Marston 2000. it is necessary to elaborate a dialectical approach to scaling processes under capitalism that is capable of capturing the ways in which. urban studies. regional studies. as it were—of the analysis of texts and the interpretation of events (Lefebvre 1976a: 67–8. . comparative politics. a considerable literature arguing that the geographical scales of human activity are not neutral ‘givens’. In order to confront the scale question effectively. I shall refer to this cluster of methodological dilemmas as the ‘scale question’ (Box 1.1. . Drawing upon Lefebvre’s (1976a: 67–8) terminology. There is now. Box 1. 1992. For a detailed overview of more recent work. . Developing postdisciplinary methodologies that emphasize interscalar relations and multiscalar transformations rather than ontologizing the distinct scalar foci upon which traditional disciplinary divisions of labor have been grounded. and Swyngedouw 1997.

It is this vertical ordering of social. geographical scale—or. the hierarchization of spaces in relation to one another. or territories. fixed. From this point of view. acted on or studied’ (Agnew 1997: 100).Introduction 9 neutral and fixed. I shall also have occasion. Box 1. geographical scales are the product of economic. above all. political and social activities and relationships. welfare state retrenchment. economic. Box 1. to consider the relationship between the rescaling of state space and the rescaling of other institutional forms—in particular. capitalist economies and urban systems. . Geographical scales are not static. Representative definitions include the following: . and therefore malleable. The contemporary period of intensified geoeconomic integration. more precisely. Scale is the ‘geographical resolution of contradictory processes of competition and co- operation’ (Smith 1993: 99). the process of scaling—is tied intrinsically to what Collinge (1999) has termed the ‘vertical ordering’ of social formations.2 summarizes the conceptualization of scaling processes that underpins this analysis. but emphasizes. and political practices that defines scalar organization in any social formation. . In addition to this ‘horizontal’ or ‘areal’ differentiation of social practices across geographical space. therefore. Scale is a ‘nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size’ (Delaney and Leitner 1997: 93).2. A number of propositions follow from this initial conceptualization: 1. the urban. as such they are as changeable as those relationships themselves. there is also a ‘vertical’ differentiation in which social relations are embedded within a hierarchical scaffolding of nested territorial units stretching from the global. dimensions of particular social processes— .) In recent scholarship. Scale is the ‘geographical organizer and expression of collective social action’ (Smith 1995: 61). The scaling of social processes. and accelerated urban-regional restructuring provides a dramatic illustration of this proposition. for it has arguably entailed one of the most wide-ranging and transformative rearticulations of scalar arrangements ever to have occurred in the history of capitalist development (Swyngedouw 2000a). at various junctures of this study. 2000a. the local. They are best understood as socially produced. the metropolitan. geographical scale has been defined in a variety of ways. Scale is ‘the level of geographical resolution at which a given phenomenon is thought of. and the body. the supranational. I shall interpret the reworking of state space in post-1970s western Europe as an important medium. and the national downwards to the regional. Theorizing scale and rescaling processes: core propositions (See also Brenner 2001a. . and expression of these broader rescaling processes. catalyst. or permanent properties of the social world or of social spatiality as such. Europeanization. localities. The geographical dimensions of social life consist not only in the fact that social relations assume contextually specific forms in different places. The conceptualization of geographical scale used in this book is broadly compatible with the aforementioned definitions. 1998a.

The long-run historical geography of capitalist development has been grounded upon a succession of determinate. Throughout much of the history of capitalism. regional. in terms of its upwards. national. Mosaics of scalar organization. The relationality of scales. the scalar configuration of capitalism as a whole may be described as a mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating scalar hierarchies (Lefebvre 1991). At the same time. 4. reproducing. the significance of scalar terms such as global. 3. conflicts. and remade. Howitt 1998). 5. Insofar as every social process or institutional form may be associated with a distinctive pattern of scalar organization. economic. and struggles (Swyngedouw 1997. such an account must also specify the relevant spatial units within that hierarchy. all-encompassing scalar pyramid into which all social processes and institutional forms are neatly subsumed. Insofar as any social. Concomitantly. destroying. national state institutions have played a significant role in constructing. Such scalar fixes are composed of temporarily stabilized geographical hierarchies in which social. This is because ‘different kinds of social process have very different geographies and they do not all fit neatly into the same set of nested hierarchies’ (Allen. Jonas 1994). and dynamics of any one geographical scale can only be grasped relationally. and transversal links to other geographical scales situated within the broader scalar order in which it is embedded (Lefebvre 1991: 85–8. and sociopolitical struggle. geographical scales provide a ‘partitioned geography’ within which diverse forms of social interaction unfold. downwards. the differentiation of social processes into determinate scalar hierarchies is never accomplished once and for all. Any systematic account of scaling processes under capitalism must therefore begin with an analysis of how. and when the social process or institution in question has been subdivided into a vertical hierarchy of separate yet intertwined geographical scales. why. The major large-scale institutional forms of modern capitalism—such as capitalist firms and national states—interact and evolve continually to produce certain ‘nested hierarchical structures of organization’ (Harvey 1982: 422) that enframe social life within provisionally solidified ‘scalar fixes’ (Smith 1995). The scalar organization of a social process or institutional form may thus become an object of direct sociopolitical contestation and may. modifying. state regulation. by consequence. Scalar fixes. junked. The institutional configuration. Consequently. and creating anew such scalar fixes (Brenner 1998a). Scalar transformations. scalar fixes through which the socioterritorial preconditions for capital accumulation have been successively secured.10 Introduction such as capitalist production. Scale cannot be construed as a system of nested territorial containers defined by absolute geographic size (a ‘Russian dolls’ model of scales). Once established. the problem of its scalar organization arises. political. and local is likely to differ qualitatively depending on the specific social processes or institutional forms to which they refer. As Smith (1993: 101) indicates. these scalar hierarchies constitute relatively ‘fixed geographical structures bounding political. urban. functions. history. social reproduction. Massey. if chronically unstable. economic and cultural activity in specific ways’ (Smith 1995: 63). but is continually forged through everyday practices. be recalibrated. fully formed one. their evolving role within the hierarchy and their changing relation to other units within that hierarchy. and Cochrane 1998: 60). 2. or economic process is internally differentiated into a vertical hierarchy of distinct spatial units. The institutional landscape of capitalism is not characterized by a single. and political activities organized at some scales tend to predominate over others (Collinge 1999). or the total disappearance of . destabilized. Processes of rescaling do not entail the simple replacement of one scalar configuration by another.

In the following chapters. There are. Gough 2004. and the remaking of urban governance. including: Cerny 1995. On the contrary.5 My analysis is thus intended as a contribution to ongoing social-scientific research on contemporary rescaling processes and their implications for social. K. such debates have recurred periodically within the social sciences since their institutionalization in the late nineteenth century. certainly. Smith 2004. inherited scalar configurations may close off certain pathways of rescaling by circumscribing the production of new scales within determinate institutional and geographical parameters. 1996. 5 The definition of the new political economy of scale provided above is intentionally broad. MacLeod 2001. Leitner 2004. Leitner and Sheppard 2002. 1995. other theoretical perspectives. often highly experimental strategies to transform the latter. The dominant scalar orderings of one historical period may thus strongly condition and constrain the development of subsequent scalar configurations. Sheppard 2002. 1997. The new political economy of scale may be usefully contrasted to what might be termed the ‘old’ political economy of scale. Hollingsworth 1998. A number of methodologically reflexive and theoretically innovative accounts of contemporary rescaling processes have been developed in the vast interdisciplinary literatures on geopolitical economy. I develop and deploy one particular strategy for investigating the new political economy of scale in the context of recent scholarly debates on globalization. Newman 1999. D. MacLeod and Goodwin 1999. even in the midst of intense pressures to restructure a given scalar order. Eisenschitz and Gough 1996.Introduction 11 some scales as others supersede them. Jones 2001. Box 1. that social scientists have explicitly recognized the historically malleable and politically contested character of scalar organization. political. I am concerned to explore what Jessop (2002: 179) has recently termed the ‘new political economy of scale’. Swyngedouw 2000a. reflexive concern to decode the multifarious ways in which inherited forms of scalar organization are being systematically rejigged. I believe that contemporary rescaling processes pose fundamental theoretical and methodological challenges for social scientists concerned to analyze the changing institutional landscapes of contemporary capitalism. rescaling processes generally occur through a path-dependent interaction of inherited scalar arrangements with emergent. Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997. and empirical focal points through which contemporary rescaling processes may be fruitfully investigated. they are generally destabilized and transformed only in the wake of intense sociopolitical struggles. however. which involved epistemological debates regarding the appropriate unit of analysis for social-scientific investigation. Herod 1997. . Consequently. methodological orientations. It is only recently. Peck and Tickell 1994. Kelly 1999. While established patterns of interscalar relations are never permanently fixed. Jessop 2002. 2002. Peck 2002. In sum.3 (overleaf) summarizes the key elements of the new political economy of scale that are explored in this book. As Wallerstein (1991) has shown. Schmitter 1999. Larner and Walters 2002. and economic life under early twenty-first century capitalism. Heeg 2001. and thus encompasses extremely diverse strands of political-economic research. the transformation of statehood. Cox 1997. The new political economy of scale is thus grounded upon an explicit.

and emergent scalar configurations do not overlap with one another in neatly isomorphic. In each of these institutional arenas. and economic processes under capitalism are not distributed uniformly or homogenously across the earth’s surface. but are . . The emergent scalar architecture of globalizing. new scales of organization are being developed and new horizons of action are being imagined . Instead. It keeps coming back in new forms Richard Walker (1997: 345) My investigation of state rescaling is centrally concerned with the regulation of capitalist urbanization and. spaces or scales that are merely being reordered. privileged scale of political-economic organization. (Jessop 2002: 179) . congruent patterns.12 Introduction Box 1. centrifugal and vortical ways’ (Jessop 2002: 180). the scalar configuration of major institutional forms and social processes—including capital accumulation. centripetal. polarized territories: reworking uneven spatial development The old bugbear of uneven development refuses to go away despite the blurring of borders and extension of transnational corporations.3. state regulation. neoliberalizing capitalism is more complex. Fordist-Keynesian period. political. horizontal. . we are currently witnessing a proliferation of strategies intended to dismantle inherited scalar configurations and to produce qualitatively new scalar hierarchies. new spaces are being created. Rescaled states. and volatile than the nationalized interscalar arrangements of the postwar. Key elements of the new political economy of scale There is no new privileged scale around which other levels are now being organized to ensure structured coherence within and across scales. Geographical scales and interscalar hierarchies are continually produced and contested as arenas and outcomes of collective social action. eccentric. they may be modified or transformed during the process of sociohistorical development (Smith 1995). . Instead there are continuing struggles over which spatial scale should become primary and how scales should be articulated and this is reflected in a more complex nesting and interweaving of different scales as they become rearticulated [ . tangled. uneven geographical development refers to the circumstance that social. new places are emerging. . Consequently. Under contemporary conditions. urbanization and sociopolitical mobilization—is being destabilized. . There is no longer a single. with the changing political form and institutional mediation of uneven geographical development. As such. In the most general terms. . diagonal. more generally. ‘different scales of action come to be linked in various hybrid combinations of vertical. ] The new political economy of scale does not involve a pregiven set of places.

but are reworked continually through capital’s restless developmental dynamic 6 Key contributions include Harvey 1982. regional. within a capitalist political-economic system. and scales. While these patterns of core–periphery polarization are always articulated in contextually specific forms. the coercive forces of intercapitalist competition pressure individual capitals to replicate one another‘s profit-making strategies in dispersed geographical locations. Storper and Walker 1989). Thus. among divergent geographical scales stretching from the local. On the other hand. household-. Consequently. and scale-specific conditions for accumulation. but also spatially. The study of uneven development has long been one of the foundational concerns of critical geographical political economy. supranational economic blocs. Soja 1989. and thus tend to equalize the conditions for capital accumulation across space. national territories. concomitantly. Smith 1990. The contours of this uneven geography are not inscribed permanently onto the institutional landscapes of capitalism. they represent systemic expressions of the endemic tension under capitalism between the drive to equalize capital investment across space and the pressure to differentiate such investment in order to exploit place-. . These patterns of sociospatial polarization crystallize horizontally.6 As Smith (1990) argues in his seminal work on the topic. places. Amin 1979. and so forth—that are characterized by divergent socioeconomic conditions. inequalities are not only expressed socially. the chronic marginalization or peripheralization of other. through the polarization of development among different territories. in the form of class and income stratification. among different types of places and territories. or firmlevel locational decisions. . regions. and also vertically. contingent by-products of precapitalist geographical differences or of individual-. regional clusters.Introduction 13 always organized within distinct sociospatial configurations—such as urban agglomerations. rural zones. Massey 1985. Rather. . developmental capacities. and Storper and Walker 1989. and national to the continental and global (Smith 1990). each phase of capitalism is grounded upon historically specific patterns of uneven geographical development in and through which the contradictory interplay of equalization and differentiation is articulated. On the one hand. the forces of intercapitalist competition engender an equally powerful process of geographical differentiation in which individual capitals continually seek out place-specific locational assets and territorially specific conditions of production that may enable them to enhance their competitive advantages. and institutional arrangements. territory-. they generally entail the systematic concentration of advanced socioeconomic assets and developmental capacities within certain core zones and. less developed places and territories (S. patterns of uneven geographical development under capitalism are not merely the accidental.

leading to a premature downgrading of local infrastructures and to worsening life conditions for many local inhabitants (Leborgne and Lipietz 1991). And finally. class fractions. leading in turn to severe legitimation crises (Hudson 2001). For instance. is not merely an aggregate geographical effect of differential patterns of capital investment. since the consolidation of organized capitalism during the early twentieth century. national states have deployed a variety of spatial policies designed to influence the geographies of capital investment and. While most studies of uneven geographical development have focused upon the interplay between capital investment patterns and the evolution of territorial inequalities. both within and beyond the circuit of capital. Lefebvre 2003a. but it may also generate dysfunctional political-economic effects that destabilize the space-economy as a whole. social movements. at various scales. and various negative externalities (such as infrastructural stress. to manage the process of uneven development within their territorial boundaries (Hudson 2001. the threat of capital flight. under certain conditions. and environmental degradation) unsettle established patterns of industrial development. thereby. dynamic urban agglomerations. the polarization of territorial development between dynamic urban cores and peripheralized regions may enable certain individual capitals to reap the benefits of scale economies and other externalities. growth coalitions. Uneven geographical development is thus associated not only with new profit-making opportunities for capital. disruptive effects that can erode the socio-territorial preconditions for sustainable capital accumulation. Uneven development. Each historical pattern of uneven geographical development is also intertwined with certain basic regulatory dilemmas: for the uneven development of capital serves not only as a basis for the accumulation process but may also. Massey 1985). in mediating and regulating that interplay. the problem of uneven development may also ‘come home to roost’ (Harvey 1989b: 144) as social polarization. overproduction. For instance. that may severely destabilize the accumulation process as a whole (Peck and Tickell 1995). national states may mobilize strategies of territorial redistribution and other compensatory regional policies to promote the dispersion . but also with potentially destabilizing. become a significant barrier to the latter (Harvey 1982).14 Introduction and through successive political strategies to subject it to some measure of state regulatory control. housing shortages. and other place-based alliances—may arise within a (national or local) territory. traffic congestion. this book explores the major role of state institutions. An erosion of national industrial capacities may ensue as declining industrial cities and peripheralized regional economies are constrained to adopt defensive. even within the most powerful. Moreover. but generates a variety of fundamental regulatory problems. disruptive sociopolitical conflicts—between classes. if patterns of sociospatial inequality are not maintained within politically acceptable limits. cost-based strategies of adjustment. in other words. Such an inquiry is of considerable importance because.

Introduction 15 of industry across their territories. since the late 1970s. most national states introduced nationally redistributive. growthoriented approaches to spatial policy have increasingly superseded previously dominant forms of territorial redistribution (Martin and Sunley 1997). and infrastructural investments within the most economically dynamic urban regions. growth-oriented. and have frequently generated any number of unintended. . cohesion-oriented and developmentalist. While these opposed approaches to state spatial policy have often failed to achieve their declared goals. as the Fordist regime of accumulation was being destabilized (Clout 1981a). state spatial policies have combined the priorities of cohesion and growth in distinctive. 5 and 6). city-centric. national states may also mobilize diametrically opposed spatial policies to facilitate the concentration of growth capacities. While I shall devote considerable attention to the consolidation of redistributive. and thus alleviate intra-national territorial inequalities. growth-oriented forms of state spatial policy is derived from the underlying contradiction within capitalist social formations ‘between [the treatment of] a location as a socially produced place to which its inhabitants are attached and [its treatment] as part of a socially produced space in which capital can make profits’. Such strategies reached their historical highpoint during the mid-1970s. regional. a variety of entrepreneurial. and often deeply contradictory ways. In the western European context. cohesion-oriented regulatory strategies during the postwar. they must both be acknowledged as essential mediating influences upon the process of uneven geographical development at all spatial scales. Subsequently. As Hudson (2001: 273) explains. inherited programs of intra-national territorial redistribution were scaled back. I am equally concerned with the post-Keynesian. Subsequently. Initially. FordistKeynesian period (Ch. during the course of the 1980s. Leitner and Sheppard 7 This formulation parallels Logan and Molotch’s (1987) emphasis on the dual role of places as usevalues and exchange-values under capitalism. with the ascendancy of neoliberalism and the imposition of new forms of fiscal austerity by national governments during the second half of the 1970s. 4). the endemic political tension between redistributive. and competitiveness-driven approaches to state spatial policy that have been deployed since the late 1970s (Chs. dysfunctional effects. centralized economic management. Such policy initiatives were aimed primarily at reducing public expenditures and at undermining traditional forms of dirigiste. competitiveness-oriented regulatory experiments were mobilized by national. socioeconomic assets. thereby exposing local and regional economies more directly to the pressures of Europe-wide and even global economic competition. historically specific.7 During the course of twentieth-century capitalist development. and local state institutions in order to promote economic rejuvenation within strategic subnational spaces (Harvey 1989a. However. cohesion-oriented regulatory strategies during the 1930s.

but actively to intensify it through the deployment of urban locational policies designed to strengthen the place-specific socioeconomic assets of strategic. Thus. cohesive. and integrated locational pattern throughout the national territory. disruptive. however. under these conditions. rather than continuing to serve as a localized relay station within national systems of territorial redistribution. through the deployment of urban locational policies. with the rescaling of state space and the proliferation of urban locational policies during the post-1970s period. a ‘parallel mosaic of differentiated spaces of regulation’ is being established through ongoing processes of state rescaling and urban policy reform (Goodwin and Painter 1996: 646). the systemic failure of this rescaled. this project of national territorial equalization has been fundamentally inverted: it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space. The task of state spatial intervention. for its central aim is to promote the competitiveness of particular territorial locations within broader spaces of competition at European and global scales (Brenner 2000b). In this manner. Such urban locational policies have not only attempted to ‘turn localities [or regions] into selfpromoting islands of entrepreneurship’ (Amin and Malmberg 1994: 243). they have also entailed a fundamental redefinition of the national state’s role as an institutional mediator of uneven geographical development. urban policy has been transformed during the post-1970s period into a field of state intervention whose overarching goal is to promote localized territorial competitiveness within a European and global context. state space is now being redifferentiated and rescaled so as to correspond more directly to the (actual or projected) imprint of transnational capital’s locational preferences within each national territory. within the polarized economic geographies of post-Keynesian western Europe. The German term Standortpolitik—which translates roughly as ‘locational policy’—provides an appropriate characterization of this rescaled approach to urban policy. The relatively uniform. and local state spatial policies is no longer to alleviate uneven geographical development. nationalized administrative geographies of postwar capitalism are thus being superseded by what might be described as a ‘splintered’ (Graham and Marvin 2001) institutional configuration composed of customized. During the Fordist-Keynesian period. In other words.16 Introduction 1998). but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital. post-Keynesian urban policy regime to confront the polarizing. and politically volatile effects of uneven geographical development at any spatial scale . placespecific regulatory arrangements designed to position particular subnational jurisdictions strategically within global and European circuits of capital. The goal of national. regional. globally linked city-regions. This latter transformation is central to this book’s argument. was to mold the geography of capital investment into a more balanced. the problem of uneven geographical development was generally construed as a matter of redressing ‘insufficient’ or ‘imbalanced’ industrialization on a national scale. As we shall see. By contrast.

Between generality and diversity: levels of abstraction and empirical focus In contemporary debates on globalization. I shall analyze the evolution of state rescaling processes during the last three decades not only with reference to the proliferation of urban locational polices. Scholte 2000.Introduction 17 represents one of its major internal contradictions. under certain conditions. coordination problems. and thus deserve close analytical scrutiny. and municipal state institutions to mobilize a range of spatially selective crisis-management strategies that have involved a further extension and intensification of state rescaling processes. regional. Accordingly. and legitimation deficits that threaten the medium. political. competitiveness-oriented model of state spatial regulation. emphasizing instead the continued diversity of national. Others have vigorously rejected such predictions. Harding 1997. it may also generate severe negative externalities. Berger and Dore ´ ` 1996. Le Gales 2001. The following analysis suggests that a number of broadly analogous tendencies of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring have been 8 For useful overviews of these debates in various research fields see. In particular. Accordingly.and long-term reproduction of capital. Guillen 2001. and Scott 2001. as indicated above. and urban/regional restructuring. enhanced intra-metropolitan cooperation. For.8 While this book is not intended directly to contribute to such debates. as I argue in Ch. it may be useful to situate my argument in relation to them. and new forms of interurban networking have addressed at least some of the disruptive effects of unfettered uneven spatial development—albeit still within the parameters of an explicitly growth-driven. these alternative projects of state rescaling have entailed important institutional and scalar shifts within the architecture of European statehood. dysfunctional political-economic consequences of urban locational policies have become increasingly evident during the last decade. and local models of capitalism. . international political economy. provide a temporary basis for short-term bursts of capital accumulation. encompassing organizational pattern. the specter of ‘convergence’ has generated considerable scholarly controversy. As such. I shall consider the deployment of new. while unfettered uneven development may. 6. regional. for instance. Boyer 1996. and economic structures towards a uniform. In each of these fields. recent projects to promote neighborhood-based anti-exclusion programs. a number of scholars have forecast the eventual convergence of social. the disruptive. leading the European Commission and diverse national. highly scale-sensitive forms of crisismanagement which have attempted—albeit unsuccessfully—to alleviate some of the regulatory failures of such policies. In addition.

Evidence for such an underlying structural transformation of state spatiality has become apparent across western Europe since the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. It is also evident that these shifts have unfolded at divergent speeds and in diverse politicoinstitutional forms within each national context. Harding 1997. my aim is to explore the major elements of what I view as a systemic reorganization of state spatiality across western Europe during the last three decades. and reproducible ‘post-Fordist’ framework of territorial development has crystallized through these variegated. 1. Instead. that regulatory responses to the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism have reconfigured the landscapes of western European statehood in a number of quite fundamental ways that can be analyzed in general terms. even in the midst of otherwise persistently diverse institutional frameworks and regulatory geographies. generic model of territorial governance has emerged. yet appropriately detailed. and local scales. whether a coherent. each of which is central to my argument (Fig. in my view. One of the central tasks of this study is to present such evidence in a synthetic. and DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999. and the divergence of evolutionary pathways—are as salient as ever under contemporary geoeconomic conditions (Brenner 2001b). and profoundly uneven transformations (Peck and Tickell 1994). the analysis presented in this book has a different purpose than to demonstrate the variety of local or national responses to geoeconomic restructuring. urban regime formation. Marcuse and van Kempen 2001. On the contrary. path dependency. 9 . 1. institutional diversity. systemic features of a given historical social system. Consideration of the abstract level enables scholars to examine the general. contested. nonetheless. my emphasis on these shared pathways of institutional and spatial reorganization among western European states should not be construed as an endorsement of the view that a single. this level may See e.1). I shall argue. Sellers 2002. across multiple national contexts (see also Jessop 2002). see Logan and Swanstrom 1990. Savitch and Kantor 2002. For an early foray into such research. leading to highly variegated sociospatial outcomes at national.9 While I am highly sympathetic to such approaches. However. form and to explicate its ramifications for the interpretation of contemporary statehood. regional. A number of urbanists have recently directed attention to the latter issues through detailed comparative studies of economic restructuring. It is highly questionable.g. Abstract level. The methodological approach deployed here can be further clarified by distinguishing three levels of abstraction. I believe that individualizing and variation-finding comparisons (Tilly 1990)—which generally emphasize contextual specificity. and patterns of sociospatial polarization in western European and North American cities.18 Introduction crystallizing across western Europe during the last three decades. Depending on the degree to which such ‘concrete abstractions’ underpin social life within a particular historical-geographical context. stabilized.

and events 1960--2000 Nationally. Levels of abstraction considered in this book . rescaling of state sapce. production of new geographies of uneven geographical development Nationally. conjunctures. 1. focuses on relatively shortterm time scales. institutional change. urban-regional Consolidation restructuring. empirical developments. focuses on longue durée temporalities MESO-LEVEL emphasizes historically specific dimensions of general processes and generalized aspects of concrete. and of Keynesian crystallization welfare of new territorial national states inequalities (KWNS) and at various spatial nationalized scales spatial planning systems Crisis of traditional Keynesian macroeconomic instruments and compensatory spatial policies Early 1980s--present: post--Keynesian regulatory experimentation Accelerated geoeconomic and European integration coupled with an enhanced dependence of transnational capital upon localized agglomeration economies Intensification of interlocality competition and sociospatial polarization at global. focuses on secular trends within mediumterm time scales General features of capitalism as a mode of production and social system General features of capitalist urbanization and capitalist sociospatial configurations General features of modern statehood and modern state spatial organization 19 1960s-. regionally. and locally specific pathways of industrial restructuring and urban-regional change. and regulatory experimentation in western European cities and states Fig. emergence Fordist patterns of flexible/lean of urbanization production systems and regional development Industrial decline. and national scales Consolidation of postKeynesian competition state regimes.early 1970s: high Fordism 1970s: period of systemic shock and initial transition Fordist regime Crisis of Fordist of accumulation mass production systems. and locally specific pathways of state spatial restructuring and regulatory experimentation. production of new state spatial configurations and regulatory landscapes Empirical foundations: case study material on state spatial restructuring. regionally. the proliferation of subnational locational policies (Standortpolitik) CONCRETE LEVEL emphasizes empirical diversity.Introduction ABSTRACT LEVEL emphasizes theoretical generality.1. European.

regulatory practices and developmental tendencies. underlying properties define their core objects of analysis. the abstract level is an essential analytical lens (Postone 1993). for it is on this level that fundamental questions regarding the character of contemporary large-scale social. In a capitalist context. the meso level reveals the underlying regularities that tie together these variegated contexts within a shared historical-geographical configuration. The concrete level refers to the contextually specific political-economic frameworks and territorial configurations through which 10 For detailed overviews of the regulation approach. Insofar as the meso level refers to certain entrenched but potentially malleable institutional arrangements. urban restructuring. 2. Concrete level. Meso level.10 While considerable institutional diversity and geographical unevenness may obtain among distinct national. and comparative political economists. For instance. political. macrohistorical sociologists. class struggle. 1990b. it involves the analysis of secular trends over a medium-term time scale. in which abstract social forms play a critical role in mediating social interaction and historical change. Insofar as the abstract level denotes certain deep structures of social life that persist even through tumultuous gales of sociohistorical ´ change. the tendency towards large-scale urbanization. regularized forms in which the system’s underlying social processes—such as commodification. and state regulation—are articulated.20 Introduction be more or less useful to sociological inquiry. regional. a number of systemic processes that underpin all capitalist social formations—for instance. even though the latter are often taken for granted rather than explicitly interrogated. and state regulation usually presuppose that certain general. generally a period of several decades. Within modern capitalist social formations. and economic transformations can be posed. 1995. urbanization. particularly among globalization theorists. It is on this level. therefore. the meso level differs from the abstract level because it illuminates the historically specific. the accumulation of capital. Boyer and Saillard 2002. regulatory frameworks. empirical studies of industrial production. or local contexts within such encompassing modes of development. MacLeod 1997. Under modern capitalism. see Boyer 1990. that periodizations of capitalist development are most commonly developed. The meso level has recently become a focal point for major scholarly controversies. Jessop 1997. the abstract level provides a basis for examining. 3. in general terms. and so forth (Harvey 1982). state theorists. The meso level refers to the relatively durable institutional arrangements. and territorial configurations that underpin distinct periods of historical development. the French regulationist categories of regime of accumulation and mode of regulation are articulated on the meso-level insofar as they attempt to identify certain historically specific institutional forms and regulatory practices that temporarily displace the endemic contradictions of capitalism. . the commodification of labor power. it is generally associated with longue duree time scales. the separation of the economic and the political. In capitalist contexts. capital accumulation.

epistemological vantage points for social theory and research. or local political economies. . On this basis. Marcuse and van Kempen 2001). neo-Marxist state theory (Radice 1999. urban policy change. political. In a capitalist context. and macroeconomic policy. regulatory practices. and the process of geoeconomic integration—research on the varieties of capitalism has been conducted primarily on a concrete level. even while acknowledging the impacts of recent meso-level transformations—such as the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. I consider the concrete level at considerable length in order to specify the major patterns of state rescaling. such as conjunctures and events. Scott and Storper 1986). Rather. it is usually concerned with relatively short-term time scales. and states can be most coherently investigated. For instance. 1999. the retrenchment of the Keynesian welfare national state.11 The most sophisticated concrete research on the geopolitical economy of capitalism is characterized by an explicit effort to relate contextually specific institutional dynamics and outcomes to broader. if dialectically intertwined. Berger and Dore 1996.Introduction 21 everyday social reproduction unfolds. 2000. meso-level transformations. 2 and 3). capitalist sociospatial configurations. and regulatory experimentation that 11 See. consideration of each of these levels can generate useful insights about social. industrial relations. my overarching analytical concern is with the meso level—for it is on this level that the possibility of a systemic reorganization of state spatial structures and scalar hierarchies across multiple cities. regions. the meso level. The abstract level. and comparative urban studies (Abu-Lughod 1999. and the modern state form (Chs. This has arguably been one of the key accomplishments of recent work in regulation theory (Boyer and Saillard 2001. Accordingly. Panitch and Gindin 2003). In light of the foregoing discussion. regional. they represent three analytically distinct. corporate governance. therefore. Insofar as the concrete level entails a focus on the contextually specific features of national. and sociospatial arrangements are most readily apparent. A key intellectual task. Hall and Soskice 2001. state institutional hierarchies. Kitschelt et al. I consider the abstract level in order to explicate certain basic features of the capital relation. Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997. for it is here that the particular properties of production systems. It is on this level that the differences among distinct national. Lipietz 2001). is to combine these levels of analysis effectively in order to pursue particular research questions. this literature has fruitfully explored a number of key empirical issues regarding the restructuring of national systems of technological innovation. for instance. the new industrial geography (Storper and Salais 1997. and economic relations that could not be gleaned through an exclusive focus upon either of the others. regional. to name just a few representative strands of contemporary research on capitalist restructuring. Likewise. In this book. finance. it is clear that such an analysis must build upon the abstract and concrete levels as well. and local models of capitalism can be observed most coherently. however. and the concrete level are not to be conceived as ontologically separate spheres of social life.

however. state spatial policy. regional.22 Introduction have crystallized in different western European cities. among other topics. regions. both in my own research and in the vast scholarly literatures on. In this view. Instead. convergence is expressed in the form of an increasing empirical identity among policies or institutions in different national. Europe-wide transformation of statehood. or local outcomes. Denmark. My focus on the meso level should therefore not be construed as a denial of the institutional diversity that can be readily observed on the concrete level. during the 1960–2000 period. has in turn mobilized a variety of spatial policies throughout the European territory. regions. and 6). is to situate the extensive case-study based literature on urban governance restructuring in a broader geohistorical and theoretical context. the demarcation of meso-level commonalities among distinct political-economic contexts is entirely consistent with an insistence upon continued empirical diversity and politico-institutional variation among those contexts. It represents a major scale on which new competitive pressures have been exerted upon cities and regions. and cities may find that my account neglects important contextual details regarding many of the institutional changes and policy realignments under discussion. 4. and urban policy. that they will find my meso-level claims to be broadly consistent with the basic facts of contemporary trends in the states. and the Netherlands.12 Although major transformations of state spatiality and urban governance are currently occurring throughout the world economy. Italy. I would hope. regionally. On the contrary. in drawing upon such concrete research. My aim. and locally specific trajectories of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring. This empirical focus enables me to contain the investigation within a single macrogeographical region. whose member states have become increasingly interdependent during the period examined here. the European Union (EU). intergovernmental relations. The EU constitutes a key institutional arena. through the investigation of nationally. nonetheless. France. the meso-level analysis elaborated in this book is grounded upon extensive empirical case studies of such trajectories. and cities with which they are most familiar. and nationally specific trends to be expressions and catalysts of a systemic. I deploy such research as an empirical foundation on which to articulate broader. The bulk of the book’s empirical material refers to realignments. the EU Commission. this book focuses upon western European developments. regionally. urban governance. regions. urban infrastructural systems. However. and product of the rescaling processes examined in this book. my concern is not to explain the nuances of particular cases. particularly since the consolidation of the Single European Market in 12 Much of the current debate on convergence is focused largely upon the concrete level. in Britain. and whose institutional apex. Experts on specific states. and states during the last four decades (Chs. regional. agent. . Germany. or to engage in a systematic comparative analysis of different national. in proceeding in this manner. meso-level generalizations regarding the new state spaces that have been crystallizing across western Europe. As the preceding discussion suggests. thereby revealing locally. 5. or local contexts.

and cultural processes are being undermined (Jessop and Sum 2001. My goal. While I shall not attempt to investigate such matters here. conceptual tools and methodological strategies are adopted with reference to the challenges of making sense of particular social phenomena rather than on the basis of traditional disciplinary divisions of labor. economic. The contemporary round of global sociospatial restructuring has also unsettled the state-centric geographical assumptions that have long underpinned traditional. Under these conditions. It would be of considerable interest to explore the degree to which analogous trajectories of state rescaling and urban governance reform have crystallized in other major capitalist super-regions. It differs from those things precisely because it requires us to follow connections. postdisciplinary approaches to social analysis have become increasingly relevant in an era in which established divisions between social. Within such approaches. and political processes have been presumed to be geographically congruent within national state boundaries (see Ch. in fact since once is not dividing it up and selecting out elements appropriate to a particular discipline. political. 5 and 6). on the contrary. I believe that many of the core theoretical categories and research strategies introduced in the chapters that follow could provide an initial methodological basis for confronting such questions. at the margins of the traditional disciplinary division of labor. Wallerstein 1991). economic. It doesn’t mean dilettantism or eclecticism. it also represents an increasingly important level of supranational policy formation (see Chs. . is to contribute to the advancement of what Sayer (1999) has aptly described as ‘postdisciplinary’ modes of social inquiry. One can still study a coherent group of phenomena. As Sayer (1999: 3) explains: Postdisciplinary studies emerge when scholars forget about disciplines and whether ideas can be identified with any particular one. new heterodox modes of analysis are being developed that (a) explore the mutually constitutive relationships among social. in which social. Towards a postdisciplinary approach to the study of new state spaces This study does not fit neatly into established disciplinary approaches to social science. such as North America and East Asia. ending up doing a lot of things badly. They follow ideas and connections wherever they lead instead of following them only as far as the border of the discipline. disciplinary approaches to social science. political. 2 below). it can be more coherent than disciplinary studies. and cultural processes and (b) introduce alternative mappings of political-economic life that do not naturalize nationalized forms of sociospatial organization. they identify with learning rather than with disciplines. Such heterodox.Introduction 23 1993. economic.

arguing instead for a more synthetic. with the proliferation of institutional. Although this line of research was pioneered by geographers. and empirical research (for a recent overview. if not postdisciplinary. during the last decade. multiperspectival approach to the study of urban sociospatial dynamics. see Soja 2000). and political-economic modes of analysis and in developing new understandings of the production and transformation of urban space. which never embraced traditional disciplinary boundaries. my analysis of state restructuring is premised upon the assumption . Lefebvre (1996 [1968]) lambasted mainstream social science for its fragmentation of urban life in the name of scientific objectivity. neo-Polanyian approaches to economic sociology (Block 1994). Gupta and Ferguson 2002). During the last three decades. many scholars have begun to acknowledge the multifaceted character of statehood and. most work on the nature of statehood has been oriented towards the specific methodological and thematic concerns of particular disciplinary or subdisciplinary communities. Lefebvre’s critique of mainstream urban studies has been taken to heart by a variety of critical urbanists. the growing interest in the cultural constitution of state forms (Steinmetz 1999). who have led the way in linking geographical. 2003a. These new theoretical paradigms include Foucauldian approaches.24 Introduction Over thirty years ago. this situation has changed through a number of key developments. Like other postdisciplinary approaches to geographical political economy. by implication. and intended to contribute to. This book is situated within. sociological. and the development of anthropological approaches to political life (Coronil 1998). these emergent. spatially attuned approaches to statehood are now being pursued by scholars from across the social sciences. Second. With the major exception of Marxist approaches. Although traditional disciplinary approaches to urban processes persist within mainstream sociology and political science. new theoretical approaches to state theory have been introduced that have likewise broadened the parameters of the field to explore a variety of key themes in an interdisciplinary. Nonetheless. the limitations of disciplinary ontologies. b). This has opened up the possibility for approaches to state theory that transcend the traditional focus on self-enclosed national state territories. Third. crosscutting currents of postdisciplinary scholarship within urban studies and state theory. and discourse analysis (Jessop 2001). feminist state theory. particularly in the context of debates on globalization and the future of statehood (Brenner et al. the field of critical urban studies has become an extraordinarily lively terrain for postdisciplinary theoretical debate. many state theorists have begun more explicitly to question nation state-centric models of political space and to develop new mappings of state spatiality (Agnew and Corbridge 1994. First. Goswami 2004. in part through a critical engagement with traditional Marxist models. It is only more recently that postdisciplinary approaches to state theory have been developed (Jessop 2001). methodological innovation. manner.

state spatial restructuring. This approach is then mobilized in order to characterize the broad patterns of state spatial regulation. rescaled forms of statehood that are currently emerging. Chapter 2 critically examines some of the major geographical assumptions that are implicit within recent interdisciplinary work on globalization and. Additionally. with the aim of developing a postdisciplinary perspective on the new state spaces that are currently being forged in western European city-regions and beyond. Chapter 5 investigates the rescaled. Chapter 2 concludes by outlining various core methodological challenges for spatialized research on global capitalist restructuring. in conjunction with widespread concerns about urban industrial decline. but mutually constitute one another at all spatial scales (Jessop 1990a. I develop such an approach through a systematic spatialization of Jessop’s (1990a) strategic-relational state theory. Structure of the book The rest of the book is organized as follows. Building upon these theoretical foundations. on this basis. Chapter 4 examines the consolidation and subsequent demise of spatial Keynesianism. the remainder of the book explores. While readers who are more directly interested in questions of state theory and urban governance than in the globalization debates may want to skip over this chapter. and state rescaling that have crystallized across western Europe during the last four decades. welfare . scalesensitive approach to state theory is needed in order to decipher the reterritorialized. and product of state rescaling processes during the last four decades in western Europe. develops an alternative. scale-sensitive conceptualization of contemporary political-economic transformations. mediator. the role of urban policy as an animateur. it introduces some of the key theoretical and methodological foundations for my subsequent analysis. and competitivenessdriven forms of state spatial policy and urban governance that began to crystallize as of the late 1970s. intensified interspatial competition. one of my key concerns is to transcend the geographical assumptions associated with mainstream. I argue that an explicitly spatialized.Introduction 25 that economic and political processes are not situated in ontologically distinct spheres. Chapter 3 addresses one of these challenges by developing a new theoretical approach to the changing geographies of statehood under modern capitalism. disciplinary approaches to the study of modern statehood. territorially redistributive approach to state spatial policy and urban governance that prevailed throughout most of western Europe from the early 1960s until the late 1970s. Poulantzas 1978. These assumptions will be specified and criticized at length in the chapters that follow. on meso and concrete levels. the nationalizing. Lefebvre 1978). growth-oriented.

these new urban locational policies served as key catalysts and expressions of broader processes of state rescaling. regulatory failures. I argue. they also contributed to an enhanced geographical differentiation of state regulatory arrangements and to an intensification of uneven spatial development across western Europe. During the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 6 develops a general interpretation of the deeply unstable. While these rescaled strategies of crisis-management have contributed to the further institutional and scalar differentiation of RCSRs. and interurban networking initiatives. I suggest that they have deepened rather than alleviated the political-economic dislocations. European integration. crisis-prone formation of state spatiality that has been consolidated through the institutionalization of urban locational policies in post-1980s western Europe. and I argue that it contains a number of chronic regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies. I then consider three alternative forms of state rescaling that have emerged. I refer to this new configuration of statehood as a Rescaled Competition State Regime (RCSR). . the establishment of an alternative. and economic globalization. in response to these problems—neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives. In the absence of a broader challenge to global and European neoliberalism. Finally. and territorial inequalities that were generated through previous rounds of urban locational policy. territorially redistributive framework of state spatial regulation at any geographical scale is likely to be an extremely difficult task.26 Introduction state retrenchment. metropolitan reform initiatives. during the 1990s and early 2000s. I argue.

consumption patterns. localities. . see.1 Yet. among other works. 1 The social-scientific literatures on globalization have grown immensely during the last two decades. For general overviews and extensive bibliographical guides. Erik Swyngedouw (2000a: 64) Introduction: rethinking the geographies of ‘globalization’ Since the early 1970s. environmental problems. transnational corporations. nationalism. citizenship.TWO The Globalization Debates: Opening Up to New Spaces? An argument can be made that social science has been too geographical and not sufficiently historical. forms of industrial organization. technological change. the financialization of capital. in the sense that geographical assumptions have trapped consideration of social and political-economic processes in geographical structures and containers that defy historical change. marginalises and silences an intense and ongoing sociospatial struggle in which the reconfiguration of spatial scales of governance takes a central position . ideologies. Contemporary research on globalization encompasses an immensely broad range of themes. democracy. . debates have raged throughout the social sciences concerning the process of ‘globalization’—an essentially contested term whose meaning is as much a source of controversy today as it was nearly three decades ago. from the new international division of labor. when systematic research first began on the topic. war. politico-cultural identities. . the consolidation of neoliberalism and urban-regional restructuring to transformations of state power. and architectural forms. despite this proliferation of research on the topic. public spheres. civil society. John Agnew (1995: 379) the preeminence of the ‘global’ in much of the literature and political rhetoric obfuscates.

contributors to the literatures on globalization commonly deploy a variety of geographical prefixes—such as ‘sub-’. 1999. and therefore. ] is a profound geographical reorganization of capitalism. Globalization is. but must be recognized as one of their constitutive. In my view. and Waters 1995. and ‘scapes’. and the recent ‘reassertion of space in critical social theory’2—has been the pervasive questioning of the territorial nation-state as a preconstituted geographical unit of analysis for social research. ‘glocalization’.28 The Globalization Debates little academic consensus has been established regarding the interpretation of even the most rudimentary elements of the globalization process—its appropriate conceptualization. above. ‘supra-’. among many other terms. The recent special issues of Economic Geography (78/3. . ‘space-time distanciation’. or beyond entrenched geopolitical boundaries. Held et al. making many of the presumptions about the ‘natural’ geographical units within which capitalism’s trajectory develops less and less meaningful (if they ever were). Guillen 2001. ‘supraterritoriality’. space cannot be conceived as a static. and ‘trans-’—in order to describe a range of social processes that appear to be operating either below. 2002). its historical periodization. the recent explosion of research on globalization provides an occasion for a broader inquiry into the socially produced character of spatial forms under modern capitalism: One of the things that the adoption of the term ‘globalization’ now signals [ . International Sociology (15/2. . numerous studies have devoted detailed attention to the question of how the geographies of social. Beck 2000. We are therefore faced with an historical opportunity to seize the nettle of capitalism’s geography. the key methodological link between these major reorientations in the contemporary social sciences—the explosion of interest in globalization studies. ‘translocalities’. historically produced dimensions. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (24/2. . ‘diasporas’. pregiven platform of social relations. Mittleman 1997. to see the production of space as a constitutive moment within (as opposed to something derivatively constructed by) the dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle. ‘deterritorialization’. or its sociopolitical implications. Meanwhile. the ‘global–local interplay’. its underlying causal determinants. the geographical context in which they occur. and economic life are being transformed under contemporary conditions. political. International Social Science Journal (June 1999). the ‘global–local nexus’. Under these circumstances. Major strands of contemporary globalization research are permeated with explicitly geographical concepts—such as ‘spacetime compression’. Scholte 2000. ‘space of flows’. Nevertheless. ‘space of places’. 1997) also provide a useful sampling of major analytical and empirical perspectives. 2000) and Review of International Political Economy (4/3. As various authors have ´ Agnew and Corbridge 1994. within this whirlwind of opposing perspectives on globalization. As Harvey (1995: 5) has suggested. in short. 2 This phrase is the subtitle of Soja’s (1989) Postmodern Geographies. an intrinsically geographical concept: the recognition that social relations are becoming increasingly interconnected on a global scale necessarily problematizes the spatial parameters of those relations. 2000).

Taylor 1996). one of the central intellectual barriers to a more adequate understanding of contemporary global transformations is that we currently lack appropriately historical and dynamic conceptualizations of social space that are attuned to the possibility of systemic transformations within established political-economic geographies. interdisciplinary. and stability—which contains but is not substantively modified by social action—is still surprisingly pervasive throughout the social sciences (Massey 1994). fixity. and at least partially undermined. Thus arises the need for new modes of analysis that do not naturalize national state territoriality and its associated. this chapter examines critically the efforts of globalization researchers to transcend state-centric modes of social analysis. the containerlike qualities of national states. in which debates on the problematic of social spatiality have proliferated in recent decades. nation state-centric configuration of capitalist development. in practice. to the extent that the current round of global restructuring has significantly reconfigured. the question of how more adequately to conceptualize the spatial3 Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space (1991) represents one of the most trenchant critiques of this ‘timeless’ conception of space. nationally organized societies. The challenges of transcending state-centric modes of analysis do not end here. and even postdisciplinary methodologies that have begun to challenge the ‘iron grip of the nation-state on the social imagination’ (Taylor 1996: 1923). economies. pregiven container or platform for social relations. On the contrary. self-enclosed geographical containers of social. economic. Thus. Against the background of the apparent spatial turn in contemporary globalization studies. . Cartesian image of space as a static block. political. Particularly since the early 1980s. significant strands of twentieth-century social science have been locked into a state-centric epistemological framework in which national states are viewed as relatively fixed. or container. or cultures has become deeply problematic.The Globalization Debates 29 recently argued. territorialist models of social spatiality are effectively overcome. This wide-ranging effort to transcend state-centric epistemologies arguably represents one of the unifying theoretical agendas underlying contemporary research on globalization. Even when static. globalization researchers have constructed a variety of heterodox. the conception of space as a realm of stasis. This goal is. and cultural relations (Agnew 1994. Despite the persistent efforts of critical human geographers in recent decades to unsettle such assumptions. However. for it entails much more than an acknowledgement that transnational or global processes are gaining significance. this inherited model of territorially selfenclosed. many analyses are still grounded upon atemporal geographical assumptions that are derived from an increasingly obsolete. as I suggest below. the overcoming of state-centrism requires a comprehensive reconceptualization of entrenched understandings of space as a fixed.3 Even within contemporary globalization studies. platform. considerably more difficult to accomplish than is usually recognized.

I develop an interpretation of the epistemology of statecentrism. more generally. this chapter provides an initial sketch of the alternative conceptualization of contemporary sociospatial restructuring that will be developed at length in this book. In the next section. rescaled sociospatial configurations that cannot effectively be described on the basis of purely territorialist. that this methodological strategy sidesteps the crucially important task of analyzing the ongoing reterritorialization and rescaling of political-economic relations under contemporary capitalism. Then. I summarize the conceptualization of sociospatial restructuring under capitalism that grounds my analysis of the globalization debates. the goal of overcoming state-centrism is accomplished on the basis of a seriously one-sided depiction of currently emergent sociospatial forms. and I indicate various ways in which the contemporary round of global restructuring has undermined state-centric modes of analysis. rather. What such a project requires. medium. Such a reconceptualization is one of the key goals to be pursued in subsequent chapters of this book.30 The Globalization Debates ities of globalization remains thoroughly contentious. the effort to transcend state-centric modes of analysis does not entail a denial of the national state’s continued relevance as a major locus of political-economic regulation. (b) the production of new. An essential. . I shall argue. however. of the territorial dimensions of social life. concomitantly. A break with statecentrism is thus secured through the conceptual negation of the national state and. nationally scaled models. and. within most standard accounts of deterritorialization. contracting. Therefore. A concluding section outlines various key methodological challenges for contemporary studies of global restructuring that will be explored in the remainder of this book. corollary of this thesis is the claim that state-centric mappings of social spatiality severely limit our understanding of the national state’s own major role as a site. respectively. Consequently. ‘global territorialist’ approaches and ‘deterritorialization’ approaches—I sketch an alternative interpretation of contemporary global restructuring as a contradictory process of reterritorialization and rescaling in which state institutions play crucial mediating and facilitating roles. On this basis. Those globalization researchers who have successfully transcended such state-centric geographical assumptions have generally done so by asserting that national state territoriality and even geography itself are currently shrinking. At the heart of this argument is the contention that capitalism is currently experiencing (a) the transcendence of the nationalized sociospatial arrangements that prevailed throughout much of the twentieth century. through a critical analysis of two major strands of globalization research— labeled. In contrast to these positions. is a reconceptualization of how the geographies of state space are being transformed at various geographical scales under contemporary geoeconomic conditions. or dissolving due to alleged processes of ‘deterritorialization’. if apparently paradoxical. and agent of contemporary global restructuring.

On globalization and the transformation of cultural forms and collective identities. regardless of which specific social. Daniels and Lever 1996. and Albrow 1996. Cox 1987. and the reduction in the cost and time of long-distance transport. political mobilization. ‘Globalisation as an outcome cannot be explained simply by invoking globalisation as 4 On the economic dimensions of globalization see. Mann 1997. or end-state (Dicken.5 To the extent that worldwide social interdependencies are being enhanced. some authors have suggested that globalization has entailed the consolidation of worldwide forms of popular consciousness and political authority that open up new possibilities for human emancipation. Shaw 2000. political. Tickell. Boyer and Drache 1996. often mediated through new information technologies. it is crucial to avoid the widespread tendency to treat globalization as a single. Magnusson 1996. the deregulation of finance capital. causal force. And finally. On the political dimensions of globalization. economic. an adequate analysis of globalization must differentiate the multifaceted causal processes that have underpinned this worldwide extension of social relations. On the emergence of worldwide forms of popular consciousness. the enhanced importance of transnational corporations. and Strange 1996. McMichael 1996. for instance. Featherstone 1990. Cox 1997. uneven effects of such processes in different political-economic contexts (Yeung 2002). and McGrew 1992. Marden 1997. or transformations of. the liberalization of trade and investment flows. this development must be interpreted as the aggregate consequence of a variety of interrelated tendencies rather than being viewed as the expression of a single. the relative merits of these and other approaches to globalization hinge upon their relative usefulness as tools of analysis with reference to particular research questions and political concerns. Jessop 2002. Held 1995. or cultural processes are foregrounded. K. while simultaneously attempting to trace the variegated. and Peck 1997). see Robertson 1992. Others emphasize newly emergent forms of collective identity. Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995. the intensified deployment of information technologies. . internally coherent causal mechanism. 5 Versions of this definition are developed by Giddens 1990. see Cerny 1995. and Scholte 1996. established forms of national state power. Dicken 1998. For some scholars. Knox and Agnew 1995. the spatial extension of social interdependencies on a worldwide scale (Rosenberg 2000: 2). the massive expansion of foreign direct investment. and Wade 1996. In other words. R. that appear to have unsettled the principle of nationality as a locus of everyday social relations. see Appadurai 1996.4 Clearly. allencompassing mega-trend. and diaspora. The notion of globalization is first and foremost a descriptive category denoting. globalization is associated with a variety of threats to. Yet. Some researchers focus upon shifts in the world economy such as the dissolution of the Bretton Woods monetary regime in the early 1970s.The Globalization Debates 31 Capitalist development and the creative destruction of sociospatial configurations ‘Globalization’ is a thoroughly contested term. From this perspective. at the most general level.

pregiven.7 For present purposes. For the sake of stylistic convenience. and scaling. territorialization. and scale are generally used to connote fixed objects.6 Considerable methodological reflexivity is therefore required in order to circumvent some of the many ‘chaotic’ presuppositions and explanations that underpin mainstream accounts of contemporary globalization (Jessop 1999c). . multifaceted. Thus. Bourdieu 1996). the remainder of this chapter adopts the terminology of ‘global restructuring’ rather than referring simply to ‘globalization’. territory. or static entities. state institutions. The starting point for this analysis is a processual conceptualization of sociospatial forms under modern capitalism (Lefebvre 1991). place-making. In this view. However. the notion of restructuring implies an uneven. geography. I shall continue to use standard terms such as space. but must be viewed as a co-constitutive. Thus. to promote state institutional restructuring. ‘the sociospatial dialectic’. space is not opposed to time and historicity. In contrast to the notion of globalization. 7 In an effort to circumvent such confusions. whether as a means to naturalize neoliberal policy prescriptions. territory. to reinterpret social identities. In other words. while concepts such as space. and oppositional social movements—in order to pursue specific political and ideological agendas. Soja (1980) summarized this essential methodological point with the memorable phrase. Kipfer and Keil 1995. polymorphic. place. dialectically inseparable moment of the latter. unified mega-trend. A directly analogous idea is also at the heart of Lefebvre’s (1991) now well-known concept of the ‘production of space’. which implies the existence of a singular. it is equally important to recognize the politically contested character of popular and academic discourse on this theme. to reorient corporate strategies. place. This discursive.32 The Globalization Debates a process tending towards that outcome’ (Rosenberg 2000: 2). political. my concern is to explore the implications of the current round of global restructuring for the changing geographical organization of capitalism. and strategic aspect of globalization has played a hugely powerful role in influencing popular understandings of contemporary capitalism. or to rally anticapitalist resistance (Kelly 1999. all aspects of social space under modern capitalism must be understood as presuppositions. it is necessary first to explicate some of the key theoretical assumptions upon which my own understanding of social spatiality and sociospatial restructuring is grounded. when discussing the work of authors who deploy the notion of globalization. pregiven platforms or static things. if also more stylistically cumbersome. Over two decades ago. terminological formulations—such as spatialization processes. arenas and outcomes of dynamic processes of continual social contestation and transformation. 6 In addition to the danger of conflating causes and effects in studies of globalization. social-constructionist notion of ‘space-as-process’. territorialization processes. and scaling rather than fixed. I shall use them throughout this book as shorthand labels for more precise. Notions of globalization have been deployed strategically by diverse actors and organizations—including transnational corporations. place-making. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). geographymaking. I shall continue to use this generic term. and open-ended process of change (Soja 1989). Such a conceptualization entails the replacement of traditional Cartesian notions of ‘space-as-thing’ or ‘space-as-platform’ with a dialectical. and scale— but it must be emphasized that these labels connote ongoing processes of spatialization. before examining more closely the geographical contours of the contemporary globalization debate.

Katznelson 1992. ‘the tendency to create the world market is inherent to the concept of capital itself. as for Marx. ‘the ability to overcome space is predicated on the production of space’. Gottdiener 1985. and Storper and Walker 1989. Insofar as they eliminate historically specific territorial barriers to accumulation. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome. each moment of deterritorialization hinges upon an equally essential moment of reterritorialization in which relatively fixed and immobile spatial arrangements are established or modified as a basis for extending and accelerating capital’s orbit. capital is oriented simultaneously towards temporal acceleration (the continual acceleration of turnover times) and spatial expansion (the overcoming of geographical barriers to the process of accumulation). 1982) conceptualization of the production of spatial configuration under capitalism as a basis for examining the distinctively geographical parameters of contemporary forms of global restructuring.The Globalization Debates 33 A foundational question for any study of the production of space under capitalism is how such processes of spatialization. large-scale transportation networks. and so forth mold and continually reshape the geographical landscape. placemaking. new markets for its products. . long-distance communications grids. scaling. From this perspective. it is only through the production of historically specific socio-geographical infrastructures—composed. and state regulatory institutions—that processes of time-space compression can unfold. expansionary tendency within capitalism was clearly recognized by Marx.8 In the present context. these tendencies may be said to embody capital’s moment of deterritorialization. Harvey insists that the impulsion to reduce the socially necessary turnover time of capital and to expand its spatial orbit necessarily hinges upon the production of relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations. capitalism is under the impulsion to eliminate all geographical barriers to the accumulation process by seeking out cheaper raw materials. 1989. As Harvey (1985: 149) explains. and new investment opportunities. industrial agglomerations. According to Harvey (1985).’ Thus. Soja 2000. In Marx’s (1973: 408) famous formulation in the Grundrisse. More recently. the historical evolution of capitalism has entailed the increasing replacement of inherited precapitalist landscapes with specifically capitalist sociospatial 8 This question has long preoccupied critical sociospatial theorists. regional production complexes. fresh sources of labor-power. In this sense. This deterritorializing. particularly in the fields of urban and regional studies and geographical political economy. Detailed overviews of. these discussions include Benko and Strohmayer 1991. territorialization. At the same time. who famously described capital’s globalizing dynamic as a drive to ‘annihilate space by time’ and analyzed the world market as its historical product and its geographical expression (Marx 1973 [1857]: 539). Hudson 2001. for Harvey. for instance. Harvey (1989c) has referred to these spatio-temporal tendencies within the capital relation as a process of ‘time-space compression’. and contributions to. Indeed. according to Harvey. of urban built environments. I shall build upon Harvey’s (1985. systems of collective consumption.

Harvey also insists that no spatial fix can ever permanently resolve the endemic crisistendencies that pervade capitalism. Capitalist sociospatial configurations are produced as historically specific geographical preconditions for capital’s globalizing dynamism. destroyed. Capitalism perpetually strives. each sociospatial configuration is merely temporary. the endemic tension between fixity and motion—‘between the rising power to overcome space and the immobile spatial structures required for such a purpose’ (Harvey 1985: 150)—provides the analytical key to the investigation of processes of sociospatial restructuring under capitalism. only just as certainly to undermine. as capital’s ‘spatial fix’—a ‘tendency towards [ . these socially produced geographical landscapes—to which I shall refer generically as ‘capitalist sociospatial configurations’—represent an essential force of production: while they serve as presuppositions. reconfigured. to create a social and physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own needs at a particular point in time. disrupt and even destroy that landscape at a later point in time. therefore. territories. and their associated forms of uneven development. and reconstituted anew: Capitalist development must negotiate a knife-edge between preserving the values of past commitments made at a particular place and time. institu- . inherited geographical landscapes. By providing a relatively fixed and immobile basis upon which capital’s circulation process can be accelerated. or devaluing them to open up fresh room for accumulation. and outcomes of particular types of social activities. only to be eventually torn down. This is the tune to which the historical geography of capitalism must dance without cease. Through this tumultuous process of creative destruction. they also play essential roles in providing the logistical foundations for the process of capital circulation as a whole (Swyngedouw 1992b). Consequently. . and scales and the marginalization or exclusion of others. each spatial fix entails ‘the conversion of temporal into spatial restraints to accumulation’ (Harvey 1982: 416). ] a structured coherence to production and consumption within a given space’ (Harvey 1985: 146). and intensified. disinvestment. extended. arenas. In a capitalist context. On this basis. chaotic see-saw of perpetual sociospatial change. . then. Harvey refers to these historically specific sociospatial configurations. The inner contradictions of capitalism are expressed through the restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes. For Harvey. Harvey (1985: 150) interprets the historical geography of capitalism as a process of continual restructuring in which sociospatial configurations are incessantly created.34 The Globalization Debates configurations—a ‘second nature’ of socially produced geographical infrastructures that are suited to the operations of capital under particular conditions (Harvey 1989b: 191). Each framework of capitalist sociospatial organization is closely intertwined with historically specific patterns of uneven development insofar as it entails the systemic privileging of some locations. and institutional reorganization. places. a chronically unstable ‘dynamic equilibrium’ (Harvey 1985: 136) within a broader. and reterritorialized during recurrent waves of systemic crisis. However.

to ‘wash away the dead weight of past investments’ and to wrest open new possibilities for accumulation (Harvey 1989b: 192–4). (b) relatively fixed and immobile socio-territorial infrastructures have been produced or transformed in order to enable such expanded. six initial implications of the theorization outlined above deserve special emphasis. Contemporary forms of global restructuring represent conflictual. urban and regional studies. From this perspective. accelerated movement. the contemporary round of global restructuring can be interpreted as the most recent ´ historical expression of the longue duree dynamic of deterritorialization. As in previous rounds of crisis-induced sociospatial restructuring. dialectical process through which: (a) the movement of commodities. Therefore. capital. Contemporary processes of global restructuring are unfolding simultaneously upon multiple. to the extension of spatial interdependencies on a worldwide scale. contemporary global shifts have entailed a multifaceted. intertwined geographical scales—not only within . and people through geographical space has been expanded and accelerated. reterritorialization. uneven. Harvey’s conceptualization of capitalist sociospatial configurations provides a useful analytical basis on which to interpret some of its core spatio-temporal dynamics. and sociospatial theory. 1. While it would clearly be problematic to reduce this tendency to any single causal mechanism. As indicated. My goal here is to underscore its implications for interpreting the diverse restructuring processes that are generally subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalization’. the contemporary round of global restructuring has been grounded upon a multiscalar. 3. and forms of uneven development are reshaped quite dramatically. 2. globalization is a multifaceted concept that refers. dialectical interplay between deterritorializing and reterritorializing tendencies.The Globalization Debates 35 tional arrangements. Harvey’s approach to the creative destruction of sociospatial configurations under capitalism has proven highly influential during the last two decades in the fields of geographical political economy. through a critical analysis of major strands of the globalization literature. at core. Contemporary processes of global restructuring are both spatial (based upon the reconfiguration of inherited sociospatial configurations) and temporal (based upon the acceleration of capital’s socially average turnover time). and (c) inherited patterns of uneven geographical development have been systematically reworked at various spatial scales. I shall develop this conceptualization of contemporary global restructuring in more detail below. and dialectical processes of sociospatial change rather than a static end-state or a terminal condition. At this juncture. much like earlier periods of creative destruction under capitalism. as major factions of capital strive to amortize the full value of existing spatial configurations. and uneven geographical development that has underpinned the production of capitalist spatiality throughout the modern era (Harvey 1995).

3). and geographical redefinition: they are thus premised upon a complex mix of continuity and change. Jessop 1999c).9 I am concerned in this book to explore the territorializing operations of state institutions in relation to capital at both national and subnational spatial scales. regions. 5. Their consequences are equally variegated in different political-economic contexts. mutually reinforcing one another in powerful ways (Goswami 2004). national states. Sassen 1996. and financing of capitalist expansion—above all through their role in the construction of large-scale geographical infrastructures for industrial production. 9 See e. collective consumption and long-distance market exchange. Scholte 1997. Brenner 1998a). . among others. and communication (see Ch. Throughout this period. and most crucially. national states have long operated as relatively fixed and immobile forms of (re)territorialization for successive rounds of time-space compression. late nineteenth. These multiscalar shifts have not entailed a total obliteration of inherited sociospatial configurations but rather their functional. Finally. much like urban-regional agglomerations. geopolitical shifts. the consolidation of neoliberalism. cities. With the consolidation of national-developmentalist political regimes during that period. From this perspective. financial deregulation. 6. The latter point is particularly essential to my argument here. Panitch 1994. transportation. particularly since the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century (Lefebvre 1978. For. Helleiner 1994. 4. and neighborhoods. regulation. new population movements. and transformations of the global labor force—rather than from a single mega-trend (Harvey 1995. Radice 1999.and early twentieth-century forms of geoeconomic integration entailed the consolidation of the national state’s role as a territorialized scaffolding for accelerated capital circulation and as an institutional interface between subnational and supranational scales. localities. institutional.36 The Globalization Debates global space.g. Sites 2003. processes of globalization and (national) territorialization proceeded in tandem. national states became ever more central to the promotion. and Weiss 1998. accelerated technological change. While numerous authors have usefully underscored the activist role of national states in facilitating the contemporary round of geoeconomic integration. national territorial states must be viewed as essential geographical arenas and agents of contemporary forms of global restructuring rather than as the passive or helpless victims of these processes. Contemporary processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization stem from a diverse range of political-economic causes—including. but also through the production and reconfiguration of diverse subglobal spaces such as supranational blocs. the reorganization of corporate accumulation strategies.

This development has systematically undermined inherited. and secondarily across. I sorted my stamps by political jurisdiction. under contemporary geoeconomic conditions. . Soja’s more recent work (1996) preserves his emphasis on the ‘reassertion of space in social theory’ while recognizing the existence of geographical assumptions even in historicist modes of analysis. Just as I collected the various ephemera of national postal systems. and the ‘polity’ which political scientists study all share a common geographical boundary. Peter Taylor (2000: 8) Agnew (1995) has questioned whether recent discussions of space.The Globalization Debates 37 I shall argue below that. simply assuming the coincidence of social boundaries with state boundaries and that social action occurred primarily within. Insofar as social science has always been permeated by historically specific geographical assumptions. However abstract the social theory. . that of the state. Martin Shaw (2000: 68) Embedded statism contains the remarkable geographical assumption that all the important human social activities share exactly the same spaces. national states continue to operate as key forms of territorialization for the social relations of capitalism. and place in the social sciences amount to a fully-fledged ‘sociospatial turn’. But what sorts of geographical assumptions do such state-centric visions entail? It is to this question that I now turn. but that the scalar geographies of this stateorganized territorialization process have been fundamentally reconfigured. social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. these divisions. . territory.10 Although I believe that 10 The main target of Agnew’s critique is apparently Soja’s Postmodern Geographies (1989). the notion of a ‘resurgence’ or ‘reassertion’ of spatial influences makes little sense. state-centric conceptions of political-economic space. the ‘economy’ which economists study. however quantitative the economic models. This spatial congruence can be stated simply: the ‘society’ which sociologists study. which argues for a domination of ‘historicism’ over spatial considerations in much of postwar social science. Hidden geographies and the epistemology of state-centrism As a youthful philatelist in the mid-twentieth century. and however behavioral the political science. it is national governance at issue. it is national economies which are depicted. I directed attention to the national forms—technical and symbolic—through which both intranational and international communication took place [ . Social relations were represented by the national societies that were assumed to frame them. ] Much social science sorted social relations in the same way. Agnew argues. it is national societies which are described.

see Jessop (1990a: 278–306). state-centric approaches do not exclude geographical considerations to constitute a despatialized social science. in the terms proposed here. In these discussions. In my view.1). a distinctively ahistorical spatial ontology lies at their very heart. (b) the assumption that all social relations are organized within territorially self-enclosed spatial containers. on the contrary. when the assumption of spatial fetishism is linked either to methodological territorialism or methodological nationalism. Taken together. Defined in this manner.1. the notion of state-centrism developed here refers to a more generalized sociospatial ontology that has been implicit within a wide range of research paradigms throughout the social sciences. geographical assumptions: (a) the conception of space as a static platform of social action that is not itself constituted or modified socially. For a useful critical overview of this literature. In contrast to this literature.38 The Globalization Debates contemporary studies of globalization have indeed confronted the problematic of social spatiality with a renewed intensity. While all three of these assumptions have pervaded mainstream social science. and therefore immune to historical change. As the above-quoted statements by Shaw and Taylor indicate. this section provides support for Agnew’s argument. 2. a state-centric epistemology has pervaded the modern social sciences since their inception during the late nineteenth Spatial fetishism Conception of social space as timeless and static. and thus as immune to the possibility of historical change Assumption that all social relations are organized within self-enclosed. state-centered theories emphasize the autonomous institutional power of the state over and against societal or class-based forces. The third assumption generates a methodological nationalism in which the national scale is treated as the ontologically primary locus of social relations. The epistemology of state-centrism: three key geographical assumptions 11 The term ‘state-centric’ has a different meaning in the literature on ‘bringing the state back in’. 2. fixed. any given mode of analysis may be said to be state-centric. these assumptions generate an internalist model of societal development in which national territoriality is presumed to operate as a static. state-centrism can be defined most precisely in terms of its three most essential. and (c) the assumption that all social relations are organized at a national scale or are undergoing a process of nationalization. . The second assumption results in a methodological territorialism in which territoriality—the principle of spatial enclosure—is treated as the necessary spatial form for social relations. discretely bounded territorial containers Assumption that all social relations are organized at a national scale or are becoming nationalized Methodological territorialism Methodological nationalism Fig. and timeless container of historicity (Fig. in which state-centered approaches are contrasted to society-centered approaches.11 The first assumption results in a spatial fetishism in which space is seen as being timeless. if usually implicit.

and macro-economics (due its focus on purportedly self-contained. throughout its history most of the discipline has still presupposed a territorialized concept of culture as a localized. and consumption that is likewise said to be spatially coextensive with the state’s territorial boundaries (Radice 1984).12 12 As Taylor (1996: 1922–3) notes. it has still been widely understood as a territorially self-enclosed entity. essentially as a subnational replication of the state-defined society. political science has been the most explicitly statecentric among the social sciences. its geo¨ graphical analog on a smaller spatial scale (Agnew 1993. state-centric conceptual orientation. R. macro-economic theory has long conceived the territorialized national economy as its most elemental unit of analysis. B. anti-statist roots in the work ´ of theorists such as Elisee Reclus and Peter Kropotkin. On this basis. Indeed. exchange. as it has traditionally been deployed. Keynes. Crucially. spatially fixed community (Gupta and Ferguson 1997. and the contemporary monetarists. a state-centric epistemology has arguably underpinned significant strands of sociology (due to its focus on nationally configured societies and communities). with national state territoriality understood as the basic reference point in terms of which all subnational and supranational political-economic processes are to be classified. self-propelled national economies). States have been viewed as politically sovereign and economically self-propelled entities. anthropology (due to its focus on bounded. this too has remained markedly state-centric insofar as national states have been viewed as the primary geographical blocks between which the factors of production are moved and in terms of which comparative advantage is measured (Taylor 1996: 1925). from Smith and Ricardo to List. Not surprisingly. the national scale (political geography). the concept of society has implied that the boundaries of social relations are spatially congruent with those of the national state (Giddens 1984. or the transnational scale (geopolitics). sociological. territorialized cultures). Although anthropology avoided this explicit form of state-centrism prior to the advent of area studies during the postwar era. Hakli 2001. the (national) state has been viewed as the container of (national) society. First. Malkki 1992).The Globalization Debates 39 century. While trade theory has always contained an explicitly international dimension. as defined above. J. until relatively recently even the discipline of human geography has replicated this territorialized. Walker 1993). while the interstate system has been mapped in terms of a distinction between ‘domestic’ politics and ‘foreign’ relations in which national state boundaries are said to separate ‘inside’ from ‘outside’ (Agnew 1994. the preconstituted container of production. and economic analysis in which the concept of the state may not even be explicitly deployed. Due to its anarchist. either with reference to the urban scale (urban ecology and the study of urban systems). Pletsch 1981). classical regional geography provides an . Urry 2000). Even when the notion of society has not been defined explicitly in terms of the state’s national boundaries. however. the above definition extends the problematic of statecentrism well beyond those fields of inquiry that are focused directly upon state operations and political life to various modes of anthropological. Finally.

political authority is grounded upon: (a) the territorialization of state power.40 The Globalization Debates This unhistorical conception of spatiality can be usefully characterized as a state-centric epistemology because its widespread intellectual plausibility has been premised upon a naturalization of the modern state’s specifically national/territorial form. In this system. the notion of territoriality is a polysemic category and not all its meanings refer to this statist global and national geography. Clearly. in major strands of the discipline of history. economic. . in which the entire globe is progressively subdivided among contiguous. Among the most rudimentary features of territoriality in social life is its role as a strategy grounded upon the parcelization and enclosure of space (Sack 1986). This development was institutionalized in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. sociohistorical change is said to occur exception to this tendency insofar as regions were viewed as ecologically delimited. an idiographic notion of space-as-context provided an important alternative to the conception of space-as-container that dominated the other. political space came to be organized in terms of exclusive state control over self-enclosed territorial domains (Spruyt 1994). This bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is arguably the essential characteristic of the modern interstate system (Gottmann 1983. J. self-enclosed national space. Likewise. and (b) the globalization of the territorial state form. more nomothetically oriented social sciences. and military power within a global grid of mutually exclusive yet geographically contiguous national state territories. bounded territories ruled by sovereign national states committed to the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. The consequence of this transformation has been the long-term enclosure of political. in which each state attempts to exercise exclusive sovereignty over a delineated. each of the conceptual building blocks of the modern social sciences—in particular. Within this framework. economy. contextually specific environments rather than as territorial subunits of the state. Walker 1993). whether with reference to political. B. and community—had come to presuppose this simultaneous territorialization and nationalization of social relations within a parcelized. societal. which recognized the existence of an interstate system composed of contiguous. the social sciences have come to presuppose a territorialist. economic. The resultant state-centric epistemology entailed the transposition of the historically unique territorial and scalar configuration of the modern interstate system into a generalized model of sociospatial organization. nonoverlapping national state territories. fixed. nationalized image of social space derived from the form of territory-sovereignty nexus that has been produced and continually reinscribed at a national scale within the modern interstate system. Ruggie 1993. since the late nineteenth century. By the midtwentieth century. However. the notions of state. or cultural processes. in the modern interstate system. With the dissolution of feudal hierarchies in late medieval Europe. R. culture. territoriality has assumed a historically specific geographical significance. However. and essentially timeless geographical space. society.

Britain’s attempt to institutionalize a self-regulating world market during the nineteenth century by combining imperialist expansion with trade liberalization eventually resulted in a countervailing ‘great transformation’ in which increasingly autarkic. and Wallerstein 1996. Indeed.The Globalization Debates 41 within the fixed territorial boundaries of a national state. For accounts of the institutional histories of statecentrism. Although the lineages of this statist developmental configuration can be traced to the late eighteenth century. . see Pletsch 1981. Following World War II. This globalist mode of analysis was elaborated during the 19th and early 20th centuries above all in Marx’s theory of capital accumulation and in the theories of imperialism developed by Lenin. including the Annales school of historiography and the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias. if largely subterranean. as McMichael (1987: 223) notes. it is also crucial to note that these state-centric tendencies in the classical social sciences coexisted uneasily with an opposing. Under these conditions. the Soviet Union. this intellectual tradition was arguably the most important alternative to state-centrism within classical sociological discourse. see also Braudel 1984). society. State-centric modes of analysis acquired a doxic. ] became the locus of reproduction of capital’ (quoted in Radice 1998: 267).13 Particularly from an early twenty-first century vantage point. Luxemburg. it was above all during the twentieth century that the interstate system came to operate like ‘a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality’ (Taylor 1994: 152. their scalar contours and the political-economic practices they putatively enclose. In this context. the 13 This is not the place to analyze the complex institutional histories through which this statecentric epistemology gradually became hegemonic as a mode of social-scientific inquiry. the ‘world market was internalized within the nation-state. culture. it is crucial to recognize that the epistemology of state-centrism was not merely a fantasy or an ideological projection. Although major strands of Marxian social theory were also eventually infused with state-centric assumptions (such as the notion that the national scale was the main strategic locus of class struggle). Maier 2000). during which the territorial state’s role in ‘encaging’ socioeconomic and politicocultural relations within its boundaries dramatically intensified (Mann 1993. such as idiographic approaches to historiography and Marshallian-inspired economic analyses focused on the problem of urban-regional agglomeration. ‘globalist’ strand of theory and research. . My concern here is less to examine the institutional consolidation of state-centrism than to characterize analytically its main geographical presuppositions. The nationally organized forms of state regulation that were subsequently consolidated served as the institutional basis for ‘organized capitalism’. and Bukharin. taken-for-granted character during the course of the twentieth century. or economy rather than through the transformation of those boundaries. Taylor (1996: 1918–19) detects various late 19th-century contextualist alternatives to state-centric conceptions of space. Palat 1996. and much of the Third World. as their ‘spatial premises enter[ed] into the realm of ‘‘common sense’’ where interrogation is deemed both unnecessary and quite uncalled for’ (Taylor 2000: 6).and early twentieth-century historicalgeographical context in which the social sciences first emerged. when England’s territorial economy superseded the city-centered economy of Amsterdam. protectionist regulatory frameworks were constructed throughout western Europe and North America (Polanyi 1957). which [ . its widespread intellectual plausibility was derived from the late nineteenth. . various non-Marxist alternatives to state-centrism also emerged. particularly in the postwar USA but also in Europe. In addition to these strands of research.

42 The Globalization Debates global regime of accumulation that prevailed from the early twentieth century until the early 1970s (Lash and Urry 1987). Within this nationalized but worldwide political geography. where something is brought to perfection: namely. and the highly bureaucratized institutional-regulatory systems of national states. ‘The organizing world principle of nation-states allowed the soothingly comprehensible vision of polities as bound up together by economic fate. On the other hand. However. distribution. the production. and selfpropelled process of modernization (McMichael 1996). On the one hand. this dramatic spatial extension and temporal acceleration of capitalism was premised upon the construction of qualitatively new forms of capitalist sociospatial configuration—including. Lefebvre’s (1991: 280) analysis of the modern state as a form of ‘violence directed towards a space’ helps illuminate this territorialist misrecognition. competing with other national economies in a worldwide regatta’ (Reich 1991: 4–5. processes of space-time compression intensified dramatically in conjunction with the second industrial revolution. This intensified territorialization of social relations at a national scale suggests that ‘the state-centric nature of social science faithfully reflected the power containers that dominated the social world it was studying’ (Taylor 1996: 1920). and consumption infrastructures of major industrial city-regions. and the Non-Aligned Movement of newly decolonized states. as embodied in the national state’s bounded. During the post-World War II period. unify. all in the same large boat called the national economy. even. and the imperialist forays of the major capitalist national states. and communication. nationalized networks of market exchange. I would argue. the globalizing expansion of the world economy. modern national states are grounded upon a relentless drive to rationalize. territorialized form. and homogenize social relations within their territorial boundaries: ‘Each state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished. The essence of state-centric modes of analysis. under the rubric of US global hegemony. The epistemology of state-centrism was tightly enmeshed within the national-developmentalist round of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that unfolded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. newly consolidated. In Lefebvre’s view. quoted in Larner and Walters 2002: 401). that of territorial fixity. the epistemology of state-centrism is to be viewed less as a faithful reflection of its historical-geographical context than as a politically mediated misrecognition of that context. a . national-developmentalist practices and ideologies were further consolidated throughout the world system. transportation. the theorization of capitalist sociospatial configuration outlined previously points toward a somewhat different interpretation: from this perspective. a space. grounded upon the notion that each national state would guide its own national society and economy through a linear. internally defined. the Bretton Woods global monetary regime. Cold War geopolitical divisions. is to focus one-sidedly upon a single term within this dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. most crucially.

on any spatial scale. is treated as an actualized reality rather than as an unstable tendency within an ongoing dialectic (Lefebvre 1991: 21). as he (1991: 308) is quick to add: ‘The space that homogenizes . . has nothing homogenous about it. and the goal for the reason why the goal was pursued. when it is merely an image. But in itself it is multiform [ . political. A representation which passes itself off as a concept. leading many commentators to acknowledge the socially produced. the geographies of capitalism have been profoundly transformed since the early 1970s. a mirror and a mirage. or permanent condition. To the extent that the national scale (or any other geographical scale) acquires tendential primacy as an organizational arena for social. Rescaling territoriality: from globalization to the relativization of scales As noted at the outset of this chapter. ] Thus to look upon abstract space as homogeneous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause. By contrast. centralization. indeed. The crucial point. this must be viewed as a historically contingent outcome of scale-specific projects and strategies rather than being conceived as the expression of an ontological necessity. did the epistemology of state-centrism ‘reflect’ its historical-geographical context—not through an operation of mimesis. And what does such a specular representation reflect? It reflects the result sought. Processes of territorialization and nationalization are thus represented as pregiven. it renders homogenous. is that territorialization. and thereby neglect to consider the ways in which the latter has been produced and continually transformed during the history of capitalist development. and economic relations. incomplete. the ‘fetishization of space in the service of the state’. enclosure. . and conflictual process rather than as a pregiven. it simply has homogeneity as its goal. and which instead of challenging. its orientation. instead of refusing. . Only in this specific sense. merely reflects. . And. must be viewed as a historically specific. natural conditions of social life rather than being seen as the products of historically specific strategies of parcelization. therefore.The Globalization Debates 43 unified and hence homogenous society’ (Lefebvre 1991: 281). and therefore malleable. natural. then. as Lefebvre (1991: 287.’ One of the basic epistemological features of state-centric modes of analysis is to conflate the historical tendency towards the territorialization of social relations on a national scale—which has undoubtedly intensified during much of the twentieth century—with its full historical realization. But. character of . Accordingly. and encaging at a national scale. its ‘lens’. but rather through a form of reification in which the ‘result sought’. state-centric epistemologies freeze the image of national state territoriality into a generalized feature of social life. italics in original) elaborates with reference to the ‘abstract space’ of modern capitalism: Abstract space is not homogenous.

to map the geographies of contemporary capitalism in ways that transcend the ‘habitual spatial assumptions’ of state-centric epistemologies. and (b) the notion that globalization entails the contraction or erosion of national state power. habitual spatial assumptions about the world have evaporated [ . Under these circumstances. . I also begin to sketch the general interpretation of contemporary rescaling processes that will be developed at length in the rest of this book. supraterritorial. however. Space is increasingly revealed as a richly political and social product. most globalization researchers have confronted this methodological challenge in one of two deeply problematic ways—either (a) through an analysis of the global scale in implicitly state-centric terms. the taken-for-grantedness of space is impossible to sustain. borderless. Smith’s formulation puts into stark relief what is arguably one of the central methodological challenges of contemporary globalization research—namely. of relatively fixed forms of capitalist sociospatial organization at diverse. as a globally stretched territorial grid. I argue that neither of these methodological strategies can provide an adequate mapping of contemporary sociospatial transformations. relativizing the primacy of the national scale while simultaneously enhancing the role of subnational and supranational scales in such processes. and thus remains trapped within a narrowly territorialist understanding of contemporary capitalism. an urgent need arises for analytical frameworks that do not imprison the sociological imagination within timeless. ] It is as if the world map as jig-saw puzzle had been tossed in the air these last two decades. . As the geographical foundations of twentieth-century capitalism are unsettled and reworked. In the remainder of this chapter. Smith (1996: 50–1) has aptly described this state of affairs as follows: The solidity of the geography of twentieth century capitalism at various scales has melted.44 The Globalization Debates inherited formations of political-economic space. or (b) through an emphasis on processes of deterritorialization that purportedly trigger the erosion of national state territoriality as such. To date. The contemporary round of globalization arguably represents a major new wave of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in which global socioeconomic interdependencies are being significantly extended in close conjunction with the establishment. and unhistorical representations of social space. and putting the jig-saw puzzle back together—in practice as well as in theory—is a highly contested affair. leaving us to reconstruct a viable map of everything from bodily and local change to global identity. territorialist. In the course of this discussion. The latter approach transcends the territorialist epistemology of state-centrism on the basis of two equally problematic assumptions: (a) the notion that globalization is an essentially non-territorial. The former approach transposes state-centric mappings of space onto the global scale. The crux of my argument is the proposition that the contemporary round of global restructuring has radically reconfigured the scalar organization of territorialization processes under capitalism. or territorially disembedded process. . or restructuring.

For Swyngedouw. Global corporations. ] [T]he local/global interplay of contemporary restructuring processes should be thought of as a single. regionalization. the political-economic geographies of this dynamic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are today being fundamentally rescaled relative to the nationally configured patterns in which it has unfolded since the late nineteenth century. however. As this process of scale-relativization has proceeded apace. Moreover. the urban. not least because of its apparent implication that two geographical scales. in addition to the global and the local.14 In this sense. these rescaling processes represent a conflictual dynamic of ‘glocalization’ in which global sociospatial integration is proceeding in tandem with a pervasive triadization. Collinge (1996) has characterized these multifaceted shifts as a ‘relativization of scales’ in which. the regional. combined process with two inherently related. institutional. and the supranational—are likewise key arenas and targets of currently unfolding rescaling processes. however. a double movement of globalisation on the one hand and devolution. and regional state institutions to multinational economic blocks. the global and the local. in marked contrast to earlier configurations of capitalist sociospatial organization. global financial movements and global politics play deciding roles in the structuring of daily life. the term ‘glocalization’ originated in Japanese business discourse. the national. dominate contemporary rescaling processes. albeit contradictory movements and as a process which involves a de facto recomposition of the articulation of the geographical scales of economic and of social life. . the current round of sociospatial restructuring has significantly decentered the role of the national scale as the primary institutional arena for the territorialization of capital. This term is not unproblematic. supranational regulatory institutions. and regimes of global governance— have acquired major roles as geographical infrastructures for the reproduction of global capitalism. There is.The Globalization Debates 45 subglobal geographical scales. Crucially. Tickell. According to Robertson (1994: 36). . while simultaneously more attention is paid to local and regional responses and restructuring processes. in other words. I reject this limited view of contemporary spatial transformations and insist upon their fundamentally multiscalar character. it is also about changes in the very nature of the relationships between scales’ (Dicken. Swyngedouw (1992a: 40) describes contemporary scalar transformations in closely analogous terms: Over the last decade or so the relative dominance of the nation state as a scale level has changed to give way to new configurations in which both the local/regional and the transnational/global have risen to prominence. For. a variety of other scales—including the body. 2000a. Like Swyngedouw. where it was used in the 1980s as a marketing buzzword to describe the adaptation of global corporate strategies to locally specific conditions. industrial districts. a range of subnational and supranational sociospatial configurations—from global city-regions. no single level of political-economic interaction currently predominates over any others (see also Jessop 2002). and Peck 1997: 14 See also Swyngedouw 1997. and localization of social relations. and cultural . the political. ‘globalization is not just about one scale becoming more important than the rest. Whereas previous rounds of deterritorialization and reterritorialization occurred largely within the geographical framework of national state territoriality. decentralisation or localisation on the other [ .

Globalization as a process of rescaling: two key concepts The central consequence of these processes of rescaling has been to thrust the apparently ossified. economic. the regional. Even though expressions of each of these scales are being significantly redefined under contemporary conditions. the national. contiguous. The key notions of the relativization of scales and glocalization are summarized in Fig. . like the concept of the relativization of scales. entrenched scalar hierarchies are being rearticulated.46 The Globalization Debates 159–60). fixed entities or platforms. Consequently. partially overlapping institutional forms and regulatory configurations that are neither congruent. the notion of glocalization is useful because. entrenched fixity of national state territoriality abruptly and dramatically into historical motion. below. I view this rescaling of national territoriality as the differentia specifica of the currently unfolding round of global sociospatial restructuring. and Kraidy 1999. and its linkages to both subnational and supranational scales. radically redefining its geographical significance. but today they are jumping at once above.2. state territoriality currently operates less as an isomorphic. Processes of territorialization remain endemic to capitalism. it underscores the ways in which inherited scalar hierarchies are being shaken up and rejigged under contemporary capitalism. thereby undermining any conceptual grammar that treats scales as if they were stable. 2.2. Jessop 2002) The entrenched primacy of the national scale of political-economic organization is being undermined New sociospatial configurations and geographies of socio-political struggle are proliferating at both supranational and subnational scales No single scale of political-economic organization or sociopolitical struggle predominates over others Glocalization (Swyngedouw 1997. For discussions of glocalization by other authors. Despite these analytical dangers. multiscalar institutional mosaic composed of multiple. and intense struggles are proliferating regarding the appropriate configuration of scales in social. Galland 1996. nor coextensive with one another (Anderson 1996). 1992a) The process of global integration is proceeding in tandem with a reconfiguration of sociospatial configurations at various subglobal scales—including the supranational. for instance. self-enclosed block of absolute space than as a polymorphic. and around the national scale upon which they tendentially converged during much of the last century. 2. and political life Fig. its organizational configuration. The relativization of scales (Collinge 1996. Bauman 1998. see. and the urban The scalar organization of political-economic life is being fundamentally recast. Courchene 1995.

Because so much of globalization research remains grounded upon state-centric or otherwise deeply problematic geographical assumptions. The key point is that the political-economic geographies of this territorialization process are no longer focused predominantly upon any single. the notion of a rescaling of national territoriality is further developed through a critical analysis of the two major strands of globalization research mentioned above. according to which globalization entails not only the growing interconnectedness of distinct parts of the globe. I shall argue that national states continue to operate as essential political and institutional sites for. and economic relations. The deployment of this type of methodology—to which I shall refer as ‘global territorialism’—is frequently quite explicit. a global society’. 1997. Meyer. and Altvater and Mahnkopf 1995. . Shaw 1992. as in Albrow’s (1990: 9) definition of globalization as ‘those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society. For critical discussions of this approach see Marden 1997. I consider this type of epistemological critique to be a crucial prerequisite for the project of developing a more geographically reflexive and scale-sensitive approach to the investigation of contemporary sociospatial transformations. In the next two sections. political. for instance. Global territorialism: state-centrism on a world scale It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics: its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground one is walking on. this emphasis on the global scale among globalization researchers has been intertwined with extraordinarily diverse conceptualizations of global social space. However. Hondrich 1992. but—in Waters’s (1995: 3) characteristic formulation—the construction of ‘a single society and culture occupying the planet’. and Waters 1995.The Globalization Debates 47 contemporary forms of deterritorialization have partially eroded the container-like qualities of national borders. self-enclosed geographical scale. This section considers approaches to globalization studies that conceive global space in essentially state-centric terms.15 Other globalization 15 Italics added. The concept of ‘world society’ has played a defining role within a major strand of mainstream research on globalization. and mediators of. as a pregiven territorial container or as a form of territoriality stretched onto the global scale. For other typical uses of the concept of ‘world society’ among globalization researchers see. Spybey 1996. McGrew 1992. et al. the territorialization of social. John Ruggie (1993: 174) All accounts of globalization entail some version of the claim that the global scale has become increasingly important as an organizing locus of social relations. Meyer 1999.

passim). the modifier ‘global’ is positioned before a traditionally statecentric. European. territorial container of social relations. the global field is an underlying structural matrix upon which sociocultural conceptions of the world are organized.48 The Globalization Debates researchers have elaborated closely analogous accounts of ‘global culture’ and ‘transnational civil society’. Peterson 1992. The preconstituted geographical space of the globe is presumed simply to be filled by the social practices associated with the process of globalization rather than being produced. According to Robertson. or experientially (for instance. reconfigured. 53. world society approaches share an underlying conception of global space as a structural analog to state territoriality. Whether this sphere of interaction is understood in normative terms (for instance. the question of the qualitative sociospatial organization of world-scale processes is essentially foreclosed through a choice of conceptual grammar. political. equality. civil society. . territorialist concept—society. as a framework of globally standardized economic. Robertson’s analysis of globalization consists of a synchronic aspect (a ‘dimensional model’ of the ‘global field’) and a diachronic aspect (a ‘sequential phase model of globalization’). or Western cultural influences). institutionally (for instance. For Robertson. and democracy). exemplifies a somewhat less explicit but still widely influential version of a global territorialist approach.17 Here. its components are the ‘quintessential features of the terms in 16 17 See e. as a worldwide diffusion of American. or transformed through the latter. because globalization is understood primarily as a world-scale process. Spybey 1996. and scientific practices). educational. peace. as a site of universalistic values such as human rights. or culture—in order to demarcate a realm of social interaction that transcends the borders of any single state territory.g. Insofar as the interpretation of global space is derived directly from an understanding of the territorially configured spaces of national societies and national cultures. and Wapner 1995. Meanwhile. world society approaches remain embedded within a state-centric epistemology that conceives space—on both global and national scales—as a timeless.16 In each case. but rather through the more geographically ambiguous categories of place and field. All parenthetic citations in the following two paragraphs refer to this work. The difference between global and national configurations of social space is thereby reduced to a matter of geographical size. globalization is a multifaceted process that has led to the formation of what he terms a situation of ‘global unicity’—the development of the world ‘as a single place’ or ‘the concrete structuration of the world as a whole’ (6. the role of national and subnational territorial transformations in contemporary processes of global restructuring cannot be explicitly analyzed. even as their unit of analysis is extended beyond national territorial boundaries. global space is not characterized through directly state-centric terms such as society or culture. Lipschutz 1992. Robertson’s neo-Parsonsian cultural sociology of globalization. as articulated in his book Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (1992). In this sense.

modified. the global field is viewed as an invariant. In Robertson’s theorization. his analysis reproduces a state-centric conceptualization of global space as a timeless. which is otherwise among the most sustained critiques of explicitly state-centric frameworks yet to be developed in the social sciences. systemic hierarchy. Globalization is then defined as a heightened ‘selfconsciousness’ of the relations among these dimensions that in turn leads to an increasing ‘differentiation of the main spheres of globality’ (26–9. 77–8). societies. ‘societies. individuals. the ‘incipient’ phase (mid-18th century to 1870s). inter-societal relations. Despite Robertson’s concern to analyze world-scale processes. Robertson elaborates a five-stage periodization to describe this world-historical trend towards intensified ‘global unicity’: the ‘germinal’ phase (15th–18th centuries). and the ‘uncertainty’ phase (1960s–present) (58–60). Robertson analyzes the changing interdependencies between individuals. societies. Robertson’s cultural sociology of globalization therefore entails the transposition of state-centric modes of analysis onto a world scale rather than their transcendence. Thus conceived. Robertson’s conception of global space is essentially unhistorical. form of global territorialism can be found within Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis. evolutionary process of structural differentiation among preconstituted spatial scales (Parsons 1971). 50–1). as in the world society approaches discussed above. by subsuming currently unfolding global transformations within a universal. Robertson conceives the global scale as a self-enclosed territorial container within which the structural differentiation of individuals. Instead. or rescaling of these inherited. reterritorialization. Second. Consequently.The Globalization Debates 49 which it is possible to conceive of the world’ (32). the ‘take-off’ phase (1870s–1920s). A radically different. First. globalization entails an intermeshing of preconstituted Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft structures on the scale of the ‘world-as-a-whole’ rather than a qualitative restructuring. the system of societies and mankind’. By demonstrating the . yet this global space is not said to be constituted. This differentiation is said to occur within the pregiven space of globality. and humanity occurs: ‘globality’ is viewed essentially as a macrogeographical formation of (national) territoriality. and the ‘global-human condition’ in orthodox Parsonsian terms. the ‘struggle-for-hegemony’ phase (1920s–1960s). which are together said to constitute the ‘global-human condition’ (26. statist forms of territorial organization. stretching from the individual and society to the interstate system and the global human condition. states. as a unilinear. Robertson’s analysis excludes a priori the possibility of a fundamental rearticulation of entrenched scalar hierarchies or of other qualitative sociospatial transformations at any geographical scale. but equally problematic. or transformed historically. territorial framework that contains historicity without itself evolving historically. historically invariant process of structural differentiation. Robertson classifies the latter according to four basic dimensions. the globalization process passes through each of these components without qualitatively transforming them or the scalar hierarchy in which they are embedded.

in which the division of labor. the cycles of hegemonic ascension and decline among the 18 See Wallerstein 1974. 19 For various definitions of capitalism in Wallerstein’s work see. state power. but rather in terms of the more geographically and historically specific notion of the ‘modern world-system’. I believe that Wallerstein’s theoretical framework replicates on a global scale the methodological territorialism of the very state-centric epistemologies he has otherwise criticized so effectively. Wallerstein 1983: 13–19.20 It is through this abstract contrast between two geometrical images—world-empires in which the division of labor is spatially congruent with structures of politico-cultural organization. and cultural forms overlapped more or less congruently within the same territorial domains. distribution. Global space is conceived neither as a society. the long-run reproduction of capitalism has hinged crucially upon the durability of this scalar arrangement. second.19 In contradistinction to previous historical systems (‘world-empires’). On this basis. 2000. According to Wallerstein. and the antagonistic class relation between capitalists and wage-laborers—he argues repeatedly that its unique scalar form is one of its constitutive features. 1974: 37–8. Wallerstein outlines the long-run history of world capitalism with reference to three intersecting spatio-temporal processes—first. On the specific problematic of space in world-system analysis see Wallerstein 1988.50 The Globalization Debates ´ longue duree and macrogeographical parameters of capitalism. See also Wallerstein 1974: 67. for instance.18 Despite these substantial achievements. 20 Wallerstein 1979: 6. the intersection of global space and national state territoriality in Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis must be examined more closely. or a place. 1979: 7–19. the commodification of production. and world-economies in which a single division of labor encompasses multiple states and multiple cultural formations—that Wallerstein delineates the geographical foundations of modern capitalism. which has provided capital with ‘a freedom of maneuver that is structurally based [and has thereby] made possible the constant economic expansion of the world-system’ (Wallerstein 1974: 348). secular trends. 1989. In essence. the Kondratieff cycles. Wallerstein’s pioneering studies have also served as a useful corrective to excessively presentist interpretations of the post-1970s wave of globalization that exaggerate its discontinuity with earlier historical configurations of capitalist development. and investment processes. To elaborate this claim. Although Wallerstein defines the capitalist world-system on multiple levels— for instance. and systemic crises of the world-scale accumulation process. . in terms of the drive towards ceaseless accumulation. 348. 1980. a culture. 348–9. italics added. Wallerstein conceptualizes capitalism as a geographically integrated historical system grounded upon a single division of labor. capitalism is composed of ‘a single division of labor but multiple polities and cultures’. Wallerstein grasps the specificity of capitalist spatiality in terms of the territorial non-congruence of economic structures (‘singular’) with politicoinstitutional and cultural forms (‘multiple’).

which in turn constitute a single. As in the tale of the traveler Gulliver who encounters identical micro. a society of midgets and a society of giants.g. rather than. the global and the national scales are viewed as structural analogs of a single spatial form—territoriality. Walker 1993: 133–40. 23 It is not accurate.and macro-scopic replications of human society. To be sure. circuits of capital. urban systems. B. 1983. by the late nineteenth century. national state territories occupy a surprisingly pivotal theoretical position within his conceptual framework. the world interstate system. Wallerstein’s concern to analyze the global scale as a distinctive unit of analysis does not lead to any qualitative modification in the way in which this space is conceptualized. In Wallerstein’s framework. the primary geographical units of global space are defined by the territorial boundaries of national states. and periphery). capitalist enterprises are in turn said to be ‘domiciled’ within their associated national state territories. yet he consistently describes the historical dynamics of the world economy in terms of the differential positions of national states within its stratified core–periphery structure. integrated system. the economic division of labor is intrinsically composed of states.24 Thus conceived. considering Wallerstein’s avowed concern to transcend statecentric models of capitalist modernity. for instance. the bounded territories over which national states attempt to exercise sovereignty. meanwhile global space is parcelized among three zonal patterns (core. 24 On this ‘Gulliver fallacy’. Wallerstein argues that its most elemental geographical units are nevertheless national states. or more precisely. then. National state territoriality and global space are thereby fused together into a seamless national-global scalar topography in which the interstate system and the world economy operate as a single.22 Wallerstein’s conception of global space is thus most precisely described as an inter-state division of labor: national state territoriality serves as the basic geographical unit of the world economy. periphery) that are in turn said to be composed of nationally scaled territorial economies.The Globalization Debates 51 core states. Wallerstein maintains that the division of labor within the world-system transcends the territorial boundaries of each national state. industries. encompassing macro-territoriality. 1984. see also the essays included in Wallerstein 1979. Wallerstein 1984: 39. For Wallerstein. the international division of labor had become coextensive with most of the planet’s physical-geographical surface. see R. The national scale is thereby blended into the global scale while the global scale is essentially flattened into its national components. Although the division of labor in the capitalist world-economy is said to be stratified into three supra-state zones (core. the global scale simply multiplies national territoriality throughout a global 21 In addition to the three volumes of The Modern World-System. 22 See e. 27–36. and third. or spatial divisions of labor. because in his framework the latter are fundamentally identical.23 In this sense. semi-periphery. to reproach Wallerstein for reducing state power to economic structure (Skocpol 1977). therefore.21 However. J. . with reference to firms. the geographical incorporation of external areas until. semi-periphery.

The possibility that the process of capitalist development might unhinge itself from this entrenched national-global scalar couplet to privilege other subnational or supranational sociospatial configurations is thereby excluded by definitional fiat. For attempts to develop more historically specific analyses of capitalist spatiality within the broad parameters of a world-system methodology see e. the assumption that a specifically capitalist form of globalization can unfold only among nationally scaled forms of political-economic organization. as a pregiven territorial container within which the process of globalization unfolds. that these problems with Wallerstein’s theory are not intrinsic to world-system analysis. however. I would argue. multiple states’—that cannot change qualitatively without dissolving capitalism’s identity as a distinctive type of historical system. and economic spaces upon which it is based. Taylor 1994. However. rather than analyzing its historical production. and transformation. Paradoxically. . that Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis entails the replication of a territorialist model of space not only on the national scale of the territorial state but on the global scale of the entire world system. The current round of global restructuring does indeed appear to be intensifying globally scaled forms of interaction and interdependence. but he acknowledges its historicity only in a limited sense. each long wave of capitalist expansion is said to reproduce the structurally invariant geographical pattern upon which capitalism is grounded.25 Two general methodological conclusions may be derived from this critical analysis of global territorialist approaches. political. To be sure. therefore. For. 1995. global territorialist 25 It should be emphasized. then. An emphasis on the global spatial scale does not necessarily lead to an overcoming of state-centric epistemologies. Wallerstein’s methodological fusion of the global and the national scales also leads to an interpretation of contemporary globalization primarily as a physical-geographical expansion of the capitalist system rather than as a rearticulation or transformation of the social.52 The Globalization Debates patchwork without modifying its essential geographical attributes. space appears to be frozen into a single geometric crystallization—‘one economy. in contrast to previous historical systems such as world-empires. Global territorialist approaches represent global space in a state-centric manner. Wallerstein’s definition of the modern worldsystem as a global amalgamation of national spaces generates a fundamentally state-centric methodological consequence—namely. within the capitalist historical system. Wallerstein conceives global space as a complex historical product of capitalist expansion. reconfiguration. Global territorialist approaches are premised upon the transposition of this state-centric misrecognition from the national to the global scale.g. one of the major deficiencies of state-centric modes of analysis is to conceive territorialization as a static condition rather than as an ongoing. In Wallerstein’s framework. As noted. 1. dialectical process. a grid of nationally organized state territories linked through a core–periphery structure to a global division of labor. Arrighi 1994.

globally scaled territorial system and thus circumvent the key methodological task of analyzing global space as an historically constituted. continually changing interdependencies between global and subglobal relations Territoriality is conceived as the natural form in which sociospatial processes are organized. or (b) the complex. and thereby bracket the profound transformations of state territorial and scalar organization that have played a crucial enabling role in the contemporary round of global restructuring. The persistence of state-centric epistemologies in globalization studies thus represents a major intellectual barrier to a more adequate understanding of currently emergent forms of national state territoriality and state scalar organization. These arguments are summarized schematically in Fig. Main features Two of the three key components of state-centric modes of analysis—spatial fetishism and methodological territorialism—are transposed from the national to the global scale Consequently: the global scale is analyzed (a) as a pregiven. unchanging arena for social relations. Waters 1995) Robertson’s (1992) cultural sociology of globalization Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis (Wallerstein 1974.3. 2. Spybey 1996. polymorphic arena composed of multiple. 1984. superimposed spatial forms. Wapner 1995. 1980. The epistemology of global territorialism: schematic overview . 1989) Problems and limitations Neglects to examine systematically (a) the historical constitution and continual transformation of the global scale as an arena of diverse social. The global territorialist approaches discussed above treat national state territoriality as a static institutional framework over and above which globalization occurs. 2.The Globalization Debates 53 approaches reify this emergent. 2. contradictory tendency into an actualized. the polymorphic geographies of the global scale are described in a narrowly territorialist conceptual grammar Neglects to examine (a) the key role of national states in contemporary processes of global restructuring. and/or (b) as a grid of national territorialities stretched onto the global scale Prominent examples ‘World society’ approaches (Meyer 1999. and (b) the ways in which national states are in turn being reshaped through their role in animating and mediating these processes Fig. consequently. and political processes.3. State-centric conceptions of global space mask the national state’s own crucial role as a site and agent of global restructuring processes. economic.

globalization involves a complex deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political and economic power. the virtualization of economic activity through electronically mediated monetary transactions. the internationalization of capital. analyses of deterritorialization confront explicitly the task of analyzing social spatiality in a historically specific manner. monetary. mechanisms of governance and cultural complexes. (1999: 28) In contrast to global territorialist approaches. superimposed geographical scales. Accordingly. From this perspective. and the increasing density and . including multinational corporations and NGOs. It may also reinforce the ‘localization’ and ‘nationalization’ of societies. or Dutch to British commercial strategies in the late seventeenth century. Deterritorialization researchers have analyzed these emergent. David Held et al. I shall now consider these sociospatial transformations more closely through a critical discussion of ‘deterritorialization’ approaches to globalization studies. the contemporary round of global restructuring can be fruitfully conceived as a conflictual rearticulation of political-economic space on multiple. or from the province and the land to the national state and the metropolis after 1860. including the deployment of new informational. military. the proliferation of worldwide ecological problems. as in the transition from Habsburg to French power. Jumping scales: between deterritorialization and reterritorialization The question that remains open is whether territory loses its institutional role in general or whether we are just in one of the eras of rescaling of territorial resources. the expanded activities of transnational organizations. and transportation technologies. Charles Maier (2000: 824–5) As globalization intensifies it generates pressures towards a reterritorialization of socio-economic activity in the form of subnational. regional and supranational economic zones. and financial markets. territoriality is viewed as a historically specific form of sociospatial organization that is being systematically decentered under contemporary conditions. the global crisis of territorialized definitions of state regulation and citizenship. New supraterritorial geographies of networks and flows are said to be supplanting the inherited geography of state territories that has long preoccupied the social-scientific imagination. purportedly post-territorial geographies as the outcomes of diverse causal processes.54 The Globalization Debates As suggested above. the intensified role of electronic media in organizing sociocultural identities.

From Castells’ (1996) account of the ‘space of flows’. people are connected with one another pretty much irrespective of their territorial position. and geographical mobility) and the spaces of territorialization (based upon enclosure. for O’Brien (1992: 1–2). territorial boundaries present no particular impediment and distance is covered in effectively no time. borders. On the one hand. or matters less than hitherto [ . This image of global space as a ‘placeless. distanceless and borderless—and in this sense ‘supraterritorial’. see Scholte 2000). or disempowerment of the national state. Whereas global territorialist approaches map global space essentially as a territorial state writ large. More generally. for Scholte (1996: 1968): Global space is placeless. Hardt and Negri (2001: 336) speak of a ‘general equalization or smoothing of social space’ in which capital supersedes entrenched territorial borders and the power of national states is effectively dissolved. In global relations. . and places. ] Money . To that extent they effectively do not have a territorial location. distanceless and borderless’ realm is the geographical essence of deterritorialization approaches. O’Brien’s (1992) thesis of an ‘end of geography’. Virilio 1984. global financial integration has generated a situation in which ‘geographical location no longer matters. .The Globalization Debates 55 velocity of transnational diasporic population movements (for an overview. The decline of national state power is viewed at once as the medium and the result of contemporary processes of deterritorialization. Ruggie’s (1993) interpretation of the EU as the world’s ‘first postmodern political form’. erosion. Jameson’s (1992) theorization of ‘postmodern hyperspace’.’ Likewise. in their widely discussed book. and geographical fixity) are represented as mutually opposed systems of social interaction. flows. . Global relations thus form a non-. Thus. will largely succeed in escaping the confines of the existing geography. and Appadurai’s (1996) concept of ‘ethnoscapes’ to Scholte’s (2000) conceptualization of globality as ‘supraterritoriality’. supra-territorial aspect of the world system. . . Empire.26 The logical corollary of this conceptualization is the contention that globalization entails the decline. analyses of deterritorialization have generally been premised upon this basic conceptual opposition between the purportedly supraterritorial or deterritorialized spaces in which globalization occurs and diverse subglobal territories. post-. extra-. localities. the spaces of globalization (based upon circulation. In the global domain. studies of deterritorialization invert this territorialist epistemology to emphasize the increasing permeability or even total negation of national state territoriality. and Hardt and Negri’s (2001) notion of ‘Empire’. see Der Derian 1990. apart from the broad sense of being situated on the planet earth. the erosion of nationally scaled forms of territorial enclosure is said to open up a space for increasingly non-territorial forms of interaction and 26 For still more extreme versions of the ‘end of geography’ thesis. In most research on deterritorialization. Ohmae’s (1995) notion of a ‘borderless world’.

their very existence presupposes the production and continual reproduction of fixed socio-territorial infrastructures—including. deterritorialization approaches have begun to articulate an important challenge to the epistemology of state-centrism. deterritorialization approaches contain three serious deficiencies. Most crucially for the argument of this book. externally related conceptions of global sociospatial transformation. the possibility that territoriality is being reconfigured and rescaled rather than eroded cannot be adequately explored. The relation between global space and national territoriality is viewed as a zero-sum game in which the growing importance of the former is presumed necessarily to entail the decline of the latter. By conceiving geographical scales as mutually exclusive rather than as co-constitutive. these globally scaled processes of deterritorialization are in turn said to accelerate the state’s loss of control over its national borders and thus further to undermine its territorial self-enclosure. cities. 1. its presence or its absence. 3. when examined through the lens of the conception of capitalist sociospatial configuration outlined above. The historicity of territoriality is reduced to an either/or choice between two options. in particular. localities. spatial embedding. By emphasizing the historicity and potential malleability of territoriality. Meanwhile. Nevertheless. Thus the apparent deterritorialization of social relations on a global scale hinges intrinsically upon their reterritorialization within relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations at a variety of interlocking subglobal scales. relationally intertwined levels of social interaction. the state decline thesis and the notion of deterritorialization entail cumulative. the thesis of state decline is elaborated not through an account of the national scale per se. deterritorialization approaches bracket the various forms of spatial fixity. this dualistic conceptualization cannot adequately theorize the essential role of subglobal transformations—whether of supranational political-economic blocs. rescaling. Global space can be viewed as non-territorial in form precisely because it is defined through the trope of an eroding or disappearing national scale. processes of deterritorialization are not delinked from territoriality. and through which global flows can circulate. From this perspective. urban-regional agglomerations and state regulatory institutions—within. mutually reinforcing rather than merely additive. or places—in contemporary processes of global restructuring. indeed. 2. national state territories. . upon. but rather with reference to the role of various globally scaled. purportedly supraterritorial and deterritorializing socioeconomic processes.56 The Globalization Debates interdependence on a global scale. and reterritorialization upon which global flows are premised. On the other hand. Consequently. In this sense. This methodological denaturalization of territoriality has also enabled deterritorialization researchers to construct alternative geographical categories for describing currently emergent sociospatial forms that do not presuppose their enclosure within territorially bounded spaces. regions.

Capital remains as dependent as ever upon . scale-jumping strategy has also been closely intertwined with various conflictual forms of reterritorialization through which new subnational and supranational sociospatial configurations are being constructed. that is. a basic structural feature of its circulation process. Nonetheless. more generally. In the context of this ongoing scalar shift. This denationalizing. the notion of deterritorialization has acquired a broader meaning to encompass as well the role of new information and communications technologies in linking geographically dispersed parts of the globe to create a temporally integrated world economy. deterritorialization may be understood most coherently as a countervailing strategy to ‘jump scales’. discrete national economies or. Since this period. The massive expansion in the role of transnational finance capital since the demise of the Bretton Woods currency controls in the early 1970s presents a further indication of capital’s increasing velocity and geographical mobility in the world economy. no matter how rapidly turnover times are accelerated. the worldwide circulation of capital can no longer be analyzed adequately with reference to self-enclosed. The rescaling of capital The concept of deterritorialization was first developed in the early 1970s to describe the apparently footloose activities of transnational corporations in coordinating globally dispersed production networks (Agnew and Corbridge 1994). the moment of territorialization still remains endemic to capital. and the deterritorialization of the national state. processes of deterritorialization can be reinterpreted as concerted yet uncoordinated strategies to decenter the national scale of political-economic organization. on the basis of strictly territorial representations of space (Agnew 1994). one of the most significant geographical consequences of contemporary processes of deterritorialization has been to unsettle and rearticulate the entrenched. Under these circumstances.The Globalization Debates 57 A major agenda of this book is to advance an interpretation of contemporary global restructuring as a rescaling of the nationally organized sociospatial configurations that have long served as the underlying geographical scaffolding for capitalist development. nationally scaled configurations of political-economic organization upon which capitalist industrial growth has been grounded since at least the late nineteenth century. If territoriality operates as a strategy grounded upon the enclosure of social relations within a bounded geographical space (Sack 1986). From this point of view. to circumvent or dismantle historically entrenched scalar hierarchies (Smith 1995). however. Crucially. the national territorial state—albeit now significantly rescaled and reterritorialized—has continued to serve as a crucial geographical infrastructure for this multiscalar dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. These arguments may be specified further through a critical reinterpretation of two commonly invoked forms of deterritorialization—the deterritorialization of capital.

Amin 1994. Smith (1996: 72) further elaborates this point: Capital [ . in practice. places] and territories of social control involves not the extinction of place per se but the reinvention of place at a different scale—a capital-centered jumping of scale. and S. Ohmae. and other flexible production complexes—has played a constitutive role. and Storper 1996. From this point of view. . industrial districts.58 The Globalization Debates relatively fixed. urbanized regions are today increasingly superseding national economies as the most rudimentary geographical units of world capitalism. 27 The literature on these ‘post-Fordist’ forms of urban and regional restructuring has expanded massively in recent decades. a number of scholars have suggested that. localized and territorially embedded technological-institutional ensembles in which technology. A. For useful recent overviews see e. rather.g.g. or distanceless space of flows.27 These shifts have been closely intertwined with a marked rescaling of corporate accumulation strategies as key factions of industrial. scholarly representations of contemporary global capitalism as a ‘smooth world’ (Hardt and Negri 2001) or as a borderless ‘space of flows’ (Castells 1996) are grounded upon an uncritical appropriation of a neoliberal ideological myth. state-centric geographical infrastructures that underpinned the last century of capitalist industrialization. Kratke 1995. every strategy to avoid and supersede ‘historically established mechanisms’ [i. but in practice. Scott and Storper 1992. the means of production. 28 ¨ See e. and service capital attempt to secure competitive advantages within global production chains through the exploitation of locally and regionally specific conditions of production (Swyngedouw 1992a). Hardt and Negri. 2.e. . The processes of deterritorialization associated with the current round of geoeconomic integration are best conceived as one moment within a broader dynamic of sociospatial transformation in which the reindustrialization of strategic subnational economic spaces—such as global cities. as Yeung (1998: 291) succinctly remarks.28 This pervasive rescaling of capital is illustrated schematically in Fig. Although the growth of these urban and regional territorial production complexes has been crucially conditioned by national political-economic frameworks. entail the construction of a quasi-autonomous. capital is ‘placesticky’. Lipietz 1993. ] may entertain the fantasy of spacelessness and act accordingly. Indeed. and many others have implied.4. In a forceful critique of Castells’ recent writings. technopoles. due to these new forms of global localization. amount to ‘ideological cover for the policy preferences of big business’. forms of industrial organization and labor-power are productively combined to extract surplus value. Such arguments. a profoundly uneven rescaling and reterritorialization of the historically entrenched. placeless. financial. as Radice (1998: 274) remarks. For. The essential point here is that capital’s drive to diminish its place-dependency does not. We are witnessing. as writers such as Castells. Benko and Lipietz 2002. . Scott 1998. the perpetuation of control by these organizations (and classes) depends precisely on this reinvention of discrete places where power over and through the space of flows is rooted. offshore financial centers.

regions. In this sense. the current round of geoeconomic integration has hinged upon ‘a change in the scale at which spatial divisions of labor are organized’ (K.and territory-specific conditions for accumulation (K.The Globalization Debates Global integration of financial markets Formation of supranational economic blocs among the triads Intensified international trade within and among the triads Intensified foreign direct investment within and among the triads Formation of new strategic alliances among major capitalist firms 59 Rescaled national economies: permeated by supranational flows. To be sure. The drive . But. and labor regulation that prevailed under the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation (Swyngedouw 1992a). as a mechanism of global localization through which major capitalist firms are attempting to circumvent or restructure the nationally organized systems of social. it is forced to reconstitute or create anew viable sociospatial infrastructures for its circulation process at other scales—whether through the reorganization of existent scales or through the construction of qualitatively new ones. monetary. rather than releasing capital from its endemic dependence upon places. local industrial networks Regional economies. Thus. global cityregions. even when successful. As capital strives to jump scale. Deterritorialization must therefore be viewed as a distinctively geographical accumulation strategy. disaggregated among regional and local economies Industrial districts. Rescaling the geographies of capital Source: derived from Swyngedouw 2000b: 548. capitalist strategies of deterritorialization may well succeed in partially circumventing the constraints imposed by national territorial boundaries. global city networks Export processing zones. Cox 1997).4. regional innovation systems Learning regions. and offshore tax havens Fig. Cox 1992: 428). capital’s apparent transcendence of nationally scaled regulatory systems in recent decades has been inextricably bound up with the production of new subnational and supranational spaces of accumulation and state regulation that provide the place. technopoles. cities. such strategies do not translate into a situation of pure capital hypermobility or placelessness. offshore financial centers. and territories. new industrial spaces Global cities. 2.

national states began actively to facilitate the process of geoeconomic integration through a variety of policy strategies—by constructing and enforcing the (global and national) legal regimes within which global capital operates. traditional Keynesian macroeconomic policy instruments proved increasingly ineffectual across much of the older industrialized world. accounts of deterritorialization conceptualize the emergence of global space through the trope of a declining or eroding state territoriality. by providing key domestic conditions for the global operations of transnational corporations. Panitch 1994. However. commodities. at the same time. Consequently. . this development has not entailed the demise. Among other major policy realignments. reconfiguring their scalar architecture in pursuit of locationally specific productive capacities and competitive advantages. among other works. and information. by establishing new supranational or global forms of economic governance. Helleiner 1994. a range of supply-side regulatory strategies were deployed in order to facilitate industrial restructuring and to encourage flexibility and technological innovation within each state’s territorial economy. such as national social welfare regimes. institutional. Jessop 1993. During the global economic crises of the 1970s. by acquiring large shares or full ownership of major home-country based transnational corporations. Instead. While these trends have unsettled the nationalized formations of statehood that have long preoccupied social scientists. As Panitch (1994: 64) explains: 29 On these policy reorientations and their longer-term institutional consequences. they have not undermined the centrality of state institutions—albeit now significantly reterritorialized and rescaled—to processes of political-economic regulation. nationally organized collective bargaining arrangements. or weakening of the state as such.60 The Globalization Debates towards deterritorialization incessantly reinscribes the role of capitalist sociospatial configurations while. The current round of geoeconomic integration has indeed rendered states more permeable to transnational flows of capital. and geographical reorganization of statehood at a range of spatial scales. labor. by establishing territory-specific regulatory conditions for global capital investment. as Yeung (1998: 296–9) indicates. and national monetary frameworks (Jessop 1993). the national states of the OECD zone began to restructure or dismantle major elements of the postwar Fordist-Keynesian regulatory order. and by controlling key conditions for the reproduction of labor-power within their territorial borders. erosion. Under these conditions. and Weiss 2003. Rescaling the state As noted. the widely prevalent ‘myth of the powerless state’ (Weiss 1998) represents a misleading basis for the understanding of contemporary political dynamics: the state is not a helpless victim of globalization but one of its major politico-institutional catalysts. Radice 1999. see. Sassen 1996.29 At this time. there has been a significant functional. money.

but represent expressions of concerted political strategies through which state institutions are attempting. throughout the OECD zone. states have promoted geoeconomic integration by forming supranational economic blocs such as the EU. A central geographical consequence of this development. to facilitate. it is encoded by them and in important respects even authored by them. has been the establishment of new ‘plurilateral’ forms of state power that do not converge upon any single. Supranational agencies such as the IMF. Cox (1987: 260) as an ‘internationalization of the state’ in which ‘adjustment to global competitiveness [has become] the new categorical imperative’. and institutional constraints operating both within and beyond its boundaries (Cerny 1995: 618). through and under the aegis of states.The Globalization Debates 61 capitalist globalisation is a process which also takes place in. Mittelman 2000). and the like. global economic criteria have acquired an enhanced significance in the formulation and implementation of national state policies. According to Cerny (1995: 620). NAFTA. even as national states . Cerny (1995: 620–1) proposes. the consolidation of post-Keynesian competition states in contemporary western Europe has indeed been closely intertwined with fundamental. On a continental scale. At the same time. situated in a wider. at various spatial scales. These ongoing reterritorializations and rescalings of state space cannot be understood merely as defensive responses to intensified global economic competition. if often rather haphazard. These realignments of state power in turn generate a ‘whipsaw effect’ in which each level of the state must react to a wide range of competitive forces. As we shall explore at length in subsequent chapters. mediate. optimal scale or coalesce together within an internally cohesive. and redirect processes of geoeconomic restructuring. the WTO. to facilitate capital mobility within new continental zones of accumulation. market-led strategies of political-economic restructuring throughout the world system (Gill 1998a. ASEAN. as the mobilization of territorial competitiveness policies becomes an increasingly important priority for dominant actors and alliances across the political spectrum. which are intended at once to enhance structural competitiveness. market-dominated playing field’. and it involves a shift in power relations within states that often means the centralisation and concentration of state powers as the necessary condition of and accompaniment to global market discipline. political pressures. and the World Bank have likewise acquired key roles in enforcing neoliberal. Peet 2003). transformations of state spatial and scalar organization. Since the 1980s. nationally scaled bureaucratic hierarchy. In a similar vein. Cerny (1995) has examined the consolidation of postKeynesian ‘competition states’ whose central priority is to create a favorable investment climate for transnational capital within their boundaries. This transformation has been famously described by R. ‘the state itself becomes an agent for the commodification of the collective. and to provide protective barriers against the pressures of global economic competition (Larner and Walters 2002. manage.

I shall interpret the current wave of state rescaling within western European urban regions as an expression. they have also devolved substantial regulatory responsibilities to regional and local institutions. and arenas of rescaling processes Urban governance.and territory-specific competitive advantages of particular subnational political jurisdictions. however. 2. Figure 2. 5).5. the ‘new localism’ Public− private partnerships Quangos (quasi non governmental organizations) Local economic governance Metropolitan governance/ new forms of regional regulation Fig. World Economic Forum Rescaled national states: major animators. which are seen to be better positioned to promote industrial (re)development within major urban and regional economies. This downscaling of regulatory tasks should not be viewed as a contraction or abdication of national state power. mediators. for it has frequently served as a centrally orchestrated strategy to promote transnational capital investment within major urban regions. the mobilization of localized economic development policies. In subsequent chapters. the establishment of new forms of public–private partnership or other public initiatives intended to enhance urban territorial competitiveness (see Ch. International Monetary Fund. Rescaling the geographies of statehood Source: derived from Swyngedouw 2000b: 548.62 The Globalization Debates attempt to fracture or dismantle the institutional compromises of postwar Fordist-Keynesian capitalism in order to reduce domestic production costs. whether through the public funding of large-scale infrastructural projects.5 provides an initial. and outcome of diverse political strategies designed to enhance the place. schematic representation of the rescaled landscape of statehood that has been forged through these transformations. World Trade Organization (WTO) Group of Eight (G8) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) European Union (EU) World Bank. medium. .

multiple levels and encouragement of movement— up. By indicating the ways in which a historically entrenched form of national state territoriality is being superseded. and direct movements between high and low levels. large-scale urban regions represent crucial geographical. A complex set of climbing frames. diagonally. and political arenas in which the rescaled geographies of statehood under contemporary capitalism are being forged and contested. but it is even less true today. D. The contemporary world is not a ladder up or down which processes move from one rung to the next in an orderly fashion. with their mixture of constructions. In subsequent chapters. territoriality is no longer organized predominantly or exclusively on the national scale. ] might be nearer the mark. down. because they recognize the historicity of territoriality primarily in terms of its disappearance. We are witnessing. Whereas the traditional Westphalian image of political space as a self-enclosed geographical container does today appear to have become increasingly obsolete. are now a defining characteristic of contemporary life. slides. as Anderson (1996: 151) argues. sideways. 2. As we shall see. new geographical metaphors are needed in order to grasp the structural features and dynamics of emergent. directly from high to low. ropes and rope ladders. post-Westphalian political geographies: There may sometimes be a linear chain of command between institutions—or parts of institutions—at different levels. the key point is that these ongoing transformations of state institutional and spatial organization do not herald the end of territoriality as such. deterritorialization approaches cannot analyze the types of qualitative . missing out or bypassing ‘intermediate’ rungs. or low to high—captures the contemporary mixture of forms and processes much better than the ladder metaphor. I shall devote detailed attention to the many challenges of theorizing and analyzing such post-Westphalian political spaces. . obsolescence. above all at subnational scales. or demise. Newman and Paasi 1998). reterritorialized political geographies in which territoriality is redifferentiated among multiple institutional levels that are no longer clustered around a single predominant center of gravity.5 illustrates. the central state mediating all links between the external or higher levels and the internal or lower ones. Not only are there now more rungs but qualitatively they are more heterogeneous. territoriality nevertheless remains a fundamental characteristic of statehood and an essential institutional scaffolding for the process of political-economic regulation at all spatial scales (Nevins 2002. . However. complete with weak or broken parts [ . swings. The metaphor of adventure playgrounds. As Fig. for subnational and supranational levels of sociospatial organization have today come to play essential roles in processes of political-economic regulation. institutional. as deterritorialization theorists contend. deterritorialization researchers have made an important contribution to the project of theorizing social space in an explicitly historical manner. the consolidation of increasingly polymorphic. Under these circumstances. but in general such a linear model (like a Russian dolls metaphor of nested hierarchies) does not fit the complex reality. rather.The Globalization Debates 63 In the present context. That was never the case.

What is occurring. a rapidly changing geoeconomic context. Whereas state-centric epistemologies fetishize this territorialist moment of capitalism. I have argued that each of these approaches grasps real dimensions of contemporary social reality. or borderless space of flows. placeless. Throughout this discussion.64 The Globalization Debates reconfigurations and rescalings of territoriality that have been briefly outlined above. The reterritorialization and rescaling of inherited. The bifurcation of contemporary globalization studies into these opposed methodological approaches reflects these contradictory aspects of contemporary sociospatial transformations without critically explaining them. the contemporary round of global restructuring has entailed neither the absolute territorialization of societies. As noted. coupled with a reshuffling of entrenched hierarchies of scalar organization. deterritorialization approaches embrace an inverse position. economies. leading in turn to qualitatively new geographies of capital accumulation. a crucial challenge for future research on the geographies of global capitalism is . Thus conceived. The alternative theorization of global restructuring introduced in this chapter suggests that deterritorialization and reterritorialization are mutually constitutive. or cultures onto a global scale. nationally organized institutional forms and policy relays represents an important political strategy through which national states are attempting to adjust to. In my view. and to (re)assert control over. and transformed under capitalism. is a multiscalar restructuring of capitalist sociospatial configurations. capital has long presupposed a moment of territorial fixity or placeboundedness as a basic prerequisite for its ever-expanding circulation process.6 provides a schematic summary of the preceding critique of deterritorialization approaches to globalization studies. if highly conflictual. state regulation. moments of an ongoing dialectic through which political-economic space is continually produced. rather. one-sided manner. reconfigured. Conclusion: rethinking the geographies of globalization Like the forms of state-centrism that have dominated the social sciences for much of the last century. Even if the role of the national scale as an autocentric territorial container has been unsettled. national states continue to play a key role in producing the geographical infrastructures upon which the process of capital circulation depends and in regulating political-economic life at all spatial scales. distanceless. nor their complete deterritorialization into a supraterritorial. and uneven development. albeit in a truncated. Figure 2. in which territoriality is said to erode or disappear as globalization intensifies. the methodological opposition between global territorialist and deterritorialization approaches to globalization studies can be viewed as a real abstraction of contemporary social practices.

reterritorialized. its presence or its absence. of national states. regional. as well as their variegated. The epistemology of deterritorialization approaches: schematic overview to develop an epistemology of social space that can critically grasp these processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as intrinsically related dimensions of contemporary sociospatial transformations. path-dependent consequences in specific political-economic . regions. eroding.The Globalization Debates Main features Territoriality is said to be declining. or disappearing as placeless. and local scales—upon which global flows are necessarily premised Fig 2. the role of subglobal transformations (for instance. and supraterritorial geographies of networks and flows proliferate throughout the world system Consequently: the capacity of national states to regulate their territorial jurisdictions is said to be weakening or eroding Prominent examples Appadurai’s (1996) theory of global cultural flows Castells’s (1996) theory of the ‘space of flows’ Hardt and Negri’s (2001) concept of ‘Empire’ Jameson (1992) on ‘postmodern hyperspace’ Ohmae’s (1990. and cities) in processes of global restructuring cannot be examined Brackets the various forms of spatial fixity. the historicity and potential malleability of territoriality are emphasized Introduces alternative geographical categories for describing currently emergent spatial forms that do not presuppose their enclosure within territorially bounded geographical spaces Problems and limitations The historicity of territoriality is reduced to an either/or choice between two options. and rescaled rather than being eroded cannot be adequately explored The relation between global space and national territoriality is viewed as a zero-sum game in which the growing importance of the former necessarily entails the decline of the latter. distanceless. 1995) notion of the ‘borderless world’ O’Brien’s (1991) conception of the ‘end of geography’ Ruggie’s (1993) analysis of the EU as a ‘nonterritorial region’ 65 Scholte’s (2000) theory of ‘supraterritoriality’ (but he explicitly rejects the thesis of state decline) Major accomplishments In contrast to methodologically territorialist approaches. thus the possibility that territoriality is being reconfigured. and (re)territorialization—particularly at national. consequently. embedding.6.

30 For important recent inroads into this task. reconfigured. Amin 2002. The contemporary round of global restructuring has put into relief the distinctive. historically specific character of national state territoriality as a form of sociospatial organization. and multiscalar geographies of global social change. Dicken et al.66 The Globalization Debates contexts. polycentric. 2001. National state territoriality is today being intertwined with. tangled mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes. at all scales. I have suggested that the contemporary round of global capitalist restructuring has destabilized the entrenched. self-enclosed and contiguous blocks of territory that has long been used to describe the modern interstate system (Lefebvre 1991: 87–8). The historicity of social space. I believe. new forms of transnational corporate organization. see A.30 A crucial methodological challenge for contemporary sociospatial research is therefore to analyze newly emergent geographies in ways that transcend the conventional imperative to choose between purely territorialist and deterritorialized mappings of political-economic space. 2. Polymorphic geographies. Under these circumstances. levels. character of inherited formations of political-economic space has become dramatically evident both in sociological analysis and in everyday life. The preceding discussion of these debates underscores four particularly crucial methodological challenges for contemporary studies of global sociospatial restructuring. the historical. and self-enclosed blocks of territorial space. and historically specific understandings of social spatiality. an immense variety of emergent sociospatial forms—from the supranational institutional structures of the EU to global financial flows. At the most general level. New representations of sociospatial form are urgently needed in order to analyze these newly emergent polymorphic. This chapter has attempted to outline some methodological foundations for confronting this task. and superimposed upon. post-Fordist patterns of industrial agglomeration. and morphologies has become more appropriate than the traditional Cartesian model of homogenous. and transnational diasporic communities—that cannot be described adequately as contiguous. scales. mutually exclusive. The overarching methodological challenge that flows from this circumstance is to analyze social spatiality. nation statecentric geographical assumptions that have underpinned the social sciences throughout most of the twentieth century. . the image of political-economic space as a complex. that contemporary debates on globalization have induced many scholars to develop more reflexive. It is for this reason. dynamic. global interurban networks. Leitner 2004. Graham and Marvin 2001. as an ongoing historical process in which the geographies of social relations are continually molded. Graham 1997. As the primacy of national state territoriality has been decentered and relativized. Larner and Walters 2002. 1. and transformed (Lefebvre 1991). and therefore malleable. and Sheppard 2002.

historically variegated. and outwards to create qualitatively new. and multiscalar regulatory geographies are emerging than previously existed. plurilateral institutional geographies that no longer overlap evenly with one another. and politically contested character. 4. this discussion has emphasized the key role of national states in promoting and mediating contemporary sociospatial transformations. polymorphic.The Globalization Debates 67 3. These developments undermine traditional. Under these conditions. Scalar arrangements are thus never fixed in stone but evolve continuously in conjunction with the dynamics of capital accumulation. given my overarching concern in this book with transformations of state space. Under these conditions. institutional. The new political economy of scale. Westphalian models of statehood as an unchanging. social reproduction. fixed. However. geographical scales must be viewed not only as the products of political-economic processes. These transformations undermine inherited conceptions of geographical scale as a static. an important methodological challenge is to develop a spatially attuned and scale-sensitive approach to state theory that can grasp not only the variegated regulatory geographies associated with inherited. it is the fourth methodological challenge that occupies center stage in subsequent chapters. and sociospatial change in contemporary western Europe. institutionally. polymorphic. nested organizational hierarchy. From this perspective. downwards. The current round of global restructuring has significantly decentered the national scale of political-economic life and intensified the importance of both subnational and supranational scales of sociospatial organization. These challenges are complementary insofar as addressing any one of them also opens up new methodological and empirical perspectives through which to confront the others. but also as their presupposition and their medium (Smith 1995). and geographically—in conjunction with this role. dominant geographical scale or constitute a single. I shall thus grapple with each of the first three methodological challenges through a more direct confrontation with the task of deciphering contemporary pro- . self-enclosed national-territorial container and suggest that more complex. and nested hierarchy and reveal its socially produced. converge upon a single. The remaking of state space. and concomitantly. but also the profoundly uneven reterritorializations and rescalings of statehood that are currently unfolding throughout the world system. and sociopolitical struggle. Finally. a key methodological challenge is to conceptualize geographical scales at once as an institutional scaffolding within which the dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization unfolds and as an incessantly changing medium and outcome of that dialectic (Brenner 1998a). nationalized formations of political space. Subsequent chapters of this book confront the aforementioned methodological challenges in the context of a postdisciplinary investigation of politicaleconomic. Contemporary state institutions are being significantly rescaled at once upwards. state regulation. the ways in which national states have in turn been reorganized—functionally.

Accordingly. scale-sensitive approach to state theory. . the next chapter elaborates the theoretical foundations for a spatialized.68 The Globalization Debates cesses of state spatial restructuring. building upon the approach to sociospatial theory introduced above.

emphasis in original) State theory beyond the territorial trap? State theorists and political geographers have long emphasized the specifically territorial character of political power in the modern world. takes into account localities and regions [ . . the villages and local communities long abandoned. Walker 1993). For the most part. ] This entails as well a reconsideration of the economy in terms of space. of the flux of stocks. of mobile elements and stable elements. . including a critique of deterritorialized abstractions which. abased through state concentration [ . . Then it reintroduces itself subversively through the effects of the peripheries. in short. states are said to be composed of self-enclosed. on automatic pilot according to its own definite.THREE The State Spatial Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis There is never a point when the state is finally built within a given territory and thereafter operates. Bob Jessop (1990a: 9) Curiously. . Henri Lefebvre (1978: 164–5. of the production and reproduction of space. Within the Westphalian geopolitical order. so to speak. . . . how and to what extent one can talk in definite terms about the state actually depends on the contingent and provisional outcome of struggles to realize more or less specific ‘state projects’. . ] Space belongs to the geographers in the academic division of labor. and mutually exclusive territorial spaces that separate an ‘inside’ (the realm of political order and citizenship) from an ‘outside’ (a realm of inter-state violence and anarchy) (R. ] In the conception proposed here. neglected. ] Whether. the regions. . fixed and inevitable laws [ . the [social] relations have social space for support . . space is a stranger to customary political reflection [ . . J. B. the margins. contiguous. at the same time. This entails a spatialization of political theory.

Consequently. nationally organized formations of state territoriality has been thrust dramatically into historical motion. these entrenched methodological assumptions have been called into question. in the context of contemporary debates on globalization. As many analysts within this heterodox strand of social science have noted. particularly by scholars working in the interstices of established disciplinary divisions of labor. the apparently ossified fixity of long-established. This debate narrows the conceptualization of state territoriality to two equally limiting possibilities—its presence or its absence— and thus precludes a more contextually sensitive investigation of processes of state spatial restructuring. Contemporary scholars are thus confronted with the daunting but exciting task of developing new categories and methods through which to decipher these emergent. unchanging grid of national borders. and inconsequential property of statehood. unproblematic. For. a ‘territorial trap’ has underpinned mainstream approaches to social science insofar as they have conceived state territoriality as a static background structure for regulatory processes and sociopolitical struggles rather than as one of their constitutive dimensions. Under these conditions. During the last decade.70 The State Spatial Process however. however. in Agnew’s (1994) memorable phrase. the global political-economic transformations of the post-1970s period have reconfigured the Westphalian formation of state territoriality (a) by decentering the national scale of state regulatory activity and (b) by undermining the internal coherence of national economies and national civil societies. territoriality has been treated within mainstream social science as a relatively fixed. post-Westphalian landscapes of statehood. Such assumptions had some measure of epistemological plausibility during the Fordist-Keynesian period. . methodological territorialism. and methodological nationalism. Whereas the first position is generally grounded upon a static understanding of state territoriality as a fixed. 2 above). Today. Indeed. the second position can envision state restructuring only as a process of contraction or disappearance in which territoriality is being rendered obsolete. state-centric geographical assumptions have underpinned the unhelpful polarization of positions between proponents of the view that national states remain fully sovereign territorial power-containers and those who contend that state regulatory capacities are being eroded (see Ch. Just as a fish is unlikely to discover water. in which a historically unprecedented territorial enclosure of political-economic space was attempted (Lipietz 1994). they have become major intellectual barriers to a more adequate conceptualization of ongoing sociospatial transformations. most scholars of modern politics and society have long embraced each of the state-centric geographical assumptions that were critically discussed in the previous chapter—spatial fetishism. most postwar social scientists viewed national state territories as pregiven natural environments for sociopolitical life (Taylor 1994: 157). even while being acknowledged as an underlying feature of modern geopolitical organization.

and regulatory conflict are being generated. This ongoing reconceptualization of state space has been extraordinarily multifaceted. 3. flow-based economic transactions under globalizing capitalism. self-enclosed platform for political relations. Perkmann and Sum 2002). organization. among the many arguments that have been advanced regarding the emergent institutional architectures of post-Keynesian states. but is now being analyzed as a historically specific strategy of spatial enclosure and as an evolving. military violence. but is now viewed as a constitutive. In contrast to the earlier fetishization of the national scale of political power. and politicaleconomic practices through which state power is articulated and contested (Newman and Paasi 1998. contemporary discussions of state spatial restructuring are distinguished above all by their emphasis on the qualitatively new geographical scales and territorial contours of statecraft that have been crystallizing in recent decades. scholars have begun to analyze a range of rescaling processes through which new. both methodologically and thematically. . D. symbolic. Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997). political authority. the internationalization of statehood. multiscalar hierarchies of state institutional organization. Boundaries are thus no longer viewed as exclusively national demarcators of state sovereignty but are now understood as multifaceted semiotic. State reterritorialization. and politico-cultural identities. Thus. perforated sovereignties. 2. immigration. MacMillan and Linklater 1995. our understanding of the new state spaces that are currently emerging remains relatively rudimentary. The meaning. 1.The State Spatial Process 71 Much of the new research on state spatiality can be situated within a broader body of critical social science concerned to counter neoliberal globalization narratives by emphasizing the essential role of state institutions in promoting market-based regulatory reform throughout the world economy. and functions of state territoriality are being reexamined in the context of debates on neomedievalism. Territoriality is thus no longer viewed as a pregiven. The changing roles of state boundaries in the new geopolitical order are being systematically explored with reference to issues such as economic governance. At the present time. citizenship. contested. The scalar organization of state power is thus no longer understood as a permanently fixed background structure. multiscalar institutional configuration (Kobrin 1998. Nonetheless. State rebordering. Newman 1999). but it has thus far focused upon at least three intertwined axes of state spatial restructuring. and the increased importance of dematerialized. State rescaling. Smith 1995. and therefore potentially malleable dimension of politicaleconomic processes (Swyngedouw 1997. recent contributions to this multidisciplinary literature have clearly illuminated the historically constructed and politically contested character of state spatiality. cross-border regions. Ruggie 1993.

Of particular importance. the geographical dimensions of state power are treated in descriptive terms. Relatedly. It also enables me to introduce a stylized model of state spatial restructuring in western Europe since the early 1960s. the causal forces underlying contemporary processes of state spatial restructuring are often not explicitly specified. Ferguson and Jones 2002. In many contributions to this literature. there is an equally urgent need for a more explicit theoretical conceptualization of the determinate social. there is arguably an increasingly urgent need for more systematic theoretical reflection on the nature and dynamics of state spatiality. in this context. The next section introduces some initial methodological premises and categories through which the geographies of state space under modern capitalism may be analyzed. Brenner et al. Delaney. that serves to demarcate the theoretical and empirical terrain on which the remainder of this book is situated. I demonstrate how the issues of spatiality. into the conceptualization of modern statehood. medium. Yet. territoriality. For recent overviews of these emerging lines of research see. and Peck 2003. 1 . I argue that state space is best conceptualized as an arena. and geographical scale may be integrated. Jacobson. stabilized settings in which state regulatory operations occur into potentially malleable stakes of sociopolitical contestation. political. among other works.1 Despite these accomplishments. as merely one among many aspects of statehood that are currently undergoing systemic changes. This line of analysis generates a multidimensional conceptual framework through which to investigate contextually specific pathways of state spatial restructuring. I then extend this conceptualization by outlining some of the broad institutional and geographical parameters within which state space has evolved during the course of capitalist development.72 The State Spatial Process thereby opening up a number of productive methodological and empirical starting points through which the changing geographies of contemporary statehood may be explored more systematically. Albert. 2003a. On this basis. and Lapid 2001. 2001a. and economic processes through which transformations of state space unfold. My overarching goal is to elaborate the theoretical foundations for the analysis of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring that will be developed in subsequent chapters. at a foundational level. Building upon the strategic-relational approach to state theory developed by Jessop (1990a). given the tumultuous political-geographical transformations that have been unfolding during the last three decades. Concomitantly. Blomley. and outcome of spatially selective political strategies. The present chapter confronts these tasks in a series of intertwined steps. is a sustained inquiry into the conditions under which inherited geographies of state space may be transformed from relatively fixed. much recent work on the production of new state spaces has proceeded without an explicit theoretical foundation. and Ford 2001.

and a bracketing of the broader geoeconomic contexts of state activities (Taylor 1993). reproducing. certain strands of this literature managed at least partially to circumvent the territorial trap of state-centrism even during its historical highpoint under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. As argued in the previous chapter. Consequently. an excessive reliance upon biological or organic metaphors. including (depending on the context) an excessively physicalist and deterministic conception of geographical influence. The key concern. classical approaches to political geography contained a number of major theoretical deficiencies. administrative differentiation. geopolitics. in conjunction with the intensified interest in critical social theory and radical political economy among human geographers and other spatially attuned scholars (Gregory and Urry 1985). others focused on various aspects of the state’s internal spatial structure. metropolitan jurisdictional fragmentation. By acknowledging the socially constructed and politically contested character of political jurisdictions at a variety of scales. state-centric assumptions generate a systemic blindness to the possibility of major ruptures within . to be found in space? Henri Lefebvre (2003a: 87) Prior to the current renaissance of spatially attuned approaches to state theory. gerrymandering. and solidifying everyday power relations at a variety of geographical scales. classical political geographers had already introduced a number of descriptive categories through which to map the spatial contours of state operations and political life. and spatial scale Is not the secret of the State. and territorial politics (for overviews see Taylor 2003. a pervasive functionalism. from this point of view. borders. that the geographies of state power have been analyzed in a more contextually specific manner and related explicitly to the historical dynamics of capitalist development. state-centrism entails the freezing of political-economic life within reified. core/periphery structures. has been to analyze ‘the historical relationship between territorial states and the broader social and economic structures and geopolitical orders (or forms of spatial practice) in which these states must operate’ (Agnew and Corbridge 1994: 100). hidden because it is so obvious.The State Spatial Process 73 Methodological preliminaries: spatial process. and war-making. 1993). national-territorial structures that are presumed to defy historical change. Some scholars addressed the issues of territoriality. such as federalism. However. spatial form. a naturalization of liberal democracy as a political form. Additionally. contributors to the new literature on the political geographies of statehood have investigated the role of state spatial arrangements in mediating. It is only during the last thirty years.

. the present analysis begins from a radically different theoretical starting point. • State scalar organization and scalar divisions of state regulation are said to evolve historically and. as the logically primary level of political power in the modern interstate system CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE A processual conceptualization of state space . The goal of this section is to add some preliminary descriptive content to these opening propositions. multifaceted. but also as a means for analyzing the changing geographies of state institutions themselves. and thus as immune to the possibility of systemic change Methodological territorialism • State territoriality is viewed as an unchanging. . whether in historical or contemporary contexts. on occasion. • State space is conceived as an ongoing process of political-economic regulation and institutional change emphasizing its polymorphic geographies . Therefore. (b) as having a polymorphic rather than a merely territorial geographical form. • Territoriality is viewed as one among many geographical dimensions of state space at a multiplicity of spatial scales • State regulation and political struggle are said to unfold at a variety of intertwined spatial scales. to be significantly restructured Fig. I shall then explicate their theoretical foundations in greater detail and outline some of their substantive implications. Beyond state-centric approaches to the study of state space . container. fixed. in ontological terms. and continually evolving. not only as a basis for the investigation of contemporary sociospatial transformations.1. or permanent aspect of modern statehood. 3. STATE-CENTRIC ASSUMPTION Spatial fetishism • State space is viewed as timeless and static. methodological territorialism. or platform. .1). and methodological nationalism that continue to pervade mainstream social science. For my purposes here. 3. Such assumptions are deeply problematic.74 The State Spatial Process inherited formations of sociospatial organization. • The geographies of statehood are conceived as polymorphic. • The geography of state space is reduced to its territorial dimensions Methodological nationalism • The national scale is viewed. . in contrast to the spatial fetishism. state space is conceptualized (a) as an ongoing process of change rather than as a static thing. and (c) as having a multiscalar rather than merely a national organizational structure (Fig.

From this perspective.The State Spatial Process 75 The state spatial process: a first cut In what sense is state spatiality a process rather than a container. and constraints upon. Brenner 2001c. Harvey (1973). fixity. processual approaches to the production of social spatiality have been mobilized extensively in the field of critical urban and regional studies (Gottdiener 1985. abridged translations of key state-theoretical writings include Lefebvre 2003a. For interpretations and commentaries. historically specific view. 1996). 2003c. b. a reification of processes of change is entrenched within the conceptual grammar of mainstream social science. . the urban must be understood simultaneously as a presupposition. Against traditional approaches to urban locational analysis. I would argue. Harvey 1996). his major writings on the state have not been extensively translated and thus remain relatively obscure among English-language readers (see Lefebvre 1978. Harvey introduced a more dynamic. 1998a. the methodological insights of critical urban researchers and other geographically inclined social scientists have had only a minimal impact upon the fields of state theory and political sociology. that the conceptualizations of sociospatial dynamics that were developed in these pioneering analyses of urban spatiality may be fruitfully mobilized to investigate the production and transformation of state spatiality as well. Surprisingly. fluidity. 1997a. and culture. While Lefebvre’s writings on cities are now quite well known among Anglo-American urbanists (see e. and an outcome of the conflictual.2 Much like the term ‘city’. and continuity even in the face of compelling evidence of flux.g. and Soja (1980) over two decades ago. 1977. as theorists of dialectics have argued (Ollman 1993. radical urban scholars began to break out of these intellectual constraints by introducing more dialectical. future social relations. Over two decades ago. Lefebvre 2003b. thinglike entity—in this case. which conceived space in EuclidianCartesian terms. society. 1976a. a platform. see Elden 2004. b). in Harvey’s (1978) more precise terminology. or a thing? Since the seminal contributions of radical urbanists such as Lefebvre (1991 [1974]). processual concepts for describing the contemporary city—for instance. Yet. and transformation. Castells (1977 [1972]). continually changing social relations of capitalism. leading scholars to presume unreflexively the existence of stasis. 2001. as represented in the colors allotted to each country on a world map. Along with other foundational sociological concepts such as economy. any historical configuration of urban spatiality represents a sedimented crystallization of earlier patterns of social interaction and an evolving grid of possibilities for. as a flat surface upon which economic activity is extended. the term ‘state’ ostensibly connotes a fixed. the urban process. For Harvey. nonetheless. Recent. 2 Henri Lefebvre is one of the few sociospatial theorists to have analyzed systematically both the production of urban space and the production of state space. Soja 2000). a closed institutional system that occupies a bordered geographical territory. a medium. urbanization or. the notions of the city and the state are arguably among the paradigmatic exemplars of this pervasive reification of sociospatial dynamics within the modern social sciences.

state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through regulatory projects and sociopolitical struggles articulated in diverse institutional sites and at a range of geographical scales. Held 1995. has been acknowledged and analyzed most explicitly in twentieth-century social science. container. be developed in order to conceptualize the state spatial process under capitalism. the dimension of political space which. in which the principle of state territorial sovereignty was first institutionalized (Spruyt 1994. and traditional Marxist debates on the relative autonomy of the state. This treatment of territoriality as a pregiven. as discussed in the preceding chapter. J. he was considerably less interested in its evolution within the modern interstate system. It is not a thing. their functions within the modern geopolitical and geoeconomic system have been modified. Weber reduced the issue to a point on a definitional checklist that could be presupposed relatively unproblematically in any discussion of modern bureaucratic states. as if they were pregiven territorial containers. This proposition can be illustrated most directly with reference to the phenomenon of state territoriality. B. in which self-enclosed territorial borders were included as one of the essential definitional features of modern political organization. from theories of liberal democracy and realist approaches to international relations theory to major strands of development studies. self-contained territorial arenas must be replaced by a dialectical. Walker 1993. I propose. . The spaces of state power are not simply ‘filled’. Newman and Paasi 1998). and dynamically changing matrix of sociospatial interaction. and R. and thus relatively transparent feature of modern statehood has been reproduced unreflexively in most twentieth-century approaches to statehood. the Weberian definitional insight must be resituated within a more dialectical. through historically specific regulatory strategies and sociopolitical struggles (Agnew and Corbridge 1994.3 While not empirically false. in his major writings on political sociology. Hakli 2001.76 The State Spatial Process A directly analogous methodological strategy can. The entrenched legacy of Euclidian/Cartesian geographical approaches to territoriality is epitomized in Weber’s (1946) approach to political sociology. 1994. Ruggie 1993). even following the historical-geographical watershed associated with the Treaty of Westphalia. conflictual. While Weber was highly sensitive to the historical specificity of modern state territoriality relative to premodern political geographies. borders have never been static. the geography of state spatiality must be viewed as a presupposition. fixed. Rather. but a socially produced. pregiven features of state power. sometimes dramatically. historically specific conceptual framework. and an outcome of continually evolving political strategies. or platform. Since 3 ¨ For further discussion of this methodological tendency see Agnew 1993. Therefore. processual analysis of how historically specific configurations of state space are produced and incessantly reworked. Instead. an arena. Much like the geography of the city. unchanging. Accordingly. the traditional Westphalian image of states as being located within static. mainstream analyses of social policy. For.

4 This distinction provides an initial analytical basis on which to 4 This distinction derives from ongoing collaborative work with Bob Jessop. (d) the institutionalization of democratic forms of political legitimation. products. Thus. b. from the war machines of early modern Europe and the wealth containers of the mercantile era to the national developmentalist states of the second industrial revolution and the Keynesian welfare national states of the FordistKeynesian period. some initial results of which were presented in Brenner et al. To the extent that national states have ever appeared to have captured politics through their territoriality. this territorialization of political life has never been accomplished ‘once and for all’. Some of the arguments elaborated in this section represent a further development of the latter work. through the principle of territoriality. I must bracket the ‘representational’ aspects of state space which encompass the diverse ways in which state space is represented. It is useful. see Brenner et al. dimension within the multilayered geographical architectures of modern state spatiality. It must be understood. and political orientations. political. contentious outcome of historically specific state projects of territorial enclosure (Paasi 1996). permanent condition. and have attempted to contain a broad range of social. 2003a. and stakes of ongoing regulatory strategies and sociopolitical struggles. and (e) the provision of social welfare (Taylor 1994). . While the national state may have indeed ‘acted like a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality’ (Taylor 1994: 152) throughout much of the history of modern capitalism. Martin Jones. and economic activities. intellectual responsibility for the elaboration of these ideas in the present context lies with me alone. Polymorphic political geographies Territoriality represents only one. national states have deployed a variety of regulatory strategies. (b) the containment and enhancement of national economic wealth. The processual conceptualization of state territoriality sketched in the preceding paragraphs can thus be extended to illuminate a number of additional aspects of state spatiality that likewise operate as arenas. regulatory operations. (c) the promotion of nationalized politico-cultural identities. However. to distinguish two closely intertwined dimensions of state spatiality—state space in the ‘narrow’ sense. instead. as a precarious. in this context. and imagined by hegemonic political-economic actors and in everyday life (for further discussion and references. this situation has never represented more than a temporary moment of stabilization within ongoing struggles over their geographical architectures. 2003b). interpreted. and Gordon MacLeod. albeit crucial.The State Spatial Process 77 the long sixteenth century. and state space in the ‘integral’ sense (Brenner et al. 2003b: 6). the national state’s role as a territorial powercontainer has hinged upon an expanding repertoire of regulatory activities— including (a) war-making and military defense. For purposes of this analysis. The role of territorial borders as modalities of spatial encagement is thus best understood as a medium and result of political strategies rather than as a fixed.

as sketched above. First. to accelerate the circulation of capital. national parks. state space in the narrow sense refers to the state’s distinctive form of spatial organization as a discrete. Second. and internally differentiated institutional apparatus. places. roads. or functions of subnational administrative units (K. for instance. Additionally. ports. rural peripheries. state space in the integral sense refers to the territory-. state institutions attempt.and scale-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized to regulate social relations and to influence their locational geographies. These strategies were eventually complemented by state-led initiatives to regulate urban living and working conditions and to establish large-scale public works facilities 5 This list is not exhaustive. This aspect of state space refers. With the possible exception of small-scale city-states. this internal territorial differentiation has entailed the establishment of intergovernmental hierarchies and place. self-contained.and region-specific institutional forms in which particular types of spaces—such as urban areas. Cox 1990). and scales as focal points for state regulation. above all. and nature preserves. and canals. and the establishment of public forests. but such scalar arrangements may also be unsettled as opposing sociopolitical forces struggle to reorganize the institutional structure. Each historical formation of state spatiality is associated with policy frameworks that target specific jurisdictions. to the changing configuration of state territoriality and to the evolving role of borders. Additional examples of state spatial targeting include the delineation of ‘safe areas’ during times of war or in natural disasters. and frontiers in the modern interstate system. border zones.78 The State Spatial Process conceptualize the polymorphic character of state spatiality under modern capitalism. and so forth—are encompassed under distinctive administrative arrangements. metropolitan economies. The resultant scalar divisions of regulation may provide a relatively stabilized framework for state activities during a given period. borders. . boundaries. and financial aid (Jones 1999). most state apparatuses exhibit a significant degree of internal territorial differentiation insofar as they are subdivided among multiple administrative tiers that are allotted specific regulatory tasks (Painter and Goodwin 1995). Within modern national states. territorially centralized. most centrally. public investments. place. to address place-specific socioeconomic problems and to maintain territorial cohesion within and among diverse centers of economic activity and population growth. state space in the narrow sense encompasses the changing geographies of state territorial organization and administrative differentiation within national jurisdictional boundaries. This aspect of state space refers. to reproduce the labor force. Through this process of spatial targeting.5 Thus early industrial capitalist states channeled massive public investments into large-scale territorial infrastructures such as railroads. to the changing geographies of state intervention into socioeconomic processes within a given territorial jurisdiction. to enhance territorially specific locational assets.

waste management systems) within major metropolitan areas. The narrow and integral aspects of state space—including territoriality. territorial differentiation. schools. centrally delegated programs to create new forms of regional economic governance may generate radically divergent policy agendas in different locations due to the impacts of place-specific industrial conditions. Consequently. 4). such as aerospace and shipbuilding. For example.’ The main elements of the conceptualization of state spatiality developed thus far are summarized schematically in Fig. or particular social groups within those locations. as Lefebvre (1991: 281) explains: ‘each new form of state. the large-scale bureaucratic states of western Europe came to promote the entire national territory as an integrated geographical framework for economic growth. each new form of political power. and indirect spatial effects— interact reciprocally to produce historically specific formations of state spatiality.2 (overleaf). apparently aspatial policies may impact particular locations. in which rental housing predominates. On the other hand. In this context. In addition to these explicit spatial policies. For instance. institutional legacies. Analogously.The State Spatial Process 79 (such as hospitals. Following the second industrial revolution. as it were. Most recently. its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. mass transportation networks. major urban and regional economies across western Europe have become strategically important spatial targets for a range of socioeconomic. state space in the integral sense also encompasses the indirect sociospatial effects that flow from apparently aspatial policies. . and political alliances (MacKinnon 2001). 5). There are two distinct aspects of this phenomenon (Jones 1999: 237–8). military spending in the USA is not only a form of industrial policy that subsidizes particular sectors. but also a form of spatial policy that generates significant employment growth in major industrial regions such as Los Angeles and Seattle. and infrastructural policies that aim to enhance national competitive advantages (see Ch. Each such form commands space. to serve its purposes. The uneven development of state regulation therefore represents an important dimension of state space in the integral sense. 3. in distinctive ways. spatial targeting. On the one hand. following the global economic crisis of the 1970s. national workfare policies may facilitate enhanced employment in buoyant local labor markets while eliciting the opposite effect within depressed local economies (Jones 1999: 238). many national state policies generate uneven spatial effects due to their interaction with locationally specific conditions. introduces its own particular way of partitioning space. Analogously. US government-sponsored mortgage subsidies and homeowner tax breaks tend to privilege suburban areas rather than cities. industrial. energy grids. relatively non-industrialized rural and peripheral regions were targeted in redistributive state projects that aimed to spread urban industrial growth more evenly throughout the national territory (see Ch.

until relatively recently. and frontiers in the world interstate system • Internal territorial differentiation: the subdivision of state territories among various jurisdictional units. and scale-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized to regulate social relations and to influence their locational geographies • Spatial targeting: the mobilization of state policies. or financial subsidies to modify or transform social conditions within specific jurisdictions and at particular scales • Indirect spatial effects: the unintended. Given the pervasive nationalization of political-economic life that was pursued during the course of the twentieth century. had some measure of plausibility both in social theory and in everyday life. The state spatial process: key dimensions State scalar configurations Before we can further unpack the methodological foundations for this dialectical. such assumptions have. that sovereignty and territoriality are permanently bundled together at a national scale.80 The State Spatial Process THE STATE SPATIAL PROCESS The spaces of state power are not simply ‘filled’. as if they were pregiven territorial containers.and region-specific institutional forms STATE SPACE IN THE INTEGRAL SENSE This refers to the territory-. public investments. unevenly distributed sociospatial consequences that flow from apparently aspatial state policies This occurs through (a) the role of hidden geographical ‘selectivities’ within ostensibly generic state policies and (b) the interaction of national state policies with locationally specific subnational conditions Fig 3. and outcome of evolving social relations STATE SPACE IN THE NARROW SENSE This refers to the state’s distinctive form of spatial organization as a discrete. The geography of statehood must therefore be viewed as a presupposition. They are. place-. This occurs through the establishment of (a) intergovernmental hierarchies and (b) place. Instead. according to which all aspects of the state’s geographical . one additional issue must be addressed—the question of the state’s distinctive. territorially centralized. and polymorphic conceptualization of the state spatial process under capitalism. and internally differentiated institutional apparatus • Territoriality/bordering: the changing configuration of state territoriality and the evolving role of borders. arena. state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through sociopolitical struggles at various geographical scales. however. and state theorists have unreflexively presupposed that ‘the’ state is necessarily organized as a national state and. boundaries. processual. As we have already seen. historically evolving scalar configuration. self-contained. most political sociologists. directly at odds with the conception of the state spatial process introduced above.2. by implication. political economists.

italics added). ] to a significant degree inclusive and constitutive of other forms or layers of state power (i. the latter still generally play key roles within the broader. and not a matter that can be settled on an a priori basis. and thus the malleability. Shaw’s layered conceptualization of modern statehood is particularly useful because it emphasizes (a) the multiscalar character of state power even under conditions in which a single scale predominates. multiscalar institutional architecture of statehood. therefore.to late twentieth century. is that the question of which scale of regulatory activity is primary within a given configuration of state power is essentially an empirical-historical one. This conceptualization also implies that the substantive politico-institutional content of particular scales . However. Shaw’s response—which he presents as an extension of Mann’s (1993) definition of statehood—is of considerable relevance to the present study.’ The crucial point. of state power in general in a particular time and space). some scales or ‘layers’ of state power are subordinate to others. Moreover. represent expressions of ongoing processes of political-economic regulation and sociopolitical contestation rather than permanently fixed features of statehood as such. even though the national scale of statehood has long encompassed and largely constituted those layers of political authority that exist at other scales. even when a given scale of state power successfully encompasses and constitutes other scales of political authority. Shaw’s explicit recognition of the layered. a distinct state apparatus. state scalar configurations must be conceptualized in a manner that is explicitly attuned to the historicity. a particular power centre must be [ . Shaw points out the various ways in which both municipal state forms and international organizations were subsumed within the organizational apparatuses of what he terms ‘nation-state-empires’ from the late nineteenth century to the mid. multiscalar character of state power opens up the fundamental question of ‘why a given layer [ . ] of state is seen as defining a particular period’ (Shaw 2000: 189). as Shaw is quick to emphasize. including its scalar configuration. Shaw (2000) has recently developed a useful framework for confronting this issue. every historical formation of state spatiality is ‘layered’ among a variety of distinct but intertwined power centers and tiers of political authority both above and below the national scale. . regulatory activity. in itself. . Accordingly. Shaw emphasizes the ways in which municipal governments and the European Commission today remain largely subordinate to national state apparatuses (Shaw 2000: 190–1).The State Spatial Process 81 architecture. Consequently. For Shaw. and thus not every level of political authority can be said to constitute. and political struggle.e. In the present context. Therefore. . italics in original): ‘to be considered a state. Concomitantly. and (b) the possibility that historically entrenched formations of state scalar organization may be qualitatively transformed. of each scale of state institutional organization. According to Shaw (2000: 190. ‘there is no reason to regard any particular layer of state power as intrinsically incapable of constituting statehood’ (Shaw 2000: 189. .

On the one hand. the remainder of this chapter confronts each of these questions in turn. with reference to its role as an arena for various forms of state intervention into socioeconomic life (Fig. how and why has the spatial. and continually changing geographies of state space under modern capitalism. why does statehood under capitalism assume a specific spatial. and scalar form? Second. and scalar configuration of statehood evolved during the history of capitalist development? Building towards an analysis of contemporary transformations of state space. Building upon the processual conceptualization of state space introduced previously. it is vital to acknowledge historical-geographical specificities in the ways in which states are constituted [ . territorial.82 The State Spatial Process of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity likewise evolves historically. These considerations open up two foundational questions. The regulatory functions. . and geographical boundaries of supranational. regional. regional. multiscalar. national. and (b) in an integral sense. Decoding state scalar configurations: narrow and integral dimensions This discussion has generated a number of initial methodological premises through which to approach the polymorphic.3). STATE SPACE IN THE NARROW SENSE SCALAR CONFIGURATION OF STATE SPACE Organizational form. territorial. 3. national. ] On the other hand. each scale of state power may be analyzed (a) in a narrow sense. or municipal state agencies in various forms of political-economic regulation Embeddedness of a given scale Embeddedness of a given scale of state activity within broader of state institutional organization scalar divisions of state within a broader scalar hierarchy regulation of state institutions Fig 3. national. institutional structure.3. . or municipal state institutions STATE SPACE IN THE INTEGRAL SENSE Distinctive role of supranational. and local scales of statehood are thus likely to differ qualitatively according to the broader interscalar hierarchies in which they are embedded. and political significance of the supranational. State space as political strategy: a strategic-relational approach There is an ever present tension in analyses of the capitalist state. institutional structure. First. institutional expressions. and geographical boundaries. the universalizing effects of the capitalist mode of production mean that a . regional. with reference to its internal organizational form.

Representative contributions to this broad research field include Dyson 1982. Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997. early Marxist state theorists and more recent contributors to the German state derivation debate focused their attention primarily on the question of how the forms and functions of state institutions (for instance. institutionalist geopolitical economy. theorists of the capitalist state have long struggled to integrate arguments regarding the nature of the state form under capitalism and analyses of the historical evolution of specific state apparatuses within the capitalist geopolitical economy. Evans. the separation of the economic and the political. while many theorists have emphasized the fundamental character of (national) state territoriality in the modern geopolitical order.6 By contrast. Rueschemeyer. see K. into the strategicrelational approach to state theory developed by Jessop (1990a). For instance. the task at hand is to confront it in a manner that can illuminate both the generic and the specific aspects of state spatiality under particular historical-geographical conditions. and geographical scale. Lash and Urry 1987. other scholars have focused their attention upon the variegated political geographies that have crystallized in different national. There is [therefore] an unavoidable tension between the need for a general theory of ‘form’ (the separation of the political and economic spheres) and for a theory of historically and territorially specific national states within the shifting limits of that form.The State Spatial Process theory of the capitalist state is both possible and necessary. I propose to grapple with this issue by integrating questions of space. regional. The literature on state institutional evolution and comparative capitalisms is far too extensive to reference at length here. and Skocpol 1985. and local contexts and time-periods within that order. see Jessop 1982.7 A directly analogous tension between abstract-logical and concrete-historical modes of analysis necessarily accompanies any attempt to decipher the spatial form of statehood under capitalism (Collinge 1996). class domination. Thus. For an excellent overview of these debates. Most traditions of state theory privilege one or the other side of this analytical divide. 7 6 . profit-driven production. Tilly 1990. as Hudson (2001: 55) rightly indicates. and the commodification of labor). and Weiss and Hobson 1995. and French regulation theory—have directed attention to the diverse political and institutional arrangements upon which state power has been grounded under modern capitalist conditions. territoriality. Cox (2002). surveys major examples of these positions.8 While this tension is. Ray Hudson (2001: 55) 83 As Hudson indicates. Political Geography. To this end. and the role of state policies in promoting capital accumulation and in reproducing labor-power) are intertwined with the fundamental features of capitalism as a mode of production (such as private property relations. For a more recent analysis. Schwartz 1994. other scholarly traditions— including historical sociology. 8 Taylor’s (1993) excellent textbook. ‘unavoidable’. at a foundational level. intercapitalist competition.

therefore. both the state’s general spatial form under capitalism and the historical variation of state spatial arrangements during the course of capitalist development.9 Jessop mentions a number of accumulation strategies: Fordism. (b) extra-economic class struggles that condition capital’s ability to control labor power in the sphere of reproduction. This conceptualization forms a theoretical linchpin for the analysis of state rescaling that will be developed in subsequent chapters of this book. ‘within the matrix established by the value-form there is real scope for variation in the rhythm and course of capitalist development’. Consequently. the capitalist state must be viewed as an institutionally specific form of social relations. and (c) the dynamics and intensity of intercapitalist competition (Jessop 1990a: 197–8). is the state form constituted through its ‘particularization’ or institutional separation from the circuit of capital (Jessop 1990a: 206). neither the value form nor the state form necessarily engender functionally unified. Most crucially. I build upon Jessop’s conceptualization of ‘strategic selectivity’ in order to specify some of the broad parameters within which state spatial configurations have evolved under modern capitalism. Through a spatialization of Jessop’s approach to statehood. According to Jessop. in Jessop’s view. On this basis. 9 . The strategic-relational approach to state theory: an overview According to Jessop (1990a). price. the fascist notion of Grossraumwirtschaft. 1988). contradictory matrix of social relations associated with the value form can only be translated into a system of reproducible institutional arrangements through the mobilization of accumulation strategies. import-substitution and exportpromotion strategies in Latin America. Just as the capital relation is constituted through value (in the sphere of production) and the commodity. an accumulation strategy emerges when a model of economic growth is linked to a framework of institutions and state policies that are capable of reproducing it (see also Jessop et al. The value form is underdetermined insofar as its substance—the socially necessary labor time embodied in commodities—is contingent upon (a) class struggles in the sphere of production that condition capital’s ability to subordinate labor power in the extraction of surplus value. However. the West German Modell Deutschland. or organizationally coherent institutional arrangements (see also Poulantzas 1978). Jessop et al. within a single analytical framework. neither the state’s spatial form nor historically specific forms of state spatiality are ever structurally pregiven. among many others (Jessop 1990a: 201–2. In Jessop’s (1990a: 198) terms. 1988: 158). operationally cohesive.84 The State Spatial Process I first mobilize Jessop’s strategic-relational framework in order to provide further theoretical grounding for the general arguments regarding the processual character of state spatiality that were developed in the preceding section. so too. from this point of view. they represent arenas and outcomes of spatially selective political strategies. rather. Jessop maintains. it will be possible to analyze. and money (in the sphere of circulation). the relatively inchoate. and Thatcherism. Jessop (1990a: 198) maintains.

Indeed. 3. the functional unity and organizational coherence of the state are never pregiven. it is only through the mobilization and consolidation of state projects—which attempt to integrate state activities around a set of common. Various more concrete features of the state form may likewise contribute to this capitalist orientation. and class struggles may undermine business confidence and disrupt the state’s capacity to promote capital accumulation (Jessop 1990a: 148–9). ‘form problematizes function’: the separation of the state from the circuit of capital may seriously constrain its ability to function as an agent of capitalist interests. contingent. 149. whose functional unity and organizational coherence are likewise understood to be deeply problematic. Jessop argues. contested. . Among many other factors. For Jessop. Jessop proposes a formally analogous argument regarding the state form. political representation. politically induced policy oscillations. bureaucratic inefficiency. On the contrary. but must be viewed as emergent. On the other hand. 346). the establishment of a political sphere that is distinct from the spheres of production and circulation may be functional to capital insofar as states provide many of the extra-economic preconditions of successful capital accumulation. however. or reproducible framework of concrete state activities. for its very existence ‘permits a dislocation between the activities of the state and the needs of capital’. according to Jessop (1990a: 9. In this sense. Jessop maintains.4. therefore. and ideological hegemony within capitalist society. The key elements of this line of argumentation are summarized schematically in Fig. the state form is an underdetermined condensation of continual strategic interactions regarding the nature of state intervention. Consequently. Accordingly. coherently articulated agendas—that the image of the state as a unified organizational entity (‘state effects’) can be projected into civil society. coordinated.e. the value form and the state form) of modern capitalism. including the framework of bourgeois law. 10 State projects are defined by Jessop (1990a: 346) not only as strategies to endow state activities with unity and coherence but also with reference (a) to their social bases within bourgeois society and (b) to their associated discourses of ‘community’ and ‘cohesion’. and potentially unstable outcomes of ongoing sociopolitical struggles between opposed social forces. and the insulation of the state’s economic and repressive organs from popular or legislative control (Jessop 1990a: 148). the mere existence of the state as a distinctive form of social relations does not automatically translate into a coherent. the indirectness of state intervention in the economy. as Jessop (1990a: 148) has frequently reiterated.10 State projects are thus formally analogous to accumulation strategies insofar as both represent strategic initiatives to institutionalize and reproduce the contradictory social forms (i. the operation of parliamentary politics.The State Spatial Process 85 Most crucially here. ‘there can be no inherent substantive unity to the state qua institutional ensemble: its (always relative) unity must be created within the state system itself through specific operational procedures. On the one hand. 161). Jessop (1990a: 206) insists that the state cannot serve as an ideal collective capitalist. the nature of bureaucracy. means of coordination and guiding purposes’ (Jessop 1990a: 346.

. by reducing costs and/or increasing outputs) Sphere of circulation • The mechanisms of price and money mediate the exchange of goods and services • Capitalists compete to reduce the market prices of commodities and to increase their own market share. . economic and extra• Yet labor power is a ‘fictitious economic preconditions commodity’ insofar as the conditions for accumulation . this object of class struggle in and outside separation enables state the sphere of production institutions to be mobilized • Capitalists share certain general interests in in ways that are not directly the reproduction of the capital relation . . over the particular conditions of for capital accumulation capitalist reproduction • The valorization of capital depends Consequently. . 3. . The form of these social relations problematizes their functional unity and institutional coherence . the nature of the power bloc [. and may even • Yet capitalists also compete be highly dysfunctional. These include: • The social bases of state power. ACCUMULATION STRATEGIES the functional unity and • ‘A specific pattern. but can the range of government policies be maintained conducive to its stable only as precarious reproduction’ (Jessop. .e. beneficial. i. CAPITAL RELATION Sphere of production STATE FORM Key element • The state is institutionally separated or ‘particularized’ from the circuit of capital Selected subsidiary elements • The state depends upon monetary taxes to fund its activities • The state relies upon parliamentary forms of representation and rational-legal bureaucracies that presuppose the formal equality of citizens and thus mask the reality of class domination in capitalist society • The state’s core economic and repressive functions are insulated from popular or legislative control • Production is organized as a value relation in which (a) production is privately organized.. .e. et al. .. (b) labor power isitself a commodity. outcomes 1988: 158) of historically specific strategies and projects STATE PROJECTS • The state practices and projects which define the boundaries of the state and endow it with a degree of internal unity. institutional of economic growth together coherence of with both its associated social these social framework of institutions forms are never (or ‘mode of regulation’) and pregiven.. (Jessop 1990a: 346) Fig.86 The State Spatial Process Capitalism is grounded upon two major formdetermined social relations . and (c) producers struggle to reduce the socially necessary labor time required to produce commodities (i. • The discourses which define the illusory community whose interests and social cohesion are to be managed by the state . . .. Strategic-relational state theory: foundations Source: derived from Jessop 1990a. of its commodification are a direct • At the same time. • The separation of the economic and the political upon capital’s ability to control wage under capitalism enables the labor in and outside the production state to maintain various process . .] whose unstable equilibrium of compromise is crystallized in the state system. or model.4.

State projects aim to provide state institutions with some measure of functional unity. and organizational coherence. interests. In this manner. however. .The State Spatial Process 87 It is on the basis of these considerations that Jessop introduces the concept of strategic selectivity. By contrast. state projects generate ‘state effects’ that endow the state apparatus with the appearance of unity. the ruling class selectivity of state power is best understood as an object and outcome of ongoing sociopolitical struggles rather than as a structurally preinscribed feature of the state system. State projects are endowed with strategic selectivity insofar as particular social forces are privileged in the struggle to influence the evolving institutional structure of state power. According to Offe (1984: 120). strategies oriented towards the state’s own institutional structure may be distinguished from those strategies oriented towards the circuit of capital or the maintenance of hegemony within civil society. For Jessop. Jessop underscores the relational character of state strategic selectivity. In particular. The state strategies in question may be oriented towards a range of distinct socio-institutional targets. and organizational integration (Jessop 1990a: 6–9). a given form of regime. will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power’ (Jessop 1990a: 260). state strategies represent initiatives to mobilize state . ‘the institutional self-interest of the state in accumulation is conditioned by the fact that the state is denied the power to control the flow of those resources which are nevertheless indispensable for the exercise of state power’. . . functional coherence. Jessop (1990a: 260) proposes that the state operates as ‘the site. Accordingly. and actors over others. The state is the generator of strategies because it serves as an institutional base through which diverse societal forces mobilize accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Jessop concurs with Offe’s (1984) well-known hypothesis that the state is endowed with selectivity—that is. When successful. Offe contends. The state is the product of strategies because its own organizational structures and modes of socioeconomic intervention are inherited from earlier political strategies (Jessop 1990a: 261). generator and the product of strategies’. The state’s tendency to privilege certain class factions and social forces over others results from the evolving relationship between inherited state structures and emergent political strategies intended to harness state institutions towards particular socioeconomic projects. the goal of which is to develop a framework for analyzing the role of political strategies in forging the state’s institutional structures and modes of socioeconomic intervention. the former represent state projects whereas the latter represent state strategies. with a tendency to privilege particular social forces. causes the state systematically to privilege ruling-class interests and to exclude other social forces from the process of policymaking. This situation. The state is the site of strategies insofar as ‘a given state form. In Jessop’s terminology. operational coordination.

State strategies are endowed with strategic selectivity insofar as particular social forces are privileged in the struggle to influence the state’s evolving role in regulating the circuit of capital and in the establishment of hegemony. Jessop is concerned to emphasize the ways in which the state serves as a ‘specific political form which offers structural privileges to some but not all kinds of political strategy’ (Jessop 1990a: 270). and hegemonic projects. Just as crucially. the institutional ensemble in which this dialectic unfolds is viewed as an outgrowth of earlier rounds of political struggle regarding the forms and functions of state power.5). In sum. The relationship between state projects and state strategies is thus a dialectical one insofar as they mutually condition and constrain one another (Fig. accumulation strategies. While state strategies generally presuppose the existence of a relatively coherent state project. state strategies result in the mobilization of relatively coherent accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects (Jessop 1990a: 196–219). ongoing social struggles mold (a) the state’s evolving institutional structure and (b) the state’s changing modes of economic intervention. they may also significantly modify the political and institutional terrain upon which state projects are articulated. Rather than viewing selectivity as a pregiven structural feature of the state.5. STATE PROJECTS Initiatives to endow state institutions with organizational coherence. Accordingly. and operational unity: they target the state itself as a distinct institutional ensemble within the broader field of social forces • Target: state institutions • Possible outcome: ‘state effects’ STATE Initiatives to mobilize state institutions in order to promote particular STRATEGIES forms of socioeconomic intervention: they focus upon the articulation of the state to non-state institutions and attempt to instrumentalize the state in order to regulate the circuit of capital and to modify the balance of forces within civil society • Target: the circuit of capital and/or civil society • Possible outcomes: accumulation strategies and/or hegemonic projects Fig. ‘the state as such has no power—it is . when state strategies are mobilized successfully. When successful. 3. Jessop contends that it results from a dialectic of strategic interaction and sociopolitical contestation within and beyond state institutions. in developing the notion of strategic selectivity. functional coordination. In this view. there is no guarantee that state projects will effectively translate into viable state strategies.88 The State Spatial Process institutions towards particular forms of socioeconomic intervention (Jessop 1990a: 260–1). 3. State projects and state strategies Source: based on Jessop 1990a. At the same time.

strategic. Esser and Hirsch’s (1989) analysis of Modell Deutschland in the 1980s emphasizes the regionally specific forms of political compromise that emerged during a period of intensive economic restructuring in the Federal Republic of Germany. Jones (1999) underscores the ways in which the Thatcherite program of central-local restructuring and labor market intervention targeted highly specific spaces and scales for regulatory intervention. In developing the concept of spatial selectivity.6 (overleaf) summarizes the various dimensions of state selectivity—structural. Jessop’s strategic-relational approach provides a theoretical basis on which this proposition may be further elaborated. For Jones (1997: 851). Consequently. Jones (1997: 851) also notes a number of additional instances in which a state regime has systematically privileged particular spaces or articulated a policy agenda in spatially distinctive ways. like all other aspects of the state form. As indicated. but can be established only through the deployment of historically specific political strategies. operational cohesion. and functional unity of the state are never structurally pregiven. and spatial—that have been examined so far in this discussion. it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power. Spatializing strategic-relational state theory: towards state spatial selectivity In an insightful geographical reworking of Jessop’s arguments. Figure 3. places. 1997) has suggested that state institutions are endowed with distinctive spatial selectivities as well. strategically selective. and scales. Jones (1999. Jessop maintains that the organizational coherence. Likewise. space is not only a key dimension of state institutional organization. I suggest that Jessop’s conceptualization of the state as political strategy can be fruitfully mobilized as a theoretical foundation for a spatialized and scale articulated conceptualization of statehood under modern capitalism. spatial selectivity refers to the processes of ‘spatial privileging and articulation’ through which state policies are differentiated across territorial space in order to target particular geographical zones and scales. and politically contested process. represents an emergent. This argument may also be fruitfully applied to the .The State Spatial Process 89 merely an institutional ensemble. The conception of the state as political strategy is thus intended to illuminate the complex interplay between these evolving institutional capacities/liabilities and the ensemble of social forces acting in and through state institutions. The methodological linchpin of this conceptualization is the proposition—presented schematically in the preceding section—that state spatiality is never permanently fixed but. Thus Gramsci’s (1971) writings on the Southern Question emphasize the Italian state’s central role in the production and reinforcement of a North–South divide during Italian industrialization. Building upon Jones’s arguments. but frequently becomes an explicit object of state strategies as they target particular geographical areas. as Jones (1997: 853) emphasizes. the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state’ (Jessop 1990a: 270).

state spatial projects. and internal differentiation of state space. as with state institutional arrangements. extant geographies of state institutions and policies must be viewed as the products of earlier strategies to reshape state spatial configurations. state projects. Dimensions of state selectivity under capitalism: a schematic summary geographies of state power. Historically specific formations of state spatiality are forged through a dialectical relationship between inherited patternings of state spatial organization and emergent strategies to modify or transform entrenched political geographies. and product of political strategies (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). generator.7).6. and state strategies. by analogy to Jessop’s strategic-relational theorization of the state form. three equally fundamental dimensions of state spatial configurations under capitalism may be distinguished—the state spatial form. privilege the access by some forces over others. 3. some coalition possibilities over others’ (Jessop 1990a: 10) SPATIAL Spatial selectivity results from the relational interplay between the geographies of inherited state structures and emergent strategies to transform and/or instrumentalize the geographies of state power Consequently: ‘the state privileges scales. generator. places and spaces through accumulation strategies (economic policy) and hegemonic projects (ideology)’ (Jones 1999: 237) Fig. Concomitantly. 3. On this basis. and product of strategies through which particular class factions and social forces attempt to impose organizational unity upon the state and to promote particular forms of economic intervention (Jessop 1990a) Consequently: ‘Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over others. the territorial coherence and interscalar coordination of state institutions and policies are not permanently fixed. structure.90 The State Spatial Process DIMENSIONS OF STATE SELECTIVITY STRUCTURAL Structural selectivity is derived from the state’s dependence upon private capital for tax revenues that are essential to its own reproduction Consequently: the state engages in a ‘sorting process’ that systemically privileges the interests of capital in the creation and implementation of policies (Offe 1974) STRATEGIC Strategic selectivity results from the relational interplay between inherited state structures and emergent strategies to transform and/or mobilize state power: the state is the site. . Therefore. the spatiality of state power may likewise be viewed as a site. some interests over others. From this perspective. and state spatial strategies (Fig. some time horizons over others. but can be established only through the mobilization of political strategies intended to influence the form.

infrastructure investment.7. functional coordination. and operational coherence of the state system are never pregiven but are the products of particular programs and initiatives that directly or indirectly impact state institutional structures State projects represent attempts to integrate the ensemble of state activities around a common organizational framework and shared political agendas STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS The geographical cohesion of state space is never pregiven but is the product of specific programs and initiatives that directly or indirectly impact state spatial structures and the geographies of state policy State spatial projects emerge as attempts to differentiate or integrate state institutions and policy regimes across geographical scales and among different locations within the state’s territory • Target: state institutions • Possible outcome: ‘state effects’ • Target: spatially differentiated state structures • Possible outcomes: consolidation of spatial and scalar divisions of regulation. A strategic-relational approach to state spatiality: a conceptual hierarchy . uneven development of regulation STATE STRATEGIES The capacity of state institutions to promote particular forms of economic development and to maintain legitimation is never pregiven but is the product of particular programs and initiatives State strategies emerge as attempts to impose particular forms of socioeconomic intervention STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES The capacity of state institutions to influence the geographies of accumulation and political struggle is never pregiven but is the product of particular programs and initiatives State spatial strategies emerge as attempts to mold the geographies of industrial development. 3.The State Spatial Process STATE FORM The state apparatus is institutionally separated or ‘particularized’ from the circuit of capital STATE SPATIAL FORM Statehood is organized in the form of territorially centralized and self-enclosed units of political authority within an interstate system defined by formally equivalent political-territorial units 91 STATE PROJECTS The organizational coherence. and political struggle into a ‘spatial fix’ or ‘structured coherence’ (Harvey 1989b) • Target: circuit of capital and civil society • Possible outcomes: accumulation strategies and/or hegemonic projects • Target: the geographies of accumulation and regulation within a state’s territory • Possible outcomes: spatially selective accumulation strategies and/or hegemonic projects historically specific forms of STRATEGIC SELECTIVITY historically specific forms of SPATIAL SELECTIVITY Fig.

state spatial form is defined with reference to the principle of territoriality. metropolitan. 2. State spatial projects thus represent initiatives to differentiate state territoriality into a partitioned. its coherence as a framework of political regulation can be secured only through state spatial projects that differentiate state activities among different levels of territorial administration and coordinate state policies among diverse locations and scales. Just as the state form is defined by the institutional separation of a political sphere out of the circuit of capital.92 The State Spatial Process 1. As indicated. as defined by subnational. regional. for it is territoriality that underpins the potential autonomy of state institutions from other social forces within civil society (Mann 1988. and organizationally coherent regulatory geography. In this sense. through centralization or decentralization measures). and regulatory activities among and within each level of state power. Whereas territoriality represents the underlying geographical terrain in which state action occurs. A formally analogous argument can be made with regard to state spatial form. State spatial form. by this territorialization of collectively binding decision-making powers within a global interstate system (Ruggie 1993. fiscal relations. This scalar differentiation of statehood occurs in close conjunction with intergovernmental projects to coordinate administrative practices. territoriality arguably remains the most essential attribute of state spatial form. provincial. Sack 1986). the organizational coherence and functional unity of the state form can be secured only through state projects that attempt to ‘impart a specific strategic direction to the individual or collective activities of [the state’s] different branches’ (Jessop 1990a: 268). service provision. Poulantzas 1978). the underlying geographical matrix within which state regulatory activities are articulated. On the most basic level. . the territorially centralized spatial form of statehood has been an essential condition of possibility for the separation of the economic and the political under capitalism. political representation. as described in the preceding section: they are oriented most directly towards state institutions themselves as relatively centralized. and territorially self-enclosed units of political authority. and local territorial boundaries. state spatial projects are embodied in the state’s internal scalar division among distinct tiers of administration. the geography of statehood has been defined. and scale articulated apparatuses of political authority within a given territory. Throughout the history of state development in the modern world system. institutionally distinct. state spatial projects represent the strategic expressions of state space in the narrow sense. functionally coordinated. as national state borders have become increasingly permeable to supranational flows. at core. State spatial projects. Since the consolidation of the Westphalian geopolitical system in the seventeenth century. statehood has been organized in the form of formally equivalent. by altering administrative boundaries) or to reconfigure their rules of operation (for instance. State spatial projects may also entail programs to modify the geographical structure of intergovernmental arrangements (for instance. Indeed. Even in the current era. nonoverlapping.

State spatial strategies are articulated through a range of policy instruments. just as state institutions play a central role in the elaboration of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. As we saw above. this may also occur as an unintended side-effect of state operations (Jones 1997). State institutions do not contain a pregiven structural orientation towards any specific scale. and Halford 1988). the capacity of state institutions to promote particular forms of economic intervention and to maintain societal legitimation can emerge only through the successful mobilization of state strategies. and local economies (Harvey 1989b). place. urban policies. and thus to establish a ‘structured coherence’ for capitalist growth within national. because state policies always engender divergent. and scale-specific effects of those policies. Analogous arguments can be made to characterize state strategies to influence the geographies of industrial development. within a given territorial jurisdiction. Jessop’s strategic-relational conceptualization of capitalist states may be expanded to provide the foundations for a ‘strategic-relational-spatial’ framework for state theory. State spatial strategies can thus be viewed as the strategic embodiment of state space in the integral sense. can emerge only through the successful mobilization of state spatial strategies. the geographies of statehood under modern capitalism represent expressions of a dialectical interplay between inherited partitionings/scalings of political space and emergent state spatial projects/strategies that aim to reshape the latter. territory-. and sociopolitical struggle. For. however. and housing policies. labor market policies. Whereas some state spatial strategies may explicitly promote this uneven development of regulation. infrastructure investment. State spatial strategies. there is an inherent tendency to geographical variation among state activities (Duncan. In sum. However. or location.8 (overleaf) summarizes the structural and strategic moments of state spatiality under capitalism. spatial planning programs. as defined above: they attempt to influence the geographies of social and economic relations. Moreover. contextually specific impacts upon diverse scales and locations within each national territory. state capacities to engage in these forms of spatial intervention. Goodwin.The State Spatial Process 93 3. This figure illustrates how the structural distinction between state space in the narrow sense and state space in the integral sense is paralleled on a strategic level by that between state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. Figure 3. State spatial strategies are also embodied in the territorial differentiation of policy regimes within state boundaries and in the differential place-. regional. infrastructure investments. including industrial policies. regional policies. determinate forms of state spatial and scalar selectivity emerge insofar as social forces successfully mobilize state spatial strategies that privilege particular spaces over against others. economic development initiatives. In this conception. beyond the state apparatus proper. State spatiality can be . so too do they intervene extensively to reshape the geographies of capital accumulation and political struggle.

On the one hand. the framework of state spatiality in which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are mobilized is itself the contested institutional product of earlier rounds of regulatory experimentation and sociopolitical struggle. modify. multiscalar politico-institutional terrain on which diverse social forces attempt to influence the geographies of state territorial organization and state regulatory activity. 3. Whereas Jones’s definition underscores the uneven spatial effects of particular state forms and policies. and scale differentiated apparatuses of political authority within a given territory State spatial projects: refers to political strategies oriented towards the reproduction. through the mobilization of state spatial strategies.8.94 The State Spatial Process STRUCTURAL MOMENTS State space in the narrow sense: refers to the character of state institutions as relatively delimited. . or transformation of inherited frameworks of state spatial intervention at various scales STRATEGIC MOMENTS Fig.11 Extending state spatial selectivity: parameters. modification. or transformation of inherited patterns of state territorial and scalar organization State space in the integral sense: refers to the geographies of state intervention into social and economic relations. On the other hand. evolution. modification. the definition proposed here focuses upon the dialectical interaction between spatially selective political strategies and the state’s evolving spatial structure. as emphasized above. The spatial selectivity of specific state institutional forms may thus be understood as an expression of the continual. through the mobilization of state spatial projects. And finally. we can now return to the questions posed 11 This definition of state spatial selectivity is intended to extend Jones’s (1999. Structural and strategic moments of state spatiality conceived as a contested. within a given territory State spatial strategies: refers to political strategies oriented towards the reproduction. and to the indirect effects of that intervention. dialectical interaction between entrenched configurations of state spatiality and ongoing struggles to influence. or transform such configurations. the uneven spatial effects of state policies can in turn be seen as outcomes of this dialectical interaction. 1997) original formulation of the concept. such struggles also focus upon the geographies of state intervention into socioeconomic life. From this perspective. transformation Equipped with this geographically reflexive and scale articulated variant of strategic-relational state theory. spatially centralized. such struggles focus upon the state’s own territorial and scalar configuration.

and ideological agendas that are promoted through state policies. and transformation of state spatial structures and state spatial strategies during the history of capitalist development. however. state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have evolved within determinate institutional parameters associated with the modern state’s underlying territorial form. this section will also introduce a meso-level framework through which to investigate the production of new state spaces in post-1970s western Europe. First. state spatial projects and state spatial strategies necessarily target institutional arrangements or socioeconomic relations situated within the bounded space of their political jurisdictions. or some portion thereof. . evolution. I would argue.The State Spatial Process 95 above regarding the variation. In so doing. what are the major institutional parameters within which forms of state spatial selectivity have evolved historically? Second. a scalar dimension in which state institutions and policies are differentiated hierarchically among a variety of scales within a given territory. and . and (b) the endemic problem of regulating uneven spatial development within a capitalist space-economy. Three issues are relevant here. modern states have been configured in a variety of politico-institutional ‘crystallizations’ that reflect the divergent political. I shall refer to the former axis of variation as the scalar articulation of state space and to the latter axis of variation as the territorial articulation of state space. military. on a fundamental level. economic. For such agendas and orientations have in turn been circumscribed within certain determinate institutional parameters associated with (a) the distinctively territorial form of statehood under modern capitalism. with reference to the territorial centralization of collectively binding decision-making powers (Mann 1988). The spatial configuration of state power under modern capitalism has likewise exhibited tremendous variation across historical and geographical contexts. This targeting and molding of politicaleconomic relations generally transpires along two core axes of variation— . how should the process of state spatial restructuring be conceptualized? Consideration of these issues can extend and concretize the conceptualization of state spatial selectivity introduced above. what types of changes occur within these parameters when inherited patterns of state spatiality are unsettled and new political geographies are forged? Third. a territorial dimension in which state institutions and policies are differentiated areally among different types of jurisdictional units or socioeconomic zones within a given territory. Parameters of state spatial selectivity under modern capitalism According to Mann (1993). Because modern statehood is constituted. that the variation of state spatial selectivity cannot be explained entirely with reference to the divergent political agendas and geographical orientations of the various social forces acting in and through the state. First.

Second.9 synthesizes these distinctions in order to specify the determinate scalar and territorial parameters within which state spatial selectivity has . Indeed. The geographies of state power do not passively reflect these patterns of uneven spatial development. but mediate and modify them in significant ways. the resultant forms of territorial inequality may also generate major legitimation problems to the extent that they are politicized (Hudson 2001). Under some conditions. they may seriously exacerbate. for they ‘are invaluable in helping dominant groups organize and manage the increasingly large scale. the relation of state institutions to patterns of uneven spatial development is frequently an object of intense sociopolitical contestation. Consequently. Storper and Walker 1989). each of these axes is the site of deep tensions and conflicts in which diverse social forces struggle over the geographical configuration of state institutions and over the form of state spatial intervention. simultaneously. Goodwin. the process of capitalist industrialization generates continually changing patterns of uneven spatial development as particular places and scales are privileged. Goodwin. 6). While state institutions may actively contribute to the establishment of a spatial fix for capitalist growth. differentiated and changing social systems of capitalism’ (Duncan. and Halford 1988: 109). State spatial selectivity must be viewed. state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have evolved in close conjunction with the uneven geographies of capitalist development. subordinated. and Halford 1988). insofar as state institutions may also be harnessed in ways that exacerbate uneven spatial development. but they may also be mobilized in ways that intensify such patterns or modify the form in which they are articulated (Duncan. State institutions provide territorially partitioned and scale articulated regulatory landscapes within which processes of capital circulation are embedded and continually reinscribed. Consequently. State institutions may be harnessed in order to influence the geographies of uneven development. such an outcome is by no means preordained. or marginalized during successive phases of economic growth (Smith 1990. rather than displace. Figure 3. . in which the contradictions of capitalism are temporarily displaced (Harvey 1982). capital’s endemic crisis-tendencies and contradictions (see Ch. While some social forces may favor patterns of uneven spatial development that privilege specific locations or scales into which they have sunk large investments or to which they have a strong cultural attachment. each formation of uneven spatial development is conditioned in key ways by the geographies of state power. 1.96 The State Spatial Process As we shall see in subsequent chapters. state institutions may be mobilized in order to alleviate territorial inequalities. . as an inherited framework of state spatial organization/intervention within which such struggles emerge and as the very medium in which they are fought out. As indicated in Ch.

As the figure indicates. on the one hand. or uneven administrative geographies in which customized. decentralization 97 STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES: geographies of state intervention into socioeconomic life within a given territory (3) Singularity vs. and regions within a territory Fig. these parameters are defined. by the changing forms of state spatial organization within a given territory (state space in the . Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (1) evolved during the course of modern capitalist development.9. area-specific institutional arrangements and levels of service provision are established in specific places or geographic zones within a territory (4) Equalization vs.The State Spatial Process STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS: geographies of state territorial organization and administrative differentiation within a given territory SCALAR DIMENSION: (1) Centralization vs. concentration • Promotion of an equalization of socioeconomic activities and investments within the state’s territorial borders: goal is to spread socioeconomic assets and public resources as evenly as possible across a national territory and thus to alleviate territorial inequalities • Promotion of a concentration of socioeconomic activities and investments: goal is to promote the agglomeration of socioeconomic assets and public resources in particular locations. 3. multiplicity • Privileging of a single dominant scale (for instance. places. customization • Promotion of uniform and standardized administrative coverage in which broadly equivalent levels of service provision and bureaucratic organization are extended throughout an entire territory. • Promotion of patchy. the national) as the overarching level for socioeconomic activities • Distribution of socioeconomic activities among multiple spatial scales • Centralization of state the scalar operations: tends to concentrate articulation of political authority at one overstate policies arching scale of state and institutions administration (generally the among different national) levels of politicaleconomic • Decentralization of state organization operations: transfers various within a given regulatory tasks away from the territory central coordinating tier of state power (generally to subnational levels) TERRITORIAL DIMENSION: the territorial articulation of state policies and institutions among different types of juridical units or economic zones within a given territory (2) Uniformity vs. differentiated.

98 The State Spatial Process narrow sense). While state operations were increasingly centralized at a national scale during much of the history of capitalist development. places. 1989. the consolidation of multilevel governance systems has further advanced this simultaneous denationalization and decentralization of state scalar organization relative to the more centralized formations of state spatiality that prevailed across western Europe under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism (Bullmann 1994. On the other hand. and regions. Cell 2: the territorial articulation of state spatial projects An examination of the territorial dimension of state spatial projects reveals an analogous. uneven. Cell 1: the scalar articulation of state spatial projects An examination of the scalar dimension of state spatial projects reveals an endemic tension between the drive to centralize state operations at a single overarching scale (generally the national) and the impulse to decentralize or disperse them among multiple levels of political authority.and area-specific patterns of state territorial organization and state spatial intervention that may emerge through such struggles. places. projects of decentralization have generated significant institutional realignments and rescalings during the last thirty years. and (b) the scale. and equally endemic. more uniform frameworks of territorial administration were introduced and generalized across much of western Europe (Bennett . The French Revolution and the subsequent wave of Napoleonic administrative reforms during the early nineteenth century entailed a dismantling of the relatively patchy. area-specific administrative arrangements within different types of locations. Fig. and erratic political geographies associated with late feudal and early industrial states. whether by promoting the rearticulation of socioeconomic activities among different scales or by redistributing them across different types of locations. tension between the agenda of promoting administrative uniformity across an entire territory and the goal of establishing customized. and regions. 3. both in unitary and federal states (Bennett 1993. overarching tier. The interplay between these competing approaches to state spatial organization has generated historically specific institutional hierarchies in which political power is more or less concentrated around a single. and regions within that territory. Sellers 2002). places. The cells of the figure illustrate (a) some of the core tensions around which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have been articulated.9 also specifies some of the ways in which states may attempt to influence the geographies of uneven spatial development within their territories (state space in the integral sense). Subsequently. Scharpf 1999). In the contemporary EU. whether with reference to the hierarchical nesting of state power among different geographical scales or to its areal articulation across different types of locations.

or scale-specific administrative arrangements that are considered to be suited to their own particular circumstances and socioeconomic assets. largescale bureaucratic hierarchies had been established through a variety of rationalizing state spatial projects in most western European countries (Cerny 1995). strategic locations within a national territory—such as capital cities. increasingly differentiated configuration of state space. but rather which scale of capital accumulation—and of socioeconomic relations more generally—is privileged through state operations. this longrun historical trend towards administrative uniformity and standardization has been unsettled through a variety of state spatial projects oriented towards a diametrically opposed. major metropolitan centers. In this case. more recent rescaling processes have engendered . During the last three decades. each scale of state power was equipped with formally equivalent politico-institutional arrangements. standardized frameworks of national territorial administration. With the consolidation of Keynesian welfare national states during the postwar period. and high-technology zones—are equipped with customized. As with state spatial projects. state spatial strategies can be classified with reference to their scalar and territorial dimensions. subnational administrative tiers were charged with the task of maintaining minimum standards of public welfare and social service provision in their territorial jurisdictions (see Ch. these projects of institutional customization have significantly undermined the uniformity of national administrative arrangements and have engendered markedly divergent levels of public service provision across each territory in which they have been mobilized (see Ch. among multiple spatial scales within or beyond a given territory (scalar multiplicity). An analogous periodization of state spatial development emerges when we consider the historical evolution of state spatial strategies under modern capitalism. This tension between state strategies intended to promote scalar singularity and state strategies intended to promote scalar multiplicity is formally similar to that between administrative centralization and decentralization. however. however. Within this countervailing model. as discussed above. Much of the history of state formation has involved a process of nationalization in which national states have promoted the national scale as the primary focal point for socioeconomic life (Lefebvre 1978. Within these relatively centralized. place. the key issue is not which scale of state territorial organization is accorded primacy. Poulantzas 1978). 4). Across western Europe. Cell 3: the scalar articulation of state spatial strategies An examination of the scalar dimension of state spatial strategies reveals an endemic tension between the agenda of promoting a single scale as the overarching focal point for political-economic life (scalar singularity) and that of distributing political-economic activities in a more variegated manner. 5). By the second industrial revolution of the early twentieth century. However.The State Spatial Process 99 1993).

] The same applies to the building of electrical power stations and distribution networks [ . . when they came into being. bridges. This massive extension of state investments in the spatial infrastructure for capital circulation was also closely intertwined with new patterns of intra-national territorial inequality 12 In his classic contribution to regional economic theory. regions. places.’ . considerations of short-term profitability [ . the key issue is not how the state should territorialize its own administrative and regulatory functions. including ports. and (b) sociopolitical struggles are proliferating. and communications networks (Graham and Marvin 2001: 73–81). . namely. the national state’s traditional strategy of promoting scalar singularity within a relatively self-enclosed. In this case. tunnels. . . in and outside the state apparatus. autocentric national economy is being superseded by the problem of managing a situation of scalar multiplicity in which (a) supranational and subnational levels of political-economic organization are acquiring an enhanced regulatory significance. an examination of the territorial dimension of state spatial strategies reveals a tension between the priority of spreading socioeconomic activities evenly across a national territory (equalization) and that of channeling them into particular types of locations. and regions within that territory (concentration). ] worked to the advantage of the richer regions. railroads. 2003a). and scales within their territorial boundaries (Lefebvre 1978). western European national states attempted to extend their regulatory control over all locations. housing facilities. however. During the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. for instance. almost always relied partly upon popular appeal and therefore almost always exerted a certain amount of countervailing power against the tendency to regional inequality.100 The State Spatial Process a rejigging of these inherited. Myrdal (1957: 44) recognized this tension as follows: ‘From the earliest times national states. as discussed above. public utilities systems. Under these conditions. concentrating state spatial strategies is formally analogous to that between administrative uniformity and administrative customization. ]. Rich Lands and Poor. Cell 4: the territorial articulation of state spatial strategies Finally. to influence the ongoing rearticulation of inherited scalar arrangements (Brenner et al. and differentiating. In the planning of railways. nationalized scalar geographies as supranational and subnational layers of state power have acquired a growing strategic importance in the reproduction of capital. It was during this period. places. but rather how it should (re)configure the geographies of capital accumulation and socioeconomic activity within its territorial borders. that national states began to channel substantial resources into the construction of large-scale public or quasi-public infrastructures throughout their territories. balancing state spatial strategies. Every national state took some responsibility for common services and for building roads and raising the level of technology in the backward regions—though ordinarily in a poor country a disproportionate part of the meager public funds devoted to such purposes served the richer regions. canals. . But from the beginning in most countries another purpose was also operative. .12 The tension between equalizing. to open up underdeveloped regions [ .

is one of the key transformations of state spatiality that will be investigated in Ch. It should be recognized. 4). . as some places and regions were systematically privileged over others as targets for state-subsidized or state-financed capital investments. it is crucial to underscore that actually existing formations of state spatiality are produced through historically and contextually specific combinations of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. I have thus far distinguished the scalar and territorial dimensions of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. 3. Instead. and place-specific forms of socioeconomic policy. Cox 1990). and the subsequent mobilization of reterritorialized. For analytical purposes. I have adopted this analytical procedure in order to illustrate the conceptual distinctions introduced in Fig. population. finally.10. the rescaling of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies generally has immediate ramifications for the territorial articulation of state space as a whole. and infrastructural investment more evenly throughout their territories. state scalar configurations are also generally modified. . that determinate types of state spatial projects generally emerge in close conjunction with particular types of state spatial strategies. 3. The crisis of redistributive approaches to territorial regulation during the post-1970s period. However. state spatial projects and state spatial strategies co-evolve relationally. As indicated in the previous section. and thus to alleviate inherited patterns of uneven spatial development (see Ch. the reworking of state territorial organization (K. 5 below. treating them as if they were separate components within each formation of state spatial selectivity. the introduction of new forms of state spatial intervention generally hinges upon. Thus. With the consolidation of Keynesian welfare national states during the second half of the twentieth century. since the 1970s. Meanwhile. when the areal configuration of state space is reterritorialized. These interdependencies among particular types of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are illustrated schematically in Fig. Concomitantly. tightly intermeshed. states began to mobilize a variety of compensatory regional and social policies designed to spread industry. in a trend paralleling that towards enhanced administrative customization.The State Spatial Process 101 and sociospatial polarization. the project of promoting spatial equalization at a national scale has been largely abandoned. through a mutually transformative dialectic. in practice. and may in turn accelerate. However. . western European national states have attempted to rechannel major public resources and infrastructural investments into the most globally competitive cities and regions within their territories (Brenner 1999b.9. Frameworks of state territorial organization generally facilitate determinate forms of state spatial intervention while excluding others. The scalar and territorial dimensions of state space do not exist in ontologically separate realms but are. rescaled. 1998b).

3. 3.10.10. State spatial projects to promote administrative centralization are generally aligned with state spatial strategies to promote scalar singularity (Fig.102 The State Spatial Process Centralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar singularity (state spatial strategies) Administrative uniformity (state spatial projects) Administrative customization (state spatial projects) Equalizing/ balancing (state spatial strategies) Differentiating/ concentrating (state spatial strategies) Decentralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar multiplicity (state spatial strategies) KEY Vertical axis Horizontal axis Regular font Italicized font scalar articulation of state institutions and policies territorial articulation of state institutions and policies state spatial projects state spatial strategies Fig. top of vertical axis). Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (2) . .

Crucially. State spatial projects to promote administrative differentiation are generally intertwined with state spatial strategies to concentrate socioeconomic activities at specific locations within a territory (right side of horizontal axis). any formation of state spatiality could be examined through this conceptual scheme by being positioned appropriately within one of the analytical quadrants along each of the axes depicted. the purpose of this framework is not to classify formations of state spatiality in a static manner. the geographies of state space can be decoded as complex amalgamations—that is. and catalysts—of particular types of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that are articulated at a variety of scales and differentiated among distinct territorial locations.10 may thus be deployed most fruitfully not by positioning particular state forms at isolated ‘points’ within the grid. The framework presented in Fig. because they correspond to articulations among the territorial and scalar dimensions of state space that are either logically impossible . 3. The bottom left and upper right corners of Fig. State spatial projects to promote administrative uniformity are generally intertwined with state spatial strategies to promote an equalization of socioeconomic activities across a territory (left side of horizontal axis). which outlines the general parameters for state spatial change within the modern interstate system through a series of diagonal arrows stretching from the upper left quadrant to the bottom left quadrant. is to position the state spatial projects and state spatial strategies associated with a particular historical formation of state spatiality on the scalar (vertical) and territorial (horizontal) axes represented in the figure. In principle.11 have been blocked out. . Figure 3. The key task. . 3. State spatial projects to promote administrative decentralization are generally aligned with state spatial strategies to promote scalar multiplicity (bottom of vertical axis).10 provides a schematic analytical grid through which to examine different historical forms of state spatial selectivity.11 (overleaf).The State Spatial Process 103 . This methodological strategy is represented in Fig. this model is intended as a basis for investigating the dynamic historical evolution of state spatial forms in relation to ongoing processes of capitalist restructuring. by building upon and concretizing the processual conceptualization of state spatiality introduced earlier. in each case. however. but rather by specifying the determinate evolutionary pathways along which historically and contextually specific forms of state spatial restructuring have unfolded. The diagonal arrows are positioned so as to demarcate a variety of possible trajectories along which processes of state spatial restructuring might be expected to unfold. 3. On this basis. as if the latter were composed of neatly isolated. permanently ossified institutional components. arenas. as products. Rather.

3.104 The State Spatial Process Centralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar singularity (state spatial strategies) Administrative uniformity (state spatial projects) Equalizing/ balancing (state spatial strategies) Administrative customization (state spatial projects) Differentiating/ concentrating (state spatial strategies) Decentralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar multiplicity (state spatial strategies) KEY Vertical axis Horizontal axis Regular font Italicized font Diagonal dotted arrows scalar articulation of state institutions and policies territorial articulation of state institutions and policies state spatial projects state spatial strategies hypothesized parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity under modern capitalism Fig. . can now be developed more concretely. under conditions of systemic change or crisis. but. This latter proposition. Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (3) or empirically improbable.11. along with the more general notion that processes of state spatial restructuring unfold along distinctive institutional and geographical pathways. As the diagonal arrows in Fig. they may also traverse from one quadrant to another. pathways of state spatial restructuring may be articulated within a given quadrant. 3.11 indicate.

more autocentric states. and strategies to promote a spatial equalization of socioeconomic activities likewise differed according to contextually specific circumstances. However. leading in turn to distinctive institutional and geographical homologies among national states that were otherwise characterized by significant historical. Here.The State Spatial Process 105 Towards an investigation of state spatial restructuring: a research hypothesis In the preceding chapter. too. and political alliances. there has been considerable institutional variation across national contexts. shaping. rather. Across western Europe. more open states and larger. Levels of bureaucratic centralization and administrative uniformity differed among unitary and federal systems. Figure 3. and (b) the specific types of . broadly analogous formations of state spatial selectivity crystallized across western Europe during the FordistKeynesian period. is not that the state spaces of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism converged around a single. Fordist-Keynesian period has been systematically reorganized during the last thirty years. territorial arrangements. The expanded conceptualization of state spatial selectivity developed above provides a useful basis on which to explore more concretely the major institutional and geographical parameters within which this rescaling of statehood has been unfolding. 4). then. In that context. institutional. the geographies of Fordist-Keynesian states were quite multifaceted and did not correspond to a single. and animating contemporary geoeconomic transformations at a variety of spatial scales. My argument. even in the absence of a complete political-geographic convergence. I also suggested that the active involvement of state institutions in these transformations has been closely intertwined with major political. I am suggesting. generic model of political space or institutional organization.12 (overleaf). and geographical realignments of state power itself. considerable variation obtained among state spatial projects and state spatial strategies within different types of western European states. generic model. depending upon (a) the specific configuration of state spatiality that was inherited from the Fordist-Keynesian period. political. the extent of economic nationalization differed among smaller. Throughout the ‘golden age’ of postwar capitalism. One of the central arguments of this book is that the nationally organized formation of state spatiality that prevailed throughout western Europe during the postwar. and cultural differences (see Ch. I argued against conceptions of contemporary globalization as a process of deterritorialization by underscoring the essential role of state institutions in mediating. the general parameters within which the geographies of Fordist-Keynesian states evolved during the postwar period are depicted in the inverted L-shaped quadrant on the upper left side of Fig.12 also points towards a closely analogous interpretation of the new state spaces that have been emerging across western Europe since the 1970s. Building upon the analytical framework introduced above. 3. that broadly analogous state spatial projects and state spatial strategies were consolidated during this period.

.12. to NEW STATE SPACES? Administrative customization (state spatial projects) Differentiating/ concentrating (state spatial strategies) Decentralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar multiplicity (state spatial strategies) KEY Vertical axis Horizontal axis Regular font Italicized font scalar articulation of state institutions and policies territorial articulation of state institutions and policies generic spatial features of the Keynesian welfare national state hypothesized spatial features of emergent.106 The State Spatial Process From KEYNESIAN WELFARE NATIONAL STATES . I would argue that a number of broadly parallel patterns of state spatial restructuring have been crystallizing across western Europe since the late 1970s. The production of new state spaces? A research hypothesis state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that were subsequently mobilized. Centralizing (state spatial projects) Scalar singularity (state spatial strategies) Administrative uniformity (state spatial projects) Equalizing/ balancing (state spatial strategies) . Nonetheless. . . 3. and (b) state spatial strategies oriented towards the differentiation of socioeconomic activities within a national territory and . . This development has resulted from the widespread mobilization of (a) state spatial projects oriented towards administrative differentiation and decentralization. post-1970s state forms Fig.

in divergent institutional patterns. the restructuring of state spatiality is uneven. For this reason. and unpredictable: it is best conceived as a layering process in which newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are superimposed upon entrenched morphologies of state spatial organization. place. they should be viewed as the outcomes of multiple tendencies of state spatial restructuring whose precise institutional and geographical contours remain deeply contested and thus highly unstable. For. . as Lipietz (1992a) indicates. Thus conceived.12 are not enclosed within determinate borders. This means that. or close to. 3. For this reason. all social actors are circumscribed in their projects to remake territory. and scale by sociospatial configurations inherited from the past. Rather. 5). I elaborate and concretize this hypothesis by investigating the role of urban policy as a key mechanism of state spatial restructuring. 3.The State Spatial Process 107 towards the management of scalar multiplicity (see Ch. they have generally occurred at markedly different rhythms. discontinuous. In subsequent chapters.12 depicts this profound reworking of state spatial selectivity in contemporary western Europe through the three diagonal arrows stretching from the upper left to the bottom right. the newly emergent state spaces depicted in Fig. It is presented here as a research hypothesis for the study of new state spaces that flows from the expanded conceptualization of state spatial selectivity introduced previously. even among national states that appear to be experiencing formally analogous institutional and spatial realignments. a medium. While these emergent forms of state space may be expected to be positioned within. schematic outline of the broad parameters within which new state spaces are currently emerging. Accordingly. Path-dependency and ‘layered’ regulation: conceptualizing state spatial restructuring The restructuring of state spatiality rarely entails the complete dissolution of entrenched political geographies. the analytical zone encircled around the phrase ‘new state spaces’. substantively different geographies of state spatial organization and state spatial intervention are frequently produced. human beings do not create new sociospatial structures under conditions of their own choosing. which serve simultaneously as constraints upon future developments and as openings for the latter. and a product of the conflictual interplay between inherited geographical parcelizations of state space and emergent political strategies intended to instrumentalize. Fig. Figure 3. and with quite variegated political-economic consequences across western European national states. Transformations within any of the basic parameters of state spatial selectivity have not occurred simultaneously or coevally. or transform the latter towards particular sociopolitical ends. restructure. the spatiality of state power is at once a presupposition. On the contrary. regions.12 is intended as no more than an initial.

so too do state spatial projects and state spatial strategies continually transform the political geographies of state regulation. as the catalysts of successive ‘rounds’ of state spatial regulation in which multiple emergent (areal and scalar) layers of state regulatory activity are incrementally superimposed upon historically inherited geographies of state space. Just as new rounds of investment in the economic landscape transform the locational surface of capitalist production and thus trigger a further differentiation of spatial divisions of labor. the economic geography of capitalism is embodied within historically specific rounds of investment in the locational infrastructure of industrial production. . and thus engender shifts within the state’s own territorial and scalar architecture. In Massey’s framework.108 The State Spatial Process Massey’s (1985: 119) concept of ‘layers of investment’ within the economic landscape provides an apt metaphor for deciphering this unpredictable interplay between inherited spatial arrangements and emergent political strategies. . The resultant spatial divisions of labor are derived from earlier rounds of investment and are modified continually as firms forge new locational geographies in response to class struggle. layers of investment represent. processes of state spatial restructuring may be analyzed in closely analogous terms. 3. processes of state spatial restructuring may likewise be understood as a continual ‘layering’ of successive rounds of state regulation within a constantly evolving mosaic of state spatiality (see Peck 1998: 29). This model of state spatial restructuring is depicted schematically in Fig. In this conception. intercapitalist competition. Two crucial methodological consequences follow from this conceptualization. State spatial projects and state spatial strategies may therefore be conceptualized dynamically. . therefore. simultaneously (a) the ossified geographical legacy of earlier historical rounds of industrial growth. Just as spatial structures of production lay the basis for the geography of economic activities within a given historical conjuncture. and technological change. By building upon the strategic-relational-spatial approach to state theory developed above. differentiated geography for the articulation of state regulatory activities. Spatial divisions of (state) regulation are thus directly analogous to spatial divisions of labor insofar as both entail determinate articulations and differentiations of particular types of social relations—whether of capitalist production or of state regulation—over an uneven territorial surface and within a chronically unstable scalar hierarchy. For Massey. and (c) an emergent. constantly changing locational surface on which new economic geographies are forged. (b) the geographical basis for current spatial divisions of labor.13. so too do entrenched configurations of state spatiality provide a relatively partitioned.

The transformation of state space entails neither an arbitrary juxtaposition of unconnected regulatory practices within state territories. 3. Conceptualizing the dynamics of spatial restructuring: spatial divisions of labor and spatial divisions of state regulation 1. layers of investment ‘interact both in moulding the character the one of the other and in producing. as Massey (1995: 321) explains. interaction of older and newer layers of state spatial regulation Path-dependent (re)combination of successive layers of investment to produce new geographies of economic activity and uneven development Path-dependent (re)combination of successive layers of regulation to produce new geographies of state regulatory activity and uneven development ‘LAYERS’ AND ‘ROUNDS’ OF INVESTMENT ‘LAYERS’ AND ‘ROUNDS’ OF STATE SPATIAL REGULATION (Interaction effects) Fig. interaction of older and newer layers of investment ‘Layering’ of regulatory activities at different spatial scales. in consequence. nor the unilinear replacement of extant layers of state spatiality by entirely new. full-formed layers.The State Spatial Process 109 Established spatial divisions of labor Established spatial and scalar divisions of state regulation Differentiated geographies of economic activity Differentiated geographies of state regulatory activity New rounds of investment New rounds of state spatial regulation: • state spatial projects • state spatial strategies ‘Layering’ of investment patterns at different spatial scales. For. The uneven development of regulation. radical differences in any one layer .13.

both in western Europe and elsewhere. MacKinnon 2001). depending on the contextually specific ways in which inherited and emergent regulatory geographies interact. the evolution of state spatiality is strongly path-dependent insofar as many of its fundamental characteristics may be reproduced. From this perspective. Analogously. each new round of state spatial regulation generates a contextually specific interaction between regulatory layers. throughout much of the geohistory of modern statehood. For instance. Analogously. ] Geographies of governance are made at the point of interaction between the unfolding layer of regulatory processes / apparatuses and the inherited institutional landscape. much like the early settlement morphologies of major industrial cities whose underlying contours have been preserved through successive rounds of economic growth and sociospatial restructuring (Abu-Lughod 1999). unitary. only becomes an on-theground reality through this process of interaction. . The unfolding layer . Indeed. then. It is only relatively recently in the history of state spatial development that this nationalized scalar hierarchy of state power has been destabilized and reworked. processes of state spatial restructuring are likely to generate radically different outcomes in divergent institutional and spatial contexts. place-. All dimensions of state spatial structure do not change simultaneously or in organizationally isomorphic patterns. leading in turn to new. As we have seen. and scale-specific forms of spatial differentiation and uneven development within the regulatory architecture of statehood (see also Duncan and Goodwin 1989.110 The State Spatial Process between different areas’. administrative. 2. regulatory activity. and even locked in during the process of historical development. polymorphic mosaic in which political geographies established at different moments of historical time are interwoven. . Just as the spatial imprint of earlier rounds of capitalist industrialization is evident within the built environment of most . the national scale of statehood has served as the predominant locus of territorial administration. jurisdiction-. Path-dependency and the juxtaposition of spatial structures. Pierson 2000). to form a new institutional surface [ . and sociopolitical struggle. and territorial structures forged during the early nineteenth century—whether of a Napoleonic. Peck (1998: 29) explains this point as follows: The process by which new geographies of governance are formed is not a pseudogeological one in which a new layer (or round of regulation) supersedes the old. The organization of state space at any historical conjuncture therefore represents a multilayered. certain ossified layers of state spatial regulation may remain entrenched. such as technological development and institutional restructuring (North 1990. many of the constitutional. the scalar configuration of state spatiality has likewise been characterized by a strongly path-dependent developmental trajectory. . For. reinforced. or federal character—continue to undergird significant aspects of state space even within post-Fordist Europe (Bennett 1989). . even as surrounding layers are reworked. as with many other sociohistorical processes.

Concomitantly. I have theorized the state spatial process under capitalism through a spatialization of Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to state theory. By conceiving state space. institutional compromises. territories. As diverse social forces struggle to mobilize state institutions towards their own ends. and product of historically specific political strategies. From this perspective. political sociology. New territorial and scalar geographies of state power are forged through a contested. generator. Against this background. A key task that flows from a strategic-relational-spatial approach to statehood is to investigate the path-dependent layering processes through which successive rounds of state spatial regulation emerge within entrenched formations of state spatiality. I have elaborated the theoretical foundations for a processual approach to the production of state spatiality. state institutions must be conceived as multiscalar sociospatial configurations that evolve historically. As Lefebvre (2003a: 85) once remarked. territories. space is one of the ‘privileged instruments’ of state institutions as they are mobilized to regulate the social relations of capitalism. within modern capitalism. or as indirect outcomes of ongoing regulatory experiments and sociopolitical conflicts. as an arena. at once in its narrow and integral senses. often in ways that have significant ramifications for the geographical configuration of capitalism as a whole. and scales for particular types of state operations. whether through explicit projects to reorganize the geographies of state territorial organization and state intervention. the architecture of state spatiality likewise bears the unmistakable territorial markings of earlier regulatory projects. contourless plane of social relations but is always articulated in spatially selective forms that target diverse places. state space is continuously reconfigured. at the same time. and scalar hierarchies. regions. open-ended interaction of historically inherited configurations of state spatial organization with newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies at various geographical scales. state institutions do not merely exist ‘in’ pregiven territorial containers. and political economy. statehood is configured in a geographically differentiated form. and political struggles. Rather.The State Spatial Process 111 contemporary cities. In short. Summary and conclusion The starting point for this chapter was the challenge of escaping the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994) that has long underpinned mainstream approaches to state theory. it is possible to explore the changing geographical dimensions of state power in historical . the process of state intervention does not occur on a flat. as state institutions are harnessed to regulate the uneven geographies of political-economic life. they engage continuously in the production and transformation of places.

or the scalar articulation of state operations—during the process of capitalist development. The interface between inherited and emergent state spaces therefore represents a key focal point for further research on the state spatial process under capitalism. through a conflictual. rather. and pathdependent interaction between inherited patterns of state spatial organization and emergent projects to reconfigure the latter. but also to demarcate some of the broad tendencies of state spatial restructuring that have crystallized across western Europe during the last three decades. I have suggested that state spatial restructuring under capitalism unfolds within certain determinate institutional parameters defined by the underlying territorial form of modern statehood and by the chronic problem of regulating uneven spatial development within each state territory. and social movements—in shaping state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. Second. I have developed an expanded conception of state spatial selectivity that encompasses the role of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies in the production of historically specific formations of state space. territoriality. A number of research questions regarding the production of state space may be derived from this theoretical framework. one could investigate the evolution of the aforementioned aspects of state spatiality in relation to specific regulatory problems under capitalism— for instance. It occurs. First. These arguments have also provided the theoretical grounding for a number of general propositions regarding the transformation of state space in western Europe since the crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian accumulation regime in the mid-1970s. spatial divisions of regulation. political coalitions. class factions. social reproduction. As developed here. unevenly articulated. place-specific forms of governance. one could investigate the evolution of specific dimensions of state spatiality—for instance. On this basis. one could investigate the interplay between state spatial projects and state spatial strategies under specific historical-geographical conditions. exploring the ways in which forms of state territorial organization and patterns of state spatial intervention reciprocally shape and constrain one another. fully formed framework of state space. this chapter has proposed a methodological framework through which to investigate the path-dependent historical evolution of state spatiality within those broad institutional parameters. those associated with capital accumulation. . and contention. political legitimation. sociopolitical mobilization. Third.112 The State Spatial Process and contemporary perspective. and so forth. the concepts of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies may be deployed not only to specify the form of state spatial selectivity associated with Keynesian welfare national states. Finally. I have suggested that state spatial restructuring does not entail a unilinear replacement of one institutionalgeographical configuration by another. Finally. one could investigate the role of diverse social forces—including classes. By distinguishing state spatial projects and state spatial strategies along scalar and territorial axes. as well as the ways in which the resultant configurations of state spatial organization in turn mold the geographies of territorial alliance formation.

However. The next chapter elaborates this agenda in three intertwined steps—first. by exploring the interface between urbanization processes and state spatial development under modern capitalism. second. by analyzing the nationalized formation of urban governance and state spatial regulation that crystallized across western Europe during the course of the postwar period. and third. . my overarching aim in this book is to investigate the evolution of state spatiality in relation to the major regulatory problems generated through the process of capitalist urbanization since the FordistKeynesian period.The State Spatial Process 113 Each of these questions is centrally relevant for my purposes in subsequent chapters. by examining the systemic breakdown of the postwar configuration of state spatiality following the global economic crises of the early 1970s.

S. Henri Lefebvre (1976c: 15) The KWNS [Keynesian welfare national state] probably gave fullest expression to the organizational and societalizing possibilities of the national state with its retreat from formal empire and its limited commitment to integration into supranational economic blocs. Antonio Gramsci (1971: 287) The town. heralds the future world. the world of the generalised urban. anti-nature or non-nature and yet second nature. overall planning for the Milan conurbation. contemporary forms of state spatial restructuring can be traced most immediately to the crisis of the Fordist accumulation regime and the Keynesian welfare national state during the 1970s (Jessop 2002. This focus is not due to some teleological unfolding of this potential but to specific economic and political conditions associated with the organization of Atlantic Fordism under U.FOUR Urban Governance and the Nationalization of State Space: Political Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism In Italy there have been the beginnings of a Fordist fanfare: exaltation of big cities. the affirmation that capitalism is only at its beginnings and that it is necessary to prepare for it grandiose patterns of development. Swyngedouw 1997). etc. state rescaling has emerged as an important political strategy through which diverse governmental coalitions have attempted to manage the disruptive consequences of a deeply . Since this period. hegemony. Bob Jessop (1999a: 383) Introduction In the western European context.

the point of this label is to underscore the ways in which the policies in question were embedded within the broader institutional-regulatory matrix that has subsequently come to be known as the Keynesian welfare national state (Jessop 2002. This goal was pursued through the mobilization of: 1 The term ‘spatial Keynesianism’ is used by Martin (1989) and Martin and Sunley (1997). as Martin (1989: 28) explains. and Myrdal (1957). nationalized configuration of statehood that the production of new. Before examining these transformations.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 115 rooted socioeconomic crisis. among other scholars. Not only was regional equity itself a legitimate welfare objective. state spatial configurations. albeit chronically unstable. it was also justified on national economic efficiency grounds.’ While Keynes himself devoted little attention to the regional or spatial dimensions of macroeconomic policies. however. I argued that the process of state spatial restructuring must be conceived as a path-dependent interaction of inherited regulatory arrangements with emergent political strategies. the notion of spatial Keynesianism refers to the broad constellation of policy prescriptions mobilized during the postwar period in order to manage and stabilize regional and local economic development under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. This crisis-induced process of state rescaling has entailed a significant reorganization of inherited. in terms of the macro-economic gains to be derived from utilising the unemployed labour within depressed districts. among others. This chapter confronts this task by analyzing the political-economic geographies of spatial Keynesianism. This work converged with a growing body of regional economic theory pioneered in the 1950s by scholars such as Perroux (1950. In the previous chapter. Fordist-Keynesian forms of statehood and the establishment of qualitatively new. Rather. 1955). correctable by the regional redistribution of industry or by labour subsidies intended to reduce wage costs. multiscalar. b). Hirschman (1958). The reference to Keynesianism is therefore not intended to imply that all policy prescriptions that emerged within this framework were derived directly from the tenets of Keynesian economic theory. For purposes of this chapter. Its linchpin was the political agenda of alleviating entrenched patterns of uneven spatial development by spreading urban growth as evenly as possible across the entire surface of each national territory. roughly from the late 1950s until the late 1970s (Martin and Sunley 1997). . in order to grasp contemporary strategies of state rescaling. it is crucial to investigate the configurations of state spatiality that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period. the framework of national and local state territorial regulation that prevailed across much of western Europe during the ‘golden age’ of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. Within this framework.1 Spatial Keynesianism was a multifaceted. For it is in relation to this inherited. to be discussed in greater detail below. ‘the problem of economically depressed areas was interpreted as being primarily due to localised structural deficiencies of demand. it is first necessary to explore the inherited configurations of state spatiality within which such political strategies have been mobilized. to underscore the stabilizing. See Chisholm (1990) and Holland (1976a) for useful overviews of the development of regional economic theory and regional policy during this period. and inspired a wide range of policy agendas. rescaled state spaces following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism in the early 1970s must be understood. a number of scholars and policymakers drew upon his economic theory in order to explore such issues and their policy implications. 1999a. Accordingly. redistributive effects of the postwar Keynesian welfare national state upon regional and local economies. and contradictory amalgamation of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that were constructed in response to some of the major regulatory dilemmas associated with postwar Fordist urbanization in western Europe.

At the same time. public service relays. labor discipline. reproducible pattern of industrial development. and in turn shaped. this chapter suggests that policies oriented towards the regulation of urban development provide an illuminating analytical window through which to examine the changing scalar geographies of state spatiality. to promote the efficient allocation of public services and to maintain national political and geographical cohesion. and socioeconomic capacities were to be anchored within each local and regional economy. and relatively uniform grid of national state space. state spatial strategies intended to channel private capital and public infrastructure investments from rapidly expanding urban cores into underdeveloped areas and rural peripheries. and public services into an equalized.116 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism . environmental relations. each unit of state administration was to be equipped with relatively analogous. social reproduction. Within this nationalized spatial matrix. My specific goal here. among others. gender relations. state spatial projects intended to establish relatively centralized. rather. and . The present chapter is therefore intended to provide a historical-geographical reference point for investigating more recent processes of state rescaling. uniform frameworks of state territorial organization. The next section considers the relationship between urbanization patterns and forms of state spatial regulation in western Europe. the political geographies of the Keynesian welfare national state could be investigated by examining the spatial and scalar articulations of a variety of regulatory issues—including. More generally. or any others. Such policies arguably played a key role in the nationalization of state space under postwar capitalism. monetary/financial regulation. Clearly. and military security. redistributive approach to intra-national territorial inequality associated with spatial Keynesianism was seen as a means to secure a stabilized. industrial development. infrastructure provision. My purpose. is to examine the interplay between urbanization processes and changing patterns of state spatial regulation during the postwar period. Spatial Keynesianism thus represented a historically unprecedented constellation of state programs to mold the geographies of capital investment. and political life during this period. the compensatory. balanced. policy formation. institutional arrangements. The point of this analytical focus is in no way to deny the importance of the aforementioned aspects of state spatial development. and as we shall see in subsequent chapters. the far-reaching nationalization of political space that ensued under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was shaped by. and comparable infrastructural facilities. Consequently. they have also served as key mediators and catalysts of state rescaling processes during the post-1970s period. is to examine the ways in which regulatory responses to the Fordist form of urbanization shaped the evolution of state spatiality throughout western Europe since World War II. focusing in particular . if not identical. however. diverse aspects of state activity.

Such configurations provide a socially produced geographical infrastructure in and through which capital can circulate: they include urban built environments. communication and utilities infrastructures. I analyze the destabilization of spatial Keynesianism during the course of the 1970s. large-scale transportation. although not without its local differentiations and extension of the (technical and social) division of labour to the regions. ‘The rush of human beings across space is . I argue that spatial Keynesianism was composed of a variety of spatially selective political strategies through which western European national states attempted to manage the distinctive patterns of urbanization and uneven spatial development that crystallized across western Europe during the Fordist-Keynesian period. . capitalist development is premised upon the production of relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations. . only to . ] crosses national boundaries: the Megalopolis of Northern Europe extends from the Ruhr to the sea and even to English cities. The urban phenomenon extends itself over a very large part of the territory of great industrial countries. The urban fabric of this territory becomes increasingly tight. I develop a more detailed analysis of spatial Keynesianism in postwar western Europe. . yet they may also become a barrier to the accumulation process insofar as they tend to imprison capital within obsolete geographical landscapes that no longer generate profitable investment returns (Harvey 1982). and state spatial development in western Europe An induced process which one could call the ‘implosion-explosion’ of the city is at present deepening. Under certain conditions. matched by an accelerating pace of change in the produced landscapes across which they rush. It [ . regional production systems. It is for this reason that the political-economic geographies of capitalism are subjected to a process of nearly continual transformation. Finally. Industrialization. As Harvey (1989b: 192) notes. and state regulatory institutions. .’ Historically specific sociospatial configurations are painstakingly forged in order to promote and stabilize the process of capital accumulation. On this basis. and from the Paris region to the Scandinavian countries. a development that opened up a political and institutional space for the subsequent proliferation of state rescaling strategies across western Europe. 2. uneven urbanization. Henri Lefebvre (1996: 71) As we saw in Ch.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 117 on the intensification of national and local state initiatives to regulate various aspects of urban development since the nineteenth century. agglomerations and cities. these grids of capitalist sociospatial organization may provide a stabilized basis for capitalist growth.

regions. and territories as industries emerge. The central issue. many new industries have emerged at a distance from established agglomeration economies. This role has significantly intensified during the course of the twentieth century. but rather a ‘highly disequilibrated form of growth’ (Storper and Walker 1989: 8) characterized by continual flux in the fortunes of places. As industries are restructured. and are in turn shaped by. and the Low Countries (Bairoch 1988). northern France. mature. qualitatively new patterns of urban development crystallized across western Europe. protoindustrialization unfolded in . for our purposes. the urbanization process lies at the heart of the ‘continuous reshaping of geographical landscapes’ (Harvey 1989b: 192) that is endemic to capitalism as an historical system. 1982). The process of urbanization is one of the key elements within this broader geography of capitalist sociospatial organization. Harvey 1989b). they have also tended to disperse away from these territorial clusters as they have matured and profit margins have been squeezed.118 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism be dismantled and reworked anew under conditions of systemic crisis (Harvey 1989b. Processes of industrial restructuring and technological change therefore reverberate in powerful and often destructive ways across urban and regional economies. but also a variety of geographical transformations in which (a) the propulsive centers of industrial dynamism are periodically shifted across territories and scales. While propulsive industries have generally clustered together within specialized local and regional economies. For. the uneven geographies of urbanization at various scales within their territories. often in previously marginalized locations that provide fresh opportunities for innovative activities (Storper and Walker 1989: 70–99). global capitalist expansion has been premised upon the production and continual transformation of urban spaces (Lefebvre 2003b. It is therefore imperative. and (b) places. cities. Moreover. regions. and regions are continually restructured in relation to changing spatial divisions of labor (Storper and Walker 1989). is the evolving role of state institutions in mediating the uneven geographies of capitalist urbanization at various scales within their territories. and decline. in studies of territorial development under advanced capitalism. Initially. In short. to investigate the ways in which state institutions shape. leading to a number of major modifications in the state’s own spatial configuration. the heartlands of European urbanization shifted from northern Italy and the Mediterranean to southern England. expand. This worldwide process of capitalist urbanization has been profoundly uneven: it has not entailed a linear expansion of urban centers. With the advent of mercantile capitalism during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. so too are cities. Following the consolidation of industrial capitalism from 1750. the evolution of capitalism through successive regimes of accumulation involves not only changing industrial specializations. In this sense. since the large-scale industrialization of capital during the course of the nineteenth century. and the broader spatial divisions of labor in which they are embedded.

Consequently. . Throughout this period of European urbanization. had been established throughout much of northwestern ` Europe. agricultural zones. from the Pas de Calais in northern France and Liege in eastern Belgium to Aachen and the Ruhr district in Germany. State economic intervention under liberal-competitive capitalism was in no way absent. Birmingham. the locational geography of industry was strongly conditioned by the need for easy access to coal supplies and transportation networks. From Flanders. coalfield regions and an extensive network of railways and inland waterways. canals. This internal spatial division of labor within the western European core states was replicated on a global scale through imperialist expansion and colonialism (S. European national governments oriented their regulatory operations primarily towards the establishment and consolidation of integrated national markets. and northern Italy (Pounds 1985). built predominantly around the locations for capitalist production sites. Cox 1987: 130–3). and Berlin as well as newer industrial agglomerations such as Manchester. western and central France. Catalonia. and labor. By the 1880s. during the course of the nineteenth century. Thus major industrial centers emerged in areas that contained large coalfields or were well connected to rivers. Throughout much of the nineteenth century. many rural areas were deindustrialized as both capital and labor flowed into rapidly expanding cities. However. including older metropolitan centers such as Paris. Lyons/Saint Etienne. Great Britain experienced explosive urbanization as medium-sized factory towns became engines of an unprecedented wave of industrial growth. this trend was reversed during the course of the nineteenth century with the intensification of industrial development and the increasing importance of large-scale fixed capital outlays in the capitalist production process.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 119 the hinterlands of major towns as small manufacturing units were established in close proximity to proletarianized rural labor pools. to establish the institutional preconditions for fully capitalist markets in land. Important outlying industrial ´ districts also emerged in Upper Silesia/northern Moravia. National states attempted to remove various inherited precapitalist obstructions to market exchange. Under these conditions. which corresponded roughly to the liberal-competitive phase of capitalist development (Lash and Urry 1987). and railroads (Hohenberg and Lees 1995). internal peripheries emerged that served primarily as suppliers of raw materials and cheap labor for the core industrial regions within each national state (Soja 1989: 164–5). During this period. Arrighi 1994). London. to ensure sound national currencies. and to consolidate centralized bureaucratic authority within their territories (R. commodities. Nonetheless. a new mosaic of industrial urbanism. uneven spatial development within each national territory was expressed in the form of a widening polarization between rapidly industrializing city-regions and predominantly rural. but its impact upon urban and regional structures remained relatively indirect. Amin 1979. and the Ruhr district. and parts of southern Germany to Andalucia and the Italian Mezzogiorno.

. a new industrial geography crystallized in which management. state power. financial. electrical appliances. capitalism evolved from a liberal-competitive configuration to a state-managed or organized form (Lash and Urry 1987). automobiles. Throughout western Europe. an intensified segmentation of the labor process. petrochemicals. More extensive forms of state regulation were subsequently mobilized in order to confront these increasingly evident market failures. Additionally. and harbors—that shaped and accelerated the urbanization process at a range of spatial scales. a new round of urban and regional expansion was spearheaded by a number of emergent heavy industries—such as steel. traffic congestion. As industrial urbanism matured. At this time. and public transportation. state institutions also became more directly involved in the production and maintenance of various public goods. energy production. This nationalized but polycentric pattern of urban and regional development was extended throughout much of western Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. packaging. waste disposal. such as infrastructures for water provision. polluted urban spaces. and distribution of consumer durables (Scott and Storper 1986). they had yet to be integrated systematically with one another or standardized across the rapidly urbanizing national territories in which they were located (Graham and Marvin 2001: 40–5). including inadequate housing. public services such as social housing and poor relief were expanded in order to alleviate some of the most socially destructive consequences of industrial urbanism (Hohenberg and Lees 1995). While the transition to organized capitalism unfolded in different forms and at divergent rhythms within each national territory. and a massive expansion of internal economies of scale (Chandler 1977). it was closely intertwined with qualitatively new patterns of urbanization. the widespread application of scientific management techniques to the production process. major social and environmental problems proliferated. poor public health. railroads. canals. and it was still further consolidated with the widespread generalization of Fordist mass production technologies following World War II. and processed food—as well as by large retail firms oriented towards the processing. Within cities. The political economy of organized capitalism entailed an increasing centralization of corporate organizational structures. communication. however. new techniques of urban planning were deployed to alleviate land-use conflicts and to reorganize overcrowded. uneven geographical development. such infrastructural systems remained relatively fragmentary and disconnected. and control functions were concentrated within traditional city cores while manufacturing activities were increasingly decentralized into large-scale regional production clusters. In the wake of the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. machinery.120 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism European national states became increasingly involved in the financing or direct provision of various types of key infrastructural facilities—such as roads. and pollution. As these sectors expanded across western Europe. Under these conditions. and urban policy across western Europe.

. ] is located not simply in society as a whole but in space as a whole. . Meanwhile. described this intra-national pattern of uneven spatial development under postwar ‘neo-capitalism’ thus: Reproduction [ . it also entailed an increasing marginalization of numerous older industrial regions and coalmining districts. Around the centres there are nothing but subjected. Throughout the Fordist period. Large-scale metropolitan regions were transformed into ‘growth poles’ (Perroux 1955) in which the major. and unionized manufacturing workers were clustered. Henri Lefebvre. overleaf). occupied by neo-capitalism. Rodrıguez-Pose 1998). Space. one of the most astute observers and critics of western European Fordism. 84–5) The Fordist accumulation regime was propelled by the dynamism of largescale manufacturing regions. being embedded within the territorial economies of national states. Although transnational interurban linkages were quite crucial to North Atlantic Fordism. the geoeconomic significance of major western European . . their upstream suppliers. more than ever before. and other subordinate economic functions were relegated predominantly to outlying towns and peripheral zones (Storper and Scott 1989). (Lefebvre 1976c: 83. exploited and dependent spaces: neo-colonial spaces. and thus as mere subunits of national territorial economies (Map 4. it is atomised. therefore. ] is made general. however. urban regions were generally understood as nodes within national city-systems.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 121 This new industrial geography was partially superimposed upon that of the first industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. but the latter were now. Colonisation [ . propulsive Fordist industries. as exemplified clearly in Dickinson’s (1964: 388) map of the European urban system during the high Fordist period. Under these conditions. . upon distinctive patterns of uneven spatial development within each national territory. As the Fordist accumulation regime reached maturity in the 1960s. reduced to homogeneity yet fragmented. space is distributed into peripheries which are hierarchised in relation to the centres. sectioned. input and service providers. . The Fordist regime of accumulation was grounded upon nationally organized spatial divisions of labor and. during the same period. a relatively tight fit was established during this period between urban dynamism and national economic growth (Sassen 1991). The geographical heartlands of western European Fordism stretched from the Industrial Triangle of northern Italy through the German Ruhr district to northern France and the English Midlands (Storper and Scott 1989).1. . becomes the seat of power. these great industrial regions and their surrounding industrial satellites experienced consistent demographic growth and industrial expansion (Dunford and ´ Perrons 1994. As national spatial divisions of labor and national markets were further entrenched. this decentralizing tendency intensified as large firms began more extensively to relocate branch plants from core regions into peripheral spaces (Massey 1985). branch plants. which had now begun to experience significant levels of deindustrialization.

1950 Dickinson’s (1964) map of the European urban hierarchy under high Fordism built upon Christaller’s (1933) approach to central place theory. The nationalization of urban hierarchies in western Europe. Map 4. the Fordist period thus represented the ‘high-water mark of national capitalism’ (Scott 1998: 17). as elsewhere.122 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism city-regions could be measured most effectively with reference to the relative geopolitical power of the national state in which they were located (Taylor 1995).1. Source: Dickinson (1964: 388). In western Europe. . cities and city-systems within all of the major European states are considered to be neatly enclosed within a grid of national territories. see Dickinson 1964: 388–99). based upon Christaller (1950). In this representation. Each national urban system is said to be composed of a single metropolitan capital (Reichsmetropole) and a surrounding network of tributary cities and towns (for discussion. c.

In western Europe. discovered and rediscovered on a colossal scale’. to facilitate the devalorization and revalorization of specific localities. In this context. municipal institutions were substantially reorganized in conjunction with measures to centralize intergovernmental relations and to expand the provision of public goods within major city-regions. these state-subsidized. 493). In essence. As Lefebvre (1991: 334) notes. Within this welfare-nationalist framework. marked out. among other works. Consequently. or state-planned investments in urban ag2 ¨ See. . European national states began much more aggressively to ‘fill’ their internal territories through a range of spatially selective administrative classifications. explored. and management of domestic social relations such that ‘no point inside the state’s frontiers could be left devoid of the state’s control’ (Maier 2000: 820). Under these conditions. expanding state bureaucracies. . industrial development assumed a ‘relatively statist’ form. Cox 1987: 165). state-financed. and to intervene more directly in the regulation of intranational sociospatial disparities. ‘Nothing that happens within the nation’s borders remains outside the scope of the state and its ‘‘services’’. Lipietz 1977. In many western European countries. . Dunford 1988. ‘the state supplemented the market-sustaining functions of the liberal state with new functions intended to compensate for the negative effects of the market on significant numbers of citizens’ (R. to engage in long-term forms of urban. infrastructural investments. based upon centralized territorial planning and an intensified ‘infrastructural interpenetration’ of everyday life by state bureaucracies (Mann 1993: 61. ‘space [was] . places. Lefebvre 1978. Evers 1974. nationalized territorial infrastructures for capital circulation and social reproduction. and policy agendas. and a growing reliance on corporatist bargaining arrangements to mediate labor–capital relations (Lash and Urry 1987). Most crucially for this discussion. regional. the major national states of western Europe also intensified their pacification. particularly after World War II. surveillance. Lapple 1978. and territorial planning. Subsequently. These cover space in its entirety’ (Lefebvre 1991: 378). as state institutions came to operate as the ‘overall manager of the production and reproduction of social infrastructures’ (Harvey 1982: 404) within each national territory. the politics of national economic development were interlinked ever more closely with a variety of large-scale investments in strategic urban and regional spaces. and Saunders 1979. large-scale investments in industrial infrastructures. Castells and Godard 1974. the extensive nationalization of politicaleconomic space under organized capitalism was intertwined with a dramatic intensification of state intervention into processes of urban and regional development across western Europe.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 123 State power under organized capitalism was grounded upon centralized national economic planning.2 For it was during this era that western European national states began to invest extensively in the construction of large-scale. Lojkine 1977. and regions within their territories. in conjunction with this ‘new political rationality’ and its associated ‘technostructure’.

as Graham and Marvin (2001: 74) indicate. ] essential components of the growth of the modern nation state itself. and reproducing the politicaleconomic and territorial preconditions for the accumulation of capital during the course of the twentieth century. they argue. and make use of space in its instrumental aspect in order to intervene at all levels and through every agency of the economic realm. telephone. the management of key public utilities and energy resources such as gasoline. . to which he refers as the ‘state mode of ´ production’ (le mode de production etatique). fragmented islands of infrastructure [to be] joined up. Lefebvre argues. were [ . and the application of new services to modern consumption. the construction of large-scale transportation infrastructures such as highways. state productivism . schools. ‘Administrative and political apparatuses are no longer content [ . ‘were necessary to support the integration of cities into national urban systems and markets and helped to underpin the parallel growth of Keynesian regional policies’ (Graham and Marvin 1995: 173). . . the territorial roll-out of networks over space. airports. . the expansion of public housing.’ The SMP thus signals the consolidation of a system of state productivism in which ‘the state takes charge of growth. Lefebvre (1991: 378) argues. dependable services across . . For Lefebvre (1978. and waste disposal systems. ‘economic failures are attributed to the state’ (2001: 773). consequently. the metropolis’ (Graham and Marvin 2001: 40). bridges. electricity. sewage. In Lefebvre’s conceptualization. . This increasing standardization and physical extension of infrastructural networks across regions and entire territories contributed not only to the reproduction of Fordist urban configurations. For. ] the state and its bureaucratic and political apparatuses intervene continually in space. and telecommunications systems. . ports. As the Fordist-Keynesian system matured. Following this epochal transition. universities. and other research facilities. . 1977). it also played a key role in catalyzing the nationalization of state space throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period. most importantly. and nuclear power as well as water. ] merely to intervene in an abstract manner in the investment of capital [ . With this development.’ Such nationally standardized. and in which.124 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism glomerations entailed. railroads. tunnels. whether directly or indirectly’. the maintenance of communications networks such as postal. this intensified mobilization of state institutions in managing the process of territorial development is a key aspect of a qualitatively new formation of state power. and public transport systems. and publicly owned infrastructural networks. integrated and consolidated towards standardized regulated networks designed to deliver predictable. and the planning and construction of grands ensembles and other large-scale urban development projects. canals. the state mode of production (SMP) emerges as state institutions become more directly involved in constructing. maintaining. the financial resources and coordinating activities of national states enabled ‘small. organizationally centralized. ‘Taking control over the supply of networked infrastructure supplies to production.

1997a. but also in the state socialist bloc of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and in the postcolonial and developmental states of the global South (see Lefebvre 2003a. Each of the aspects of state spatial intervention discussed by Lefebvre may be interpreted as a distinctive state spatial strategy. welfare policy. the role of state institutions in mobilizing urban spatial organization as a productive force has substantially intensified during the course of the twentieth century through initiatives to devalorize obsolete industrial spaces and projects to create new spatial configurations for capitalist growth within ¨ their territories (see also Dunford 1988. labor law. 4 See Lefebvre 2003a. b. transportation policy. .Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 125 is inscribed into the modern state form. 2003b. and financial regulation that contribute to the productive and innovative capacities of locally embedded capitalist firms. ]—because only the state has at its disposal the appropriate resources. Lefebvre’s account of the SMP is relevant due to its emphasis on the interplay between state spatial configurations and the regulation of capitalist urbanization. see Brenner 2001b. educational and training policy. and selected urban policies (see also Castells and Godard 1974. Elden 2004. urban and regional policies. Lefebvre’s notion of the state mode of production was intended to characterize state productivism not only in the advanced capitalist states of North America and western Europe. According to Lefebvre (1977). spatial planning. techniques and ‘‘conceptual’’ capacity’. political struggles regarding state/economy relations came to focus increasingly upon (a) the appropriate regulatory strategies through which accumulation would be pursued and (b) the form and extent of state-led social and spatial redistribution within a given territory. Castells 1976. States construct and maintain the territorial conditions for social reproduction within major urban regions by means of various forms of housing policy. 3. demographic planning. States operate to mobilize space as a productive force within major urban regions through various forms of infrastructural investment. land-use planning. 1978. . 2. Subsequently. 2001. Schmidt 1985. State actions to promote urban collective consumption may occur in a variety of forms in which the costs of social reproduction are assumed to a greater or lesser degree by public agencies. 1977. Developed in the late 1970s. 2003b.3 In the context of the present chapter. independently of fluctuations of political regime or ruling coalition. As Lefebvre (2003a: 90) suggests. 2001. Lefebvre examines four aspects of state spatial intervention into the urban process that have been consolidated during the course of the twentieth century:4 1. and H. industrial policy. 1977). as defined in the preceding chapter. Preteceille 1975). ‘only the state is capable of taking charge of the management of space ‘‘on a grand scale’’ [ . Lapple 1978). policies that promote the 3 For a more detailed discussion of Lefebvre’s view of the state mode of production. 1978. . In particular. Above and beyond capital’s inherent tendency towards uneven development. States operate as the most crucial institutional mediators of uneven geographical development within national urban systems.

. Accordingly. Finally. that spatial fixes for the process of accumulation—‘a certain cohesiveness if not a logical coherence’ of sociospatial organization—can be secured. the next section examines some of the key politico-institutional pillars of spatial Keynesianism in the context of the broader formation of postwar capitalism in which it was embedded. national states throughout the developed capitalist world introduced a variety of spatial policy initiatives intended to mediate. Mapping state spatial selectivity in postwar western Europe: geographies of spatial Keynesianism The national economy is privileged in Keynesian theory for the purely practical reason that the nation-state system defines the geopolitical space with the necessary features convenient for the theory: a common currency. contributing to macroeconomic crisistendencies as well as to problems of political legitimation. As Lefebvre (1976b: 56) suggests. Lefebvre (1991: 378) insists.’ It is ultimately through the role of state institutions in producing and reconfiguring social space. and shared institutions. common laws. the national state ‘transforms virtually destructive conflicts into catalysts of growth [ . This occurs insofar as national states attempt to embed the process of capitalist urban development within relatively stabilized territorial configurations and scalar hierarchies that provide a temporary institutional basis for sustained accumulation. to alleviate. A more detailed examination of spatial Keynesianism can illuminate key aspects of the historically specific formation of state spatial selectivity that was associated with the postwar Keynesian welfare national state in western Europe. . during the second half of the twentieth century. Lefebvre emphasizes the essential role of state institutions in securing spatial fixes for capitalist growth both within and beyond urban regions. While the four aforementioned aspects of state spatial intervention into the urban process were initially consolidated during the early decades of the twentieth century. ] It preserves the conditions of a precarious equilibrium. the polarizing consequences of rapid urban growth within their territories. The political geographies of spatial Keynesianism. Consequently. 4. often through intense sociopolitical contestation. represent an important institutional product and arena of such struggles over the regulation of capitalist urbanization. and in many cases. which emerged across western Europe between the late 1950s and the late 1970s.126 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism productive force of urban space may severely exacerbate inherited sociospatial disparities across a national territory. their politico-institutional forms have been reconfigured considerably since that period. Hugo Radice (1984: 116) .

goods and services. Box 4. ‘never before ha[d] the space of capital been so closely identified with the national framework’. Concomitantly. and political compromises that provisionally stabilized the conflicts and contradictions that are inherent to capitalism (Boyer and Saillard 2002). 1999a. b. Lipietz 1987.5 The North Atlantic Fordist configuration of capitalism was premised upon a variety of regulatory arrangements that were articulated ‘at the interface of the national and the global’ (Peck and Tickell 1994: 290). ‘the complex field of economic relations was handled as though it was divided into a series of relatively closed national economies’. Frank Moulaert. However. the exact configuration of regulatory organization and political compromises varied according to the specific model of capitalism that was established in each national context. Although the sources of this unprecedented ‘golden age’ of capitalist expansion remain a matter of considerable academic dispute (Marglin and Schor 1990. ‘the postwar years saw the construction of an international regulated space. . Consequently. comprised of a constellation of nation states linked one to another through reciprocal flows of money. 1992. the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). the Bretton Woods monetary regime. including US global military hegemony. and nationalized frameworks of industrial relations and sociopolitical struggle (Agnew and Corbridge 1994. the newly consolidated institutions of the Keynesian welfare state. even though the Fordist-Keynesian system had determinate international (and also subnational) dimensions. Hirsch and Roth 1986. Jessop 2002). as Jessop (1999a: 382) explains. institutional forms. Herrigel 1996. Webber and Rigby 1996). Nonetheless. Within this framework. ‘it was through the national state that the national economy would be regulated as a distinctive imagined economic space and efforts [would be] made to secure a 5 On the institutional architectures of Fordist capitalism in western Europe see. complemented by a set of international institutions which existed to manage the process of adjustment within the international economy’ (Leyshon and Thrift 1997: 71). Ruggie 1982).Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism the political geography of Fordism is a national geography. Indeed. its most essential geographical building blocks were national political-economic formations. with international ramifications and regional qualifiers. among many other works. numerous scholars have emphasized the key role of the national scale as the preeminent geographical basis for accumulation and for the regulation of political-economic life during this period (Swyngedouw 1997.1 (overleaf ) summarizes the basic regulatory-institutional architecture that underpinned the North Atlantic Fordist system. and Patricia Wilson (1988: 13) 127 Throughout the older industrialized world. Erik Swyngedouw. Altvater 1992. Boyer and Saillard 2002. the Fordist-Keynesian configuration of capitalist development was grounded upon a historically specific set of regulatory arrangements. according to Lipietz (1994: 29–30). To be sure. Jessop 2002.

the expansion of trade relations. Petit 1999. during which a nested set of new or redefined scales are produced. Swyngedouw 1997. Form of inter-capitalist competition. Key axes of regulation under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism Source: based on Boyer 1996. Rather. The state and other forms of governance. . Collective bargaining occurs primarily at the national scale. and mediating social unrest. often through corporatist accommodations between capital. Competition between large firms is mediated through strategies to rationalize mass production technologies. complementary expansion of national production and consumption as the basis for a politics of prosperity’ (Jessop 1999a: 383). National central banks oversee the distribution of credit to corporations and consumers. contested and always precarious process of sociospatial change.1.128 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Box 4. the nationalized formations of political-economic space that had been established during the preceding wave of capitalist expansion and state development were further . . Monetary and financial regulation. As the Fordist accumulation regime matures. National states mobilize industrial and technology policies to bolster the worldmarket positions of their largest firms. Fordism is not a condition or stable configuration. After the Great Depression of the 1930s. National states engage extensively in managing aggregate demand. redistributing the social product through welfare programs. Longterm investment decisions by capital are enabled by stabilized patterns of national macroeconomic growth. The Keynesian welfare national state was hardly a necessary teleological outgrowth of World War II. and the ascendancy of the US dollar as world currency. Monopolistic forms of regulation enable corporate concentration and centralization within major national industrial sectors. promoting full employment. labor. Wage labor is extended and standardized with the spread of mass production systems throughout national social formations. Keynesian welfare national states may ´ be viewed as the culmination of a longue duree trend towards the nationalization and territorialization of political space that emerged during the midseventeenth century with the consolidation of the Westphalian geopolitical order and was significantly intensified during the course of the late nineteenth century (Maier 2000). International configuration. looking backwards at the history of modern state formation in western Europe. global interdependencies among national economic spaces intensify due to enhanced competition among transnational corporations. Wage relation. The world economy is parcelized among relatively autocentric national economies and policed by the US global hegemon. . (Swyngedouw 1997: 154) . Yet. The money supply is regulated at a national scale through the US-dominated Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Wages are tied to productivity growth and tendentially increased in order to underwrite mass consumption. and the state. . generalizing mass consumption. containing swings in the business cycle. it refers to a dynamic.

Hall (1989) for a more detailed comparative discussion of the diffusion of Keynesianinspired macroeconomic policies in western Europe and the USA since the 1930s.’ However. Throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period. state intervention. among others (Parris. Keynesian socioeconomic policies were widely deployed across western Europe in order to institutionalize demand management. and counter-cyclical monetary policies. ‘This period marks the highest stage of the national state form in Europe as an economic. state intervention into processes of urban and regional development was multifaceted: it was articulated in a variety of politico-institutional forms in specific national contexts.7 Throughout the Fordist-Keynesian period. Britain. from the 1950s to the early 1970s. monopoly pricing. and Saynor 1987.1 (overleaf). ‘The homogenization across national space of a series of socioeconomic aspects (wages. 4. Following postwar reconstruction. redistributive schemes.6 According to Jessop’s (2002) influential account. collective bargaining. Pestieau. especially housing and nation-wide education. social and physical infrastructures. Belgium. ‘public spending increased on utilities. even as urban and regional development patterns and governance arrangements were differentiated extensively under Fordism. all of which presupposed the geographical-political space of the sovereign nation-state (Radice 1984). a distinctive politics of spatial Keynesianism crystallized across much of western Europe in which national 6 See P. but due to the nationalization of key Fordist industries in a number of European countries. rules and procedures) was articulated with a highly uneven and differentiated local and regional development process. see Jessop 2002. and (b) the primacy of national economies and national populations as the key targets for state socioeconomic regulation. . 7 For a more extensive discussion of the role of the Keynesian welfare national state in constructing a distinctive spatio-temporal fix for postwar capitalism. Within this nationalized politico-regulatory framework. not only through the expansion of welfare services. As Swyngedouw (1997: 153) explains. with its apogee occurring at the end of the 1960s after the success of the Marshall Plan and the development of the European Community in 1945–1968’ (Jessop 2002: 60).Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 129 entrenched. and Sweden. the Netherlands. France. deficit spending. political and social power container. Toninelli 2000). and various collective goods. Consequently. The scalar architecture of state regulation under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism is summarized schematically in Fig. health care and social benefit systems’ (Martin and Sunley 1997: 280). the Keynesian welfare national state was grounded upon (a) the primacy of national states (rather than international or subnational levels of political authority) as the key institutional agents of regulatory activities. socioeconomic norms. and it generated variegated effects upon patterns of urban and regional growth across the western European space-economy. including Italy. the role of the national state as the primary geographical container of politicaleconomic life was significantly intensified across western Europe (Milward 2000). Public sector employment increased significantly.

in this context. and finance various aspects of social reproduction Fig. Lefebvre (1976c: 111–12) insightfully underscored the complex inter- . The goal of state action. Insofar as significant large-scale territorial disparities were viewed as a major threat to stabilized patterns of macroeconomic growth. On the most general level. was less to enhance the productive force of capitalist sociospatial configurations than to spread the industrialization process as evenly as possible across the entire surface of the national territory—much like butter on a piece of bread. states mobilized broadly analogous strategies of territorial administration and urban-regional regulation. Writing in the mid-1970s. operating primarily to plan. subsidize. It was assumed. and thereby. at the highpoint of spatial Keynesianism in western Europe.1.130 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Spatial scale(s) of regulation Global Major characteristics and institutional embodiment(s) Bretton Woods financial system and GATT underwrite global financial stability and global trade. that ‘there is a loss of output and income to the national economy from the over-development of leading regions and the under-development of others’ (Holland 1976a: 13). leading to an international diffusion of Fordist institutional forms and regulatory practices Global-national relations National states assume independent responsibility for monetary policy in the context of continued US global hegemony National The Keynesian welfare national state secures the institutional conditions for mass production and mass consumption while promoting national sociopolitical and territorial cohesion National− local relations Local National governments centralize intergovernmental relations and mobilize various mechanisms of territorial redistribution intended to alleviate intra-national disparities Local welfare states serve as transmission belts for central state policies. political strategies to alleviate intra-national sociospatial polarization came to serve as important tools of national socioeconomic and industrial policy. The scalar architecture of state regulation under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism Source: derived from Tickell and Peck 1995: 377. under these conditions. 4. to promote stabilized national industrial growth. spatial Keynesianism may be understood as a broad constellation of national state institutional forms and regulatory strategies designed to alleviate uneven geographical development within the national space-economy.

. . To use the classic metaphor.8 Drawing upon the approach to state theory developed in the preceding chapter. classes—had been solved [ . Whereas postwar European national states promoted a spatial fix under Fordism by attempting to spread industrial urbanization as evenly as possible throughout their territories. . not only as a window into the different forms of state spatiality that underpinned the national building-blocks of North Atlantic Fordism. and it therefore provides an illuminating basis on which to investigate the distinctive form of state spatial selectivity that was produced in and through the Keynesian welfare national states of postwar western Europe. rural peripheries. apparently more similar trajectories of state spatial restructuring that have crystallized in each of these contexts during the post-Fordist period. but also as a basis for comparing the subsequent. . . spatial Keynesianism may be characterized most precisely with reference to (a) the mobilization of state 8 A very different formation of spatial Keynesianism was consolidated in the USA during the postwar period (Friedmann and Bloch 1990). ] During this euphoric period. A more systematic comparison of postwar spatial Keynesianism in western Europe and the USA has yet to be undertaken. Everything was subordinated to growth [ . This ruling scenario of the 1950–1970 period gave rise not only to a so-called ‘logic’ but also to strategies which gradually covered space as a whole [ . it seemed that the problem of integrating and co-opting everything that opposed this society—ideologies. . what Francois Perroux calls ‘the growth ¸ poles’. Such a comparison would be highly illuminating. grounded upon the continual spreading of a standardized urban grid across the entire national territory. . subsidized suburban development on a massive scale (Florida and Jonas 1991). ] was an idyllic period for the whole of capitalism [ . the ship of capitalism and its leaders found itself with a motor.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 131 connections between urban regulation. if largely unrecognized. centres. the politics of economic growth and the problem of uneven spatial development under postwar capitalism: the period roughly between 1950 and 1970 [ . however. ] The retarded or backward areas. a rudder and a fixed course. nuclei and growth poles. ] An apparent truth imposed itself which has only now become paradoxical: the ‘truth’ of unlimited growth. . the attempt to integrate so-called ‘lagging’ or ‘backward’ areas into the developmental trajectory of the national space-economy as a whole was a key component within the broader postwar project of integrating oppositional forces into a national social formation oriented towards mass production and mass consumption. As Lefebvre indicates. . the indefinite extension of the centres. This political project of spatial extension and homogenization—of promoting the ‘Taylorization of territory’ (Veltz 1996: 24)—was arguably the geographical essence of spatial Keynesianism. from suburbs and new towns to older industrial areas. covering ‘space as a whole’ (Lefebvre 1976c: 112). More precisely. the US state promoted intense inter-urban competition among local growth machines (Logan and Molotch 1987). ways to the nationalization of state space during the Fordist-Keynesian period. it now constituted for itself solid nuclei. . could and had to be integrated into growth. and channeled major public resources into the military-industrial complex (Gottdiener 1989). social groupings. . was thus inextricably intertwined with a politico-geographic logic of endless spatial extension and homogenization. with its goal of endless industrial growth. The productivist economic logic of postwar Fordism. and outlying agricultural zones. the underdeveloped countries. ]. Spatial Keynesianism contributed in essential.

4. through a variety of political strategies intended to centralize. 3. but also spatially. STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS SCALAR DIMENSION State administrative and regulatory capacities are centralized around the national scale: regions and localities are ‘subordinated to the macroeconomic and macroredistributive imperatives of the [national] centre’ STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES The national scale is promoted as the most essential level of political-economic life: the national economy thus becomes ‘the essential geographical unit of economic organization. accumulation. standardize. In sum. 4. homogenize. postwar Keynesian interventionism was a key factor behind the steady process of regional convergence in per capita incomes that characterized most advanced capitalist nations until the late 1970s’ TERRITORIAL DIMENSION Relatively uniform structures of territorial administration are established throughout the national space-economy: ‘consistent standards of social welfare and social infrastructure provision [are established] across regions and localities. 281. national states attempted to redistribute the surplus not only socially. 280. and (b) the mobilization of state spatial strategies oriented towards the spreading of urban development as evenly as possible across the entire national territory (see Fig. such strategies entailed the establishment of various extralocal or interscalar ‘rule-regimes’ that served to ‘constrain and channel the strategic options and tactical behavior of local actors’.132 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism spatial projects oriented towards the establishment of centralized and uniform frameworks of territorial administration.2. and regulation over which the state is the sovereign actor’ Redistributive policies are mobilized in order to equalize the distribution of industry and infrastructure investment across the national space-economy: ‘in most countries. In Peck’s (2002: 338) useful terminology. State spatial selectivity under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism: the case of spatial Keynesianism Source: builds on Fig. thereby incorporating them into an increasingly collective or public space-economy’ Fig.9. quotations are drawn from Martin and Sunley 1997: 279. through institutionalized collective bargaining arrangements and national social welfare policies. under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. Under the dominance of spatial Keynesianism. such extralocal rule-regimes operated to bring ‘regions and localities within the economy under much greater central state control and dependence’ by subordinating them ‘to the macro-economic and macro-redistributive imperatives of the centre’ (Martin and Sunley 1997: . and equalize national political-economic space.2).

Between the 1950s and the 1970s. in circular causation.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 133 279. Gunnar Myrdal (1957: 41) Across most of western Europe. and the tendential convergence of per capita income levels—that figured crucially in the reproduction of the entire Fordist-Keynesian order (Martin and Sunley 1997: 280–1). In the present context. Its job was to follow the path to growth laid down by national policies’ (Sengenberger 1993: 316). and thus. a range of regional industrial . to redistribute employment within national boundaries. the promotion of full employment. to induce the spatial integration of the national economy as a whole. the stronger will be both the urge and the capacity to counteract the blind market forces which tend to result in regional inequalities. Boxes 4. across otherwise qualitatively different national. the extralocal rule-regimes associated with spatial Keynesianism established certain minimum standards of social welfare and infrastructure provision across national intergovernmental systems. again.3 (overleaf). will spur economic development in the country. the diffusion of Fordist-Keynesian forms of urbanization. Taken together. ]. and so on and so on.3 (p. I shall not attempt to provide a comprehensive investigation of the differentiated national political geographies that were generated across western Europe through the politics of spatial Keynesianism. Selected examples of the latter are then surveyed in the discussion that follows. Instead. for they served explicitly to alleviate inter-place disparities. At the same time. which in some countries extended to large-scale state ownership and management of key industries.2 (p. and this. in addition to utilities and other collective goods’ (Martin and Sunley 1997: 280). ‘thereby incorporating [regions and localities] into an increasingly collective or public space-economy. 4. Within this framework. and local regulatory landscapes. between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. regional policies were one of the most significant mechanisms of spatial Keynesianism. 135) and 4. . the extension of capital investments into marginalized areas. regional. Compensatory regional policies The more effectively a national state becomes a welfare state [ . ‘the local unit was seen as having no essential economic life of its own. . The interplay between the rise of the Keynesian welfare national state. 280). the mobilization of spatial Keynesianism. 136) summarize the key state spatial projects and state spatial strategies upon which spatial Keynesianism was grounded. the following analysis focuses on some of the most prevalent policy mechanisms and institutional forms through which spatial Keynesianism was articulated. and the nationalization of state space is represented schematically in Fig. these extralocal rule-regimes directly or indirectly generated a variety of ‘regional redistributive-stabilizing effects’— including the stimulation of consumer demand.

increasing concentration of managerial and financial functions within city cores coupled with a decentralization of manufacturing into suburban satellites and. . state spatial projects . into underdeveloped peripheries The rise of spatial Keynesianism Goal is to maximize national output and income by promoting a balanced spatial distribution of socioeconomic capacities and infrastructural investments across the entire national territory Major consequences • Cities and regions are increasingly subordinated to central state regulatory control and are incorporated into an encompassing national economic framework • Intra-national patterns of uneven spatial development are tendentially alleviated • Urban and regional development patterns are gradually stabilized • Per capita income levels increasingly converge within each national territory Fig. education. and transportation infrastructures • Promotion of national social and territorial cohesion Key elements of Fordist-Keynesian urbanization • Widespread generalization of Fordist mass production systems • Massive urban growth fueled by large-scale heavy industries • Consolidation of national city-systems • As Fordism matures. and large-scale energy. 4. social welfare. communications. eventually. and full employment policies • Expansion of public spending on national collective goods such as housing. .3. . spatial Keynesianism. . and the nationalization of state space in postwar western Europe . Urbanization.134 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Consolidation of new forms of state spatial selectivity grounded upon . • Centralization of state regulatory capacities at a national scale • Replication of relatively uniform administrative structures across the national economy as a whole and state spatial strategies • Promotion of the national scale as the predominant level of socioeconomic activity • Spatial equalization of capital investment and infrastructural facilities evenly across the national territory Consolidation of Keynesian welfare national states • Mobilization of national demandmanagement.

These new forms of metropolitan territorial administration played important roles in distributing the public services of the Keynesian welfare national state while managing the intensive patterns of land-use and suburban expansion that crystallized within rapidly expanding Fordist city-regions (Sharpe 1995a.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Box 4. . and infrastructural policies were introduced to promote industrialization within each state’s ‘underdeveloped’ peripheries (Clout 1981a. (Lefebvre 1991: 23) Having become political. In both federal and unitary states. rationalized. space is distributed into peripheries which are hierarchised in relation to the centres . Local government reorganization. b). (Lefebvre 1976c: 84) 135 Spatial Keynesianism rested upon state spatial projects oriented towards the establishment of nationally centralized and uniform patterns of state territorial organization. These centralizing. major cities and metropolitan regions still received the bulk of large-scale public infrastructure investments and welfare services during the Fordist-Keynesian epoch. In conjunction with projects to rationalize governmental bureaucracies. Within this nationalized institutional configuration. local states operated primarily as transmission belts for centrally determined policies (Mayer 1991). Metropolitan governmental consolidation. Due to their high population densities. Territorial reform initiatives. As national governments attempted to standardize the provision of welfare services and to coordinate national economic policies across their territories. Through such territorial reform initiatives. Intergovernmental centralization. The state determines and congeals the decision-making centres. At the same time. standardizing state spatial projects included: . . . a variety of compensatory policy mechanisms were introduced in order to rechannel employment and growth capacities into underdeveloped regions and rural . social space is on the one hand centralised and fixed in a political centrality. municipal institutions were reorganized. . and on the other hand specialised and parceled out. . consolidated metropolitan institutions were established in major western European city-regions. Holland 1976b). and expanded in order to deliver various kinds of public services to local populations. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. enabling them to impose national socioeconomic policy priorities upon regional and local govern´ mental units (Meny and Wright 1985. Key state spatial projects promoting spatial Keynesianism This modern state promotes and imposes itself as the stable centre—definitively—of (national) societies and spaces.2. Nonetheless. intra-national jurisdictional boundaries were simplified and many formerly contiguous units of local territorial administration were fused together. Rose 1985). national govern- ments acquired more centralized control over subnational territorial governance. the number of subnational territorial units—particularly municipalities— was significantly diminished in major western European countries.

Nationalized industries. Automatic stabilizers. energy. central governments assumed direct ownership of major Fordist industries—such as coal. and equalization of political-economic life within the state’s borders. Key state spatial strategies promoting spatial Keynesianism An apparent truth imposed itself which has only now become paradoxical: the ‘truth’ of unlimited growth. population distribution. infrastructural planning. while also adding a new layer of state-financed industrial investments within inherited spatial divisions of labor (Holland 1974. . national spatial planning systems stimulated and coordinated the channeling of investments away from overheated metropolitan cores into less developed or marginalized areas. In this manner. housing. Their goal was to alleviate overheating in core regions while enhancing levels of economic activity and employment in marginalized. transfer payments. ] (Lefebvre 1976c: 112) Spatial Keynesianism was grounded upon state spatial strategies oriented towards the nationalization. They enabled low-income regions to pay lower taxes and to receive higher levels of government expenditure. or underdeveloped regions (Clout 1981a). aerospace. France. nuclei and growth poles. New towns policies were particularly prominent in Britain. and the Netherlands but were . . Through indicative planning initiatives and various forms of infrastructural investment. among others. redistributive state spatial strategies included: . locational incentives. In many western European countries. National governments attempted to alleviate urban congestion by establishing suburban new towns in relatively close proximity to major metropolitan agglomerations. This ruling scenario of the 1950–1970 period gave rise not only to a so-called ‘logic’ but also to strategies which gradually covered space as a whole [ . and automobiles. systematic manner. Like compensatory regional policies. steel. homogenization. Scandinavia. the indefinite extension of the centres. National governments deployed various forms of finan- cial aid. These entailed mechanisms of interregional resource transfer that were built-in to national fiscal and social welfare systems and activated through regionally specific economic fluctuations. peripheral. New towns policies. and infrastructural investments in order to promote industrial growth and economic regeneration outside the dominant city cores. . These nationalizing. .3.136 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Box 4. . with high-income regions paying higher taxes and receiving lower levels of public support (MacKay 1994). and large-scale territorial management. shipbuilding. national states enhanced employment levels and development potentials within selected localities and regions. Martin and Sunley 1997). Such indicative planning initiatives were generally centralized within newly ´´ ´ established governmental ministries—such as France’s DATAR (Delegation pour l’Amenage´ ment du Territoire et l’Action regionale) and the Dutch RPD (Rijksplanologische Dienst)—that were devoted specifically to problems of urban development. Compensatory regional policies. National spatial planning systems. New forms of national spatial planning were mobilized in order to guide future patterns of territorial development in a comprehensive. . national governments facilitated population deconcentration and guided urban and regional development across the national territory.

They played a key role in promoting social reproduction within major city-regions through large-scale investments in the localized infrastructures of collective consumption (including transportation. Urban managerialism. and much of Northern Ireland. and the declining industrial zones of the English North. Golany 1978). tax privileges. these redistributive regional policies entailed the introduction of various forms of financial aid. Generally justified in the name of priorities such as balanced national development and spatial equalization. the agricultural peripheries and border zones of West Germany. Accordingly. ‘lagging regions’. few of western Europe’s major cities or city-regions were targeted by these classic Fordist-Keynesian regional policy initiatives. both of whom suggested that various forms of public intervention were required to alleviate market-driven interregional inequalities. Some of these policies were derived from the writings of Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and Albert Hirschman (1958). construction and purchase of industrial buildings. and transfer payments to promote industrial growth and economic regeneration outside the dominant city cores. Such regions ‘were conceived as blank spaces on the national map of industry. roads. a broad range of regional and spatial policies were introduced across western Europe that explicitly targeted such peripheralized spaces. Francois ¸ . government guarantees. As Map 4. and education). From the Italian Mezzogiorno and Spanish Andalusia to western and southern France. border zones. western Ireland. housing. or ‘distressed areas’. generally composed of economic spaces that had been marginalized during previous rounds of industrial development or that were locked into obsolete technological-industrial infrastructures (OECD 1976). the resultant compensatory regional policies included ‘rebates of interest.2 (overleaf) illustrates. to be filled by the same development strategies as such voids were to be filled in the Third World’ (Sabel 1994: 126). and they often channeled major public infrastructural investments into such locations. South Wales. the Limburg coal-mining district of northern Belgium. which were directed almost exclusively at underdeveloped rural peripheries. the Scandinavian North. each European national state had its so-called ‘problem areas’. parts of Scotland.)’ (Albrechts and Swyngedouw 1989: 68). etc. the northwestern regions and islands of Denmark.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 137 also mobilized on a smaller but significant scale in other European countries (Merlin 1971. industrial land development. social welfare functions (Harvey 1989a). locational incentives. capital grants. peripheries throughout the national territory. . [and] improvements of the regional infrastructure (transport facilities. the Dutch northeastern peripheries. throughout the postwar period until the late 1970s. Local states and municipal governments came to serve as ‘long arms’ of national policies and were oriented increasingly towards managerial. In the western European context. and declining coal-mining regions.

2. likewise gained considerable popularity during this period and was frequently . which emphasized the role of propulsive industries in generating investment and employment within particular areas. Perroux’s (1955) growth pole theory.138 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Map 4. Geographies of compensatory regional policy in postwar western Europe Source: Clout (1981a: 27).

One of the conceptual foundations of postwar redistributive regional policies was the notion that intra-national territorial inequalities—as expressed through the polarization of investment. Myrdal and Hirschman provided an important intellectual justification for interventionist policies intended to alter the territorial distribution of the factors of production within each national territory. France (Brittany. Perroux’s ageographical conception of ‘poles’ was applied to the analysis of ‘growth centers’ or agglomeration economies (Darwent 1975).. Francois Perroux’s (1955.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 139 invoked to justify a variety of industrial policies that had significant regional and local impacts (Parr 1973) (see Box 4.4. Merseyside). the construction of major industrial sites—generally in classic Fordist sectors such as cars. and the various compensatory regional policies that flowed from it. etc. during the course of the 1960s. Perroux provided an important intellectual justification for large-scale. spatially redistributive forms of state intervention within marginalized zones of the national territory. The basic logic underlying Perroux’s theory is depicted in the diagram (based on Chisholm 1990: 66). by criticizing the neoclassical assumption that spatial equilibrium—i. the relocation of some existing demand. a maximally efficient geographical distribution of capital and labor—would automatically result from market forces. Like Myrdal and Hirschman.e. Perroux’s theories thus formed the basis for a variety of growth pole policies in which governmental agencies subsidized.4). In other words. Both authors recommended various ‘equalizing measures’ (Myrdal 1957: 45) through which national states could attempt to counteract capital’s chronic tendency to cluster in the most developed agglomerations. Subsequently. Intellectual foundations: regional economic theory and the logic of spatial Keynesianism Sources: Chisholm 1990. . The basic assumption was that ‘some of the new investment [ . could trigger long-term cumulative growth which would not require continuing public subsidy’ (Chisholm 1990: 76). the establishment of a large firm with a significant employment base within a given region would generate ‘multiplier effects’ stimulating other upstream and downstream firms to locate in close geographical proximity to the ‘motor industry’ and to one another. From this perspective. Friedmann and Weaver 1984. which would stimulate the economy of the laggard region. In particular. were derived from a variety of major currents within postwar regional economic theory. steel. public policies inspired wholly or partially by growth pole theory played an important role in stimulating large-scale investments by the automobile and steel industries in a number of marginalized regions of the UK (Scotland. in part through the work of Jacques Boudeville. Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and Albert Hirschman (1958) developed theories of ‘cumulative causation’ that underscored the inevitability of polarized patterns of territorial development in the absence of public intervention. . . More generally. Fos). combined with judicious initial expenditure on infrastructure. and chemicals—in underdeveloped or peripheral zones (Cameron 1970). This assumption. Perroux’s work focused on the role of the ‘propulsive industry’ as the stimulus for further industrial development within a broader matrix of inter-firm relations. 1950) theory of ‘growth poles’ was likewise an influential basis ¸ for postwar regional policies. and Italy (Taranto)—albeit with varying Box 4. and per capita income levels across the national territory—were detrimental to national economic stability. or fully financed. ] could be steered to suitable sites to provide the initial stimulus required for establishing a growth pole. employment.

and central Scotland. and other areas afflicted with severe economic problems. In Britain. . 9 Writing in the late 1970s. and Sagonte—as paradigmatic examples of the national state’s increasing role in coordinating the interplay between fixed spaces of production and mobile flows of capital in the modern space economy. Henri Lefebvre (2003a [1978]: 91–2) referred to the ‘colossal installations’ of Fordist heavy industries at Tarente and Fos-sur-Mer—as well as in Lorraine.9 Important examples of the types of compensatory regional policy initiatives mobilized in western Europe during the Fordist-Keynesian period include the following: . west Cumberland.140 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism A new export firm locates Increases the agglomeration economies Increases the employment and population Expands output of local suppliers Increases pool of labor Increases demand for local goods and services Expands the service sector Enlarges the town's financial base Improves the town's infrastructure degrees of economic success over the medium and long term (Keating 1998: 48). northeast England. Through the Distribution of Industry Acts. the Special Areas Act was approved in 1934 with the goal of promoting economic regeneration in four depressed coal-mining regions— south Wales. Dunkerque. The Industrial Development Act of 1966 established still larger target zones for regional policy. these target areas were expanded and relabeled after World War II to include a number of major towns. cities.

Yuill 1979. Rhodes. Strasbourg. In France. OECD 1976.10 . Dunford 1988: 231–51. and ‘nuclei of industrialization’ (Nuclei di Industrializzazione) were established in strategic locations. and border zones. Clout 1975. Following the introduction of the Fourth National Plan in 1964. postwar regional policies were developed in close conjunction with a series of five-year plans that underpinned national economic policy. The Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI). an executive body responsible for promoting agricultural modernization. Law 1980. were oriented above all towards the alleviation of large-scale territorial disparities between the industrialized North and the predominantly agricultural South. into the distressed areas of the north and west. capital grants. rural areas. Marseille. the Cassa began to mobilize a variety of fiscal incentives and grants in order to promote industrial relocation into the Mezzogiorno.11 . Moore. Hull 1979. Their main aim was to decentralize industrial capacities and employment out of the dominant Paris region and into major provincial cities. Hansen 1968. As of the late 1950s. Thomas 1975. population expansion. Ross and Cohen 1975. . towns. Subsequent initiatives in regional planning. and territorial management throughout the Southern region. Postwar regional planning in Italy was initiated in 1950 with the establishment of the Southern Italy Development Agency (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno). and infrastructural investments. through tax incentives.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 141 encompassing 40 per cent of British territory and 20 per cent of the total population. such as the South East and the Midlands. French regional policy channeled substantial public funds into medium-sized ‘regional centers’ for industrial growth and rural areas while imposing tax penalties on firms committed to locating in the Paris region. in which the Cassa played a central coordinative and financial role. employment premiums. a multi-sectoral state holding com10 11 Brown 1972. Toulouse. and infrastructural investment in peripheral regions dispersed outside the Parisian metropolitan area. and Tyler 1986. Nantes. soft loans. Lille. and discretionary loans. growth centers. industrial growth. one of the cornerstones of this program was the delineation of ´ ´ eight ‘countervailing metropoles’ (metropoles d’equilibre)—Lyon. and Nancy—that were intended to serve as focal points for urban growth. Allen and MacLennan 1970. they served to delineate broad zones of the UK national territory in which industrial relocation was to be encouraged through diverse regional policy measures. including development grants. The goal of such policies was ‘to promote an urban division ´ ´ of labor so that each [of the metropoles d’equilibre] would be able to rival Paris in some way. tax concessions. The overarching goal of postwar regional policy in the UK was to redistribute employment from rapidly expanding urban cores. where new industrial development zones. Although the precise boundaries of these ‘assisted areas’ were modified during the course of the 1960s. Bordeaux. In addition. becoming a magnet for activity in some critical area’ (Ross and Cohen 1975: 746).

Zielinski 1983. Holland 1972a. likewise played an active role in rechanneling capital into the underdeveloped Mezzogiorno during this period of so-called ‘extraordinary state intervention’ (Intervento Straordinario). Utrecht.142 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism pany responsible for coordinating the investment activities of public enterprises. In general terms. OECD 1976. rural peripheries. and employment from the western Randstad region—composed of Amsterdam. and the Hague—into the peripheral regions and depressed areas of the North. Selan and Donnini 1975. above all. The ROG distinguished urban regions. Dunford 1988: 145–61. then. regional policies oriented towards the South were integrated more explicitly with national economic agendas. from various types of ‘problem regions’. and employment from the major urban regions into ‘lagging’ areas such as small towns. The Netherlands represents one further variation on these broad trends within postwar regional policy. Rotterdam. which was intended. with the introduction of the first National Economic Plan. They designated ‘development areas’ and ‘development Allen and MacLennan 1970. population. and South. and border zones. This redistributive approach to spatial planning was further extended in 1969 with the introduction of the Program for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structure (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ‘Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’—GA). the overarching focus of postwar regional policy in West Germany was on the spreading of developmental capacities. These national government initiatives attempted to promote a more balanced form of territorial development while simultaneously preventing unchecked suburban sprawl both within and beyond the Randstad megalopolis. including rural peripheries and marginalized zones along the eastern border. The initial impetus for this project of spatial decentralization and ‘concentrated deconcentration’ was the Physical Planning Act of 1962 (Wet op de ruimtelijke ordening—WRO). 13 ¨ Blacksell 1981. 12 . which was followed in 1966 by the more comprehensive Second National Physical Planning Report (Tweede Nota over de ruimtelijke ordening). King 1975. As of the late 1960s. From the mid-1960s. where economic growth and population expansion were expected to continue unabated. the ROG was expanded to include depressed coal-mining areas in the Saarland and the Ruhr zone as important targets for state assistance. which were labeled ‘federal development areas’ (Bundesausbaugebiete) and targeted for state aid and infrastructural investment. The problem regions were delineated with reference to their major cities and towns. soft loans. a variety of national land-management and spatial planning initiatives were mobilized during the course of the 1960s in order to disperse industry. R. capital investment. Vath 1980. Brenner 1997a. Casper 1979. to enhance coordination among federal and Land (state) authorities in the implementation of compensatory regional policy. including capital grants.12 . postwar regional policies emerged with the approval of the Spatial Planning Law (Raumordnungsgesetz—ROG) in 1965 which required the promotion of ‘equal life conditions’ (gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen) across the entire national territory. and depreciation allowances. In the Dutch context. Ronzani 1979. In West Germany. Schikora 1984.13 . East.

such direct and indirect interregional resource transfers had a very significant impact upon the intra-national geographies of uneven development during the postwar period. Dunford and 14 Dutt and Costa 1985. Faludi and van der Valk 1994. Keating (1998: 47) summarizes the logic and the impacts of these nationally specific patterns of regional policy: a key feature of early [regional] policies was the diversion of industrial activity from one region of the state to another. diversionary policies brought jobs and investment. along with the integration of the working class. S. nation-wide plan.3. and public resources were to be channeled through a variety of direct and indirect policy measures. Zonneveld 1989. For the national economy as a whole. In addition. industrial investment. Hamnett 1982. as well as boosting the fortunes of governing parties. The diffusion of developmental capacities. population distribution. closely analogous maps were disseminated by regional development agencies and national spatial planning ministries in order to represent the goals and projected consequences of compensatory regional policies within each national economy. which were particularly crucial to the Netherlands’ distribution-based national economy. Reflecting on the political geographies of postwar Keynesianism across western Europe. overleaf) of the French spatial structure depicts the intended effects of these compensatory regional policies in one national economic system. Throughout western Europe. forceful arrows. and employment according to a comprehensive. as many studies have subsequently indicated. and the rest of the national territory is configured into precisely defined functional zones into which metropolitan socioeconomic forces were to be diffused outwards. and the development of ports and inland waterways. land reclamation. indeed. as territorial equity comprised part of the postwar social settlement. the policy could be presented as a way of utilizing under-employed resources in the regions and expanding national output in a noninflationary manner. labour markets and housing.14 Brunet’s (1973) map (Map 4. Dutch regional policy during the postwar period addressed various contextually specific issues such as structural unemployment. Such maps served to glorify the modernizing power of the national state and to underscore its alleged capacity to sculpt patterns of industrial growth. and employment from the Parisian metropolitan core into the country’s western and southern peripheries is represented through stark. Finally. there was a political rationale. And. There was also a social dimension. Faludi 1991. and limited in-migration. For the problem regions. For regions of full employment. Gay 1981. as regional policy was seen as a mechanism for consolidating the nation state in regions where dissent was likely. contributing to an unprecedented convergence of per capita disposable income within most western European states (Ashcroft 1982. they relieved pressures on infrastructures. infrastructural investments. . From a political perspective this had the advantage of addressing several constituencies at the same time.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 143 nuclei’ into which industrial capacities.

in Clout (1981a 27).144 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Map 4. in ‘France’. Major areas of tourism.3. Main maritime routes. 16. Mountainous international frontiers. 2. ‘Area of repulsion’. Rhinelands axis and its ‘overspill’ into France. Rural labor complex. . Outward expansion of economic activities from the inner Paris Basin. High rates of natural increase of population. 4. 15. Major industrial growth centers in neighboring countries. Large provincial urban centers. Major national growth area. repr. 10. 5. 17. 6. 9. Old industrial regions in need of renovation. Main axes of communication. 14. Major port complex. 8. 13. ‘Southern France’. Source: Brunet (1973: 251). 11. Major industrial focus. 12. dividing an axis of nineteenthcentury industrialization. 3. Industrial and urbanized areas. Compensatory regional policy in postwar France Key (from Clout 1981a: 27): 1. 7. 18. Upland core.

the system of automatic stabilization was calibrated so that government expenditure would decline within each region as per capita income rose. Under these circumstances. spatial Keynesianism was also premised upon a number of so-called ‘automatic stabilizers’ that were activated through regionally differentiated economic fluctuations rather than through direct political intervention (MacKay 1995). and requiring high-income regions to pay higher taxes while receiving lower levels of public support (Kaldor 1970). This interregional redistributive mechanism was generally ‘built in’ to national fiscal and social welfare systems. the growth of its per capita income must not be slower than the national mean’ (Boudeville 1966: 56). as one postwar commentator explained: ‘the poorest region must not turn into a geographical proletariat. In sum. which depicts the model of regional resource transfer among ‘donor regions’ and ‘recipient regions’ that was famously developed by the Cambridge regional economist Nicholas Kaldor (1970). and spatial equalization must thus be viewed as one of the major state spatial strategies through which the regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism was articulated. The overarching purpose of automatic stabilizers was to help marginalized areas absorb the impact of economic shocks while diverting the surplus income of core regions to stabilize the national economy as a whole (MacKay 1995. The logic of automatic stabilization is summarized schematically in Fig. such automatic stabilizers ‘transfer the economic impact of state expenditures and of differences in taxation from one area to another’ (Dunford and Perrons 1994: 169). urban deconcentration. In contrast to explicit regional policies. While the study found that automatic stabilizers . personal taxation levels within each region were calibrated to increase linearly with increases of per capita income. There is an important built-in fiscal stabilizer [ . enabling low-income regions to pay lower taxes while receiving higher levels of government expenditure. . automatically gets ‘aid’ whenever its trading relations with the rest of the country deteriorate. locationally targeted forms of interregional resource transfer. ‘low-income regions enjoy fiscal gains (they pay less in taxes than they receive in services and benefits). Conversely. In the late 1970s. This nationally oriented project of industrial decentralization. As the figure illustrates. 4. Automatic stabilizers A region which forms part of a political community. high-income regions provide support’ (MacKay 1994: 576). a detailed cross-national comparative study known as the MacDougall Report was conducted by the European Commission to examine the impact of automatic stabilizers upon regional income levels in advanced capitalist states (CEC 1977). . with a common scale of public services and a common base of taxation.4 (overleaf). 1994).Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 145 Perrons 1994). ] Nicholas Kaldor (1970: 345) In addition to explicit.

146 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism G (high) T (high) G1 Government expenditure (G) and tax (T) T2 T1 G2 T (low) Region 1 ‘Recipient Region’ (periphery) Region 2 ‘Donor Region’ (core) G (low) Income per capita in different regions Fig. they generated spatially redistributive effects across much of the national territory. and Switzerland). West Germany. In particular. Canada. Kaldor’s model of automatic stabilizers: alleviating uneven development? Source: based on Mackay 1994: 576 generated more explicit regional effects in federal states than in unitary states. it indicated that these mechanisms of interregional resource transfer had reduced regional income inequalities by an average of 40 per cent during the high Fordist period in the countries under investigation—five western European states (West Germany. Just as importantly. . Italy. the UK.4. For this reason. and Italy. automatic stabilizers also served as state spatial strategies insofar as. 4. The MacDougall Report thus concluded that ‘the reality of automatic stabilization is remarkably close to the model’ (MacKay 1994: 577). automatic stabilizers represented one of the key institutional pillars of spatial Keynesianism. similar levels of interregional transfer (at identical income levels) were found to be occurring in the UK. by rechanneling state funds towards less favored or marginalized regions. Automatic stabilizers can be viewed as state spatial projects insofar as they significantly influenced the geographical distribution of governmental expenditures within each national state apparatus. as well as the USA. which otherwise had quite different fiscal systems. and Australia (CEC 1977: 12). France.

a number of western European countries introduced national systems of spatial planning designed to guide future patterns of territorial development in a comprehensive manner. and so forth) that were often distinct from extant administrative jurisdictions. and the Belgian Regional Economic Councils (Keating 1998: 50–1). the Netherlands. Closely analogous. the ´´ Delegation for Regional Development and Territorial Planning (Delegation ´ ´ pour l’Amenagement du Territoire et l’Action Regionale) (see Box 4. by the (short-lived) Department of Economic Affairs. overleaf ). including Germany. by embarking upon a complementary policy for spontaneous development as well as a rational policy intended to stimulate new economic activities. Boudeville (1966: 48) As of the late 1950s and early 1960s. and large-scale territorial management. The paradigmatic exemplar of this new. comprehensive approach to national spatial planning was the French agency.and long-term macroeconomic planning. the ´ French Regional Economic Development Commission (Commission de Devel´ ´ oppement economique regionale—CODER). Such initiatives were generally centralized within newly established governmental ministries devoted specifically to problems of urban development. The point of this lies in the fact that the nation can assist the region. territory-wide approaches to spatial planning were developed by national economic ministries—in the former case. such as Britain and Italy. the English Regional Economic Planning Councils (REPCs). DATAR. if less internationally prominent. classified with reference to basic economic indicators (per capita income. Such programs were viewed as an important extension of medium. on this basis. housing. planning ministries were established in many other western European countries. infrastructural planning. In other European countries. and in the latter case. comprehensive. National spatial planning generally involved efforts to forecast future patterns of national territorial development and. . population distribution.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 147 Nationalized spatial planning systems Economic regionalism was at first national in character. to develop ‘indicative plans’ that would mobilize state resources to influence those patterns through a combination of inducements and restrictions.5. the Italian Regional Economic Planning Committees (CRPEs). by the National Commission for Economic Planning (Wannop 1995). These subnational economic spaces were the key geographical reference points in terms of which future national trends were predicted and the targets for various forms of state regulatory intervention were identified. J. National spatial planning initiatives also entailed strategies for incorporating local and regional interests into national policy agendas. These new systems of spatial planning usually entailed the comprehensive division of each national territory into specific types of regional units. and Sweden.-R. employment levels. often through the establishment of new regional consultative bodies—for instance.

and the South. telecommunications. ] French regional planning was an attempt at injecting some geographical rationality into national economic planning. Thus it involved a centralization of influence. Its remit ‘was to coordinate regional development activities on a national level.148 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Box 4. Ross and Cohen 1975. ] it was to serve as a general center of animation for regional planning. aerospace. and between levels. including the plan- ning and zoning of large-scale industrial estates. DATAR acquired a variety of key roles in managing French national territorial development during the period of high Fordism: . Dezert 1999.5. Because the very rapid economic development that flowed from these planning efforts tended to accentuate regional imbalances already present in France. In France perhaps more than anywhere else in the advanced capitalist world. By establishing a central institutional locus for the coordination of territorial development policies. in conjunction with the Fourth National Plan (1961–4). and oil sectors. coordinating between governmental de- partments involved with any aspect of regional development and spatial planning. on a local level. DATAR was also central to the implementation of the metropoles d’equilibre policies. . It assumed various interministerial functions. It promoted the decentralization of industry and employment away from Paris and into other towns and cities throughout the French territory. . In particular. It was to be the general synthesizing organization for regional planning [ . in this context. tourism development. . the state has come to play a key organizing and energizing role in economic life. not the regionalization or decentralization of power as one might naively have expected. whose goal was likewise to disperse industrial capacities into peripheral towns and regions. Regional planning is perhaps the latest innovation in the dirigiste or ‘neocapitalist’ political economy which emerged in France during the post-World War II years. (Ross and Cohen 1975: 748) DATAR was founded under the Gaullist regime in 1963. DATAR and the rise of nationalized spatial planning in France ´ Sources: Allen and MacLennan 1970. . and the establishment of national parks. the Massif Central. above all in the West. . . It established new regulatory capacities for the shaping of national state space and introduced new forms of knowledge and representation through which developmental trends could be forecast and potentially influenced through state action. ´ . was devoted to the automobile. DATAR played a key role within the regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism in France. the agency was required to advise the government on all matters of regional planning and policy. not an attempt at giving the grass roots more say about economic objectives. promoting activity to keep the planning and execution program thriving wherever such activity was needed’ (Ross and Cohen 1975: 739). It engaged in various forms of indicative planning intended to project and shape future developmental patterns across the national territory. water management. ´ . Responsible to the Prime Minister. Essig 1979. It supervised regional development projects in diverse policy fields. regional planning became a necessary addition to the planning operation [ . . Particular attention. . It introduced the Regional Development fund (Fonds interministerial pour l’amenagement du territoire en France—FIAT) to channel state resources into strategic local public investments.

in financing large-scale industries. Consequently. a continued politicization of regional policy priorities.4). Italy. for both entailed the mobilization of state spatial strategies intended to divert investments away from overheated metropolitan cores into less developed or marginalized areas. Nationalized industries: the public ownership of major Fordist firms While public ownership of major capitalist firms predated the Fordist era. as if they were agencies of the state’ (Vernon 1974: 3). Thus. the public enterprise was intended to operate as a propulsive firm or ‘motor industry’ whose upstream and downstream linkages to other (private) firms would enhance the spatial concentration of investment and employment within marginalized areas of the national territory. During the course of the Fordist period. Most crucially for this discussion. national enterprises were increasingly instrumentalized by national governments ‘in an effort to solve specific problems. ¸ In such cases. Crucial among these problems was that of ensuring ‘the location of more investment and jobs in regions of low employment growth or actual employment decline’ (Holland 1974: 31). For. the French National Plan of 1966. in contrast to the relatively successful outcomes of compensatory regional policies. which were introduced during the high Fordist period to guide macroeconomic growth. automobiles. and a chronic lack of appropriate inducements to influence capitalist firms’ locational decisions (Keating 1998: 48–50). state-owned sectors expanded considerably during and after World War II in a number of western European countries (Holland 1974). However. It was relatively ineffectual in practice due to. national governments were also channeling significant public resources into the places and regions where such industries were located. these indicative planning initiatives were linked directly to national economic plans. shipbuilding. and Sweden. The project of indicative planning therefore overlapped significantly with the agendas of compensatory regional policy. Many of these initiatives were directly inspired by Francois Perroux’s approach to growth poles (see Box 4. nuclear power). and the British National Plan of 1965 all contained specific regional policy prescriptions intended to influence future patterns of territorial development and to alleviate intra-national territorial disparities (Holland 1976b: 50–4). the project of indicative planning proved largely to be a ‘white elephant’ (Holland 1976b: 50–4). energy (oil. state control over public enterprise was mobilized . in a number of prominent cases in France. and aerospace had significant spatial ramifications within many western European states. electricity. steel. among other problems. the difficulty of translating national macroeconomic goals into viable strategies of regional development. among other countries. the Italian national development program or Vanoni Plan of 1954. the nationalization of key Fordist sectors such as coal. gas.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 149 Frequently.

thus much of its fixed capital was damaged extensively during World War II. the IRI reemerged and was mobilized to modernize major national industries. The most comprehensive program to mobilize public enterprise in compensatory regional policy initiatives was embodied in the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI). By the late 1950s. aircraft. b. (Allen 1972: 179) The Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale— IRI) was founded in 1933 as a state-owned holding company responsible for distributing credit and financial assistance to key industrial and service firms. its goal was to generate multiplier effects that would influence private economic activity as well. Holland 1972a. redistributive approach to regional policy grounded simultaneously upon growth pole theory and public enterprise. Box 4. and total IRI employment (including services) increased by 63 per cent during the same period (Allen 1972: 174–5). telecommunications. During the subsequent decade. the IRI’s decision to construct an Alfa-Romeo car plant in Naples was subsequently followed by plant construction programs in the South by the private car companies FIAT and Pirelli (Holland 1972a: 26). cars. The IRI thus represented a classic instance of a compensatory. transport. and railways. Unlike many approaches to public enterprise that prevailed in western Europe. The IRI’s contribution to regional development in the South has been so large that it raises the question whether other countries with serious regional problems would be advised to create a similar institution with a similar obligation to assist the economies of their less prosperous areas. the IRI acquired a prominent role in stimulating industrial relocation into the southern Mezzogiorno region. industrial machinery. . the IRI played a major role in financing military production. shipbuilding. By promoting strategic relocations within public enterprises.6. electrical engineering. highway construction. Following the war. including steel.150 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism explicitly in regional policy initiatives as a means to divert investments into marginalized areas. In this manner. These policies generated significant regional consequences. electronics. The IRI’s manufacturing employment levels in the South increased by 82 per cent between 1960 and 1969. a state holding company that directed largescale industrial investments into Italy’s traditionally underdeveloped South (see Box 4. and thus likewise channel investment into underdeveloped zones of the national territory. The IRI’s investments were spread broadly among multiple sectors. the ‘IRI formula’ attempted to integrate state control and market forces. the IRI attempted to generate ‘follow-my-leader’ geographical effects in which private firms linked to those sectors would replicate their locational patterns. Thus the IRI generally controlled significantly less than 100 per cent capacity in the sectors in which it operated. In one prominent example. and it generally controlled less than a total shareholding.6). Public enterprise as a means of regional policy: the case of the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) Sources: Allen 1972. the IRI had been transformed into a public agency holding majority shares in key industrial and service firms. The IRI engaged in economic planning by attempting to steer investment into propulsive firms within multiple sectors.

Germany. the existence of such state-financed industrial investments significantly enhanced employment levels and economic capacities within many marginalized localities and regions. which also generated significant consequences for regional industrial and employment growth. at Vasteras in the underdeveloped North (Holland 1972b: 261). these regulations were modified so that 100 per cent of investment in new factories and 60 per cent of total investment by public enterprises was required to be located in the South or in other marginalized areas (Holland 1974: 33). other western European national governments likewise utilized their control over public enterprises to promote this agenda through a variety of policy mechanisms. After another protracted struggle. shipbuilding. For instance. . . The Swedish parliament followed the example of the Italian IRI by estab¨ lishing a state holding company (Statsforetag) in 1970 to influence investments in various sectors. the Italian national government passed a law ‘requiring stateowned enterprises to locate 40 per cent of their existing investments and 60 per cent of their new investments in the Mezzogiorno’ (Grassini 1981: 76). The following examples illustrate some of the ways in which state control over public enterprise could operate as a form of regional policy: . such as Britain. insofar as they established an entirely new layer of state-financed economic activity within inherited spatial divisions of labor. and Italy. One of its expressed goals was also to promote new employment opportunities. In a number of western European countries. particularly in the defense sector. The French national planning agency DATAR played a key role in influencing the locational geographies of public enterprises throughout France. the French national car company Renault was forced by DATAR to build a new electrical foundry in Brittany rather than in Paris. in 1971. DATAR succeeded in influencing the French national government to require Renault to build a new assembly plant near the harbor of Nantes. More generally. In 1957. including mining. following lengthy negotiations. along with another assembly plant in Le Havre.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 151 While the IRI was unique in the degree to which it explicitly promoted intranational industrial relocation. However. even in instances in which national governments did not attempt explicitly to influence the locational decisions of public enterprises. and banking. closer to existing production facilities in Normandy (Anastossopoulos 1981). public enterprises formed a crucial element within the broader political and economic geographies of spatial Keynesianism (Martin and Sunley 1997: 280). These laws regulated the activities of the IRI as well as all other statecontrolled investment groups. . such as railways and highways. In 1968. state enterprises played a key role in constructing largescale transportation infrastructures.

local states were instrumentalized in order ‘to carry out a national strategy based on a commitment to regional balance and even growth’ (Goodwin and Painter 1996: 646). the representative functions of local government meant that the relatively consensual social democratic politics char- . This centralization of intergovernmental authority occurred in close conjunction with the consolidation of a ‘nationwide approach’ to state power in which governmental institutions were organized primarily for the ‘routine nationwide organization and delivery of services of the welfare state: health. In order to standardize the provision of welfare services and to coordinate national economic policies. Centrally financed local welfare policies also constituted important elements of the social wage. transportation. The centralization of intergovernmental relations and nationwide systems of public service delivery during the postwar period entailed the increasing subsumption of municipal and regional state institutions within nationally organized institutional hierarchies. local government was involved in widespread planning and regulatory activity. national states centralized the instruments for regulating urban development. nationwide public services accounted for over two-thirds of total public expenditure among western European national governments (Rose 1985: 17–18). local government provided a range of services whose production was unprofitable for capital under existing technical and organizational conditions. Meny and Wright 1985). social services. all of which were intended to replicate certain minimum standards of social welfare and infrastructure provision across the national territory (Harvey 1989a. Castells 1977). Finally. pensions and other income-maintenance programmes.152 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Intergovernmental centralization and urban managerialism The postwar period witnessed an unprecedented centralization of intergovern´ mental relations throughout western Europe (Rose 1985. . and post and telephone communications’ (Rose 1985: 13–14). public transport. but for which there was a political demand. This included land-use and resource planning and environmental health regulation. thereby transforming local states into transmission belts for centrally determined policies and programs. Under these conditions. In this manner. and other public goods. By the early 1970s. Within this managerial framework of urban governance. education. states or regions were merely administrative units that channeled the growth and distributed the blessings of Fordist modernization evenly all over the nation’ (Mayer 1991: 107). . ] Secondly. This principle of universal provision of a range of basic services is one hallmark of the Fordist era [ . Painter (1991: 28) summarizes the key operations of the managerial local state under Fordism as follows: Firstly. the overarching function of state institutions at the urban scale was the reproduction of the labor force through public investments in housing. and thus contributed significantly to the generalization of the mass consumption practices upon which the Fordist regime of accumulation was contingent (Goodwin and Painter 1996: 641). ‘[l]ocal governments functioned as subordinate agencies.

whereas no centralized regulation of the process is being set up in the economic [level]. . . managerial local states also served as key institutional arenas in which the crisis and eventual breakdown of the Fordist regime of accumulation would be articulated. part of the process of consumption. It is here that the ‘urban problematic’ sends down its roots [ . and welfare services) to be locally scaled (Fig. since it intervenes in direct aid to the large economic groups that dominate that process. Despite his otherwise deep theoretical differences with Castells. electoral levels of the state while production interventions gravitate towards higher level corporatist institutions’. In sum. ‘The expansion . the nationalization of state space proceeded in significant part through the instrumentalization of municipal state institutions to implement centrally determined policy agendas. While Saunders emphasized the nationally specific patterns in which this formation of state power was articulated. Saunders (1985: 302) likewise postulated a scalar division of state regulation in which ‘consumption interventions [tend] to be focused on local. however. . ] Thus we shall witness a takeover by the state of vast sectors of the production of means essential to the reproduction of labour power: health. This conceptualization of the postwar scalar division of state regulation was further specified by Saunders (1985) in his well-known ‘dual politics’ thesis. political and ideological levels. ] Since the state is taking charge of considerable. Western European managerial local states thus formed a key institutional pillar within the broader regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism. overleaf ). since consumption is becoming a central cog in the economic. . the state becomes the veritable arranger of the processes of consumption as a whole: this is at the root of so-called ‘urban politics’. . housing. education. the continued expansion of local government services was subjected to intense political criticism from the Right. ] Thus as a key component of the welfare state. 4. Just as crucially. etc. .5. Consequently. neoconservative. his analysis nonetheless underscored a broad tendency for policies oriented towards social reproduction (for instance. As the institutional edifice of the Keynesian welfare national state was increasingly destabilized. With the onset of economic stagnation and recession during the course of the 1970s. collective amenities. the state’s role in the promotion of collective consumption was the very essence of urban politics within state monopoly capitalism: The state apparatus intervenes in a massive. systematic.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 153 acteristic of Fordism could find partial expression at the local level [ . permanent and structurally necessary way in the process of consumption [ . local government was central to the Fordist mode of regulation [ . education. housing. and objectively socialized. and monetarist pressures for state fiscal retrenchment intensified. neoliberal. throughout the postwar period. For Castells (1977: 459). . . ] This pervasive localization of the state’s collective consumption functions under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism was famously theorized by Castells (1977) in his structuralist discussion of the urban question.

in the western European context they served chiefly as a means to facilitate and . education. of local government during the early 1970s fed into a crisis of regulation rather than contributing to a successful mode of regulation’ (Goodwin and Painter 1996: 642). New towns policies and state-subsidized suburbanization The location. character and size of New Towns must be examined within the framework of national policy for the settlement system. Consumption sector interests Public service: citizenship rights Policy arenas Social base Dominant ideology Fig. italics in original) Inspired in part by Ebenezer Howard’s concept of garden cities. above all around London. Saunders’s ‘dual state’ thesis: mapping the scalar division of state regulation under spatial Keynesianism Source: dervied fron Saunders 1985: 306. Such a national policy would aim at the creation of a suitable hierarchy of settlements based on the criterion of functional integration of settlement units at different levels of economy (Galantay 1980: 25. 4. welfare-oriented functions of municipal governments have been significantly reconfigured since the breakdown of North Atlantic Fordism in the early 1970s. see also Saunders 1979. As the Fordist pattern of urbanization matured during the course of the 1960s.5. and to counteract urban sprawl by establishing suburban new towns in relatively close proximity to major urban centers. number. As we shall see in the next chapter. Class interests Capitalist: private property rights LOCAL STATE Promotion of social reproduction and delivery of public services Public transportation. housing. and Brazil as a form of compensatory regional industrial policy. regional planning policies. health services. Eastern Europe. social welfare. etc. the managerial. and passim. recreational planning. etc. new towns were established near major British cities. labor relations. While new towns were established in the Soviet Union. immediately following World War II (Osborne and Whittick 1977).154 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism NATIONAL STATE Function Promotion and regulation of capitalist production Industrial policy. to expand housing infrastructures. a number of western European national governments likewise attempted to alleviate urban congestion. unemployment policies.

were subsequently constructed with considerable state financial aid through a variety of public or quasi-public agencies. Corby in the East Midlands. Edinburgh. Other components of the framework were intended to reduce metropolitan-wide population densities by encouraging residential decentralization. Skelmersdale outside Liverpool.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 155 coordinate the ongoing decentralization of industry and population beyond core metropolitan areas. see Merlin 1971. among others. large-scale green belts were also established around many urban areas (Osborne and Whittick 1977). new towns were introduced with the explicit goal of creating new economic centers in previously underdeveloped areas. Examples of this trend included Mourenx in southwestern France. the New Towns Act of 1946 established a national legal and administrative framework for the construction of new towns in suburban zones during much of the Fordist period. As of 1958. Stockholm. and Peterlee in northern England. or grands ensembles. Liverpool. However. and Birmingham. Golany 1978): . Bateman. The French new towns program was developed following World War II to address an increasingly serious housing crisis. Washington. . a ´ number of priority development areas (Zones d’Urbanisme en Priorite—ZUPs) were delineated throughout the Paris region—including Aulnay-Sevran. Large-scale housing estates. Burtenshaw. and the Dutch Randstad delineated particular axes along which development was to be channeled and specific growth nodes into which population settlement was to be concentrated (Burtenshaw. while over a half million people moved into the new towns during the two decades following World War II. Merlin 1971: 243–4. To this end. the majority of new towns policies in postwar western Europe were intended to subsidize and plan the process of suburban development. Cardiff. . and Ashworth 1981). Bateman. Newcastle. Thus large-scale urban planning initiatives in London. Major national examples of new towns policies included the following (for an overview. Wulfen and Marl in the northern Ruhr district of Germany. 15 Clout 1981b: 50. Copenhagen. In Britain. Manchester. particularly around large urban centers. these settlements absorbed only a relatively minimal proportion of total population growth within major British metropolitan regions (Merlin 1971: 59). It established New Town Development Corporations to guide the growth of new towns and introduced various financial incentives and restrictions intended to influence firms to decentralize their investments outside the most congested urban cores. In conjunction with the planning of suburban new towns. Newton Aycliffe. and Ashworth 1981: 280. and Luossavaara-Kiiruna in northern Sweden. Cwmbran in South Wales. new forms of public infrastructure and housing were planned and eventually constructed outside London and other major cities such as Glasgow.15 However. Paris. In a number of western European cases. Wolfsburg in Germany’s Lower Saxony region. the German Ruhr zone. Salzgitter in the German Harz mountains. England.

infrastructural facilities. they promoted a dispersion of industrial investment. monoindustrial zones and peripheral regions. Smaller grands ensembles were subsequently established at the fringes of other major French towns as well as. For the most part. Dronten. and Rouen-Le Havre. . and Amsterdam. and population within major Fordist industrial regions rather than across the entire national territory of Fordist-Keynesian states. in a few cases. and Emmeloord were also constructed on reclaimed land in the polder zones of the Zuider Zee. relatively selfcontained urban centers that were to be constructed along two preferential axes running along a southeast to northwest arc roughly parallel to the Seine beyond the city’s most densely developed core. new towns policies likewise acquired considerable prominence during the postwar period (Constandse 1978). major new towns such as Almere. Nantes. To be sure. The priority of constructing and regulating new towns was also reflected in national policies and integrated directly into the Sixth and Seventh National Plans of 1971–5 and 1976–80. and Massy-Antony—in which such residential clusters were to be concentrated (Merlin 1971: 142. during this period the earlier ZUPs were replaced by concerted development zones (Zones ´ ´ d’Amenagement Concertee—ZACs) in order to channel both private capital investment and governmental subsidies into the new towns (Rubenstein 1978). Scargill 1983). In addition. the Hague. Broadly analogous master plans were subsequently introduced for Lyon.156 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism ´ Creteil. on expanding regional transportation infrastructures. Nancy. Nonetheless. which was introduced through the Second Report on Physical Planning of 1966. contained an explicit agenda of counteracting suburban sprawl and preserving open spaces. Lelystad. both within and beyond the western Randstad megalopolis. All were intended to forecast emergent urbanization patterns and demographic trends. which demarcated a constellation of new. The Dutch approach to new towns was thus focused above all on channeling residential investments beyond the city cores. Vitry. insofar as western European new towns . It attempted to achieve these goals in part through the establishment of new towns in close proximity to major urban cores. on coordinating urban development and preserving open space within the Randstad’s ‘Green Heart’. to establish a new planning framework through which appropriate infrastructures for housing and transportation could be established. and on this basis. The French new towns program was significantly expanded in 1965 following the introduction of a master plan for urban development in ´ ´ ´ the Paris region (Schema Directeur d’Amenagement et d’Urbanisme de la Region Parisienne—SDAURP). and on managing demographic expansion throughout the national territory. In the Netherlands. the decentralization initiatives embodied in new towns policies were articulated at a more circumscribed scale than the types of regional policies discussed above. In addition to overspill towns or ‘growth towns’ in immediate proximity to Rotterdam. The previously mentioned project of ‘concentrated deconcentration’. in relatively marginal.

they must be viewed as key spatial strategies through which the regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism was articulated. Lefevre 1998: 14–16. redistributive systems of spatial planning. Among the major metropolitan institutions established during this period in western Europe were the Greater London Council (1963). The establishment of larger units of urban territorial administration was viewed as a means to rationalize welfare . Leeds. the Rijnmond or Greater Rotterdam Port Authority (1964).Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 157 policies were mobilized in significant measure through national governmental initiatives. Liverpool. as Fordist urban regions expanded beyond the inherited boundaries of traditional industrial city cores. Sheffield. coordinating administrative tiers within the centralized hierarchies of intergovernmental relations that prevailed under spatial Keynesianism. Moreover. Sharpe 1995a). Thus. ˚ the Greater Copenhagen Council (Hovedstadsradet) (1974). their broad diffusion in the western European context must be understood above all in relation to the distinctive types of state spatial strategies that emerged under the Fordist-Keynesian configuration of capitalist development. the Stuttgart Regional Association (Regionalverband Stuttgart) (1972). and Newcastle (1974). Lille. diverse types of consolidated metropolitan institutions were established in a number of major western European city-regions. the metropolitan counties in British cities such as Manchester. and spatial redistribution within the nationally organized macroeconomic policy frameworks of the ` Keynesian welfare national state (Lefevre 1998). Consolidated metropolitan government Within this nationalized system of urban governance. While new towns policies did not disappear with the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism in the early 1970s. the Barce´ lona Metropolitan Corporation (Corporacio Metropolitana de Barcelona) (1974). regional planning. Lyon. regional. Birmingham. the urban commu´ nities (communautes urbaines) in French cities such as Bordeaux. local service provision. Debates on the construction of metropolitan and regional institutions during this era focused predominantly upon the issues of administrative efficiency. and the Ruhr Municipal Agency (Kommunalverband Ruhr) in the Ruhr agglomeration of Germany ` (1975) (see Keating 1998: 55–71. metropolitan political institutions acquired an important mediating role between managerial local states and centrally organized. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. newly established metropolitan institutions came to operate as key. and local scales— attempted to manage the process of urban and suburban development within their territories. new towns policies became crucial regulatory instruments through which state institutions—at once on national. and Strasbourg (1966). the Madrid Metropolitan Area Planning and Coordinating Commission (1963). the Greater Frankfurt Association (Umlandverband Frankfurt) (1974). and were articulated with reference to politically delineated target areas that were dispersed widely across each national territory.

and the extensive seaport zone. including harbor and industrial development. through a range of planning and policy initiatives articulated with reference to the Rotterdam region’s position in the Dutch national spaceeconomy: . and population settlement beyond traditional city cores into suburban fringes. land-use planning and housing construction could be coordinated. and environmental matters. The authority was governed by the Rijnmond Council. which was directly elected by the population of the participating municipalities. or Rijnmond. . infrastructural investment. Metropolitan authorities subsequently acquired important roles in guiding industrial expansion. in a 1969 report to the British government. Housing zones were concentrated within the cities and towns and separated from polluted industrial areas. was established by the Dutch national parliament in 1964 to coordinate urban and regional planning in the large-scale industrial region encompassing Rotterdam. It thus represented ‘a fully-fledged authority. Physical planning programs were mobilized to coordinate the development of the port and other industrial zones and to establish an appropriate functional division of regional space. transportation. recreation. Whereas Rotterdam had previously attempted unsuccessfully to annex many suburban municipalities. which repreBox 4. transportation. its surrounding municipalities. and open space was to be preserved as much as possible. efficient local government (Lefevre 1998: 12. . Rotterdam’s Rijnmond: a typical case of metropolitan governance under spatial Keynesianism Source: Hendriks and Toonen 1995. with a restricted competence’ (Hendriks and Toonen 1995: 152). industrial and commercial locations. . As suburbanization and industrial decentralization proceeded apace during the course of the 1970s. At the same time. Box 4. Keating 1997: 119). The Council could not enact binding laws. metropolitan political institutions came to be justified as a means to establish a closer spatial correspondence between governmental ` structures and functional territories (Lefevre 1998). The Greater Rotterdam port authority. It operated primarily on a voluntary basis.158 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism service provision and to reduce administrative inefficiencies within rapidly expanding urban agglomerations. infrastructural development. Accordingly. housing. the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission maintained that a population of 250.7. and so forth. primarily through the deployment of comprehensive land-use plans and other policy mechanisms to influence intra-metropolitan locational patterns. its more circumscribed remit was to offer guidelines to the municipalities regarding issues of regional concern.7 summarizes the basic features of Rotterdam’s Rijnmond. Numerous consolidated metropolitan institutions were introduced in order to differentiate urban and regional spaces functionally among zones of production. housing. the Rijnmond provided a new institutional framework through which local physical plans (bestemmingsplannen).000 inhabitants was the optimal size threshold for ` effective. metropolitan institutional forms were seen as being analogous to Fordist forms of mass production insofar as they were thought to generate economies of scale in the field of public service provision (Keating 1997: 118).

Additionally. As the Fordist pattern of urbanization accelerated and expanded. 1. and education. a new politics of spatial Keynesianism emerged across western . the Rijnmond assumed an important role in various forms of recreational and environmental policy. state spatial projects insofar as they entailed the construction of new layers of political authority and regulatory capacity within inherited national administrative geographies. sents a typical instance of metropolitan governance within a large-scale Fordist industrial city-region. . . The Rijnmond played a key role in determining the distribution of housing construction throughout the region. It introduced a Regional Economic Plan that contained a vision for infrastructural development in the area. transportation. coordinative role. and transforming political-economic space: they entailed a variety of spatially selective institutional changes and policy initiatives that fundamentally transformed inherited patterns of state spatial organization and intervention. monitored noise and pollution levels. It served as an important institutional relay within the Dutch framework of spatial Keynesianism while also addressing various place-specific regulatory problems that emerged within the Rotterdam port region during the Fordist phase of urbanization. The Rijnmond embodied the large-scale bureaucratic institutions that underpinned processes of urban and regional governance during the Fordist period. In the field of economic development. including unemployment. Summary Four broad generalizations regarding the political geographies of FordistKeynesian capitalism in western Europe may be derived from the preceding analysis. insofar as they were generally harnessed in order to influence land-use and investment patterns within major western European cityregions. At the same time. The Keynesian welfare national states that emerged throughout western Europe during the postwar period were premised upon new ways of organizing. Quotas for housing construction were established at a national scale but exact intra-regional locations were determined by the Rijnmond. It also indirectly addressed various issues related to economic development.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 159 . The problem of regulating and reproducing Fordist forms of urban development figured crucially in the production of these new forms of state space under postwar capitalism. the Rijnmond played a more limited. on the one hand. the consolidated metropolitan governments of this period also provided an important institutional platform for the mobilization of new types of state spatial strategies at urban and regional scales. producing. It coordinated the maintenance of recreational areas. and regulated various aspects of waste management. They represented. Metropolitan governmental institutions appear significantly to have influenced the geographies of state power and urban development during the era of high Fordism. 2.

The politics of spatial Keynesianism signaled a significant intensification of state intervention into processes of urban and regional development. industrial regions. contributed in fundamental ways to the pervasive nationalization of politicaleconomic space that unfolded during this period. above all. to facilitate economic expansion and social reproduction within core urban regions and to disperse socioeconomic capacities and infrastructural investments outwards into suburban areas. Such rule-regimes served at once to subordinate cities and regions to the centralizing regulatory controls of national governments and to position them within nationally configured spatial div- . . During the postwar period. each national state mobilized contextually specific combinations of such state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. These dilemmas included. and population across the entire national territory. as defined in the preceding discussion. controlling the growth of rapidly expanding urban cores. regions. infrastructure. and new towns to outlying areas and rural zones—within relatively uniform. crystallized in some form within all major western European national states between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s. subsidizing and coordinating urban collective consumption. and their precise institutional contours and regulatory orientations frequently became major focal points for political and territorial struggles. The regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism was composed of diverse state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that. cities. taken together. State spatial projects were mobilized in order to centralize regulatory control over local development and to subsume all locational points within the national territory—from cities. To be sure. standardized administrative frameworks. suburbs. 3. 4. National states thus played a key role in constructing. and. securing an appropriate spatial fix for Fordist regional production systems. homogenized. across western Europe. outlying towns. above all. and all other subnational economic spaces were increasingly enclosed within nationalized interscalar rule-regimes. . and reproducing the historically specific sociospatial configurations upon which the Fordist regime of accumulation was grounded. and standardized subnational administrative structures. State spatial strategies were mobilized in order to embed local and regional economies within an encompassing national space-economy and to equalize the distribution of industry. the basic elements of spatial Keynesianism. but mobilized a variety of political strategies intended. regulating. and peripheralized regions. national states not only rationalized. simultaneously. Nonetheless. improving administrative efficiency in metropolitan public service delivery.160 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism Europe in response to some of its major accompanying regulatory dilemmas. In this manner. alleviating newly emergent patterns of uneven development within each national territory.

the mobilization of spatial Keynesianism accelerated. and intensified the nationalization of political life that was unfolding under North Atlantic Fordism. far-reaching ways. and in this manner. spatial Keynesianism arguably represented the historical high-point of twentieth-century state strategies to alleviate uneven geographical development and territorial inequality within national borders. Insofar as intra-national polarization was widely viewed as a significant barrier to stabilized national macroeconomic growth. and the fiscal crisis of Keynesian welfare national states (Armstrong. the decline of traditional Fordist mass production industries. Glyn. and Harrison 1991). stabilizing. they eventually came to define the basic parameters for local political-economic life under the Fordist-Keynesian system. contributed significantly to the establishment of qualitatively new forms of state spatial selectivity. the intensification of economic competition from newly industrializing countries. the project of alleviating spatial disparities and equalizing socioeconomic capacities across the national territory acquired an unprecedented political-economic significance throughout western Europe. the rise of mass unemployment. through the various institutional forms and policy mechanisms outlined above. a number of tumultuous political-economic shifts sent shock-waves through the North Atlantic Fordist configuration of territorial development.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 161 isions of labor. the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary order. land-use patterns. Spatial Keynesianism played a key role in producing. and reproducing the distinctive urban built environments. most crucially. Indeed. in a trialand-error manner. the increasing saturation of Fordist mass consumption markets. The crisis of North Atlantic Fordism and the collapse of spatial Keynesianism the old Fordist mechanisms were developed to regulate the interaction of regional economies within a single nation state rather than the interaction of interdependent regional and national economies in Europe. regional agglomeration economies. the eruption of the 1973 oil crisis. deepened. The politics of spatial Keynesianism thus shaped the institutional landscapes of postwar capitalism in profound. and nationwide infrastructural networks associated with Fordist urbanization. These developments significantly destabilized the interscalar arrangements on which the Fordist-Keynesian political-economic order was organized—national regulation of the wage relation and international regulation of currency and trade (Peck and Tickell 1994). The deregulation of financial markets and the global credit system since the collapse of the Bretton . Mick Dunford and Diane Perrons (1994: 170) During the early 1970s. These included. While these interscalar rule-regimes were constructed. At the same time.

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Woods system in 1973 undermined the viability of nationally organized demand management and monetary policies. Meanwhile, the intensified globalization of production, inter-capitalist competition, and financial flows diminished the capacity of Keynesian welfare national states to treat their territorial economies as if they were self-enclosed, quasi-autarchic economic spaces (Agnew and Corbridge 1994; Jessop 2002). Under these circumstances, as Dunford (1994: 102) explains:
The connection between a national model of productivity growth and national macroeconomic mechanisms was weakened: in the [Fordist] past, wages paid in a particular country were also a major determinant of demand for the products of firms located in that country; with internationalization, wages appeared increasingly as nothing more than a cost to be minimized. As successive governments adopted monetarist strategies, demand stagnated. World demand is just the sum of demand in each individual nation, however, and so as countries copied one another, world demand stagnated and the recession was internationalized.

The global economic recession persisted into the 1980s, and processes of deindustrialization spread throughout the older industrialized world. Growth rates continued to plunge during this decade even as monetarist and neoliberal regulatory strategies superseded the traditional Keynesian formula of promoting full employment, institutionalizing demand management, and guaranteeing national social welfare (Fig. 4.6). Taken together, these trends heralded the dissolution of the Fordist developmental regime, the systematic
1960−8 Real GDP Real GDP per head Civilian employment in manufacturing Civilian employment in services Real GDP per person employed Real value added in manufacturing per person employed Real value added in services per person employed 4.7 3.8 0.5 1.7 4.6 5.2 1968−73 4.8 4.2 0.6 1.9 4.3 5.6 1973−9 2.5 2.1 − 0.9 1.7 2.4 3.1 1979−89 2.2 1.9 −1.2 2.1 1.6 2.6

3.0

3.2

1.7

0.6

Fig. 4.6. The end of the ‘golden age’? Output, employment, and productivity growth in the EU, 1960–89: average annual percentage rates of growth
Source: Dunford 1994: 101, using data derived from OECD 1991.

Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism

163

collapse of the interscalar arrangements upon which the postwar regulatory order had been grounded, and the dramatic proliferation of rescaling processes throughout the North Atlantic zone (Fig. 4.7).16 For present purposes, my concern is to summarize the ways in which the political-economic and scalar transformations of the 1970s destabilized the regulatory system of spatial Keynesianism that had been established in western Europe and opened up a political space in which alternative approaches to the regulation of capitalist urbanization could be mobilized. In this context, four distinct but closely intertwined processes of political-economic restructuring are of particular relevance.

Spatial scale(s) of regulation Global

Regulatory tensions and contradictions underlying the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism International financial instability intensifies following the crisis of the Bretton Woods system in 1971; intensified competition from newly industrialized countries threatens US global economic hegemony and contributes to the formation of a new international division of labor The internationalization of capital accelerates, undermining the viability of Keynesian demand-management strategies and macroeconomic policies. Domestic macroeconomic problems are transmitted globally With the decline of Fordist mass production systems, deindustrialization deepens, leading in turn to mass unemployment. Consequently, national governments experience extensive fiscal crises under conditions of declining control over interest rates and intensifying domestic distributional conflicts New forms of intra-national uneven development emerge and classical approaches to territorial redistribution become increasingly ineffectual; fiscal retrenchment shrinks local budgetary resources and intergovernmental conflicts intensify As national fiscal crises worsen, local welfarism is undermined. Urban social exclusion and sociospatial polarization intensify

Global− national relations

National

National−local relations

Local

Fig. 4.7. The crisis of North Atlantic Fordism and the destabilization of state scalar configurations
Source: derived from Peck and Tickell 1994: 300–2.
16 For general overviews of these transformations and their geographical consequences, see Swyngedouw 1992a; Soja 1989; and Brenner and Theodore 2002a. The character of these ruptures, and their implications for the future trajectory of capitalist development, remain a matter of intense academic controversy. Useful overviews of the major positions in these debates can be found in Albritton et al. 2001; Boyer and Drache 1996; and A. Amin 1994. See Crouch and Streeck 1997 for an overview of different national trajectories of restructuring during the post-1970s period.

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1. The decline and restructuring of mass production industries. The traditional mass production industries upon which the Fordist growth dynamic was grounded—such as steel, petrochemicals, machine tools, appliances, shipbuilding, and the like—contracted and declined as of the early 1970s due to a combination of intensified international competition, market saturation, and accelerated technological change (Lipietz 1987). Unemployment rates skyrocketed as a wave of plant closings, layoffs, and industrial relocations swept across the western European economic landscape (Coriat and Petit 1991). Although revitalized, neo-Fordist forms of mass production eventually crystallized within these sectors in a number of European manufacturing regions, their industrial output and their share of total employment were markedly diminished relative to the levels associated with the high Fordist period. In the wake of these shifts, many of the boom regions of European Fordism, such as the English Midlands and the German Ruhr district, experienced long-lasting crises that were manifested in mass unemployment, social upheaval, infrastructural decay, and extensive ecological degradation (Albrechts and Swyngedouw 1989). The decline of Fordist industries also had a profound impact upon more economically diversified metropolitan regions, such as London, Paris, Hamburg, and Milan, which confronted analogous problems within their traditional manufacturing sectors. Whereas Fordist systems of production have in no way disappeared from the western European economic landscape, they have been profoundly restructured during the last three decades, as the socio-institutional conditions for maintaining industrial competitiveness in the manufacturing sector have been reconstituted under a new geoeconomic configuration (Benko and Dunford 1991; Martinelli and Schoenberger 1991). These developments presented major dilemmas for the forms of territorial redistribution that had been introduced during the Fordist-Keynesian period. Spatial Keynesianism targeted relatively underdeveloped regions as the key geographical focal points for redistributive public subsidies. Throughout the postwar period, large-scale manufacturing regions were viewed as economic spaces in which continued industrial development and social prosperity could be presupposed unproblematically. However, following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism, this widespread equation of core city-regions with consistent economic growth, permanent full employment, and stable demographic expansion became increasingly problematic. Instead, a new configuration of territorial development began to crystallize in which (a) cities and regions across each national territory were restructured according to their relative positions within supranational spatial divisions of labor; and (b) new forms of territorial inequality were superimposed upon inherited national patterns of core–periphery polarization. Within this transformed economic landscape, in which all major local and regional economies were undergoing systematic, highly disruptive transformations, the project of alleviating intra-national uneven development through national state intervention was

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significantly complicated. For, in contrast to the Fordist territorial configuration, in which spaces of growth, spaces of decline, and lagging areas appeared to be separated neatly among distinct geographical zones within each national territory, these different types of spaces were now being superimposed and interlinked at all geographical scales (Veltz 1997: 84). During the course of the 1970s, a number of western European countries attempted to confront this situation by including declining industrial cities on the list of target areas for redistributive territorial policies. Yet, as economic stagnation persisted and national budgets were further squeezed, the viability of promoting spatial equalization at a national scale was widely called into question. 2. The rise of flexible production systems. As traditional manufacturing sectors declined, productivity, output, and employment began to expand significantly in newer industrial sectors grounded upon flexible or lean production systems. These flexible production systems have been characterized by (a) the use of nondedicated machinery and multi-skilled labor at the firm level, (b) expanding social divisions of labor, dense subcontracting relationships, and short-term contracts at the inter-firm level, and (c) increasing product differentiation in the sphere of circulation (Storper and Scott 1989). Although flexible production methods have had a profound impact upon labor practices and industrial organization throughout the advanced industrial economies (Moody 1996), they have been particularly prevalent within three broad sectoral clusters— high-technology industry, advanced producer and financial services, and revitalized craft production (Scott and Storper 1992). Additionally, during the last three decades, flexible production methods have been introduced into traditional mass production sectors such as automobiles, as large firms have mobilized new strategies in order to enhance efficiency, to bolster market share, and to externalize risks in an increasingly turbulent geoeconomic environment. Such strategies have generally involved the construction of new spatial divisions of labor in which (a) command and control functions are centralized at selected headquarters locations, (b) low-cost production facilities are dispersed outwards through global sourcing arrangements, and (c) other major production functions are subcontracted or outsourced to diverse supplier networks (Nilsson and Schamp 1996). These organizational changes have been facilitated through advanced information technologies that provide ‘new opportunities for increased flexibility in the production process and [ . . . ] new options to customize products and production’ (Nilsson and Schamp 1996: 122). The nature of the industrial divide between Fordist production systems and their putative successor(s) remains a matter of considerable dispute (A. Amin 1994; Gertler 1992; Lovering 1995). The crucial point here is that, during the last three decades, the firms and regions associated with these flexibly organized, high-technology sectors have come to account for an increasing proportion of industrial output and employment in major western European economies (Storper 1996). As in other zones of the world economy, the crys-

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tallization of flexible production systems in the western European context has been particularly evident in so-called ‘neo-Marshallian industrial districts’, where small- and medium-sized firms have traditionally dominated the local economic fabric and where mass production technologies were never widely adopted (Sabel 1994; Scott 1988). In addition to these new industrial spaces, flexible production systems and high-technology industrial clusters have also acquired prominence within and around major European global cities such as ¨ London, Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Zurich, and Milan. Here, large transnational corporations rely extensively upon local webs of producer and financial services industries that are generally organized in flexible, decentralized forms (Amin and Thrift 1992; Sassen 1993). The postwar project of spatial Keynesianism entailed various top-down political strategies to establish standardized socioeconomic assets, integrated policy frameworks, uniform institutional forms, and territory-encompassing infrastructural arrangements across the entire national space-economy. However, with the crystallization of flexible production systems, corporate and political elites have come to emphasize the importance of customized, specialized, and place-specific conditions of production within local and regional economies as a means to secure global competitive advantages. As Veltz (1997: 79) explains:
Economic development is increasingly ‘systemic’ and presumes highly specific conditions in the environment, in the production and use of techniques and in competencies. Whereas in Taylorist-Fordist mass production, territory mainly appeared as a stock of generic resources (raw materials, labour), nowadays it increasingly underpins a process of the creation of specialized resources. Competitiveness among nations, regions and cities proceeds less from static endowments as in classical comparative-advantage theories, than from their ability to produce new resources, not necessarily material ones, and to set up efficient configurations in terms of costs, quality of goods or services, velocity and innovation.

As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the increasingly widespread demand for place-specific regulatory, institutional, and infrastructural arrangements is to be interpreted less as the reflection of inexorable economic requirements than as the expression of newly emergent political strategies intended to position particular subnational economic spaces within supranational circuits of capital accumulation. In the present context, the key point is that the diffusion of flexible production systems across the western European spaceeconomy has helped to create a political-economic environment in which the traditional, compensatory regulatory strategies associated with spatial Keynesianism are considered increasingly obsolete. 3. The globalization and integration of European economic space. The aforementioned sectoral realignments have occurred in close conjunction with an intensified globalization and supranational integration of the European spaceeconomy. Since the early 1980s, European national economies have been fused

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together through the institutions of the European Community and, subsequently, the European Union (EU). With the consolidation of the Single European Market (SEM) and the resultant abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in 1993, international trade and foreign direct investment among the EU member states’ economies were further accelerated. These developments, coupled with the deregulation of the financial sector and the process of European monetary integration, have significantly enhanced the mobility of capital within the EU states, reduced transaction costs, and intensified inter-firm competition for European market shares (Leyshon and Thrift 1995). Consequently, ‘companies are increasingly restructuring themselves to serve the European market as a whole rather than a set of national markets. They eliminate national headquarters and have just a European headquarters; they have European-wide marketing strategies; and they streamline their product range and concentrate their production’ (Cheshire and Gordon 1995: 109). Meanwhile, non-European foreign direct investment has also increased throughout the European economic zone, above all in the United Kingdom, ¨ France, the Netherlands, and Germany (Dicken and Oberg 1996; Amin and Malmberg 1994). Through a combination of mergers and acquisitions, the formation of international strategic alliances, and new greenfield investments, North American and Japanese corporations, among others, have become major players in European economies, competing directly with European firms for national market shares. Dunford (1994: 106) reports that ‘direct overseas investment in EU countries reached $98.4 billion [in the early 1990s] compared with $14.8 billion in the 1980s, increasing some three times faster than gross domestic fixed capital formation in most of the large EU economies’. Major European corporations have likewise internationalized their activities to become an important source of foreign direct investment in North America, Japan, and Europe itself. Cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances among European firms have also significantly intensified as of the 1980s (Amin and Malmberg 1994). In short, during the last three decades, a ‘tidal wave of massive organizational ¨ and geographical restructuring’ (Dicken and Oberg 1996: 115) has been under way within western Europe as major European, North American, and Japanese firms compete aggressively for market positions within the European economy while struggling to adjust to rapid geoeconomic fluctuations. As a result of these developments, places throughout the EU are being embedded ever more directly in the ‘hyperspace’ of transnational corporate capital (Swyngedouw 1989). Even in the midst of the deepening localization and agglomeration tendencies associated with the proliferation of flexible production systems and processes of global city formation, the economic vitality of cities and regions has come to hinge still more directly upon their positions within international corporate geographies (Amin and Malmberg 1994; Amin and Thrift 1994). The politics of spatial Keynesianism were oriented towards the patterns of core–periphery polarization that had emerged during the Fordist period within

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relatively autocentric national economies and extensively nationalized urban systems. Within this framework, territorial inequality was expressed, above all, in the form of a divide between expanding industrial city cores and relatively underdeveloped rural peripheries. However, post-1980s patterns of globalization and Europeanization have destabilized this pyramid-shaped model of territorial organization by (a) embedding national economies within European and global spatial divisions of labor; (b) expanding the geographic scope of transnational corporate activities; and (c) enhancing the significance of horizontal linkages among large metropolitan regions situated in different national territories (Veltz 1997: 83). As Veltz (1996) indicates, within this ‘archipelago economy’ metropolitan city cores are being delinked from their immediate hinterlands and connected instead to a transnational inter-urban network. In this new geoeconomic context, the project of generating spread effects within a single national territory, as had been envisioned by postwar regional economists such as Myrdal and Hirschman, has become increasingly problematic. As Holland (1976a: 39) already recognized in the 1970s, multinational corporations have little reason to cooperate with the regional development priorities of their host countries; they thus contribute very little to the spreading of industrial capacities beyond the major metropolitan centers in which their own operations are located. More generally, by undermining the territorial and functional coherence of national economies, contemporary processes of globalization and European integration have at once enhanced sociospatial polarization at a variety of spatial scales and undermined inherited national political strategies for alleviating the latter (Veltz 2000). 4. The crisis of the Keynesian welfare national state. The Keynesian welfare national states that had been consolidated throughout postwar western Europe underwent a major crisis during the course of the 1970s (Jessop 2002). The geoeconomic trends outlined above undermined the viability of traditional Keynesian macroeconomic objectives such as full employment, price stability, and sustained economic growth while also generating major new regulatory problems such as rising unemployment, growing public debt, decaying public infrastructures, and shrinking state budgets. Subsequently, a variety of postKeynesian regulatory experiments were mobilized whose aggregate effect, by the late 1980s, was to erode the institutional foundations of the postwar welfare state and to establish a more fragmented, multitiered, and market-oriented regime of state regulation than previously existed (Cerny 1995). At different times and speeds in western Europe, the redistributive mandate of the welfare state was superseded by a new framework of political imperatives, such as promoting structural competitiveness, labor market flexibility, efficient public management, and permanent innovation. In this new political regime, labor is treated primarily as a cost of production in world markets rather than as a source of (domestic) consumer demand; accordingly, social policy is increasingly subordinated to the priority of maintaining labor market flexibility in a global context (Jessop 1993; Mayer 1994). Meanwhile, the demand-side polit-

have been subordinated to supply-side agendas intended to enhance the flexibility of markets. Second. Consequently. Consequently. which were now widely represented as an unnecessary interference in market relations. In this manner. the crisis and retrenchment of the Keynesian welfare state occurred under conditions in which demands for state aid were significantly increased while tax revenues were shrinking. and finally. the postwar view of socio-territorial inequality as a barrier to stable macroeconomic growth was called into question. or. Intra-national spatial disparities were increasingly reinterpreted as unavoidable preconditions and consequences of market-driven growth rather than being seen as regulatory problems in their own right (Brenner and Theodore 2002a). redefined. and traditional forms of compensatory regional policy. fiscal policy.2. the establishment of multiscalar regulatory arrangements within post-Keynesian competition states introduced a further complication for inherited forms of spatial Keynesianism. The project of promoting territorial redistribution within the national territory was thus widely dismissed as an obsolete remnant of an earlier. disagreement. Fig. Drawing on the stylized conceptualization of spatial Keynesianism that was presented in Fig. gentler configuration of political-economic life. 2 above. Within these newly emergent institutional hierarchies stretching from the EU downwards to regional and municipal governments. First. national states are no longer the singular. processes of welfare state retrenchment during the 1980s significantly destabilized the politico-institutional foundations for spatial Keynesianism. were scaled back. and sectors and to construct advanced communications and transportation infrastructures for transnational corporations (Torfing 1999).8 (overleaf) provides a schematic representation . western Europe has witnessed the widespread consolidation of competition states. 4. there has been considerable confusion. in some cases. like other forms of social policy. dismantled. This transformation of inherited forms of state regulation necessarily had major implications for the politics of spatial Keynesianism across western Europe. The national scale is no longer taken for granted as the primary level on which the regulation of capitalist territorial development should occur (Keating 1998). the rise of New Right and neoliberal political agendas in many western European states entailed an aggressive ideological assault upon many established forms of state redistribution. Therefore. such as employment policy. causing its various regulatory components to be weakened. 4. coupled with the aforementioned geoeconomic trends. predominant scale of political-economic governance and territorial redistribution. firms. as outlined in general terms in Ch. Third. The availability of public funds for redistributive spatial policies was thus severely constrained. and debate regarding the appropriate scale at which such projects should be mobilized. and monetary policy.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 169 ical programs that prevailed within the Keynesian welfare state. even in national contexts in which political support for projects of spatial equalization has persisted.

This undermines the project of establishing a generic. Uneven spatial development is increasingly reinterpreted as a necessary basis for macroeconomic growth rather than as a potential barrier to the latter Fig.170 Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES The national scale is promoted as the most essential level of political-economic life Emergent contradictions: SCALAR DIMENSION State regulatory capacities are centralized around the national scale Emergent contradictions: • As the crisis of Fordism deepens. Urban cores can no longer be equated with continuous economic growth. 4. The lack of a privileged scale of state power seriously complicates the attempt to alleviate intra-national patterns of uneven development Redistributive policies are mobilized in order to equalize the distribution of industry and infrastructure investment across the national space-economy Emergent contradictions: TERRITORIAL DIMENSION Relatively uniform structures of territorial administration are established throughout the national space-economy Emergent contradictions: • With the decline of Fordist manufacturing industries. place-specific regulatory problems. stretching from the European and national levels to the regional and local levels. Emergent contradictions of spatial Keynesianism during the 1970s (Compare Fig. new forms of territorial inequality are superimposed upon inherited patterns of core−periphery polarization. place-specific conditions of production. local and regional state institutions attempt to construct customized institutional forms and policies to confront their own.8.2. p. This undermines the viability of centralized. 4. 132) . This leads many central governments to streamline large-scale national bureaucracies and systems of public service delivery • Global and European economic integration relativize inherited scalar hierarchies and undermine the territorial coherence of national economies. This undermines the uniformity of national administrative structures • As deindustrialization intensifies. corporate demands intensify for customized. This generates a crisis of traditional compensatory approaches to spatial policy • The fiscal crisis of the national state shrinks the public resources available for redistributive social and spatial policies • With the spread of flexible production systems. This undermines efforts to channel spread effects into lagging areas of the national territory • Place-specific socioeconomic problems proliferate. Core metropolitan economies are increasingly delinked from their hinterlands. top-down regulatory arrangements and lends increasing support to decentralization initiatives • The regulatory architecture of state power becomes increasingly multiscalar. state regulatory burdens expand and the tax base shrinks. highly standardized grid of state institutions and public infrastructural configurations across the national territory • The ascendancy of the New Right undermines public support for redistributive policy measures.

. due to the patterns of crisis-induced restructuring reviewed above. Conclusion Spatial Keynesianism played an essential role in constructing and reproducing the nationalized forms of state spatial selectivity that were consolidated during the Fordist-Keynesian period. These restructuring processes generated a variety of contradictions that undermined the basic political. In the next chapter. I analyze the consolidation of these postKeynesian approaches to urban policy and territorial regulation. significantly rescaled approaches to the political regulation of capitalist urbanization could be mobilized. it had become apparent that the project of alleviating uneven spatial development through the promotion of balanced urbanization within relatively closed national economies was as short-lived as the Fordist accumulation regime itself. Rather. therefore. Despite considerable variation in the form and pace of these national responses. the primacy of the national scale of state power was significantly decentered. and their implications for the geographies of state spatiality. the key state spatial projects and state spatial strategies associated with spatial Keynesianism became increasingly problematic during the course of the 1970s. such shifts opened up a political and institutional space in which alternative. leading in turn to pathdependent. Such an investigation provides an illuminating basis on which to decipher the emergence and subsequent evolution of new state spaces in contemporary western Europe. with the relativization of scales following the geoeconomic crises of the early 1970s. catastrophic rupture. however. spatial Keynesianism was not dismantled through a single.Geographies of Spatial Keynesianism 171 of its destabilization following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. its constitutive elements were eroded due to a confluence of distinct processes of restructuring. institutional. However. leading to new conflicts and struggles over the rearticulation of state scalar arrangements. Crucially. politically contested regulatory realignments and institutional modifications within each national state apparatus. As the figure indicates. and geographical preconditions upon which spatial Keynesianism was premised. By the end of the 1970s.

] National economic policies and institutions are increasingly being geared towards promoting internal competition between different industrial regions for investment . . as national governments struggled to adjust inherited institutional frameworks. ]. . Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan (1999: 282) Urban governance and the political geographies of the competition state As noted in our initial discussion of state restructuring in Ch. and modes of intervention to a radically transformed geoeconomic configuration. the early 1980s witnessed the consolidation of post-Keynesian competition states throughout western Europe. It does this most notably by designating particular regions as ‘development areas’ to the detriment of certain others—a process which [ .FIVE Interlocality Competition as a State Project: Urban Locational Policy and the Rescaling of State Space The State’s role in favour of foreign or transnational capital heightens the uneven development of capitalism within each country in which foreign capital is reproduced. In contrast to the redistributive agenda associated with the Keynesian welfare national state. Nicos Poulantzas (1978: 213) Rather than be constrained by an external force of globalization [ . so that they are no longer ‘national’ in the sense of being universally and evenly applied throughout the territory of the state [ . 2. . regulatory arrangements. . the competition state attempts to promote economic regeneration by enhancing . the state has created conditions whereby it must make a normative differentiation between different aspects of its ‘national’ economy with respect to the global. . . . The state has not retreated but reconfigured the way it applies its regulations. ] produces fissures in the national unity underpinning the bourgeois State. .

They compete to attract productive investment to build up their national production base. ] Both are. social institutions and economic agents. restructure or reinforce—as far as it is economically and politically feasible to do so—the competitive advantages of its territory. . and industrial districts. the competition state has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory. social. (Cerny 1997: 259) the state in the contemporary global economy can be legitimately regarded as a competition state [ . In the western European context. (a) neoliberal initiatives intended to dismantle inherited regulatory constraints upon capital accumulation and thus to reduce the costs of public administration and economic activity within particular locations. by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states [ . . and technological preconditions for high road pathways of (re)industrialization in which the priorities of profitability and social equity are reconciled (V. . even where they operate abroad. or which otherwise contribute to national wealth. its labor force. states take on some of the characteristics of firms as they strive to develop strategies to create competitive advantage [ . population. In particular. Key perspectives on the post-Keynesian competition state ‘Competition state’ is used here to characterize a state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders.Urban Locational Policy. capture. ] In this respect. and maintain the higher value-adding elements of the production chain. in turn. ] [T]he competition state prioritizes the pursuit of strategies intended to create. Box 5. which. (Dicken 1994: 112) . and its most important cities. this agenda has been pursued through diverse political strategies. Schmidt 2002. states compete to enhance their international trading position and to capture as large a share as possible of the gains from trade. in effect. State Rescaling 173 the global competitive advantages of its territory—including its major firms. most prominently. Specifically. states strive to create. Scharpf and Schmidt 2000).1. . and (b) social democratic initiatives intended to establish the institutional. its technological infrastructure. locked in competitive struggles to capture global market shares. enhances their competitive position. . regions. more competitive in international and transnational terms. built environment. (Jessop 2002: 96) Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market. . to ‘decommodify’ them as the welfare state was organized to do. including.1 summarizes some of the Box 5.

2. reterritorializations. Indeed. Against this background. to enhance national competitive advantages. Panitch 1994). either above or below the national state. and sociopolitical struggle (Cerny 1995. and local consequences of geoeconomic restructuring. the current round of global restructuring has entailed the systematic destabilization of inherited national political geographies and the construction of new scalar configurations in a number of major regulatory spheres (Box 5. In the previous chapter. internally coherent state forms. these worldwide rescaling processes have triggered an intensely contested ‘search for a new institutional fix’ (Peck and Tickell 1994) characterized by the proliferation of political strategies intended to manage the disruptive supranational. This ‘reshuffling of the hierarchy of spaces’ (Lipietz 1994: 36) has not established a stable interscalar architecture for the regulation of global capitalism. within each state territory. the consolidation of competition states has entailed a number of fundamental transformations of state spatial selectivity. current transformations of national state spatiality have been provoked by. the present chapter develops an interpretation of contemporary transformations of state spatiality in western Europe. national. On the contrary. and sociopolitical struggles are unfolding. institutional evolution. to alleviate proliferating socioeconomic tensions. regional. policy realignments. Competition states must thus be viewed as unstable politicoinstitutional matrices in which a variety of structural realignments. the consolidation of competition states generates new fault-lines of political conflict at various geographical scales. They are generally grounded upon speculative. In contrast to the comprehensive nationalization of regulatory space that was pursued under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. leading in turn to further rounds of trial-and-error regulatory experimentation. mutually contradictory political strategies intended simultaneously to promote economic development.174 Urban Locational Policy. Most importantly for our purposes. the nationalization of state space under postwar western European capitalism was interpreted as an outcome of political and institutional responses to the . Competition states should not be construed as fully consolidated. and arena of state rescaling processes. State Rescaling key perspectives on the competition state that have been developed by critical political economists. My central argument is that urban governance has served as a major catalyst. For this reason. medium. the relativization of scales and the other rescalings. and rearticulations of capitalist sociospatial organization that were outlined in Ch. The newly forged patterns of spatial selectivity associated with post-Keynesian competition states must be understood in relation to these broader interscalar transformations and the diverse regulatory experiments and political struggles they have provoked.2). and have in turn significantly accelerated. and to maintain political legitimation. The rearticulation of these regulatory arrangements has been intertwined with a major shaking-up and reconstitution of worldwide interscalar hierarchies.

working conditions. sectoral. . Wage relation. Global financial speculation intensifies with the rise of ‘stateless monies’ that lie beyond national regulatory control. ] is a series of highly contested. New scales of regulation emerge at global. Monetary and financial regulation. National monetary systems and financial markets are deregulated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. State Rescaling Box 5. In many contexts. . and local economic spaces. Analogously. national. technological innovation. supranational. and national social welfare policy are undermined. the content of existing scales.Urban Locational Policy. the present chapter interprets the rescaling of western European statehood as an expression of diverse political and institutional responses to . and privatization of global. . With the growing dominance of neoliberal ideologies. geoeconomic integration intensifies and deepens. . regional production systems. regulatory dilemmas generated by Fordist-Keynesian forms of urbanization. wage levels. supranational. Swyngedouw 1997. Deregulatory initiatives facilitate the expansion of foreign direct investment and global financial speculation. Due to the expansion of information and communications technologies. supply-side and monetarist programs of state intervention are mobilized. The state and other forms of governance. deeply contradictory and variegated processes and power struggles that often revolve around scale. New. Redistributive welfare policies are widely superseded by workfare policies intended forcibly to conscript workers into low-wage. the link between savings and investment is undermined. 175 What is generally referred to as ‘post-Fordism’ [ . local. Neoliberal political-economic forces promote the further deregulation. and the articulation between scales (Swyngedouw 1997: 156) . and internationalization in major industries. new spheres and methods of intercapitalist competition emerge. and subnational levels. the construction of new scales. on a regional. or plant-level basis. contingent labor markets. . and public employment is retrenched. Traditional Keynesian forms of national demandmanagement.2. inter-capitalist competition intensifies on a global scale. As Japanese and German capital threaten US firms’ market shares. control over particular scales. Petit 1999. The rescaling of regulatory forms after Fordism Sources: derived from Brenner and Theodore 2002a. Offshore banking centers proliferate and the role of global regulatory bodies expands. The national scale of capital accumulation is increasingly superseded by supranational economic blocs (the ‘triads’) and by subnational agglomeration economies (urban growth poles. As finance capital expands its control over industrial capital. in downgraded forms. . and industrial districts). State finances are reduced under conditions of sustained fiscal crisis. and workers’ benefits are renegotiated. along with programs to promote structural competitiveness. International configuration. Form of inter-capitalist competition. national macroeconomic policy. Nationalized collective bargaining agreements and national regulations ensuring workers’ rights are undermined. National protectionist policies and national barriers to foreign direct investment are weakened or dismantled. liberalization.

Other key reference points for such an analysis include European integration. For. crisis-induced forms of urban restructuring that have unfolded since the 1970s. and . and by means of diverse institutional realignments. across the western European city-system. 1 My intention here is in no way to assert that contemporary processes of state rescaling result entirely or predominantly from state projects and state strategies oriented towards the regulation of urban restructuring. These include: . housing. and infrastructure policies. and local states have mobilized a number of profoundly place. at a variety of spatial scales. The key institutional features of such urban locational policies. . following from the mode of analysis developed in the preceding chapter. their major political forms. and the new regionalism. the attempt to regulate urban development during the post-1970s period has entailed significant rescalings of state spatial organization and state spatial regulation. trade. western European national. labor. for instance. to decentralize key aspects of economic regulation to subnational (regional or local) institutional levels. many of which have explicitly targeted cities and city-regions. impelling their regulatory institutions to privilege the goals of local economic development and territorial competitiveness over traditional welfarist. state spatial projects intended to establish customized. in pursuing their overarching goal of enhancing the supranational competitive advantages of their territories. redistributive priorities. cross-border regions. and their relation to the contemporary rescaling of statehood. This rescaling of statehood has not only eroded the nationalized formations of urban governance and the redistributive forms of state spatial policy that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period. urban governance is conceived here as one among many possible empirical reference points through which the contemporary rescaling of western European statehood may be investigated. and industrial districts and. the process of state rescaling may be fruitfully investigated with reference to the geographies of specific state policies—including.176 Urban Locational Policy. monetary. will be examined at length below. city-regions. industrial. However. regional. more generally. welfare. to enhance the territorial competitiveness of major local and regional economies. welfare state retrenchment. state spatial strategies intended to reconcentrate socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructural investments within the most globally competitive city-regions and. State Rescaling the tumultuous.1 The regulation of urban restructuring in post-1970s western Europe has been pursued through a broad array of political strategies.and scale-sensitive approaches to institutional reorganization and regulatory intervention. It has also entailed the consolidation of new interscalar rule-regimes (Peck 2002) that have enhanced fiscal constraints and competitive pressures upon cities and regions. place-specific regulatory capacities in major cities. I shall refer to the diverse institutional realignments and regulatory strategies mobilized by post-Keynesian competition states as forms of urban locational policy insofar as they explicitly target cities and urban regions as sites for the enhancement of territorial competitiveness (Brenner 2000b). In addition. multilevel governance. more generally. Instead. immigration.

and van Weesep 1997. Jensen-Butler. the pervasive reorientation of urban governance from the managerial. and that 2 The literature on urban entrepreneurialism is too extensive to review at length here. see Harvey 1989a. Initially.and scale-specific types of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that have been mobilized by post-Keynesian competition states. Hall and Hubbard 1998. the proliferation of entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance represents a key expression and outcome of the place. Rather. entrepreneurial urban policies have been closely intertwined with contemporary processes of state rescaling.and scale-specific forms of economic decline while strengthening inherited social compromises and forms of territorial redistribution. 3. and Stohr 1990.2 While the present chapter draws upon the empirical insights generated in such studies. these new urban locational policies have emphasized the need for place. growthoriented. Mayer 1992. regional. For foundational statements. and local states have attempted to confront the multifaceted regulatory problems associated with the new configuration of urbanization. Jewson and MacGregor 1997. From this point of view. as I indicate below. As such. Shachar. ` ¨ 1990. I shall embed them within the spatialized state-theoretical framework developed in Ch. 1996. Harding et al. . On this basis. and competitiveness-driven framework during the post-1970s period is not to be understood merely as a realignment of local institutional forms and functions. Like the endogenous development policies of the 1970s and early 1980s. The next section examines the rearticulation of the western European urban system during the last three decades. I argue that. welfarist mode of the Fordist-Keynesian period to an entrepreneurial. urban locational policies have been an increasingly pervasive state response to the regulatory challenges of geoeconomic restructuring and European integration. see. 1994. I consider the new approaches to urban policy that have been mobilized since the 1970s as western European national.and scale-specific forms of state regulatory intervention. However. among other works. to enhance the supranational competitive advantages of strategic cities and city-regions. but they have been oriented more directly towards positioning major cities strategically within broader global and European spatial divisions of labor than towards the traditional priority of facilitating intra-national or intra-regional territorial redistribution. growth-oriented forms of state intervention into urban and regional development that have crystallized in the wake of contemporary rescaling processes have been discussed by numerous urban scholars under the rubric of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’. 1991. the post-1980s period witnessed a pervasive turn towards urban locational policies—spatially selective state initiatives intended. Leitner 1990. since the mid-1980s. focusing in particular upon the crystallization of a new mosaic of uneven spatial development in conjunction with ongoing processes of industrial restructuring and European economic integration. Moulaert and Demaziere 1995. above all. State Rescaling 177 The new. For overviews of the transition to urban entrepreneurialism in western Europe.Urban Locational Policy. deindustrializing cities and regions mobilized endogenous development policies that attempted to address place.

1 and 5. the ‘best’ universities. and the German Ruhr region—experienced devastating socioeconomic and infrastructural crises during this period. Riccardo Petrella (2000: 70–1) The spatial consequences of the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism have been widely noted (Benko and Dunford 1991. . during the course of the 1980s (Figs.178 Urban Locational Policy. western Belgium. In the remainder of the chapter. together with the rest of the Dutch Randstad. In the western European context. the Paris Basin. The most aggressive financial resources will be ‘available’ in these cities/regions. Torino.2). the new Edinburgh. the new Berlin. Scott and Storper 1992). European and global peripheries [ . Stockholm. formerly dynamic cities and regions were confronted with unforeseen developmental blockages. . Denmark. London East Anglia. and proliferating social problems. In many European countries. and I examine their cumulative impact upon the scalar configuration of western European statehood. research centres and scientific institutions. 5.and medium-sized enterprises]. Stuttgart. the ‘greatest’ theatres. I survey the major state spatial projects and state spatial strategies through which urban locational policies have been mobilized. maintain and strengthen tighter flows and linkages among themselves than with the rest of ‘their’ national. The ‘core islands’ will tend to establish. Brussels ‘district’. . The urbanized industrial heartlands of western Europe—including the British Midlands. ] The linkage between the core islands of the Archipelago and the rest are growing increasingly weaker. State Rescaling such policies have in turn triggered a number of fundamental rescalings of state space. decaying industrial infrastructures. Glasgow area. Even in countries in which average unemployment rates did not reach these levels. above all in the manufacturing sector. up to twice the national average (CEC 1992: 108). operas. As deindustrialization accelerated and established economic specializations were reworked. Madrid. and Munich regions. northeast France. unemployment rates in major cities exceeded 20 per cent. Urban restructuring and uneven spatial development: towards Archipelago Europe? The ‘core islands’ of Archipelago Europe already have a name: the Parisian region. this crisis entailed the tumultuous decline of many large-scale manufacturing regions that had been grounded primarily upon Fordist mass production industries. Barcelona. Rotterdam and Antwerp. Lombardia. the new Veneto. the Frankfurt. major cities experienced particularly massive job losses. headquarters of multinational organisations and networks of the most dynamic SMEs [small. concert houses and musea. as manufacturing industries were downsized.

such as those located in key border regions or in major transportation hubs—for instance.7 −7. 1980–8 Source: derived from CEC 1992: 110–18.637 −11.Urban Locational Policy.414 10. Still other European city-regions—particularly major metropolitan centers such as London. Barcelona. 1980 Liverpool Birmingham Copenhagen Paris Lyon Marseille Brussels Dortmund Frankfurt Hamburg Amsterdam Rotterdam Milan Naples Dublin Barcelona Madrid 16 15* 8 7 6 12 6 6 3 3 8 9 5* 14 10* 15* 12 1984 24 20 13 8 7 15 10 16 6 11 17 17 7 15 14 17 18 1988 20 15 11 9 8 17 16 17 6 12 19† 17† 5 25 19† 14 16 * corresponds to 1981 figure † corresponds to 1987 figure Fig.838 32.318 3.9 −988 −548 −9.5 −3.2. Per cent unemployment in major European cities. Amsterdam.758 Change 1973--81 (000s) −2. . or Glasgow—were able to renew their strategic importance within the changed geoeconomic configuration. However.1 Fig. Paris.5 −57 −1. Lille. some older industrial cities. derived from Eurostat Labor Force Survey Data.1. State Rescaling Total Manufacturing Employment 1973 (000s) Highly urbanized regions (21) Urbanized regions (23) Less urbanized regions (32) Rural regions (29) Total EEC9 regions (105) 11.044 179 % −17. 5. Copenhagen. percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.188 7. The decline in manufacturing employment in the European urban system Source: Keeble 1986: 171. 5.

in the midst of these major sectoral and geographical realignments.180 Urban Locational Policy. and local geographical scales (Dunford and Kafkalas 1992. Moulaert 1996). Just as importantly. including: . Thus. State Rescaling and Milan—experienced simultaneous processes of economic decline and economic rejuvenation as different sectors within their local economies struggled to adjust to the rapidly changing competitive environment. northern Rotterdam. in locations such as the M4 corridor (in western London). and Montpellier to West Jutland. and Tuscany. regional. 1. Such new industrial spaces also proliferated on the fringes of major European cityregions. Faced with enhanced geoeconomic volatility during the last three decades. Lever 1996. inward investment. Emilia-Romagna. these new industrial spaces have been grounded upon flexible production systems and have demonstrated impressive dynamism in a variety of internationalized. Veltz (1996) refers to this trend as a process of ‘metropolitanization’ in which (a) high value-added socioeconomic capacities. peripheralized zones (Amin and Tomaney 1995). Gre¨ noble. From Bristol. Cooke and Morgan 1998). since the early 1980s. Europe-wide geographies of uneven spatial development may be understood as the expression of four closely related trends. the Cite Scientifique in Southern ˆle de I France. and (b) territorial disparities between core urban regions and peripheral towns and regions are significantly intensifying across the entire European economy. in a number of spatial transformations within European national urban systems. even though historically entrenched territorial disparities decisively conditioned the developmental pathways of cities and regions. Cambridgeshire. during the last two decades. and labor flows are increasingly concentrated within major metropolitan regions. the current period has been characterized by qualitatively new forms of uneven development and core–periphery polarization at European. CEC 1991: 48). Metropolitanization and the rise of the archipelago economy. and northern Copenhagen (Hall and Castells 1994. Such metropolitanization tendencies have been embodied. the Schiphol airport zone (adjacent to Amsterdam). advanced infrastructures. new spaces of growth emerged in a number of erstwhile lagging or marginalized regions that were ‘insulated from the older foci of Fordist mass production’ (Storper and Scott 1989: 27). These new. Baden-Wurttemberg. the Swiss Jura. and their large concentrations of high-skilled workers (Dunford and Perrons 1994: 172–3). the strategic importance of major metropolitan cities within the western European economy has been significantly enhanced. the leading metropolitan areas of western Europe have been able to exploit two crucial locational advantages—their strategic positions within advanced communications and transportation networks. high-technology sectors and revitalized craft industries (Scott 1988. highly developed urban and regional cores and lagging. Consequently. The sectoral transformations and new corporate accumulation strategies of the last three decades have intensified established spatial divisions between advanced. industrial growth. Eschborn ´ and Darmstadt (near Frankfurt). national.

Hamburg. which now accounts for over 30 per cent of French GNP (Veltz 1996). The consolidation of the Single European Market in 1993 unleashed powerful centripetal forces that further contributed to the process of metropolitanization and the consequent intensification of territorial disparities (Cheshire 1999). output. in many major European urban and regional economies (Crouch et al. the increasing centralization of management and control functions in major German cities such as Frankfurt. and Berlin (S. ¨ Kratke 1993). Following a massive wave of mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s. and European integration have contributed to the formation of new transnational urban systems in which the most globally integrated cities are linked together ever more tightly while disadvantaged places and less favored regions are further marginalized (Sassen 1993. ‘metropolitan growth creates autonomous centres of development that benefit more from their networked horizontal relationships with other large poles than from their traditional vertical relationships with the hinterland’. and lagging areas organized according to their specific functions within Fordist production systems and nationalized spatial divisions of labor. Stuttgart. processes of industrial restructuring. ¨ Munich. high-tech jobs and productivity growth in Paris. financial. industrial regions. processes of industrial restructuring since the 1970s have engendered a ‘self-reinforcing polarization of high-level activities in wellresourced and well-connected nodes’ (Dunford and Perrons 1994: 173) throughout the European space-economy. the intensified economic dynamism of local production systems.Urban Locational Policy. By contrast. globalization. . The rescaling of inherited urban hierarchies has also contributed to the establishment of new patterns of uneven spatial development during the last three decades. During the 1950s and 1960s. suburbs. Within the resultant ‘archipelago economy’. and corporate control functions—both for global and Europe-wide . foreign direct investment accelerated markedly across western Europe. In short. Cologne. and trade to be extended in many local economies (Amin and Malmberg 1994). each European national economy contained an internal hierarchy of cities. the enhanced significance of the Dutch Randstad as a center for corporate headquarters and logistics functions (Dieleman and Musterd 1992). Kratke 1991). according to Veltz (1997: 83). the increased concentration of high-skilled. and . causing transnational corporate control over employment. the growing dominance of Greater London in producer and financial services (Sassen 1991). The formation of transnational urban hierarchies. in the current period. One major consequence of this development has been the formation of a European network of global cities in which advanced management. 2001). State Rescaling 181 . . . grounded upon a variety of industrial specializations and institutional configurations. S. 2.

such as London. Shachar 1996). accounting. global cities contain other propulsive industries that are linked to the activities of TNCs. Lyon. Such models have underscored not only the strategic functional roles of global cities within a vertically configured urban hierarchy but also their increasingly dense. commerce. Munich. Amsterdam. business law.3 indicates. Global city formation in western Europe Urban researchers have identified various ‘global cities’ or ‘world cities’ as key spatial nodes of contemporary global capitalism. have only more recently acquired worldwide or continental economic significance. Thrift 1987). and control capacities. Paris. While various criteria have been proposed for the specification of the world urban hierarchy (Beaverstock. Because such functions are heavily dependent upon a complex of specialized producer and financial services. ¨ Paris. Box 5. Hitz et al. they generate spillover effects into local economies that reinforce the metropolitanization tendencies discussed above (Sassen 1993). Zurich. horizontally articulated interlinkages with one another (Taylor and Hoyler 2000). most researchers concur that world cities represent key basing points for global capitalist firms due to their high concentrations of corporate decision-making. The most important among these are advanced producer and financial services sectors—for instance. Moreover. Many European global cities. Barcelona. such as Frankfurt and Barcelona. Research on global cities has drawn attention to the following major realignments within the European urban system: . and industry—are concentrated within a relatively small network of European metropolitan centers. More recently. State Rescaling investment activities—have been centralized (Taylor and Hoyler 2000).3. Smith. and Taylor 2000). and the like—which serve the command and control requirements of transnational capital (Sassen 1991. Friedmann’s (1986a) foundational statement on world city theory included a number of European cities within the global urban hierarchy—London. a large number of global and European corporate headquarters—in banking. Milan. and Milan (Box 5. Paris. as Fig. Frankfurt. have a much longer history as administrative hubs of colonial empires and as coordinating centers for global trade (King 1991). Frankfurt.182 Urban Locational Policy. advertising. Brussels. among others. Others. more precise models and more detailed descriptions of the European global city system have been developed (Kunzmann 1998. These European global city economies now capture many of the administrative and managerial functions that were previously concentrated within regional centers or national capitals. As the methodology of world city theory has been refined. and Amsterdam. London. Major European global cities include. Vienna. Friedmann (1995) has noted ¨ the role of Amsterdam. financial management and consulting. world city theory has been consolidated as a major framework for critical urban studies (Knox and Taylor 1995. Rotterdam. Since the initial formulation of the world city hypothesis in the early 1980s by Cohen (1981) and Friedmann and Wolff (1982). banking. In addition to their role as locations for TNC headquarters. Zurich. 5. insurance. and the Ruhr agglomeration as important nodes within the emergent transnational urban system. and Madrid. 1995).3). financial planning.

. . logistics centers. low-wage jobs in the formal and informal economy (Fainstein. . The massive expansion of advanced infrastructures for communication and transport— including high-speed rail lines. The increased articulation of major European cities to the global economy through their role as global or continental headquarters locations for TNCs (Castells 1994. The emergence of new forms of sociospatial polarization within European cities as urban labor markets are increasingly bifurcated or ‘dualized’ between high-wage corporate jobs and routinized. Gordon. 5. The consolidation of advanced producer and financial services complexes as major sources of economic dynamism and employment growth within European global cityregions (Sassen 1993). Feagin and Smith 1989). Fainstein 2001. C. . The increasing integration of strategic suburban peripheries into transnational circuits of capital as selected global city functions are decentralized beyond traditional downtown cores (Ronneberger and Keil 1995). The stratification of the European global city hierarchy among ‘alpha’.3. 1994). . London Paris Frankfurt Amsterdam 4 Brussels Milan Headquarters of the world’s top 500 banks (by total value of transactions) Headquarters of top 200 European banks Headquarters of Europe’s top 300 commercial companies (by turnover) Headquarters of Europe’s top 500 industrial companies 15 17 12 7 5 13 13 12 3 7 7 49 18 7 4 4 3 85 72 9 4 8 11 Fig. and Harloe 1992. ‘beta’. The new inter-metropolitan polarization. and ‘gamma’ tiers according to major cities’ different levels of connectivity within the global city network (Taylor and Hoyler 2000). and customized telecommunications networks—ensuring high levels of connectivity among the most strategically significant European urban centers (Graham 1999). 3. Hamnett 1996.Urban Locational Policy. airports. The new spatial divisions of labor that have been generated through the combined processes of geoeconomic restructuring and European integration have transformed inherited patterns . State Rescaling 183 . Corporate headquarters in various European global cities as of 1990 Source: derived from CEC 1992: 52–5.

As we shall see below.4. Nijkamp 1993.184 Urban Locational Policy. and Hungary. the ‘blue star’. into the border states of eastern and central Europe (Hadjimichalis and Sadler 1995. 5. these shifts within the western European urban system have rearticulated and intensified nationally specific patterns of interurban polarization. As in the USA. transportation. Kunzmann and Wegener 1991. and the ‘red octopus’. see Dematteis 2000. it has been extraordinarily difficult for cities and regions located in these marginalized zones of the European space-economy to break out of deregulatory. during the 1980–8 period. debates on the ‘regional problem’ were renewed both in political and academic circles (Box 5. . and Wegener 1995. where processes of industrial restructuring during the 1980s polarized urban development patterns between the declining snowbelt cities of the northeastern manufacturing belt and the sunbelt boomtowns of the south and west (Sawers and Tabb 1984). these zones are dominated by cities and towns that lack large clusters of skilled workers and an advanced industrial. measured in GDP per inhabitant. the ‘cucumber’.1 (p. low valueadded economic functions and back offices into semi-peripheral and peripheral regions of Mediterranean and southern Europe and. Taylor and Hoyler 2000. as evidence of intensifying intra-national disparities mounted during the 1980s. political responses to this situation during the post-1980s period have differed significantly from those that predominated during the FordistKeynesian epoch. defensive modes of adjustment (Moulaert 1996).5 (p. Figure 5. the ‘boomerang’. and communications infrastructure. New zones of marginalization and exclusion. 189) depicts one of the most widely disseminated spatial images of post-1970s Europe. State Rescaling of urban development. Kunzmann 1998. and Greece to Poland. As processes of deindustrialization and reindustrialization have deepened. the Czech Republic. New zones of marginalization and exclusion have emerged at the fringes of Europe’s vital axis as transnational corporations have continued to decentralize routinized. even in cities and regions that lack the transnational ¨ command and control capacities associated with global cities (Lapple 1985). the ‘bowl of fruit’. 4. 188) illustrates the intensifying disparities among strong and weak European regions. Lever 1993. 186). more recently. Portugal. southern Italy. The new patterns of uneven geographical development that have resulted from the aforementioned four trends have been described through a number of spatial metaphors—including the ‘blue banana’. Given the centripetal forces and large-scale sociospatial disparities that have been unleashed through the process of European integration. Consequently. Nilsson and Schamp 1996).3 Map 5. which was first elaborated by Brunet (1989) in a report for the French spatial planning agency 3 For discussions of such metaphors. From Spain. the ‘European green grape’. p. the entire European urban system has been differentiated extensively among cities and regions attempting to position themselves strategically within the Single European Market and the new international division of labor (Fig. the so-called ‘blue banana’.4).

Toulouse. Frankfurt. Athens Palermo. ‘science cities’. whose local economies are specialized on a single function (technopoles. Palermo. Arnhem. Roissy. Strasbourg. Haarlemmermeer New towns Monofunctional satellites Small towns and rural centers Tourism and culture cities Border and gateway cities Throughout Europe Salzburg. lack of physical planning and adequate public infrastructure. 36–43. Barcelona Located throughout the British Midlands. Turin Milton Keynes. Sindelfingen. obsolete industrial infrastructure. Zürich. economic. generally located in close proximity to traditional urban centers. Naples Declining industrial cities and regions Port cities Declining shipbuilding industries. . and Belgian Wallonia Liverpool. and cultural headquarters. Lyon. center of innovative activities. Duisburg. Montpellier. restructured/modernized industrial base Large concentrations of governmental functions as well as international governmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Advanced industrial base. tourist outposts. political. Prague. Almere Sophia-Antipolis. marginalized working class. Euro-Disneyland. Venice. Höchst. 5. Rotterdam. Thessalonika Fig. Basle. Madrid. Malaga. Milan Administrative/ governmental centers High-tech/ services cities Brussels. Marseille. airports) Smaller cities and semi-urbanized zones in rural regions. extensive environmental degradation Examples 185 London. environmental deterioration Middle-sized towns in which local economy is dominated by a single corporation Relatively self-contained towns inhabited by overspill populations from large urban centers New urban growth centers. Eindhoven. Evry. Dunkirk. Stuttgart. Rome Bristol. Cadiz. The differentiation of urban economies in western Europe Source: based on Kunzmann and Wegener 1991: 35. Thessalonika. Ludwigshafen. Florence Aachen. the Nord-Pas de Calais and Lorraine regions of France. extensive environmental degradation. and producer services Traditional. Antwerp. Genoa. Reading. Hamburg. significant clusters of producer and financial services industries. population decline. often located near coastlines and isolated from major transportation corridors Local economic base depends extensively on international tourism and European cultural events Hinterland is crosscut by a national border. Trieste. Paris. such cities often serve key administrative functions and become gateways for economic migrants and refugees Expanding cities without an industrial base Company towns Leverkusen. Amsterdam. Avignon. State Rescaling Urban type Global cities Key features Large concentrations of financial. the Hague. Lelystad. structural unemployment. Cambridge. Frankfurt/ Oder. Berlin. the German Ruhr region. monostructural industrial base. extensive spatial restructuring as ports attempt to modernize their infrastructures Large informal economy. Runcorn. significant concentrations of research and development facilities. Geneva. mass unemployment.4.Urban Locational Policy.

Bavaria. The pattern of uneven development is now one of increasing spatial division. Dusseldorf. researchers detected evidence of a North/South regional divide during the mid-1980s. population. The return of the ‘regional problem’: North/South divides in Germany. ] reflect what has been the most extensive geographical decentralization and internationalization of industrial production since the origins of industrial capitalism (Soja 1989: 172) The geoeconomic dislocations of the 1970s intensified territorial disparities across the European space-economy (Dunford and Perrons 1994). north-east England and Wales. the UK. and investment levels among already urbanized local and regional economies (Lapple 1985). Relatively stable mosaics of uneven regional development have suddenly become almost kaleidoscopic. and Italy. ] have been dramatic and perplexing. and Bremen) and the more diversified southern regions (such as Hesse. Lower Saxony. Northern industrial cities such as Berlin. Britain. . . Lapple 1986). Under these circumstances. To a large extent these ‘divergent geographies’ reflect the different roles of different areas and localities in the old and new regimes of accumulation. . mass unemployment. the Ruhr—have been experiencing accelerated economic decline and deindustrialization. where many high-technology firms had recently agglomerated (Frie¨ drichs. These new territorial disparities were articulated on a variety of spatial scales. older industrial areas of the west and north (the Ruhr region. and on a wider front their position in the changing international division of labor. State Rescaling Box 5. as disparities intensified between the declining. academic and ¨ public discussions of the so-called ‘North/South divide’ proliferated during the 1980s in conjunction with debates on deindustrialization. .4. In the FRG. . ] loosening up of the landscape of capital [ . it has been divergent. Hannover. Once highly industrialized and prosperous core regions—segments of the American manufacturing belt. . . northern France. Haußermann. but one of their most significant expressions was the intensified polarization of spatial development within each national territory. and BadenWurttemberg). Bremen.186 Urban Locational Policy. Analogous forms of territorial ¨ ¨ polarization were articulated within the (West) German urban system during this period. Wallonia. While all major cities in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) experienced population growth and high employment levels until the mid-1960s. traditional urban/rural divisions were increasingly superseded by differentials in employment. ] have become new centres of industrial growth and expansion. and Essen became sites of disinvestment and mass unemploy¨ . . while many poor peripheral regions [ . at a variety of spatial scales. In the (West) German context. and urban decline. and Siebel 1986. Hamburg. and Italy in the 1980s whereas the development of the post-war space economy up to the early 1970s was generally convergent. Bochum. for the past decade or more. These ‘role reversals of regions’ [ . (Martin 1989: 31) The regional repercussions of this [ . by the early 1970s conditions among cities located in different zones of the national territory had come to differ significantly. . Hamburg. and especially since the late 1970s.

While it was grounded upon historically entrenched spatial divisions. and East Anglia. Meanwhile. The economic dynamism of these southern cities was reflected in relatively low unemployment rates throughout the 1980s (S. the key point is that recent processes of geoeconomic restructuring. and Munich became important centers for high-tech industries and advanced producer and financial services. the southern Mezzogiorno region experienced a severe economic crisis characterized by mass unemployment. more generally. the northeastern and central industrial districts of Emilia-Romagna and the Third Italy were consolidated as major sites for flexible production systems. the historically entrenched North/South divide in Britain was exacerbated through a combination of (a) accelerated economic growth in the South East. and (c) significantly increased North/South divergence in unemployment levels. In Britain. European integration. Heeg. Second. contributed further to these trends. Such simplistic spatial models have been criticized. meanwhile. generating important spillover effects for its surrounding regional economy. they intensified following the onset of global recession and the consolidation of Thatcherism (Dunford 1995. Kratke 1991. DATAR. and Wales. and new business registrations (Dunford 1995. the North West of England. in the northwestern heartlands of Italian Fordism. as regional per capita incomes tendentially converged. and metropolitanization have . Moreover. First. insofar as they are usually promulgated by public agencies that have a strong political interest in depicting particular localities. For present purposes. regions. . the industrial centers of Genoa and Turin underwent significant deindustrialization and (partial) reindustrialization. or countries as the boom regions of the future. above all in revitalized craft sectors dominated by small and medium-sized firms. While spatial inequalities were partially counterbalanced during the postwar period. Milan was transformed into an important second-tier European global city-region. These new territorial disparities were debated most explicitly in the UK as a resurgence of the country’s recurrent ‘regional problem’ (Massey 1986. southern urban centers such as Frankfurt. the new pattern of territorial polarization was the product of three post-1970s developments. the process of global city formation in the City’s core financial district and. the North/South divide has a long historical legacy. During the 1980s. the North/South division continued to represent the predominant axis of territorial inequality (Bagnasco and Oberti 1998. even though the national space-economy was often said to have been differentiated among ‘three Italies’ during this period. Sablowski 1998). Stuttgart.Urban Locational Policy. capital flight. Thus. Martin 1989. the South West. Third. Hudson and Williams 1989). and Stein 1997). 1988). State Rescaling 187 ment. because they ossify complex networks of interdependencies and ongoing sociospatial ¨ transformations into a static territorial grid (Kratke. The intensification of inward investment around Greater London. the growing ‘London-centeredness’ of the entire UK economy. and insufficient capital investment. Martin and Rowthorn 1986). Dunford 1988. (b) continued industrial decline and socioeconomic crisis in the older manufacturing regions of the West Midlands. however. household income. ¨ . Esser and Hirsch 1989). Italy represents another major European national state in which an inherited North/ South divide was exacerbated during the 1980s. such models are often based ‘less on empirical evidence than on creative geopolitical imaginations’ (Taylor and Hoyler 2000: 179). Scotland. despite the redistributive regional policy programs that had been mobilized during the postwar period.

Paris. and now also includes eastern Germany and parts of eastern and central Europe (Dunford and Perrons 1994: 165–6).1 Fig. in the dynamic cities of southern Germany (Frankfurt. whose components are tightly interlinked through advanced communications and transportation infrastructures.e. Hamburg. Stuttgart. Data are in PPS (i. Consequently. as Soja (1985: 187) explained in the mid-1980s: . adjusted to reflect differences in purchasing power among EU states). and Finland. 5. the economic geography of the new Europe is now dominated by a broad urban arc stretching from the South East of England through the German Rhinelands southwards to the northern ¨ Italian Industrial Triangle (see also S. first. is surrounded by a number of important outlying cities. traditionally corporatist countries. This transnational urban corridor. and Vienna. EUR 12 ¼ 100. polarizing forces that have been unleashed since the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. in the traditional northwestern urban cores of London. and Bologna). Disparities in GDP per inhabitant among European regions.5 47 145 57 135 26.5. 1980–8 Source: derived from CEC 1991: 87. Copenhagen. The heartlands of this densely urbanized ‘vital axis’ are located. characterized by low wage economies and strong deregulatory policy orientations. Munich). such as Barcelona. Zurich) and northern Italy (Milan. excluding French overseas territories. Switz¨ erland (Geneva.8 1984 45 149 55 137 27. whose accelerated growth in recent years has pulled Europe’s economic center of gravity southwards (Dunford and Perrons 1994: 165). Thus. Berlin. fundamentally transformed the patterns of geographical industrialization and territorial development that prevailed under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism (Storper and Walker 1989). Norway. Turin. as Petrella (2000) indicates in the statement quoted at the outset of this section. and the Dutch Randstad. and second. Austria. including Switzerland. and by a number of affluent. Rokkan and Urwin 1982).9 1988 45 151 56 137 27. Kratke 1993).188 Urban Locational Policy. An outer layer of relatively underdeveloped peripheries. regions refer to NUTS 2. Although these emergent patterns of uneven spatial development have a longer lineage within previous rounds of capitalist industrialization (Braudel 1984. State Rescaling 1980 Average 10 weakest regions Average 10 strongest regions Average 25 weakest regions Average 25 strongest regions Disparity* *Weighted standard deviation 1982 46 147 56 136 26.2 1986 45 151 55 138 27. stretches from the western Atlantic coast to the southern Mediterranean economies and Greece. Sweden. Brussels. their current articulation is a powerful expression of the centripetal.

Many well-established core regions have experienced sustained and even expanded relative economic and political power. ] These ‘intensified Dorsals / Dorsale Dependències / Dépendances Nord del Sud / Nord du Sud Assimilats / Assimilés Finisterres / Finisterres «Suds» / «Suds» Llacuna / Lacune Relacions amb l’Est? Liaisins avec l’Est? © RECLUS. Source: DATAR (1989: 79). .1. accelerated technological innovation. while many backward peripheries have plunged deeper into relative impoverishment [ .Urban Locational Policy. part of the change has involved an intensification of preexisting patterns of uneven regional development and a reinforcement of old core and periphery relations. . In contrast to the nationalized vision of urban hierarchies that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period (see Map 4. and advanced infrastructural facilities that was ideally suited for the activities of transnational corporations. 1990 Map 5. surrounded by a variety of outlying industrial regions and peripheries. highly skilled labor. State Rescaling 189 Paradoxical as it may initially appear. The blue banana was conceived as a zone of intense economic dynamism.1). Mapping the new territorial disparities: the European ‘blue banana’ Brunet’s famous ‘blue banana’ represented an influential attempt to map the future impact of the Single European Market upon the urban and regional system. . the city system was now viewed as a transnational network of tightly interlinked and globally competitive metropolitan centers.

. . in order to examine the changing structural positions of European cities within this new spatial mosaic. Figure 5. CEC 1992. globally integrated metropolitan cores. 1993) analysis of the new European urban hierarchy is particularly useful. (c) enhanced levels of connectivity and interdependence among the most dynamic. (b) a growing differentiation among local and regional economies according to their particular specializations within global and European spatial divisions of labor. and advanced infrastructure investments into major metropolitan areas (‘metropolitanization’). the position of cities within networks of corporate control. the urban hierarchy is composed of two overlapping dimensions—first. Mønnesland. State Rescaling continuities’. Cheshire 1999. political. decentralized. As the arrows in the diagram indicate.g. S. . or control centers for major firms. as defined by their dominant forms of industrial production and economic specialization. based on diverse data sources and conceptual schema. In sum. As new headquarters locations and command. Kunzmann and Wegener 1991. ‘hooksand-ladders’ conceptualization of the European urban hierarchy is represented in Fig. the economic geography of post-1970s western Europe is characterized by (a) an enhanced concentration of socioeconomic capacities. 1993. new corporate locational strategies. Lever 1999. and second. Urban economists have developed a variety of ranking systems. and technological conditions which have significantly modified how GUD [geographically uneven development] is produced and reproduced. European. or national headquarters locations or as management.6 thus represents a multiscalar geographical forcefield in which inherited spatial infrastructures. Champion.6. however. European.4 In the ¨ present context. for they have been occurring under a new set of sectoral. 5. and localized processes of industrial restructuring interact to produce differential pathways of urban development within a rapidly changing geoeconomic environment. financial. it may likewise ascend within the hierarchy (S. and (d) an increasing functional disarticulation of major urban regions 4 See e. This two-dimensional. Cities may ascend the hierarchy as their local economies are upgraded from standardized mass production systems into flexible. .190 Urban Locational Policy. social. are not simply more of the same. as defined by their role as global. and national spatial divisions of labor. highskilled labor. and Vandermotten 1996. evolving system of relations and interdependencies between cities rather than a fixed hierarchy of positions. Cities may also move downwards within the hierarchy if their industrial base or command and control functions are significantly downgraded. various forms of economic restructuring may alter a city’s position in the urban hierarchy. This figure is intended to represent an unstable. and innovation-oriented production systems. Kratke’s (1995. the position of cities within global. ¨ Kratke 1995: 139–43). management and steering functions are attracted to a city. In this model.

the notion of an ‘archipelago economy’ introduced by Veltz (1996) and the vision of an ‘Archipelago Europe’ proposed by Petrella (2000) provide vivid. Hamburg. Kratke 1995: 141. which are exacerbating territorial inequalities at all spatial scales. Barcelona. Cottbus. Oslo. Palermo. decentralized or ‘lean’ production systems Traditional Fordist mass production systems Lack of competitive industrial infrastructure 191 Spatial scale of control capacity Global: high concentrations of global headquarters locations. from their surrounding peripheries and from other marginalized areas within the same national territory. or advanced business services GLOBAL CITIES (London.) (3a) (3b) POST-FORDIST CITIES (Stuttgart. etc. Frankfurt) (1) EUROPEAN URBAN REGIONS (Amsterdam. financial activities.Urban Locational Policy. financial activities. if also disturbing. Lyon. etc. characterizations . etc. Madrid. Toulouse. etc. Copenhagen. and advanced business services Lack of control capacities: lack of important headquarters locations. financial activities. financial activities. etc.) MARGINALIZED CITIES (Naples.6 The changing European urban hierarchy ¨ Source: derived from S. State Rescaling STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM Flexible. Rotterdam. and advanced business services National: high concentrations of national headquarters locations. Duisberg. Sheffield. Milan. Brussels. Rome. 5.) (2a) (2b) NATIONAL URBAN CENTERS (Berlin. Zürich. Birmingham. Prato. Paris. and advanced business services European: high concentrations of European headquarters locations. Turin.) (4) (5) (6) Fig. Dortmund.) FORDIST CITIES (Manchester. In light of these trends.

Urban governance in transition: from endogenous development to locational policy As indicated in the penultimate section of Ch. 4. urban crises were deepening. However. is how inherited state spatial configurations were recalibrated. This conceptualization provides a useful methodological basis on which to investigate the reworking of state intervention into the urban process during the post-1970s period. then. despite their variegated effects upon cities and regions. The new patterns of urbanization outlined above presented state institutions at all spatial scales with any number of major regulatory dilemmas—including. Instead. State Rescaling of the new spatial (dis)order that has emerged in western Europe during the last three decades. to confront the various aspects of urban restructuring discussed in the preceding section. rather. labor deskilling. It has been premised. rising sociospatial inequalities. coherent. 4. I suggested in Ch. However.192 Urban Locational Policy. with divergent degrees of success. regional. trial-and-error regulatory experiments through which national. decaying public infrastructures. multilayered formations of state spatiality that eclectically combine elements of inherited state spatial arrangements with newly forged regulatory geographies. even as inherited approaches to spatial policy were being undermined. in particular. as the obsolescence of spatial Keynesianism became widely evident. political shifts. and internal crisis-tendencies. The key question. declining tax revenues. For. these processes of regulatory experimentation have cumulatively engendered a number of systemic transformations of state spatiality at both local and supralocal scales. This interaction generates new. 3 that the production of new state spaces cannot be conceived adequately as a complete destruction and transcendence of inherited political geographies. spatial Keynesianism was grounded upon top-down. As we saw in Ch. the regulatory architecture of spatial Keynesianism was destabilized following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism due to a confluence of geoeconomic realignments. in order to confront the rapidly proliferating regulatory challenges associated with newly emergent urbanization patterns. the transformation of urban governance during the last three decades has not entailed the simple replacement of spatial Keynesianism with a single. and intensified interspatial competition. state spatial restructuring is best viewed as a layering process in which newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies interact with inherited configurations of state space. deindustrialization. redistributive policies intended to spread certain generic socioeconomic . and local state institutions have attempted. and thus the problem of regulating the process of capitalist urbanization remained as acute as ever. mass unemployment. post-Keynesian model. industrial transformations. upon a series of ad hoc.

Subsequently. the inherited policy framework of spatial Keynesianism was further differentiated (a) to include deindustrializing. the French Plan of Action for Employment and Industrial Reorganization. this decade may be viewed as the historical culmination of the various projects of national territorial redistribution that had been introduced during the postwar period. State Rescaling 193 assets. however. . institutional configurations.and scale-specific regulatory dilemmas—in significant measure through the rescaling of state institutional structures and modes of intervention—represent an essential feature of postKeynesian forms of urban governance. the new urban policies of the post-1970s period have been recalibrated to emphasize place. are obsolete.’ I shall argue that such state initiatives to address place. many of the redistributive policy relays associated with spatial Keynesianism were significantly expanded. . as Messner (1997: 31) declares. Initially. ] to shift to more directly ¨ effective instruments’ (Stohr 1986: 67). and the new politics of place Throughout the 1970s. and (b) to remove barriers to investment within major industrial centers. ‘Traditional industrial policies. socioeconomic conditions. The national state’s underlying commitment to the project of spatial equalization at a national scale was thus strongly reinforced during the course of the 1970s. . political alliances in many European national states attempted to defend the redistributive policy relays of spatial Keynesianism. formulated far from the sites concerned by the planning staffs in capital cities. In stark contrast to this postwar project of promoting the ‘Taylorization of territory’ (Veltz 1996: 24). in contrast to classical Keynesian forms of spatial policy. the Dutch Big Cities Bottleneck Program. endogenous development strategies. The goal of such preservationist alliances was to ‘intensify still further traditional regional policy instruments. albeit under geoeconomic conditions that were systematically undermining the viability of the Fordist-Keynesian developmental model.Urban Locational Policy. as crisis tendencies within the boom regions of Fordism deepened.and scale-specific industrial legacies. In this manner. distressed cities as key geographical targets for state financial assistance. and public services as evenly as possible throughout the entire national territory. infrastructural arrangements. Interscalar tensions. which had focused almost exclusively upon underdeveloped peripheries. to refine their criteria and spatial orientation towards specific crisis areas and locations and [ . Indeed. Thus. Consequently. national governments mobilized ‘fire-brigade type crash programmes’ intended to address particularly drastic urban-industrial crises through direct subsidies or incentives to large firms ¨ (Stohr 1986: 67). national urban policies were now introduced in major western European states in order to address the specific socioeconomic problems of large cities. and developmental resources. Key examples of such policies in the 1970s included the West German Urban Development Assistance Act. and the British Inner Urban Areas Act (Fox Przeworski 1986).

but these efforts proved to be no more than temporary. Whereas the new national urban policies introduced during this period enabled many cities to capture supplementary public resources. In particular.194 Urban Locational Policy. many municipalities attempted to adjust to the new fiscal climate by delaying capital expenditures. and subsequently expanding to diverse firm-based. within the newly imposed framework of interscalar relations.5). State Rescaling While redistribution-oriented political alliances prevailed at a national scale during the first half of the decade. land-assembly programs. Following the global economic recession of the 1970s. and by increasing their debts. At this time. More generally. and land-use planning schemes. area-based. additional public revenues were sought in. . In the wake of these shifts. in which economic restructuring had generated particularly devastating consequences (Hudson 1994. stop-gap measures. without extensive reliance upon external investments or national subsidies (Box 5. sectoral. most local governments were nonetheless confronted with unprecedented budgetary constraints due to the combined impact of national fiscal retrenchment and rapidly intensifying local socioeconomic problems. National grants to subnational administrative levels were markedly reduced. and job-creation measures (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). across much of western Europe. there was a proliferation of so-called ‘endogenous development’ strategies intended to promote economic growth and technological innovation from below. local economic development projects (Fox Przeworski 1986). Although this new politics of urban economic development would eventually be diffused in diverse political and institutional forms throughout the western European city-system. often dominated by a single industry. beginning with anti-closure initiatives. a range of devolutionary national policy initiatives and intergovernmental realignments were introduced in order to scale back inherited. the national scale became an important institutional locus for diverse restructuring-oriented political alliances that aimed to dismantle many of the redistributive. as industrial restructuring accelerated and inherited frameworks of interscalar relations became increasingly unstable. managerial-welfarist approaches to urban governance. local governments now began to introduce a range of initiatives intended to rejuvenate local economies. among other sources. in contrast to their earlier focus on welfarist redistribution. Thus. Subsequently. compensatory policy relays that had prevailed within the Keynesian welfare national state. and local government expenditure as a share of GDP likewise declined significantly (Pickvance and Preteceille 1991b). western European national governments were increasingly pressured to rationalize public expenditures. These newly imposed forms of fiscal austerity impelled many European local governments to become more dependent upon locally collected taxes and non-tax revenues such as charges and user fees (Mouritzen 1991). by drawing upon liquid assets. during the 1970s it remained most prevalent within manufacturing-based cities and regions. the tide began to change in many European national states during the late 1970s.

attachment to place that was grounded in the spatially defined routine of everyday life’ (Hudson and Sadler 1986: 173). marketdriven. . By the early 1980s. As of the 1970s. such alliances were generally formed in order to address place-specific processes of industrial restructuring without extensive reliance upon national government planning guidance or financial aid.Urban Locational Policy. large-organization and central-government-initiated development processes has steadily weakened the capability of territorial communities to confront the challenges of worldwide economic restructuring by indigenous innovation and flexibility [ . It entails mobilizing to the maximum and optimum extent possible the resources in a given area. Under these conditions. however. Bassand et al. . including capital. (Sengenberger 1993: 310) It would appear that monocentric reliance on traditional large-scale. Amin 1986). (Stohr 1990: 2) ¨ The notion of endogenous development can be traced to the activities of European mercantilist states from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century and to the protectionist agenda of the German Zollverein during the nineteenth century (Friedmann 1986b. and (b) a vision of autocentric territorial development (based upon internally negotiated compromises rather than externally imposed political agendas or corporate power). the slogan of endogenous growth was used to denote. endogenous growth strategies were mobilized in declining European industrial regions as well (Hahne 1985: 29–169. Endogenous development strategies and the new politics of place in the 1980s By definition the concept of endogenous local development means that development can be initiated and organized ‘from the inside’.5. labour. ] Central [state] policies have frequently aggravated this. especially in Latin America. simultaneously. Hahne 1985). (a) a method of state intervention into the urban process (oriented towards ‘indigenous’ socioeconomic capacities rather than ‘exogenous’ investments or redistributive transfers). Initially. While their specific political agendas and policy strategies varied extensively. and such institutional resources as the local infrastructure. State Rescaling 195 Box 5. the project of endogenous development was being embraced by a broad array of place-based. and to varying degrees collectively shared. 1986). the notion of self-reliant or endogenous development was introduced as a means to promote economic revitalization in the peripheralized rural regions of western Europe (Stohr and ¨ Taylor 1981). In this sense. They may have been able to redistribute growth during growth-dominated periods but they have been unable to generate local innovative capacity and promote flexibility during periods dominated by restructuring needs. During the Fordist-Keynesian period. as well as through postcolonial initiatives to promote autocentric forms of national economic growth in other zones of the world economy (S. Subsequently. such initiatives articulated a politics of place grounded upon ‘a deeply felt. instead of waiting for—or trying to attract—outside capital and outside firms to foster growth and employment. . the politics of endogenous development were redefined in the context of the import substitution industrialization strategies pursued in the newly industrializing countries. neocorporatist political alliances in crisis-stricken manufacturing regions. the notion of endogenous development was redeployed in the core national states of western Europe with reference to ongoing processes of regional industrial restructuring.

eco-socialist. and. even as most western European national governments continued to promote territorial equalization at a national scale. neocorporatist alliances attempted to establish negotiated strategies of industrial restructuring in which economic regeneration and technological revitalization were to be linked directly to priorities such as intra-regional redistribution. such placebased. Accordingly. in practice. vocational retraining. and to address other ‘new urban left’ concerns such as nuclear disarmament and the rights of women. In the West German discussion. Mayer 1993). Belgian Wallonia. As Hudson and Sadler (1986: 173) note—borrowing a political slogan that was used in opposition to a plant closing in Longwy. Their central goal was to mobilize regionally and locally specific sectoral. the municipal socialist movement attempted to mobilize local councils in order to counteract the neoconservative policies of the consolidating central state under Thatcher (Boddy and Fudge 1984). grounded upon a variety of cross-class. Under these conditions. throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s. technology. class compromise (Hahne 1985. and the English Midlands. to enhance municipal control over capital investment. Likewise. While some commentators characterized these initiatives ¨ as ‘labor-oriented regional policies’ (Stohr 1986). most were. and place-based alliances concerned to rejuvenate locally fixed capital investments and. neocorporatist alliances proliferated within monostructural. and employment policies that would reverse industrial ¨ decline and facilitate economic restoration within particular places (Stohr and Taylor 1981). municipalities were represented as a ‘counterforce’ (Gegenmacht) against national state policies (Bullmann and Gitschmann 1985). from Hamburg and the German Ruhr district to Lorraine and the Nord in France. sectoral. but all viewed municipalities as privileged institutional platforms for various forms of democratic self-determination by local populations. France—these alliances were concerned ‘to defend the right to ‘‘live. in Britain. including Green. more generally. Throughout the early 1980s. feminist. and ethnic minorities . State Rescaling Parkinson 1991). and work’’ in particular places’. rustbelt cities and regions. which was criticized as a bureaucratic monolith lacking genuine democratic accountability. Hudson 1994). socialist. These local reform initiatives were elaborated from a wide range of political perspectives. the Greater London Council (GLC) mobilized a variety of industrial and social policies intended at once to alleviate concentrated unemployment. investments in collective consumption. Rotterdam. and social-democratic standpoints.196 Urban Locational Policy. job creation. Another important strand of endogenous development strategy during this period emphasized the role of cities and regions as strategic arenas for radical political reform and grassroots democratic renewal (Castells 1983. place-specific devaluation’ (Harvey 1982: 420). learn. thereby. Such democratic-associationalist priorities were counterposed to the centralizing administrative hierarchies of the (now increasingly crisis-stricken) Keynesian welfare national state. for instance. to ‘ward off the threat of localized. gays.

the new projects of endogenous development laid the foundations for a customized. scale-sensitive approach to spatial policy that would be focused explicitly upon the regulation of particular places and regions rather than treating them either as subunits of the national space-economy or as localized relay stations within national administrative hierarchies. However. more generally. Some of these neocorporatist local and regional economic initiatives would persist into the 1980s. The salient point here is that such localized strategies of endogenous growth. to promote grassroots democratic control over local territorial units (Lefebvre 2001. Nonetheless. infrastructure. territorial equalization. turbulent political-economic environment. and class compromise were maintained. and autogestion movements entailed the defense of local ‘islands of reform’ and radical economic democracy within an increasingly hostile. the municipality-as-counterforce. the basic Fordist-Keynesian priorities of social redistribution. ‘militant particularist’ loyalties to particular communities and locales (Hudson and Sadler 1986). in a rescaled institutional framework. the democraticassociationalist approach to endogenous development generally coupled its local political initiatives with efforts to forge broader connections to progressive social forces located in other. place-specific socioeconomic assets. In contrast to national policies of territorial redistribution. The endogenous development initiatives of the 1970s and early 1980s were grounded upon a neo-Fordist political project intended to recalibrate the institutional infrastructures of spatial Keynesianism from the national scale to the regional or local scale. Unlike many of the place-based alliances that emerged in older industrial regions during this period. developmental trajectories. cities and regions were now recognized to have their own. these democratic-associationalist approaches to endogenous development played an important role in animating the broader politics of place that was crystallizing during this period in many western European cities and regions. as central governments continued to transpose the costs of economic restructuring onto fiscally enfeebled subnational institutions. In essence. State Rescaling 197 (Eisenschitz and North 1986. Lourau 1974). Mackintosh and Wainwright 1987). In this sense. in which local and regional economies were viewed as agglomerations of generic resources (such as labor. the late 1970s witnessed a variety of ‘self-management’ (autogestion) initiatives by dissident socialist groups and trade unionists concerned to assert workers’ control over major factories and. similarly. then. and in a transformed geoeconomic environment. such movements lost momentum or collapsed ¨ (Kratke and Schmoll 1987). in France. At the same time. And. which often took the form of spatially exclusionary. local socialism. during the second half of the 1980s. however. and raw materials).Urban Locational Policy. and structural problems. economic . albeit now within the more bounded parameters of regional and local economies rather than as a project to be extended throughout the entire national territory. albeit in reconfigured political forms. equally embattled locations and territories.

the subnational neocorporatisms and place-based alliances of the 1970s contributed to the ongoing destabilization of spatial Keynesianism that was gathering momentum during that decade. The 1970s is thus best viewed as a transitional period in which state institutions at various spatial scales attempted to adjust to the destabilizing national. newly formed political coalitions concerned (a) to scale back the redistributive interscalar relays associated with postwar welfarism and (b) to introduce more place-sensitive frameworks of economic governance. democratic renewal. and institutionally inchoate character of endogenous development strategies.198 Urban Locational Policy. due to their differentiating. they were generally grounded upon a rejection of nationally encompassing models of territorial development and oriented towards the goal of promoting endogenous local and regional growth within particular places. given the geographically localized. . it would be problematic to claim that they contributed to the establishment of a new territorial basis for urban development within any European national state. through which a new spatial layer of subnational regulatory arrangements was superimposed upon the nationalized political geographies that had prevailed under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. they established a significant political opening for the more radical rescalings of urban governance and state spatiality that would subsequently unfold. neo-Keynesian priorities continued to predominate at a national level. and territorial self-management first emerged during a period in which spatially redistributive. grounded upon an attachment to specific places and regions. redistributive agendas of spatial Keynesianism. rescaled landscape of state spatiality began to emerge as of the late 1970s. Rather. subnational layer of state spatial regulation and the inherited (if increasingly unstable) national geographies of spatial Keynesianism that the broad contours of a new. Under these conditions. regional. Insofar as the endogenous development strategies of the 1970s were largely uncoupled from the nationally equalizing. It was through the conflictual interaction of this newly emergent. then. Although the new regulatory spaces sought by such modernizing coalitions remained relatively inchoate at both national and local scales. and local effects of geoeconomic restructuring. the first major cracks in the edifice of spatial Keynesianism appeared during a decade that was otherwise the historical highpoint for state projects of national territorial redistribution. politically unstable. Paradoxically. fragmenting impacts upon each national urban system. Yet. The diffusion of endogenous development strategies during this period and into the early 1980s thus appears to have engendered significant institutional fractures within the inherited political geographies of spatial Keynesianism. such regulatory experiments are best understood as localized and regionalized forms of crisis-management. It was characterized by interscalar struggles between political alliances concerned to preserve the nationalized institutional infrastructures of spatial Keynesianism and other. State Rescaling development.

subsequently. leading to a new phase of urban policy reform and state spatial transformation across western Europe. from mercantilism to free trade’. and the rise of urban locational policy During the course of the 1980s. anti-welfarist. or social/christian-democratic countries. The strategies of national and local crisis-management of the 1970s had neither restored the conditions for a new national regime of accumulation nor successfully resolved the deepening problems of economic stagnation. the Bank for International Settlements. 1994) and Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (91/3. see Rhodes. Rhodes 1995. Overbeek 1991. as growth-first. Muller and Wright (1994: 2) contend that a major ‘paradigm shift’ occurred throughout western Europe during the 1980s as the character of state intervention shifted ‘from Keynesianism to monetarism and neo-liberalism. during the course of the 1980s. including the Netherlands. fiscal discipline. the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Denmark. and Wright 1994. Majone 1994. generate Thatcher-style ideological and institutional transformations. which attempted to diffuse neoliberal policy agendas such as fiscal discipline.Urban Locational Policy. in most instances. privatization. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). and deregulation had been adopted not only in the United Kingdom under Thatcher and in West Germany under Kohl. Accordingly. the new interspatial competition. regulatory downgrading. Italy. a variety of international institutions. market-driven logics were increasingly naturalized as the necessary technical parameters within which public policy must be ¨ articulated (Rhodes 1995. By the late 1980s. France. the World Bank. ¨ Muller and Wright 1994. infrastructural obsolescence.5 While such agendas did not. 2000). Spain. Consequently. they nonetheless entailed what might be termed a ‘subversive’ neoliberalization of key arenas of socioeconomic policy. Belgium. from fiscal expansionism to restraint. Heywood. but also in many traditionally social democratic. State Rescaling 199 Neoliberalism. became important agents of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. the process of geoeconomic restructuring intensified and accelerated. and Wright 1997. . trade liberalization. During the same period. Meanwhile. and industrial decline within western European cities and regions. the process of European political and economic integration regained momentum as preparations were made under the Delors Commission for the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) and. This neoliberalization of western European political systems is also examined in special issues of West European Politics (17/3. and Sweden. from dirigisme (explicit or gently disguised) to market-driven solutions. rising unemployment. most European national governments abandoned traditional Keynesian macroeconomic policies in favor of monetarism: a competitive balance of payments replaced full employment as the overarching goal of monetary and fiscal policy (Scharpf 1999). Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Ross 1998). statist. neoliberal political agendas such as welfare state retrenchment. including the International Monetary Fund (IMF). trade liberalization. Peck and Tickell 2002). 5 For useful overviews of these trends.

redistributive approaches to spatial policy were significantly retrenched. and unrestrained foreign direct investment on a global scale (Gill 1995. based upon neoliberal principles such as fiscal discipline. new forms of municipal governance. Tickell and Peck 2003). Jessop 2002. the privatization of public services. Rottger 1997). while also contributing to the weakening and eventual marginalization of the Social Charter within the 1991 ¨ Maastricht Treaty (Pollack 1998. and deregulatory policy agendas were further reinforced and generalized through a series of EUlevel directives. both in western Europe ¨ and beyond (Hirsch 1995. and the new public management. at various spatial scales. subsequently. neoliberalism must be viewed as a concerted political strategy through which qualitatively new forms of state–economy relations have been constructed. were unleashed. political support for large-scale strategic planning projects waned. In the European context. privatized service provision. such market-building. Under these conditions. the mobilization of neoliberal forms of political-economic restructuring during the last two decades has entailed moments of institutional destruction and institutional creation—the former. Wright 1994). including. to extend market-oriented regulatory arrangements. not least at metropolitan and municipal levels. whose revenues had already been reduced significantly during the preceding decade. lean administration. and to enhance the discretionary power of capital at all spatial scales (Brenner and Theodore 2002a. liberalizing. were introduced (Pickvance and Preteceille 1991a.200 Urban Locational Policy. The mobilization of neoliberal critiques of Fordist-Keynesian forms of public policy did not entail a simple ‘rolling back’ of the state as self-regulating markets. the Metropolitan Barce- . and inefficient. foreign direct investment. Meanwhile. above all. State Rescaling labor market flexibility. now supposedly liberated from political constraints. Peck and Tickell 2002). and the latter. and traditional. During the 1980s. insofar as such strategies seek to establish new forms of statecraft and institutional ‘hardware’ through which to enforce market discipline. during the mid-1980s. insofar as neoliberal restructuring strategies strive to dismantle the regulatory infrastructure and social compromises of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. The processes of institutional creative destruction unleashed through these neoliberalization strategies have in turn contributed to the consolidation of post-Keynesian competition states. in order ‘to subject the majority of the population to the power of market forces whilst preserving social protection for the strong’ (Gill 1995: 407). the Single European Act of 1987. From this point of view. welfare state bureaucracies were downsized. inherited metropolitan institutions such as the Greater London Council. and corporate mergers and acquisitions. the consolidation of neoliberal state practices at the EU level and their diffusion among western European national states imposed additional fiscal constraints upon most municipal and metropolitan governments. which massively intensified Europe-wide market integration. Rottger 1997). On the contrary. the English metropolitan counties. expensive. The localized relays of the Keynesian welfare national state were attacked as being excessively bureaucratic.

The intensified fiscal squeeze upon public expenditure in cities and regions and the weakening or dissolution of inherited metropolitan institutions were thus among the major localized expressions of the processes of national welfare state retrenchment that began to unfold during the 1980s. Rodenstein 1987). Drawing upon the notion . among all EU member states. The much-discussed Cecchini Report. qualitatively new forms of state intervention into the urban process were mobilized. European cities were now seen to compete far more directly with one another than had previously been the case. With the removal of national barriers to trade and investment. For. Consequently. EMU) would significantly intensify that competition by undermining the ability of national governments to insulate their cities and regions from transnational market forces by means of monetary and fiscal policies. and simultaneously. While various forms of interspatial competition on a European scale were recognized prior to the 1990s. metropolitan institutions were formally preserved but weakened in practice due to centrally imposed budgetary pressures and enhanced competition between city cores and suburban peripheries for capital investment and state subsidies (Barlow 1991).6 (overleaf) presents some typical expressions of this viewpoint that were articulated by European. During the 1980s and 1990s. subsequently. State Rescaling 201 lona authority.Urban Locational Policy. since the consolidation of the SEM. both defenders and critics of the Cecchini Report concurred that the SEM (and. critics of the Cecchini Report argued that the SEM would reinforce centripetal tendencies within the European economy by strengthening the dominant role of large corporations and major urban regions while further marginalizing peripheral cities and regions (Amin and Malmberg 1994. Dunford and Kafkalas 1992). the consolidation of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1993 was widely viewed as a dramatic ratcheting-up of interspatial competition among urban regions on a European scale. As of this decade. and local policymakers following the introduction of the SEM. and the Rijnmond in Rotterdam were abolished. published in 1988. as cities and regions throughout the EU attempted to adjust to the neoliberalization of key fields of state policy. By contrast. to prepare themselves for the new competitive pressures associated with the Single European Market. famously articulated this view within a neoclassical framework and interpreted the SEM as a means to increase the efficiency of the European economy as a whole (CEC 1991). national. The acceleration of European integration during the second half of the 1980s—itself an expression and product of neoliberal statecraft—also generated new challenges for cities and regions throughout the continent. In other western European city regions. Box 5. the national preconditions for municipal Keynesianism were systematically eroded as local and metropolitan governments were increasingly forced to ‘fend for themselves’ in securing a fiscal base for their regula¨ tory activities (Mayer 1994. the Greater Copenhagen Council. economic competition within the EU has been widely understood as inter-urban and interregional competition rather than as a competition among national economies.

such as London. Paris. In this context. CEC 1992: 44) of Standortpolitik. . I propose to interpret the new approaches to urban governance of the post-1980s period as forms of locational policy.6 As 6 While this term is derived from contemporary German policy debates on Standort Deutschland (Germany as an investment location). has become much more direct. MBZ 1994: 10) The political developments associated with the creation of open borders within Europe and the reunification of Germany have led to a situation in which competition with other metropolises. The Single European Market and the new interspatial competition With the disappearance of national borders within Europe [ . ] [T]he single market will trigger further adjustments in the roles and functions of cities. with Berlin emerging as well ¨ as a new source of competition within our own country (from a planning report commissioned by the municipal government of Frankfurt am Main. it is used here in a more specific. . it is of considerable importance to the Dutch economy that the Dutch urban regions maintain a strong position (from a law on metropolitan institutional reform in the Netherlands approved in 1994. see Brenner 2000b. in addition to their national or regional one (from a report on urban trends published by the European Commission. State Rescaling Box 5. Speer 2000: 1–2) The internationalization of the European economy has intensified the competition between the cities of Europe. This expanding scale [of competition] occurs in conjunction with a concentration and specialization of economic activities in various realms. ] Changes in national urban hierarchies will occur as some cities emerge onto a wider European stage. social-scientific sense. Amsterdam or Zurich. M. Kratke 1999. as national boundaries and interests will be less important than before. . MoE 1992: 11) The completion of the internal market and the abolition of internal frontiers within the Community is the latest stage in the process of internationalization [ . But no city will get anything for free in future transnational competition. . . For more detailed discussions of the ideology and practice of locational policy in the contemporary ¨ German context. ] urban regions (cities and suburbs) are competing internationally with other urban regions. Increased inter-urban competition for development will be an important driving force [ .6. . which has become a keyword of German neoliberal political discourse since the late 1980s.202 Urban Locational Policy. The single market in the European Community will provide new opportunities for the cities and towns in Denmark. An active effort is required to obtain the potential benefits (from a 1992 national spatial planning document in Denmark. .

and local state institutions throughout western Europe in order to promote the territorialized competitive advantages of strategic cities and regions in relation to supranational (European or global) spaces of economic competition (Cheshire and Gordon 1996). urban locational policies have been mobilized aggressively by national. they sig7 A variety of strands of contemporary urban political economy have amassed extensive evidence for the proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades. 1996. More recently. at various spatial scales. Mayer 1992). help constitute—in producing and maintaining territorially embedded competitive advantages (Cooke and Morgan 1998. Locational policies may involve direct subsidies and other public schemes to lure the investments of specific firms. albeit from a different methodological and political angle. the essential feature of locational policies is their overarching goal of enhancing the economic competitiveness of particular places. Begg 1999. Insofar as urban locational policies broke decisively from top-down. like the endogenous growth policies that had prevailed during the preceding decade. many studies of local production milieux.g. Concomitantly. the new urban locational policies emphasized place. which state institutions at various spatial scales (European. In short. territories. Lefebvre 2003a). and local) are now actively attempting to cultivate. In this transformed political-economic context. the locality is increasingly construed as a ‘breeding ground for new productive forces’. Garofoli ` 2002.Urban Locational Policy. Le Gales and Voelzkow 2001. Storper and Salais 1997). and nationally encompassing approaches to the regulation of urban development. but are increasingly viewed as dynamic growth engines through which national territorial competitiveness may be promoted. or scales in relation to broader. in significant ways. standardized. Gordon 1999.and scale-specific regulatory problems and mobilized place. the vast literatures on urban entrepreneurialism have underscored the enhanced mobilization of local state institutions to promote economic development and to attract external capital investment (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993. Since this period.and scale-specific forms of state intervention in order to confront them. supranational circuits of capital accumulation. industrial districts. they have most frequently been mobilized at a national scale. It is only since the 1980s that western European states have deployed locational policies extensively at an urban scale. Harding 1997. a number of studies of territorial competition in the EU have likewise documented the proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades (see e. in the field of urban governance. For instance. For. regional. 1995). While locational policies have a long history under modern capitalism.7 The urban locational policies of the 1980s and early 1990s built. as Lipietz (1994: 37) notes. in conjunction with national-developmentalist strategies of industrialization and nationalized approaches to territorial development (McMichael 1996. . State Rescaling 203 conceived here. Cheshire and Gordon 1998. cities are no longer seen as containers of declining industries and intensifying socioeconomic problems. and regional innovation systems have explored the role of place-specific regulatory systems—which state institutions. but they are best understood as being oriented towards the general conditions for capital accumulation within particular territorial jurisdictions. national. Hall and Hubbard 1998. upon the legacies of previous strategies of endogenous development.

urban locational policies have been generalized throughout the European urban system. Whereas endogenous development strategies attempted to combine the agendas of economic rejuvenation and territorial redistribution within particular subnational spaces. In at least four key respects. post-Keynesian competition states were scrambling to enhance their competitive advantages within a rapidly integrating global and European space-economy. . However. and growth-promotion (Cheshire and Gordon 1996). Bologna. By contrast. State Rescaling nificantly deepened the fragmentation and erosion of spatial Keynesianism that had been initiated during the previous wave of urban policy reform. oriented towards the goal of positioning major cities and cityregions strategically within supranational scales of capital circulation. or local political-economic coalitions embarked upon proactive programs of place-marketing. 1. the endogenous development strategies of the 1970s emerged in a political-economic context in which western European national governments remained firmly committed to the priority of national spatial equalization. 3. Rotterdam. advanced infrastructure investment. regional. Whereas endogenous development strategies attempted to promote ‘selfreliant’. autocentric places. Whereas endogenous development strategies were mobilized above all within crisis-stricken manufacturing cities and regions. ‘national commitments to geographically ‘‘balanced’’ growth in the name of equity have increasingly given way to concern with the way in which the characteristics of particular localities can enhance the growth prospects of firms and support national economic competitiveness’ (Harding 1997: 307). or recast in terms of. the urban locational policies of the post-1980s period have entailed a significant break from the endogenous development strategies of the preceding decade. urban locational policies have privileged the goals of securing territorial competitiveness and promoting economic growth. urban locational policies have been aggressively extrospective. and Glasgow—in which national. Redistributive concerns have not disappeared from the field of urban governance. Under these circumstances. Anecdotal evidence suggests that urban locational policies were pioneered during the early 1980s in a number of vanguard cities and regions—such as Hamburg. but they have been subordinated to. locally controlled forms of economic renewal within relatively bounded. but they have been largely dissociated from the field of urban economic policy (Keil 1998b). as these initial. However. Lyon. Lille. Consequently. The issues of popular control and local democratic accountability have continued to arise within urban political struggles. Birmingham. then. entrepreneurial priorities (Mayer 1994). the project of promoting territorial redistribution at any spatial scale was increasingly viewed as ‘a luxury belonging to an earlier period of ¨ economic growth’ (Lapple 1985: 52).204 Urban Locational Policy. 2. the urban locational policies of the 1980s and early 1990s were articulated under conditions in which newly consolidated. developmentalist.

During the initial round of crisis-induced regulatory restructuring of the 1970s. endogenous development strategies destabilized the institutional foundations of spatial Keynesianism while preserving. Figure 5. entrenched. This situation. 4. and local governments throughout western Europe to adopt closely analogous initiatives within their own cities and cityregions (Harding 1997. . and urban locational policies as distinct but partially overlapping approaches to the regulation of capitalist urbanization. coupled with the widespread embrace of an ‘alarmist vocabulary of globalization’ (Eisenschitz and Gough 1998: 762) after the introduction of the SEM. the urban locational policies of the post-1980s period also systematically suppressed their spatially redistributive agendas. urban locational policies built upon the subnational policy repertoires and institutional scaffolding that had been forged through the endogenous development strategies of the preceding decade. Figure 5. and as we shall see. While some urban locational policies have indeed been initiated through the activities of local growth coalitions.7 is also intended to underscore the incremental and path-dependent. at subnational scales. and eventually generalized across the western European urban system. Leitner and Sheppard 1998). However. character of urban governance restructuring since the early 1970s. in a subsequent round of crisis-induced regulatory experimentation. from the European and the national to the regional and the urban. from the neoliberalization processes outlined above (Peck and Tickell 2002). the latter are now embedded within a significantly transformed intergovernmental context in which both European political institutions and national states have imposed new competitive pressures and ` fiscal constraints upon cities (Le Gales 2002). they have played a major role in the generalization of urban locational policies across western Europe. it was on the basis of this recently established layer of place. State Rescaling 205 ad hoc experiments in urban locational policy were diffused. regional. endogenous development strategies. in which local or regional institutions steered the process of regulatory experimentation. even as they drew upon certain regulatory instruments of endogenous growth strategies. led national.7 (overleaf) provides a schematic comparison among spatial Keynesianism. a political commitment to the project of territorial equalization.Urban Locational Policy. and thus targeted them with particular intensity for various types of urban locational policies. Indeed. rather than linear. These new. Whereas endogenous development strategies were grounded primarily upon bottom-up initiatives. the costs and risks associated with a failure to mobilize such policies intensified. urban locational policies have emerged through the interaction of multiple scales of political authority.and scale-specific forms of state intervention that urban locational policies could be articulated. National governments now came to view their most globally integrated cities and city-regions as key motors for national economic growth. and competition-oriented interscalar rule-regimes have been derived. in significant measure. market-driven. During the 1980s.

place.7. . and territorial competitiveness at a particular scale Key Cells shaded gray Cells enclosed within bold lines unique features of a given approach features shared with another approach Fig. self-propelled unit of economic development Multiscalar: promotes economic development by positioning a particular scale strategically within broader.and scale-specific forms of spatial policy Promotes balanced development and territorial redistribution at a particular scale Urban Locational Policy: early 1980s-present Regional and urban Grounded upon customized. Three approaches to urban governance: spatial Keynesianism. external capital investment.206 Urban Locational Policy. endogenous development strategy.and scale-specific approaches to urban governance were thus transformed from a basis for promoting economic rejuvenation and territorial redistribution within crisis-stricken industrial urban regions (1970s–early 1980s) into a means for positioning major cities and regions strategically within global and European spatial divisions of labor (post-1980s period). self-propelled unit of economic development Autocentric: promotes a particular scale as a relatively selfcontained. 5. State Rescaling Predominant Predominant mode of scale of implementation operation Major regulatory goal ‘Projected’ geography of economic development Autocentric: promotes a particular scale as a relatively self-contained. transnational interscalar hierarchies and networks Spatial Keynesianism: 1960s--early 1970s National Mobilizes generic spatial policies evenly across the entire national territory Promotes balanced development and territorial redistribution at a particular scale Endogenous Development Strategy: 1970s-early 1980s Regional and urban Grounded upon customized. and locational policy Place. place-and scale-specific forms of spatial policy Promotes economic growth.

compete against one another in order to maximize profits and economic growth. The goal of locational policy. national. like capitalist firms. Fordist-Keynesian understanding of cities as localized subunits of national economies. When applied to such entities. by providing a suitably skilled labor force. . Given the earlier. by lowering investment costs. the notion of competitiveness is an attribute of capitalist firms. Budd 1998.’ For our purposes. either for firms or for territories. regional. As long as the concept of national competitiveness remains in currency then no single state is likely to opt out. In this viewpoint. Camagni 2002. Begg 1999. Some economists. from the OECD and the European Commission to national governments. regional administrations.8 However. this new emphasis on urban territorial competitiveness in 8 See e. then. by increasing productivity levels. and entrepreneurial municipalities. For Krugman. is to promote territorial competitiveness by maintaining and continually expanding the capacities for profit-making and economic growth that are embedded within specific political jurisdictions. Krugman (1994: 31) argues. therefore. or countries. and urban policymakers across western Europe have become concerned to enhance various attributes of cities that are considered to contribute to their ‘competitiveness’ relative to other global and European investment locations (Gordon 1999. there seems little likelihood of policy-makers actually heeding his warnings and refraining from both the rhetoric and the reality of competitive policy measures. regions. and Lovering 1999.Urban Locational Policy. Krugman’s critique of competitiveness discourse among economists and policymakers has been addressed in the urban studies literature as well. locational policies hinge upon the assumption that territorial units. the notion of competitiveness represents a ‘dangerous obsession’ because they ‘have no well-defined bottom line’. in which a number of scholars have debated the intellectual plausibility of divergent conceptions of urban locational competitiveness. State Rescaling 207 Urban locational policies and the question of territorial competitiveness At any spatial scale. Lever 1999). notably Paul Krugman (1994). As Dicken (1998: 88) explains: ‘Whether Krugman is right or wrong in his analysis. by creating an innovative environment or by means of other strategies intended to enhance the value of economic activities located within its boundaries (Begg 1999). it is not necessary to embrace a particular definition of competitiveness.g. not of territorial units such as cities. have criticized attempts to apply the notion of competitiveness to territorial units. even the most subtle deconstructions and critiques cannot occlude the mounting evidence that territorial competitiveness has become a pervasive concern among policymakers at all scales of political authority. the ‘dangerous obsession’ of territorial competitiveness cannot be dismissed as a mere conceptual fallacy or ideological illusion. Consequently. The key point here is that. since the early 1980s. the competitiveness of a given territory is said to flow from its capacity to achieve these goals effectively and durably—whether by attracting inward investment flows.

among others. at various spatial scales. social democratic or offensive approaches to urban locational policy attempt to capitalize upon strong forms of inter-firm competition. depending on the balance of costcutting. in practice. as Lovering (1999: 389) notes: ‘The choice invoked by the concept of competitiveness is not simply between favouring different industries and firms. deregulatory state initiatives. Urban locational policies have been articulated in divergent political forms. According to Storper and Walker (1989). and locally specific types of urban locational policies that have crystallized in western European city-regions during the last two decades. Instead I proceed on a meso level in order to specify three key axes on which basis such policies may be decoded. Neoliberal or defensive approaches to urban locational policy attempt to capitalize upon weak forms of inter-firm competition. Whereas weak competition is oriented towards the reduction of costs and the redistribution of resources within a given spatial division of labor (static comparative advantages).208 Urban Locational Policy. regionally. More generally. they are based upon the assumption that lowering the costs of investment within a given territory will attract mobile capital investment and thus enhance its competitiveness. Veltz 2000). they are based upon the assumption that territorial competitiveness hinges upon the provision of non-substitutable socioeconomic assets such . and those that attempt to enhance firm productivity and innovative milieux within the jurisdiction in question (Leborgne and Lipietz 1991). It is no less than a choice between different visions of the collective economic and cultural future. Cheshire and Gordon 1996). upon a diverse range of assumptions regarding the sources of competitive advantage within local economies and the role of state institutions. ideological. in the present context. they have been grounded. State Rescaling relation to supranational circuits of capital represents a striking political. in promoting the latter (Begg 1999. different social structures and different national economic geographies. While such policies are frequently justified with reference to the widely disseminated writings of business school gurus such as Michael Porter (1990) and Kenichi Ohmae (1990).’ I shall not attempt. Forms of territorial competition. Urban locational policies may likewise be oriented towards weak or strong forms of inter-firm competition. to compare systematically the nationally. and scalar realignment (Lovering 1999. The proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades is at once an expression and an outcome of this changing conception of how cities contribute to economic life. but is also about deciding between different groups of workers. 1. both within and among national intergovernmental systems. strong competition is oriented towards the transformation of the conditions of production in order to introduce new technological capacities and a new spatial division of labor (dynamic competitive advantages). inter-firm competition under capitalism occurs in weak and strong forms. By contrast.

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as innovative capacities, collaborative inter-firm networks, advanced infrastructural facilities, and skilled labor power (Eisenschitz and Gough 1996). Within any national or local context, the precise balance among neoliberal/ defensive and social democratic/offensive approaches to locational policy is an object and outcome of intense sociopolitical struggles over the form of state intervention into the urban process (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). 2. Fields of territorial competition. Building upon Harvey’s (1989a) study of urban entrepreneurialism, four distinct fields of urban locational policy may be delineated according to the particular circuits of capital they target. First, urban locational policies may attempt to enhance a city’s advantages within spatial divisions of labor, generally by establishing or strengthening placespecific conditions for the production of particular types of goods and services. Second, urban locational policies may attempt to enhance a city’s advantages within spatial divisions of consumption, generally by creating or strengthening a localized infrastructure for tourism, leisure, or retirement functions. Third, urban locational policies may attempt to enhance a city’s command and control capacities in the spheres of finance, information processing, and government. Finally, urban locational policies may attempt to enhance a city’s economic capacities by procuring governmental resources, whether from the European Commission or from national state agencies. While these fields of territorial competition may be distinguished analytically, most urban locational policies attempt, in practice, to enhance a city’s position simultaneously within multiple fields. 3. Geographies of territorial competition. Finally, urban locational policies entail the delineation of determinate geographical parameters within which the process of economic development is to unfold. These parameters may be defined with reference to three key elements. First, urban locational policies generally entail the demarcation of determinate spaces of competitiveness within which place-specific economic capacities are to be mobilized—for instance, central business districts, inner-city enterprise zones, revitalized manufacturing and port areas, new media enclaves, high-technology suburbs, and so forth. Second, urban locational policies entail the targeting of broader spaces of competition, including the Single European Market and the world economy as a whole, within which cities (or some component thereof) are to be positioned as attractive investment locations. Third, a variety of spatially selective political strategies may be mobilized in order to position urban spaces of competitiveness within supranational spaces of competition (Healey 1998; Jessop 2002: 190–2). For instance, some urban locational policies attempt to transform an urban economy into a key articulation point within a nested hierarchy of regional, national, and supranational economic spaces. Other urban locational policies may attempt to delink an urban economy from surrounding regional and national economic spaces by expanding its command and control capacities or its supranational transportation and communications links. Still other urban locational policies may attempt to

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reorganize inherited urban hierarchies—whether vertically, through the promotion of new forms of cooperation among different tiers of state power (for instance, within metropolitan regions); or horizontally, through the promotion of transversal alliances among geographically dispersed cities occupying complementary positions in the European or global division of labor (see Ch. 6 below). Therefore, even though all urban locational policies strive, in some manner, to position cities and regions favorably within supranational circuits of capital, this goal may be pursued through diverse political-geographical strategies (Jessop 1998). Urban locational policies have an inherently speculative character due to ‘the inability [of political alliances] to predict exactly which package [of local investments] will succeed and which will not, in a world of considerable economic instability and volatility’ (Harvey 1989a: 10–11). Moreover, urban locational policies are often grounded upon untenable assumptions and unrealistic predictions regarding the possible future trajectories of local economic development (see Ch. 6). Despite these endemic problems, the proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades has engendered a fundamental transformation in the character of state intervention into the urban process throughout the EU. Most crucially for our purposes, urban locational policies have not only entailed an intensified mobilization of state institutions to promote territorial competitiveness within strategic local economies; they have also contributed to a fundamental rescaling of state institutions themselves.

Mapping state spatial selectivity in post-1980s western Europe: urban locational policies and the rescaling of state space
If the Keynesian state was concerned to integrate its constituent regional and local economies and to cushion them from economic instability, the approach of its successor [ . . . ] has been to dismantle and fragment those systems of support in deference to the restructuring forces of global competition, destabilizing its regions in the process. Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (1997: 282; italics in original) What we are witnessing with the demise of Fordism is the emergence of much greater geographical unevenness in the system of regulation. The abandonment of national redistributive strategies and the emerging global mosaic of regional economies have led to the development of a parallel mosaic of differentiated spaces of regulation. Mark Goodwin and Joe Painter (1996: 646)

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Insofar as urban locational policies were first mobilized within formations of state spatiality that had been inherited from the Fordist-Keynesian era, their institutional and geographical consequences were highly uneven, varying considerably within each national, regional, and local context according to (a) the resilience of preservationist political alliances concerned to defend the institutionalized social compromises and territorial arrangements of the Fordist-Keynesian order; and (b) the distinctive strategies of restructuring and rescaling adopted by modernizing political-economic forces (Lipietz 1994). Consequently, the diffusion of urban locational policies in western European national states did not simply erase earlier geographies of state regulation, but generated contextually specific, politically contested rearticulations of inherited state spatial configurations at a range of geographical scales. In general terms, the rescaled geographies of state spatiality that crystallized during the post-1980s period must be conceived as expressions of a conflictual, path-dependent interaction between (a) the standardized, nationally configured regulatory geographies that were inherited, albeit in a destabilized form, from the transitional period of the 1970s; (b) the endogenous development strategies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, with their goal of mobilizing negotiated, place-specific restructuring strategies to address localized socioeconomic crises; and (c) subsequent forms of urban locational policy, with their goal of mobilizing place- and scale-specific forms of state intervention to enhance urban territorial competitiveness. However, despite the incremental, path-dependent character of state spatial restructuring following the initial crisis of North Atlantic Fordism, it was evident, by the late 1980s, that rescaled configurations of urban governance and state spatiality were being superimposed upon inherited national regulatory geographies. Whereas early forms of urban locational policy were articulated while the institutional framework of spatial Keynesianism was still being provisionally defended at a national scale, the consolidation and subsequent diffusion of such policies during the post-1980s period entailed a more sustained attack upon that framework. As urban locational policies acquired increasingly prominent regulatory roles within post-Keynesian competition states, the nationalized, centralized, standardized, and redistributive policy relays associated with spatial Keynesianism came to be viewed as major institutional impediments to the new priority of enhancing the territorial competitiveness of cities and city-regions. Under these circumstances, a radically transformed interscalar framework for the regulation of capitalist urbanization was seen to be required in order to maximize the place-specific locational advantages of major cities and city-regions. The process of envisioning and establishing such an interscalar framework was geographically uneven, institutionally diffuse, and politically contested. It involved a variety of Europe-wide, nationally specific, and place-based debates regarding the appropriate institutional form and strategic orientation of (national, regional, and local) state intervention into the urban process.

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Accordingly, much like the endogenous development strategies of the preceding decade, post-Keynesian initiatives to reconstitute the national, regional, and local geographies of urban governance were initially grounded upon ad hoc, trial-and-error intergovernmental realignments, policy adjustments, and regulatory experiments. Eventually, however, with the entrenchment of neoliberal policy agendas at a European scale and the progressive consolidation of postKeynesian competition state regimes at a national scale, these reform initiatives gained significant political momentum and acquired an enhanced institutional solidity.9 Consequently, across western Europe, the nationally standardized political geographies of spatial Keynesianism were eroded; inherited relays of national territorial redistribution were ruptured; centralized systems of intergovernmental relations were recalibrated; and qualitatively new, competitionoriented frameworks of interscalar regulation were introduced. These newly constituted, state-organized interscalar rule-regimes were explicitly designed to facilitate urban locational policies by channeling ‘the strategic options and tactical behavior of local actors’ (Peck 2002: 338) towards developmentalist, competitiveness-driven agendas. More generally, such interscalar rule-regimes attempted to institutionalize entrepreneurial, competitiveness-oriented, and ‘growth first’ approaches to urban governance (a) by exposing cities and regions more directly to geoeconomic pressures and (b) by subjecting them to competitive regimes of intergovernmental resource allocation based upon market position, performance, and efficiency rather than social need (Peck and Tickell 2002: 47–8). From this point of view, the new interlocality competition of the post-1980s period cannot be understood simply as the aggregate expression of localized policy responses to global and European market integration. On the contrary, the grim, neoliberal requirement for cities to ‘compete or die’ (Eisenschitz and Gough 1998: 762)—which aptly encapsulates the aggressively competitive spatial logic underlying urban locational policy—must be interpreted as a politically
9 Such initiatives were further reinforced through the activities of diverse supranational organizations—including the European Commission, the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations, and URBAN 21—which likewise began to advocate a variety of national intergovernmental reforms during this period in the name of priorities such as territorial competitiveness, administrative efficiency, market responsiveness, and fiscal responsibility. Various aspects of national administrative reform and territorial governance were thematized in diverse EU, World Bank, OECD, and United Nations documents as of the late 1980s, resulting in a range of ‘expert’ policy recommendations regarding the need to reorganize the public sector. URBAN 21 is a more recent ‘expert commission’, funded by the governments of Germany, Brazil, South Africa, and Singapore, and assigned to evaluate the challenges of contemporary urban policy around the world (see Hall and Pfeiffer 2000). The role of these and other supposedly neutral supranational bodies in providing political support and ideological legitimation for the remaking of national state spaces during the last two decades has yet to be investigated empirically. Wright (1994) provides a highly suggestive, but largely anecdotal, foray into such an analysis with reference to the diffusion of ‘new public management’ approaches across western Europe. While the issue of cross-national policy transfer has been examined in detail with reference to welfare-to-work initiatives and other ‘Third Way’ reform agendas (Peck 2001a, b; Peck and Theodore 2001), this process remains to be investigated in other institutional spheres. Such an analysis would arguably form a key element within any systematic account of the political geographies of neoliberalism (see also Wacquant 1999; Peck and Tickell 2002).

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constructed imperative that was imposed upon local and regional economies in significant measure through the rescaling of national state spaces. Concomitantly, national states should not be conceived as static territorial containers within which urban locational policies have been mobilized. Rather, national state institutions actively promoted such policies by recalibrating their internal intergovernmental hierarchies, modes of intervention, and policy repertoires in order to facilitate the strategic positioning of their major local and regional economies within Europe-wide and global circuits of capital. Building upon the theoretical framework introduced in Ch. 3, and replicating the analytical strategy deployed in Ch. 4 to analyze the political geographies of spatial Keynesianism, the key elements of this transformation of urban governance and state spatiality during the post-1980s period are depicted in Fig. 5.8 (overleaf). First, urban locational policies were grounded upon qualitatively new state spatial projects intended to enhance state capacities for mobilizing place-specific forms of intervention within strategic cities and cityregions. To this end, state regulatory configurations were decentralized towards subnational tiers and customized according to place- and jurisdiction-specific conditions. Second, urban locational policies were grounded upon qualitatively new state spatial strategies intended to enhance the competitiveness of major cities and city-regions. To this end, state institutions at various spatial scales promoted the localization of major socioeconomic assets within strategic urban and regional economies and the increasing differentiation of urban and regional developmental pathways across the national territory. Thus, in contrast to the centralized, standardized, and nationalized geographies of state space that prevailed under the Fordist regime of accumulation, the establishment of this new, competitiveness-oriented institutional infrastructure for urban governance during the post-1980s period entailed an increasing geographical splintering, fragmentation, and differentiation of state space at various spatial scales. This rescaling of state space was closely intertwined with a fundamental inversion of inherited postwar approaches to the political regulation of uneven spatial development. Whereas postwar strategies of spatial Keynesianism were oriented explicitly towards the alleviation of territorial inequalities, the mobilization of urban locational policies during the post-1980s period actively intensified uneven spatial development in a variety of ways—(a) by promoting a systematic reconcentration of socioeconomic capacities within each national territory’s most globally competitive locations, (b) by encouraging divergent, place-specific forms of economic governance, public service provision, and territorial administration within different subnational political jurisdictions, and (c) by institutionalizing competitive relations, whether for public subsidies or for private investments, among major subnational administrative units. In his recent study of the transatlantic circulation of neoliberal workfare policies, Peck (2002) has underscored the ways in which, rather than treating intra-national spatial polarization as a regulatory problem requiring political intervention, national, regional, and local state institutions are today

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Urban Locational Policy, State Rescaling
STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES Increasing localization of socioeconomic assets as national, regional, and local state institutions attempt to enhance territorial competitiveness within strategic urbanized spaces Cities and city-regions are viewed as key geographical engines of economic development within increasingly volatile global and European interscalar hierarchies Increasing differentiation of national political-economic space as state institutions attempt to channel major socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructure investments into the most globally competitive urban and regional spaces This generates an increasing divergence of social welfare standards and an enhanced differentiation of developmental pathways among local economies within each national territory

SCALAR DIMENSION

Tendential decentralization of state administrative arrangements towards subnational tiers of political authority Regional and local state institutions acquire new responsibilities in the development, financing, and implementation of economic development policies

TERRITORIAL DIMENSION

Increasing customization of state administrative arrangements according to place- and jurisdictionspecific conditions and priorities This generates an increased differentiation of local and regional institutional forms and an enhanced divergence of local and regional policy regimes across each national territory

Fig. 5.8. Urban locational policies and the transformation of state spatial selectivity (builds on Fig. 3.9, p. 97, compare Fig. 4.2, p. 132)

explicitly promoting geographical differentiation, interlocality competition, and spatial unevenness within their territories. Peck’s (2002: 356) description of neoliberal workfare policies therefore provides a strikingly appropriate characterization of urban locational policies in post-1980s western Europe:
Uneven geographic development is being established as an intentional, rather than merely incidental, feature of the delivery of workfare programs, while local experimentation and emulation are becoming seemingly permanent features of the policymaking process. Under workfarism, spatial variability, the churning of persistently reformed programs, rapid interlocal policy transfers, and the ceaseless search for local

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success stories that are ripe for replication are all effectively normalized. In stark contrast to the aspirations to fair and equal treatment under welfare regimes, when spatial unevenness, local discretion and instances of atypical [ . . . ] treatment were often constituted as policy problems in their own right [ . . . ] workfare makes a virtue of geographic differentiation, subnational competition, and [ . . . ] circumstance-specific interventions.

The multifaceted interplay between the consolidation of post-Keynesian competition state regimes, the restructuring of European urban economies, the rise of urban locational policy, and the rescaling of state space is summarized schematically in Fig. 5.9 (p. 217). Boxes 5.7 and 5.8 (pp. 218–19) summarize the major state spatial projects and state spatial strategies through which urban locational policies have been mobilized during the post-1980s period. These diverse pathways of politico-geographical and institutional transformation have engendered a ‘new scalar gestalt of governance’ characterized by the dominance of a ‘boosterist, entrepreneurial development vision’ within strategic urban locations and, frequently, by the contraction of inherited lines of democratic accountability at multiple scales of state power (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2003: 22). I shall not attempt here to provide a comprehensive, comparative account of each of the spheres of policy reform, regulatory experimentation, and institutional restructuring summarized in Boxes 5.7 and 5.8, or to trace systematically their variegated sociospatial consequences in different European cities, regions, and national states. Instead, drawing on evidence from across the western European city-system, the remainder of this chapter examines three specific realms of political-institutional restructuring that clearly illuminate the links between urban locational policy and the rescaling of state space: (1) the decentralization of intergovernmental relations; (2) the metropolitanization of national spatial planning systems; and (3) the splintering of large-scale urban infrastructural configurations.

Box 5.7. Key state spatial projects promoting urban locational policy Since the [national] state cannot seek to assure everywhere the same form of macroeconomic regulation [ . . . ] the issue is to equip the regional armatures with more powerful instruments of economic and social regulation and to reserve for the nation-state the administration of the external relation (support to industries, administration of foreign exchange). In comparison to Fordism, which is above all and by definition ‘national’, this new division of capacities between the national and the regional means a contraction of the national legislation and collective agreements and a larger variability for the regional armatures in their choice of the social protection level. (Lipietz 1994: 38)

the managerial.and area-specific institutional forms. Intergovernmental devolution. Prominent examples of this trend have included enterprise zones. They have also frequently entailed the suspension of existing planning regulations in favor of ‘exceptional’ (but increasingly normalized) policy tools and modes of intervention within strategic areas or infrastructural configurations (Swyngedouw. National. In both federal and unitary states.and jurisdiction-specific conditions within each national territory.and scale-specific problems of economic governance (Fox Przeworski 1986. customizing state spatial projects have included: . These reconstituted or newly established metropolitan institutional forms are intended to bundle together region-wide socioeconomic assets. communitybased organizations (Mayer 1994. and Rodriguez 2002). and local governments have attempted to channel urban (re)development into particular locations by introducing new. to market major city-regions as unified locations for external capital investment. regional. At the same time. clearly delineated urban zones. zero-sum forms of intra-regional competition (Brenner 2003a. . particularly from the early 1990s. Such institutions are often autonomous from local state control and dominated by unaccountable political and economic elites. to intensify and accelerate economic growth within strategic. 6). Keating 1998). market-driven approaches to public management and have established new forms of public–private partnership to promote economic rejuvenation. The construction of place. Local economic regulation is increasingly grounded upon flexible governance networks that involve not only entrepreneurial local state institutions but also various private actors and ‘third sector’. As national governments have promoted fiscal retrenchment. Such projects of intergovernmental rescaling have been viewed as a means to promote fiscal retrenchment within state bureaucracies while impelling subnational institutions to seek new sources of revenue through proactive economic development programs. Clark 1997). Moulaert. . such rescaling initiatives have enabled regional and local state institutions to introduce customized regulatory arrangements and policy strategies oriented towards place.and scale-specific institutional forms. public service functions of local governments have been streamlined or privatized. training and enterprise councils. . State Rescaling Urban locational policy has been grounded upon state spatial projects oriented towards an enhanced decentralization of state regulatory capacities and an extensive customization of state administrative arrangements according to place. Lefevre 1998). . The new priorities of maximizing administrative efficiency and enhancing consumer responsiveness have thus superseded the traditional goal of facilitating local social welfare. in some manner.216 Urban Locational Policy. all of which have been designed. new forms of metropolitan economic coordination have been introduced (see Ch. urban development corporations. Local states have introduced new. Metropolitan institutional reform. and to minimize de` structive. national governments have devolved various regulatory responsibilities to subnational administrative units. These decentralizing. Local government reorganization. and development planning boards. airport development agencies. jurisdiction. inward investment agencies. In many European city-regions.

and jurisdictionspecific conditions and state spatial strategies • Promotion of cities and city-regions rather than the entire national economy as key scales of economic competitiveness • Concentration of major socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructure investments into the most economically dynamic and globally competitive cities and city-regions Key elements of post-1970s urban restructuring • Industrial restructuring reworks postwar patterns of urban and regional development • The spread of flexible production systems enhances the importance of localized. . and the rescaling of state space in post-1970s western Europe (compare Fig. locational policy.Urban Locational Policy. . .3. place-specific socioeconomic assets and innovative capacities • Accelerated geoeconomic and European integration generates new forms of economic uncertainty for cities and regions • Interlocality competition intensifies as cities and regions attempt to attract investment from mobile capital The rise of endogenous development strategies place. . zero-sum bidding wars erupt among localities competing to attract mobile capital investment • The geographies of state regulation are increasingly splintered and differentiated.9. 134) . demand management policies are undermined • Priorities of promoting territorial competitiveness. fiscal responsibility. . State Rescaling Rise of postKeynesian competition states • Traditional Keynesian welfarist. major cities and city-regions are increasingly targeted for such policies State spatial selectivity is transformed by means of new . Urbanization. and technological innovation gain significance The rise of urban locational policy (Standortpolitik) proliferation of placeand scale-specific state initiatives designed to enhance territorially embedded competitive advantages in global and European circuits of capital. p. 4. labor market flexibility. state spatial projects . 5. thus undermining the relatively uniform administrative structures that had prevailed under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism • New forms of uneven spatial development and territorial inequality proliferate at all scales Fig. 217 • Decentralization of key state regulatory capacities towards subnational scales • Customization of state administrative arrangements according to place.and scalespecific state initatives designed to promote negotiated forms of economic rejuvenation and territorial redistribution within crisis-stricken industrial cities and regions Major consequences • Cities and regions are increasingly forced to ‘fend for themselves’ to secure local revenues and external capital investment • Predatory.

. the priorities of maintaining a good business environment. Key state spatial strategies promoting urban locational policy many countries are . which emphasized public welfare and collective consumption initiatives. These localizing. In contrast to earlier. . to national economic competitiveness and performance (Leitner and Sheppard 1998: 294) Urban policy no longer aspires to guide or regulate the direction of economic growth so much as to fit itself to the grooves already established by the market in search of the highest returns (Smith 2002: 94) Urban locational policy has been grounded upon a variety of state spatial strategies oriented towards the localization of major socioeconomic assets and the concentration of advanced infrastructural investments within the most globally competitive cities and cityregions. and promoting local economic growth now predominate (Hall and Hubbard 1998. State-financed mega-projects and advanced infrastructural investments. and local state institutions have channeled public resources into large-scale development projects within strategic urban infrastructural configurations. metropolitan-centered state spatial strategies have included: . city-centric approaches to national spatial planning have explicitly targeted metropolitan regions for external capital investment and for major public infrastructural projects. State Rescaling Box 5. particularly large cities. national governments have demarcated the most competitive urban regions within their territories as key geographical focal points for state-sponsored economic development initiatives and strategic planning programs. .8. these new ‘metropolitanized’ approaches have been oriented above all towards the goal of enhancing the place-specific competitive advantages of major local and regional economies within global and European markets. Through ‘partnerships’ with private and community-based organizations. National. municipal governments have mobilized a range of entrepreneurial policies intended to promote local economic (re)development. Mayer 1992). In contrast to earlier forms of urban managerialism. concentrating their public expenditures on their most dynamic. . compensatory approaches to spatial planning. industrial policies. . . ] are seen as the motors for national competitive success [ . attracting external capital investment. local states have sought actively to acquire additional public subsidies through national or European industrial and sectoral programs. Whereas spatial planning previously served as a mechanism of territorial redistribution. ‘metropolitanized’ spatial planning policies. These policies have included labor market programs.218 Urban Locational Policy. Rescaled. Such urban . and property redevelopment campaigns (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993. . globally-linked agglomerations at the expense of basic equity issues both within these agglomerations and between them and other areas of the national territory. ] national governments across western Europe have increasingly come to stress the potential contribution of cities. . infrastructural investments. Local economic initiatives. regional. Leitner and Sheppard 1998). At the same time. These rescaled. placemarketing initiatives. (Scott and Storper 2003: 588) Cities [ .

waterfronts. Decentralization tendencies and the recalibration of intergovernmental relations The growing significance of spatial-structural factors for the competitiveness of firms points unequivocally to the need for decentralization policies and a redefinition of the competencies of national.Urban Locational Policy. Moulaert. . According to Sellers’s (2002: 91) evaluation. decentralized approaches to regional industrial policy have been mobilized not only through extant governmental institutions. These urban mega-projects and high-performance infrastructural investments have also served as an institutional mechanism through which national. such as France and Spain. While these institutional realignments were most dramatically evident within historically centralized states. and Swyngedouw 2003). State Rescaling 219 development projects have included airports. . place-specific infrastructural foundations for high value-added capital investment and dynamic economic activity within and among strategic urban nodal points. they have usually generated significant spatial consequences insofar as the targeted firms and sectors are agglomerated within major urban and regional economies. far-reaching programs of decentralization were undertaken in many other western European states as well. and tourist/recreational facilities. These new. regional. national governments throughout western Europe began to transfer diverse public policy responsibilities to subnational (regional and local) administrative tiers. office complexes. . advanced telecommunications networks. . Rodriguez. gaining rapidly in significance is the expansion of the competence and the financial scopes of regional and local administrations. ] What is . Pickvance and Preteceille 1991a). lasting transformations within inherited intergovernmental landscapes (Crouch and Marquand 1989. . high-technology enclaves. . Under conditions of intensifying interlocality competition. and local states channel public funds into strategically located. While such policies have not always been oriented explicitly towards specific geographical areas. this new emphasis on ‘governing from below’ entailed nothing less than . and regional state institutions have mobilized various policy initiatives in order to create decentralized inter-firm networks. but also through newly established urban and regional development agencies designed to facilitate inter-firm networking and enhance innovative milieux in strategic subnational territorial areas (Cooke and Morgan 1998). business parks. regional and local policy-making authorities [ . Decentralized approaches to industrial policy. Moulaert. . such state-led urban development initiatives have been intended to provide the customized. convention centers. bridges. leading to profound. The objective is to build institutional structures that make it possible to shape the structures in local and regional industrial locations . and Rodriguez 2002. logistics centers.and medium-sized firms (Ansell 2000). Dirk Messner (1997: 31) As of the early 1980s. particularly among small. market-oriented development initiatives (Swyngedouw. national. European.

‘The more that national. however. even though decentralization cannot be reduced to the agenda of enhancing urban territorial competitiveness. Thus. social democratic and associationalist demands for enhanced local democracy. and external capital investment within major city-regions. for such intergovernmental realignments were intended simultaneously to ‘limit the considerable welfare demands of urban areas and to encourage lower-level authorities to assume responsibility for growth policies that might reduce welfare burdens’ (Harding 1994: 370). named after a former mayor of Marseille who served in the national government during the reform process. In short. hierarchical. Insofar as programs of fiscal decentralization often reduced central grants to subnational governmental tiers and enhanced municipalities’ dependency upon locally collected taxes. this priority figured crucially in the formulation and implementation of such programs across western Europe during the post-1980s period: . One of the most comprehensive programs of intergovernmental decentralization was initiated by the Socialist government in France as of the early 1980s. In many instances. they impelled local alliances. the more that governing from above has depended on governing from below. local and regional populations—could more directly influence subnational policy outcomes (Ansell 2000). and vertically integrated national administrative frameworks that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period. more autonomy of decision and control of resources. decentralization programs were also animated by developmentalist claims that ‘local and regional tiers [of the state system] are better placed to forge durable and interactive relations with firms’ (Cooke and Morgan 1998: 23). and Kreukels 2003a: 12). in some cases. The 1982 Loi Defferre. to become ‘more receptive to strategies to increase local investments’ (Salet. regardless of their political orientation.’ The decentralization initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s were motivated by a variety of political agendas. decentralization initiatives can be viewed as an essential institutional mechanism for the mobilization of urban locational policies. gave ‘more power. and ideologically hybrid arguments regarding the superior efficiency of decentralized models of public service provision (Keating 1998. intermediate and transnational governments have tried to shape urban political economies. as Sellers (2002: 90) concludes. economic growth. In addition to these positions. State Rescaling a ‘sea change in prevailing ideas about how policy making should be done’. Wright 1998). decentralization programs also established qualitatively new regulatory instruments through which regional and local state institutions could promote industrial regeneration. Thornley. In contrast to the highly centralized.220 Urban Locational Policy. more . including neoliberal critiques of welfarism. more generally. the post-1980s wave of decentralization established new subnational layers of state institutional organization and regulatory activity through which major local and regional political-economic actors—and. established local governments that were formally independent of direct central control and. In this sense.

Schmidt 1988: 54. including the wage tax (Lohnsummensteuer) and the tax on working capital (Gewerbekapitalsteuer). and planning policies (Bade 1998. Local governments were subsequently impelled to engage more actively in the mobilization of local economic development programs. Schmidt 1988: 63). The mobilization of urban locational policies by municipalities was not directly mandated by the German federal government or the Lander. Mayer 1992). During this period of heightened fiscal austerity. or regional presidents. State Rescaling 221 responsibilities and competencies to the non-central tiers of government— ´ municipalities. The institutional structure of German federalism was redefined during the post-1970s period (Jeffery 1998. Meanwhile. In the German federal system. .Urban Locational Policy. . on the right or the left [ . thus triggering ‘an unprecedented amount of local economic activism’ (V. and innovation’ and impelled ‘all local elected officials. . departmental presidents. 63). whether mayors. but this trend was ¨ . they were subsequently transformed into ‘the equivalent of local industrial development brokers’ (V. 1987). for it ‘incorporated a mandate to all levels of local government to promote economic development. departements and regions’ (Preteceille 1991: 127). business expansion. a countervailing process of intergovernmental decentralization was initiated during the 1980s under the Kohl government. various significant sources of local revenue. Following a wave of centralizing crisis-management measures during the 1970s. ] to see one of their major roles as that of fostering the ‘‘enterprise spirit’’ and of encouraging the growth of business in their constituencies’ (V. municipal budgets were severely constrained ¨ (Haußermann 1991). Consequently. the decentralization programs of the 1980s institutionalized this priority and provided new regulatory mechanisms through which it could be pursued. were cut back through federal legislation. and many Lander began more actively to mobilize regionally and locally specific ¨ industrial. the Lander ¨ and the municipalities acquired new regulatory tasks and financial burdens. Esser 1989). considerable responsibility for mobilizing these new economic development programs was transferred to regional councils. municipalities were ‘confronted with a scissors movement of growing tasks and burdens on the one hand and structurally limited financial resources for local policies on the other hand’ (Hanesch 1997: 32). As of the mid-1980s. In practice. technology. which were viewed as a means simultaneously to secure additional public revenues and to address deepening socioeconomic problems (Esser and Hirsch 1989. labor market. Benz 1998). Biarez 1994). Schmidt 1988: 67. While local economic initiatives had been mobilized by French municipalities as of the mid-1970s. which came to play a key role in coordinating relations between the DATAR and local authorities. as both the federal government and the Lander reduced their ¨ grants to local governments. This decentralization program served as a ‘major spur to local economic development’. then. the intergovernmental shifts of the 1980s served primarily to shift expenditures downwards to the Lander and the municipalities while ¨ consolidating revenues within the central government (Hesse 1991.

Rotterdam. and downsizing measures that significantly reduced municipal revenues (Kickert 1996. Under the Lubbers coalition cabinets. Nonetheless. by the new centrally and regionally imposed ¨ fiscal constraints of this period (Rodenstein 1987). a number of decentralizing reforms were accompanied by budgetary cuts. these intergovernmental realignments only minimally facilitated the mobilization of local entrepreneurial policies. impelling national and local state agencies to continue to coordinate decision-making authority on major policy. . they subsequently evolved through a variety of power-sharing. and the Hague) as well as the establishment of new informal mechanisms of coordination and cooperation for the Randstad as a whole in the form of a Randstad Administrative Council (Bestuurlijk Platform Randstad). However. which enabled municipalities to continue to derive the bulk of their revenue from central grants. planning. According to the Montijn Report.and medium-sized firms (Weiss 1989). intergovernmental decentralization proceeded during the 1980s in close conjunction with national fiscal austerity measures and a retrenchment of municipal finance. and a series of subsequent governmental policy studies. However. Kreukels and Spit 1989). The latter were designed (a) ‘to encourage entrepreneurship. by the end of the decade. regional governments became the ‘planners and pace-setters of industrial policy. advocated the creation of four ‘agglomeration municipalities’ (agglomeratiegemeenten) in the major Randstad cities (Amsterdam. Due to the extreme fiscal centralization of the Dutch state. the decentralization initiatives of the post-1970s period deepened this ‘territorially differentiated development strategy’ by facilitating the mobilization of regionally based. State Rescaling facilitated. such administrative reforms were . a more radical program of national and local administrative reform was mobilized that explicitly embraced the priority of enhancing territorial competitiveness within major Dutch cities and city-regions. In the wake of these shifts. place-specific economic policies (Weiss 1989: 116). investment and innovation’ and (b) ‘to expand the marketing opportunities of individual firms and regionally typical products and services’ within Italy’s major industrial districts (Weiss 1989: 117). devising innovative growth strategies and delivering a rich array of services to the local economy’ (Weiss 1989: 109). in fundamental ways. Italian national economic policies had long contributed significantly to the consolidation of decentralized production systems based upon small. redistributive approaches to regional policy. co-management arrangements between the central government and regional authorities (Gualini 2001). the basic institutional elements of the Dutch system of co-governance (medebewind) were maintained during this period.222 Urban Locational Policy. and budgetary issues (Toonen 1993. a commission of prominent corporate executives and government officials that had been appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Utrecht. 1991). privatization initiatives. Intergovernmental decentralization programs were initiated in Italy during the 1970–7 period in conjunction with a retrenchment of postwar. particularly but not exclusively in the Third Italy. . The 1989 report of the Montijn Committee. In the Netherlands.

Urban Locational Policy. . . (MBZ 1989: 43) The existing organization of tasks and responsibilities has created difficulties for the large cities as they attempt [ . the question of intergovernmental reform re-emerged under a new rubric—the need to enhance the territorial competitive advantages of major Dutch cities under conditions of intensifying European interspatial competition. such debates focused predominantly upon issues of bureaucratic efficiency and public service provision. While the Montijn Committee’s specific proposals were not successfully implemented. ] to secure a strong position for themselves within the single European market. (MBZ 1990: 13) The problem of the ‘regional gap’ between the provinces and the municipalities has generated recurrent debates on intergovernmental reform in the Netherlands since the late 1950s (Toonen 1993.9. In this context. during the late 1980s and early 1990s. to ensure the long-term dynamism of the Dutch national economy as a whole (MBZ 1989. which were seen as a means to address place-specific economic problems and regulatory challenges in urban regions (WRR 1990). This council also advocated the creation of various special-purpose administrative districts. . For example: . they initiated an intensive nationwide debate on administrative reform and territorial competitiveness in Dutch city-regions that persisted into the 1990s (Box 5. 1987). A variety of alternative intergovernmental frameworks were proposed. By contrast. ] competition between European urban regions becomes ever more important for the economic welfare of the participating countries [ . ] The time is ripe for change which. . Intergovernmental reform in the Netherlands: the quest for bestuur op niveau The administrative organization of the Netherlands has become an increasingly heavy handicap (of its own making!) as the acute [ . more generally. WRR 1990). . State Rescaling 223 essential in order to bolster the place-specific competitive advantages of major Dutch cities relative to their European competitors and. must be accomplished swiftly. 1989). The Montijn Committee and the Advisory Council on Internal Administration (Raad voor het binnenlands bestuur) advocated the introduction of new administrative units—either small-scale provinces or large-scale municipalities—in the major Randstad cities (MBZ 1990. During the postwar period up through the mid-1970s. The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) advocated an intensive fiscal decentralization of the Dutch state in order to facilitate local entrepreneurialism. . a series of widely discussed policy studies commissioned by the national government argued that inherited administrative structures were undermining the economic competitiveness of Dutch cities relative to other European metropolitan centers. . in any case. Box 5. all of which entailed the creation of new urban and metropolitan institutional arrangements designed to facilitate local economic development. .9).

By this time. As the preceding discussion illustrates. it sought to create seven metropolitan regions by 2001 that would encompass 171 municipalities and roughly 40 per cent of the entire Dutch population. The Framework Law was officially approved in the national parliament in July 1994 by a ‘purple coalition’ composed of Social Democrats. and the call for administrative reform proposals ‘‘from below’’ ’ (Toonen 1990: 85–6). through the creation of qualitatively new institutional tiers within established intergovernmental hierarchies. a number of significant formal and informal changes were enacted within the Dutch intergovernmental system. the rejection of uniformity and administrative blueprints imposed ‘‘from above’’. decentralization was not the only form of intergovernmental rescaling through which . the national government’s proposal to establish ‘city-provinces’ (stadsprovincies) in Amsterdam and Rotterdam was rejected by the local populations within each of these cities in the late 1990s. as the case of Thatcherite Britain demonstrates. or through some combination of the latter methods. The Dutch national cabinet’s plan for administrative reform in these urban regions was elaborated during the early 1990s in a trilogy of policy documents entitled Bestuur op Niveau (BON). plurality in administrative forms. State Rescaling Building upon these proposals. regional variation. However. Whereas intergovernmental restructuring had become a central political project of the Dutch national government as of the early 1990s. and the broader intergovernmental reform agenda embodied in the Framework Law was subsequently put on hold. through new. Brenner 1999c). one of their encompassing goals was to establish new state capacities for economic coordination. which roughly means ‘Administration at the Right Scale’. As a result of these national and local debates concerning ‘administration at the right scale’. the cabinet proposed the creation of new metropolitan authorities (stedelijke gebiedsauthoriteiten) in seven major Dutch city-regions—including the four large Randstad cities as well as Arnhem-Nijmegen. and ´ Enschede-Hengelo.224 Urban Locational Policy. the debates on intergovernmental reform that had been initiated during the late 1980s contributed to a major reorientation of urban governance in major Dutch cities during the subsequent decade. The Framework Law provided a temporary but legally binding basis for institutional restructuring in the seven urban regions that had been selected by the central government as sites for administrative reform. Nonetheless. and Liberal Democrats (D66). centrally imposed fiscal pressures. industrial policy. and place-marketing within the major Randstad cities (Terhorst and van de Ven 1995. infrastructure investment. To this end. While these intergovernmental realignments were multifaceted and assumed place-specific forms in different provincial and municipal jurisdictions. Liberals (VVD). Eindhoven-Helmond. Toonen 1993. the BON proposals were further concretized in 1992 through the introduction of a Framework Law on Administrative Restructuring (Kaderwet bestuur in verandering). However. above all in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. intergovernmental decentralization frequently impelled subnational state institutions to engage more actively in the promotion of urban economic development—whether through explicit programs to transfer responsibilities for such tasks downwards within state administrative hierarchies. various projects of administrative reform had gained significant momentum on the local level. its implementation hinged upon political negotiations and struggles within each of the metropolitan regions that were targeted for reform. the Dutch national cabinet subsequently embraced an administrative reform policy oriented towards ‘tailor-made solutions. On a national level.

10). throughout the 1980s. such as the Metropolitan County Councils (MCC) and the Greater London Council (GLC) were abolished as the central state attempted to create alternative. The central state imposed new fiscal constraints upon local governments through a combination of spending control measures and rate-capping policies. The central state established new.Urban Locational Policy. This regional state solution entailed ‘the removal of sub-national state functions to non-electoral local states. while electoral local governments are left formally in position but with much reduced powers’ (Duncan and Goodwin 1989: 249). Such institutional innovations were intended to deregulate restrictions on local economic development and to provide financial incentives to private firms for investing within certain centrally designated urban areas. the reconfiguration of central–local relations played a key role in a centrally guided accumulation strategy designed to promote London as a global and European financial center while suppressing the territorialized opposition of both industrial capital and manufacturing workers. intergovernmental relations were transformed in conjunction with a neoliberal program of political-economic and spatial restructuring. For. (Harding 1989: 35) Urban policy was arguably the arena in which the full character of the neoliberal response to the crisis of British Fordism first became evident. . . were streamlined. Freeports. non-elected regional and local state agencies that it could directly control. 1990. or privatized. (Wilks-Heeg 1996: 1266) In the UK under Thatcher.10. Key elected metropolitan institutions. in the British case. . Towards central government localism? Intergovernmental reform and urban locational policy in Thatcherite Britain Sources: Harding 1989. a wave of concerted intergovernmental centralization was initiated during the course of the 1980s that likewise fundamentally transformed the institutional fabric of urban governance and contributed to a marked proliferation of urban locational policies (Box 5. . . such as council housing and public transportation systems. Indeed. Box 5. The central state attempted to integrate private-sector interests more directly into extant and newly established local political institutions. Central government has used its legislative supremacy [since the 1980s] to constrain independent local authority initiatives and to limit local control over the development process. Legislative and administrative power has also been used significantly to extend the role of central departments. such as Enterprise Zones. Major urban public services. centrally appointed agencies and the private sector in the formulation and implementation of urban economic development policy. and Urban Development Corporations. Duncan and Goodwin 1989. including that within London itself. contracted out. These fiscal austerity measures were manipulated so as to affect Labour councils most significantly. Pickvance 1991. State Rescaling 225 urban locational policies were promoted during this period. The basic elements of these intergovernmental realignments can be summarized as follows: . market-oriented local institutions.

The centralization of intergovernmental relations enabled the British national government to circumvent recalcitrant local authorities and to establish a new. functions. The rescaled state spaces that were produced through intergovernmental restructuring during this period did not result from a unilinear transfer of regulatory capacities downwards to subnational institutional tiers. these intergovernmental realignments were at once intensified and accelerated throughout western Europe due to the increasing role of regional or ‘meso’ institutions within the multilevel intergovernmental hierarchies and policy relays of the EU. any effective decentralization [of state power] is reliant on complementary changes at the central level. an intensified geographical differentiation of subnational regulatory arrangements was imposed by central government fiat. the Thatcherite central state attempted to impose a neoliberal approach to urban locational policy upon municipal councils that generally remained committed to local welfarism and to negotiated projects of endogenous economic development. through intergovernmental restructuring. Sharpe 1993. Le Gales and Lequesne 1998. and indeed instead presupposes an expansion of controlling capacities and modified tasks for central management (networking and development of strategic visions for the overall enterprise instead of central management of all corporate divisions). As Messner (1997: 31) explains: Just as in modern corporations greater autonomy for profit centers does not in the least imply any sort of abolition of the top corporate levels. differentiated layer of subnational regulatory institutions oriented towards. the realignments described above were premised upon centrally coordinated recalibrations of intergovernmental relations that redefined the forms. the rescaling of intergovernmental relations in the UK entailed a profound reconfiguration of state institutions at both local and national scales—for it was only as of the 1980s that the British central government adopted an aggressively activist orientation towards the issue of local economic governance. In this instance. . market-oriented infrastructure for urban governance in UK cities. a 10 ` See Jones and Keating 1995. rather than through the negotiated.10 The 1980s was thus a decade in which the inherited intergovernmental hierarchies of the Fordist-Keynesian period were significantly recalibrated. among other priorities. Keating 1998. the consolidation of ‘central government localism’ (Duncan and Goodwin 1989) in Britain likewise entailed the establishment of a new. as elsewhere in western Europe. and policy outcomes of intergovernmental rescaling varied considerably by national context. While the political mechanisms. institutional pathways. The centralization of intergovernmental relations in the UK under Thatcher. decentralizing approaches to intergovernmental restructuring that prevailed within other western European states.226 Urban Locational Policy. though apparently ‘out of step’ (Crouch and Marquand 1989) with western European trends. Moreover. local economic development. But. Rather. and scalar configuration of state institutions at both subnational and national scales. During the late 1980s and early 1990s. State Rescaling In short. clearly illustrates this point.

and Anton Kreukels (2003a: 12) A number of major trends are visible in the 12 Member States. insofar as the intergovernmental rescaling processes of this period opened up a political space in which territorially customized. place-specific administrative arrangements and regulatory regimes could be established. ] There is [ . however. even though they tend to be stronger and more advanced in those with a long history of spatial planning [ . some [national governments] are obliged to continue to give some support to backward regions. they served as important institutional catalysts for the activation of urban locational policies in western European cities. Indeed. post-1980s competitive context they feel the need to place their bet on the strongest regional horses [ . State Rescaling 227 general trend towards decentralization became evident in most western European countries during this period.Urban Locational Policy. ] For electoral reasons. A growing sophistication in the means of attracting inward investment and a freer choice as regards location for many companies has strengthened the need for spatial plans to respond more fully to market circumstances and requirements. spatial planning is arguably one of the politico-institutional arenas in western Europe in which the interplay between state rescaling and urban locational policy has been most . Andy Thornley. . 1960s and even 1970s. . The metropolitanization of national spatial planning systems In the 1950s. uniform political geographies that had prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period and created rescaled national institutional landscapes in which divergent. italics in original) As we saw in Ch. spatial planning has become a major institutional arena in which the rescaling of state space has been promoted. Increased competition in the Single Market is a major factor underlying this trend. national spatial planning systems contributed in key ways to the establishment and reproduction of nationalized state spaces during the Fordist-Keynesian period. in significant measure as a means to facilitate the mobilization of locational policies within major urban regions. . 4. these intra-national decentralization tendencies differentiated the relatively standardized. but their real concern remains the improvement of the strong regions. More generally. Along with the increasing Europeanization of intergovernmental hierarchies. but in the new. More recently. . Willem Salet. national governments used to support backward regions. place-specific regulatory arrangements could be constructed. Commission of the European Communities (CEC 1994: 142. . . ] a wider recognition of the need to take account of market forces within the spatial planning process.

increasingly. an emphasis on the European institutional context in which local. Often in direct conjunction with the former tendency. As of the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Since the mid-1980s. National spatial planning systems have been comprehensively reorganized so as to replace traditional. 1. . Comprehensive national reforms. national. and national spatial planning initiatives are embedded. an emphasis on the perceived constraints associated with intensified global and European economic competition rather than the project of integrating local spaces into a cohesive national space-economy. an emphasis on regulatory coordination among state institutions at multiple spatial scales rather than unilaterally centralized. . State Rescaling dramatically evident. and cross-border regions—as the privileged focal points for state spatial intervention. this rescaling of national spatial planning frameworks has been promoted along two main pathways. . territorially customized spatial planning reforms within strategic urban regions and development zones. including: . rescaled approach to spatial planning has been characterized by a number of key features. . 2. but entail the demarcation of qualitatively new geographical targets—such as strategic city-regions. globally competitive cities and city-regions rather than lagging. . Area-based. regional. national. an emphasis on unleashing urban growth potentials and enhancing urban territorial competitiveness rather than redistributing resources from overheated urban cores into underdeveloped or non-industrialized zones. this new. territorially customized reforms.10 indicates. and local governments have also mobilized area-based. While both of these rescaling projects have been initiated and managed at a national scale. territorially redistributive role of spatial planning policies was eroded during the course of the 1970s. generally by central government planning agencies. As Fig.228 Urban Locational Policy. 5. top-down control. We have already seen above how the compensatory. regional. These comprehensive reform projects generally encompass the entire national territory. developmentalist policies oriented towards major metropolitan regions. major international transportation corridors. and. an emphasis on strategic. a qualitatively transformed approach to national spatial planning was forged in major western European states. regional. they have also entailed new forms of regulatory coordination among local. outlying towns and rural peripheries as the most urgently important targets for state spatial intervention. redistributive policy relays with new. EU-level state institutions (Atkinson 2001). Such place-specific approaches to spatial planning are viewed as a means to unleash growth capacities and attract inward capital investment within major cities and cityregions that are considered to be essential to national economic competitiveness.

underdeveloped areas. Reworking spatial planning in post-1980s western Europe: from nationalization to metropolitanization? . globally competitive cities and city-regions Spatial planning serves as a key political mechanism of urban (and. centralized: Predominant the national state imposes mode of implementation its standardized spatial planning agenda upon subordinate regional and local state institutions within a relatively inflexible administrative hierarchy Implications for forms of state spatial selectivity Spatial planning serves as a key political mechanism in the nationalization of state space during the postwar period Fig. and splintering of state space during the post-1980s period Major geographical targets National economy as a whole Outlying towns. 5. promoting economic growth. private capital investment. underdeveloped areas. differentiation.Urban Locational Policy. decentralized: spatial planning is increasingly grounded upon the flexible coordination of regulatory activities among diverse scales of state institutional organization. in some cases. and lagging regions Top-down. and attracting mobile capital 229 Predominant regulatory response(s) Redistributive regional policies: goal is to channel employment. particularly those that are already tightly embedded within. regional) locational policies Strategic urban regions.10. or connected to. State Rescaling Nationalized spatial planning systems (1960s--1970s) Perceived regulatory problems Overheating of urban cores due to rapid economic growth and physical expansion Intra-national territorial disparities undermine macroeconomic stability ‘Metropolitanized’/rescaled spatial planning systems (1980s--present) Accelerated economic restructuring coupled with intensified global and European interspatial competition Maintaining territorial competitiveness. from the European and the national to the regional and the local Spatial planning serves as a key political mechanism in the rescaling. and rural peripheries Spatial planning serves as a key political mechanism of intra-national territorial redistribution New. ‘metropolitanized’/ rescaled forms of state spatial planning: goal is to reconcentrate socioeconomic assets. and public infrastructure into outlying towns. and advanced infrastructural investments within strategic. developmental capacities. European and global circuits of capital and transportation networks Multilevel.

. Hamburg. developmentalist approaches to spatial planning. State Rescaling Among major western European national states. Crucially. The ROG. and Stuttgart—as the ‘engines of societal. and Denmark. and the HRA emphasized urban regions rather than the entire national economy as the most crucial geographical target for spatial planning policies. the German Spatial Planning Law (Raumordnungsgesetz—ROG) was radically redefined and a new approach to national spatial planning was introduced through the Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Orientation (Raumordnungspolitischer Orientierungsrahmen—ORA) and the Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Implementation (Raumordnungspolitischer Handlungsrahmen—HRA). . the Netherlands. growth-oriented forms of national urban policy. Munich. ] are the regional growth engines for the spatial development of the national territory as a whole’ (BMBau 1993a: 6). As of the mid-1990s. national governments have introduced explicitly metropolitanized.2. but also in less densely urbanized regions as well. Rhine-Ruhr. the ORA. often in close conjunction with new. economic.230 Urban Locational Policy. a regionalization of spatial planning is required because ‘The major urban regions [ . these policy initiatives privileged the question of urban territorial competitiveness as the central focus of national spatial planning. which depicts the major urban targets for spatial planning initiatives within thick hexagonal enclosures. the HRA introduced a project to create ‘city networks’ (Stadte¨ netze) that would bundle the socioeconomic assets of small. In each of these contexts. more internationally significant regional clusters for economic planning and industrial development (Map 5.3. This new political emphasis on ‘agglomerations of international or inter-regional standing’ is illustrated in Map 5. The HRA reinforced this regional focus with reference to the same constellation of economic priorities and delineated six ‘European metropolitan regions’—Berlin-Brandenburg. 232). And in each instance. the issue . In explicit contrast to the earlier focus on the equalization of industrial growth and the overcoming of spatial disparities within the national territory. p. While the problematic of socio-territorial ‘equalization’ (Ausgleich) remained central to this rescaled approach to national spatial planning.and medium-sized German cities and towns and thus establish larger. comprehensive reforms of spatial planning systems have been most prominent during the post-1980s period in Germany. these new approaches to spatial planning were mobilized not only in the largest metropolitan regions. According to the ORA. A strengthening of ‘endogenous regional capacities’ was thus viewed as the appropriate means to enhance the competitiveness of ‘Germany and its regions as investment locations’ (BMBau 1993a: 13). To this end. Rhine-Main. . social and cultural development’ (BMBau 1995: 27–9). the rescaling of spatial planning regimes has been justified as a necessary political response to the pressures imposed by intensified European and global interspatial competition.

.2. State Rescaling 231 Map 5. Targeting city-regions: the metropolitanization of national spatial planning in the FRG Source: Federal Ministry for Regional Planning. Building and Urban Development (1993: 5).Urban Locational Policy.

3. was fundamentally redefined in terms of the federal government’s new priority of enhancing the territorial competitiveness of major urban regions (Box 5. State Rescaling Map 5.232 Urban Locational Policy. these policy realignments entailed the most comprehensive reconfiguration of national spatial planning in the FRG since its introduction during the mid-1960s. German ‘city networks’ as forms of urban locational policy ¨ ¨ Source: BMBau. Bundesministerium fur Raumordnung.11). Bauwesen und Stadtebau (1996: 19). Taken together. Within this new framework. intra-national uneven spatial development is understood as a necessary expression of local and .

In post-unification Germany. the equalization of living conditions was thought to entail the replication of certain minimum infrastructural conditions and levels of service provision across the entire national territory. italics added) The redistributive agenda of German spatial planning has traditionally been justified as an effort to execute Article 72 of the German federal constitution (Grundgesetz). Reworking the politics of uneven geographical development: the case of spatial planning in post-unification Germany How shall we organize the spatial structures of our country so that they [ . (DB 1994: 2) The classical Fordist problem of spreading growth from core industrial regions into the ‘lagging’ peripheries has thus been superseded. during the post-unification period. place-specific locational advantages. and position in the international spatial division of labor.Urban Locational Policy. State Rescaling 233 Box 5. Enough room for maneuver (Spielraum) must be maintained to enable different trajectories as well as initiatives from below (Eigeninitiativen) [ .11. ] The state cannot guarantee an equalization in all areas. its substantive political and geographical content has been. and it will be posed more explicitly as the process of globalization continues Klaus Topfer. ] secure economic competitiveness for this location (Standort) relative to other locations (Standorten) in Europe and the world? This is the central question. During the postwar period. fundamentally inverted. However. in practice. the post-reunification redefinition ¨ of national spatial planning has generated qualitatively new understandings of what this requirement entails. Federal Minister of Spatial Planning ¨ (1998: 19. the Spatial Planning Report of 1993 redefined the notion of ‘spatial equalization’ through a distinction between the ‘equivalence’ (Gleichwertigkeit) and ‘similarity’ (Gleichartigkeit) of regional conditions: The equivalence (Gleichwertigkeit) of living conditions should not be confused with their similarity (Gleichartigkeit). but can merely provide assistance for investments and initiatives—particularly in the realm of infrastructure—that favor selfreliant regional development. developmental trajectory. then. Although the priority of socio-territorial equalization (Ausgleich) is still formally embraced within the official discourse of national spatial planning. . by various political initiatives designed to differentiate national economic space among specialized urban regions—each with its own unique. . . Analogously. which requires the ‘uniformity of living conditions’ (Einheitlichkeit der Lebenverhaltnisse) through¨ out the national territory (Vath 1980: 152–9). national spatial planning has been redefined from a political mechanism for alleviating intra- . the project of equalizing life conditions has been equated increasingly with intensified intranational geographical differentiation and local economic specialization. which argued that ‘the alleviation of spatial inequalities can only be realized in the long-term through the concerted promotion of self-reliant regional trajectories’ (BMBau 1993a: 21). in post-unification Germany. This fundamental policy reversal was made most explicit in the 1993 Framework for Spatial Planning Policy Orientation (ORA). By contrast. . regional economic specialization—and thus as the appropriate geographical basis for national competitiveness—rather than as a hindrance to sustainable macroeconomic growth.

Their goal was to develop ‘an internationally competitive climate for inward investment in a limited number of [Randstad] cities’ while encouraging major regional economies throughout the Netherlands to ‘make full use of their own particular assets’ (Galle and Modderman 1997: 15–16). The VINEX definitively abandoned the earlier policy of promoting deconcentrated growth on a national scale. the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning of 1988 and the Fourth Report Extra of 1990 (known by its Dutch acronym.4). the postwar framework of spatial planning. Extensive investments in the ‘mainports’ (the Rotterdam harbor and Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport) and other ‘key locations’ (toplocaties) were presented as a key precondition for ‘stimulating a metropolitan business climate that is internationally competitive [and] drawing new business to the Randstad’ (Staalduine and Drexhage 1995: 192). VINEX). Under these circumstances. These new frameworks for national spatial planning specified the Randstad megalopolis as the regional engine of national economic growth and. Accordingly. nine urban ‘spearheads’ were delineated as the major growth clusters of the Dutch national economy. 1991). city regions and locations were primarily assessed—and classified—in terms of their ‘‘potential’’ as a locational environment for pre-selected ‘‘target groups’’ of companies. State Rescaling national territorial inequalities into a form of urban locational policy designed to enhance the competitive positions of major German urban regions within global and European circuits of capital. has been radically reversed since the late 1980s. and capital investment into that region (Faludi and van der ¨ Valk 1994. . Meanwhile. MVROM 1988. particularly within the Randstad and the ‘Central Netherlands Urban Ring’ (Stedenring Centraal-Nederland) (see Map 5. which was oriented towards the spatial diffusion of urbanization beyond the western agglomeration of the Randstad. services and households’ (Vermeijden 2001: 223). Tommel 1992). in the Netherlands. The VINEX was introduced in 1990 and significantly extended the major policy agendas of the Fourth Report (Faludi and van der Valk 1994. in addition to delineating nine specialized ‘urban nodal points’ (stedelijke knooppunten) as the primary spatial units of economic growth. on this basis. the Fourth Report introduced the conception of ‘regions on the strength of their own assets’ (regio’s op eigen kracht) as a crucial part of its strategy to promote internationally competitive investments within each of the county’s major regional economies. The . These realignments were initiated through two major national spatial planning initiatives. spatial planning was transformed into an ‘economic policy of location factors’ in which ‘regions. advocated the systematic reconcentration of socioeconomic assets. in favor of a new ‘compact cities’ approach oriented towards the intensive concentration of urban growth in close proximity to existing settlements and transportation corridors. advanced infrastructures.234 Urban Locational Policy. Analogously.

State Rescaling 235 Map 5.Urban Locational Policy. Rescaling national spatial planning in the Netherlands: ‘urban nodal points’ as targets for locational policies Source: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (1987–8: 96). .4.

the VINEX promoted new forms of spatial planning.236 Urban Locational Policy. Prime Minister Poul Schluter proposed to transform Copenhagen into ‘the power centre of Scandinavia’ (Hansen. the mobilization of intensively customized. An equally fundamental transformation of spatial planning unfolded in Denmark as of the late 1980s. the goal of ‘appropriate multiplicity’ thus replaced that of ‘equality’ as the overarching priority for national spatial planning (Jørgensen. the IJ-embankment and the eastern port zone in Amsterdam. and socioeconomic policy on the scale of the Randstad as a whole in order to enhance the region’s competitive position in European and world markets. the ‘raison d’etre of regional policy changed from addressing interregional inequalities to boosting the contribution of every region to national economic competitiveness’ (Halkier 2001: 328). And finally. all central government regional subsidy and incentives ˆ programs were summarily terminated. Shortly thereafter. and the Danish national government subsequently introduced a new approach to spatial planning oriented towards the promotion of city-regions. In addition. the conservative-liberal national government established a new. ten ‘areas subject to combined spatial and environmental policy’ (ROM-Gebieden) were delineated in order to regulate territorial development in strategic socioeconomic sites such as Schiphol airport. In this context. the Rotterdam seaport. place-specific locational policies at urban. particularly Copenhagen and its surrounding metropolitan fringes. infrastructural investment. The 1992 spatial planning report. and regional scales became one of the overarching agendas of Dutch spatial planning. Following a decade of industrial decline and intensifying unemployment in Copenhagen. State Rescaling VINEX also outlined various ‘key projects’ (sleutelprojecten) through which large-scale infrastructural investments were to be directed into strategic locations within major urban regions—including. . the Green Heart (central agricultural area) of the Randstad. Denmark in the Year 2018. as the growth engines of the ¨ national economy as a whole. In particular. and Nielsen 1997: 47). Andersen. the IJsel lake between Amsterdam and Almere. the Central Station zone in the Hague. Kjœrsdam. In this manner. In 1990. and various additional environmentally sensitive locations. initiated a variety of large-scale infrastructural projects and planning schemes intended to enhance urban territorial competitiveness and supranational connectivity in Copenhagen and the transnational Ørestad region (MoE 1992). like the Fourth Report. the 1989 National Planning Report stated that conditions were no longer appropriate to pursue ‘the former doctrine of regional equality’ (Andersen and Jørgensen 2004: 4). business-oriented Metropolitan Development ˚ Board (Hovedstadens Udviklingsrad) and an Ørestad Development Corporation responsible for promoting urban growth within a large plot of land between the central city and the airport. metropolitan. and the Kop van Zuid project in Rotterdam. and Clark 2001: 858). most prominently. the national government chan- . the Danish national parliament initiated a debate on Cophenhagen’s future as a global and European economic center. In addition.

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neled public resources into the redevelopment of Copenhagen’s docklands, a new subway line, and the construction of the Sound Link, a combined tunnel ¨ and bridge linking Copenhagen to Malmo, Sweden (Andersen and Jørgensen 1995: 19–20). These new institutional forms and infrastructural configurations signaled a significant break from the earlier, redistributive remit of Danish spatial planning and the consolidation of a new approach to urban develop` ment ‘as a strategic tool in order to achieve a better competitive position vis-avis other European city regions for investments’ (J. Andersen 2003: 98). As a result of this fundamental policy reorientation, Copenhagen was transformed from ‘an urban problem to a national asset within less than five years’ time’ (Andersen and Jørgensen 2004: 4–5). This new, Copenhagen-centric vision of Danish national spatial planning is illustrated in Map 5.5 (overleaf ). In contrast to the cases of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, changes in the Italian, French, and British national spatial planning systems were induced less through comprehensive, nation-wide realignments than through the interaction of national regulatory reforms and diverse, place- and scalespecific policy initiatives. While the consequences of this interaction varied by national and local context, it generally entailed an increased differentiation of subnational institutional forms, regulatory arrangements, and planning techniques within each of these national territories. Moreover, many of the territorially customized, place- and area-specific spatial planning and urban policy initiatives that were mobilized in Italy, France, and Britain during this period were justified explicitly as a means to enhance the international competitive advantages of major urban areas. Such locally and regionally specific planning reforms ‘punctured’ inherited systems of national spatial planning by channeling socioeconomic assets, major infrastructural investments, and public resources into designated urban nodal points that were in turn to be positioned strategically within European and global economic networks. The post-1980s evolution of spatial planning into a form of urban locational policy in three major European global city-regions—Milan, Paris, and London— clearly illustrates these trends.
. The institutional landscape of Italian spatial planning was significantly reorganized as of the early 1990s, with the passage of a series of national laws oriented towards local government reorganization, metropolitan institutional reform, and urban economic growth. During the preceding decade, the period of ‘extraordinary intervention’ (Intervento Straordinario) in the Mezzogiorno had been terminated; and many state-owned enterprises were privatized. In 1991, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was abolished and replaced by locally elected administrations in the South. Although redistributive regional policies were not entirely abandoned, qualitatively new, developmentalist spatial policies and area-based initiatives were subsequently mobilized in order to enhance the international competitive positions of major Italian local and regional economies (Gualini 2001). In particular, since the early 1990s, ‘territorial pacts’

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Map 5.5. City-centric spatial planning in Denmark: promoting Copenhagen/Øresund as node in transnational networks
Source: Ministry of the Environment (1992); cited in Commission of the European Communities (1997: 169).

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(patti territoriali) have been introduced in order to promote public–private cooperation, inter-sectoral networking, and territorial identification in strategic local economies (Gualini 2001: 760). Consequently, a ‘leopard skin’ model of specialized cities and regions replaced the traditional North/South economic geography that had traditionally animated Italian regional policy (Bozzi 1995). In conjunction with these national reforms, a number of explicitly entrepreneurial local planning initiatives were introduced during the 1980s in Milan that were based upon ad hoc, project-oriented modes of state intervention rather than a comprehensive statutory plan. This fundamental reorientation of local spatial planning precipitated what Gualini (2003: 272, 273) terms an ‘ ‘‘extraordinary’’ format for policy-making’ that situated Milan ‘in an exceptional, ‘‘unorthodox’’ position in the Italian planning landscape’. First, a number of local territorial agencies introduced a ‘proactive and flexible approach to urban modernisation’ oriented towards major development and infrastructural projects—including the Malpensa airport, the Garibaldi-Repubblica financial district, the Portello-Fiera fair district, the regional rail system, the Milan Stock Exchange, the Bicocca technopole, and various older industrial sites—that were intended to upgrade ‘Milan’s central functions in the European urban hierarchy’ (Gualini 2003: 273–4). Second, new Regional Laws were introduced in Lombardy that ‘moved away from the objective of achieving territorial balance’ and aimed ‘at enhancing and internationalizing’ the region’s economic development capacities (Bozzi 1995: 278). Third, the Province of Milan—whose regulatory capacities were enhanced through a 1990 national law—introduced a Provincial Socio-Economic Plan (PSEP) intended to coordinate economic development policy, inter-firm relations, and vocational training within the extended metropolitan region. More generally, the post-1980s period witnessed the end of the model of a ‘public, equitable city protected against private speculative interests’ in favor of a new form of spatial planning oriented towards ‘the encouragement of all opportunities for cooperation and partnership with private developers and the business world in general, seen as the only way to beat public sector inefficiency and to compete against other cities internationally’ (Balducci 2001: 160).
. Following the publication of the Guichard Report in 1986, the French national spatial planning agency, DATAR, became increasingly engaged in the promotion of urban and regional territorial competitiveness (Biarez 1994). Different French regions were now analyzed with reference to their structural position in the European economy and their relative capacities to compete against other major European regions. The national government introduced a new mechanism of spatial planning and urban policy, the Chartes d’Objectif, through which local and regional officials were encouraged to formulate economic development projects designed to position major French cities strategically in the European space-economy (Newman and Thornley 1996; Biarez

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1994). Due to its emphasis on local economic competitiveness in a European context and its relatively decentralized mode of implementation, this new spatial planning initiative undermined the centralized, redistributive agenda ´ ´ associated with the postwar metropoles d’equilibre program. The national government abandoned the long-entrenched assumption that Paris ‘grew at the cost of other French metropolitan areas’ and began more directly to acknowledge ‘the specific needs of the Paris area as a world-class city in competition ` with London, Tokyo and New York’ (Lefevre 2003: 292). Indeed, Paris was now increasingly considered to be ‘the locomotive of the whole national economy’ (Biarez 1994: 200). Against this background, the regional plan in the Paris region (known as the ´ ´ Schema Directeur Regional, SDR) was renewed through a combination of national and local government consultations in the late 1980s. In the wake of Brunet’s (1989) influential DATAR report on the European ‘blue banana’, French political-economic elites came to accept the view that further economic growth and spatial expansion would be required in the ˆle-de-France I region in order to ‘bypass London in the competition for the title of ‘‘the’’ megalopolis of Europe’ (Lipietz 1995: 147). Thus the initial SDR proposal of 1990, the Livre Blanc ˆle-de-France, promoted an aggressive concentration of I high-speed transportation infrastructures, high-technology industries, and transnational firms in the Paris region. Following extensive national and local debates, and the national electoral defeat of the socialists, a compromise solution known as the Grand Bassin Strategy was proposed and subsequently adopted (Burgel 1997). The resultant ‘Grand Bassin Charter’, which was approved by the national government in 1994, was designed to combine continued growth in the urban core of ˆle-de-France with the channeling of I overspill development into a historical ring of medium-sized cities—‘a supernova beyond the administrative limits of the central region’ (Lipietz 1995: ´ 151)—including Chartres, Dreux, Evreux, Beauvais, Creil, and Compiegne (Map 5.6). The new national commitment to promoting concentrated economic growth in the Paris region was further solidified in 2000, with the abandonment of the authorization procedure that had long required firms seeking to locate in the Paris region to acquire central government permission ` (Lefevre 2003).
. During the post-1980s period, the inherited British system of regional and spatial planning has been increasingly overlain by diverse policy initiatives oriented towards place- and scale-specific conditions and the general priority of local economic development (Wannop 1995). During the course of the 1980s, the Thatcherite central government introduced a number of deregulatory, market-oriented urban planning programs and aggressively promoted London as a global and European financial center. Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), Enterprise Zones (EZs), and Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs) were established in a variety of strategic urban locations, including parts of London,

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Map 5.6. The ‘Grand Bassin Strategy’: reconcentrating growth in the Paris ˆle-de-France region I
ˆ ´ ´ Source: IAURIF (Institut d’Amenagement et d’Urbanisme de la Region d’Ile-de-France) (1993: 48).

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Cardiff, Sheffield, Bristol, Leeds, and Manchester. These localized regulatory experiments bypassed traditional planning rules and local relays of democratic accountability while providing property developers with significant investment inducements, such as streamlined decision-making structures, simplified planning regulations, and tax exemptions (Gaffikin and Warf 1993). As of the early 1990s, a new cluster of national urban policies—including City Challenge, City Pride, and the Single Regeneration Budget—introduced a more inclusive, socially oriented, and partnership-based approach to urban redevelopment, but nonetheless perpetuated the growth-oriented regulatory agenda of the UDCs by impelling localities to formulate economic development strategies and to bid competitively for central government funding (Davoudi and Healey 1995; Ward 1997). In this national context of simultaneous administrative centralization, institutional fragmentation, and economic deregulation, spatial planning in the London region was significantly restructured. While the goal of regional decentralization had already been abandoned in the mid-1970s, the subsequent decade witnessed the consolidation of more concerted national and local political strategies designed to promote economic growth, local entrepreneurialism, and property redevelopment throughout the London metropolitan area (Gordon 1995). The centrally induced ‘Big Bang’ of 1986, which deregulated key financial services industries, was intended to strengthen the City’s strategic position relative to other European financial centers. However, following the 1986 abolition of the Greater London Council, spatial planning in the extended London region was fragmented among various agencies, including the centrally controlled Department of the Environment (DoE), London and South East Regional Planning Conference (SERPLAN), the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC), and the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). A report commissioned in 1991 by LPAC and other local governmental agencies, London: World City, outlined a variety of boosterist strategies and policy measures through which London’s global and European competitive advantages could be enhanced (LPAC 1991). Subsequently, London’s lack of strategic planning came to be viewed as a locational disadvantage relative to other European metropolitan regions, and the institutional fragmentation of the London region was counterbalanced during the course of the 1990s. New local promotion agencies, such as London Forum and London First, were established and, with the initiation of the City Pride program in 1992, a more comprehensive program of urban planning and economic development was elaborated whose aim ‘was to ensure London’s position as the only world city in Europe’ (Thornley 2003: 48). This emphasis was reinforced in the early 2000s under the newly established Greater London Authority (GLA), led by Ken Livingstone, whose spatial planning program has likewise heavily emphasized the need to promote London’s role as a world city.11
11

See e.g. Gordon 1999; Newman and Thornley 1997; Thornley 2003; Syrett and Baldcock 2003.

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In short, just as the nationally redistributive spatial planning policies of the postwar era actively facilitated the universalist political agendas of the Keynesian welfare national state, so too have the rescaled, metropolitanized spatial planning frameworks of the post-1980s period contributed significantly to the developmentalist, growth-oriented projects of post-Keynesian competition state regimes. For, in order to pursue their goal of enhancing national competitive advantages in European and global circuits of capital, post-Keynesian competition states across western Europe have attempted to establish new approaches to spatial planning through which to reconcentrate socioeconomic assets, advanced infrastructural configurations, and transnational capital investment within their most internationally competitive city-regions. Spatial planning has served as an essential institutional mechanism for such urban locational policies, for it has supplied state institutions at all geographical scales with place-specific and territorially customized policy instruments through which to channel developmental capacities into strategic urban locations. Galle and Modderman’s (1997: 15) comment on the Dutch VINEX law of 1990 thus provides a more generally applicable summary of this transformation of national spatial planning into a form of urban locational policy during the post-1980s period: ‘Spatial planning would not determine where economic activities should take place, which had proved ineffectual in the past. Rather, it would support the further development of the economically attractive areas of the country.’

Splintered infrastructural networks, urban mega-projects, and the rescaling of regulatory space
We are starting to witness the uneven overlaying and retrofitting of new, high performance urban infrastructures onto the apparently immanent, universal and (usually) public monopoly networks laid down between the 1930s and 1960s. In a parallel process, the diverse political and regulatory regimes that supported the ‘roll out’ of power, transport, communications and water networks towards the rhetorical goal of standardized ubiquity are, in many cities and states, being ‘unbundled’ or even ‘splintered’, as a result of widespread movements towards privatization and liberalization [ . . . ] What this amounts to [ . . . ] is the uneven emergence of an array of [ . . . ] ‘premium networked spaces’: new or retrofitted transport, telecommunications, power, or water infrastructures that are customized precisely to the needs of powerful users and spaces, whilst bypassing less powerful users and spaces. Stephen Graham (2000: 185)

As discussed in the preceding chapter, national, regional, and local state institutions have long played a central role in the construction of large-scale

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transportation, communications, utilities, and development infrastructures both within and among major western European cities. During the course of the postwar period, such state-planned, state-financed infrastructural configurations figured crucially in the establishment of Fordist urban production systems, in the consolidation of nationalized urban hierarchies, and in the embedding of cities within the nationally standardized, centralized regulatory configurations of the Keynesian welfare national state (Graham and Marvin 1995). However, this inherited model of urban infrastructure provision was systematically unsettled following the crisis of spatial Keynesianism in the 1970s. As the urban production systems, land-use complexes, and public infrastructural configurations of the North Atlantic Fordist order were rendered increasingly obsolete, local, regional, and national governments were confronted with the problem of establishing new territorial infrastructures in and through which both transnational and local capital could circulate profitably. The transformations of western European spatial planning systems described above were designed not only to revitalize major agglomeration economies and to channel globally competitive capital investments into strategic urban locations. Additionally, the rescaling of spatial planning was generally intertwined with concerted state spatial strategies to construct customized, high-performance technological infrastructures for telecommunications, energy provision, transportation, and economic development within major European urban regions. Such infrastructures have included, among other elements, ‘globally oriented ‘‘teleports’’, international ‘‘hub’’ air and water ports, ‘‘wired’’ technology parks, high speed railways, as well as international supply connections in electricity, gas and water’ (Graham 2000: 188). Given the importance of seamless, uninterrupted, long-distance geographical connectivity under conditions of intensified geoeconomic interdependence (Castells 1996; Sassen 1991), these advanced technological infrastructures have become highly important locational factors for all major factions of capital during the post-1980s period. In light of this, state strategies to produce what Graham (2000: 185) terms ‘premium networked spaces’—namely, urban spatial infrastructures ‘that are customized precisely to the needs of powerful users and spaces, whilst bypassing less powerful users and spaces’—have become increasingly ubiquitous across western Europe. As summarized in Fig. 5.11, this intensified mobilization of national, regional, and local state institutions to produce premium networked infrastructural configurations has entailed a fundamental break from the universalist, nationalizing model of public infrastructure provision that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period. Indeed, despite the neoliberal rhetoric of privatized, market-led investment that pervades mainstream discourse on these newly established, high-performance infrastructures, their construction across the western European urban system has, in practice, been premised upon a variety of quite intensive state regulatory operations. To be sure, due to the

Urban Locational Policy, State Rescaling
Standardized public infrastructural monopolies (1960s--1970s) Major providers National, public corporations engaged in the provision of public goodst National economic development, supply-driven Premium networked infrastructural configurations (1980s--present) Local, national, and international private firms in collaboration with state and para-state agencies at multiple spatial scales (public--private partnerships) Premium, demand-driven markets; goal is to enhance levels of Europe-wide and global connectivity among strategic urban areas Facilitated through deregulation and liberalization of European and national markets; national, regional, and local state agencies continue to supply important regulatory, institutional, and spatial preconditions for the production of new, networked infrastructures Enhancement of territorial competitiveness, generally through the systematic channeling of advanced technological infrastructures into major global and European cities and high-speed interurban transportation networks

245

Predominant orientation

Type of regulation

Central government direction and internal management of public corporations

Objectives of state regulators

Provision of universal service at standard tariffs; use of standardized technologies to facilitate nation-wide coverage National economic development, interregional equalization, economies of scale

Productioneconomic dimensions

Rebalancing of tariffs, recommodification, local and regional growth promotion, cross-investment: goal is to promote particular urban locations as key nodes within global and European capital flows and transport networks Enhanced social polarization and fragmentation at European, national, regional, urban, and intra-urban scales as new forms of connectivity and disconnectivity are produced Promotes the splintering of politicaleconomic space and the intensification of uneven geographical development at all scales throughout the European urban system

Socialconsumption dimensions

Universal, nationwide access to standard social services through domestic mass markets Promotes national sociospatial cohesion and interregional redistribution

Roles in urban development

Fig. 5.11. State spatial strategies and the production of large-scale infrastructural configurations
Sources: based on Graham and Marvin 1995: 174; Graham 2000.

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liberalization and deregulation of national and international markets for key public goods, private corporations have been involved more directly in the establishment and operation of large-scale, premium infrastructure networks. However, state and para-state institutions have figured crucially in the planning, financing, construction, management, and promotion of such infrastructural projects—in most cases, by assuming or sharing their major financial risks; by channeling significant public resources into their financing; and by establishing location- and project-specific regulatory arrangements to facilitate their implementation, effective operation, and profitability (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002). The overarching goal of such infrastructureoriented state spatial projects and state spatial strategies has been to undercut inherited monopolistic, redistributive, and socially inclusive regulatory arrangements while mobilizing state institutions actively towards the construction of new, targeted spaces of capital accumulation through ‘selective deregulation, stripping away red tape and investment ‘‘partnerships’’ ’ (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002: 200). Thus, in contrast to the technocratic, comprehensive, and universalizing approach to public infrastructure provision that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period, an institutionally fragmented, market-oriented, locationally selective, and spatially splintered model has emerged in which ‘planners and urban governance agencies [ . . . ] fight for the best possible networked infrastructures for their specialized district, in partnership with (often privatized) network operators’ (Graham 2000: 191). This qualitatively transformed role of national, regional, and local state institutions in what Lefebvre (2003a: 90) described as the ‘production of space ‘‘on a grand scale’’ ’ can be summarized in general terms:
. The primacy of urban locational policy. The overarching goal of state infrastructural provision is no longer to provide universal, standardized public services through the geographical ‘rolling out’ of utilities, communications, and transport grids evenly across the entire national territory. Instead, national, regional, and local state institutions have constructed customized, high-performance, place-specific infrastructural configurations as a key mechanism of urban locational policy, that is, as a means to enhance the territorial competitiveness of selected urban zones. While such projects have frequently been justified to national, regional, and urban populations through the assertion that their benefits will eventually ‘trickle down’ in the form of new jobs and investments, they have been driven above all by the priority of promoting territorial competitiveness within circumscribed urban locations rather than by redistributive concerns at any spatial scale (Graham 2000; Healey et al. 1997). . Rescaled geographies. The geographies of state infrastructural provision have been rescaled. As we saw in the previous chapter, Keynesian welfare national states attempted to extend public infrastructures as evenly as possible throughout their territories. By contrast, state spatial strategies to construct

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premium infrastructural configurations during the post-1980s period have entailed the reconcentration of major socioeconomic assets and public resources into certain targeted urban zones or inter-urban corridors, which are in turn to be positioned optimally within European and global capitalist networks (Graham and Marvin 2001, 1996). This rescaling of state spatial strategies has also generally entailed significant transformations of the urban built environment, as targeted plots of urban land are revalorized, extant buildings are dismantled or retrofitted, and entirely new building complexes are constructed in order to provide an appropriately ‘delocalized’ physical-technological space for the operation of advanced, high-performance infrastructural configurations. . The normalization of ‘exceptional’ spaces. In contrast to the comprehensive, relatively standardized, and hierarchically nested land-use plans that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period, premium infrastructural networks are grounded upon new, strategic planning arrangements that permit flexible, site-specific decision-making procedures, funding schemes, zoning specifications, planning guidelines, and regulatory techniques. Through such exceptional, locationally circumscribed planning mechanisms, high-performance infrastructures are ‘unbundled’ from their immediate geographic contexts and regulatory environments, while being positioned more directly within supranational telecommunications, transport, and commercial networks. Of course, such exception-based, project-specific planning mechanisms had been mobilized, in certain instances, even prior to the current period—for instance, in the construction of national airports or strategic military installations—but they have become increasingly normalized during the last two decades as essential tools of urban infrastructural and economic policy (Healey et al. 1997). . New institutional configurations. The institutional arrangements underlying state infrastructure provision have become increasingly complex, both in organizational and geographical terms. The collective public monopolies that dominated infrastructure provision during the Fordist-Keynesian period were generally grounded upon relatively transparent, legally codified national bureaucratic hierarchies. By contrast, the construction of premium infrastructural configurations has been premised upon new forms of ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’ between (national, regional, and local) state institutions and private capital; upon location-specific, special-purpose, para-state agencies assigned to promote specific development projects; and upon flexible, informal governance networks whose goals, decision-making procedures, and participants may be continually renegotiated. These special-purpose development agencies have become increasingly pervasive across the western European urban landscape, not least because ‘they can be tasked with equipping strategic economic spaces with high-quality infrastructure without facing onerous political challenges or the imperatives of cross-subsidies and territorial equalisation’ (Graham and Marvin 2001: 310). While the spatial boundaries of these

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new institutional configurations are generally defined with reference to those of the infrastructural investments in question, they often involve the interaction of multiple levels of political authority, including European, national, regional, and local state institutions (Moulaert, Swyngedouw, and Rodriguez 2003; Motte 1997). . The contraction of democratic accountability. In many European city-regions, the establishment of premium networked infrastructures has entailed a contraction of inherited relays of democratic control over the process of urban development. Rather than operating through formal channels of representation and public accountability, many of the state agencies and quasi-governmental bodies involved in the planning, construction, and management of high-performance infrastructural configurations are dominated by planning ‘experts’, business and legal advisers, boosterist corporate elites, and other national and local ‘power brokers’. Accordingly, such agencies generally embrace the agendas of politically unaccountable national, regional, and local growth coalitions while excluding the concerns of the place-based constituencies that are most directly effected by their decisions (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2003, 2002). The interplay between the construction of premium infrastructural configurations and the rescaling of state space has been dramatically evident since the early 1980s in city-regions of all types throughout western Europe, from global cities, international financial centers, and major transportation/logistics nodes to high-technology production centers, revitalized manufacturing districts, and even declining industrial regions. In each case, the construction of new, high-performance infrastructures for communications, transportation, utilities provision, and economic development has been justified as a means to maintain, enhance, or revive the competitive advantages of a given city (or some part thereof) within supranational circuits of capital. And, in each case, new, rescaled state regulatory arrangements have been promoted as a key politico-institutional precondition for the establishment and effective operation of such infrastructural configurations. The following examples illustrate the role of rescaled state institutions as financiers, producers, regulators, and managers of premium, high-performance infrastructural networks in a number of major western European cities.
. Euralille TGV Interchange. Euralille is a large-scale urban development pro´ ject centered around a strategic high-speed rail (trains a grand vitesse, TGV) interchange in the industrialized Nord Pas-de-Calais region in northwestern France. Planning for this interchange, which lies along two major northern European rail lines (including the TGV line linking France to Britain via the Channel Tunnel), was initiated in the late 1980s through the efforts of Lille’s entrepreneurial Socialist mayor, Pierre Mauroy, and a local lobbying group, TGV-Gare de Lille. Their common goal was to ‘transform Lille into a postindustrial, high-technology service city’ (Levine 1994: 396). Thus, in addition to its

exceptional planning arrangements. these newly constructed. and semi-autonomous institutional formation (Newman and Thornley 1995: 243). Proposals to construct a bridge and tunnel across the Øresund link. Sweden. The Øresund link proposals were rejuvenated in the late 1980s by the European Council of Industrialists and were subsequently concretized and approved by the Danish Parliament in 1991. . dynamic ‘cross-border learning region’ based upon a cluster of advanced R&D intensive industries and fueled by a network of local universities. this combined railway/highway link is ‘one of the largest crossnational infrastructure projects in the world’ (Flyvbjerg. the Øresund link was viewed as the infrastructural foundation for the creation of a new. date to the 1960s. development-oriented. including an office tower. As indicated in our discussion of the rescaling of Danish national spatial planning above. Euralille was also intended to ignite economic development at both urban and regional scales through a variety of grands projects. b. situated on the island of Amager. through a place-specific. business schools. Salin and Moulaert 1999a. Levine 1994.Urban Locational Policy. At an estimated cost of 11. The construction of the Euralille infrastructural configuration was ´ ´ grounded upon a public–private partnership known as an SEM (Societe d’Economie Mixte). Bruzelius. customized institutional forms. technologically advanced office buildings. State Rescaling 249 transnational logistical functions. Øresund Link and Ørestad. the Departement of Nord. its construction has also been closely intertwined with a major expansion of the Copenhagen Metro system. and research institutes (Maskell ¨ and Tornqvist 2000). premium infrastructural projects in the Greater Copenhagen region have been implemented through placespecific. and numerous regional institutions). local chambers of commerce. they have been implemented and managed ‘outside the constraints of local government bureaucracies’. and various local and foreign banks) ´ and diverse public agencies (including major local municipalities. The Euralille SEM was headed by Mauroy and composed of a combination of private stakeholders (including the French national railway company. In this context. project-based. midway between the Copenhagen city core and the cross-border waterway. Den¨ mark. While the various elements ´ of Euralille have been embedded within a masterplan (schema directeur) defined by state agencies. the waterway separating Copenhagen. Copenhagen.7 billion Danish Kronen (at 1990 prices). and Rothengatter 2003: 13). flagship urban development project on a land grid known as the Ørestad. On the Danish side of the Øresund. a shopping and hotel complex.12 . and a conference center (Lille Grand Palais) designed under the direction of Rem Koolhaas. the construction of the bridge/tunnel connection has also been linked to a large-scale. and light industry are to be clustered along a strategic transportation axis. 12 This account draws upon Newman and Thornley 1995. The Ørestad has been planned as a high-performance. knowledge-based urban nodal point in which educational institutions. and Malmo.

a derelict port zone adjoining the Thames in the city’s eastern periphery.13 Analogously. The UK national government channeled massive financial resources into the LDDC—during the 1981–90 period it received over 59 per cent of the total grants-in-aid funding distributed among eleven UDCs (Deakin and Edwards 1993: 98). to market the region as an attractive investment site within an integrated European economy.com/oresund/welcome2.250 Urban Locational Policy. London Docklands. and Newham). the Thatcher government established UDCs in declining urban zones throughout Britain. the ODC has attempted to fund the new Ørestad infrastructure through the sale of newly valorized urban land. discretionary control over local land use was transferred to a quango (quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization). in 1993.500 acre area was technically owned by three local boroughs (Tower Hamlets. As mentioned above. 2004. Kjœrsdam. Maskell and ¨ Tornqvist 2000. the Øresund Committee. Thus. Jørgensen and Anderson 2002.14 . which thereby acquired primary responsibility for planning and development in the area. developmentalist approach to urban governance throughout the Greater Copenhagen region. to lobby the European Commission for financial support through the INTERREG program. it has created an exceptional. accessed 13 Feb. State Rescaling and public–private partnerships. and development infrastructure designed to 13 See: http://www. project-specific planning scheme within the confines of the Ørestad zone that circumvents traditional. The ODC was modeled on the British Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and has been oriented towards a ‘Schumpeterian strategic growth policy. The largest and most prominent was established in the London Docklands. based at the state. and Clark 2001.dk/english. 14 This account draws upon J.oresundskomiteen.htm. . the Ørestad Development Corporation (ODC) was established in 1992 as an autonomous company owned by various state agencies (the city of Copenhagen and two national departments. The Docklands project was intended to replace brownfield sites across the port zone with an advanced transport. regional and municipal level’ (J. Andersen 2003: 103). Insofar as the LDDC was dominated by centrally appointed developers and corporate elites. of a new cooperative planning organization. which has served to facilitate regulatory partnerships among regional and local governmental agencies throughout the border region. and http://www. Andersen 2003. during the early 1980s. local development in the Docklands zone was effectively ‘taken out of the electoral orbit of local government and placed in the hands of a non-elected body appointed centrally and responsible to the centre’ (Duncan and Goodwin 1989: 133). Despite relatively low levels of private investment and increasing debt levels during the second half of the 1990s. the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transport). more generally. the Øresund link project led to the establishment. Southwark. Anderson. telecommunications. Even though the 6. local land-use regulations. and. Hansen.oresund. and it has contributed to the adoption of an entrepreneurial. and Jørgensen. the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). and Nielsen 1997.

one of the central agendas of Dutch national economic policy in the 1990s was to promote the Netherlands as a ‘distribution land’. Graham and Marvin 2001: 323–7.Urban Locational Policy. on this basis.). in significant measure through the establishment of high-performance logistical infrastructures within each of the mainports. Fainstein 1994. including the Betuwe rail freight line. a variety of superimposed fiber optic grids. each of the Dutch mainports was perceived to be confronted with intensified competitive pressures from other major European locations—London (Heathrow and Gatwick). The LDDC was phased out under the Blair government in 1998 and replaced by an array of successor bodies. and the London Development Agency (see http://www.7. a small airport. expansion. the development of the mainports into major global and European logistical nodes was an explicit agenda of the rescaled spatial planning initiatives that were mobilized through the Fourth Report (1988) and the VINEX (1990). the Docklands can be viewed as the material product of a concerted national state strategy intended to create ‘new packaged landscapes for the global financial services industries’. premium infrastructural projects across the Randstad region. the Amsterdam teleport in Sloterdijk. Randstad.15 . the LDDC installed a number of large-scale. 2004. Amsterdam’s South Axis. including a customized light rail line. lddc-history. the Kop van Zuid in Rotterdam. With the consolidation of the Single European Market. Consequently. the High Speed Rail Line South. State Rescaling 251 reinforce the global and European competitive advantages of London. or ‘mainports’—Schiphol airport near Amsterdam and the Rotterdam deep-sea container seaport. specialized in the transport of goods into and out of European markets. in the case of Schiphol airport. Despite the crash of Olympia and York in the early 1990s. the Dutch national government has devoted extensive public resources to the upgrading. and Frankfurt. 1993. dedicated energy and highway access links. premium infrastructural configurations. as Graham and Marvin (2001: 323) indicate. Amsterdam’s eastern seaport. The mainports were designated as ‘projects of national importance’ and. Accordingly. including local boroughs. in the case of the Rotterdam seaport. These publicly financed infrastructural projects in the Randstad were closely intertwined with the introduction of new.uk/. English Partnerships. Since the late 1980s. high-technology office development complex at Canary Wharf overseen by the Canadian developer Olympia and York (Map 5. overleaf ).org. . Paris (Orly and Charles de Gaulle). customized planning policies. special-purpose development agencies. place-specific forms of intergovernmental coordination and public–private partnership. These policies also promoted a number of additional. and promotion of the country’s two most important infrastructural sites. Consequently. As discussed above. accessed 13 Feb. property markets on the Isle of Dogs were significantly revived during the second half of the decade and private investment has subsequently been rejuvenated (Fainstein 2001). and public– 15 This account draws upon Brownill 1999. and the New Centre of the Hague. and Antwerp and Hamburg. and a large-scale. Deakin and Edwards 1993. Mainports. two teleports.

These have included the Randstad Administrative Commission (Bestuurlijke Commissie Randstad—BCR). p. and Premius and van der Wusten 1995. 19 (July). and public–private partnerships in order to coordinate economic.7. and has in turn significantly intensified. the Dutch national government’s project of establishing premium network infrastructures across the ‘Delta metropolis’ was closely intertwined with a significant rescaling of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity. most recently. . the Randstad Public Agency (Openbaar Lichaam Randstad—OLR). the Randstad Consultation on Spatial Planning (RoRo). the Dutch national government established a variety of place-specific consultative bodies. the Consultative Body on Structural Investments (Overleg Ruimtelijke Investeringen—ORI) and. ‘All the right connections’. Thus. 47. State Rescaling Map 5. Chevin. the rescaling of state space throughout western Europe. Kreukels and Spit 1990. Premium infrastructural networks and the differentiation of state space: the case of the London Docklands Source: Graham and Marvin (2001: 325). 223). private partnerships were introduced within their immediate environs. in the process of 16 This account draws on Frieling 1994. Building. development agencies.16 As this discussion indicates. Kreukels 1992. Premius 1997. For.9. even in the absence of the comprehensive administrative reforms associated with the city–provinces initiative (see Box 5. Concomitantly. the production of premium infrastructural networks has been enabled by. transportation. during the course of the 1990s. adapted from D. 1994.252 Urban Locational Policy. and infrastructural policies at the scale of the entire Randstad.

Thus. experimental prototypes for urban locational policies were being pioneered by entrepreneurial local growth coalitions within a relatively small vanguard of western European city-regions. the establishment of such infrastructures has been intertwined with a differentiation of inherited frameworks of state spatial organization. with their customized. special-purpose. State Rescaling 253 constructing and managing premium infrastructural networks within and among their major cities. and place-specific regulatory configurations. At the same time. interscalar alliances. the processes of state rescaling examined above had contributed to the transnational generalization of such competitiveness-oriented urban policy agendas throughout much of the western European city-system. and place-promotion. western European states have rescaled their own institutional hierarchies and modes of regulatory intervention. However. and subnational scales. are viewed as essential institutional preconditions for the establishment and effective operation of globally competitive. From this perspective. Just as crucially. and the mobilization of new political strategies designed to enhance the global and European territorial competitiveness of major urban economies. by the mid-1990s. national. the construction of premium. their underlying entrepreneurial. market-based forms of local fiscal management. As of the early 1980s. redistributivewelfarist forms of territorial regulation. the imposition of new.Urban Locational Policy. highperformance urban infrastructural grids. the extension and intensification of aggressively competitive interlocality relations at European. economic policy. high-performance infrastructures for communications. Coda: a note on urban entrepreneurialism. the continued diffusion of urban locational policies across the European urban system added further momentum to political initiatives to create customized. and economic development in major western European cityregions has entailed not only an ‘unbundling’ of the centralized. even though urban locational policies were articulated in diverse political and institutional forms. These rescaling processes entailed the erosion of inherited. both within and among western European national states. transportation. competitiveness-driven logic was institutionalized quite .and scale-specific forms of state spatial organization and state spatial intervention within major local and regional economies. and territorially integrated infrastructural configurations that prevailed within high modernist and Fordist cities (Graham and Marvin 2001). as a city-centric patchwork of place-specific regulatory enclaves has been stretched unevenly across the western European political landscape. place. Such rescaled state spaces. nationally standardized. and state rescaling The foregoing analysis has explored the interplay between processes of state rescaling and the proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades.

My claim. . that the spread of urban locational policies and the concomitant rescaling of state space led to the consolidation of a qualitatively new interscalar ruleregime in which—to repeat Lipietz’s (1994: 37) succinct formulation—cities were increasingly viewed as a ‘breeding ground for new productive forces’. and intensely contested field of urban governance was thereby reduced to a narrowly economistic agenda of positioning cities competitively within supranational circuits of capital. Shachar. is that the priority of promoting international territorial competitiveness—which is increasingly understood with reference to both economic and extra-economic factors (Messner 1997.17 While such case studies have contributed significantly to our understanding of contemporary European cities. However. rather. It was through the rescaling of inherited state 17 See the works cited in n. intergovernmental configurations. the primacy of urban locational policies within the newly consolidated interscalar rule-regime of the post-1980s period represents a striking politico-institutional realignment. It is in this sense. to introduce local competitiveness policies (Cheshire and Gordon 1996). The account of urban locational policies developed in this chapter suggests a distinctive vantage point from which to interpret the vast. For. This is not to suggest that the complex. to embrace the narrative of global and European interlocality competition. the proliferation of place-specific economic crises and the intensification of foreign direct investment within urban economies provided local political-economic elites with significant. and van Weesep 1997). developmentalist alliances.254 Urban Locational Policy. Jensen-Butler. and. the preceding analysis has emphasized the role of rescaled state spatial projects and state spatial strategies in facilitating the mobilization. often business-led. responses to newly imposed. on this basis. as Harvey (1989a: 15) emphasized over a decade ago. in light of the above discussion. Given the overarching role of redistributive. I would argue. case-study based literature on entrepreneurial urban governance in western Europe. multifaceted. collective consumption functions at the urban scale within the postwar framework of spatial Keynesianism. By contrast. supranational economic constraints (see e.g. and institutional landscapes that were being forged during this same period. the spread of urban growth machines and competitiveness-oriented local territorial alliances across western Europe must also be understood in relation to the rescaled national political geographies. the transition to urban entrepreneurialism ‘required a radical reconstruction of central to local state relations and the cutting free of local state activities from the welfare state and the Keynesian compromise’. 2. To be sure. they have tended to conceive the transition to urban entrepreneurialism as the product of localized. and generalization of urban locational policies. market-led incentives to form place-based. Jessop 2002)— has come to define the political and institutional parameters within which other dimensions of urban policy may be articulated. institutionalization. State Rescaling pervasively across western Europe.

and Barcelona—the rescaling of national state spatial configurations described above was one of their essential institutional ` conditions of possibility (Le Gales 2002. in cities such as Hamburg. Any systematic. then. Milan. national. often by circumventing extant municipal institutions and by establishing centrally controlled forms of local regulation. is that urban locational policies were implemented during the post-1980s period through a diverse array of interscalar and territorial alliances. finally. More generally. While activist. often by capitalizing upon strategic opportunities generated through the process of European integration. and local political-economic forces. a variety of spatial scales. It is crucial to recognize.Urban Locational Policy. comparative study of urban governance restructuring in post-1980s western Europe would need to examine the contextually specific political. Lille. locally embedded political-economic alliances appear to have played a formative. and sociopolitical conflicts following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism. urban development strategies could be mobilized and generalized across western Europe. Lyon. regulatory problems. McNeill 2001). ad hoc political responses to the proliferation of place-specific economic crises. Under still other circumstances. that many of the aforementioned patterns of interscalar and territorial alliance formation coexisted within the same national institutional landscapes. regional. I have argued in this chapter that urban locational policies represent experimental. entrepreneurial mayors frequently contributed to the formation of such ‘local’ development regimes—for instance. durable role in the mobilization of urban locational policies. The urban locational policies described in this chapter were introduced by political alliances rooted within. The salient point here. and geographical bases of urban economic development strategies within each national territory (for an important recent contribution to such an investigation. Such policies were articulated through a broad range of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies designed (a) to promote urban regions rather than national economies as the most essential geographical targets for economic development initiatives. and articulated across. In some cases. In other instances. they involved tangled interscalar articulations among European. see Savitch and Kantor 2002). urban locational policies were mobilized by national governments. and (b) to customize the institutional infrastructure of urban governance according to placespecific political-economic conditions. yet place-specific. State Rescaling 255 spatial configurations and the recalibration of established interscalar relays that localized spaces for regulatory experimentation were opened up in which aggressively extrospective. . institutional. the regulatory realignments induced through urban locational policies were premised upon the assumption that a rescaling of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity could resolve the regulatory failures of spatial Keynesianism and unleash new economic growth capacities within major urban regions. which together attempted to rejig the framework of urban governance and to channel public and private resources into strategic urban locations.

256 Urban Locational Policy. despite these profound differences in ideology. to the mobilization of localized. For. In this sense. This splintering of state space represents the most widespread political expression and institutional outcome of urban locational policies. as we have seen. spatially equalizing regulatory project associated with spatial Keynesianism. political agenda. regional. and socioeconomic base. territorial redistribution. all forms of urban locational policy entailed a fundamental break from the nationalizing. and neo-statist coalitions concerned to enhance the capacity of state institutions to override class-based coalitions (Gough 2002. and to the concentration of advanced socioeconomic assets within strategic city-regions. they diverged considerably in the visions of political-economic transformation they aspired to realize. Yet. and they likewise played a central role in facilitating a significant geographical differentiation of political-economic space throughout western Europe during the post-1980s period. Eisenschitz and Gough 1996). area-based economic development strategies. urban locational policies were promoted by a variety of opposed class forces and political alliances within each national. . and urban managerialism that had prevailed during the 1960s and early 1970s. urban locational policies contributed markedly to the erosion of the nationalized forms of class compromise. neocorporatist coalitions concerned to promote cross-class cooperation and to forge ‘high-road’ developmental pathways. State Rescaling However. and local context—including neoliberal coalitions concerned to grant new discretionary powers and public subsidies to transnational capital. while the post-Keynesian state spatial projects and state spatial strategies surveyed in this chapter shared an underlying commitment to the creation of place-specific institutional configurations.

On a theoretical level. Throughout this study. I have interpreted this transformation as the latest expression of the tension between deterritorialization and reterritorialization that has long underpinned the production of capitalist sociospatial configurations. I have returned repeatedly to the endemic problem of uneven spatial development under capitalism. growth-oriented policies that intensify the polarization of territorial development. This analysis has underscored the role of state institutions. at various spatial scales. state spatial strategies. I have argued that state institutions may seek to influence the geographies of uneven spatial development through diverse political strategies. I have confronted this problem through three distinct but intertwined arguments. Henri Lefebvre (2003a: 91) Reprise: state space and the new geopolitics of uneven development Before proceeding to the final stage of this inquiry. this analysis has attempted to mobilize a processual conceptualization of state spatiality. . and on this basis. including redistributive policies intended to alleviate sociospatial inequalities and competitiveness-driven. in mediating and transforming patterns of uneven development. Through an investigation of the interplay between state spatial projects. state action makes them worse. the theoretical and empirical terrain we have traversed in the foregoing chapters. I shall recapitulate. in broad strokes. 3. 2.SIX Alternative Rescaling Strategies and the Future of New State Spaces Rather than resolving the contradictions of space. 1. This analysis has been framed around the contention that the current round of global restructuring represents an intensification and reworking of inherited patterns of uneven spatial development. and uneven development.

and the remaking of state spatiality in western Europe during the last four decades. place-. Taken together. within each inherited framework of state spatial organization. These contradictory tendencies of integration. Concomitantly. I have argued that. 2. globally interlinked cities. the last four decades have witnessed an inversion in state approaches to the regulation of uneven development. and exclusion within many of Europe’s older industrial cores and underdeveloped. Chs. capital. marginalization. urban policy restructuring. and (c) new geographies of political-economic life are forged. At the same time. as diverse political coalitions have maneuvered to position their respective territories strategically within a rapidly changing geoeconomic order (the moment of reterritorialization). regional. (b) new forms of regulatory experimentation are articulated. the tendential integration of European political-economic space (the moment of deterritorialization) has been tied to processes of sociospatial differentiation and rescaling. more or less equalized. I have proposed. European economic space has been simultaneously homogenized and redifferentiated through EU-level and national political strategies designed to dismantle inherited barriers to Europe-wide economic competition and to establish integrated commodity. state spatial strategies generate more or less nationalized. regions. This has facilitated the development of transnational corporate accumulation strategies oriented towards Europe-wide spatial divisions of labor. While the above propositions were elaborated on an abstract level in Chs. and labor markets at a European scale. In post-1980s western Europe. matrices of state spatial organization. and local political strategies intended to enhance the territory-. 2 and 3. 4 and 5 explored their ramifications on meso and concrete levels. geographies of political-economic life. through an investigation of uneven development. that state spatial projects generate more or less centralized. on the one hand. and industrial districts and by enhanced stagnation. differentiation. and rescaling have produced a new European sociospatial mosaic characterized by intense economic dynamism within a select group of powerful. Across western Europe. state spatial projects and state spatial strategies produce historically specific configurations of state spatial selectivity in which (a) inherited patterns of uneven development are provisionally regulated. three meso-level arguments—corresponding to each of the three abstract propositions summarized above—have emerged: 1. and scale-specific features of particular investment locations. more or less uniform. In this sense.258 The Future of New State Spaces to decipher the changing geographies of statehood under modern capitalism. the current round of worldwide deterritorialization and reterritorialization has entailed a deepening and rearticulation of inherited patterns of uneven spatial development. During the . peripheral zones. this wave of supranational market integration has provoked various national. In particular.

Such policies were premised upon new state spatial projects and state spatial strategies designed to enhance the supranational territorial competitiveness of major cities and city-regions. and inherited territorial inequalities were alleviated through nationally redistributive spatial policies. uneven spatial development is increasingly viewed as an unavoidable precondition for profitable capital accumulation rather than as a potentially destabilizing barrier to the latter. a significantly rescaled configuration of state spatial selectivity was forged as urban locational policies proliferated across western Europe. a nationalized. major socioeconomic assets and advanced infrastructural investments have been reconcentrated within strategic urban and regional economies. and urban policy has been reoriented from redistributive-managerial priorities towards the goal of positioning major cities and city-regions (or strategic locations therein) advantageously within global and European circuits of capital. territorially differentiated configuration of state space in which interlocality competition. territorially uniform configuration of state space was established through the historically specific constellation of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies associated with spatial Keynesianism. the redistributive policy relays of spatial Keynesianism were undermined. a new. patterns of state spatial selectivity have been fundamentally transformed. state regulatory capacities have been decentralized and customized according to place-. growth-oriented and competitiveness-driven approach to urban governance was consolidated. Within this transformed interscalar rule-regime. scale-. 3. As of the 1980s. Following a transitional period of crisisinduced restructuring and regulatory experimentation in the 1970s. the proliferation of urban locational policies during the last two decades has facilitated the consolidation of a rescaled. and jurisdiction-specific conditions. state institutions sought to alleviate intra-national territorial inequalities. In short. Under these conditions. and the intensification of intranational sociospatial polarization are actively promoted through state institutions and policies. divergent local developmental pathways. state institutions at various spatial scales began actively to intensify uneven development by promoting the most strategic cities and city-regions within each national territory as privileged sites for transnational capital investment. In conjunction with the aforementioned realignments. During the FordistKeynesian period. state administrative arrangements were centralized and standardized. which were viewed as an impediment to balanced. however. With the proliferation of urban locational policies during this decade and thereafter. urban economies were subsumed within national spatial divisions of labor. By the 1980s. stabilized macroeconomic growth. .The Future of New State Spaces 259 Fordist-Keynesian period. urban policies were subordinated to national regulatory imperatives. this formation of state spatiality was thoroughly destabilized. Within this nationalized interscalar rule-regime. Following the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism.

and a regime. nationally focused regulatory arrangements. the term ‘regime’ is intended to underscore the institutionally and geographically unstable character of currently emergent state forms. b). as ‘glocal states’ (Brenner 1999b. because it privileges the goal of economic competitiveness over traditional welfarist priorities such as equity and redistribution. even in the midst of the wide-ranging rescaling processes that have unsettled traditional. in compensating for market and state failures. 2 n. I have replaced the semantic couplet of glocalizing/glocalized with that of rescaling/rescaled. The transformation of western European Keynesian welfare national states into RCSRs has been mediated through diverse political agendas and has been pursued along divergent pathways of institutional and scalar restructuring in different national contexts.1 Within this rescaled configuration of state spatiality. evolving institutional-geographical mosaic rather than a fully consolidated framework of statehood. which I now consider to be more appropriate labels for contemporary processes of state rescaling. more simply. . refers to the enhanced role of self-organizing governance networks. medium. Despite this.12 (p. For further discussion of the genealogy of this terminology. national governments have not simply downscaled or upscaled regulatory power. rather than hierarchicalgovernmental apparatuses. In a number of essays that were written prior to the completion of this book. but still nationally coordinated. I have argued that a systemic transformation of western European statehood has become evident during the last three decades. For present purposes. I described currently emergent state forms as ‘Glocalizing Competition State Regimes’ (GCSRs) (Brenner 2004a. 2. cities. and outcome of ‘glocalization strategies’. dynamic. see Ch. 14. In this sense. By contrast. as used here. national states have attempted to retain control over major subnational political-economic spaces by situating them within rescaled. The notion of an RCSR is intended to summarize the main institutional and scalar contours of this transformation. and its associated disadvantages and advantages. Elsewhere (Brenner 2003a. accumulation strategies. 1998b). By contrast. industrial districts) optimally within supranational (European or global) circuits of capital accumulation. because it represents an unstable. a competition state. but have attempted to institutionalize competitive relations between subnational administrative units as a means to position local and regional economies strategically within supranational (European and global) circuits of capital. regions. b) or. I believe that this situation of ‘scalar flux’ is an endemic feature of post-Keynesian statehood in western Europe—it is the predominant political expression of the relativization of scales. It is essential. to deploy concepts that underscore the fluidity of contemporary scalar configurations and interscalar relations. The former terms can be easily misconstrued as substantive characterizations of a newly fixed architecture of state scalar organization. as initially outlined in Fig. 1 This formulation partially parallels Jessop’s (2002: 252) characterization of Schumpeterian workfare postnational regimes. however. as described in Ch. I have referred to contemporary processes of state rescaling as an expression. One key difference is that the notion of ‘regime’. the notions of rescaling/rescaled are more generic. because it rests upon scalesensitive political strategies intended to position key subnational spaces (localities. therefore. and open-ended: they usefully underscore the continually evolving scalar configuration of state institutions and policies.260 The Future of New State Spaces The transformed configuration of state spatiality that has crystallized through these transformations may be provisionally characterized as a Rescaled Competition State Regime (RCSR)—rescaled. 3. in Jessop’s conceptualization. 106).

are challenged. each of the cuts corresponds to a particular stage within the institutional and scalar evolution of RCSRs. second-cut formation. and political dislocations of post-Keynesian urban governance to be further exacerbated. This second-cut interpretation suggests that RCSRs have been locked into a vicious cycle in which ineffectual regulatory experiments engender equally dysfunctional institutional innovations. by contrast. that the splintered institutional landscapes of RCSRs are permeated by chronic regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies. my goal is to extend this ‘first-cut’ conceptualization of RCSRs by exploring their continued institutional and scalar evolution during the 1990s and early 2000s. the three cuts represent progressively more sophisticated analytical lenses through which to interpret the process of crisis formation under capitalism. In the present context. dysfunctional trends that have destabilized the accumulation process and undermined the territorial coherence of political-economic life. which resonates closely with the analysis of state rescaling developed in this chapter. ‘third-cut’ transformation of RCSRs. they thus represent evolutionary modifications within RCSRs rather than a transcendence of the latter. to accomplish unless the forces of transnational neoliberalism. urban locational policies have contributed to a variety of disruptive. . I conclude by considering the prospects for a more optimistic. the thirdcut analysis of RCSRs presented at the end of this chapter is speculative: it focuses not upon a new developmental formation of RCSRs. that these highly scale-sensitive approaches to crisis-management have done little to subvert the competition-driven. However. I examine three alternative strategies of rescaling that have been mobilized in response to this situation: (a) neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives. and third cuts into the interpretation of RCSRs are derived in part from Harvey’s (1982) terminology in his classic account of crisis theory in Limits to Capital. first. and has contributed to a further institutional evolution and scalar differentiation of RCSRs. It has also opened up some new spaces of regulatory experimentation in which diverse political alliances are attempting to return issues of territorial cohesion back to the center of debates on the urban question. contradictory effects of urban locational policies. causing the economic. My adoption of this terminology has also been inspired by the innovative recent work of Jones (2001) and Jones and Ward (2002). second. but upon the prospects—currently bleak—for a progressive transformation of the current. I argue. and (c) interurban networking initiatives. For. as well as to theoretical efforts to decipher the latter. despite their goal of unleashing new economic development capacities. This latest round of state rescaling has partially counteracted some of the most polarizing. in which the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies of urban locational policies would be counterbalanced through the establishment of a Europe-wide. On this basis. 2 My references to the first.The Future of New State Spaces 261 In this concluding chapter. To elaborate such a ‘second-cut’ analysis. territorially equalizing interscalar rule-regime. social. In Harvey’s work. if not impossible. however. I argue. (b) metropolitan reform initiatives. growth-first logic upon which urban locational policies are grounded. and the socially regressive regulatory geographies they promote.2 I argue that such a scenario will be difficult.

In both instances. . Massey 1985). it may also undermine the socioeconomic and territorial preconditions upon which the accumulation process as a whole depends (Harvey 1982. while uneven spatial development may present certain fractions of capital with new opportunities for profit-making. in turn. it is assumed that the place-specific competitive advantages of city-regions will not be threatened by rising levels of intra-national sociospatial polarization. to reappear at a later date and require ‘new’ urban policies that. as national. ] turns cities into accomplices of their own subordination [ . however. intra-national territorial inequalities are usually viewed as an unavoidable consequence of global and European economic integration. In neoliberalized political systems. in national and regional contexts in which social.and christian-democratic traditions have remained more robust. RCSRs—are premised upon spatially polarizing institutional innovations and regulatory initiatives. The polarization of territorial development is seen as an undesirable but necessary side-effect of political initiatives to maintain national economic competitiveness. . as noted in the opening chapter of this book. For. ]—through a centrally orchestrated state apparatus. . regional.262 The Future of New State Spaces Unstable state spaces: regulatory deficits of urban locational policies The logic of interurban competition [ . such policies are justified through the contention that stable macroeconomic growth will be secured as local and regional economies are forced to compete on the basis of their supranational market positions. urban locational policies—and. such assumptions have proven to be thoroughly problematic. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002: 46) The implementation of urban policy is frequently associated with crises. . More generally. In practice. shored up by the political reality that no city can afford principled noninvolvement in the game. . create further contradictions and crisis. ] The public subsidy of zero-sum competition at the inter-urban scale rests on the economic fallacy that every city can win. Martin Jones and Kevin Ward (2002: 128) As outlined in the preceding chapter. a number of regulatory failures and crisis-tendencies have become evident across the western European urban system during the last two decades. which are diffused—temporarily [ . it is assumed that the benefits of urban economic dynamism—both within and beyond the city-regions that are targeted for development initiatives—will offset any detrimental political-economic consequences that might flow from the new territorial polarization. by implication. By contrast. As numerous urban scholars have suggested. however. . and local state institutions have mobilized urban locational policies in the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework for contain- .

For instance. Lovering 1995. 1994. 1996. the potential disadvantages of a failure or refusal to introduce them have escalated (Leitner and Sheppard 1998). urban locational policies may induce inefficient allocations of public resources as taxpayer revenues are channeled towards the promotion of private accumulation rather than towards the general conditions of production or social expenditures. . In this manner. leading to a zero-sum redistribution of capital investment among competing locations within the EU (Cheshire and Gordon 1998. they have simultaneously contributed to a destabilization of urban. regional. Hence. Urban locational policies enhance competitive pressures upon subnational administrative units to offer favorable terms to potential investors. social-democratic approaches to urban locational policy have been less destructive. Keating 1991. Short-termism. and polarizing than defensive. and national economic development. To be sure. regionally.g. such advantages have generally been eroded as analogous policies have been diffused among similarly positioned cities within the European spatial division of labor (Leitner and Sheppard 1998). Despite this. Nonetheless. Even though some cities have managed to acquire short-term competitive advantages through the early adoption of urban locational policies. The proliferation of urban locational policies has encouraged ‘the search for short-term gains at the expense of more important longerterm investments in the health of cities and the well-being of their residents’ (Leitner and Sheppard 1998: 305).The Future of New State Spaces 263 ing their territorially polarizing consequences. The following are among the major regulatory failures and crisistendencies that have been generated through the widespread mobilization of urban locational policies in post-1980s western Europe: . 3 . As these policies have been diffused. Cheshire and Gordon 1996. MacLeod 2000. Dunford 1994. Inefficiency and waste. Peck and Tickell 1995. 1996. Leitner and Sheppard 1998. ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of urban governance) cause urban systems to become more ‘vulnerable to the uncertainties of rapid change’ and thus trigger ‘all manner of upward and downward spirals of urban growth and decline’ (ibid. ‘much territorial competition [among cities] is pure waste’. neoliberal approaches (Leborgne and Lipietz 1991). supply-side gains for local economies. More frequently. Jones 2001. as Harvey (1989a: 10–11) recognized in the late 1980s. Eisenschitz and Gough 1998. Dunford 1994). and locally specific forms. as Cheshire and Gordon (1995: 122) conclude. the macrogeographical impacts of offensive. destabilizing. in channeling public resources towards the goal of enhancing urban territorial competitiveness. there is currently little evidence that urban locational policies generate positive-sum.). such initiatives have entailed public subsidies to private firms.3 Such policies have proven contradictory in the sense that. for instance. urban locational policies (in his terms. the patterns of regulatory failure and crisis formation induced by urban locational policies have been articulated in nationally. In See e. by upgrading locally embedded industrial capacities.

globally connected urban enclaves that generate only limited spillover effects into their surrounding territories. Leborgne and Lipietz 1991). The resultant intensification of national and local sociospatial polarization may undermine macroeconomic stability. and at supralocal scales. as advanced infrastructural hubs and high-technology production centers are delinked from adjoining neighborhoods. . as the engines of national economic dynamism. as a strategy for strength` ening some territories vis-a-vis other territories and other nations’ (Leborgne and Lipietz 1991: 47). Gough and Eisenschitz 1996.264 The Future of New State Spaces this sense. offensive approaches ‘operate . Such policies are premised upon the assumption that enhanced urban territorial competitiveness will benefit the broader regional and national space-economies in which cities are embedded. it worsens life-chances for significant segments of local and national populations. offensive forms of urban locational policy are likewise prone to significant crisis-tendencies (Eisenschitz and Gough 1996. or specific locations therein. The macroeconomic instability that subsequently ensues may undermine the very . Urban locational policies entail the targeting of strategic. it may also breed divisive. they have proven far less effective in sustaining that growth over the medium or long term (Peck and Tickell 1995. disruptive political conflicts (see below). This process of regulatory undercutting is dysfunctional on a number of levels: it aggravates rather than alleviates municipal fiscal and regulatory problems. however. These outcomes tend to downgrade national economic performance (Cheshire and Gordon 1996. First. This tendency towards ‘glocal enclavization’ is being articulated at a local scale. while urban locational policies have helped unleash short-term bursts of economic growth within some cities and regions. In practice. 1993. like defensive approaches to urban locational policy. Nonetheless. Particularly in their defensive. as globally competitive agglomerations are delinked from older industrial regions and other marginalized spaces within the same national territory (Graham and Marvin 2001). 1994). Uneven spatial development and territorial conflicts. ‘Glocal enclavization’. and it exacerbates entrenched inequalities within national urban hierarchies (Eisenschitz and Gough 1998. and intensify uneven development beyond the territorial zones in which they are deployed (Eisenschitz and Gough 1996: 444). globally connected urban regions. . social-democratic forms of urban locational policy. and municipal governments attempt to reduce the costs of capital investment within their territorial jurisdictions. . Hudson 2001). . regional. The aforementioned regulatory problems may assume more moderate forms in conjunction with offensive. Peck and Tickell 1995). neoliberal forms. urban locational policies have encouraged a race to the bottom in social service provision as national. urban locational policies have contributed to the establishment of technologically advanced. they thus ‘increase the profitability of strong economies more than the weak’. . Regulatory undercutting.

technical experts. . The institutional fragmentation of statehood induced through urban locational policies thus constrains the capacity of state institutions. it systematically undermines their ability to address broader social needs and to maintain territorial cohesion (Eisenschitz and Gough 1998). offensive approaches to urban economic development suffer from serious problems of politicization. the proliferation of urban locational policies has generated new conflicts regarding democratic accountability and political legitimation. they have undermined the organizational coherence and functional integration of state institutions. yet the apparent successes of such strategies at a local scale generate intense distributional pressures as other localities and regions within the same national territory strive to replicate the ‘recipe’ or to reap some of its financial benefits (Eisenschitz and Gough 1996). this lack of supranational or national regulatory coordination in the field of urban policy may exacerbate the economic crisis-tendencies discussed above: it enhances the likelihood that identical or analogous growth strategies may be replicated serially across the European urban system. thus accelerating the diffusion of zero-sum forms of interlocality competition (Amin and Malmberg 1994).The Future of New State Spaces 265 localized socioeconomic assets upon which offensive urban locational policies depend (Leborgne and Lipietz 1991). because urban locational policies enhance the geographical differentiation of state regulatory activities without embedding subnational competitive strategies within an encompassing national policy framework. property developers. to address many of the dysfunctional side-effects of such policies. the increasing geographical differentiation of state regulatory activities induced through local economic development policies is ‘as much a hindrance as a help to regulation’. as Goodwin and Painter (1996: 646) explain. Second. and Rodriguez 2002). Problems of interscalar coordination. and local state institutions. Second. The proliferation of place-specific strategies of local economic development exacerbates coordination problems within and among national. and corporate elites who are not accountable to the populations that are most directly affected by their activities (Swyngedouw. regional. Many of the new. This fragmentation may also generate serious legitimation deficits if oppositional social forces are able to politicize the negative socioeconomic consequences of urban locational policies or their undemocratic character. First. . even more so than defensive forms of urban locational policy. both within and beyond the cities in which they are deployed. . Democratic accountability and legitimation problems. Moulaert. highly fragmented institutional forms established to implement urban locational policies are dominated by non-elected government bureaucrats. While this lack of political accountability may enable regulatory agencies to implement urban locational policies more efficiently. Their effectiveness hinges upon being confined to locally delineated areas. Finally. For. at various spatial scales.

Building upon this insight. competitiveness-oriented logic of urban locational policy. they have been oriented towards the place. dislocations. but also as a form of crisis-management designed to manage the regulatory deficits. State rescaling has thus come to operate not only as a political strategy for promoting local economic development. The political form. and local context. post-Keynesian approaches to urban governance. The institutional and scalar architectures of RCSRs have been qualitatively modified through the interaction of this new. I suggest that a crisis-induced recalibration of RCSRs has been unfolding since the mid-1990s. regional. politicized. Nonetheless. but also in relation to the specific types of urban locational policy that were previously mobilized within those contexts. scale-sensitive politics of crisis-management with inherited. I shall consider three scale-specific forms of regulatory experimentation that have been mobilized since the early 1990s—neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives. a rescaled layer of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies has been forged within RCSRs whose purpose is to confront some of the major regulatory failures that have been generated through urban locational policies. scalar foci. institutional shape. and scalar configuration of each of these crisis-management strategies have varied not only by national. such strategies have entailed the construction of institutional flanking mechanisms through which state institutions are attempting to monitor. and conflicts induced through earlier rounds of state spatial restructuring (Jones and Ward 2002.and scale-specific politicaleconomic conditions of urban regions. Despite their otherwise divergent institutional forms. They also provide a theoretical basis on which to decipher the institutional and scalar evolution of RCSRs during the 1990s and early 2000s. Brenner 2003a). and regulatory aims. For it is in relation to the endemic regulatory failures of such policies that the alleged need for a recalibration or extension of state rescaling processes has been perceived. these three forms of state rescaling share several common features: . and alleviate some of the most destructive political-economic consequences of such policies. as the disruptive. Under these circumstances. and acted upon in specific politico-institutional settings. and thus develop a second-cut interpretation of RCSRs.266 The Future of New State Spaces These regulatory problems and crisis-tendencies are of considerable significance to the present analysis. These rescaled strategies of crisis-management have not challenged the growth-driven. . Hudson (2001: 66) has recently suggested that state institutions may transform their own internal structures and modes of operation as they attempt to ‘reconcile the contradictions inherent to [their] involvement in the economy and society’. and interurban networking initiatives. dysfunctional consequences of urban locational policies have become more apparent. In order to explore this latest round of state rescaling. metropolitan reform initiatives. manage. Drawing upon Offe’s (1984) approach to crisis theory. not only because they illustrate the internally contradictory character of urban locational policies.

4 . and Sassen 1993. the pursuit of territorial competitiveness. the neighborhood scale is recognized as a major site See e.The Future of New State Spaces . trial-and-error regulatory experimentation. Rescaling (further) downward: neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives A number of scholars have drawn attention to the intensification of sociospatial polarization within major European cities during the last three decades. In interpreting the latest round of state rescaling as a form of crisis-management.4 Increasingly. . and the evolving scalar geographies of western European statehood. through a further scalar differentiation of state space. institutional learning. Cars. 267 they have attempted. O’Loughlin and Friedrichs 1996. Madanipour. As in the preceding two chapters. Recent rescaling initiatives in European cityregions have emerged through the combined impacts of deliberate design. often on the basis of claims that such an emphasis is not only compatible with. the capacity of these rescaled forms of crisismanagement to resolve the regulatory deficits within RCSRs remains highly problematic at the present time. I shall not attempt here to provide a comprehensive survey of each of these rescaling initiatives. therefore. 1991. Andersen and van Kempen 2001. and on that basis. political coalitions. As I argue below. as diverse social forces. Musterd and Ostendoorf 1998. but conducive to. and territorial alliances have struggled to reshape the field of urban governance and. they have reintroduced a concern with territorial cohesion back into debates on the urban question. or that they effectively resolve the latter. more generally. In each case. to alleviate the new forms of uneven development that have emerged within and between European cities during the last two decades. this meso-level account aims to illuminate the general. and these crisis-management strategies have also generated new conflicts and crisis-tendencies of their own. Geddes and Benington 2001. to influence the trajectory of state spatial restructuring. through spatially selective state projects and state strategies. pan-European features of the institutional shifts and policy realignments in question. and political compromises. to counteract some of the regulatory failures associated with earlier approaches to urban locational policy. the regulation of uneven spatial development. Mingione 1996. the rescaling of state space has served at once as the basis on which a particular form of crisis-management has been launched and as the source of new regulatory dislocations within RCSRs. to specify their cumulative implications for urban governance. they have attempted. chance discoveries.g. and Allen 1998. . I am not suggesting that state spatial configurations evolve automatically and coherently in response to inherited policy failures.

including social networks. the problem of urban sociospatial polarization has been met with qualitatively new. Although the urban renewal policies of the Fordist-Keynesian period likewise targeted specific urban zones. in contrast to earlier welfarist policies oriented towards urban . Given the multiple politicaleconomic forces underlying contemporary urban sociospatial polarization. and also at a European scale.and ethnicity-based forms of urban residential segregation have a long lineage in the history of European urbanism (Hohenberg and Lees 1995). and so forth (H. T. Nonetheless. their regulatory goals. T. clearly delineated areas and neighborhoods for multifaceted forms of policy intervention. the elderly poor. inherited national institutions (such as welfare state regimes). and welfare recipients) and social problems (such as unemployment. for instance. and their institutional configuration: 1. and homelessness) have been concentrated within inner-city areas and outlying housing estates (Andersen and van Kempen 2003). recent immigrants. 2. the area-based urban policies of the 1990s ‘widen the scope of intervention to include not just physical upgrading but also social relations’. institutional environments. poverty. but also in explicitly social terms. crime. Andersen 2001: 241). as disadvantaged populations (including the long-term unemployed. In a number of western European national states. C. Urban policy at a neighborhood scale. therefore. educational opportunities. Accordingly. Three aspects of these strategies to counteract urban sociospatial polarization deserve emphasis here—their scalar selectivity. the form of urban governance) on the sociospatial fabric of European cities (Marcuse and van Kempen 2001. conceived not only in terms of economic factors such as income levels and job availability. The goal of neighborhood-based urban policies is to combat the problem of social ‘exclusion’. and life chances of local inhabitants. rescaled regulatory responses during the course of the 1990s (Geddes and Bennington 2001. These urban districts are generally delineated strictly such that ‘anything that is not located inside the selected area will be excluded from the programmes’ (H. policies are devised and implemented with reference to the place-specific socioeconomic conditions and perceived problems of disadvantaged neighborhoods. Andersen and van Kempen 2003). labor-market participation.268 The Future of New State Spaces at which new social and territorial inequalities have been articulated. Moreover. because such policies have facilitated the reorientation of urban governance away from socially and spatially redistributive goals. Andersen 2001: 242). Of course. class. it would be problematic to view the latter as a direct outcome of urban locational policies. they have contributed to an intensification of intra-urban territorial inequalities during the post-1980s period. with reference to the social networks. the scholarship on the ‘new’ urban exclusion has attempted to disaggregate the impacts of recent global shifts (such as geoeconomic integration). Social exclusion as a threat to economic competitiveness. and emergent local struggles (regarding. The policies in question target specific. In each case. Hamnett 1996).

H. Thus.and community-based associations. as well as the involvement of various non-state actors.The Future of New State Spaces 269 problems such as poverty. T. Anti-exclusion policies acknowledge explicitly that territorial inequalities—in this case. but also as a basis for protecting and upgrading urban competitive advantages. 3. as Harloe (2001: 895–6) notes. and quasi nongovernmental organizations (Quangos). Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies generally entail the interaction of multiple tiers of state organization. and ` [to] take their direction from.1 underscore the ways in which. Andersen 2001). eligible participants. The statements quoted in Box 6. On the one hand.1 indicates. social inclusion or cohesion is seen as likely to have positive consequences for competitiveness’. Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies have also had important implications for the geographies of western European statehood. They also generally involve systematic efforts. such policies have been justified not only as a means to alleviate intra-urban inequalities. the new approaches to social exclusion ‘are more likely to be organized by. neighborhood-based initiatives have entailed an . As Box 6. A multilayered but localized institutional structure. The new urban social policies are thus promoted less as an alternative to urban locational policies than as a stabilizing complement to the latter. They often involve ‘partnerships’. as Fig. the European Commission. at various scales of state power. ‘contracts’. a number of major western European national states. across several national contexts. and struggles rather than by top-down policy directives. local forms of regulation’ (Le Gales 2002: 215). conversely. while national state institutions. the latter have exhibited a strongly localized character: their specific politico-institutional forms have been conditioned above all by placeand scale-specific political-economic circumstances. 6. However. coalitions. neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies may be understood as a significant extension and fine-tuning of urban locational policies. ‘social exclusion is seen as potentially or actually having negative consequences for competitiveness and cohesion. and ‘covenants’ between national state institutions and various local and neighborhood-level institutions in which the objectives. anti-exclusion policies are justified as a means to enhance urban territorial competitiveness. For. In this sense.1 (overleaf) indicates. crime. those that emerge within cities—may undermine urban competitiveness. in contrast to postwar antipoverty policies. which were nationally formulated and locally implemented. have figured crucially in initiating and funding such area-based regulatory experiments. and unemployment. along with the European Commission. mobilized neighborhoodbased anti-exclusion policies during the 1990s. to integrate previously distinct spheres of policy in the context of concerted neighborhood-level interventions (Andersen and van Kempen 2003. and time-frames for specific policy programs are specified. and in some cases. private business alliances. such as neighborhood.

leading ultimately to social and economic exclusion. public safety. The Commission provided financial support for a variety of neighborhood-based initiatives. crime and quality of life—but now cast less as symptoms of urban failure than as potential obstacles to competitive success. Changing Copenhagen’s social geography has thus become a primary strategy for developing its competitiveness. Hamburg.1. urban renewal policies were decentralized during the 1990s (Altes 2002. rent reductions. and Clark 2001: 865) The [urban revitalization] policy [in the Netherlands] to help disadvantaged groups catch up with the rest of society was legitimated with reference to the presumably negative effect that deprived neighborhoods would have on the economic base of urban amenities and on the attractiveness of the city as a prime location for economically robust companies and households. and van der Meer 1998: 265). this program was intended to enhance labor-market participation. Andersen. One of the key goals of the GSB has been to promote an integrated approach to urban regener- . Braun. This new concept embraces some old issues—including poverty. Vermeijden 2001). (Vermeijden 2001: 222) The urban problem [in the United Kingdom] has been redefined in terms of a supposed lack of social cohesion. Emblematic of these changes. Kvarterløft Program. and other social programs. its overarching goal was to stimulate local governance networks that could address ‘the aggravating problems [that] threatened to put a spoke in the wheel of the motors of the economy: the major cities’ (van den Berg.270 The Future of New State Spaces Box 6. (Hansen. the Big Cities Policy (Grote Steden Beleid—GSB) was introduced in 1996. Through the establishment of localized governance networks and public–private partnerships. Subsequently. Denmark. both for the cities themselves and for the national economies that increasingly rely on them. Andersen and van Kempen 2003). including physical upgrading. the national government introduced the ‘Urban Area Improvement Program’ (Kvarterløft-programmet) which focused on seven large neighborhoods located in Copenhagen and several other Danish cities. Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives: selected western European examples The concentration of poor [inhabitants] in Copenhagen municipality is seen as a burden in the context of attracting investments in competition with Berlin. In the Dutch context. Netherlands. Stockholm and other European cities. and social vitality in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Kristensen 2001. The political agenda for cities is thereby defined as the search for institutions and policies that might reconcile competitiveness and cohesion goals. The Danish national government founded an ‘Urban Commission’ in the early 1990s in order to promote social and economic improvements within 500 housing estates. . Grote Steden Beleid. (Harloe 2001: 889–90) Key examples of neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies in contemporary western Europe include the following: .

these new urban social policies have been characterized by (a) competitive regimes of resource allocation. including the national government. The Contrats perpetuated. and Kruythoff 1997). and. and economic competitiveness (Parkinson 1998. The so-called Politique de la Ville was introduced in France during the late 1970s in order to confront the social problems of deprived areas within the French urban system (Body-Gendrot 2000). along with diverse local institutions. City Challenge focused on socalled ‘areas of concentrated disadvantage’ with the goal of promoting localized economic growth and enhancing the social integration of marginalized populations (Davoudi and Healey 1995). Since 1994. United Kingdom. and the Hague—it has subsequently been expanded to include the so-called ‘G-15’ and the ‘G6’. through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). which was oriented towards employment. . two additional clusters of medium-sized towns that likewise manifested serious problems of sociospatial polarization (Torrance 2002. Contrats de Ville. and (c) an orientation towards a range of urban socioeconomic issues. neighborhood-based anti-exclu- sion policies have been mobilized by the European Commission. France. which ´ targeted 148 neighborhoods. Following the market- oriented transformation of British urban policy under the Thatcher government. and education to crime. community-based initiatives. This program was expanded in 1994. European Commission. Utrecht. Aside from their explicit focus on marginalized urban neighborhoods. areabased forms of urban social policy were mobilized across the UK in the 1990s (Wilks-Heeg 1996). whose socioeconomic vitality was now viewed as a key precondition for national economic prosperity. environmental degradation. environmental conditions. URBAN has drawn upon. in many cases. which amalgamated resources from various governmental departments and twenty urban policy initiatives into a single urban social fund (Ward 1997). from labor markets. recreation. and education in over 1. associations. and crime. These programs were further expanded in the early 1990s through the Contrats de Ville program. .5 million to thirty-one local partnerships during a five-year period. Sallez 1998. would collaborate to confront social problems such as long-term unemployment. the Concerted Program for Urban Development (PACT urbains). (b) an emphasis on localized governance networks. Premius. which increased the number of targeted areas to 540. and actors. and public–private partnerships. private bodies (Jacquier 2001). The GSB allotted public funds to rejuvenate marginalized neighborhoods within the major Dutch cities. . crime. the antiexclusion agendas of previous approaches to Politique de la Ville. in which local authorities must bid against one another for access to public funds. City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget. Body-Gendrot 2000). URBAN Programme. While the GSB was initially oriented towards the four ‘motors’ of the Dutch national economy—the ‘G-4’ of Amsterdam. Boelhouwer.200 disadvantaged urban areas. Jones and Ward 2002). Such urban social policies were expanded ´ during the 1980s. The City Challenge Program was introduced in 1992. regional and local authorities. first through the Developpement Social des Quartiers (1984–8). above all through the URBAN program. and has to some extent been coordinated . it allocated £37.The Future of New State Spaces 271 ation in which multiple national governmental ministries. Additional area-based state policies were also mobilized during the 1990s—for instance. Rotterdam. while also introducing new forms of collaboration among diverse institutions. housing. in a more comprehensive form. and the Large-Scale ` Urban Projects (Grands Projects Urbains) (Le Gales and Loncle-Moriceau 2001. and then through the Developpement Social Urbain (1988–92).

territorially customized state spatial configurations and localized. local anti-exclusion programs have entailed a significant evolutionary modification within RCSRs: they have expanded the problematic of territorial competitiveness to include a variety of cohesion-related issues. its goals have paralleled those of the latter. derived from the Structural Funds (CEC 1998. Yet. some of the polarizing sociospatial consequences of previous rounds of political-economic restructuring. in many cases. such as employment. Second. it is currently being debated in the context of broader struggles regarding EU enlargement and the reform of the Structural Funds. their highly localized scalar focus also appears to represent a significant structural limitation. housing. the neighborhood has become a key spatial and institutional forcefield for post-Keynesian regulatory experiments. so too have neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies contributed to the consolidation of decentralized. In its initial phase. regionally. place-specific forms of state intervention. or quartier. extension and deepening of post-1980s forms of state spatial restructuring. the state spatial projects and state spatial strategies associated with neighborhood-based anti-exclusion programs have tendentially modified the geographical architecture of RCSRs in at least two ways. including those induced through urban locational policies. the aforementioned. education.272 The Future of New State Spaces with. In this manner. 6.and scale-specific ways. selecting appropriate . such localized anti-exclusion initiatives have attempted to introduce a new scalar niche and territorial arena within RCSRs—namely. Indeed. provided additional financial resources for nationally. the urban neighborhood. First. confined to the targeted areas. neighborhoodbased anti-exclusion initiatives have attempted to alleviate. However. URBAN focused upon 110 depressed neighborhoods and commanded a budget of 880 ` million. Consequently. albeit exclusively within the confines of particular urban districts. Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies have helped to reinvigorate public debates on the problem of territorial inequality in western European cities. the future of the URBAN initiative remains uncertain. Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies may thus be viewed as an important new flanking mechanism through which one of the major regulatory deficits of urban locational policies is being addressed. and locally initiated regeneration projects.1 also indicates. much like urban locational policies. in fact. district. While the neighborhood-level orientation of these anti-exclusion policies enables them to be customized according to placespecific conditions. at a highly localized scale. By confronting the problem of uneven spatial development in place. and crime. that had not previously been addressed within the parameters of urban locational policy. as Fig. most of the social problems they aim to confront are not. Le Gales 2002: 101–3). and it has. nationally specific urban social initiatives. However.

and their associated funding streams. In this scenario. Although such policies are not oriented directly towards territorial competitiveness. but also within urban regions Fig. neighborhood-specific regulatory arrangements are superimposed upon inherited. 6. national.1. ‘contracts’. they are frequently justified as a means to protect or upgrade the latter by maintaining urban social cohesion In this manner. such policies redistribute the spatial expressions of social exclusion among different locations within an urban . city-wide administrative structures This contributes to a further customization and differentiation of state space according to place-specific conditions and priorities STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES 273 New. and ‘covenants‘. and local state institutions TERRITORIAL DIMENSION Certain disadvantaged urban districts or suburban areas within national urban systems are selected for specific types of institutional reform and policy innovation. many area-based urban social policies engender the unintended but dysfunctional consequence of displacing social problems from the targeted areas into other zones of a metropolitan region. national. Neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs spatial targets—particularly if they are required to be neighborhood-based— remains highly problematic: for ‘selecting only areas with the biggest problems might mean that areas with a score that is slightly better on the variables such as unemployment. while also enhancing interscalar linkages among supranational. such policies reinforce the strategic role of cities and city-regions as targets and arenas for accumulation strategies The mobilization of neighborhoodspecific social policies entails the establishment of strictly defined territorial enclaves into which public funding allotments are channeled. are applicable only within the boundaries of the targeted districts This contributes to a further territorial differentiation of state space.The Future of New State Spaces STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS SCALAR DIMENSION Through neighborhood-level ‘partnerships’. In these cases. and local state agencies as well as community-based associations and private institutions This extends the decentralization and localization of state space. new forms of regulatory coordination are established among European. The policies. and modes of state intervention is established not only among major regional and local administrative units. crime and quality of life do not get any attention’ (Andersen and van Kempen 2003: 82–3). Relatedly. funding schemes. as a patchwork of divergent policy regimes. area-based forms of state intervention are mobilized in order to address social problems that have crystallized with particular intensity at a neighborhood scale.

and integrated within. place-specific regulatory enclaves. and urban policy. regional. growth-oriented logic upon which post-Keynesian urban governance is grounded. the British Single Regeneration Budget. neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies operate primarily to address some of the most destructive effects of urban locational policies within self-enclosed urban districts. Andersen 2001). While some recent urban policy initiatives. neighborhood-level anti-exclusion policies are adopted as a means to address social problems that are actually metropolitanwide or even national. to confront their underlying political-economic causes. progressive role in processes of urban regeneration. Under current geoeconomic and European conditions. they thus exacerbate the fragmentation of state space by generating a patchwork of localized. as Moulaert (2000) has argued. the aforementioned limitations of neighborhood-based social policies are likely to remain chronic ones. rather than addressing their underlying political-economic causes. the problem of institutional fragmentation is endemic to localized. large-scale approaches to metropolitan governance were undermined or abolished during the 1980s in conjunction . Finally. competition-based models of urban development—but only if they are systematically linked to. even under the most favorable political circumstances. therefore. Rescaling (back) upward: metropolitan reform initiatives Like urban neighborhoods. T. a broader European and national redistributive political agenda. This pessimistic assessment is not intended to deny the possibility that neighborhood-based initiatives might play a stabilizing. to integrate the targeted districts into the broader metropolitan fabric. such as the URBAN program of the European Commission. or to counteract the competitiveness-driven.274 The Future of New State Spaces agglomeration. are more explicitly attuned to the need for interscalar coordination and meta-governance. they may obscure the supralocal institutional contexts in which territorial inequalities are generated (Andersen and van Kempen 2003: 83). and the French Contrats de Ville. such local social policies may contain considerable potential to establish alternatives to growth-oriented. area-based approaches to urban regeneration (H. As indicated in the preceding chapter. In the absence of such a macrogeographical project of territorial equalization. metropolitan regions have become important sites of scale-specific transformations of statehood since the early 1990s. For. comprehensive. the integration of area-based initiatives into metropolitan-wide or national developmental strategies poses major regulatory challenges. Insofar as localized. they do little to alleviate those effects at supralocal scales. I would suggest. many neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives are not coherently integrated into European or national frameworks of spatial. Thus.

Faced with these recent institutional changes and regulatory experiments. In contrast to the hierarchical-bureaucratic frameworks of metropolitan service delivery that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period. DISP 2003. These metropolitan institutional reforms have not been designed according to a single recipe or imposed from above. debates on the installation of new metropolitan institutions have proliferated. this apparent institutional vacuum in the field of metropolitan governance proved to be shortlived. industrialists. Jouve ` ` and Lefevre 1999a. (b) representatives of wealthy suburban towns that fear central city dominance or reject external claims on the local tax base.2 (pp. Soon after the high-profile abolitions of the Greater London Council and Rotterdam’s Rijnmond in the 1980s. The most vocal opponents of such reforms have generally included (a) representatives of middle-tier or provincial governmental agencies that perceive powerful metropolitan associations as a threat to their administrative authority. urban locational policies were diffused within a reterritorialized institutional landscape in which inherited regulatory controls on metropolitan-wide spatial development were significantly compromised. Stuttgart. and (c) residents within large cities that fear a loss of democratic accountability and local political control (Heinz 2000: 21–8). and STANDORT 2000. several commentators have suggested that a renaissance of metropolitan regionalism is currently under way throughout western Europe. place-marketing.The Future of New State Spaces 275 with the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism and the resultant retrenchment of Keynesian welfare national states. Herrschel and Newman 2002. administrative. Since the early 1990s. However. environmental sustainability. Hannover. In some city-regions. and other ‘boosterists’. and Kreukels 2003a.g. and national political coalitions across the western European urban system began to advocate a renewal of metropolitan governance—albeit in significantly different politico-institutional forms than those that had prevailed under spatial Keynesianism. In other major European urban regions. (b) political elites within central cities. b. Bologna. and democratic accountability. Lefevre 1998. . suburban sprawl. but have generally emerged ‘as a product of the system of actors as the process [of institutional reform] unfolds’ ` (Lefevre 1998: 18). informal frameworks for metropolitan cooperation have been superimposed upon inherited political geographies and have provided a new institutional basis for intra-regional negotiations regarding diverse policy issues— including economic development.5 Figure 6. and regulatory competencies are concentrated. spatial planning. Brenner 2003a. infrastructural planning. Frankfurt. 276–80) provides an overview of some of the major metropolitan reform initiatives that have emerged in the European urban system since the early 1990s. partnership. voluntary ` participation and flexibility in the constitution of new structures’ (Lefevre 1998: 18). and economic governance. and (c) local and regional business elites. The current round of metropolitan institutional reform has been promoted primarily by (a) modernizing national governments. regional. local. such as London. the metropolitan institutional reforms of the 1990s have been grounded upon a new model of public action that ‘highlights values of negotiation. Salet. and Copenhagen. Following the collapse of spatial Keynesianism. Barlow 1997. in many cases leading to significant changes in regional territorial administration. Thornley. Keating 1998. 5 See e. new metropolitan institutional arrangements have been constructed in which multiple planning. Heinz 2000.

2A. and surrounding towns Fig. North West Partnership Invest North West Agency for Regional Development (INWARD) City Pride Partnership Manchester Investment and Development Agency (MIDAS) Marketing Manchester organizations in the South East of England Diverse local advocates of democratic renewal and ‘third way’ ideology Centrally imposed during Greater Manchester the early 2000s but also closely linked to new (Deas and locally articulated Ward 2002. the current renaissance of metropolitan regionalism in western Europe has been multifaceted. its suburbs. Peck. Newman and Thornley 1997. or informal cooperative approaches with differing . development strategies Tickell. leading to the establishment of ‘a more bewildering tangle of municipalities. 6. within Greater and Dicken Manchester 1995) Oriented towards the goal of marketing the North West of England as well as Greater Manchester as integrated. governmental and regional organizations and institutions. Syrett and Baldcock 2003) Centrally imposed under the Blair government during the early 2000s Oriented towards enhancing London’s competitive strength in global and European markets Linked to new ‘thirdway’ discourses regarding democratic renewal and a national project of administrative devolution Greater London Authority British national state (GLA) (from 2000) Local and regional London Development political elites in the Agency (LDA) (from London region 2000) Large business South East Development Agency (SEEDA) East of England Development Agency (EEDA) Various public−private partnerships and informal governance networks at regional and local scales North West Regional Association (NWRA). competitive locations for capital investment UK national state Large business organizations in the North West of England and in the Greater Manchester region Local and regional political elites in Manchester.276 The Future of New State Spaces Form of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s Organizational embodiment(s) Major political-economic forces behind metropolitan regionalism Greater London (Thornley 2003. and public. The new metropolitan regionalism in western Europe: an overview of recent trends As Figure 6. North West Development Agency (NWDA). Metropolitan reform initiatives have interacted in place-specific ways with inherited institutional frameworks. regional economic 2000.2 indicates. private.

as a simultaneous extension and modification of previous approaches to urban locational policy. Nonetheless. centrally imposed regional institutions into instruments of local and regional economic development strategy Communauté Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY) Région Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) Logistical Alliance for the Urban Region of Lyon Economic Development Local and regional business organizations Plan (1997) in the Lyon region Council of Participants in an Development (within emergent regional the COURLY as of growth machine 2001) Transforms earlier. centrally imposed regional institutions into instruments of local and regional economic development strategy Communauté Urbaine de Lille (CUDL) Regional Economic Development Agency Lille Metropolitan Area Economic Promotion Agency (APIM) DATAR (French national government) Lille municipality Entrepreneurial local political elites (led by Lille mayor Pierre Mauroy) Local and regional business organizations in the Lille region Participants in an emergent regional growth machine Aims to position Lille Lille Metropolitan strategically in European transportation Agency for Economic Development and networks Urban Planning Tied to cross-border (1990) cooperative initiatives with Flanders (Belgium) Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing Chamber of Commerce and Kent (UK) Fig. For this reason. . Motte Grounded upon 1997) region-wide strategic economic planning initiatives. (continued ) actors. Moulaert. functions. Salin. in more general terms. Mabrouk and Jouve 1999. and jurisdictions’ (Heinz 2000: 27). 6. much like the neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies discussed above.2B. and Werquin 2001) Transforms earlier. I suggest that the current round of metropolitan reform in western European cityregions can be deciphered. each instance of metropolitan institutional restructuring must be understood with reference to the nationally and locally specific administrative-constitutional system and political-economic landscape in which it has emerged. placemarketing campaigns.The Future of New State Spaces 277 Form of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s Organizational embodiment(s) Major political-economic forces behind metropolitan regionalism DATAR (French national government) Lyon municipality Entrepreneurial local political elites (led by ‘mayor-entrepreneur’ Michel Noir) Greater Lyon (Bardet and Jouve 1998. and infrastructural investment programs Lille Metropolis (Newman and Thornley 1995.

and industrial policy Stuttgart Regional Agency (VRS) (from 1994) Stuttgart Regional Economic Development Corporation Stuttgart Region (Benz and Frenzel 1999. 6. selected suburbs.2C. and van der Meer 1997) Enabled in 1990 through national legislation to establish ‘Metropolitan Cities’ in major Italian urban agglomerations Metropolitan City Agreement (1994) Metropolitan Conference Metropolitan Economic Aims to transform Consultation Bologna and its suburbs (from 1996) into an integrated.278 The Future of New State Spaces Form of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s Organizational embodiment(s) Major political-economic forces behind metropolitan regionalism Italian national government Bologna municipality Entrepreneurial local and regional political elites (led by mayor Walter Vitali) Selected fractions of local and regional capital in Bologna and Emilia-Romagna Bologna Metropolitan City (Jouve and Lefèvre 1999b. Heeg 2003) Land government of BadenWürttemberg Stuttgart municipality Local political elites in Stuttgart. Priebs 1997) Goal is to enhance the efficiency of public administration and to develop a regionally coordinated strategy of economic development. Van den Berg. spatial planning. Metropolitan Master competitive ‘Eurocity’ Plan (from 1996) through strategic planning projects and place-marketing campaigns Enabled through a Land governmental initiative Aims to bundle economic capacities through the development of a coordinated regional growth strategy Combines regional approaches to infrastructural planning. place-marketing. Braun. and various surrounding counties Major regional and local business organizations in Stuttgart and BadenWürttemberg Hannover Region (Droste. and Schmidt 1997. Fiedler. 1997. (continued ) . and infrastructural planning Greater Hannover Association of Municipalities (KGH) Hannover Regional County (from November 2001) Land government of Lower Saxony Hannover municipality Political elites in Hannover and its suburban hinterland Major local and regional business organizations in Hannover and Lower Saxony Fig. Fürst and Rudolph 2003.

In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s. and place-marketing with selected institutional changes Tied to cross-border Copenhagen Industrial cooperative programs Forum with Malmö and Lund Copenhagen Capacity (Sweden) Fig. and some of its surrounding counties Frankfurt/Rhine-Main chamber of commerce Other major local and regional business organizations in Frankfurt and southern Hessen Danish national government Copenhagen municipality Local and regional political elites in Copenhagen and some of its suburbs Major local.The Future of New State Spaces Form of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s Organizational embodiment(s) 279 Major political-economic forces behind metropolitan regionalism Social Democratic Party of southern Hessen Local and regional political elites in Frankfurt. and national business organizations Diverse advocates of expanded cross-border links to Malmö and Lund Frankfurt/ Rhine-Main Region (Freund 2003. Ronneberger and Keil 1995. to develop a coordinated strategy of regional economic development. regional. in which debates on metropolitan regionalism focused on the issues of administrative efficiency. Jørgensen. proposals to reconfigure inherited frameworks of metropolitan governance have been justified as a means to strengthen urban locational policies by transposing them onto a regional scale. Kjœrsdam. some of its suburbs.2D. local service . 6. (continued ) In most western European city-regions. and Nielsen 1997) Enabled through new national political initiatives to promote Copenhagen as a major European metropolis Combines new forms of regional planning. Aims to minimize Brenner 1999c) zero-sum forms of inter-municipal competition within the region. infrastructural investment. and to enhance regional locational synergies Emerges following recurrent debates on the inadequacies of earlier frameworks of city-suburban cooperation Greater Frankfurt Association (abolished in 2001) Frankfurt/Rhine-Main Regional Planning Association (from 2001) Council of the Region (from 2001) Rhine-Main Economic Development Corporation (from 1995) Metropolitana Frankfurt/Rhine-Main (from 2001) National Planning Strategy for Territorial Development to the Year 2018 (1992) Various ‘Grand Projects’ to channel infrastructural investments into the city core and strategic suburban locations (such as Ørestad) Greater Copenhagen Authority (from July 2000) Copenhagen metropolitan area (Andersen and Jørgensen 2004. Scheller 1998. Bruun 1995.

2E. informal coordination among extant institutional forms and Verges diverse public and private 1999) agencies in the Randstad’s southern wing Greater Rotterdam Rotterdam Administrative Board (OOR) (until 1996) Stadsregio Rotterdam (from 1996) Rotterdam Forum Regional Economic Major local and Board regional business Goal is to develop a regionorganizations wide strategy of economic in Rotterdam region development and to coordinate (including seaportspatial planning and related interests) infrastructural investment. and infrastructural investment Amsterdam Amsterdam municipality Regional Local and regional Cooperation (RSA) political elites in Coordinating Amsterdam and Commission some of its suburbs (CoCo) Amsterdam chamber Regional Economic of commerce Development Other major local Strategy (RES) and regional business Amsterdam organizations in Regional Business Greater Amsterdam Platform (ORA) Fig. and territorial equalization. the current round of metropolitan institutional reform has been oriented towards the promotion of regional economic competitiveness in a context of intensified European interspatial competition. Promotes new forms of Kreukels 2003. spatial planning. competitive. and redistributive relationship within a national administrative hierarchy into a horizontal. Crucially. Metropolitan governance has thus been redefined from a vertical. however. 6. Brenner 1999c) Promotes new forms of informal coordination among extant institutional forms and diverse public and private agencies in the Randstad’s northern wing Aims to promote coordinated regional economic development. Van der veer 1997. national government to Terhorst and establish an Amsterdam van de Ven City-Province (1995) 1995. and developmentalist relationship between urban regions competing at European and global scales to attract external capital investment. particularly in the seaport zone Amsterdam Regional Agency (ROA) Dutch national government Emerges following a failed Greater Amsterdam attempt by the Dutch (Salet 2003. (continued ) provision. coordinative.280 The Future of New State Spaces Form of metropolitan regionalism in the 1990s Organizational embodiment(s) Major politicaleconomic forces behind metropolitan regionalism Dutch national government Rotterdam municipality Local and regional political elites in Rotterdam and some of its suburbs Emerges following a failed attempt by the Dutch national government to (Hendriks establish a Rotterdam and Toonen City-Province (1995) 1995. these regionalized approaches . 2000.

a ‘European town’. coordination. or quite simply to keep their place. both a necessary instrument and an advantage in attaining their objective. then. must have if it wishes to continue to play a major international role. which is now seen as a basic precondition for regional economic competitiveness. and governance are thus promoted as key components of regional economic development strategies. . . with its combined emphasis on intraregional political cooperation and supraregional territorial competition.2. Cooperation and competition in the new metropolitan regionalism If the central cities agree to play the game [of metropolitan cooperation].2 presents several typical justifications for this new approach to metropolitan governance. it is of considerable importance to the Dutch economy that the Dutch urban regions maintain a strong position. ` (Lefevre 1998: 22) With the disappearance of national borders within Europe [ . In essence. or political agreements to bring an area-wide policy to a successful conclusion. the metropolitan regionalisms of the 1990s have mobilized new forms of cooperation within urban regions as a basis for engaging still more aggressively in territorial competition against other urban regions at European and global scales (Prigge and Ronneberger 1996). . they must free themselves and go beyond their administrative limits. A unified [external] presentation and the coordination of policies on a supralocal level has a central importance in this competition. . To do so. no longer to provide urban services. From this point of view. In this context. This expanding scale [of competition] occurs in conjunction with a concentration and specialization of economic activities in various realms. In this respect. it is because they are now aware that they need the peripheries in order to develop. ] The globalization of the economy has once again meant that the economy and functional considerations are factors which make the introduction of metropolitan governments necessary. Box 6. ] urban regions (cities and suburbs) are competing internationally with other urban regions. excessive interlocality competition within an urban region is thought to undermine the region’s capacity to compete for capital investment at supraregional scales. the metropolitan territory has become the scale on which the central cities reason. (from a national law on metropolitan institutional reform in the Netherlands.The Future of New State Spaces 281 to locational policy have also entailed concerted efforts to enhance intraregional territorial cohesion. but infrastructures and facilities that a ‘world’ metropolis. planning. Box 6. in the ranks of world cities [ . The metropolitan government is to them. financial resources for building. the central cities need their peripheries to keep their place in international competition. MBZ 1994: 10) . Whether it be a question of land for facilities and housing. Region-wide forms of inter-organizational cooperation.

` (Jouve and Lefevre 1997: 97) The metropolitan reform initiatives of the 1990s have contributed to the further consolidation of RCSRs. the region must become stronger than the sum of its municipalities in this international competition. none of the municipalities within the region can alone maintain this international business climate. ] Adaptation to the market is presented as inevitable [ . ] The synergies that can be achieved through cooperation enhance the locational attractiveness of the entire region. not only individual cities but entire regions are competing with one another. Department of Urban Planning. ] Bologna must become a hub which can withstand competition from Amsterdam. place-specific political-economic conditions. the current round of metropolitan institutional reorganization has enhanced the regulatory significance of subnational scales of state power. Rather. (from a draft statement of a regional economic development strategy for Greater Amsterdam.282 The Future of New State Spaces [One goal of regional economic strategy is] to strengthen the international business climate. quoted Scheller 1998: 14) The municipalities of the Rhine-Main region must recognize and accept the fact that they are not competing with one another to influence the locational decisions of firms. . The future of the region as a national gateway to the world economy depends to a large degree upon international industry. Such an institution becomes a fundamental element in the economic success of international cities [ . . Gemeente Amsterdam 1997: p. Therefore. while further differentiating state regulatory arrangements according to localized. ii) The European competition for capital investment intensifies the need for supramunicipal cooperation [ . (from a law on inter-municipal cooperation in Stuttgart. (statement by the Director. . albeit in a restructured institutional and scalar form (Fig.3). metropolitan reform initiatives have . . Like many other post-Keynesian state spatial projects. . and environmental policy—is therefore an urgent task for spatial planning in the future. The latter is more than the sum of its parts. they compete as a single region (Gesamtraum) with other European metropolitan locations. 6. Concomitantly. Regional cooperation—in the areas of economic development and labor market policy. housing policy. However. City of Frankfurt. BMBau 1993b: 32) On a European scale. (from the German government’s annual report on spatial planning. In the future. . drafted by the regional association of chambers of commerce. Zurich and Frankfurt. mutual cooperation [among municipalities] as well as with surrounding regions within the Randstad is of major importance. Bologna is presented as being unable to do without the Metropolitan City. Wentz 1994: 14) On pain of being irrevocably outdistanced by other European urban areas. like many other post-Keynesian state spatial strategies.

It also contributes to a further differentiation of urban and regional developmental pathways across each national territory 283 TERRITORIAL Place. Metropolitan reform initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs generated locally customized forms of state intervention that actively target urban regions as the geographical engines of economic development. metropolitan reform initiatives have contributed to at least two significant evolutionary transformations within RCSRs.The Future of New State Spaces STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS SCALAR DIMENSION Creation of new forms of state institutional organization and governance at a metropolitan scale This enhances the organizational density and regulatory responsibilities of subnational tiers of state power STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES New. much like the neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies discussed above. 6. a key goal of newly established metropolitan institutions is to amalgamate local economies .3. First.and region-specific DIMENSION patterns of metropolitan institutional organization and economic governance are established in major urban agglomerations within each national territory This contributes to the further entrenchment of customized. At the same time. The new metropolitan regionalism promotes regionally specific development regimes oriented towards internal (interlocal) cooperation and external (interregional) competition This contributes to the further concentration of advanced socioeconomic assets and infrastructural investments within major metropolitan regions. metropolitan reform initiatives have helped consolidate the regional scale as a key focal point and target for territorial competitiveness strategies. regionally specific forms of state intervention are mobilized in order to enhance economic competitiveness and to maintain territorial cohesion within major urban regions This consolidates the role of metropolitan regions as targets and arenas for accumulation strategies. Indeed. The metropolitan reform initiatives of the 1990s have thus reinforced the major trends of state spatial restructuring that were triggered through the initial wave of urban locational policies during the preceding decade. place-specific institutional arrangements and regulatory configurations across each national territory Fig.

Across national and local contexts. First. at supraregional scales. with new approaches to regional economic planning and place-marketing intended to minimize zero-sum interlocality competition within the region. the metropolitan regionalisms of the 1990s have promoted the regional scale not only as an institutional platform for new types of locational policy. regionally configured territorial units. Urban locational policies have not been superseded by this trend. metropolitan scale of regulatory activity within RCSRs has reproduced rather than alleviated the major crisistendencies associated with earlier forms of urban locational policy. Second. they have frequently been associated with territorial redistribution programs designed to minimize intra-regional sociospatial polarization. newly established metropolitan institutions lack the regulatory capacity and political authority to counteract the destabilizing. metropolitan-wide approaches to economic development and territorial competitiveness. metropolitan reform initiatives have attempted to counteract some of the crisis-tendencies of urban locational policies. metropolitan reform initiatives have added momentum to debates on the intensification of territorial inequalities within post-Keynesian western Europe. In this sense. Like neighborhood-level anti-exclusion policies. While these new strategies of region-wide regulatory coordination have varied contextually. like neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies. they intensify interspatial competition. Consequently. and thus macrogeographical instability.284 The Future of New State Spaces into larger. the metropolitan reform initiatives of the 1990s have introduced an expanded approach to economic competitiveness that is attuned to the problem of maintaining territorial cohesion at a particular spatial scale. in this case at the spatial scale of entire urban regions. which are in turn promoted as integrated. regionalized scalar niches and territorial enclaves for locational policies within the already differentiated subnational geographies of RCSRs. Despite this explicit emphasis on territorial cohesion. insofar as metropolitan reform initiatives channel institutional resources towards the mobilization of regional locational policies. metropolitan reform initiatives have exacerbated the regulatory deficits of RCSRs in at least two ways. while the new metropolitan regionalisms may provisionally ameliorate sociospatial polarization within an urban region. competitive geographical locations for external capital investment. For. but they are increasingly being embedded within broader. Thus. the consolidation of a new. they share with urban locational policies the tendency to erode the socio-territorial preconditions for . but also as a focal point for crisis-management strategies designed to counteract the destructive intra-regional effects of such policies. by introducing new forms of regulatory coordination among the major administrative units within urban regions. and with new forms of intergovernmental cooperation and partnership oriented towards the establishment of integrated. region-wide approaches to metropolitan territorial development. destructive effects of locational policies. Metropolitan reform initiatives have thus established new. beyond their own circumscribed territorial and scalar parameters.

Meanwhile. and intergovernmental linkages. Metropolitan institutional reforms may enhance intergovernmental synergies. In sum. both within and beyond the urban regions in which metropolitan reform initiatives are mobilized. even when new frameworks of metropolitan governance are successfully established. and Pederson 1993). tangled. Keating 1998. Second. despite their attention to problems of intra-regional territorial cohesion. metropolitan reform initiatives generate a variety of destabilizing political conflicts and territorial fissures of their own. Relatedly. In most western European city-regions. As such conflicts intensify. functionally integrated and operationally unified framework for state economic intervention (Jessop. institutional capacities. but they intensify the tendency within RCSRs to spread public funds ever more thinly among diverse. As with neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies. the project of enhancing regional institutional flexibility is frequently at odds with the equally powerful need for continued fiscal support and administrative coordination from superordinate tiers of the state. the metropolitan regulatory experiments that have proliferated during the 1990s appear to have differentiated the scalar architectures of RCSRs while further destabilizing urban and regional economies. policy coordination. This increasing geographical differentiation of subnational regulatory arrangements and development regimes complicates the task of maintaining an organizationally coherent. The balance that obtains among these opposed regulatory priorities within a given urban region is thus a matter of intense sociopolitical contestation at a range of spatial scales (Jones 2001. their basic condition . 1997). newly established metropolitan institutions exacerbate the coordination problems that ensue within RCSRs as subnational institutional landscapes become increasingly complex. any number of unresolved tensions permeate the project of formulating a coherent strategy of regional economic development. Particularly when powerful social and economic interests are tied closely to extant levels of state territorial organization. established patterns of economic governance may be disrupted.The Future of New State Spaces 285 sustainable economic development at both national and European scales. scale. In addition to their role in aggravating the regulatory failures of inherited forms of urban locational policy. It also exacerbates market failures within local economies while undercutting the capacity of state institutions. and territorial alliances regarding issues such as jurisdictional boundaries. This may in turn destabilize the accumulation process at various spatial scales.and place-specific development initiatives. at any spatial scale. the scalar configuration of metropolitan reform initiatives represents. political coalitions. and meta-governance capacities within individual urban regions. the project of metropolitan institutional reform generates intense struggles between opposed class fractions. democratic accountability. Nielsen. and differentiated. simultaneously. the agenda of enhancing regional distinctiveness stands in tension with the perceived need to reduce production costs through regulatory downgrading and direct subsidies to capital. to alleviate them. including regional and national governments. fiscal relays.

286 The Future of New State Spaces of possibility and their most significant structural limitation. and territorial redistribution at the scale of major urban regions. and exocentric strategies of regional economic development. On the one hand. metropolitan reform initiatives would appear to open up new possibilities for regulatory experimentation. there is little evidence at the present time to suggest that recent metropolitan reform initiatives in western Europe will engender sustainable forms of economic regeneration or a less polarized pattern of territorial development. Some of these new transnational interurban networks have been forged through bottom-up collaborative initiatives. the RECITE program (Regions and Cities for Europe) was initiated in 1991 by DGXVI (the Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion) to encourage transnational interurban networking. by introducing new forms of region-wide intergovernmental coordination. At the same time. competitiveness-oriented. Such regionalized locational policies transpose the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies of urban locational policies onto a larger spatial scale. In effect. the quantity. generally across national borders. In these cases. and thus partially counteracting the destructive consequences of unfettered interlocality competition within metropolitan regions. such experiments have begun to address a serious regulatory deficit of urban locational policies. despite their apparently stabilizing emphasis on regional territorial cohesion. In particular. and regulatory significance of interurban networks have been expanded since the early 1990s due to the facilitating role of the EU.6 6 The intensification of EU-sponsored and other forms of interurban networking during the last decade has been documented extensively by urban scholars. which has provided localities with financial incentives to engage in cooperative projects. For this reason. among cities and regions in dispersed geographical locations. political compromise. these initiatives to enhance territorial cohesion within metropolitan regions have been promoted in direct conjunction with growth-driven. formal or informal collaborative networks have been established. organizational density. there has also been an expansion of cooperative relationships among geographically noncontiguous cities and regions. On the history of European interurban . In this manner. However. the new metropolitan regionalism instrumentalizes intra-regional cooperation in order to intensify the process of interspatial competition at supraregional scales. the RECITE II framework provided a second round of EU-sponsored funding for interurban networking during the 1995–9 period. at any spatial scale. rather than substantively alleviating them. in the medium or long term. Rescaling outward: interurban networking initiatives Whereas recent metropolitan reform initiatives have promoted new forms of institutional coordination among geographically contiguous municipalities.

The Future of New State Spaces 287 In the western European context. is to exchange ‘best-practice experiences in order to improve the problem-solving capacity and performance in the cooperating metropolitan regions’ (Heeg. which is oriented towards the alleviation of urban traffic congestion. Leitner 2004. McNeill. Eurocities. Dawson 1992. EUROGATEWAY. governance practices. 2000. An additional agenda of transnational interurban networks has been to promote city-oriented lobbying activities at the European scale. social welfare. which is concerned with the dissemination of telematics technology. Telecities. among other works. their geographical locations. the Commission des Villes. and Sheppard 2002. Third. which represents municipalities situated in cross-border regions. medium-sized cities) or among cities located in the same broad geographical context (for instance. Pavlik. and Parsons 2002. and FINE (Fashion Industry Network). Typical examples include EURACOM (European Action for Mining Communities). which has been led networks. see. As the preceding examples suggest. Graham 1995. Klagge. cross-border regions. thematic networks involve cooperation among cities with reference to specific policy issues—for instance. Examples of this type of interurban network include Quartiers en Crise (Neighborhoods in Crisis). First. the Edge Cities Network. Lavergne and Mollet 1991. their spatial characteristics. which represents the major European second-tier cities. MILAN (Motor Industry Local Authority Network). The major aim. in these contexts. and Phelps.and medium-sized European cities. On more recent interurban networking programs. unemployment. spatial networks involve cooperation among similar types of cities (for instance. the Atlantic Arc. or the Baltic Sea region). Heeg. ¨ Klagge. This aspect of interurban networking has contributed to a process of ‘mimetic institutionalization’ in which certain generic local policy frameworks. which is concerned with the promotion of small business infrastructures. Examples include METREX (the Network of European Metropolitan Regions and Areas) which represents metropolitan regions containing more than 500. and partially overlapping with the aforementioned types. which represents municipalities situated on the fringes of major European urban agglomerations. and place-marketing techniques have been replicated across the western ` European city-system (Le Gales 2002: 107–8). which is concerned with the problem of urban decay and concentrated urban poverty. poverty. and Ossenbrugge 2003: 150). or their socioeconomic problems. Second. which represents small. and POLIS. or technological change. ¨ and Ossenbrugge 2003.000 inhabitants. and INTERREG. Parkinson 1992. management strategies. sectoral networks involve cooperation among localities that are specialized in similar industries and thus confronted with analogous patterns of industrial restructuring. interurban networks have emerged in three main forms (Benington and Harvey 1998). see Sellers 2003. interurban networks have often been formed to share information and problem-solving methods among cities confronted with similar regulatory dilemmas—whether due to their industrial specializations. Leitner and Sheppard 2002. Leitner. Benington and Harvey 1998. The Eurocities network. .

. As state spatial projects. Other. Thus. . 6. these are intended to illustrate the diversity of political concerns that have been articulated through such networks. Finally. Concomitantly. However. and strengthening economic and social cohesion [ . and place-specific regulatory arrangements within RCSRs. interurban networking initiatives have further enhanced the significance of urban regions as arenas for regulatory experimentation and accumulation strategies within RCSRs (Fig.288 The Future of New State Spaces by prominent political officials in many of Europe’s largest cities. much like neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies and metropolitan reform programs. In many cases. Pavlik. interurban networking initiatives have modified the inherited institutional and scalar architectures of RCSRs in several ways. As Leitner. p. 291). facilitating the spread of innovative practices in economic development. in distinctive ways. reducing waste of public resources resulting from competitive bidding of cities for businesses and investment. more specialized interurban networks have likewise attempted to pool local resources in order to attract EU funding and to influence specific aspects of European governance. interurban networking initiatives have extended the role of localized. the European Commission attempts to capitalize upon such networks in order to influence local development outcomes without the direct mediation of national state institutions (Leitner. ] These goals match and mirror larger EU policy concerns. and Sheppard 2002). . as well as to influence EU-level funding streams and policy frameworks. as state spatial strategies. interurban networks have provided municipalities with additional institutional capacities through which to promote local economic development within their boundaries. Pavlik. Interurban networking initiatives have contributed. Box 6. has played a significant role in influencing the development of EU urban policy since the late 1980s. and developing best practices for economic development. and Sheppard (2002: 293–4) explain: The stated goals of [interurban] networks promoted by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion are as follows: improving local response to challenges posed by an increasingly European and global economy. Meanwhile. while at the same time reducing economic and social disparities within the EU territory.3 presents brief excerpts from the mission statements of several prominent European interurban networks. as Fig. European municipalities attempt to establish transnational lobbying platforms without directly involving their respective national governments.4. the European Commission has supported networks in order to further its own policy goals. moreover.4 also indicates. interurban networks are viewed both by municipalities and by the European Commission as a means to circumvent national governments in pursuit of their own regulatory agendas. In these ways. 6. as well as some of their shared regulatory goals in a European and global context. namely: enhancing economic growth and the competitiveness of European cities and regions. territorially customized. to the consolidation and evolution of RCSRs. through such networks. achieving a more efficient use of resources.

with the involvement of politicians.eurometrex. (Dawson 1992: 7) Networks provide an alternative route for exploration which may soften the economic fragmentation and social polarisation which derive from the crude dictates of ‘marketised’ territorial competition. .org) 289 METREX is a Network of practitioners—that is. in recent years. . socio-economic and political realities they share common challenges and solutions. (Graham 1995: 518) METREX—The Network of European Metropolitan Regions and Areas (Source: http://www. led to inter-urban co-operation and an explosion of interest and participation in networks of cities throughout Europe. EUROCITIES wants to promote transnational cooperation projects between its member cities across Europe: we facilitate their coordination and help provide access to EUfunding. . EUROCITIES (Source: http://www. of methodologies for integrated urban social development’. We take the lead to make their voices heard. . in cities. the exchange of best practice policy and resource lobbying has.eurocities. officials and their advisers—with a common interest in spatial planning and development at the metropolitan level.The Future of New State Spaces Box 6. to promote the exchange of knowledge between practitioners on strategic issues of common interest. in particular through the promotion and dissemination.3. regions. Its objectives are ‘to further . Quartiers en Crise / Neighborhoods in Crisis (Source: http://www. Interurban networking initiatives: selected western European examples Economic interaction.org) EUROCITIES wants to ensure that urban affairs are placed high on the European Union’s policy agenda: Most decisions taken at EU level affect cities and their citizens. and to be proactive in shaping national and EU policy. local and national policies and initiatives for the regeneration of neighbourhoods in crisis. politicians. We encourage our members to exchange their expertise. technicians and local residents in that process. States and the European Commission. The twin purposes of the Network: . . to contribute to the metropolitan dimension to planning at the European level. .com/demons/ QECOnline/en/index_html) Quartiers en Crise is a network of towns promoting the integrated approach to the revitalisation of disadvantaged areas. EUROCITIES wants to foster a networking spirit amongst Europe’s large cities: whilst having different cultural.styrax. These institutionalised urban ‘clubs’ often aim to subdue the increasing intensity of city rivalry by stimulating collaboration rather than competition.

ideas and experience in addressing these challenges.telecities. The Partners have been collaborating to exchange knowledge. . 2004. lowering polluting emissions. rather than focusing upon the territorial competitiveness of a single. POLIS (Cities and regions networking for innovative transport solutions) (Source: http://www.polis-online. . and to provide decision-makers appropriate information and tools for the development of sustainable mobility. multinodal network rather than a self-enclosed urban or metropolitan area—in terms of . both at European and local level. TeleCities provides a platform of over 100 local authorities from 20 different European countries. In this manner. including joint projects and activities. Polis aims to foster co-operation and partnership across Europe. Websites accessed 17 Feb.org) TeleCities is the major European network of cities committed to leadership in the Information and Knowledge Society [ .edgecities.com/) The Edge Cities Network [ . TELECITIES (Source: http://www. sharing experience and developing practical solutions achieving an Inclusive Information and Knowledge Society. to represent the voice of cities and regions at EU level. enhancing safety. Its aim is to promote ‘eCitizenship’ at local level to ensure that all citizens can equally gain from the benefits of the Information and Knowledge Society. McNeill. TeleCities actively works for its members to: . ] brings together towns and cities on the edge of the major capitals of Europe. programmes and initiatives at EU and local level . circumscribed urban or metropolitan location. Influence the European Agenda to ensure that the interests of cities are taken into account in policy making . ] TeleCities is open to democratically elected city governments as well as to business and scientific partners. and Parsons 2002: 214). interurban networking initiatives promote an entire network of cities over and against ‘less ‘‘networked’’ neighbors’ (Phelps. Foster exchange of experience and knowledge transfer amongst cities.org/) The primary objective of Polis is to support European cities and regions in improving quality of life through innovative measures for reducing congestion. These municipal authorities have all identified that they face common economic and social challenges due to their location. To achieve this aim. Co-operation and networking with South European and CEE cities is also pursued to contribute to the enlargement goals of the European Union . Inform members on policies. to make research and innovation accessible to cities and regions. such initiatives introduce a more complex spatial referent—a flexible.290 The Future of New State Spaces European Edge Cities Network (Source: http://www. Facilitate and support the development of EU funded projects relevant to the members and the network. . and offering better and equal access to transport services. . First.

transnational networks of interurban cooperation among groups of European cities confronting similar problems This extends the decentralization and localization of state space. Under these circumstances. . that promote their economic development interests and compete with one another’ (Leitner and Sheppard 1999: 240).and jurisdiction-specific regulatory enclaves within European cities. the institutional architecture of RCSRs is further differentiated STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES 291 Newly established interurban networks provide municipalities with new institutional capacities through which to promote local economic development within their boundaries.The Future of New State Spaces STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS SCALAR DIMENSION Creation of new. . territorialized political geographies. ‘Competition is not eliminated [ . As multiple. and to influence EU policies This further enhances the role of cities as targets and arenas for accumulation strategies Interurban networking initiatives contribute to the establishment of place. Interurban networking initiatives have thus superimposed a new. interurban linkages tends to puncture inherited.4. to acquire EU funding. It is no longer single cities and regions. ] but is simply shifted to a higher spatial scale. while also enhancing the organizational density and regulatory significance of interlocal linkages across national borders TERRITORIAL The institutional structure DIMENSION of each interurban network is customized according to the priorities of its local participants. interurban networks. This reinforces the institutionalized promotion of uneven spatial development and territorial competition within RCSRs Fig. but networks of cities and regions. horizontally articulated interurban networks crosscut each national territory. This contributes to the further divergence of local and regional developmental pathways across each national territory Interurban networking initiatives also generate new geographies of territorial competition within RCSRs: competition among individual cities is now paralleled by competition among multinodal. place-specific regulatory arrangements across each national territory The proliferation of crossborder. Interurban networking initiatives and the evolution of RCSRs which territorial competitiveness is to be promoted. horizontally articulated framework . This facilitates the consolidation of customized. 6.

or some part thereof ). spatially polarized urban landscapes of the post-Keynesian period. Second. horizontally articulated pattern of governance onto the splintered political geographies of RCSRs. information pooling. Third. and (c) multiple networks may overlap. While interurban networks have contributed to this rescaling of statehood. Interurban networks are scalar insofar as they are premised upon scaled units (in this case. cost sharing. ‘the spatial surface spanned by networks is [ . In light of these distinctive features of networked forms of governance. Pavlik. interurban networking initiatives have partially modified the entrepreneurial. like neighborhood-based anti-exclusion programs and metropolitan reform projects. In this context. that of the western European urban system. while political territoriality is grounded upon relatively stable jurisdictional boundaries. Interurban networks pursue this goal by introducing cooperation-based interlocal relays into the volatile. interurban and otherwise. is to soften the cut-throat. cities) that are interconnected at a broader spatial scale (in this case. but rather. (b) patterns of network membership may fluctuate. collaborative planning. connecting spatially separated territorial units as members of a network of interaction and exchange’ (Leitner. which assert control over political space by enclosing it within delineated boundaries. while counteracting some of the destabilizing. ] fluid and unstable’ insofar as (a) the degree of connectivity among network nodes may fluctuate.292 The Future of New State Spaces for the mobilization of urban locational policies upon the vertically rescaled institutional hierarchies of RCSRs. However. interpenetrate. In the case of interurban networks. . they have also modified the territorial framework within which this process has been unfolding. joint lobbying. and crosscut one another (Leitner 2004: 248–9). The geographies of networks thus ‘tend to leapfrog over space. competition-based model of urban governance that prevails within RCSRs. Moreover. networked forms of governance are premised upon the attempt to ‘span space’ by establishing horizontal interlinkages among geographically dispersed nodal points (Leitner 2004: 248). to establish cooperative institutional linkages among groups of cities dispersed across the European urban system. in contrast to territorialized regulatory forms. then. or to enhance territorial cohesion at the scale of metropolitan regions. The geographical configuration of RCSRs was defined above with reference to the rescaling of inherited national state spaces in conjunction with broader processes of scale relativization. . ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ form of interspatial competition that has dominated RCSRs since their initial consolidation in the 1980s. it is evident that their proliferation within the institutional land- . and the dissemination of ‘best practices’ are viewed as a means to enhance the economic development capacities and geopolitical weight of the network as a whole. the goal is not to alleviate social exclusion within disadvantaged neighborhoods. interurban networks have superimposed a new. spatially polarizing consequences of previous approaches to urban locational policy. A major agenda of these cooperative interurban networks. and Sheppard 2002: 297).

and Leitner and Sheppard 2002. The concept of reticulation was suggested by Bob Jessop (personal communication). . and contradictory ways (Ansell 2000. to provide a political opening for the establishment of a less polarizing formation of state spatial regulation. however. networked forms of governance appear unlikely. and Sheppard 2002. 3. In effect. For.7 Like neighborhood-based anti-exclusion initiatives and metropolitan reform projects. the World Association of Cities and Local Authorities. and 3. in increasingly complex. In practice.g. more generally. rather. to supersede the territorialized institutional architecture of modern statehood. despite their internally cooperative institutional logic. such interpretations amount to a ‘triumph of hope over experience’ (Dawson 1992: 9). Contrary to some scholarly predictions (e. they would appear to disrupt the ruthlessly competitive logic of post-Keynesian urban governance and. 1999. Leitner and Sheppard 2002). conflictual. For this reason. the Hanseatic League.9. 3. many networking initiatives have generated a de facto intensification of territorial 7 I am not suggesting that networked forms of urban governance did not exist prior to the current period. is that interurban networks modify the geographical structure of territorial competition. Indeed. but do little to alleviate its polarizing. and 104): it would entail the addition of a third axis on which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies could be articulated. interurban networking initiatives may be interpreted as political responses to the uncertain geoeconomic conditions and unstable regulatory landscapes in which contemporary European cities are situated. in this context. defined by the broad parameters within which ‘reticulation’ processes (as opposed to territorialization processes and scaling processes) evolve. is that the organizational density and regulatory significance of interurban networks have markedly intensified in contemporary western Europe due to ongoing processes of scale-relativization and state rescaling. the proliferation of networked approaches to urban governance represents an important evolutionary development within the political geographies of RCSRs.10. My claim here. interurban networks have opened up an additional parameter of state space—defined by nodal connectivity rather than by territorial enclosure or interscalar articulation— within which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies may be articulated. 102.11 (pp. Nonetheless.The Future of New State Spaces 293 scapes of RCSRs has entailed the insertion of a qualitatively new dimension into inherited geographies of state regulation. governance networks are arguably being embedded within territorialized political spaces. Pavlik. On the contrary. at the present time. as with neighborhood-based anti-exclusion programs and metropolitan reform projects. destructive socioeconomic consequences (Leitner and Sheppard 1999: 240). and intermeshed with ongoing rescaling processes. Leitner. The central problem. Further consideration of networked forms of state spatial regulation would complicate the analytical grids depicted in Figs. and the Federation of United Cities represent only a few among many interesting examples of interurban networks that emerged during previous phases of capitalist development (Sellers 2003). Castells 2004). 97. Because interurban networks are grounded upon cooperative institutional relays. the distinctive scalar configuration of interurban networks systematically limits their capacity to transform the interscalar rule-regimes upon which RCSRs are grounded. The relationship between contemporary interurban networks and the restructuring of political space in western Europe has been analyzed with considerable theoretical sophistication by Leitner 2004.

and social crises. However. and socioeconomic policy may offer a glimmer of hope to many municipal governments that are confronted with deeply rooted fiscal. therefore. To the extent that cities are embedded within a Europewide interscalar rule-regime in which territorial competition has been pervasively institutionalized. In this manner. than as a mechanism of ‘fast policy transfer’ that homogenizes urban governance repertoires according to a narrowly market-based. neoliberal logic (Leitner and Sheppard 2002. While interurban networking initiatives have facilitated the insertion of a new. polarizing tendencies within interurban networking initiatives may in turn generate additional regulatory deficits. the regulatory failures and crisistendencies of such policies are upscaled onto a new institutional-geographical matrix rather than being alleviated. Peck and Theodore 2001). interurban networking initiatives operate primarily to rescale the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies of previous forms of urban locational policy. Peck 2002. such urban policy prototypes are often derived from apparent local ‘success stories’ that are extremely difficult. they have simultaneously reinforced a Europe-wide interscalar rule-regime grounded upon the pervasive institutionalization of interspatial competition and unfettered uneven development. . even within interurban networks that are not oriented directly towards economic development. First. interurban networking initiatives have not. cooperation-based layer of state regulatory activities and governance practices into RCSRs. Second. In sum. the transnational diffusion of ‘best practices’ in urban governance via interurban networks may unsettle rather than rejuvenate the process of urban development. despite their apparently stabilizing emphasis on cooperation. place-marketing. economic. if not impossible. interurban networks may serve less as a basis for enhancing territorial solidarity among cities.294 The Future of New State Spaces competition by transposing urban locational policies onto the larger scale of interurban networks. At the present time. in practice. generated an alternative basis for urban governance that transcends the competitive logic of urban locational policies. to replicate in other institutional and geographical settings. These destabilizing. cooperative impulses may be undermined due to ‘hidden competition between internal members and between members and nonmembers’ (Graham 1995: 520). The prospect of gaining access to the ‘best practices’ of public administration. cooperative interurban initiatives will continue to rest upon tenuous foundations. Consequently.

. It is in this context that the three alternative rescaling strategies examined in this chapter must be understood. In this manner. each of these political strategies has helped to catalyze a further round of state rescaling in which new. rather than signaling their imminent collapse. dynamically evolving institutional and scalar configurations: they are premised upon state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that engender disruptive. Society will evolve and recreate itself only because it is already rooted and made material in terrain: it already exists as a form of territory. Neighborhood-based antiexclusion policies. ] and also the manner in which existent space already limits and conditions that social evolution. Human space is therefore a constraint for future society (as well as a starting point for it). . for processes of accumulation and regulation. However. Alain Lipietz (1992a: 104–5. . ] must be understood in terms of both worldwide social evolution [ . but on the basis of what is inherited from the past [ . For. constant from the Theses on Feuerbach through the 18th Brumaire. tangled scalar layerings of institutional organization and regulatory experimentation have been superimposed upon the already extensively scale-differentiated political geographies of RCSRs. italics added) The concept of the Rescaled Competition State Regime (RCSR) was introduced at the outset of this chapter to synthesize this book’s major arguments—it served as our first-cut interpretation of the transformed form of statehood in contemporary western Europe. . . RCSRs are unstable.to a third-cut interpretation of RCSRs? The ‘future of space’ [ . and according to which: mankind makes its own history. and interurban networking programs can be interpreted as attempts to alleviate some of the major regulatory failures of RCSRs—in significant measure through a further rescaling of inherited approaches to urban locational policy.The Future of New State Spaces 295 Concluding reflections on the future(s) of new state spaces: from a second. dysfunctional consequences. The contradictions between these existing spaces (between those forming civilization materially as we know it today) and those ‘projected spaces’ (the materialization of development models competing for the future) will also have to be regulated. ] The ‘future of space’ is not a simple projection mapped by the future of society. The analysis of alternative rescaling strategies developed in the preceding sections complicates and differentiates that firstcut characterization. at various geographical scales. metropolitan reform initiatives. It is the consolidation of these new layers of crisis-management mechanisms within European cities and regions that necessitates a second-cut interpretation of . . the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies within RCSRs serve as a powerful impetus for their further institutional and scalar evolution. The relationship between space and the social process is thus the central outstanding illustration of Marx’s thesis. as this discussion has revealed.

local growth coalitions selected municipal governments. to influence EU urban and regional policies. these rescaling strategies have altered the political geographies of crisis formation within cities and regions.5C indicates (p.296 The Future of New State Spaces Neighborhoodbased anti-exclusion policies Metropolitan reform initiatives Interurban networking programs Political and institutional animateurs European Commission.5A. as the bottom row of Fig. regional. regional local state institutions. Alternative rescaling strategies and the ‘second-cut’ interpretation of RCSRs: synthesis RCSRs. growth coalitions. as a means to enhance the economic development capacities of network members Geographical Disadvantaged. local and regional chambers of commerce The regional or metropolitan scale of large urban agglomerations Establishes new. 296–8) synthesizes the key elements of this second-cut interpretation of RCSRs. to disseminate knowledge about ‘best practices’ for urban governance. the proliferation of alternative rescaling strategies during the last decade must be viewed as a symptom of continued institutional and spatial disorder within RCSRs. to establish regionally coordinated economic development strategies. regionwide forms of metropolitan institutional organization and regulatory coordination: goals are to prevent zero-sum interlocality competition within an urban region. interlinked via horizontal networks Establishes new forms of cooperation among cities that share common concerns: goals are to promote information sharing. Figure 6. On the contrary. marginalized targets neighborhoods Implications for urban governance Channels fiscal resources into disadvantaged neighborhoods and establishes new. For this reason. national. governments. and local state institutions. area-based partnerships: goal is to combat social exclusion and to enhance socio-territorial cohesion at an urban scale Fig. cumulatively.5 (pp. and to acquire EU funding for local initiatives. These are viewed. 298). 6. but without eradicating the underlying sources of economic instability and regulatory failure within RCSRs. which at once builds upon and extends the first-cut interpretation introduced previously. community-based associations Selected national European Commission. rather than as embryonic evidence for their . The point of this second-cut interpretation is not to suggest that these alternative rescaling strategies have effectively resolved the contradictions of urban locational policies. 6. and to enhance socioterritorial cohesion at a metropolitan scale Major European cities or selected parts thereof.

. hyper-localized scalar niches and territorial enclaves within RCSRs: this further consolidates the splintering of state space induced through the previous round of state rescaling This also entails the creation of new.5B. regionally focused but place-specific forms of locational policy and political-economic coordination within the already differentiated geographies of RCSRs 297 Interurban networking programs May partially alleviate uneven spatial development within the European urban system: informal and/or formal cooperative relays are established among localities that otherwise compete directly for external capital investment and public funds Establishes new interlocal policy networks throughout the European state system: this further consolidates the role of localized.The Future of New State Spaces Metropolitan Neighborhoodbased anti-exclusion reform initiatives policies Implications for uneven spatial development May partially alleviate uneven spatial development among neighborhoods within major urban areas: disadvantaged zones are provided with new public resources for addressing localized social problems May partially alleviate uneven spatial development among major cities and towns within large urban agglomerations: zerosum forms of interlocality competition are discouraged. the increasingly haphazard displacement of persistent governance problems among the different scalar units and territorial niches within RCSRs further exacerbates the crisis-tendencies of urban locational policies. often cloaked in optimistic predictions of an imminent ‘urban renaissance’. Indeed. cross-border expansion of horizontal linkages among local political institutions also contributes to the puncturing of inherited. in some cases. and place-specific policy regimes and institutional forms within RCSRs The transnational. 6. even in the absence of sustainable forms of economic development. (continued ) tendential stabilization. in a vain effort to maintain political legitimacy and social control within their territorial jurisdictions. intra-urban redistributive relays within the already differentiated geographies of RCSRs Fig. intraregional redistributive mechanisms are introduced Establishes new regionalized scalar niches and territorial enclaves within RCSRs: this further consolidates the splintering of state space induced through the previous round of state rescaling This also entails the creation of new. customized. nationalized formations of state territoriality Implications for state spatial selectivity Establishes new. This new scalar politics of crisis-displacement may also contribute to an exhaustion of policy repertoires in which state institutions recycle ineffectual regulatory methods.

298 The Future of New State Spaces Neighborhood-based Metropolitan anti-exclusion reform policies initiatives Interurban networking programs Introduces new forms of cooperation within the European urban system.5C. growth-driven interscalar rule-regime of the post-1980s period Major regulatory deficits and crisistendencies Addresses the problem of territorial inequality within specific urban zones. while neglecting the supralocal scales on which such inequalities are generated. In this manner. interurban networking initiatives reinforce the competition-based. it is thereby ‘dissociated’ (Keil 1998b) from other. Social problems may thus be spatially redistributed among different neighborhoods within an urban region rather than being alleviated Affirms the growthfirst logic of urban locational policy insofar as anti-exclusion policies are justified with reference to the goal of enhancing local competitiveness Thus. 6. but affirms the logic of interspatial competition at interregional scales The limitations and crisis-tendencies of urban locational policy are thus transposed onto a larger spatial scale rather than being alleviated. For this reason. Consequently. (continued ) The reinvigorated concern with territorial cohesion and interscalar cooperation in many European city-regions has been intertwined with a widespread ‘depoliticization of previously contested economic policy fields’ under the current global regime of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism (Tickell and Peck 2003: 177). and in what form. urban locational policies should be mobilized is increasingly positioned ‘off-limits’ to political debate. more explicitly contested aspects of urban policy. growth-driven interscalar rule-regime of the post1980s period Fig. metropolitan reform projects reinforce the competition-based. they reproduce the broader interscalar framework within which such deficits are generated The institutional form and political content of metropolitan governance are an object and stake of intense conflicts at various spatial scales of state power. but interurban networks are still instrumentalized to enhance the competitive positions of network members The units of interspatial competition are thus altered—from individual cities to interurban networks—but the large-scale patterns of sociospatial polarization generated by that competition are not addressed The limitations and crisis-tendencies of urban locational policy are thus transposed onto large-scale interurban networks rather than being alleviated. while these policy initiatives directly address one of the major regulatory deficits of urban locational policies. the putative need for . Such conflicts may undermine the capacity of metropolitan institutions to confront region-wide politicaleconomic problems Focuses on the problem of territorial inequality within metropolitan regions. For this reason. the question of whether.

Yet. and deepening macroeconomic instability was anticipated at the outset of Ch. and Brenner and Theodore 2002b. 5. 8 For an elaboration of this line of analysis. in various institutional and geographical contexts see. or national politicaleconomic elites. 2002. The neighborhood. but also through concerted political strategies that have actively promoted and institutionalized uneven development at all spatial scales. and the interurban network are thus promoted as privileged scalar and institutional arenas in which the regulatory dislocations of contemporary capitalism may be alleviated—even as uneven development is further institutionalized in a realm of post-Keynesian statecraft that has been. the metropolitan region. RCSRs currently appear to be ‘locked in’ to developmental trajectories that do not. with reference to Petrella’s (2000) pessimistic vision of an ‘Archipelago Europe’ and Veltz’s (1996) analogous notion of an ‘archipelago economy’. triggered through the very crisis-tendencies they have generated within local. it has become apparent that the geographies of the contemporary archipelago economy have been produced not only through worldwide processes of industrial restructuring. for the moment at least. regional. by implication. while refocusing mainstream political debate on the question of how to manage the polarizing socioeconomic consequences of the new interspatial competition. We thus arrive at the following result: despite their destabilizing consequences for accumulation and regulation. Each of the three alternative rescaling strategies discussed in this chapter has contributed to this depoliticization of urban locational policy: each treats urban economic development as a technocratic matter to be managed by local. and national economies. By presenting the erosion of territorial cohesion within European city-regions as an ineluctable consequence of global economic forces. Moulaert. Keil 1998b. financial speculation. Swyngedouw 2000a. not counteracted. and corporate reorganization. regional. and scalar reorganization continue unabated within RCSRs. and arguably cannot. even as their institutional and scalar architectures continue to evolve. and Rodriguez 2003. . such crisis-management strategies help conceal the continued culpability of (rescaled) state institutions in generating the very regulatory dislocations they have ostensibly been mobilized to resolve. RCSRs have continued to develop along evolutionary pathways that reinforce the primacy of urban locational policies and. among other works. rising levels of sociospatial polarization. this regressive politics of uneven development within Archipelago Europe.The Future of New State Spaces 299 growth-first. Processes of regulatory experimentation. Tickell and Peck 2003. insulated from direct political contestation. b. Peck and Tickell 2002. competitiveness-oriented approaches to local economic development has acquired ‘the privileged status of a taken-for-granted or foundational policy orientation’ (Peck and Tickell 2003: 42). in the institutional dynamics of urban governance. unfettered interspatial competition. Swyngedouw. At this stage of our analysis.8 This bleak scenario of unfettered interlocality competition. institutional searching. The more recent crystallization of second-cut RCSRs has reinforced.

it is considered more effective to maintain them.300 The Future of New State Spaces engender either a sustainable regime of economic growth or a territorially cohesive framework of political regulation at any spatial scale. ‘The logic of interurban competition [ . contemporary ‘networks of interscalar regulatory relations are more fragile than they may seem at first. territorial niches. cohesive. for progressive political forces to demarcate the institutional arenas. as Peck and Tickell (2002: 46) have noted. and their associated crisis-tendencies. and sociospatial justice? These questions must lie at the heart of any third-cut analysis of RCSRs. as developed in the literature on pathdependence in technological and institutional development (Arthur 1994. A more systematic elaboration of this type of ‘increasing returns’ argument. In light of the foregoing analysis of state spatial restructuring. might be broken or at least loosened? How might the trajectories of state spatial restructuring in contemporary western Europe be rechanneled to facilitate the creation of alternative political-economic geographies. increasing returns ensue when ‘the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time’. According to Pierson (2000: 252). grounded upon more progressive objectives such as territorial redistribution. being partly designed to mystify and obfuscate the regime’s serial vulnerability to local policy failure and the continuing political culpability of national states’ (Peck 2002: 357). ] turns cities into accomplices of their own subordination. could help explain how and why. even as their regulatory deficits and dysfunctional consequences have become increasingly manifest. the perceived costs of abandoning urban locational policies are considered to rise prohibitively as they have been adopted ever more pervasively across the western European urban system (see Leitner and Sheppard 1998). the continued reproduction of regressive regulatory arrangements and political-economic geographies should not be misconstrued as evidence for their structural stability. In this case. concomitantly. the prospects for such an evolutionary transformation—and thus. North 1990. However. the central task for a third-cut analysis of RCSRs is to explore the possibility that urban policy—and more generally. for a third-cut analysis of RCSRs—may appear limited at the present time.’ . at both urban and supra-urban scales. and traced their subsequent institutional and scalar evolution. and socially just interscalar rule-regime. democratic. this situation could be plausibly explained through the principle of ‘increasing returns’. On the contrary. therefore. with specific reference to the emergence and consolidation of RCSRs. . a sub-optimal institutional configuration has been maintained because. Our first-cut account of RCSRs explored their initial consolidation following the crisis of spatial Keynesianism. I would argue that the evolutionary development of RCSRs during the last two decades represents an excellent illustration of this principle. as Peck (2002) cautions. Pierson 2000). Concomitantly.9 What are the prospects that this apparent evolutionary lock-in of urban locational policies. . It is crucial. our second-cut analysis of RCSRs underscored their regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies. under geoeconomic conditions in which urban locational policies have been diffused ever more broadly. political strategies to regulate uneven development—might be fundamentally transformed so as to contribute to the establishment of a more stable. Building upon these mappings. and policy relays within the current interscalar rule-regime in which hegemonic control 9 Although it is not possible to develop this argument here. democratic empowerment. ‘the costs of exit—of switching to some previously plausible alternative—rise’.

even though the process of state spatial restructuring is path-dependent. 109). the endemic problem of uneven spatial development would presumably generate new regulatory failures and crisis-tendencies. many political projects that are ostensibly oriented towards such institutional alternatives may be assimilated into the very interscalar rule-regimes they were intended to challenge. inherited formations of state spatiality may be qualitatively rearticulated as new layerings of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are superimposed upon them (see Fig. neighborhood-based anti-exclusion policies. if they can be still further channeled towards a repoliticization of urban economic development in any local. For this reason. Yet. A key task. metropolitan reform initiatives. From this point of view. or national context. . p. inherited regulatory geographies cannot fully determine the shape of newly emergent regulatory strategies. and interurban networking programs may contain untapped progressive political potential. and Hausner 1995). In order to counteract the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies within RCSRs. therefore. and thus susceptible to the tendency towards institutional lock-in. recentralized state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. Building upon this role. Rather. even if such path-shaping regulatory initiatives are constrained by inherited institutional configurations. the European Commission represents another vibrant institutional arena in which 10 Even if such a transformation of statehood were successfully accomplished. therefore. the basic tension between deterritorialization and reterritorialization—could ever be transcended within a capitalist space-economy. such path-shaping initiatives would need to mobilize upscaled. leading to further rounds of regulatory experimentation and state spatial restructuring. Jessop.The Future of New State Spaces 301 appears weakest. my intention is to consider the possibility that these endemic regulatory problems might be confronted through more progressive political strategies than those which currently prevail in the western European context. Indeed. is not to suggest that the problem of uneven development—or. The point of exploring the possibility for a third-cut transformation of RCSRs. 3. most vulnerable to being captured and reshaped through counterhegemonic initiatives.13. for that matter. they may still be harnessed. regional. it is also worth recalling the strategic-relational conceptualization of institutional change upon which this analysis of state spatial restructuring has been grounded. to expose the regressive social consequences of contemporary spatial policies.10 As our discussion of recent policy initiatives to combat social exclusion and to enhance territorial cohesion in European city-regions has indicated. notwithstanding the pessimistic interpretation developed previously. Beyond the sphere of urban governance on which this book has focused. In this context. and therefore. contemporary European debates on social exclusion and territorial cohesion may help to lay the foundations for a broader challenge to urban locational policies. at minimum. in pursuing this somewhat speculative line of analysis. for progressive political alliances is to locate strategic openings within the institutional landscapes of RCSRs in which to launch ‘path-shaping’ regulatory initiatives (Nielson. and thus to promote the establishment of a reinvented ‘big government’ committed to the pursuit of sociospatial justice at all geographical scales (Lake 2002).

. Kratke 2001. the European Commission has also attempted to strengthen several policy programs that are ostensibly oriented towards the goal of enhancing territorial cohesion. Waterhout 2002). in the classical sense associated with postwar spatial Keynesianism. Gill 1998a). the Structural Funds have allotted considerable financial resources towards the promotion of economic development in disadvantaged. neither the Structural Funds nor the ESDP can be construed as genuinely compensatory. the newly introduced European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) embraced the goal of promoting a balanced. As we have seen. Consequently. that of eastward enlargement) has been grounded upon an orthodox neoliberal agenda that has institutionalized market-based territorial competition. at all geographical scales (Agnew 2001. too. across the European space-economy. competition-based . path-shaping regulatory experiments have been emerging. The project of promoting polycentric territorial development is thus designed not to redistribute socioeconomic assets towards structurally disadvantaged areas. competition-based interscalar rule-regime is permeated by deep ambiguities. the process of European integration (and. the Structural Funds have been aligned more closely with the ‘supply-side orientation of the neo-liberal orthodoxy’ (Amin and Tomaney 1995a: 177). . this program has attempted to upgrade local industrial infrastructures so that even the most peripheralized zones within the EU may be equipped to compete effectively within particular niches of the global economy and the Single European Market (Amin and Tomaney 1995b). A directly analogous conclusion may be derived from the ESDP which. marginalized cities and regions among the EU member states. competitivenessoriented model of European interscalar relations and territorial development. however. Atkinson 2001. This orientation has been further entrenched through Agenda 2000.1).302 The Future of New State Spaces potentially transformative. like the alternative rescaling strategies discussed earlier in this chapter. Nonetheless. more recently. proposes to differentiate European economic space among various ‘global economic integration zones’ anchored by internationally competitive metropolitan regions (Map 6. the Structural Funds and the ESDP serve to reinforce the supply-side. In practice. from the early 1990s. Concomitantly. despite its much-publicized embrace of polycentricity. territorially redistributive policy instruments. which has revised the eligibility criteria for financial assistance under the Structural Funds in preparation for eastward enlargement. Despite their emphasis on the need for territorial cohesion. Here. polycentric pattern of spatial development across the entire EU. but to position European local and regional economies strategically in the competi¨ tive worldwide race to attract external capital investment (S. In particular. Rather. in 1999. Rather than guaranteeing socioeconomic resources and automatic fiscal transfers to marginalized regions. neither of these EU spatial policies has posed much of a threat to the prevalent competition-based. however. the project of challenging the predominant.

function not as a counterbalance to locational policies. logic of locational policy. oriented towards territorially redistributive goals. ‘Global integration zones’ in the European Spatial Development Perspective: a basis for ‘polycentric’ development? Source: Waterhout (2002: 98).1. They thus provide an additional set of examples in which apparently transformative. . in this case at both European and regional scales. path-shaping policy innovations.The Future of New State Spaces 303 Map 6. but rather as an instrument for their further entrenchment.

regulatory failures. for this reason. through ongoing struggles over the future of new state spaces. the regulatory deficits and crisis-tendencies of such policies persist. RCSRs cannot survive in their current institutional and scalar forms. much less transcending. either within or beyond cities. It must be forged. none have succeeded. The shape of a third-cut interpretation of RCSRs thus remains open. they are also spaces of incessant regulatory experimentation and dynamic institutional searching. and territorial inequalities of post-Keynesian urbanization. based upon a substantive commitment to territorial redistribution and sociospatial justice. It remains to be seen whether the process of state spatial restructuring in European urban regions will continue to institutionalize a regressive politics of unfettered territorial inequality and sociospatial polarization. redifferentiated—and destabilized. might eventually be established. the persistent lock-in of locational policies. or whether— perhaps through the dislocations and crisis-tendencies we have explored—an alternative framework of interscalar rules. they demand compliance to the grim categorical imperative of globalizing capitalism. in the realm of political practice. in loosening.304 The Future of New State Spaces In sum. while a variety of recent regulatory experiments appear to point beyond the currently dominant interscalar framework of institutionalized uneven development. RCSRs seem to permit no alternative. in practice. This is the central paradox of the new state spaces we have explored in this study. opposing political projects. Meanwhile. Insofar as they continually assimilate alternative. At the same time. . crisis. reterritorialized. New state spaces are thus spaces of conflict. because they exacerbate rather than alleviate the economic dislocations. causing the landscape of contemporary statehood to be still further rescaled. and contradiction. ‘Compete or die’.

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