Bloch Con law case outline I. The role of the Supreme Court The Basic Framework Marbury v.

Facts of the Case: The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams's presidency, but these last-minute appointments were never fully finalized. The disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in the Supreme Court. Question: Is Marbury entitled to his appointment? Is his lawsuit the correct way to get it? And, is the Supreme Court the place for Marbury to get the relief he requests? Conclusion: Yes; yes; and it depends. The justices held, through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution--the nation's highest law--conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
Facts of the Case: Lord Fairfax held land in Virginia. He was a Loyalist and fled to England during the Revolution. He died in 1781 and left the land to his nephew, Denny Martin, who was a British subject. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the original land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. The Jay Treaty seemed to make clear that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property. The Supreme Court declared that Fairfax was so entitled, but the Virginia courts, where the suit arose, refused to follow the Supreme Court's decision. Question: Does the appellate power of the Supreme Court extend to the Virginia courts? Conclusion: The Court rejected the claim that Virginia and the national government were equal sovereigns. Reasoning from the Constitution, Justice Story affirmed the Court's power to override state courts to secure a uniform system of law and to fulfill the mandate of the Supremacy Clause.

Cooper v. Aaron
Facts of the Case: The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. They refused to obey court orders designed to implement school desegregation. Local officials delayed plans to do away with segregated public facilities. Question: Were Arkansas officials bound by federal court orders mandating desegregation? Conclusion: In a signed, unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Arkansas officials were bound by federal court orders that rested on the Supreme Court's decision in


Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land and that it had a "binding effect" on the states. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to desegregation and reiterated that legislatures are not at liberty to annul judgments of the Court.

Cohens v. Virginia
Facts of the Case: An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government. Question: Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law. Sources of Judicial Decisions

McCulloch v. Maryland
Facts of the Case: In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. Question: The case presented two questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme. . .they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them."

Calder v. Bull
Facts of the Case: Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were denied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court. Question: Was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the


which prohibits ex post facto laws? Conclusion: In a unanimous decision. administrator of Mr." arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights. validated congressional withdrawal of the Court's jurisdiction. Wilson. Based on the statute and the President's proclamation. After hearing arguments in the case. V. McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was arrested were unconstitutional. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights. the Congress withdrew its 1867 act conferring jurisdiction. Wilson's estate." U. The basis for this repeal was the exceptions clause of Article III Section 2. properly. with full restoration of property rights.S. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective. and further said that acceptance of such a pardon was evidence that the person pardoned did provide support to the South and was ineligible to recover sale proceeds. Political Control of the Supreme Court Ex parte McCardle Facts of the Case: William McCardle was arrested by federal authorities in 1867 for writing and publishing a series of editorials in his Mississippi newspaper. Klein stands for the proposition that the legislative branch cannot impair the exclusive powers of another branch. Klein recognizes and supports the fundamental value of separation of powers defined by the 3 . subject only to taking an oath of allegiance. Klein. In 1870. Put another way. Klein Facts of the Case: Lincoln issued a proclamation offering a pardon to any person who had supported or fought for the Confederate Army. The Court also ruled that Congress had impermissibly infringed the power of the executive branch by limiting the effect of a Presidential pardon.Constitution. Question: Was congress’ law in 1870 unconstitutional and did they exceed its powers? Conclusion: The SC ruled that the 1870 statute was unconstitutional and that Congress had exceeded its power by invading the province of the judicial branch by prescribing the rule of decision in a particular cause. But Chase pointedly reminded his readers that the 1868 statute repealing jurisdiction "does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised. to the Court of Claims to recover the proceeds of the sale of property seized from Mr. Wilson took the oath of allegiance. but prior to announcing a decision. the Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law. McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867 congressional statute that conferred jurisdiction on appeal to the High Court. Mr. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws. The editorials were sharply critical of Reconstruction.F. Broadly speaking. Congress had passed an act in 1863 that permitted an owner of property confiscated during the war to receive the proceeds from the sale of the confiscated property. all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. speaking through Chase. then applied. Question: May the Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the High Court after that jurisdiction has been given? Conclusion: The Court. Congress passed a law that prohibited the use of a Presidential pardon as the basis for claiming sale proceeds. v.

Ogden Facts of the Case: A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. which forced him to obtain a special operating permit from the state to navigate on its waters. also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Question: Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress. II. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution? Conclusion: No. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. 4 . Klein suggests. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges.'" Doctrinal Fundamentals: Federalism and Judicial Review Gibbons v. The "Term Limitation Amendment.S." in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government. Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution." Furthermore.. Klein means that Congress may not direct the outcome of a case by prescribing the rule of decision.S. In his opinion.Constitution. Federalism at work. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce. nor may Congress impair the power and effect of a Presidential pardon. which included navigation on interstate waterways..allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union. Similarly. Term Limits v. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. Read more broadly. the regulation of interstate commerce? Conclusion: The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. namely. Specifically. but does not state. ". the scope of congress’ powers The Values of Federalism and some techniques for implementing them U. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In this case a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey challenged the monopoly that New York had granted. the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas. that Congress may not use the Exceptions Clause to cripple the Court's ability to be the final arbiter of what the Constitution means. Thornton Facts of the Case: On November 3. Question: Can states alter those qualifications for the U. 1992.

It outlawed "every contract.S. industry. combination. "it may still. v. In his wording. He claimed that he wanted the wheat for use on his farm. Question: Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use. and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. which are local in character. Production was not commerce..or conspiracy. The E. the Tenth Amendment. Filburn Facts of the Case: Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio.C. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11. Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly. the act regulated production and consumption. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. Knight Co. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce..'" The Evolution of the Commerce Clause Doctrine U. whatever its nature." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government. Dagenhart Facts of the Case: The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. Fiburn was penalized. be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Facts of the Case: The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant combinations controlling transportation. Question: Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? Conclusion: The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. and commerce. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.C. E. Question: Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? Conclusion: According to Filburn. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few.Hammer v. in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce. and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect. Wickard v. Reuben Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. or the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. including feed for his poultry and livestock. Manufacturing was 5 .

the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. including unhealthy one Question: Were the NIRA provisions in excess of congressional power under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: The Court distinguished between direct effects on interstate commerce. which Congress could lawfully regulate. Texas. A. as well as requirements regarding the sale of whole chickens. Champion v. declared Fuller for the majority. Question: Did the ICC have the power to regulate intrastate rates? Conclusion: The regulation was legitimate. (The Shreveport Rail Case) Facts of the Case: A railroad company in Texas charged higher haulage rates for service between Shreveport. the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case." Houston. the Court found that the "stream of interstate commerce" had stopped in this case— Schechter's slaughterhouses bought chickens almost exclusively from intrastate wholesalers and sold completely exclusively to intrastate buyers. and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution.not commerce. Schechter Poultry Corp. Congress may take "all measures necessary or appropriate" even if that means affecting intrastate commerce as well. These included price and wage fixing." and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. v. U. the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic. Louisiana and Dallas. Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing. Ames (The Lottery Case) Facts of the Case: The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines." Congress may lawfully exercise authority.L. Justice Hughes argued that in situations where interstate and intrastate commerce are "so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other.A. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce. E & W Texas Railway v. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly. noting that this power "is plenary. Question: Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision. refining sugar). and indirect. In fostering and regulating interstate commerce.S. United States Facts of the case: The regulations at issue were promulgated under the authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. than it did for service involving greater distances within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroad to charge similar rates for similar distances within and between states." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders. Though the raising and sale of poultry was an interstate industry. which were purely matters of state law. is complete in itself. Any interstate 6 .

and therefore beyond federal reach. minimum wages. In this case. Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. Carter. thus. brought suit against his own company in an attempt to keep it from paying the tax for noncompliance. Without local production somewhere. a stockholder. and mining coal were found to be part of the local process of production. Congress determined that labormanagement disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and. Although compliance was voluntary." Employing workers. maximum hours.C. interstate commerce. Darby Facts of the Case: In 1938. Facts of the Case: With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The justices abandoned their claim that labor relations had only an indirect effect on commerce. Question: Was the Act consistent with the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: Yes. the National Labor Relations Board charged the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. with discriminating against employees who were union members. tax refunds were established as incentives to abide by the regulations. would practically disappear. Justice Sutherland argued that "[e]verything which moves in interstate commerce has had a local origin. Carter Coal Co. The Court held that the Act was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. could be regulated by the national government. and child labor. and Halvering v. The Act regulated prices. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Facts of the Case: In 1935. Clark. maximum weekly hours. Question: Was the act a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce? Conclusion: The unanimous Court affirmed the right of Congress to exercise "to its utmost extent" the powers reserved for it in the Commerce Clause. . Tway Coal Co. R. Tway Coal Co." NLRB v. The Court ruled that "commerce" is plainly distinct from "production. and "fair practices" of the coal industry. setting wages and working hours. .effect of Schechter was indirect. v.C. United States v. Question: Did the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceed congressional powers under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: In a 5 to 4 decision." the national government was justified in penalizing corporations engaging in interstate commerce which "refuse to confer and negotiate" with their workers. separate from any trade of goods that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Carter v. the Court held that the 1935 Act overstepped the bounds of congressional power. Corporations which engaged in interstate commerce or produced goods which were sold in other states were punished for violating the statute. Since the ability of employees to engage in collective bargaining (one activity protected by the Act) is "an essential condition of industrial peace. Carter. v. Glenn. Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act to regulate many aspects of employment including minimum wages. also known as the Guffey Coal Act. Relying heavily on the Court's 7 . In striking down the law. This case was decided together with R.

refused to serve blacks in apparent violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ogden (1824)." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. such as the Heart of Atlanta. the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. in Birmingham Alabama. Question: Did Congress. United States Facts of the Case: Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels. . argued Justice Clark. Part of the Act prevented restaurants serving interstate travelers. forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone. . refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta. Georgia. a 12th grade high school student. from discriminating on the basis of race. .decision in Gibbons v. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . Question: Does a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks burden interstate commerce to an extent that Congress can legitimately prohibit such discrimination? Conclusion: The Court found that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally. Congress's solution to this problem was appropriate and within its bounds to regulate interstate commerce.." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit. Katzenbach a school zone. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. The next day. in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Lopez Facts of the Case: Alfonzo Lopez. Question: Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act. the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute. McClung Facts of the Case: The owner of Ollie's Barbecue. Justice Stone argued that the "motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment . of the right to choose their own customers? Conclusion: The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce. free from governmental regulation.." Furthermore." Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce. or receiving a substantial amount of their food from interstate commerce. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: 8 . United States v. Texas high school. discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio. over which the courts are given no control. and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster.

Souter. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true. Crawford." Additionally.. Drexel Furniture Co. the Court of Appeals affirmed. companies employing children under fourteen years of age would be assessed ten percent of their annual profits. Brzonkala then sued Morrison. Spending. and War Powers The Taxing Power Bailey v. Crawford was not punished. Drexel Furniture Company was found in violation of it and required to pay over $6000 in taxes." Ultimately. United States v. Ultimately. part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). Question: Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: No. raped her.Yes. no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of. also called the Child Labor Tax Law. Justice David H. noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress. and not by the United States. Morrison's punishment was set aside." Dissenting. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. Under the law. During the same year in which the act was passed. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity. the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. through repetition elsewhere. alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981." Other Powers of Congress: Taxing. while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech). Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy.. which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. as it was found to be "excessive. the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Question: Did Congress violate the Constitution in adopting the Child Labor Tax Law in 9 . Facts of the Case: As an exercise of its taxing powers Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1919. Justice Stephen G. Brzonkala dropped out of the university. In dismissing the complaint. Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone.showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce. which it did under protest. which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison Facts of the Case: In 1994. After a hearing.. and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court. dissenting. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. In 1995. both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech.Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia. After an appeal through the university's administrative system. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might. Rehnquist..

if employers paid taxes to a state unemployment compensation fund (created by the states subject to federal standards). in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end. Question: Did Congress exceed its constitutional taxing and spending powers with the Act? Conclusion: The Court found the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production. Morgan Facts of the case: Prior to the 1960s. however. The Act established a federal payroll tax on employers.S. . the Court held that the tax under the Social Security Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. . The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under.attempting to regulate the employment of children. Supreme Court held that literacy tests were not necessarily violations of Equal Protection Clause of the 10 .The nation responded to the call of the distressed. they were allowed to credit those payments toward the federal tax. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitution as it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes. Question: Did the Act arbitrarily impose taxes in violation of the Fifth Amendment or subvert principles of federalism? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision. The Court took note of recent unemployment statistics from the years 1929 to 1936. Butler Facts of the Case: As part of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act. Steward Machine Co." and violated the Tenth Amendment. the U. Taft feared that upholding this law would destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress" by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in the cloak of taxes. In 1959. Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities. maintaining that "[i]t is too late today for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare. argued Justice Roberts. a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. an arena reserved to the states. Even though Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds. v. Davis Facts of the Case: The Steward Machine Company challenged the validity of a tax imposed by the Social Security Act." Congress’ Enforcement Power under the Reconstruction Amendments Katzenbach v. many states and municipalities in the United States used literacy tests in order to disenfranchise minorities. Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in a realm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. The Court found that the tax was uniform throughout the states and did not coerce the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment. The Spending Power United States v.

it may only impose the least restrictive burden. City of Boerne v. Among other provisions. The "ratchet theory" essentially set judicially recognized rights as a support. Lassiter v. and. Texas. Brennan has often been credited with introducing the "ratchet theory" for congressional legislation enacted under Section 5. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA. In doing so. Flores Facts of the Case: The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). or an accredited private school. it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. According to this "ratchet" theory. Question: Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which. With respect to this case. Under the RFRA. Section 4 (e) was aimed at securing the franchise for New York City's large Puerto Rican population and "provides that no person who has completed the sixth grade in a public school. but Justice Brennan ruled that Section 4(e) was appropriate. the Voting Rights Act made some literacy tests illegal. the Court added. specifically. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores. in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms.Fourteenth Amendment nor of the Fifteenth Amendment. In 1965. in part. Northampton Election Board (1959). the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest. in Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be disfranchised for inability to read or write English. Justice Brennan stressed that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. which sought to safeguard the voting rights of previously disenfranchised minorities. even then. Section 4(e) arguably expanded rights beyond what the Court had recognized in Lassiter. by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne. This." Question: Did Congress exceed its powers of enforcement under the 14th Amendment Congress infringe on rights reserved to states by the 10th Amendment? Conclusion: Section 4(e) was constitutional. is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. as opposed to just the judiciary. but that Congress could not ratchet down judicially recognized rights. subjected local ordinances to federal regulation? Conclusion: Yes. the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari. The "ratchet theory" held that Congress could ratchet up civil rights beyond what the Court had recognized. Maryland (1819) to determine whether the legislation passed constitutional muster. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction. and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance." Justice Brennan applied the appropriateness standard of McCulloch v. on which Congress could expand if it so chose. Justice Brennan's opinion allowed for multiple interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment. there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation 11 .

the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. The Tenth amendment as a federalism based limitation on congressional power Missouri v. Game Warden.S. Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty. the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause.ordinance favored one religion over another. The Court noted that the birds the government sought to protect had no permanent habitats within individual states and argued that "[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. In a 7-to-2 decision." The Court thus upheld the exercise of the treaty power and thus found no violation of the Tenth Amendment. an employee of SAMTA. New York filed suit against the federal government. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself. threatened to arrest citizens of Missouri for violating the Act. Joe G. Question: Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision. questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management. Usery (1976). Garcia v. the state of Missouri challenged the treaty. Holland. claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. New York v. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise. Holland Facts of the Case: In December 1916. United States Facts of the Case: The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. protected state sovereignty. the U. and Canada. which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority. the Court held that the national interest in protecting the wildlife could be protected only by national action. Question: Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee 12 .S. the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty to protect a number of migratory birds in the U. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. Garcia. Question: Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion: No. When Ray P. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function. brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority Facts of the Case: The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA).

" This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment. United States. piloting was navigation. and. Printz v. the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review. stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. United States Facts of the Case: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. Navigation was commerce. separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. Question: Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion: According to Justice Curtis. Board of Wardens Facts of the Case: A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot." wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them. III. "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes. the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it even temporarily. "Either type of federal action. Though the 13 . On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional. The third provision. reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. Question: Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification. the "take-title" qualification. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine. Cooley was a ship owner. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional. until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadephia. can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks? Conclusion: No. in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership. who wrote the majority opinion. which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. State Regulation of Interstate Commerce: Federal Limitations Cooley v. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine.clause" of Article Four? Conclusion: In a 6-3 decision.

Protection against discrimination City of Philadelphia v. Clarkstown. a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Modern Approach .000 tons of solid waste each year.Regulation must pursue a legitimate state end ." Question: Did New Jersey's waste importation law violate the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: Yes. like pilotage. and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation. The Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce. the Court found that "the article of commerce. In 1991. Inc." which requires that all waste pass through a certain waste processing plant. New Jersey Facts of the Case: A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste that originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State. and any discrimination against interstate commerce.000 ton quota." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. To meet the 120. and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. Clarkstown Facts of the Case: A New York town. the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exclusive." C&A Carbone. claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. To avoid paying the $81 fee.Regulatory burden imposed by the state on interstate commerce. Question: Does a town's "flow control ordinance. while others. it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for projectionist reasons. disrupt the flow of articles of commerce. Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance. C & A Carbone. operated a similar plant within the town. violate the interstate Commerce Clause by disrupting commerce for waste processing plants in other states? Conclusion: Yes. the 14 .. must be outweighed by the state’s interest in enforcing its regulation. Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill.subject to be regulated was commerce. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor.Regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate end . The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive. Inc. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy. demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions.

.service of processing and disposing of [waste]. unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.. was denied a permit to sell milk.for the benefit of the preferred processing facility. Question: Did the Madison ordinance unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce? Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision. In response to Mass farmers losing market share to lower cost producers from outside. with 97% of the milk it purchases is from out of state farmers. The Commerce Clause also limits the power of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to adopt regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce. "To permit Madison to adopt a regulation not essential for the protection of local health interest and placing a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause. nondiscriminatory alternatives were available to ensure milk sold in the city was wholesome and properly pasteurized. cl. When the Dean Milk Company." West Lynn Creamery. The Court argued that general discrimination against non-local producers was not narrowly tailored to serve the city's interests. The order required every dealer in Mass. Thus. Said fund then distributed money to local dairy farmers proportionate to their contribution into the State’s production of raw milk." Dean Milk Co. Inc. v. it filed suit against the city. Madison Facts of the Case: A Madison. Wisconsin ordinance prohibited the sale of milk within city limits unless it came from a local farm or was pasteurized at an approved plant within five miles of the center of Madison. 3. Question: Did the pricing order unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce? Conclusion: Yes." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste. the Court held that the Wisconsin ordinance imposed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.. Art." For the ordinance to be constitutional. to make a monthly premium payment based on the amount of fluid milk sales into a FUND. state statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down .. Healy Facts of the case: Healy was the Massachusetts Commissioner Department of Food and Agriculture (respondent) Pl/pet is a milk dealer licensed within Mass. Principle under commerce clause is that a state may not benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. Mass enacted a pricing order. The "premium payments" are effectively a tax that 15 . 1. Reasonable. § 8. the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest. located in Illinois. v.

its effect on Massachusetts producers is entirely (indeed more than) offset by the subsidy provided exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources. 82 (1984). The Issue before the Court is whether such a program violates the Dormant Commerce Clause—essentially. Alexandria Scrap Corp. In such instances." and that therefore the state was acting as a regulator. 794 (1976) was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. This case created the "market participant" exception to the general restrictions on states imposed by the Dormant Commerce Clause. One such customer was Reeves. Reeves. Alexandria Scrap Corp. Inc. Reeves v. South-Central Timber Dev. for economic reasons. v. Determining when a state is acting like a "market participant" rather than as a regulator was not decided by this case. 3) imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state processors. but found in South Central Timber Development v. Maryland created a program that. 2) paid a bounty for those with Maryland license plates and. The premiums simultaneously burdens interstate commerce and discriminates in favor of local producers. Although the tax also applies to milk produced in Massachusetts. Unlike previous Dormant Commerce Clause cases. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. whether Maryland could Constitutionally discriminate or burden interstate commerce by imposing more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state processors or favoring in-state car dealerships when they purchase junk cars.'" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator. Question: Did South Dakota's preferential system violate the Commerce Clause? Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision.S. not as a mere market participant. in an effort to reduce the number of abandoned cars in Maryland. and found that "'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State. Maryland was acting like a market participant (as opposed to a state regulator). the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. the Court determined that a state actor can favor its own citizens over the foreign citizens.makes milk produced out of State more expensive. The Court saw the bidding rules as an attempt to control commerce "down the stream. Market-participant doctrine Hughes v. Stake Facts of the Case: The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. 1) purchased junked cars. in the absence of congressional action." and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. Hughes v. Wunnicke.S. from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others. 467 U.. Like an ordinary tariff. 426 U. the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a "natural resource" 16 . In 1978. a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. the tax is thus effectively imposed only on out-ofstate products.. Wunnicke Invalidated Alaska's policy of insisting that high-bidders on state-owned timber agree to process some of the timber they purchased at Alaskan sawmills. Alexandria Scrap Corp. Inc.

Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable tax rate regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. but reaffirms. 17 . Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions. 451 U. Ward Facts of the case: An Alabama statute imposes a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-of-state (foreign) insurance companies. The Equal Protection Clause Metropolitan Life Insurance which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access. Co. 648. v. Question: Did the statute violate the equal protection clause? Conclusion: The Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to appellants. Alabama's purpose constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. Western & Southern Life Ins. Wash. A State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely because of their residence. (b) Nor is the encouragement of the investment in Alabama assets and securities a legitimate state purpose. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination is similar to the type of burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. State Board of Equalization of California. the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose.S. it does not cure. Facts of the Case: In 1972. Question: Was the ordinance unconstitutional based on the privileges and immunities clause? Conclusion: A city can pressure private employers to hire city residents. designed only to favor domestic industry within the State. The Privileges and Immunities Clause United Building & Construction trades council v. Facially neutral statutes with significant effects on interstate commerce Hunt v. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. required that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents. the impermissible classification based solely on residence. Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is purely and completely discriminatory. (a) Under the circumstances of this case. Comm. v. distinguished. since the investment incentive provision does not enable foreign insurers to eliminate the statute's discriminatory effect. Camden Facts of the case: A municipal ordinance of the city of Camden. it does not purport to limit the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. but the same exercise of power to bias private contractors against out-of-state residents may be called into account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution. New Jersey. State Apple Ad. Moreover. The statute permits foreign companies to reduce but not to eliminate the differential by investing in Alabama assets and securities.

47. less burdensome options available to the state." Question: Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion: The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. and legislature. In No. 47 advocated the ratification the United States Constitution. judiciary. The absence of any of these factors fully distinguishes this case from Hunt v. Madison acknowledged that the three branches intertwined but asserted 18 . The Court held that the regulation was constitutional despite huge extraterritorial effects of the regulation. which represented about 5% of all those in Maryland. 47(Madison) Like the other Federalist Papers. No.: "Since Maryland's entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerce and since there are no local producers or refiners. including Exxon." Majority held that Act does not (1) discriminate against interstate dealers (2) prohibit the flow of interstate goods (3) place added cost on them (4) or distinguish between in-state or out-of-state retailers. Bruce Church.North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception. Facts of the Case: An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. claimed that the law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. IV. v. Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. First. Exxon Corp. Washington Apple Commission. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Question: Did the law pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion: The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. Governor of Maryland The Supreme Court of the United States upheld a Maryland law prohibiting oil producers and refiners from operating service stations within its borders. The law was a response to evidence that those stations. had received preferential treatment during the 1973 oil crisis. The distribution of national powers Intro The Federalist No. Although the regulation was facially neutral. This case is an exception to the rules set forth in Pike v. such claims of disparate treatment between interstate and local commerce would be meritless. The challengers. Therefore. and no legitimate state interest apart from a desire for cheaper oil. Consolidated Freightways Corp. the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads. Kassel v. the law was "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similar regulations. which disagreed with Exxon et al." Second. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority. The safety interest was "illusory. Madison addressed criticisms that the Constitution did not create a sufficient separation of powers among the executive. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce.

e. the acts of each other. the people who wrote the thirteen state constitutions. not only the legislative branch. He finds that "there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. i. yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions" and that its powers are both "more extensive. those with power will attempt to control everything they can."[1] Madison's interpretation of Montesquieu supported a system of checks and balances quite similar to checks and balances the former thirteen colonies had created in their state constitutions. Although each branch has its distinctive powers. To support his argument. Madison said that if the states did not think their constitutions violated the separation of powers. the paper summarizes the conclusions of a report by a "Council of Censors" on apparent violations of the Pennsylvania constitution. i. as distinct from other types of government. or no CONTROL over. it cannot stand alone without the check and balance system of the other two branches. in order to practically maintain the branches as "separate and distinct". 19 . However. in which he corroborates the claims of the paper. Madison viewed the separation of power as essential because without it only one power would rule the country. 48(Madison) Federalist No. tyranny results when one branch of government simultaneously holds the powers of another branch. Madison argues that Montesquieu "did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in. Madison referred to the writings of Montesquieu.that the blending did not violate the principle of separation of powers. Madison tried to enlist the support of the young states by analyzing their individual constitutions. The paper begins by asserting that "power is of an encroaching nature". It then asks how this tendency can be stopped."[2] For example. it found many. 47 argued that the branches of government can be connected. they must have "a constitutional control" over each other. In respect of Pennsylvania. Madison attributes the widespread support of a separation of powers to Montesquieu. It singles out the legislative branch as being particularly successful in taking over power. and less susceptible of precise limits". 48 is that. The paper offers a number of reasons why legislative over-reaching is more likely in a "representative republic". The Federalist No. The argument of No. the new national Constitution did not violate of the separation of powers either. As an aside from the main argument.e. Then two examples of legislative over-reaching are given: Virginia and Pennsylvania. These reasons include the claim that the legislature is "sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude. the New Hampshire Constitution allowed its senate to serve as a judicial tribunal for impeachments. The United States Constitution similarly granted the powers of impeachment to the legislature. the paper notes that the danger of the legislative branch taking over has not been thought about by the "founders of our republics". It then makes the claim that merely defining the boundaries of the branches is an insufficient safeguard. A small rebuttal is made to the claim in the report that many violations were committed by the executive branch. The Virginia example is primarily a long quote from Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia. while remaining "separate and distinct". According to Montesquieu. which could easily lead to abusive ruling. in order to preserve the "separate and distinct" quality of the branches of government.

The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. Question: Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills? Conclusion: In a 6-to-3 decision. Facts of the Case: Curtiss-Wright was charged with conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia. President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. Regan Facts of the Case: In reaction to the seizure of the U. He classified this case as falling within the third category. When the hostages were released in 1981. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims. which was engaged in an armed conflict in the Chaco. Question: Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legal claims against Iran? Conclusion: The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. ranked in descending order of legitimacy: (1) those cases in which the President was acting with express or implied authority from Congress. Dames & Moore Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. eschewing any fixed boundaries between Congress' and the President's power. Curtiss-Wright Corp." *Jackson's opinion took a similarly flexible approach to the issue. Truman did this in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America.S. Jackson divided Presidential authority vis a vis Congress into three categories. Treasury Secretary Donald Reagan affirmed the agreements made by the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. (2) cases in which Congress had thus far been silent. Dames & Moore v. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power. This violated a Joint Resolution 20 . Foreign Affairs Executive Authority United States v. v.A Case Study: Presidential Seizure – Youngstown. and (3) cases in which the President was defying congressional orders. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. limiting the decision to the facts of the case. during the Korean War. embassy and American nationals in Iran. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case) Facts of the Case: In April of 1952.

Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of the Union. 1861. A state of civil war existed de facto after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12. a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. declared an "enemy combatant. Justice Sutherland argued because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. The district court ruled for Hamdi.S. an American citizen. By the Act of August 6. Making important distinctions between internal and foreign affairs. On appeal. finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not.. Question: Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war? Conclusion: The President had the power to act. a defense attorney in Virginia. to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system. without access to an attorney. Yaser Hamdi. Frank Dunham. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. 1861. was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan.of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt." Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. first on his own and then for Hamdi's father. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right." Hamdi v. telling the government to release him. 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"? Conclusion: 21 . He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U. Question: Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely. 1861. The Prize Cases Facts of the Case: Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination. when states waged war against the United States government." and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. during wartime. the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself.. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there. in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional.without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name. Question: Did Congress in its Joint Resolution unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President? Conclusion: The Court agreed that the President was allowed much room to operate in executing the Joint Resolution. Jr. it found no constitutional violation. Rumsfeld Facts of the Case: In the fall of 2001.

" Clinton v. Nixon v. an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. without more. Roughly one year later he was fired. Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker. disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Nixon Facts of the Case: A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Souter and Ginsburg. nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications. unqualified. Question: Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit? Conclusion: Yes. The War Powers Resolution Page 399 Domestic Affairs Executive Authority United States v. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice. joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices. then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force.Yes and no. can sustain an absolute. presidential privilege. concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege." which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. argued Justice Powell. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Fitzgerald." Therefore. the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. United States." This sweeping immunity. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately. Jones 22 . Decided together with Nixon v. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust. testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers. however. Souter. Question: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information. Justice David H. was a function of the "President's unique office. rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history. Fitzgerald Facts of the Case: In 1968. entirely immune from judicial review? Conclusion: No. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office.

violate the Presentment Clause of Article I? Conclusion: Yes. the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office. attention. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee. a hospital. In a unanimous opinion. In the second. for separation of powers reasons. two hospital associations. is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time. the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal. the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. made by President William J. Question: Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills.Facts of the Case: Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. Clinton. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York. the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended. Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office? Conclusion: No. the Court added. This. under the Line Item Veto Act. and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and 23 . she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. and two health care unions. under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers. New York Facts of the Case: This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional. and its affiliates. On appeal. and resources of the Chief Executive. pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity. Legislative Authority Delegation Page 418 Clinton v. the City of New York. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request. In the first. Question: Is a serving President.

Chadha and United States Senate v. Administrative Agencies Myers v. Question: 24 . Question: Did the Immigration and Nationality Act. which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions. and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue. President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers.concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. Such discretion. United States Facts of the Case: An 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first. Chadha Facts of the Case: In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. United States Facts of the Case: President Hoover appointed.e.e. a postmaster first class. under authority granted him by the Act. President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation since the latter was a conservative and had jurisdiction over many of Roosevelt's New Deal policies. the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. According to Taft. In 1933. it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority. Chadha.S. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers. the FTC Act only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency. After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President's appointment power. Question: Did the Act unconstitutionally restrict the President's power to remove appointed officials? Conclusion: Yes. violate the separation of powers doctrine? Conclusion: The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. vetoed) by the President. without seeking Senate approval. legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i. past his visa deadline and was ordered to leave the country. The House of Representatives suspended the Immigration judge's deportation ruling. his executor sued to recover Humphrey's lost salary. Legislative Veto INS v." Humphrey’s Executor v. Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency. second. and the Senate confirmed. Chadha had stayed in the U. or malfeasance in office. violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers. to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed. Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). However. Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause. When Humphrey refused to resign. signed) or rejected (i. neglect of duty. the Court concluded.

In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executive department. Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. Justice Sutherland dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily on the Court's decision in Meyers v. First. as requested by the Comptroller General. Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Synar and United States Senate v. did not apply in this situation. if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded. Synar Facts of the Case: Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration.Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere with the executive power of the President? Conclusion: The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns. therefore. argued Sutherland. Question: Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers? Conclusion: The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. would go into effect. Buckley v. Valeo Facts of the Case: In the wake of the Watergate affair. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do. Under the law. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. First. automatic cuts. United States (1926). it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association. Second. the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Question: Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The Meyers precedent. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. in 25 . Synar. because it was a body created by Congress to perform quasi-legislative and judicial functions. the Court arrived at two important conclusions. Bowsher v." The FTC was different. violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? Conclusion: In this complicated case. Among other things.

and. in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause. and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch. thus. Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and. the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III.exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal. Second. Question: Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers? Conclusion: The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. if necessary. it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Olson Facts of the Case: The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate. was intruding on the perogatives of the executive branch. 26 . Morrison v. prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.