California electricity crisis

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California electricity crisis
Chronology 1996 April 1998 May 2000 June 14, 2000 August 2000 [1] [2] [3] California begins to loosen controls on its energy market and takes measures to increase competition. Spot market for energy begins operation. Significant rise in energy price. Blackouts affect 97,000 customers in San Francisco Bay area during a heat wave. San Diego Gas & Electric Company files a complaint alleging manipulation of the markets.

January 17–18, 2001 Blackouts affect several hundred thousand customers. January 17, 2001 March 19–20, 2001 April 2001 May 7–8, 2001 September 2001 December 2001 February 2002 Winter 2002 November 13, 2003 Governor Davis declares a state of emergency. Blackouts affect 1.5 million customers. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. files for bankruptcy. Blackouts affect upwards of 167,000 customers. Energy prices normalize. Following the bankruptcy of Enron, it is alleged that energy prices were manipulated by Enron. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission begins investigation of Enron's involvement. The Enron Tapes scandal begins to surface. Governor Davis ends the state of emergency.

The California electricity crisis, also known as the Western U.S. Energy Crisis of 2000 and 2001 and the Phony Energy Crisis of 2001 was a situation where California had a shortage of electricity caused by market manipulations and illegal shutdowns of pipelines by Texas energy consortiums. The state suffered from multiple large-scale blackouts, one of the state's largest energy companies collapsed, and the economic fall-out greatly harmed Governor Gray Davis's standing. Drought and delays in approval of new power plants[4] and market manipulation decreased supply. This caused 800% increase in wholesale prices from April 2000 to December 2000.[5] In addition, Rolling blackouts adversely affected many businesses dependent upon a reliable supply of electricity, and inconvenienced a large number of retail consumers. This demand supply gap was exploited by energy companies, mainly Enron. Energy traders took power plants offline for maintenance days of peak demand to increase the price.[6] [7] Traders were thus able to sell power at premium prices, sometimes up to a factor of 20x its normal value. Because the state Government had a cap on retail electricity charges, this market manipulation squeezed the industry's revenue margins, causing the bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and near bankruptcy of Southern California Edison in early 2001.[8] The financial crisis was possible because of partial deregulation legislation instituted in 1996 by Governor Pete Wilson. Enron took advantage of this deregulation and was involved in economic withholding and inflated price bidding in California's spot markets.[9] The crisis cost $40bn to $45bn.[10]

"[12] Effects of partial deregulation Part of California's deregulation process. It was therefore advantageous to make it appear that electricity was being generated somewhere other than California. "Ricochet". In a letter sent from David Fabian to Senator Boxer in 2002.[11] Some of these have been extensively investigated and described in reports Megawatt laundering is the term. But in the Death Star scenario. Enron was allowed to price-gouge at will. and AES. coined to describe the process of obscuring the true origins of specific quantities of electricity being sold on the energy market. Williams. Power lines have a defined maximum load. Manipulation strategies were known to energy traders under names such as "Fat Boy". Reliant. then caused others to need it. by California's free-market rules. Overscheduling was one of the building blocks of a number of scams. Utilities were precluded from entering into longer-term agreements that would have allowed them to hedge their energy purchases and mitigate day-to-day swings in prices due to transient supply disruptions and demand spikes from hot weather. market manipulation was only possible as a result of the complex market design produced by the process of partial deregulation. Next. "Death Star". "Big Foot". "Ping Pong". involved the partial divestiture in March 1998 of electricity generation stations by the incumbent utilities. Dynegy. which was promoted as a means of increasing competition. "Red Congo". For example. "Congestion fees" were a variety of financial incentives aimed at ensuring power providers solved the congestion problem. the Death Star group of scams played on the market rules which required the state to pay "congestion fees" to alleviate congestion on major power lines. the congestion was entirely illusory and the congestion fees would therefore simply increase profits. "Cong Catcher" and "Get Shorty". analogous to money laundering. A total of 40% of installed capacity — 20 gigawatts — was sold to what were called "independent power producers." These included Mirant. "Black Widow". I heard that Enron traders purposely overbooked that line. "Forney Perpetual Loop". it was alleged that: "There is a single connection between northern and southern California's power grids. who were still responsible for electricity distribution and were competing with independents in the retail market.California electricity crisis 2 Causes Market manipulation As the FERC report concluded. Lines must be booked (or scheduled) in advance for transporting bought-and-sold quantities of electricity. Overscheduling is a term used in describing the manipulation of capacity available for the transportation of electricity along power lines. The utilities were then required to buy their electricity from the newly created day-ahead only market. the California Power Exchange (PX). The California energy market allowed for energy companies to charge higher prices for electricity produced out-of-state. . "Overscheduling" means a deliberate reservation of more line usage than is actually required and can create the appearance that the power lines are congested.

the California government discouraged citizens from practicing conservation. but the incumbent utility companies still had to purchase power. flawed market design and inconsistent rules made possible significant market manipulation as delineated in final investigation report. creating shortages. They were unable to pass the higher prices on to consumers without approval from the public utilities commission.[14] When electricity wholesale prices exceeded retail prices. "Believe me.[13] Deregulating the producers of energy did not lower the cost of energy. in 2000.. wholesale prices were deregulated. but retail prices were regulated for the incumbents as part of a deal with the regulator. albeit at a loss. Government price caps By keeping the consumer price of electricity artificially low. end user demand was unaffected. This was a procedure referred to as "gaming the market. utilities had no financial incentive to expand production. and causing artificial transmission constraints. After extensive investigation The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) substantially agreed in 2003:[16] "." . wholesalers such as Enron manipulated the market to force utility companies into daily spot markets for short term gain. California governor Gray Davis stated.California electricity crisis 3 Then." In economic terms. This assumption remained true from April 1998 through May 2000. and true market processes were stymied — whereas opponents of deregulation assert that the fully regulated system had worked for 40 years without blackouts. Instead. arbitraging the price between internal generation and imported (interstate) power. In some instances. wholesalers bought up electricity in California at below cap price to sell out of state."[15] Energy price regulation incentivized suppliers to ration their electricity supply rather than expand production. based on the expectation that "frozen" rates would remain higher than wholesale prices. Deregulation did not encourage new producers to create more power and drive down prices. as long term prices were capped. energy producers began shutting down plants to increase prices. State lawmakers expected the price of electricity to decrease due to the resulting competition.[14] In January 2001. Instead. the producers of energy charged more for electricity. utility companies were required by law to buy electricity from spot markets at uncapped prices when faced with imminent power shortages. For example. attempts to manipulate the market would not be successful. allowing the incumbent utilities to recover the cost of assets that would be stranded as a result of greater competition..[14] The producers used moments of spike energy production to inflate the price of energy. In February 2001. hence they capped the price of electricity at the pre-deregulation level. Energy deregulation policy froze or capped the existing price of energy that the three energy PG&E yard in San Francisco distributors could charge. The affected incumbents were Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E). Since they also saw it as imperative that the supply of electricity remain uninterrupted. wholesalers scheduled power transmission to create congestion and drive up prices. Without underlying market dysfunction. the incumbents who were still subject to retail price caps were faced with inelastic demand (see also: Demand response). Energy deregulation put the three companies that distribute electricity into a tough situation.supply-demand imbalance. When the electricity demand in California rose. in a market technique known as megawatt laundering. with increasing demand for electricity. if I wanted to raise rates I could have solved this problem in 20 minutes. Pro-privatization advocates insist the cause of the problem was that the regulator still held too much control over the market. The resulting scarcity created opportunities for market manipulation by energy speculators. This allowed independent producers to manipulate prices in the electricity market by withholding electricity generation.

The state did not build any new major power plants during that time. FERC's resources are in fact quite sparse in comparison to their entrusted task of policing the energy market. in fact Steve Peace and the California legislature expected that there would be regulation by the FERC which would prevent manipulation.California electricity crisis ". Democratic State Senator Steve Peace. Lobbying by private companies may also have slowed down regulation and enforcement. in theory. 4 New regulations In the mid-90's. is to regulate and enforce Federal law.. Though at no point during the crisis was California's sum of [actual electric-generating capacity]+[out of state supply] less than demand." The major flaw of the deregulation scheme was that it was an incomplete deregulation—that is. These critical shutdowns often occurred for no other reason than to force California's electricity grid managers into a position where they would be forced to purchase . under Republican Governor Pete Wilson(R). unregulated companies such as AES. have generally deregulated utilities but kept the providers regulated. "middleman" utility distributors continued to be regulated and forced to charge fixed prices. preventing market manipulation and price manipulation of energy markets. California began changing the electricity industry.. such as Pennsylvania's. and San Diego Gas and Electric) to sell off a significant part of their electricity generation to wholly private. the chair of the energy committee and the author of the bill that put these changes into effect. California's energy reserves were low enough that during peak hours the private industry which owned power-generating plants could effectively hold the State hostage by shutting down their plants for "maintenance" in order to manipulate supply and demand. The new rules called for the Investor Owned Utilities. although existing in-state power plants were expanded and power output was increased nearly 30% from 1990 to 2001. out-of-state privateers which were clearly manipulating the California energy market. California's utilities came to depend in part on the import of excess hydroelectricity from the Pacific Northwest states of Oregon and Washington. the FERC hardly reacted at all and did not take serious action against Enron. Southern California Edison. or deregulated both.[17] Supply and demand California's population increased by 13% during the 1990s. Other. (primarily Pacific Gas and Electric. The buyers of those power plants then became the wholesalers from which the IOUs needed to buy the electricity that they used to own themselves. Reliant. is often credited as "the father of deregulation". When called upon to regulate the PG&E electric meter on Angel Island... The FERC's job. and continued to have limited choice in terms of electricity providers. Wilson admitted publicly that defects in the deregulation system would need fixing by "the next governor". as opposed to coal whose emissions are more toxic and contain more pollutants. and Enron. While the selling of power plants to private companies was labeled "deregulation"." "Electricity prices in California’s spot markets were affected by economic withholding and inflated price bidding.many trading strategies employed by Enron and other companies violated the anti-gaming provisions. California's groundbreaking clean air standards favored in-state electricity generation which burned natural gas because of its lower emissions. or IOUs. In the summer of 2001 a drought in the northwest states reduced the amount of hydroelectric power available to California. or any other privateers. in violation of tariff anti-gaming provisions. less catastrophic energy deregulation schemes. Reliant.

. PG&E filed bankruptcy. they were capped at 6. Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) were buying from a spot market at very high prices but were unable to raise retail rates. twenty cents. and Southern California Edison worked diligently on a workout plan with the State of California to save their company from the same fate. this bottleneck was not problematic. the energy companies took advantage of California's electrical infrastructure weakness. Manipulation by the industry of natural gas prices resulted in higher electricity rates that could be charged under the semi-regulations. With a smaller pool of generators available to draw from in each area.900 MW. and finally suffered rolling blackouts on January 17 & 18. and San Diego Gas & Electric Company filed a complaint alleging market manipulation by some energy producers in August 2000.[19] PG&E and SCE had racked up US$20 Billion in debt by Spring of 2001 and their credit ratings were reduced to junk status. and. the electricity crisis caused Governor Gray Davis to declare a state of emergency. 2001 this stop-gap measure had been extended and would also include SDG&E. On December 7. Even though these rates were semi-regulated and tied to the price of natural gas. had not been improved for many years and became a major bottleneck point which limited the amount of power that could be sent south to 3. In addition. On December 15. With better demand response the market also becomes more resilient to intentional withdrawal of offers from the supply side. meaning power reserves were below 3 percent. The state stepped in on January 17. The financial crisis meant that PG&E and SCE were unable to purchase power on behalf of their customers. having the California Department of Water Resources buy power. yet. As a result. The main line which allowed electricity to travel from the north to the south. 5 Some key events Rolling blackouts affecting 97. Without the manipulation by energy companies. led by Enron Corporation. 2003 that the utilities would resume procuring power for their customers. compared to $45 per megawatt-hour average one year earlier. Rolling blackouts were avoided when the state halted two large state and federal water pumps to conserve electricity. were collectively making large profits while the state teetered on the edge for weeks. 2000.7 cents per kilowatt hours in terms of what they could charge their retail customers. 2000. the California Independent System Operator (ISO). the companies (which included Enron and Reliant Energy) controlled the supply of natural gas as well. Path 15. Consequences of wholesale price rises on the retail market As a result of the actions of electricity wholesalers. Speculators.California electricity crisis electricity on the "spot market". instead approving a "flexible cap" plan of $150 per megawatt-hour. but the effects of the bottleneck compounded the price manipulation by hamstringing energy grid managers in their ability to transport electricity from one area to another. the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected California's request for a wholesale rate cap for California. since the California power companies were technically bankrupt and had no buying power. declared the first statewide Stage 3 power alert. That day. fifty cents or more. It would not be until January 1. where private generators could charge astronomical rates. A product that the IOU's used to produce for about three cents per kilowatt hour of electricity.000 customers hit the San Francisco Bay area on June 14. Davis was forced to step in to buy power at highly unfavorable terms on the open market. suffering from low supply and idled power plants. 2001. California was paying wholesale prices of over $1400 per megawatt-hour. they were paying eleven cents. The resulting massive long term debt obligations added to the state budget crisis and led to widespread grumbling about Davis' administration. 2001. By February 1. The International Energy Agency estimates[18] that a 5% lowering of demand would result in a 50% price reduction during the peak hours of the California electricity crisis in 2000/2001. 2000. which manages the California power grid. both of which were being manipulated by the energy companies. On January 17. managers were forced to work in two markets to buy energy.

and we cannot do without it. saying. and oversight. which don't operate in trading "pits" and don't have the same government regulations. Small businesses were badly affected. Vincent Viola. from 56. Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce. and at the worst possible time. Never again can we allow private interests to create artificial or even real shortages and to be in control. Foreign Commerce and Tourism in April[21] and May 2002. 2002: "There is one fundamental lesson we must learn from this experience: electricity is really different from everything else. but he died due to a heart attack on July 5 of that year before he could be sentenced.California electricity crisis Between 2000 and 2001. chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange—the largest forum for energy contract trading and clearing—urged that Enron-like companies. who was appointed Chair of the California Power Authority in the midst of the crisis. . terms or conditions of those contracts are unjust or unreasonable." The original statement was made in a phone conversation between David Freeman (Chairman of the California Power Authority) and Kenneth Lay (CEO of Enron) in 2000. David Freeman." Nevada was the first state to attempt recovery of such contract losses. Supreme Court had ruled "that FERC has had the authority to negate bilateral contracts if it finds that the prices. only US$202 million of this was expected to be paid." Enron eventually went bankrupt. It cannot be stored. At a Senate hearing in January 2002. retail electricity prices rose much more from 1999 to 2007 in states that adopted deregulation than in those that did not. We need to go back to companies that own power plants with clear responsibilities for selling real power under long-term contracts. Enron CEO Ken Lay mocked the efforts by the California State government to thwart the practices of the energy wholesalers.000 to 54. and signed a US$1. due to its other bankruptcy obligations. If Murphy’s Law were written for a market approach to electricity. There is no place for companies like Enron that own the equivalent of an electronic telephone book and game the system to extract an unnecessary middleman’s profits. People say that Governor Davis has been vindicated by the Enron confession. 2005. In any case. Ken Lay was convicted of multiple criminal charges unrelated to the California energy crisis on May 25. be given the same requirements for "compliance.S. it doesn't matter what you crazy people in California do.700. Companies with power plants can compete for contracts to provide the bulk of our power at reasonable prices that reflect costs. Science and Transportation on May 15. San Diego had worked through the stranded asset provision and was in a position to increase prices to reflect the spot market. will be gamed. However. his record was expunged and his family was allowed to retain all his property. made the following statements about Enron's involvement in testimony[22] submitted before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs. Enron traded in energy derivatives specifically exempted from regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. which makes opportunities to take advantage of a deregulated market endless. In electric power. "Enron stood for secrecy and a lack of responsibility. the U. then the law would state 'any system that can be gamed.[22] S. the combined California utilities laid off 1. According to a 2007 study of Department of Energy data by Power in the Public Interest.[20] 6 Involvement of Enron One of the energy wholesalers that became notorious for "gaming the market" and reaping huge speculative profits was Enron Corporation.300 workers. it cannot be seen. disclosure.52 billion settlement with a group of California agencies and private utilities on July 16." He asked the committee to enforce "greater transparency" for the records of companies like Enron. "In the final analysis. Because Lay died while his case was on federal appeal. according to the statements made by Freeman to the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs. 2006. in an effort to remain solvent. It is a public good that must be protected from private abuse.' And a market approach for electricity is inherently gameable. because I got smart guys who can always figure out how to make money. we must have openness and companies that are responsible for keeping the lights on.

Meanwhile. We got no help from the Federal government. During that time. 2003. the California State Legislature would sometimes push Davis to act decisively by taking over power plants which were known to have been gamed and place them back under control of the utilities." Signs of trouble first cropped up in the spring of 2000 when electricity bills skyrocketed for customers in San Diego. Davis officially brought the energy crisis to an end by issuing a proclamation ending the state of emergency he declared on January 17. while his defenders attribute the crisis to the power trading fraud and corporate accounting scandals and say that Davis did all he could considering the fact that the Federal government. Davis apologized for being slow to act during the energy crisis. and refused to allow prices to rise for residences statewide much like they did in San Diego. 2001. Some critics. Davis began asking the Federal regulator FERC to probe possible price manipulation by power suppliers as early as August 2000. Experts warned of an impending energy crisis. 2001. Former Governor Gray Davis's critics often charge that he did not respond properly to the crisis. Davis would issue a state of emergency on January 17. where Gray Davis disagreed with the treasury officials and energy executives. which they argue could have given Davis more leverage against the energy traders and encouraged more conservation. but Governor Davis did little to respond until the crisis became statewide that summer.[25] The crisis. but then forcefully attacked the Houston-based energy suppliers: "I inherited the energy deregulation scheme which put us all at the mercy of the big energy producers. when I was fighting Enron and the other energy companies. 2003. as noted above). ensuring a more steady supply and slapping the nose of the worst manipulators .California electricity crisis 7 Handling of the crisis Governor Gray Davis Perhaps the heaviest point of controversy is the question of blame for the California electricity crisis.[23] In addition. California issued licenses to 38 new power plants. In fact. amounting to 14. and the subsequent government intervention. shortly before leaving office.[24] More criticism is given in the book Conspiracy of Fools. alleged that Davis was lulled to inaction by campaign contributions from energy producers. regulate interstate power commerce. and is regarded as one of the major contributing factors to the 2003 recall election of Governor Davis. and acted rudely. not states. They advised suspending environmental studies to build power plants and a small rate hike to prepare for long-term power contracts (Davis eventually signed overpriced ones. while Davis supported price caps. conservatives argued that Davis signed overpriced energy contracts. including market manipulators such as Enron. such as Arianna Huffington. In a speech at UCLA on August 19. . when wholesale electricity prices hit new highs and the state began issuing rolling blackouts. and energy executives. The state of emergency allowed the state to buy electricity for the financially strapped utility companies. On November 13.365 megawatts of electricity production when completed. Clinton Administration Treasury officials. these same companies were sitting down with Vice President Cheney to draft a national energy strategy. the first area of the state to deregulate. which gives the details of a meeting between the governor and his officials. have had political ramifications. denounced the other solutions as too politically risky. employed incompetent negotiators. The emergency authority allowed Davis to order the California Energy Commission to streamline the application process for new power plants.

p. Over a year later.. Lea Fastow. McCullough Research (June 5. McCullough Research (June 5. p. 2002) [12] Letter from David Fabian to Senator Boxer. Retrieved 2010-03-17. asp). p. Schwarzenegger was elected Governor of California to replace Davis. [8] Weare (2003). officials of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power met with the Task Force. 1 [6] http:/ / www.4. html). Jeffrey Skilling Kenneth Lay. pdf).[26] [27] [28] On October 7. com/ Learning/ CaseStudies/ ref_case_californiacrisis. and the Enron corporate officers were swiftly arrested and tried. quoted in Congestion Manipulation "DeathStar" (http:/ / www. The Task Force refused. Those arrested and tried included Treasurer Ben Glisan. February 13. The Refund Case. gov/ industries/ electric/ indus-act/ wec/ enron/ summary-findings. mresearch. [2] "ERisk. . org/ web/ 20060118233725/ http:/ / www. mresearch. 2002) at p. Footnotes [1] "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chronology" (http:/ / www. com/ pdfs/ 19. 2001 to head the National Energy Development Task Force. There were no power shortages or outages while Schwarzenegger was governor. [10] Weare (2003). . html?ex=1107666000& en=01449ebf62df572e& ei=5070). William Fuhs and James Brown. . 2005). The Enron Investigation. 2002." which called for an end to Federal and state investigations into Enron's role in the California energy crisis. pdf) (PDF). The Economic Withholding and Anomalous Bidding Case. Retrieved 2008-08-17. tapes/ Tapes: Enron plotted to shut down power plant. 2003. involving wide-ranging recovery of illegal profits made by some companies during the crisis. Richard Causey. Timothy (February 4. National Energy Development Task Force Vice President Dick Cheney was appointed in January. 2–3 [9] "FERC Summary of findings" (http:/ / www.[30] • • • • The Gaming Case. he attended the commissioning ceremony[29] of a new Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) 500 kV line remedying the aforementioned power bottleneck on Path 15. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was intimately involved with the handling of the crisis from the summer of 2000. archive. com/ 2005/ 02/ 04/ national/ 04energy. p.com's The California Energy Crisis 2063-20100" (http:/ / web. [3] "FrontLine's California Crisis Timeline" (http:/ / www. the refund case was ongoing. "Tapes Show Enron Arranged Plant Shutdown" (http:/ / www. ferc. There were in fact at least four separate FERC investigations. asking for price controls to protect consumers. erisk. . gov/ industries/ electric/ indus-act/ wec/ chron/ chronology. com/ Learning/ CaseStudies/ ref_case_californiacrisis. org/ wgbh/ pages/ frontline/ shows/ blackout/ california/ timeline. . 3–4 [11] Congestion Manipulation "DeathStar" (http:/ / www. Andrew Fastow. In the Spring of that year. erisk. Retrieved 2008-08-17. investigating general allegations of manipulation of the Western energy markets. p. com/ pdfs/ 19. future Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and former Los Angeles Mayor Republican Richard Riordan met with Enron CEO Ken Lay at the Peninsula Beverly Hills Hotel in Beverly Hills. 109 [5] Weare (2003). asp) on 2006-01-18. The New York Times.California electricity crisis 8 Arnold Schwarzenegger On May 17.[31] In January 2006. nytimes. cnn. com/ 2005/ US/ 02/ 03/ enron. ferc. Retrieved 2009-06-26. and insisted that deregulation must remain in place. pdf) (PDF). Archived from the original (http:/ / www. pbs. Jr. Dan Boyle of Enron and Merrill Lynch bankers Daniel Bayly. . [7] Egan.1. pdf). 2001. The meeting was convened for Enron to present its "Comprehensive Solution for California. [4] Sweeney (2002). specifically investigating the involvement of Enron. Robert Furst.

wapa.347 at 62. . archive.pdf).gov/cneaf/electricity/ california/assemblybill. ISBN 0-8179-2911-8. wapa. Stanford: Hoover Institution. Archived from the original (http:/ / www. Retrieved 2008-08-17. . archive. . [20] Johnston. pdf) (PDF).gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/chron/chronology. org/ web/ 20060924224547/ http:/ / www. gov/ industries/ electric/ indus-act/ wec/ enron/ summary-findings. org/ publications/ 2005/ 13.ppic. New York: Broadway Books. Retrieved 2008-08-17. [25] Eichenwald. html). Archived from the original (http:/ / commerce. Christopher (2003). DTL). Retrieved 2008-08-17. html). San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. [17] "White House Paper Shredding Costs Spiral" (http:/ / campusprogress. Counterpunch. ISBN 0-7679-1178-4. Kurt.360 (2003). Retrieved 2008-08-17. com/ p/ articles/ mi_qa3827/ is_200308/ ai_n9286114).ferc. Retrieved 2008-08-17.org. [24] "Ten good reasons to recall Gray Davis" (http:/ / www.). [23] Arianna Huffington (January 27. San Diego Union-Tribune. .html) • Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets (March 23. Closed Circuit newsletter. archive. pdf) Findings of IEA Demand Response Project. James L.doe. [30] "Summary of FERC documentation relating to the Western Energy Crisis 2000-2001" (http:/ / www. sfgate. pdf) (PDF). The San Francisco Chronicle. . pdf) on 2004-08-07. "Western Area Power Administration" (http:/ / web. html). org/ web/ 20040807013804/ http:/ / commerce. . Retrieved 2008-08-17. 2003 [16] "FERC Summary of findings" (http:/ / www. cgi?file=/ gate/ archive/ 2001/ 05/ 08/ lookhow. Studies Show" (http:/ / www. Democracynow. . pp. ferc. Davis and the failure of power" (http:/ / www. gov/ newsroom/ cct/ 2005/ jan14/ 27no12. 2001).org. signonsandiego. Retrieved 2010-08-14. Salon. 2002. . findarticles. counterpunch.eia. gov/ newsroom/ cct/ 2005/ jan14/ 27no12. 2007. • Sweeney. DTL). salon. . com/ politics/ feature/ 2001/ 01/ 27/ power/ ). org/ 2003/ 10/ 6/ schwarzenegger_accused_of_involvement_in_9b). [28] "Jason Leopold: Schwarzenegger. com/ cgi-bin/ article. . [21] "Testimony of S.Enhancing Demand Response in Liberalised Electricity Markets (http:/ / www. Retrieved 2008-08-17. gov/ hearings/ 051502freeman. "THE ENERGY CRUNCH / A YEAR LATER / State's deregulation folly is no laughing matter / Consumers face inflated bills for years for failed electricity plan" (http:/ / www. "Gov. Human Events. html). com/ news/ politics/ recall/ 20030902-9999_1n2power. [18] The Power to Choose . December 17. democracynow. . 2001). nytimes. David Freeman" (http:/ / web. [22] "Testimony of S. com/ cgi-bin/ article. projectcensored. Retrieved 2008-08-17. Retrieved 2008-08-17. gov/ hearings/ 041102freeman. Retrieved 2010-08-14. "15". . ferc. August 18.pdf) . org/ archive/ 01/ 01-03keeley-speech.ferc. The California Electricity Crisis. The San Francisco Chronicle. [31] Investigation of Anomalous Bidding Behavior and Practices in the Western Markets. September 2. org/ leopold08182003. 9 References • Weare. commonwealthclub. com/ 2007/ 11/ 06/ business/ 06electric. senate. [29] Carolyn Hinkley (January 14. iea. senate. 2001).org/ content/pubs/report/R_103CWR. . "Competitively Priced Electricity Costs More. .gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/summary-findings. htm) on 2006-09-24. Archived from the original (http:/ / commerce. External links • Summary of 1996 Deregulation Bill by the Department of Energy (http://www. sfgate. 103 FERC ¶ 61. gov/ industries/ electric/ indus-act/ wec. David Freeman" (http:/ / web. David (2007-11-06). org/ web/ 20030503201728/ http:/ / commerce. 408–412. Michael Milken and Ken Lay" (http:/ / www. pdf) on 2003-05-03. [26] (http:/ / www. Retrieved 2008-08-17. cgi?f=/ c/ a/ 2001/ 12/ 24/ MN71492. The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options (http://www. 2003. Conspiracy of Fools (1st edition ed. htm). senate. May 15. The New York Times. org/ newswire/ 2320/ white-house-paper-shredding-costs-spiral). senate. org/ textbase/ nppdf/ free/ 2000/ powertochoose_2003. Retrieved 2008-08-17. ISBN 1-58213-064-7. Presentation 2003 [19] Fred Keeley (March 8. html) [27] "Schwarzenegger Accused of Involvement in $9B California Swindle with Enron's Ken Lay" (http:/ / www. [14] Carolyn Said (December 24. [15] Energy crisis cited as turning point for Davis (http:/ / www. April 11. pdf) • Chronology in detail (http://www. asp). "The Energy Crisis: Keeping The Lights On" (http:/ / www. 2003) • Findings at a glance (http://www. 2005). 2002. pdf) (PDF). (2002). gov/ hearings/ 041102freeman. gov/ hearings/ 051502freeman.California electricity crisis [13] "Energy Crisis Overview: How we got here" (http:/ / www. Retrieved 2008-08-17.

spike.ferc. • Congestion Manipulation "DeathStar" (http://www.update_12-9-02.org/headlines04/0518-05.commondreams. 2002) • C66 and the Artificial Congestion of California Transmission in January 2001 (http://www.pdf) (June 28.ca. shtml) .cfm). 2003) • Reading Enron's Scheme Accounting Materials (http://www.com/pdfs/18.edu/ hepg/Papers/Pope_CA. 2004) Susan L.mresearch. "California Department of Water Resources 50th Anniversary Article on the 2001 Energy Crisis" (http://web. Archived from the original (http://www. htm#Manifesto on the California Electricity Crisis) Enron Traders Caught On Tape (http://www.pdf)" (Dec 9. 2002) • Senate Fact Sheet on the California Energy Crisis (http://www. 2003) • Testimony of Behalf of City of Tacoma and Port of Seattle (http://www.mresearch.mresearch. Defining Democracy": As Internal Memos Reveal That Enron Drove Up Power Prices in California (http://www.asp) • Reports on Enron and the California Energy Crisis (http://www.com/stories/2004/06/01/eveningnews/main620626.org/web/20070403224128/http://www.mresearch.edu/spiller/eleabs.org/2003/10/6/schwarzenegger_accused_of_involvement_in_9b) . htm) .haas. Crisis (http://www.water.archive.pdf) (Jan 16. Pope.org/2002/5/7/defying_corporations_defining_democracy_as_internal) .pdf) (Nov 29.water. archive.gov/dwr50thanniversary/cers.com/pdfs/90. some of which were presented as evidence during investigations into the causes of the crisis. 2003) • Prepared Rebuttal Testimony of Robert McCullough on Behalf of The City of Seattle.com/pdfs/80.publicaffairs.edu/faculty/lkletzer/borenstein_jepw02.ca. 2002) • California Electricity Price Spikes: The Factual Evidence (http://www.com/pdfs/84.(Democracy Now!) "The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster" (http://web. 2003) • Fat Boy Report (http://www. Archived from the original (http://econ.org/headlines02/0507-02.com/reports.mresearch.pdf) (PDF).mresearch. Washington (http:// www.gov/dwr50thanniversary/cers.(The Washington Post) "Defying Corporations.com/pdfs/76.html) by McCullough Research — page includes a large number of downloadable reports.edu/faculty/lkletzer/borenstein_jepw02.commondreams.A talk to Author Richard Grossman (Democracy Now!) Schwarzenegger Accused of Involvement in $9B California Swindle with Enron’s Ken Lay (http://www. (CBS Evening News) Enron Tapes Hint Chiefs Knew About Power Ploys (http://www.mresearch.(Los Angeles Times) Papers Show That Enron Manipulated Calif.cfm) on 2007-04-03. The McCollough research generally supports the position that the energy markets were manipulated unethically. org/web/20060905020641/http://econ. 2002) • Three Crisis Days At The California ISO (http://www. including detailed report (http://www.pdf) (June 26. 2002) (Opposes the McCullough research and supports the view that the crisis was an outcome of genuine problems with supply and demand) Manifesto on The Californian Electricity Crisis (http://faculty.Gloating about manipulating California's energy market.price.mresearch.pdf) (Sept 17. " California Electricity Price Spikes: An Update on the Facts (http://www.publicaffairs.pdf) (March 20.cbsnews. 10 • • • • • • • • • .democracynow.com/pdfs/74.pdf) (Regional Economic Losses from Enron's Fat Boy Scheme) (May 28.pdf) (June 5.hks. democracynow.mresearch. htm) .harvard.pdf) (March 2.California electricity crisis • Further documents.com/ pdfs/77.mresearch.com/pdfs/19.ucsc.com/pdfs/89.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec.pdf) on 2006-09-05.ucsc.berkeley.

VinnieCool. Deanlaw. Synthe. Falcon91Wolvrn03.tan.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 2. SimonP. Ashley Pomeroy.php?title=File:PG&E_Meter_on_Angel_Island. Ed Poor.jpg  Source: http://en.ץכ דמלמ‬anonymous edits Image Sources. Mintleaf. GD. Vistago. Nomad spirit. Will Beback. Brianegge. Eastlaw. Mephistophelian. Hugahoody. Conant Webb. Chicocvenancio. ‫ 191 . Dseer. Pinkmouse. Wik. Sam Hocevar. BlueLeather. Vnv lain. Heron. Grundle2600.Article Sources and Contributors 11 Article Sources and Contributors California electricity crisis  Source: http://en. Vapour. Atmoz. S. HiFiGuy.org/w/index. Hadoren. Shaw. Hydrogen Iodide. org/ licenses/ by-sa/ 3. 0/ . Davemcarlson.. Twang. Kuru. Gparker. Bbulkow.henderson. Laurinavicius. Naufana. Njaard. Madzyzome. Golbez. Gnatcatcher. Dispenser. Olivier.php?oldid=414756910  Contributors: Agentbla. JJJJust. TOttenville8.jpg  Source: http://en. Azumanga1. John of Reading. Scj2315.0 Unported http:/ / creativecommons.0  Contributors: peterme Image:PG&E Meter on Angel Island. Malcolm Farmer.org/w/index. NekoDaemon. Pxmike. Minesweeper. Texaswebscout. Calbear22. Bletch. Peterson. Beland. Jeph paul. Licenses and Contributors Image:PG&E Yard. Calwatch.org/w/index. GregorB. Calbaer. Piano non troppo. PigFlu Oink. Sirkan. Akamad. Alexius08. Everyking. Lukjad007. DavidLevinson. CBowers.wikipedia. Apoc2400. Caravaca. Noisy30.0  Contributors: Кevin License Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3. Richard L. Lockesdonkey.php?title=File:PG&E_Yard. Ed g2s. Lawilkin. Rmmiller44. Ulner. Llywrch. Sladuuch. HouseofBrick. Mr Minchin. Rezashah4.wikipedia.enh. Dr. Alex. P R Slayer. Ortcutt. Plasticup. Trolleytimes. Savantpol. SidP. Seano1.wikipedia. Nightsmaiden. Poppy. Debresser.jpg  License: Creative Commons Attribution 2. AniRaptor2001. Tiles. SiobhanHansa. MGTom. MCalamari. ViperSnake151. Dan100. DeMollesley. Shiftchange. Ken Gallager. Leonard G. CommonsDelinker. R. Gangster Octopus. Johnfos. Edward. JPMcGrath. Timrollpickering. Bastin. Rich Farmbrough. Herschelkrustofsky. User2004. Dkeesey. Twilsonb. Jim. Kiaparowits. Jesse Viviano. Rjwilmsi. Sortior.