Na►ec, 143 (1W1)
236 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 subjunctive mood, lies at the very heart of the hypothesizing activity. If scientific knowledge constitutes a system of coherent truths, then theorizing within a system so conceived is difficult to justify. This is to say that a coherent system of scientific claims as conceived by Rescher limits the flexibility of theorizing as ordinarily understood. For to suggest a scientific hypothesis as something to be tested places all relevant scientific truths on a tentative footing until the said hypothesis has been proven true. Hence one could argue that there is at least the suspension of the truth of knowledge claims surrounding the counterfactual until the requisite verification has taken place, which is antithetic to Rescher's thesis. All of this is not to deny the valuable work Professor Rescher has done in indicating a way by which hypotheticals can be handled within a system of knowledge claims. However, the remedy he proposes cannot cure the problem in all of its manifestations. Somehow, natural discourse seems to demand that there be an openness of connotation which resists specification in terms of a possible world model. From this perspective much remains unsaid concerning the role of the subjunctive, in which mode Rescher presents a great number of his illustrations. Cleveland State University

Translated by Fritz Marti

Introductory Note by the Translator. (Translator's insertions are in brackets.) In the second part of these aphorisms, starting at about Aphorism 121, Schelling sketches the traits of his Naturphilosophie. (I shall retain that word because it is more convenient than any awkward and possibly misleading translation.) The total of the two hundred and twenty-four aphorisms (VII, 140-89) can rightly bear the title of an Introduction to Naturphilosophie. But when I here present a translation of only the first eighty, I ought to warn the reader that she or he will not find Schelling's Naturphilosophie, but rather an emphatic introduction to the method of philosophizing and more especially a short "negative theology," that is, an instruction in what not to do when theologizing. I hope that theologians unfamiliar with the German original will find my translation useful, and that it will challenge philosophers to revise a still current notion that Fichte provides one half of philosophy and Schelling the other. The notion goes back to the different Critiques of Kant. The basic question of the Critique of Pure Reason was: How is objective knowledge possible? The problem of the Critique of Practical Reason was: How is unconditional obligation possible? And the Critique of Judgment raised the question regarding the systematic unity of "theoretical" (i.e., objective) and "practical" (moral) truth. The climax of this third Critique is found at the end of section II of the Introduction: There must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible which lies at the basis of nature, with that supersensible which the concept of freedom contains practically [that is, not as a mere fact but in a sheer act]; and the concept (Begriff) of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the ground, and hence has no jurisdiction (Gebiet) of its own, nevertheless makes possible (or ought to make possible) the transition from the mode of thought (Denkungsart) according to the principle of the one to that according to the principle of the other. (J. H. Bernard's translation, here slightly amended.) It may look as if Fichte had tried to extend the jurisdiction of practical reason so as to cover the theoretical. And, in line with Kant' s "primacy of

'Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, "The Contraryto-Fact Conditional," by R. M. Chisholm (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 485. 'Nicholas Rescher, Hypothetical Reasoning (Amsterdam, 1964). 'Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 'Rescher, 1973, p. 265. 'Rescher, 1973, p. 272. Rescher, 1973, pp. 280-81. 'Rescher, 1973, pp. 284-87. Rescher, 1973, pp. 275, 278, and 286. Rescher, 1973, pp. 84-85. "'Robert Stalnaker, "Formal Semantics and Philosophical Problems," paper presented at the American Philosophical Association meeting, New York City, 1979. "Stalnaker, pp. 6-8. ''Alan R. White, Truth (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 16.
8 9

151-55. 1963. then the reader could not learn from the word idealism anything about the proper content of a system advanced under that name.238 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 239 practical reason. 166). and that there exists nothing but what equals I. could have conceived of idealism in an entirely subjective and I.. p. Furthermore there — ." then indeed the conventional label of "subjective idealism" would stick to Fichte. Fichte. young Schelling grasped that unconditionality. we can and must start from somewhere. "Yet. Bucknell University Press. cannot become a thing" (I. drives me to establish publicly the system itself which in my mind underlies those different presentations. "an I that posits itself as positing itself. "The principle of dogmatism is some not-I posited as antecedent to all I. H. that is. and to place within reach of all who are interested what until now I possessed only for myself or shared with but a few.." If we want to talk philosophy." Now if the "ground of unity" postulated by Kant could be attained by the practical "mode of thought. at first independently from Fichte. what you call different philosophical sciences are only representations of the one and indivisible whole of philosophy under different aspects (unter verschiedenen ideellen Bestimmungen) or. I do not say this is the real case. and my introduction to the Letters in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. Having for several years tried to present one and the same philosophy from two quite different sides.) In 1801 Schelling started the Presentation of My System of Philosophy with the following statement. the present situation of the science now. I." Following the clues in Kant. and as Kant had shown. University of Notre Dame Press. Criticism starts from the unconditional conviction we all have or could and should have of being each what goes by the name of "I." is followed by the sentence. the principle of criticism is an I posited before every not-I and excluding every not-I" (I. 1980. although one cannot deny that both are idealistic. the sixth and seventh letters. What does it mean? In a vulgar expression. I. In Kant's language the not-I in the strictest sense is called a thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). 109) The word complement might induce the reader to believe that Schelling simply added the half of philosophy missing in Fichte. There are those who now first understand the system as I here present it and who therefore care to and are capable to compare it with those earlier presentations. as Naturphilosophie and as Transcendental Philosophy. But supposing it were the case. 510). (IV." says A. or to two philosophies. idealism in the subjective sense would have to claim that the I is everything. for instance. (See. 106) Nowadays the word potency is no longer familiar. in contrast. Caponigri (Philosophy from the Renaissance to the Romantic Age. the I's reflection on itself as this specific I is possible only under the condition that it set its own limit in an opposite. representations in different potencies. And then one could say with Caponigri that "the development of the system of reason which was undertaken by Schelling appears as the complement of Fichte's efforts and their completion. or a subject is not possible without an object. in an objective sense. things are conditional entities. idealism in the objective sense on the contrary that everything equals [is equal to the] I. Although Fichte's sentence sounds like an intransigent ethicism that would reject the very study of the objective constitution of things by physical science. I merely posit it as possible. in his Grundlage (I. 307-16. if I may immediately use the familiar term. 286)." The mode Schelling calls dogmatism starts from the assumption of some thing. 285f. (On the Relation of Naturphilosophie to Philosophy as Such. In 1795. in some "mode of thought." As Capaigri adds: "This complementariness led presently to the characterization of their respective systems as subjective and objective idealism. 170). as Kant says." Compare what Schelling himself said in 1801: Fichte. Bernard's translation. and.). Yet in 1802 Schelling himself declared emphatically that there is only One philosophy and One science of philosophy. p. This interdependence of subject and object led to Schelling's emphasis in his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism of 1795 where he stressed the fact that dogmatists can be as serious thinkers as criticists. "it was obviously no part of Fichte's intention to negate the order of nature. Fichte wrote: "If the Wissenschaftslehre were asked 'how are things constituted in themselves?' it could answer only saying 'the way we ought to make them. as far as is in his power. pp. No doubt these are different views. earlier than I myself wanted. Fichte may have had in mind the last section of §84 in Kant's Critique of Judgment which states that man's "existence involves the highest purpose to which." that is in an object (I. or: the determination of the I. he can subject the whole of nature. 218). or with it the possibility of a philosophy of nature." one can point out that scientific objectivity is one of our moral duties. And that would lead to two isms. for instance. "Unconditional is that which cannot at all be turned into a thing. contrary to which at least he cannot regard himself as subject to any influence of nature" (J.. in the same Grundlage the sentence that "the not-I is itself the product of the self-determining I and is nothing absolute posited outside the I. ." but not what one actually "is doing. R. it means what one "can do.

" Following his hunch he will return to the observable phenomena in order to test his thought. Schelling furnished a methodology of Naturphilosophie in the "first or general part" (VII. we call dead or inorganic matter." led Schelling's pupil H. after this exceedingly solemn declaration. p. willing to give it up if not confirmed by experiment. 1923. Fichte spoke of the hunches of a physicist who "starts from phenomena and seeks the unifying law. First comes a methodical though very formal inquiry into the concept of being. there were some who actually imagined this after my lectures of last winter... They all will judge it natural and not at all faulty that I first made these preparations and that. with regard to the particular." This outright evolutionism. . the plant meridional. the former by the female sex" (IV. the structure of the Aphorisms of 1805 as a whole is the same as that of the System of 1801. . This view leads to Schelling's distinction between empirical natural science and Naturphilosophie. The latter pole. After all this I should answer the question of this introductory note: What is the significance of the Aphorisms in Schelling's development? This is not the place to review all his writings up to 1805. Though I could no longer pass an examination in physics. 117). let the reader who is not allergic to German do what one can do so profitably with Spinoza's Ethics: skim the content by reading only the theorems. Therefore the animal is septentrional. a view I heartily share. in the particular as well as in the whole. (True. the methodology of 1801 is restricted to the concept of being while that of 1805 is a methodology of the philosophy of religion. It is well known that Schelling's hunch expressed in the first clause of §89 (IV.) [In the winter 1800/1801 Schelling gave three lectufe courses: on philosophy of art. that is. 161). I tried to prepare the complete knowledge of this philosophy (which I audaciously and really take for the real one) before I would dare to present it in its totality. follow our Aphorisms as an Introduction to Naturphilosophie. and not fantastication (Schwdrmerei). See Kuno Fischer. Naturphilosophie. The main thesis is Schelling's Declaration (Erklarung) § 147: "Matter. tallies with the anti-Newtonian or antimechanistic view that nature is alive and that the very study of the inorganic is relatively abstract. must be conceived as engendered by metamorphosis. Schellings Leben. the gist of what I once learned sticks to my mind and completely blocks my vision when I read such a statement as theorem §152: "With regard to the whole. a philosophical methodology precedes a sketch of the Naturphilosophie. in the Yearbooks on Medicine as Science (1806). Below I simply list them. Naturphilosophie. winding up with theorem §51: "The first relative totality is matter" (IV. (IV. 4th ed. I for one find two distinct and very different parts. and which give still another presentation of Naturphilosophie. Second. 107f. After these thirty pages there follow seventy pages of what to me looks like the often repeated. Werke and Lehre. 207). for his manner of presentation. Here I merely point out two things. since Schelling declares that. The identical bipartition of the treatises of 1801 and 1805 justifies our separate printing of the methodology of 1805. is designated by the male. the animal nitrogen. I also share Schelling's view that the empirical sciences borrow their methodical concepts from philosophical insights.. Oersted a score of years later to the experimental proof of electromagnetic induction (1820.240 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 241 are those who realize how many preparations were necessary for the complete and evident presentation which I am convinced I can now make. 35. . 206). A fantasticator (Schwiirmer) "demands that nature adjust to his thoughts" (VII... First. for us still indispensable.I always took them for opposite poles of philosophizing. from those quite different sides. Schelling calls this a Corollary of § 151: "The organization [of an organism]. cit. Now. With the present presentation I am standing at the point of their indifference. In his Berlin lectures of 1804 on the Basic Traits of the Present Age. 113). though equally often reformulated.]. Thus his hunch is "a gift of genius. that "the process of an electric conduit occurs under the form of magnetism. he chose "Spinoza as a model" (IV.Never have I taken what I call transcendental philosophy and Naturphilosophie for being each by itself the system of philosophy. insofar as it is not raised to the form of absolute identity. loc. 336). Chr. 198-220) of his Aphorisms on Naturphilosophie which. None of those who realize all this will be able to imagine that I have changed my own system of philosophy. one looks at the content of the Presentation of 1801. Ever since my years of studying physics in 1915-1922 (a now very dated physics indeed) I have tried at least once a decade to understand Naturphilosophie. and transcendental philosophy. a generation before Darwin (1809-1882). the plant represents carbon. It does not justify nor excuse for us the romantic roamings of Schelling (and of Hegel) based on the romantic though sincere guesses of the incipient sciences around 1800.) If. Matter which is [sic!] the form of being of absolute identity is living (belebt)" (IV. see Kuno Fischer. 142). necessarily though often unintentionally and without knowing their source.

1-343 345-583 III. or the philosophy that needs no thinking and knowing. IN 46616 . 132-39 1805 Aphorisms as introduction to Naturphilosophie. 1795 Of the I as principle of philosophy or on the unconditional in human knowledge. Date Title Reference in Werke 1792 On the origin of human evil. 511-23 1802 Miscellaneous (the poem Heinz Widerporst: 546-48). 1802 Bruno. 11-70 1804 Propaedeutic of philosophy. 1-78 79-103 105-212 213-332 1802 Further presentations from the system of philosophy. philosophie. 1976). 71-130 1804 System of the entire philosophy and of Naturphilosophie in particular. to be sure. 3-17 1802 On the absolute identity system and its relation to the newest (Reinholdian) dualism. German translation by Reinhold Mokrosch in the first volume of the Historico-Critical Edition brought out by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog. Latin thesis for the Master's degree in philosophy. * 1796 New deduction of natural right. 1798 Of the world soul. English translation by Peter Heath (University of Virginia Press. or on the divine and natural principle of things. 1869 Riverside Drive. 1-10 1804 Philosophy and religion. Ed. has a few flaws. 1800 General deduction of the dynamic process or of the categories of physics. 1799 First sketch of a system of Naturphilosophie. V. 1797 Ideas for a philosophy of nature. 1980). and philosophemes of the oldest world. Dialogue. Wiirzburg lectures 1804/1805). 106-24 On construction in philosophy. VII. German translation by JOrg Jantzen in the second volume of the Hist. 152-63 Miscellaneous notes. 1801 Presentation of my system of philosophy. 1799 Introduction to the sketch of a system of Natur1800 System of transcendental idealism. 207-352 1803 Philosophy of art (Jena lectures 1802/1803. VI. Theological dissertation in Latin. South Bend.* 1795 On Marcion as emendator of the Pauline letters. 18-77 1802 Rtickert and Weiss. 164-206 1803 LectUres on the method of university study. * 1795 Philosophical letters on dogmatism and criticism. English translation by Norbert Guterman (Ohio University Press. 1800 On the General Literary Journal of Jena. 1980). 1966). schaftslehre. 1801 On the true concept of Naturphilosophie. 1794 On the possibility of a form of philosophy as such. 353-736 1804 Immanuel Kant. 1-40 41-83 85-112 113-48 149-244 281-341 245-80 343-452 453-87 II. A dialogue between the author and a friend. a hypothesis of higher physics. historical legends. 1-268 269-326 327-634 635-68 IV. 140-97 1805 Aphorisms on Naturphilosophie. 198-244 *English translation by Fritz Marti in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge (Bucknell University Press. 125-51 On Dante in philosophical regard. (Stuttgart. 78-105 1802 On the relation of Naturphilosophie to philosophy as such. may lead to some confusion. 1793 On myths. 525-65 1802 On the nature of philosophical critique in general and its relation to the present stage of philosophy in particular. Crit.242 IDEALISTIC STUDIES Schelling's Works 1792-1805 SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 243 All titles here are put into English which. 131-576 1805 Preface to the Yearbooks of Medicine as a Science. 1978). * 1796 Treatises as explanation of the idealism of Wissen1796 (Seven short papers). I.

often across long gaps of time. grains of sand added to other grains in order to build the universe. 2. ultimately enter into the all-life of nature whose image is the earth and the stars. To see the finite dissolved in the nonfinite is the spirit of science in its seclusion. in case it does not also return to the absolutely universal. In its very nature all conflict in science can have but one source. This composite life of science. 9. In its seclusion. the disregard of that which. then the rebirth of all sciences and all aspects of culture can start only with the renewed acknowledgment of the All and its eternal unity. To see the nonfinite in the finite. and thus. not in their union but in disunion. To present with the seriousness of science those laws in which. You also see the beauty of life vanished. 14. 4. This insight works in everything. it has another side on which it is open and unlimited. Similarly the full beauty of public life can be born only from the combination of the universality of legislation with the particularity of all and every one. reason too is never satiated with contemplation. Wherever that revelation occurred. And I ask everyone who is not biased whether he knows another name for the representations of individual things and phenomena whiCh a pious zeal brings forth without any knowledge of the laws of the All. all artistic degenerations. that is. 8. the immortal God lives. in spite of great efforts only slight advances in the growth of insight. 12. and in fact those three start from this revelation and have significance only through it. in isolation. Though in its search for laws science insists on conclusiveness. Just as all elements and things of nature. Science is the knowledge of the laws of the whole and thus of what is universal [and common]. Furthermore the relation which reason has to the structure of the universe is the same as the relation of philosophy to that perfect state. religion and art would be that state which is shaped in conformity with the divine model. even the most singular. Schelling 1. not mechanically but artfully. Yet not only the separations of the sciences from each other are abstractions. The eye alone never sees enough. 3. Art shapes the universal and the particular into one. 5. and likewise tried to conceive of themselves in isolation and as separated from the All. There is a third similar dependence: philosophy can attain a divinity in line with the idea of philosophy only by means of an actual permeation of science with religion and art. and thus to identify in a nonfinite way the universal and the particular is the spirit of true philosophy.244 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 245 APHORISMS AS AN INTRODUCTION TO NATURPHILOSOPHIE Friedrich W. 7. there is no higher revelation than that of the divinity of the All. as an echo of the harmony of the universe. It is religion that ordains the natural scientist as a priest of nature. there was rapture. is the spirit of art. 6. even when transitory. in its devotion to the particular. notwithstanding the greatest individual originality. in religion or in art. it matters neither for that infinity nor for philosophy in what form the spirit reveals itself. 15. cessation of all conflict. as an animating and governing spirit. concord and wondrous agreement. 10. however. Religion however is the contemplation of the particular in its ties to the whole. 13. Be it in science. each of which divinely embodies all forms and kinds of being. all aberrations of religion are only the consequence of that disregard and abstraction. If all false systems. Religion assigns the God-set limits to our bent for the universal. being all-blessed. This insight is no light that shines from without but it arouses us inwardly and moves the entire bulk of human culture. and a widely diffused wild war of opinions regarding the first and most important things. in mankind as a whole. The state legislation amounts to nothing without the heroism of preservation and the religion of compliance in the particular. and as the fruit of it a universal coalition of the arts and sciences. in the comprehensibility of the finite. nor does the ear ever hear its fill. being mere abstractions from the All. Those who take a stand against the idea of unity are fighting for nothing else than the very discord on which their existence depends. so also must all elements and creations of the spirit ultimately enter a common life which is higher than the life of each separately. nor talk it through. owing to the devotion with which he cares for the particular. The material in which the spirit finds its form is infinite. The acknowledgment of that side is the religion in science. And as it urges and works in the whole tree of knowledge so also in its every branch and twig. will necessarily lose itself in superstition. a combination due to the spirit which rules the whole. or . but likewise the separation of science from religion and art. J. only in such a state can philosophy find its own image manifest and alive. as a sacred tie. yet to grasp with the same love the particular. 11. Provided this material is drawn from the All. Wherever the light of that revelation got dim and men perceived things not from the All but as separated. Religion. be it ever so great or ever so trifling. everything gone to pieces. science furnishes an analogy: nobody can think the thought of the All to its end. can contain no discord. there you see science desolated in vast spaces. be it the lyrical outpouring of a harmonious individual. as an ancient put it. it mediates science with art. repudiation of finite forms.

For so is also the part and the particular by itself.' 20. Still. but the inward poetry implanted in the object like the music of the spheres. either in the still tart style to which any system gives birth in science and in art. religion is not philosophy. much less cancel one. 25. and not the pale color of one who like a hermit indulges in idle self-contemplation. and what you say when you talk about it is not your own wisdom. to me their well-known vintage tasted like a wine turned sour in their hands so that. philosophy can never again exclude its eternal relation to nature. they tried to recure it with honey or sugar.246 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 247 be it the epic spread and fullness of the history of the universe poetically condensed. let none enter who is not initiated into geometry. 24. 27. What I deprecate most are rhetorical trimmings with which some have tried to improve this simple doctrine. In my best insight. before the word is so. and thus the infinity of philosophy. 26. has the complexion of nature. like bad innkeepers. however. or in the last perfection full of dramatic life. No wonder when at last brazen beggars who are poorer in spirit than Irus in goods issue a pugilistic challenge to him from whose table they still devour the leftovers. And similarly the seriousness and strictness of scientific discipline must have overcome the ignorance of minds before the sweeter fruits of philosophy can ripen. nor can it desire to comprehend the whole by means of the one-sided abstraction of the intelligent world. Unless our whole time changes. is finished by itself and is thus perfect. Of course I acknowledge something higher than science. 18. Like wise only those states which begin with strict legislation are gifted for greatness.] In the part where that representation enters into particulars. Philosophy is also poetry. 17. even in views that sprang still from divination rather than from conscious knowledge. This inner perfection of the infinite which is imprinted on the greatest and the smallest furnishes a fit type of looking at the particular and a system of knowing a whole. I first gave a new presentation of my doctrine of nature and of the All in 1801. What do I boast of?—Of the one that was given to me. The religion of the philosopher. and if I gave you only a single ear as a growth of divine kind. Even if the scientific form were only a band around the full sheaf. the potential sameness of all knowledge no matter of what topic. and whether philosophical insight can be enhanced by religion. you would have to thank me. 16. Yet let it not be a forward poetry which voices nothing but the subject. Yet a philosophy that would not unite religion and science in sacred harmony would not be philosophy. The true infinite is not formlessness but is delimited in itself. or in the more moderate style of an art already unshackled by gracefulness. does anyone attain that higher simply because he bungles in science? That would be like declaring someone is a first-rate poet simply because he writes bad prose. only what I have already said here and am yet to say can answer the question whether religion can be higher than philosophy. These forms merely designate different levels of culture and of artistic maturity. Herewith I give thanks for all improvements known to me which have been made with regard to the matter and form of that representation. Yet not only the whole as whole is divine. 105-212. however. The latter can in no way be connected with our philosophy which rests on the wholeness of nature's All. where the profoundest seriousness and the freest play reciprocally illuminate and elevate each other. with sublime mastery over the matter. First let the matter be poetic. is valid in a much wider sense. Here my only intention is to affirm afresh - the whole and the still valid in that representation and bring it into every possible new light. in short sentences and in as simple strokes as then seemed possible. 23. And all kinds of competitors for a prize plant themselves in Naturphilosophie just like the arrogant gluttons in the house of Odysseus. or finally revealed in strictly plastic delimitation. . 21. 22. In the first place. The Platonic word. the anger of the vociferous multitude that considered my doctrine of the All as a bone of contention tossed to them could not cast doubts upon a single one of my sentences. it is the robust complexion of him who with bold courage descends into the depths of nature. of this that I have proclaimed the divinity even of the particular. Winkelmann said the still tart and severe style of the oldest sculpture had to precede the creations of later art beautified by grace. be they well meant or born from ill will. Those who are condemned by their own frame of mind to remain pupils are the very ones who vociferate the loudest about the restrictions of school. since scientific form is an inner organic connection where every part is of the nature of the whole and lives in itself just as much as it lives in the whole. I have since found cause to improve or to change my view of many a thing and in general to expand it. The general foundations. on my part. All the more. 19. I have done nothing but furnish the element for endlessly possible insights. In many writings of such authors. To be sure. Yet even many of the better ones have too narrow a view of my cause when they do not see that it is not only a concern of our time and that. [Representation of My System of Philosophy. as they are established there (§§1-50 of that Representation) have wonderfully held good in every subsequent investigation. IV.

Give me a few of this kind. Contemplate that law as such. but not comprehending it in itself. which affirms itself and is affirmed by itself.) 31. 35. discerns the empty unity without fullness or totality. By means of forming general concepts. in a nonfinite manner. not divine.ripos (the unifying principle) even for science. —Hence the unfathomableness in everything sensuous. 37. The infinite clearness in ineffable fullness. which is also expressed in that law which alone admittedly takes unconditional affirmation into account. Do I want a school?—Yes. Can they shoot through the hole? The sequel will show whether they were capable of bending the bow. secondly. Since this identity alone is the existence and essence of all things. the indissoluble identity of predicating and predicated. and. 32. Reason discerns not merely the confused infinite (without the unity) as sense does. Therefore. Though it is bent upon the particular. Reason. but only that which is from and by itself absolutely and in every respect. clearness and fullness themselves are one in reason. or ratiocination as simul- taneously intuitive (der Verstand. but absolutely (schlechthin) and in a nonfinite manner. God is the positing (Position) of all things. Yet it has no reference to your thinking but is a universal. It is impossible to furnish anybody with a description of reason. in each particular. thus. a) Of unity and totality. 36. sense beholds a present infinity. but the way there were once schools of poetry. in a word. in testimony of the matter itself. Not knowing what it is doing. or that which is the nonfinite positing of itself. yet not merely in the particular manner of the imagination. I wanted to start with those principles which are needed for the specific pursuit of Naturphilosophie and to present them not in a doctrinaire way nor by always giving strict proofs. however. the confused plenitude. the law of identity (A = A). no matter of what kind. This is the idea of absoluteness. And it seemed to me it would be most expedient to proceed in the following order. That which is thus equal to itself and self-affirmative is. in the first place. I have long set up in front of opponents and of others the iron and the bow. or as the oneness. 33. 29. which manifests itself and is manifest by itself. der zugleich anschauet). Ratiocination. contains sense. And insofar as ratiocination comprehends the general in the particular. Sense can be equated with religion. also simultaneously infinity or totality. the chaos. It is the imagination (Einbildungskraft) which unites clearness with depth. ratiocination compares things and. and you shall see God. Reason. nor the empty unity (without the infinity) like ratiocination. that which in all things is equal to itself. but more historically. it can be equated with science in its isolation. In line with the specific program of this journal. 34. it is its entire essence itself. that is. The nature of ratiocination is clearness without depth. For he is affirmation of himself. ratiocination posits the very distinguishability and manifoldness of things. 41. for if it did it would be the same as ratiocination and could posit only finiteness. it cannot affirm any [mere] distinctions. mirroring one thing in another. This is only God. ratiocination does away with the divineness of all things and of each in particular. yet without resolving it in unity. Imagination as such is only sense aware of its infinity. that nothing truly exists which is not absolute (36). recognize its content. 40. thus you could find in it only the empty repetition of your own thinking. a nonfinite law which states that in the universe there exists nothing as merely predicating or predicated. 39. but that eternally and in everything there is only One. such as I have found. the fullness of sense with the comprehension of ratiocination. The affirmation of the infinite oneness and totality is no mere accident in reason. therefore. without being itself one of the three in particular. and the ineffable fullness in infinite clearness is God—infinite affirmation and equally infinite being . 38. Reason cannot affirm anything that would have reality only in some relation or comparison. and I promise you yet the 611. but unity and infinity. and see to it that inspired ones will not be wanting in the future. it cannot discern or posit anything that could exist only owing to another. 30. but each only to the God who speaks out of all. as the self-equal. No one teaches another. it beholds totality.248 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 249 28. nor is bound to another. not only in the particular but absolutely and quite universally (schlechthin and durchaus allgemein) in everything and in each one. at the expense of the particular's infinity. This requires no pupils nor any head or master. sense grasps each particular by itself as if it were a world by itself and as if nothing existed beside this particular. Sense is divine in the following respect. however. Reason must describe itself in each one and by means of each one. That way those of joint inspiration may continue in a common key to compose this eternal poem. therefore. (Von der Ein-und Allheit. ratiocination and imagination as three finite restrictions. can be satisfied only by that which is equal to itself. At the same time. You have been considering this law as merely formal and subjective.

then whatever is in either is still only the One as One. therefore. yet not immediate on the part of man. nor can it be used. You speak of an inkling (Ahnung) of what is divine. he is the One as such.. but of the divine by the divine. 50. Since nothing is outside of God. What you wanted to save was merely the • subject. Every kind of view in which the subject subsists as subject is inherently reprehensible. 47. however. 48. 46. so he must acknowledge the idea of God as shining in reason and in those who speak about it. is without any relation at all. in order to take part in this good. But the divine has no inkling of the divine.. but as all in all. neither you nor I. Not we. in an absolutely simple invisible manner. Here there is nothing subjective and nothing objective. 43.. 53. since without divine inspiration (Begeisterung) nobody can know God nor speak of God. As known he ceases to be God. 51. Reason is the one kind of knowing in which it is not the subject but the absolutely universal (therefore the One) that knows (43) and in which.. which could be outside the One. As soon as the idea of God is born from the fullness of reason (Vernunft) ratiocination (Verstand) steps in. Therefore there is no ascent of knowledge to God. Anyhow there is no reason at all which we could have. God. there is any knowing at all and any being known. the absolutely universal alone is the known (39).. so is the knowledge of God itself the being in God. and no I and therefore also no object or non-I. 2 c) About the indivisibility of knowledge by reason or the impossibility of abstracting anything from the idea of the Absolute or deriving anything from it. but only a reason which has us. For insofar as reason affirms God it cannot affirm anything else and thus at once annihilates itself as something particular. 55. physiological. I am" is ever since Descartes the fundamental error in all knowledge. . in no merely human. it is itself the being of God and is in this being. and being not my being. but as the center though not as in contrast to a periphery. God. Ratiocination wants to inspect separately what is posited in that idea as eternally and absolutely one. The "I think. Likewise there is a divine restraint of knowledge which does not originate in human beings themselves and in which the knowing one as such disappears. because there are no two distinct entities. You did not at all want to glorify the divine. for everything is only God's or the All's.. The inane one who would deny it voices it without knowing it. To search in oneself and to count or weigh the faculties which afford a knowledge of God is the utmost limit of confusion and of inward eclipse of the mind. not a tool. just as in that kind of acting. 49. but only an immediate recognition. All particularity. it is this idea and nothing else. forces human beings to act the right way. which alone can be disputed. and nothing else. We are never outside of God so that we could set him in front of us as an object. God or the All. but a knowledge of God which is itself in God. the acting one disappears as an agent. Even the highest is highest only in relation to something lower. Reason does not have the idea of God. and to bestow reality outside of unity upon what has reality only in the unity. With regard to reason one cannot ask whence the idea of God comes to it. In truth and as such there is no subject at all. 54. If. 44. he cannot rationally connect two concepts except in this idea. There is a restraint of will which. since reason itself is this idea. as something outside of God. 52.As everyone sees light shining in nature. This idea is not an object of dispute or of discord. Yet along with the vanishing knower there also disappears the known as known. the very knowledge of God is simply the nonfinite knowledge which God has of himself in the eternal self-affirmation (36). that is. that is. And so there is a way of acting in which the individual forgets itself. Just as the feeling of gravity is our being in gravity.250 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 251 affirmed by itself. of a faith which you place higher than knowledge (Erkenntnis). Reason is not a faculty. Thinking is not my thinking. He is not to be imagined as the highest or as the end. In no kind of knowledge can God occur as the known (the object). or psychological but in a divine manner. God. b) About reason as knowledge of the Absolute. but only one and the same (51). 45. one which knows and another that is known. that which is affirmable only from itself and by itself. know about God. 42. vanishes in this idea. but only One. on that very account. not by any power of their own but by the power of God. Even reason is not an affirmation of the One. Every such abstraction immediately manifests its nullity thrugh the contradiction that accompanies it necessarily. Also there is no faith in God that would be a mere disposition in the subject. God is not the highest.

Nevertheless God is also not a negation of all knowing. Right away ratiocination would separate from the idea what is affirmative and likewise what is affirmed. of the contrast between being and acting. and that to every such thesis its antithesis can be affirmed with the same right. and always becomes. no matter what its expression. and God is also not One. an expression which is the same and designates the same as the infinite self-affirmation of God (36). while there are no Many that can be contrasted with the absolute One (das schlechthin Eine). Yet God as affirming himself is absolutely identical with God as the affirmed. As soon as one does away with the indivisible unity of it. and insofar as every possible predicate can be contrasted with another. All knowing is nothing else than affirming From time immemorial science has looked for the point where being (das Sein) includes knowing. the idea of God. 61. Not an acting. however. But how could they be more completely one than in the idea of the universal substance. 66. and would conceive of God as either the one or the other. 59. the being of God. 63. is the infinite affirmation of himself. Yet for that very reason it is not possible to attribute being or knowledge separately. 60. For. and vice versa knowledge includes being. that it is absolutely indivisible.) God does not grasp himself because he cannot be greater than he is. However. The proposition that the Absolute has no predicates is quite correct insofar as the predicate itself is possible only in contrast to the subject (a contrast that is unthinkable in God). therefore nothing which stands in a contrast. But nothing which stands in a relation. The idea that God is the infinite affirmation of himself seems to be dissoluble into two conclusions: God affirms himself infinitely. it can be shown that each of the two ostensible separables into which the idea seems to be dissolved is contradictory. The same is true with regard to the opposite proposition. one cannot posit unity by itself. provided you lift out only one of the members of the identity which the affirmation expresses. a mere being (Sein). evident that ratiocination cannot affirm any one of the possible antitheses by itself without contradiction. Thus the circularity of the argument (der Umkreis des Cirkels) can be regarded as a being. also that the indivisible unity of the idea contains truth only in its indivisibility. being as such is only in contrast to knowing. 57. for then the unity would he a merely . Thus the idea does away with itself. by virtue of the idea of the Absolute which defines it as that whose essence is also its existence (das Sein). can be affirmed by reason (ist affirmabel durch die Vernunft) (36) and affirmed of God. in a more general sense. is impossible by virtue of the idea itself. and is therefore not the negation of knowing.' 65. it is impossible that God affirm himself. Not the negation. for the infinite self-affirmation of God fuses with the being of God and is itself this being (61). In this idea reason posits neither the negation of contrasts nor any actual contrasts in it. If you consider the first one by itself. (The two are one and the same. whose being is the infinite affirmation of himself. taken by itself. and therefore in God the knowing and the known are one and the same. In the same manner every possible reasonable affirmation (Vernunftbejahung). but only one and the same. The result is that what you so abstract can be neither posited nor not posited. for the One is only in contrast to the Many. Therefore the proposition: God affirms himself. yet as a being it includes an acting. He is incomprehensible for himself and cannot be grasped because he cannot be inferior (kleiner) than he is. God is not what is simply One. Nevertheless he is also not not-One. The same can be said. one cannot attribute existence to God. For likewise God cannot be what is affirmed of him. this idea dissolves into contradictions. Given the proposition that God is unity and totality (Einheit and Allheit). and whose being therefore includes the knowledge. and knowing includes being. but in an infinite way. In God there is neither an acting nor a negation of acting. Yet neither can existence be denied of God. while in God it is absolutely identical with essence. or with what is being affirmed of God. You were of the opinion that with these contradictions you could argue against the idea itself. namely the absolute self-recognition of the unity as totality.252 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 253 56. The reasonable idea (Vernunftidee) of God states that he is the infinite affirmation of himself. since existence as such is only in contrast to essence. For instance. Nevertheless the acting in God is not negated. For the self-affirmation of God is an infinite affirmation. Therefore eternally the Absolute can be expressed only as absolute and absolutely indivisible identity of the subjective and objective. 58. precisely through the idea itself. but in fact you merely revealed the idea's inner essence. for the same reason that in God existence is precisely the same as essence. that is. 62. because he is nothing different. and in that respect there is no knowing in God. for the affirmative (the concept) is greater than the affirmed (the thing).' 64. By that very fact it became. therefore that it is also impossible to derive anything from it by analysis or abstraction. because in being he is the infinite affirmation of himself. not Many. and God is being affirmed by himself. a completely blind Absolute. can be dissolved in a contradiction. This short inspection (55-63) suffices as a proof that the idea of the Absolute resists every abstraction.

In the being there is also a seeing and in the seeing a being. is not the unity of two parts which only together make a whole. so everything that is affirmable by reason is only one being. 75. that would not be simultaneously affirmative and affirmed. lies in God alone who is the infinite affirmation of himself. for the center by itself without the circumference is not center. 72. for instance any sure actions of the sleepwalker which occur as distinctly without consciousness and yet reveal as much expediency as the actions of animals. 70. For just as it is no real opposition if one and the same being has two different names. I will try to clarify by some illustrations this distinction [of 67] which is clear enough in itself yet is not clear for most. The idea of the circle is an absolutely simple and indivisible idea. The whole nature and all sciences offer plenty of examples of the absolute unity of opposites. Even the most obstinate habit of seeing mere objectivity in nature could long have been subdued by the phenomena of extraordinary states in man. is yet similar to a conscious principle. and they are also not not real. as the same in everything. a being and a seeing. what the idea negates is not the disparity in every contrast. center and periphery are not factors of the circle. the absolutely universal (das schlechthin Allgemeine). 71. Truly. A and B. and the circumference by itself. —Although in the concrete circle the center and the circumference are spatially outside of each other. And as we recognize this we are not positing any dualism. in which even according to common opinion the soul has no share. but the point as point is not the positive nullity of the two. they are effaced in that idea not in a negative but in a positive way. in abstraction from being (else it would not be an organ). that is. For what is a point anyway but a circle of infinitely small diameter. and yet only one. it is what unites both. 67. in abstraction from the seeing (else it would be mere matter) nor is it mere seeing. The ground. therefore. which we nevertheless regard as sheer material beings. in the idea of the circle neither the center nor the periphery is posited separately. It is not at all my opinion that the absolute identity of the subjective and objective is only the particular essence of God (for the essence of God is nothing particular). for their negation is not posited. The center is the circle in its affirmativity or the ideal circle. and as one is entirely and throughout affirmed. It follows (from aphorisms 55 to 74) that just as abstraction has no . without any dualism. the periphery is only the circle regarded in its being affirmed or in the totality. and just as in this case the being A and the being B are not two different beings but only one being. abstracted from the center and therefore from the entire circle. forced on us by the meaningfulness of those actions and especially by their artfulness. an objective ground as acting in them. if matter as such and as being is not yet perceptive? The action of animals is completely blind. I hold that it is the essence of all things. but only in relation to the two forces. Although in the deeper spheres of nature the perceptions are dimmer and hazy. 68. that this ground or principle. Or think of any sense organ. The forces annul each other in that point. however. and if he would not conceive of matter in each of its points as both. 74. 69. namely a point of rest. the absolute unity. the circle is neither the product nor the synthesis of the two. but we assume something else. The being one. those incessant somnabulists. for this absolute identity of the subjective and objective. The whole of nature is at variance with every kind of abstraction. Here the unity as such is equal to the totality. as the universal substance. We think of them not as acting on their own. it is entirely being and entirely seeing. Nevertheless we recognize with irrefutable certainty. they are unmistakable in the animals. As for contrasts. all substance is likewise in itself oneness of the affirmative and affirmed. Yet the organ is not mere being. expansive and attractive. Absolute identity of the subjective and objective cannot be a mere equilibriums or synthesis but only an entire being one. entirely ideal and entirelyreal. They are not [real] for their positive identity is posited. 6 73. but in each there is already by necessity the entire circle. though as such objective in regard to the animals. In each point of its nature (Wesen) it is both. on the part of the two. it is equal to the point). is not a circumference. The seeing and the being do not stand to each other like factors which annul each other. for instance with the notion of matter as something wherein all subjective inner life and all perception is negated. for instance an organ of sight. in an indivisible manner. how can perception be superadded to matter. One cannot abstract from the circle. Yet there is no validity in the opposite assumption that the contrasts were posited as real in the idea. the center as such equal to the periphery (since the size of the periphery is of no importance. In their case. The fulcrum of a lever represents the equilibrium of two opposite forces. but it is not their absolute identity. and that nothing can be affirmed or can be.254 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 255 negating and therefore conditioned unity. in spite of the lack of consciousness. It is what it is. yet in the idea of the circle they are one. or a circle whose periphery coincides with the center? On the other hand. He who would comprehend matter even in the simplest manner by contraction and expansion would never arrive at a real matter as long as he would assume those two as if they were opposites like the forces of a lever. it is their absolute identity. not by itself. and what it affirms is the absolute identity in a given contrast. and through whom.

In his Presentation of Philosophical Empiricism. for he is all bliss (allselig).. I. not absolute. the infinite of ratiocination. —Speculation is all [the knowledge we have]. Oldenbourg Verlag. he is nothing but relation and pure relation. Equally worthless. had foretold it so definitely that he could not now write about it more definitely. In itself this idea of the infinite self-affirmation of the nonfinite being." Hegel calls it "das Nicht-endliche" (i. first delivered in 1805-1806. v) by Schelling: God "shows his reality which is independent of the idea. and I do it in a very positive way. Schelling stated: "One could well say that God is really nothing in itself. Nothing can be detached from God. for instance. absoluteness or infinite self-affirmation is the eternal return. In this sense. Therefore nothing can truly come about in God or evolve from God. It is entirely useless to quarrel about these beginnings. he would posit a part of himself as objective (as world) and keep the other for himself.256 IDEALISTIC STUDIES SCHELLING'S APHORISMS OF 1805 257 power over the idea of God and can neither bend it to its purposes nor lift out of it anything particular to be set up by itself. 1930. 37}. but he is an infinite self-knowledge in the infinite being. 80. for he is everything.' The explanations given so far contain the mere beginnings of philosophy. '[Schelling's note] An equilibrium of opposites is the highest one can reach in terms of .. owing to the idea of God. Schellings letzte Wandlung. 4 [Translator's note] Relation in the sense of contrast. then we would have to deny all knowledge of the Absolute.. Yet that cannot be since God does not identify himself. 77. and for a morality decreed by the individual itself. neither in him nor outside of him. God does not come to be by the fact that he affirms himself or knows himself. but as the eternal being and persisting of God in himself. contemplating that which is in God. Also I am pleased in finding that one has begun to see it. Or it means a self-differentiation in God whereas. 207-352) [fluently but not flawlessly translated by Norbert Guterman. The word "das Unendliche" retains a touch of potential Aufhebung. I exclude knowledge and morality from the system of reason. On the contrary. and if methodic knowledge (Wissenschaft) found only two ways open. Likewise it would be useless to try to give further explanations to those who. entirely contradictory is the notion of an Absolute which goes forth from itself. 76.. contemplation of God as he is. which is by and from itself. 571). for which it is the highest. so it is impossible to derive anything from that idea. Methodical knowledge (Wissenschaft) has value only insofar as it is speculative. a promise for Vernunft but tantalizing for Verstand (ratiocination). God inclines toward nothing. In God everything is without origin. for he is God precisely because he is everything. he would not be God. 151) Hegel wrote: "If the infinite is set up in contrast to the finite as qualitatively different from that other. it would have to be his self-identification. 2 [Schelling's note] These sentences point at the value of the so far best known endeavor [by Jacobi?-----as one might surmise. then it must be called the bad infinite. are not able to fashion any other notion of the Absolute but that of a Thing and. eternal. Compare the penultimate page of the very latest and unfinished writing (see XI. of a thing in which the identity of subject and object inheres as a property. if there were any action in God. he would posit himself as subject and also posit himself as negated in the object. for he is absolute precisely because nothing can be abstracted from him. then on that very account. 150). and in their relationship the infinite is only a boundary of the finite and is thus itself only a specific infinite which is itself finite. judging from their own repeated utterances. is necessarily and is eternal. 78. If God could go forth from himself. 1966].b. not as an act. The infinite affirmation of himself is not an act to which God could have the relation of agent. seeing. which moves only in contrasts.and thus reveals himself as the real Lord of being" (XI. a hypothesis which contradicts the very first idea of God as infinite position of himself. not outside of it nor as a separate act. 79.Then there are two worlds. to be sure. that is. This consideration (75 to 79. [Gerbrand Dekker speaks of Jacobi's "irrational knowledge by faith" (Glaubenswissen) on page 131 of Die Rackwendung zum Mythos. but is the absolute identity. either a self-division of God by which. To be sure this endeavor was not unforeseen by the author who. and whatever cannot be in this manner cannot be at all.. For ratiocination the idea means one of two things. Nothing can be derived from God as becoming or coming into existence. it is the very being of God. Our age asks for knowledge as knowledge of the subject. Hegel said: "Philosophy is most inimical to the abstract and leads back to the concrete" (XIII. He does not bring about anything. reading Xavier Tilliette's Schelling. an infinite and a finite one. that is. in the manner of becoming or of issuing forth. For whatever can be. absolute truth.] '[Translator's note] In the Introduction to his lectures on the history of philosophy. 313] though indubitably also the last endeavor to turn the knowledge of the Absolute into a subjectivity. for he is only the Lord" (X. more specifically. that is. Ohio University Press. 360). in the Lectures on the Method of Academic Study (V. the one of analysis or abstraction and the other of synthetic deduction (a twofold assumption which is indeed quite current). is as simple as it is difficult for ratiocination. last presented at Munich in 1836.' Notes '[Translator's note] In the Logic (III. as well as the earlier one 55 to 74) shows that ratiocination can have no part in the idea of the Absolute.

Michael Ruse defines a "Darwinian" as "someone who identified with Darwin. S. in order to give men the attention necessary for the first and basic and most simple concepts. but the particular slant he gave it was peculiarly pragmatic and was held in common. state of nature were misreading Darwin. Since Royce and James both considered the doctrine of evolution central to their philosophic outlook. for which everything is either thinking or being. a comparison of their treatment of it should throw light on an important idealist source of James's Darwinism. Jr. which in turn can illuminate his reading of European sources.258 IDEALISTIC STUDIES relations. 2 He excepted himself from this interpretation. still to think it a contradiction arises for reflection. - EXTENDING THE DARWINIAN MODEL: JAMES'S STRUGGLE WITH ROYCE AND SPENCER Charlene Haddock Seigfried In the nineteenth century there were as many formulations of Darwinian evolution as there were Darwinians. Hence such a misunderstanding of the idea on the part of those who comprehend nothing but relations. although there is nothing simpler than the concept (notion) of eternity." '[Translator's note] Schelling then quotes a passage taken from Leibniz who says that. whom he influenced. and how much he diverged from Royce's idealism in his own evolutionism. By "Darwinian evolution" he sometimes refers to a reductionist interpretation according to which consciousness is nothing but brain processes. James was also greatly influenced by Josiah Royce during the eighties and early nineties.. Consequently. but disagreed on its meaning. I will first explicate Royce's and then James's early formulations of Darwinian evolution to show both how much James was indebted to contemporary formulations of American idealism. however. neither as thinking nor being. not in opposition to the misunderstanding but in agreement with it? 6 [Translator' s note] The reader may wonder why a Naturphilosoph should insist on denying consciousness in animals. the only way to determine what William James meant by Darwinian evolutionary science is by checking his references to it and his adoption of recognizably Darwinian theory and methods. with C. 7 [Schelling' s note] Schelling himself refers to a passage in the Neue Zeitschriftfiir speculative Physik. . one must call them back from their dissipations and to themselves. 391) whose gist is: "As reason is summoned to think the Absolute."' Therefore. but not necessarily someone who accepted all of Darwin's ideas. who influenced him. and with John Dewey. the same time he was writing the Principles of Psychology. The theologians who spoke of eternity needed many discourses. Most have at least disputed this product of their incomprehension. with variations. Schelling surely is no objectivist. As John Herman Randall. But in this very contradiction intellectual intuition manifests itself (trio die intellektuelle Anschauung ein) and produces the Absolute. But what judgment must be given on those who want to argue against me. comparisons and examples to make eternity known. James was confident that his reading of Darwin and particular application of it were consistent with the Darwinian texts and that the reductionist Darwinians who understood the survival of the fittest as a justification for a Hobbesian. and his own evolutionary Darwinism was a merging of idealist philosophical and empirical scientific commitments. pointed out.' Royce differed from the pragmatists in styling himself an idealist. and survival of the fittest is applied to reality mechanistically. Peirce and Chauncey Wright. IV. 1802 (Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie. There is certainly adequate support in Darwin for James's position.

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