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Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

COINTENTS

List of Tables

.".iIi

VlU

iix

xii

E'ART T. RE8IL41_RCB ON INTERNA'IIONAI.

REGIMES

L R.esearch (10 Intem,atiotlJal Regimes in GentUlny: Tlie:

Adaptivelnte'mallizadon of an .A.merican Soda.~. Sc~ence, Concept

Volker'Rittberger 3

2. The Ana~,ys;j]s 0:1 International Regimes:, 1'owards a EUfOpeaD-"AmericanReseallch Programme

Btimrl1;__Q__Kwbanf! 2:3

"ART U. CONCRPTUA:L AND THEORETICAL :fRnBl.RMLO IE RliGIM&___AN'ALYS: IS

,3., lnternatiollial Sodcty and~he Study of Rtlgimes,:' A Refl,ecdve Apiproach

Andrew HUrfttiJ49

4. Contract and 'Regimes,:, Do IS5uifl Spe-dfidtyand Variations tlf Form,a]ily Mauer?

Friedri.tih K rt./J'och wiJ 73

S. CmDl'ising tbe ]J,oundary belwee.n Public a:~d Private·!

Intc;mano-nal Regimes aDd Non-Sttllte Actor-s

Virginia Haufler 94

6. Progress, in. Game- Theor,et~cal Ana~ysrns, of IntternaUonal .Regfm.es

Andrew .Kydd Q'ful Dutu::an Snidal 1.12

P'AR'T III. REGIME FORMATION AND CHANGE

1.. Sov:erei,gnty, Regi.mes,,,, ~.nd He,man R.igbts Stephen D .. K'(J;SI1t!.r

13,9

Tdif hakk: 0 an malcrya'

Conte:nt:'J

8.. E pistemic Com,wunities and the Dynamics O[ ]n(:erna do:na.~ En[vi'r!()~ul1ef!jtal C(l-Op~ration

Peter M. Rmlii ]168

'9'. CognidveFac~ors in, Exp1aJnin; Regime Dynamics

Qiriste:r.mnnof! 202

10. Testing TIleodes of Regime Formadon: ,Findings from a Large; CoH~b()fative Re~e;ardl Project

Oran R. Young and Gail Oshe,renko 223

'1,',1' ", 1[,; ,t,·,,·~·i '," ,', ;d' 'C', •. '-c :'1Ir ·=-,·t·· ·'··,l'zi, ,- H~ iotheses:

,JlU egradngalLolllI,ex lJaJ __ ng _ yp ...

AI,terna.tiy,e Path:!)' to 13 etter Expla.naUons of Regime FormaUon?

M' •• ·, to'.".~ I':';r.; .. ,!t •• ", }>" .... " M'. ,-II VLOr ..... J ...... ", . ..iI'ru '" C"t l. worz,Oi'

~n.:1!'ll:ru ,Cl!fo~Q'~r,~, """I·"" .. _ 1"£-'"" "{,,,U, \'lu~W. "'~I ",_J;_f~'I.,_, ,,__,,~_

, 252

12,. Bringing tbe Second Image (Back) In: About the DomesU,c SOUIces of RJegivneForma~~ion.

Michael Ziim

EARUV, REGIMUE CONSfr.QUENClE S 13. ConstrlJJcdiIJIg, Ri8todca~ CounilJe.dactuals to Assess ~,he

1980l5,

--'

Tho.mas 1. Bier.t-teker

315

14. Ana~ysllilg,Reglme Consequences: Conceptual Outlines ~ul!d Environmental ExpluraUol1s

d ;17'1 D' 'W'" IP~ 3:39

.He'lmut .B're.i:t.n",de.r an L. Kteus .• leter '. ·oj

~5. rfhe Intcmal~za.tion of P'dncip:tesr Norms, andiRules by Govel]Jmen~s: The Case of Security Reg~,mes

Htu:JJ}:d Mi111a 361

PART V. CONCLUSION

16. Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives

.'Peler Mayer. Vhlkt:.r .R.i:'ttberger~ and M.ichael' Zurn 39 I

Rej"erencf2s 431

Cantr ibu tars 459

In;dex 46S

Tdif hakk: 0 an malcrya'

,6 . .1. A eo-ordmanon problem 12Jl

6 .. 2. A correlated equilibrium. for chicken 121

6.3. Prisoners' dilemma 122

to,.1. A multivariate model of regime formation 239

12.1. Foreign policy type as .an intermediary variable 285

12.2. The secondimage ofregime formation 290

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1.1. Type; of 'Cowniet and Regi.m.e,-CondudvcllIcss 14

4.1., Dimens~ons of Agreements 90

10.1" P'ower~Based Hypothoeses albout~Regim.eFormaHon 229

10.2. Interest-Based Hypotheses about Regime Formation 231

10.,3. Know]edge"Based Hypotheses :about Regime

.F'unnatio11l 236

'l(1.4. Contextual. Factor:s, of Re,gime Format~on 238

11.1.. Cm;e Studies of the TDbingen P'roj e<::ton. Regimes 256

11.2., Prediction Success. of Hyp,otheses 2169

12.1. Altempts at R:egimc Initiatruon ,and Re,sime

PIIevc;otion294), 12.2., Foreign 'PoUty Types (Ep'r) and Regime ..

Condueiveness 297

]2.3., Foreign Policy Typcsln CSCE and OBCD Issue

Areas 298

12.4. Dom:estic Sources of Regime FormaUon 310

]4.]. Dimensions and Criteria ofl:tefiime Consequences 34]

]6.,1. Dependent Variables for the Study of Re:gime

Consequences 424

Tdif hakk: 0 an malcrya'

ADM

Art. ATBM CDU/CSU

C.FCs CFE Cb(s) .. CIA CoCom

CSBM CSCE

DC

DDT

Ee

ECB

EPC BURATOM FAC

Fig.

FPT

.FRG

G .. i

GA'IT

OB

GDR

GNP

GRIT IAEA

lAS

ICJ

IGO

anti-ballistic missile Article

an ti-taetical ballistic missile defences Chr.is~lkh.,a.emokrati;S(:he Un:~QnJCbristlich~soiZial!e Union (Christian DemoeradcUnion'Christlan Social Uniion)

chlorofluoroearbens

convenrional forces in Europe

chapterts)

Central ~ntelUgepce Agency

Co-OrdiIl3.tion Committee for MuUilat.era.1 Export Controls

confidence- :andsecu:r.ity~bui!ding measures Conterence on securnyand Co-Operation in Europe

developed country dj.€::hloro-diphenyl.:trichlor-oethane European Com.munity

Economic Commission for Europe (of the UN) European PoliticalCo-Operation

European Atomic Energy Community

Food and Agriculture OrganIzation (of the UN) figure

for,ejjgn poUcy type

Federal Republic of Ger.many 'Grolllp of Seven

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Great Britain

German Demoeratie Re:p·ubUc

VOSS national product graduatedreciproeation in te;nsi.onredocUon International Atomic Energy Ag~Imy issue-area speclfi,cpower structure Internatlonal Court of Justice

intiemational govern mental. organization

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

ILO

IMF

INF' .INFCIRC 'LCD LDC LPAR LRTA:P Med P1au MNC

N NATO NGO NP1' OECD

OPEC OPS PCBs peu

PD PVO

SALT sec SDl sect(s)" SIPRI S02 SPD

START UNCHE

UNCLOS UNCfAD

UNHP UNESCO

.A bbr« viations International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund intermediate-range nuclear forces Intormation Circular (of the lAEA) least comma," denominator

less deve loped country

large-phased array radar

long-range transboundary air poUu:t:i.on Mediterranean Action PJan

mnl tinationsl corporation

numbe r of cases

North .Atbmt.ic Treaty Organization (international) non -governmental 0 rganizatioD Non- Proliferation 'Treaty

Organization for Bconomle Co-Operation and Develo pmen t

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries overall power structure

pelyehtoeinated biphenyls.

Permanent Court of International Justice prisoners' dilemma,

private voluntary organization (Ch. 5);, Voyska Protivovozdnshney Oborony (Soviet Air Defence Command) (Ch.., IS)

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty Standing CQnsuUa tive Comm.i:s.>Ii'lon Strategic Detense J nitiative

section(s)

Stockholm. International Peace 'Research Insdtut,e sulphur dioxide

Soziatdemckratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Demooratic Party of Germany)

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development

United Nations EnvlronmentProgr,amme

'United Nations Education and Science O:rganization

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Editor's lntroduaion

xm

of intemational regimes has shown remarkab~e.integra.ti.vecapw::ity in more than one respect. The 'regime perspective' has. been ,applied successfully to a wide variety of issue areas in international polities, bridging the gap 'between experts in intematlonal security

d . '1" ". 'I ~... I b idi

an . speeattsts III mtemanonat po~.I.Uca eoono'my I_Y praVll ing

them with a common core concept as well as a set of related theoretical propositions to guide analysis, SCholars with ditle:rent intellectual backgrounds. have beenanracted by this approachand have entered into a fruitful dialogue representing neo-hberal, critical, and. even real.ist basic orie:ntati.ons.Fiinally, regime analysis hasrataer quiddy spread beyond theconnnes.of the North. Amedeaa Intemational Relations cemmunity, 'whose offshoot it is, and. lound consider.able resonance among Buropean, in. partkular Scandinavian and German; political scientists; who have adapted this app.Jlo,acil to' their own. research needs and aspirations. Up to now, fhe reception accorded by the European and American scholarly ecmmunities to each athee's work has been very asymmenio, howevel (and perhaps more so than is justifie-d by the differences in q'lilantity and .quaUty of the work that is being done

. -

on both sides of the Atlantic).

The present volume refleetsthis integrative capacity of regime analysis and, at the same time, seeks to enhance integration and communication among students of international regimes, where it is, as yet underdeveloped. Thus, it assembles scholars from, four different nations (United States, Ge;rmany~ United Kingdom, and Sweden), and American. and European authors have an equal share in the, contribudens, The main purpose. of thi~ volume, however, is to take stock of more than ten years. of collective research on the origins and forms as well as the functions and consequences of international regimea.te point to achievements and shortcomings of these ,eff()rts~ andto saggest and explore paths on which progress inthe study of regimes may be attained.

2

The volume breaks down into five parts. In Part I (composed of Chapters '1 and 2) research on lntemational regimes in Germany and the: United States is reviewed" The second pad 'of the- volume (Chs. 3-6) focuses on. fundamental. conceptual and theoretical problems of regime analysis. Part III (Cbs. 7-]2) is devoted to the

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X.1V

Editor's Introduction

explanation of regime formation and change, Part IV (Cbs. 13-- 15) addresses regime cortseqnenees, Part V (Cll. (6), fmally, attempts to draw together the various hnes of analysis pursued ia the preceding chapters and, in this way ~ provides both a summary of the volume and an assessment of the state of regime theory.

In Chapter 1 ~ opening the first part of the volume, Volker Rittberger traces the development of regime analysis in Germany and its [asymmetric) relationshipwhh its Ang:1o~Ainerican counterpu.:'fl and source of inspiration. Differences between German and US scholars regarding the (geo-)poHti.cal context of research and the basic philosophical orientations and valae premisses are pinpointed in order to account for different thematical foci in practical research The efforts of German regime analysts to cladfy UJe~ eoneeps of intern.a:tional regime and to make it more amenable to their particular research interests are described. The theoretical approaches toW'.a:rds explaining. the formation ot international regimes which have been favoured by German students of international regimes (and for some· of which there is no eq uivalent in American regime analysis] are outlined. Finally, the chapter reports con.ceptual work andempirical fipdi,pgs of German scholarsin a widely neglected field of regime analysis, the study .of regime consequences,

~nChapter 2 Robert 0 .. Keohane looks back at more than a. decade of research on international regimes in the United States, the insights it has provided as wen as the lacunae 'it has not yet belen. able 'to close ... Theehaptet is meant as an attempt to facilitate, a rransnatienal continuation of this research programme, Keohane: addresses the fundamental methodological commltments underlying this research programme and discusses different definitions of its key concept, lntemationel regime. He considers possibilltles of resolving empirically the questions whether and hoW' regimes make a differenee in intern.ationalpolitics and reviews some of the work already done in this fi!l.dd. Finally, Keohane turns to 'the issue of explaining various property dimensions of regimes (iilstitutt,ona] membership, strength, scope; and property rights), discussing: approaches to be found in the regime Iiterature and .adding arguments from a ~contractu,ali.sf perspective.

In. the first chapter of Part Il, Chap&e" 3~ Andrew Hurrell places n.~~gime theory within the Grotian tr~dition of thought 0]1 international relations, which centres on the concept of international

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xv

society and. attributes a ~e;y role m lnternational law as both expression and foundadon of this sodety, In the light of 'this tradition of thought Hurrell examines the strengths and the weaknesses of CrauQnansUc~) regime theory. His central claim is that theanalytical rlgour that regime theory has introduced into the study oFintemational eo-operation has produced not only gains, but significan·tcosts as wen by obscuring some of the most important insights of tile international. society tradition I.nto the workings of fnternational rules and norms ..

In Chapter 4 Friedrich KratoohwU examines two mrerrelared aspects of the regime concept that have not received due a ttenticn in the sCholarly debate so far. En the. :fitst part of his conrrlbution he develops a. typo~ogy of contracts in order toprovlde aconeeptual jw;ti.ficaUQll for the issue~specificity of lnternatlosal regimes" which" he argues, i:s widely acknowledged, but insufficiendy understood am,on_g regime analysts .. The second part. of Kratochwi]'s chapter is devoted 1'03. di:sclllssion of the formal . ....;.lnfQrrual, ,explIcitImplicit, and public-secret dimensions of international agreements and thJeir repercussions on foe strength of regime norms and rules.

In Chapter 5 Vi.rgini.a Haufler challenges the state .. centrism characteristic of the bu!lk. of r:e,gimea.na~ysi;s by 'e;xploring the Jogieal possibility' of,. and supp,lying evidence for.,th.e existence of (oojh corporate and non-corporate) private regimes .. In doing so,she arguesthat the conventlonal definition of 'international regime' does not presuppose states as members . .of regimes and thatthe claim-that transnational co-cperatlon a_ttlong corporatio,ns must necessarily takethe form of either a cartel or an oUgopo~y ~e.a.vmg 110 room for en applicadon of tbe regirae concept is untenablc.Moroove:r.~ she quesfiens the view that non-corporate private regimes, even if theY' exist, cannot be assumed to havea noteworthy impact cn fntematlonal poUtiC;S~and addressesmore generaUYEhe; relasionship 'between international regimesand nonstale actors,

In Chapter 6~ Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidalexamine advan .. tages uad pilfa11s of game-theoretically informed analyses of internaticnal regimes by cr.iti.caUy reviewing recent work In this fie~d... They discuss the extent to which. the application of new game-theoretical solution concepts (suehas 'trigger' ~ 'eorrelated equilibriam', and ~cheap talk') to problems of international co-operation may enhance our unde;rsta.nding of therQ~e of

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Editor}s lntroducti.on

international regimes by incorporating factors such as beliefs, rommunication~ andinform.ation into thean.alysis .. They deal with am attempt to reconcile the central argument of' the bureaucradc politics litemture that states cannot be considered unitary actors with the assumption that states are rational actors. Finally, they consider the: (informal) use; ofgame theory as an 'inteIpietat~ve device" in older to shed light on the interaction between domestic and internationalpofltics in processes of regime-building (the two .. level game approach).

In the, openi:",g chapter of Part II£, Chapter 7J, Stephen D ..

Krasner Jooks into the de,t:enninan1.s ofUle formation, content" and implemeutaticn of human rights regimes, arguing that such regimes,.whkh essentially deal with the relationship' between rulers a:nd ruled, can 00 better accounted for from aJ realist perspective with its emphasis on power and. interest than on the basis of liberal co-operation theory focusing on problems of market t'aUure.Four cases of hum.an rights regimes-e-regarding religious practices in the seventeenth century, the slavetrade in the nineteenth century,. minority rrghts 'in Central Europe in the late nineteentb and early twentieth centuries, and liberal individual rights in the twentieth century-e-are analysedin order to su~taptiate this elaim ..

In Ch'opte:r 8Pet.er M .. Haas uses nee-realist, institutionalist, and co_gnitivist assumptions to derive flour environmental regime patterns, i.e. distinct styles of collective management and Iessondrawing associated with. regime fonnaJion~ persistence." and e'hange .. Subsequently, he evaluates the empirical vaifiidlty and explanatory force of these patterns in the light of the international regime controlling the pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (Med Plan), emphasizing the way that the origina] regime pattern was transformed by the, emergence of anepistemie community in the issue area.

In Chapter 9 Christer Jonsson examines the potential value of oogni.dve theory fOir the study of jntemational regimes, Cognitive theory eXplores the Iimitsof rationality and points to. judgem,ent~d heuristics and biases that operate. when human beings have to cope with a complex, ambiguous reality. Dra,wing fr()Ul insigb'ts gained in various branches of cognitive science he: develops and iflustrates a number of pertine,nt hypotheses accounting for regime formati.'on,peISistenre~ and c'hauge .. Moreover, Jonsson addresses the

Tc if hakk 0 an rnalcrya

xvii

rela.tionship between the cogni.tivea.nd the more established structuralist approach in regime analysts.

In Chapter9.10 and 11 Oran R. Young, and Gail Osherenko, and Manfred Efinger, Peter Mayer , and. Gudrun Schwarzer ~ respectively ~ report results from two large-sealeprojeets whicb were, devoted to the study ,of the determinantsof regjm.e forma lion. Young and Osherenke tested power-based, int,erest':bascd~ and knowledge-based h!ypolh.c1se~sagainst the evidence of several Arctic eases, most Q.fwhichrelate to enViJronmenta] andnaturalresources issue-s~wh:ereas :Efinge.r t Maye,r., and Schwarzer evaluated systemic,. problem-structural, and situat.ioll,-strocturalhypotheses in the Ught of .8. variety of issue areas, in most of which western democracies confronted eastern socialist stares, .Both chapters conclude with considerations 00 how th,e present stage of smgl.e..:variable accounts might be overcome in favour of more complex, mu~tivariate theories of regimefo.rm.atfon .

. In Chapter 12 Michael Zmn 'e:xplore-s the domestic sources of regi:me formadon. For this; purpose he addresses, in a first step, the characteristics of a regime-conducive forelgnpoliey, i.e, ;3 constellation of foreign policy strategy and instrume{IlL'l' that, when implem.ented by an actor in the issue area, makes regime formation lik ely • Ina. second step', he then goes onto generate hypotheses about the relationship between domestic :politics vsriabies and ether unit properties, on the one, hand, and the pursuit of a. regime-conduewe f:()re~jgn poli.cy, On the other,

In Chapler .13, commencing the third part of the volume, 'Thomas Biel8teker analyses fundamental methodological problems associated with the study of re;gime consequences. Biersteker argues that the student of regime effects has. virtually no. choice but resort, to' counterfactuals [statements of wbat would have happened if history had~atsome point, deviated from its aetna] course lin order to substantiate his or her (ca.usal) claims. Subsequently ,Biersteker suggests several g!llideline-s to. be heeded when oonstru.cNng historical cOlIEltedactua~s .. FinaUy, he Ulustrates the eounterfacrual method with reference: tothe case .of the global debt. regime: and Itsconsequences forthe course of the debt crisis .... f the 'l'n.o'fl-,

"=""J._J!J! ~.-~(K.IS •.

In Chapter J4 Helmut Breitmeier and Klaus Dieter Wolf addressconceptual issues of the s,tllldy of regime consequenees, They propose a categorization of the dependent variable based on

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

Tclif hakk: olan rnalcrya'

'P"AR"'T' I

"~ :,'-"'. ~-.:.'-.-

Research on International Regimes

Telil hakk: a an rnalcrva

Tclif hakk: olan rnalcrya'

I

Research on International Regimes in Germany

The Adaptive 'Internalization of an American Social Science Concept

VOLKER RI''fTB~ERGER

IN this chapter; an attempt will be, made 1.0 trace the path of research oiiilltemational regimes in Germany with speeiaf ,e,m,pbasis on its, (asymmetric) interaction w.ithAnglo-American work in this field (sect. 1)" to' pinpoint the differences of 'context and of the state of the: discipline of International Relations between tbe Anglo-American world (,e.g . .Ho~sti]9.B.s) and Germany (e.g, Rittberger 199Oc) which may have provided diffe;rent perspectives on the foCtis 'of regime ,analysis (sect. 2), and to elaborate the extent to whicb research on international rcgjm,es bas been modified or altered by German scholars in the process of internalizing this research programme (sects. 3-5).

1,. RECEPTION AND DlF'FUS[ON or REGIMS ANALYSIS IN GERMANY

Wh~,~.e, on several occasions during the 1'9,80s" members .of the German International Relation s communhymade at best a loose and rather tl'd hoc 'Use of the term 'internationairegime' (e .. g, Muller and Rode 1984)~ a more systematic reception of this concept ,se't in. ve:ry slowly and with a lag: of several years. Faupel (1984) was thefirst to respond to the pub~ica,tiQn of the Krasner (1983c) volume and to s:ketch his own thoughts on the subject. He coaceptuallzedmtemattcnal regimes 3.5 a form oiin5titutionaUzed Internaticnal collaberaflon distinct from governments, treaties, or international organizatierrs, Faupel,. however. de-emphasieed the

Tc if hakk 0 an rnalcrya

4

Vollwt R.iuber;ger

normative eontents of the concept of regime, and related it strongly to routiniZied and in:stltu.tiollal~zed transaetionahetween and am.ong states. Thus? his definition of the concept remained rather broad and lacked the is-sue area odentatlon whlch accounts fur part of its success, The lac.k of a sharp couceptuallzatlcn showed Up,fOf example, in his daimthat the Concert of Europe, practising balance-of-power policies could "be perceived a san international regime, and that the detente ofthe .19705 could have evolved intoan international regime, if only the Soviet Union had understood, or alternatively bad wislllcd to play by, the rules of the game.

The concepts of intern,ati()na~ regime and Q:f re.Gime aualysise were giveatheir firstthoreugh, critical treatment irr German in an often-quoted erticle by Wolf and Ziirn (1986). Ever since, research on international. regimes bas arouseda growing interest (and, in pa,raU.c1~a controversy about Ib merits] withm the German International Re~atio()soomml!1nity .. German International Relations scholars sought to master the new 8"UOjOCt and to add to this h~ternatiQ:na~Fesearchpro.gr.amm.e by :foUowingtw() trucks. On the one hand, the: International P'oUUcs Section of the German Political Science Ass.ociation (Deutsche Vereinigung fur Politisehe Wi,ssenschaft) devoted several of its meenngsto the discussion of

'III" d :."., d ··b ,. thl f h

regime ana~ysls ano sencrted contnutlOns to t usarea 01· researc ,.

from Us members, By the e:nd of the decade, the results of these joint eff:orts~quantitatively Impress:ive.,. yet of mixed quality'~ were p"ublisbed ill several votumes, ene exdusive,~y dealing with international regimes (Kohler-Koch 1989'b)~ and two etherscontaining several relevant chapters (A]br,ecbI1989, Hartwieh 1.989),.1 On the other hand, 'centres' of regime analysis evolved i.nF~ankfu:rt~ (MilUer 1989b, 1993) and in Tubingen. .. The research team located in Ttiblngen followed a. more ~y:stematic approach to' making use of, and a.d.apting, the regime an:a:lysis of American vintage to urgently felt needs of theoreticany informed empirical research on c.ruclal problems of' oontemporaryinllernationa] relariens, In view of theemphasis In American regime analysis on West-West and global issue areas,. it wasrec.ognii:zednha~ East-West relatlons

~ The 1988a:nnual meeting of. the GefmanPeace Research Association (Aibcj,ts:gemC:~U5Ch~ft: 'fitlfJ1nedcns~ und KO'ntli.kU'brschllng) pro\'~d'oo anethe forumfof c:}lchanging v:icW'Sab)i~t the ments of in'emntion:rl regime 3inal)ltd:s t·M-~l~ .... na and ·S'--·DII.-, .. c~K' nob .·Io"'lf. ·t9,QR. 'I'U? -24'-':).

,. .. _.,0 '~[nann an .Cllelua ... s __ nV. _""n ,L07, ~O-.r'" __ .'.

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Research on, Regimes in Germany

7

amdety in large parts of the populaee in Germany, and in Europe in general In additilon,tlie distaste for multilater,a~ism sb.OWll by the Reagan Administration. aroused concern about the directions of US for,e:ign policy.~ especially its, confrontational 5tyle, a:mong various elite strata and political activists in Gennaoy (and other parts of Europe)" w:bose criticisms were often mistaken for an expression of 4.Anti-Amedcanism.',

In any case, these different political settlings, seem toaecount for different choices of objeets for study~. Amerieanregime alullysis bas, ccncenrrated (tbo1i1gh not exclusively) on issue, areas in WestWest relations mostly Mthin the economicrealm, German research on. i.ntemationa!1. regimes hasiastead centred on East'-West (Efing~r~ Rittberger, and Zilm .1988; Kohler .. Koch 1989b, cbs ... by Bfinger~ MU:Ue:r, Ropers and Schlotter, and Ziirn;. Rittberger 1990a~ l'99Od; Rittberger and Zurn 1991a~ 1991b) as wellas on North-SQuth and globa1issues (Zum 1987.; Kohler-Koch t 989b, ehs, by Beta, Brock, and Wolf; K. D. Wolf 1991) .Wher·eas, in. the Amertcan debate, the examination of intemational security regimes has not played a major role (at fi~t largely confined to' Jervi.sts workand later somewhatenhancedthrough the" volumeedited by George, Fadey, and D.alUn (1988) ), the German research effort in the fi!e~d ofreo1m~ anal-sis a.lmn,,,~ right fro·'~ ,-, ~!b· .e~~· .~~.:'.~. ~'., .-. has .. -,':d· .

_ . _ ~. ... y~,~ ., ~""'.~U , ~" m ~ .... ,. vegmmng, .. as pal a

great deal of attention to the formadon and censequenees of intemation.al regimes in the issue area of intemarional security ~ and it has been eager to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of regime for .studyin;g: international co-operation in this issue area as wen. (InadcUUon to previously citedpubllcations see Brzoska (1991)~ Efinge;r (990);. (t.99~a)~ Efinger and Rittberger (1992), Riuberger~ Eflnger~ and Mend~er '(1990), Sehrogl (1990»).

TIllS was, to be sure, an offshect of the emphasis on East-West relauons which has characterized 3. vast, segment of German International relations research. Anomer eady thematic focus of German regime analysis lay in the area of international cooperatton for ,environmeIU.al protection ~ :a.gainwith. a regional emphasis on transboundaryair andover pcllution, and on the marineenvfronraenr of the Baltieand the North Sea (list 1900a,. 199:l~List and Rlttberger 1992" Pdttwitz 1989'~ Strubel 1.989',. Schwarzer ]99Oa). Thlsreglcnal and sector,al specialization may be; seen as a. quite useful division of labour between American and European students o.f int,ema.tional regimes, resulting in the

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

8

Volker Rittberger

coverage of all major sectors ofinte:m,atimnd politics and thus providinga t.ich source to be mined for fbeiory",building, about

international regimes. -

'However ~ with the end of the, Cold War, and the tr,an&formu~on OfCODfUcEs in what used to be called East;....West relations (Rittber'2er and Zurn 1991.0), this transatlantic division of la hour also may be ehangl ng, Whereas a regional emphasis on regime formation in Eur-ope on the part, of the German research community is mcely to eontlaue, the, sectoral specialization with its strong ,emphas~s on seeurity Isauesjs giving way~o .3 preoccupation. with ,3" much broader range of issue areas. III addition to the already mentioned and increasLing work on inremaeional environmental regimes the various e:lforts at bringing human rights and minority rights, pro:tectionlllud.erthepUfvicw of inte;matlonal regime analysis (MencUer 1990~ List 1'992) represent a s:igni.ficnnt departure from past trends,

r. CONCEPTUAl- AND .P'HILOS OPH ICA1 ... .DIFFERENCES AND .RtlPPROCHEMENTS

M'ore fundamental differences between Ameriearrand German regime ana~ysis OO'FiJOe:m, the conceptual andphi~osopbical, underpinnings of theresearch pro gramme,

3 1 D .I:~'.. t 'I. .,.. ... ." .. .·1 D.'·.... ..'

. .. ..... . _ .. epmng .. ntemauona .. negtmes

In response to Stein's (l983:l1S)critkism that. 'scholars have falleninto using the ter.m~'regime" so disparately and with such little, precislon that it ranges from an umbrella for all. international. relations, to little more than a synonym fOir internatkmal organizations' 1 ,efforts were renewed to define the concept of international regime more adequately and more preci.sely. By and large, the coneepmallzarton of imernanonal regfme as merely 'patterned behaviour' (e.g .. Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 63') did not g,ain much support 1m German writings aboue regimes since the heurissicvalue of the concept of international regime, was held to de-pend on its power to select from among the variety ofint.e:ra;(:,tions and even

~ .

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

Re:Je:an:h on Regimes in Ge.rmany

9

co-operation between and among states (Kobler .. Koch 1989Ia:. l~ 20}. Behaviour occurring with some r,eg,ula.rityis not necessarily co-operative; and even patterns of ce-operatlcn :m.ay be caused by structural constraints fath.er than origina.te in normadve considerations and the recognition of1jnconv,enient obligations' (Keohane). Therefore, a. denniti.on ofintemadonal regime so broad as to encompass mere regularities of co-operative behaviour wouldtail to capturethe phenomenon which liesat the heart ofregi.me analysis: th,e institutio:nalized co .. operation of states formao,aging conflicts and inter-depende;noo problems, instead of relying on seJf .. help strategies) either individuaUy or ooUecUvely (amancel~ even though self-help action ma.y seem to produce greater individual benefits or lessindividual costs in the short term .. 2

Thisbas~c thrust of intero.aUo!ual regime analysis is." 81t fi.rst :sigbt" adequately reHected. in the" widely accepted deflni.tion of Krasner (1983a: 2) whid.n states that regimes are 'setsof implicit or expUci.! principles, norms, .. rules, and decision .. making procedures around which actors' expectations (~)Rverge.in. a. given area of Intematlonal relations'. While Haggard and Si:mmons, (1987) rightly questicned whether the notion of 'implicitness' would flat defyoo:y effort to operationaliaethe ,eoncept's definition ,. Wolf and .zum (1986) argued that an observable behavioural elementshould be added to Krasner's definition in order to d[stingnish regimes from mere . promises or contracts to which the parties mayor may not live up. Thus.fhey added the criterion of ,cffedivenesstot:hefou.r pri:ndpal componemsof Krasner's d~finjtio,n. As a. result, a regime" is said. not to. have come into exi.stenceif theperUnent norms and rules are disregarded by states at their discretion. Instead of distingtlishing between strong and weak r-egimes~ or be,twleem declaratory, action-guiding; and implemented regimes (Ropers. and Schlotter 1990: 4), it: was, 8ugg:es,tedthat: norms and rules which. do not shape the behaviour of states cannot be considered reliable predictors -of states' behaviourcapable of p.roducingconvergent ex.pectations,. In this view ~ even e:x:plidt norms and roles if th~y remain lar8ely :inope;rativ'cfail to indicate the existence; of an Institution, and therefore do not form. part of an inte:rna.tional. regime.

To give an example (M:endler 1990).:.tooking at the issue area

:2 This in~erpfe:taltiQn of regime analysiis ls fiurther de'V~loped in Ch. 16~sect. 2~ below.

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

10

of ~working, conditions of foreign journalists", wh.lch wast,be· object of Basket Three agreements wlt.hin the; CSCE, the questionarose whe;ther, from a perspective focusing on different degrees of institutionaliZ1cd co-operation, these, agreements had already evolved .iMo an inrematlcnal regime. No doubt it was possible to discover in the .afterma.th of Helsinki I' (]~9i5) a weak principle, some norms" and even a few rules circumscribing the range of permissible action on the part of both public authorities and foreign Journalists. Yet norm observance and :rule oompl.iance varied so greaUy over time and across countries, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, that-using effectiveness as a. cdterio1'l,-it did not seem warranted to. ack.n.ow~ed,ge the; existence of aninternetional regime ..

By stressing the behavioural (or compliance) component of regimes these; German regime a.n.alysts(hougbt to ·provide a useful delimitation of cases. On the, one hand, the political science concept: of inrernatkmal fegim.e: is not identical with. the concept of a legal regime since its existence does not pressppose a bindio.g: legal instrument; however ~ it is predicated on normaUvely reeognized social practices as is any other institunon. On the other band, thepolitical science concept of international regimetranecendsthe notion of established patterns of conference dlplomacy (e.g .. the CSCEprcme"ss) and their outcomes (e.g, treaties), Since these may rum, out, to be mere 'paper regimes', it was, held that a more restdcdve use of the term would be analytically advantageous ..

In the meandme, a debate between those favouring, a contractoriented prm!e~d'ure (r,equidng on~:y agreemcntsaboutrutes. and procedures) and those; favouring a more behaviour-oriented procedure (requiring rule-consistent behaviour _ in addition) of identifying international regimes has developed." This has ledto a new consensus, a.t least about the operarienal d.efinitiion of Inrernatjonalregime, am.ong rese,archersfrom both sides of the Atlanti~c. The solution, which is likenedto tthe use of 3. ;sliding, seale', has been summarized as fellows:

We: agreed to begin with a "tl.riliverse of cases indudilillg an arrangements that: meetthe expHcit rules test. l'hls: wOUildbeJo]~()wed by an effort ee identifY that subset of theinidal lmiyenem~etjng the expUc:iilt rules test and alsa .achieving P[,e.scrip1!;~ve status in th.e sense that actors :re'fer

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Res,earch on: Regimes in Germany

n

re,g,u~ady to the rules both in characterizing tbelr own be,:haYior and in commenting on the beharvior ,of others. Beyond this~ analys,ts; should seek to pinpoint. a smaller subset of anangemen,tsthat meet the first two testsancl!tbat give rise '~o a. measure of rule.,oonsistentbehavio:r as

weU:~ -

Aecording to the new consensus, no arrangement :should be caned an international r-egime; unless it: passes the :first two tests, i.e. the mere existence of explicit rules pertaining to an issue area .in inte:madonalreladons will not do. On the other hand, sets of 'e~plkjt rules witb preseripdve status in the ab ovesense do not need. to. be honoured under all circumstances to. qualify as a regime ("althougb it can be assumed that most of the cases which pass the second test wIlltle arrangements that also ·give rise to a measure of rule-conslstent behavior').

3.2. Scholarly .Backgr:ound and Analytical Perspectives

Another major difference between American and German approaches h) regjm.e analysis derives from premisses and preoccupationswhich set German regime analysts apart. from their American colleagues, In Germanyregi'me analysis was introduced above all ElY scbelarswho had beenaetive in peace and conflict studies. Therefore, regimes were cencepraalized a's part. of a confl:i.ct. process model of intematioh.al relations, The basic underlyingassumptioR of this model is that conflict tends to be pervasive in. international relatlons (as in socialrelations, in generall, and that international regimes could be conceived of as social instituUons wbichregu]ate 'conH:icts between sta.tesby constraining their behaviour through the observation of norms and rules in their dealing wlth disputed objects (Bfinge.[, Rittberger, and Zum 1988: 69'). In this analytical perspecti.ve,t:tile formation of mtemational regimes represents a colleetive response loa vadety of conflict sUuaUons. Instead of turning to self~he:lp strategies, indud.ing the threat or use of force, states may manage tbetir conflicts in. a

"' See Oran.Young·s (l99Ic~ :3)~eport on dre, ~RegimC:8. :Sluml!r!jt' held at Dartmouth Coneg;c:~ Noll'. 1991 .•. P.anLcipali1!l!!i inlbts, conference induded scho.la:rs from the, United States (inter o.'lia .Robert Keonanc".i3dward MUes.il.tld Oran Y~l,mg). Norway {A.r.ild Underda'l ,and researel\er:s frOIl1l the NansenIWldtUitC)~8!od

Gci!ltlany ('mcm.bciI'$ (if:the 'Fijb;lng~liI, group). .

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14

Valke:r RiUberser

draws on older efforts to explain foreign policies of states by issue or issue area characteristics (Rosena.u 19(6). It holds that certaln inherent characteristics of issues or confl!icns predetermine the- way in which these issues or ccnflicts win be dealt with. In the Tubiugen research project an East-West: regimes, a conHJiet. typology has been developed which is based on the dlsUnction between 'consensual' and 'dissensual conflicts' (Aubert 196:3,. Kri.esberg 1982..: 30-42) and cons] sts of four types of cenflict which vary in thelr degre,e- of regime-conduciveness. In dis sensual eenflicts the acton disagn~ie about whatis desirable, not just for each of them IndivIdually but for all of them collectively. In consensual conflicts the actors are confronted with a sltnation of ~ardty in whichevery actor desires the same valued. object butcannot besatisfied fully because: there is not enough. for everybody. Subdividing dissensual oontli.ccts into confllcts about values and conflicts about means, :it is :hypothes1.2'.icd that conffiets about values (which ~ by their vier}' nature, leave very little room for compremise) usually defyc{)~ operative conflict management, whereaaecnfllets about means are more easny dean with in a co-operarive way. Turning to consensual contlicts, we- distEnguishrurther between conflicts of interest, aboutrelative1y .3!ssecssed goods,. t .. e. obje,cts whose valuation by an actor is not: independent of the size of other actors" shares In these objects (e.g, power, prestige, weapons], and conflicts of interest about absolutelyessessed goods which obtain their value independently of what other actors have (e .. g. food) .. Here, it is hypothesized that the former type of confliet ofinterest, which often prompts intense competition, is farJess condacive to regulated conflict mana.gement than the latter type, which, in general, displays the bighese prepensity for re·gimeformatiQn (Efinger, Rittberger, and Zorn 1988: 92~7:; Rlttberger and Ziinl 1990: 29-:3:2). Tabl'e 1.1 summarizes the problem-structural hypotheses,

TABLE 1..1. Type of Conflict and .R~gime~Conduc,iveness

·oonfljtc~: of interest about absOliulteLyasse.'i.ored. goods high

cmdlic1 about means mcdiil:l.m.

conflict ofiinterest abeut relatlvefy assessed goedslow

cOAni.ct: abeut vajues very tow

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Research on Regimes in Germany 15

These hypotheses have: been te-sted in two ways. One consisted of examining several case s,tudies of Eas~-We5t and Woest-W,est regime fermationand of determlningwhether or not these cases deviated from what we wouM. expect on the basis of our problemstructural hypotheses. In general, tbis typo,logy achieved consider .. able emplricatsupport, yet alt.e:ma:ti.ve" especi,aUy situa~ion·structur,al (game .. theoretic] explanations (see 8ect.4!,.2. below) seem to be mm:ep:romi.singif we deal with issueareas dominated by conflicts of interest," COllsidering.~ for example.jhe issue area of long-range traasboundaeyetr polhition, it took more than a. decadeuntil an intema tional regime was, established in 1984/5. Since the cO]]Jfiictts in thei:ssu!c, area wert: identified as ,conflicts of interest about abselurelyassessed goods (mone.yto be spent on abatement technclogy] reglrne formaticn should not: have, en/countered so ma1no,1 ·d···f1ic 'It".,.s·· and she ,'"I d ..• · not hav ~ t aken -0' ··.1""",. ..... However

---'--J ,1 UI¥ .. ---- Wl .. ' n ._._iQ.e ,.3 ...... 0 s, _ .... ng •... ,,,",,el,.

mode.ning the situation structure according tostates' preferences prevaning in the is s.u e area from 1970 to the beg~.nning of the ]'980s:~ the case represents a. 'Rambo' game in which some actors re~ch their optimum by refusing to co-operate at aU;.thusl'legiitne formation is not to be expected. ,En this case, the situationstrucnaral e:xplana.~ion proved stronger than the problem-structural one. Asfar as issue areas domin,atied by confJiiets aboutvalues are eoneerned, howeser, the p;rotdem"istnlctuta] appreach suffices to explain thefailnreof international regime [ormation (Rlttberger and Zi:i:rn 1991,a: 172f.).

The other test of thcproblem-etructnral hypotheses involved a st,atis,tJic~~ anal,ysi:s of data .on East~We:st oOinflictS: (coded on the, basis, .of the above-mentioned conOiclt typology) and conflict .. managing interactions (ceded on the basis, ()f a £aur-point ordinal :scaier.anging from 'no co-operation' to 'existing agreement'). The fie suits of thi.squantit:ative test of our problem-structural bypothesecS were quite encouraging: the connngency c{),e·:fficient which was used to. examine the ,corrdaUonbetween the conflict typology and the mode of contlict management reached values of higher than 0.5. However., .it would. be premature to take, these findings forr established facts before indepeadent replicatioos of these tests, have been carried out and, more imporrtanUy~ before

IS Eling,er. Ma}i'er~ and Scbwar.zer., iill Ch. 11[:. sect 2 .. 3, be~ow. report resul.1s of an. empirical test ,of the: pl[~blcm~troctl!ral and the situat:ion·structuralas well as other hypothe:k.s pml):KH1ing to explain regirn.elormaltion.

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

Volker Ritlberger

similar data on 'W'est-West interactions have been analysed, separately aswell as together with ihe East-West data. set, inthe same fashion (Efinger and Ziirn 1900).

Despite its weaknesses (e.g, problems of. operationalization; neglectof context variab~es).~the problem-structural approach and thcnypot:heses wI-deb it allQw~s one to generate, seem to account for a considerableamount of vadaUoil ill the outcome of interstate jnteractions. Therefore" it should be; acknowle.ag.e.d as a fheoretical perspective which deserves to he looked at, more cbsely by other researchers as well as in other research programmes. EspeciaUy lncombination with other explanations of international behaviour, it mightadvaace theprocess of i.nternation.~d rel~.t.icms theory-building.

4.2. The Situ(J.tion-Structu~al Approach

From the beginning game-theoretic approaches to the, analysis of internationajreghnes have been. present in the American discus-

_- '~

sion of internatienaltco-cperation under anarchy' (Oyel986).

However, they remained in the. shadow of!strnc'ura~' andfuncttonal' explanations of regime formation." In Germany, game dleory in general" and its application to international relations in particular, faced serious reservations, or prejudices, even more than regimeanalysis had encountered. The dislike refers to what JUDne (l972) once caned tho·.limite~d. rationality of strategic Ulinldng~., Only slowly are these reservations being overcome, A German difference from the; American scene, then.fs the low level of attention and the scarcity of r,esOllrces that have been devoted to game-theoretic regime analysis.

F:OUCJwing the examples setby a manber of American sebolars Zurn (:1992) inparticui.ar has developed the: 'situation-structural approach", which builds upon, but. also differs from, current gametheofe{tic approaches in International Relations. Instead oflbcUising ana. small or a large number ofselected games.be has constructed a typology of '2 x 2game;s. re;pr,esend:ng~priQ blemanc social situations' (Raub and Voss t986)~ teo situations in which tbe,

7 F"orthefum::ticna~i;sil (or contractualist) iPerspect~ve on variQus issues hI regime; .anaruysi~ see on. 2". ~~, 4 and .s:,below.

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Res,ear,ch on Regimes in, Germany l7

individual iaterpretation of rationality mvergesfrom its collectiee interpretationc Problematic soda] :situations are social traps in wbi.chthe rationalpursuit of self-interest can lead to a oo]lectively subopti.mal outcome.,s It is in :such situations:, and in the absence of a central governing a.uthori.ty, that tne quest fo~ finding a. cooperative solutionto avoid.or atleast to. m.inimize" the suboptimal collective outcome arises.

However, the existenceof a. problematle social situaUonis only a necessary conditien for the em.ergence O'f a. lasting ee-operatlve solution, ,e,.g. an fntemational regime, Totlnd out whether indeed, and howeasily, an in~e:mationa] regimewill be formed the already mentioned typology of problematic social si.tuatiops, demonstrates its usefulness. Four types of problematic social situations are disdngulsb.ed:

Co-ordina:tion games wlthdlslributio,nalco.nfiict~ such as ibatU.e of sexes' ~ and c()'"f)taination games without distribwiona.l conflict, such as 'assurance'. In either type of situanon the formation of an international regime can be expected within a relatively short period of time once the situation has beenrecognized by tbe actors .. SUuations of the former type are somewhat more complicated to handle and therefore. involve a greater risk of the act,()FS ending up with a. collectiveJy ;suboptimal outcome. Overall, however ~ CO~ ordination games come; close to bl,:d:ng sufficient conditions of regime formation,

D.ilemma games" such as the 'prisoners' dilemma'. Here, the situation as sueh does: Dot augurwell for the f01"R!l.a.tion of a regime sinceit contains powerful incentives for non-cooperatlcn by every actor. Regime formation thus depends on exogenous factors exerting a favourable infhience, as e.g, the 'shadow of the future", i.e, the expected diachronic iterationof the game, and the (small) number of aetorsvIna dilemma-type situation an intemational regime is nkely to be established only after a lengthy process of interaction during wbich exogenous factors 'Ill,ust con tr.ibut.e to confidence"bunding between. the parties involved.

t Ramboi' gam"s 51 ...... ei ... such al situatto ·DIOtl' ..... ·a. ctorr :.. (j, -h· . =. -'~I' ~J

. .' ..... .,.._ •.. _·n_ .,1.1. ,." .' ..... ., ...... u!l.~. . u.",. ' ....... _.~ [e·~.c·, .es nISI

her optimum by refusing to co-operate: while the coUecHve outcome might be (an.daften 15) subeptimal, regime formation is next

:II An ql.lioome is ,roU.ectiv.e.llysuboptimlli~ ii' e~th(lr it is not Pareto oprimai OF thcl"(l is :!'lBQ1berPa~ito op,tr.:Iilum ilD.wh:i()hbe,ne.fits are mOOie equally dlstri.bu~ed.

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

1.8

'Volker Riltberge"

to impossible. Ag:ain,,3m exogenous factor such as. cross-issue linkage may help the aggrievedactor mduee the other party tt) be more co-operative (Rittberger and Zurn 1.990: 3&42; 1991a~ 173-5).,

Empirical research using a variety of historical cases dearly supports the usefulness of the founo,ld typo,logy of problematic soclal situations and Its appficationto internerienel regime formation. This is not to claimthat more- systematic efforts, are unwarranted, Such efforts might not only bui~dJ upon analready existing base of tested hypotheses but also use a metlrcdology for the comperanveanalysis of 'real cases 'in.s~e.ad of making inferences from deductively constructed games. The methodological step fO,f\V,a.rd consists, in particular, in the modelling of historical conflict situations by ascertaining empirlcallythe preferences of actors. (and theirordering) independently of their actualbehaviour (Ziirn. 1992: 23.&48).

It was mentioned earlier that, the preoccupatton with theanalysis of r'eglme formation among German International Relations scholars was due to their standing in the tradition of peace; and conflict. studies, ThisbackgrouI1Id was also felt when in German .tesea:tlch on. Internationat regimes questions about ,the Impact or consequences of international regimes were dealt with (Efinger et al. 199{k 273--9; Rittberger and Zurn 1990, 199],a),

In acoordancewHh thciir specific scholarly background German students of international regimes paid special attention to the potential relationship between regimesand different torms (or levels) of peace, The question 'Do regimes matter?" has been speelfledand reformulated asDo regimes matter fur peace? J In this line of reasoning, the; idea of 'peace In parts' 0. S. Nyc) re .. emerges in a somewhat diffeIcnt form. Here this idea carries, two .assillmption~. One is that ccnffkts, once they have become regulated .. ~ win stay regulated Crobust.ness~ or 'resilience'). The: other is ehat international regimes affect the overall. relations between states which have been interconnected througb intc:rnational regimes: these diffuse· "".Onseque~noos are ·calledtble ~civiJmngt

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

Researd: on Regimes in Oer:many

21

for the authoritatlve (re~)dlstribution of resources. Conversely, market-oriented and state-oriented international regimes are likely to produce more efficientt but less just outcomes.

Whereas the criterion of justice seems to app~y primarily to relations betweenactors t,ne structure, of whioh is hi.ghly asymmetrical usaally on more" than one dimension, as". for instance, in

N·'· rth "'.... h , ' J - 1'- -,, ,I ,', I' ", "h, . " <t'j+'" ", ' i has t - I 'Ik -. - l.4ld·d. when

ort , -Soutt retauons, no sue res nC,lOn "as .0 ue a~,e, _. _~ _

introducing I,be distinction betweentinternal' and "external inter .. national regimes' and disrussin,g its relevance as regardstheimpact of regimes, In general, U, is sugges,ted that extemal regimes" which primarily serve to make, sure that their member states co-operate to manage, oontlic-ts among themselves about their dealing with other countries (as, for instance, in the case of GoCom)" are less Hkely to foster intematienal peace .. Conversely, internal regimes, which institutionalize co-operauon for conflict management only among their members, will be moreconducive to peacefulinternational relations. Anecdotal eviden(C seems to support this a.rgume:n t .

. Another ceJl.t[a~ issue :in the study of regimeconsequences refers to the extent to which. the publicly statedgoals .of regimes are actually achieved, The question of goa.l altain~me'nt can only be studied OR a case-by-casebasis, Yet, pursued at some I,cngth,. the results otthese investigations may lend. themselves to. formulating hypotheses about the interactive effects of various regime 'I;XU1,sequences. Furthermo['e~ it m,ay turn out that only certain types of regimes exbibit a high propensit,y towards goa] attainment. As to empielcal evidence, there is hardly a single ease of an eff-ecUive international regime which could be said. to. faU thetest of goal attainment in toto, However, taking. regimes. in issue areas of eavironmental proteenon as examples, the degree of goal attainment, can be very limitoo, sometimes only permi~t~ng the conclusion that, without the regime, the environmentajconditions would be worse (List 1990u.t 199'1). In fact, this assessrnentakmeeould justify the energies spent on studying fnternatianalregimes. Howev'er~a:s our knowledge about international regimes as bulldiagblocks of lnternational governance increa:ses,thisminimaUst eeneeptien of regime; impactmay tum. ousto be overly cauUous.~2

12: Most of the issues of this Ketlon areronher disoussed. both tllilcofetlcaliy ~nd

illl tile; Ugh.t of cmpi:dcal cases, in Ch.1i.4 below. -

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

22

Volker Ritlberger

(). CONCLUSION

Looking back at. Otis brief overview of bow German International Relations scholars first embraced the researeb progr.anune, on international regimes, mitiated by their North Americancolleagaes, and then struggled to adapt it to pn~vamng 'interests of 'cognitioni (Habermas) in the German Intemational Relations community ~ I think. the elaim is not overstated that this research programme, rather than €urtm.e:r dividing the discipline, has offered a meetingground 'for transnational scho~arly d~alogue and cross .. fertilization, Although j.t is still true that the, communication. g,ap between Interaational Relations scholars jn North America, on rhe one hand, and. in Europe, and in Germany in particular, o.n the other ~ has not yet significantly narrowed (exceptions demenstrating the rule), joint state-of-the-art assessments of research on inter .. nationa] regi.mes contribute toredudng the a"!)y.mm.et:rie',,li in schQlarly commuaication across Europe and across the Atlantic. It seems to me, that the diffe;r,eut scholarly interests andpolitical, ev-en moral, concerns which lie behind the cellectlve efforts on both sides of the; Atlantic to advance theory-buildiagand empirical research on international ce-operanon and institutions complemen teach other wen. The variations of emphasis rejleetirrg different intellectual traditions and exposures to historical contexts should be seen as .aJ. source of mutual enrichment ratherthaa of estrangement, Regime analysis is certain~y not the, golden egg of internat~omd. relations theory development; yet. aside from Morgenthauean realism, no other research programme in International Relations has spawned such a transnational, eohesive scholarly community. Before it wiU have: outllved its usefulnesscthere still are a goodman)!' lacunae of both a theoretical and an ,e,m.pjrica.l natnre needing to be fiUed ..

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The Analysis of International Regimes Towards, a European-American Research Programme

,ROIBERT O. KEOHANE,

r. INTRODUCTION

The concept ofintemational regimes originated- not from social seientists' urge Ill' invent new terms for their own sake, but as a way to understand international co-operation, defined as co-ordinated mutual adjustment of states' policiesyieldin,g benefits to partkipants. Systematically organized co-operation is extensive in. world pali,tics; yet, very few rules are, hler,archicaU.y enforced, Rather, most cooperationappears to be organized horizontaUy 1"':d,ther 'thanverHcally, through the practice of reciprocity. Specific agreements are embedded in a multi-layered system in which agreements, are. 'nested' within a moee comprehensive set of a;greed-uponrules,. Understanding the fOmlationand impact of these syste,ms. of rule-s is therefore essential for an app:reda.tion of ilhe oonditk)'J»j, under which international co-operation could occur (Keohane 1983: 150).,

Thiscliarpter c{)uldl not have been written without tbe ~tcl:lsi;veand valuable d:iS(lllS~ion:s with panieiipafil:s ara meeting :in Tnb[ngelll:, Federal Republle of Germany.; in July 1991, !.lind, ,a 5ma~lcr working group meeting 311: DarfmO!,:!)th CoUege, New .HamPshire; USA~ in N(lVemhef 199.1. -I Him gratdul to Val.kc,. RinbClrger amid Gran R. Y:opng, !Tes~i,"'~lly" ror DiI'f!lIliWlii:zing tl1~ meetings. My tlIri.nk~!1g 00, definitions of inte:manona~ regimes has. bGn~fi.ted from these discus. sloas, pattiicularly (rom ooflluibuckifiS by Volker Rittbe:rger .and Micnae;1 Ziirm. My observatlans Oil! the lmpact, of intema.tioRaEregimcs reflect insiglhtftlil 'oonhibutions aI, the nbing,~n mooting by Thomas Bema.uer. Friedliic:hKratocn\riI,. Harald .MijUeC1 VQlk,(:t Riubcrger., Ora.~Yo!ln.g. and And.rei Zagonkt I am paliiti.ctl:Jaily gr;i!!~fu~ 'to Jeffry Frieden for ,comments 00 an cadi~f; versiGI.I!I.o~' this ~hapilie:r ,alnd for suggesting the term. 'oonc:r3Jctllal eJilv~r'Qlitmelfu';. Part'S of seetiens 4 :and 5 drnw velbatim~ with per:miisslon of the publisber. on Keohane (1'990).

Tclif hakk: 0 an male ya

24

R b O· V L

o .' ert ' .. ,n..eOriane

Over the past decade" much thought and effort. has gone into the study of iaternatlonal regimes, The definition of the concept has been debated and sharpened, A number of good descriptive studies of specific regimes have been, completed, and theories purporting to explain regime formation and impact have been devised. As the papers for this volume indicate, the concept 'Of mternational regimes can no. longer be considered a passing fad (Strange 1983). However. unti~ recently, researchon international regimes was conducted almost entirely by North Americans,uud therefore limited by the political and cultural assumptions that, North American social scientisl1! bring to the study of internationa.l relations, as well as by our lack: of. Ung,uIstlc versatility. Furthermore" progressIn intcgratJng conceptual, theoretica.l, and empieical work bas been disap'pO~Dting,; we stint do not have a well-tested theory of international regimes, These papers, however, reveal extensive ;QreHS of agreement: indeed, they reveal that social scientists on both side,s of the Atlantic who. are interested ~n systematic ,empl.rical and. theoretical analysis are thinking: in quite similar terms.

This chapter representsan attempt: to faeilhateaarensnatlonal investigation of the formation, natere, and ·e:ffe:ctiv,eoess· of interna tional regimes, Its dlscusslonproeeeds in tour parts. The next section (sect 2) rai ses issues of methodology ~ arguing for a. Weberian conception of 'objective' social selenee. Section 3 briefly examines, conceptsand definitions: what: do we. mean by 'inrernational regimes'? Section 4 addresses the theoretical issue o f1! whieh an .study of regimes depends: do regimes matter ~ and if so." bow and under what conditi;ons'P Section 5,finaUy, considerssome other questions that theorles of regimes should seek ~o explain, such as increases over time; in the number o[ regimes; variations in their membership, str~F!igth" and scope; and variations in property rigntsand rules,

2, A WEBERIAN APPROACH TO ~'OBJECTIVrl'Y' ]N SOCIAL SCIENCE

In the humanities, increasingly in history" and on the margins of the social ~clences~ it has becomepopular to deny the possibility

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Th« Analysis of Inl'e.rn~ational .R'egimes 25

of objective knowledge. As Gordon S. Wood (1991: 12) writes" 'the blurring of fact and fiction. is part of the lntelleetual climate of our postmodern tlme-« dominated as it '~s by winds of ep~stlemological skepticism and Niewchean denials Qf the possibility of objectivity',., The debunkers .of objectivlty have criticizeda carlcature of positivistic social science, according to which social change; occurs deterministieall Y';, social :scien'tists observe behaviour unmediated by their own percepeions andbeliefs, permitting them. clearly todistinguish fact from, value; and causalpropositions can. be verified, It should not be necessary to emph,asize that sophisdeatedccnremporery social scientists make none of those assumptions ... They see social reality as subject to random variation, effects of conjunctures between. unrelated events, and historical 'path-dependence', in. which earlier events probabUistkaUyaffect later ones .. 'Thus it would be n alvetobeUeve that one; could predict the fumrefromthe present, as if humanaffairs were like a highly complicated cJock..Furthermo:re,~ the evidence we have of human affairs must be Interpreted by observers before it is lmelligible partly because much of it derivesfrom arguments, justiftcat~.ons~ and otber forms of discourse, rather than. :stdctly from behaviour. Human. fa~libility guarantees measurement ern),' and bias (some deriving from observers' values) ~ and causal infen::Floes can never befinal.ly vedfie;d.

Nevertheless, methods of historical and. socia!!. scientific.rese:arch, r;equiring: evidence that other observers can a[80 gather and evaluate, permit 'ust.Q have some confidence in professiotilal accounts of events. Descriptive inference penults us to generaliae ~ and to understandtbe likely range of error of our generallzatlons, Methods of causal inference, qualitative as wen as quantitative, permit usto tesrandevahsate-e-semetimes to falsify~ never finally to verify-causal hypotheses. We expect social scientists to be self-conscious about, their own biases, and to by to guard against them; more important" we: expect criticIsm fro!Rl scholars witb d~fierent values to ex poise the effects of bias, on supposedly objective findlngs .. What Max: Weber referredte as "oojectivity' does not require that we accept what he called 'fantastic' elai ms about determinism in human affairs, much less that socialreaUty can be observed dired~y. It does, however, necessitate detailed hlsterical research,. the careful use of abstract concepts, or~id,ea'l typesj~ and the djsciplined comparison otobsereaden with concept.

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Raben O. Keohane

required were to be more than minhnal; however, this approach w()uldrequire investlgators tc solve very difficult problems of causal inference as a. precondition to identifying the regimes that they study .. Such a methodology would seem virtually to assure that investig,ators would be~or ever snue;k at the flest level: identifyjng the phenomenon to be studied. Furthermore, as noted above, the key theoretiealissue-c-the relatlcnship, if any" between regimes and. state behaviour'==wou~d beoome a definitional quesdon. Such anapproach would invert the usual order of sdentiUc investigation •. in whidl description, and descriptive inference, precede explanation. U is odd to have to explain behaviour On terms of regime rules) before identJfyingthe pracdcesto be analysed,

Yet the drawbacks of U pUf¢ly forma] conceptuallzerion remain substantial, It therefore seems sensible to define ,a:gnN~ments IU p:urely formal terms "explidt rui,es agreed by more than one state) and to consider regimes as arising when states recognize these agreements ashaving continuing validity. This de.finition has 'thin' substantive content: a. set of rules need not be ',effective·" toqua:H(y as a regime, but it must be recognized as c.ontinuin,g to exist .. USing, tbis denn.lUofl, regimes C:!Ul beidentifi,ed' by the existence of expficit rules that: are referred to in an affirmattve manner by gevemments, even if they arc, not neces5arilyscru.pulousl.y observed.

. ,

Thus,estabUsn.ing that a regime exists is an issue for descriptive

inference, based. onpubliely avaUable texts, rather than psychological ins.ight, or ca usat fnference ,I

Such a definition meshes wen with the; soctologjCtd. concept of institu:ticms" detined as persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and mformal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain acH\tjt:y~ and shape expectations .. Since an institutlon's rnles must be "persistent", tb~y must continue to be: taken intoaccount by parneipants, but no minimum standards of effectiveness are 'imp,lied. Internadonal institutions include formal intergovernmental Dr transnational organizations, internatienal regimes, and eonvenlions. Intemational organizations are purposive entiries, with bureaucratic structures and leadershlprpeemitting them to respond to events. International regimes ,are inst:itudons with expltcitrules,

~, On tliilciss.'lle, of' how best ~o oon(cpt:lla~i[ze .i.[Jtc~ational regimes. see.also Ch ..

W. sed .• 3.~ ~abo,ve.

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The Analysis ,oflmernati'onal Regimes

29

agreed upon by govemments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in International relations, Convendonsare infor.mai ins:Utu~ ti(ms, with. impUc;ltrul.es and understendmgs, that shape the expectations of actors (Keohane 1989a: 3 f).

4 .. .D.Q REGIM.ES MATTER?' IF SO, HOW'!

Work on lnternational regimes has been rheery-drtven.Tndeed, the Ameriean literature on international regimes has been shaped ~one m.ight say distorted-by its advocates' theoredcal struggles wi.th nee-realists, as represented by Kenneth WaHz.W·altz's (1979) articulaticn of a, syst,cmictheory of i nternstional relatlons, selfconsciously deductive and rigorous yet: ecnslstent with the core propositions of realism, challenged institutl:onaUsts by downplny~ lagthe role of internatioaalhtstitutions within ~self~hel.p systems', just as it annoyed students of foreign policy by stressing the primacy of intemational structure, wit:hou't by any means denying the need for a theory of foreign policy (Keohane 1986b).

Regime, theorists have proposed a, number of f,eaSOrls why reg." imes should matter .. Within a modified nee-realist framework,

I". L.:

internadona] regimescan affect both the .c.apabilitie,'i and the

buereas of states. International regimes can affect eapabffides by serving as a. source of mfluenee for states whose pollcies are consistent with regime rules, or which are advantaged by the regime~s dedsion~making procedures .. In Power and .lnter:dependence (1.977) Josepb S. Nyea.nd I referred to these irdlJuefic.e resources as 'ior:ganizadonal[y dependem capabflities'. Regimes may also alter the und.edyingpowe;r capabilitiea of states, whether by reinlorclng the dominance of ricbJ powerful states, as dependency theory argues, Of by disslpating jhe hegemon's resources, as claimed by some versions of hegemonic stability theory (Kras.ne,r 1983b)., International regimes mayalso, as claimed byfunc.tlonat theories, aUerca1culaUons of inte:restD:yassigning property righ.ts, providing information, and altering patterns of transaetion costs. Outside ofa nee-realist fr.amewo:rk, regimes can have other effects on state action: by altering bureauc.r,aticpmctjoes and ruJes (or 'habj,t;s~); by promoting learning about cause-effect relationshlps; by aUerlng ideas, about the legitimacy and value of practices; by

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R'obert O. .Keohane

beCOIDI.ng embedded in bighe[-~evel normative networksr' by incre:asing the politlcal salience of certain Issues;. by 'changing the balance ofpoHdca~.Enflu(mce within domestic pomics; or by enhancing thepolitieal or admini5trative capacity of governmental, or non-governmental organizations wh.Mn countries. T<) some extent nee-realist and institutionalist theories are complementary, Students ofinternanonal regimes need not discount theroles of interests and power ill world pnlitica, Nor do sophistieated nCQrealists have to deny that ideas ca.nbe impenanr or ignore the impact of regimes on domestic poUties. Regimes could conceivably have any 'Or aU of the effects attributed to them; under different conditto~s. Thus the theoretical debate bi. not nearlyas divisive as the i nrellectual chasm that separates, scholars seekine ~objecdve' knowledge inW,ebe;r!s sense and those who deny its poS\sibUity. Disputes about the effects of international regimes, or about th e conditions. under which they come into existence, are: not irresolvable' because of deep epistemological or methodelogical 'conflicts .. Theyere simply unr:esolvc.d because we have not. done the work. necessary to formnlate theories. in ~:est,ab]e. ways or to test them empirically ..

With respect to, theoretical presumptions, therefore, ill programme of research onjnternatienal regimes cantler a Inmdred flowers bloom' .. Indeed, diversity of tbeolc~i:calv~ewpoints is. desirable, since It wiU he~l" to generate more lnterestlng hypotheses. The only requirement is that: theories need to' be formnlated in such a way tbat. hypothecse~ are derived from them, and that these hypo~.hesesa.rein principle subject to fal:silfication thr-ough. empirical work. Propeuents and. scepHcs of each theory should seek tmsginattvelyto think of observable consequences: of the: theory, and. of ways to test whether these hypothetical consequences in fact .obtain.

These consequences need not be at the level of the, international syst:c:m.. .of eonrse, the, most obv,ious implications of rheodes of regimes win be at this level.the unit of amdysis win be, the regime itseU~al!ld inqlLtiry win locus. On its characteristics, However, many theories ofintematioeal regimes win have implications at the bevel of the state .. For instance, if regimes transmit ~nrorwatioo, governments' prooo-dll.lres, for h:atu:U],ng. and disse;mina.ting information

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

The Analysis of International Regimt!s . 31

should change asthey join regimes, or as the rules of the regimes are modifiJedL Ifregimes operate throegh reciprocity, we should observe foreignpolicy actions designed to monitor other states' actions and respond ina. tit-for-tat fashion. Jn general, social scientists should 'encourage stringent te-sts by giving more credence to, hypot.he;se·s that pass such. tests than to those whose propos;Iti.ons are banal. and obvious, The more stri.ngent the test proposed, Ule more tmpJlessive a hypothesis that passes h.

What we essentially seekto ascertainis bow much exp~alla.tory leverage we wmgain by including International regimes, among other undoubted.ly important factors, in our explanations of state policles and. their octcomea. 'In. so far as we can show that regimes are often etfeetive, students ofintematiorial relations will have to take them system.atica.lly into account in explaining st:ate~poHcy. Having: established fhesign.incance of regimes, we can then neat effectlveness as, a variable, to beassessed comparatively across reglmes: under what con:dill,Otl'S, we wiI[ ask" do regimes matter, and in what ways? Ef£ectivencss~ and its preconditions, will become central sub] ects forrheoretlcal and empi.dca.li:n;y',estigation. rather than defining characteristics nf regimes,

Oran Young (t9890: 206 f.) is right to observe that the proposition that tntemationel regimes are signl,ficant has often been 'relegated to the realm of assumptions rather than brought to the forefro~t as a focus "for analytical and empirical inve·stigatiori~. Nevertheless, some good. recent work has, sought to examine whether the existence of international regimes has been associated with changes in patterns of state behaviour (Ymmg 1979, Nye; 1987, P. M .. Haas ·~989). Yet there remains a fundamental diffieulty in asse;ssing the impac.t Qf international regimes: causal inference is dIfficult where experlmental or statistical research desI.gos, are infeasible .. We, do not have ahypothetical instituUonfree baseline from which to measure the impact of actual institu~ lions on state capabilities. Likewise, we: might be tempted to attribute ce-operation among. states" inacccrdance with internetional rules, to constraints on short-range self .. mterest, or changes in long-range .self~interest:,resuh:ing. fr()m. those rules.Butboth the co-operation and the regimes couldin principle be reflections of some t:hird set: of forces, such. as patterns of co:mple:rnentaI:Y interests and und.erlying distributIons of power, wit:hontll~gj.mes ha.vi.ng any effect. at all, H i,t were possib~e to use an experimental

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32

Rober« O. Keohane

design, wewouJd control for other explanatory facters, such as

di .·t·: lb tie . ,-::f" , ..' n •. ' " id interes: '.; 'a,': -.-.,.-- - ·'-·'t,'t-,· -:~ ·'-c - '11 ,·~h·,·' .'.- ·c~

~s nnuuens 0 .powc,r 41U'L mterest, an . vary rnsu utronal c arae-

teristlcs. Unfortunately, we cannot, .actua.uy perform su.chaJl experiment, As Rittbergerand Michael Zurn (1990: 40) argue:

I:!tv~tigatil}g the, {;Q~:seqyencesQf ~t!terniltio~al r.egi~ r.eql!!i~es a 'OO~!1!te:r~ factual ergumenr. 111 ease, the oonnkts, In theissue area are mot managed by a r-e~:nle.~beOi one has to speculate about what a Icgimec-vuld do .. And if areglmc does e:x:~!')t, one has to eope with. the question of. what wf.mld' be wi:thoutit. 3

One could try to deal winh this problem, in part, by using a research design that compared behaviour be:(oife and after the institution of a. regime, Clearly, one would have to control for other factors th at migh t also have changed; but with a careful designand a sufficient: nmnbercf cases, a. researcher could hope to Isolate the impact of ,ehaogesin cxpUdt ndes .. .I believe that such re:sear-cbwO'tdd be w(lrth while, To do SO,. however, requires a strict definition ofr'Internationel regime', sl!1chas the one I proposed above, nil,a.~ ~I:illks the concc:pt to spec~fic, observable behaviour ..

One way of assc;s:s:ing: the sl.gnificance of international regimes is to see whetbe:rgQvemrnents roudnely fellow their rules. We know from Hwory that co-operation does not take place automatlcaUy, even in a co-ordination game lacking fundamental confUcts of ~nteres.(.We also know that in world politics, distributional conflicts are endemic, even when incentives existfor co-operaricnr tak~n£t:hi~faC1: into account, RiUberger and Zurn (1'990; ]6) re-fer to regimes as one form of 'regulated contilkt management'. Routine rule-fuUowing in situations r~quidng co-ordination, where various actions wouM be possible, is evidence for the impact of regimes.

More far-reaching effects of regimes can OC.oUf when actors alter their coneeptions of self-interest through mutua~. persuasionand the accumulation of seientifie knowledge, This phenomenon has, belen observed in the European Community, the Internationa! Monetary Fund and World Bank, on envhoumentel issues such as. ozone depletion (E .. B. Haas 1.990~P. M. Haas, 1990~ Keohane and 'H" o ffm ann ·1'1 Clf1l B·· ened ick ~11I9c·l· Ha .... 01' Keoh '" 0["'" an d Lew 1990)1

'JL", __ ,I_~ __ ~,iYi._"",liI! "IL?,';:1.-" , __ I!\,oI ...... '_..'_ " __ J .l7","-"""" .""L.I __ (JII~", - ,. -,L,~"I!!!"":tI, IP'.,... J - '''_ ~

and im the East-West:regi.mes studied by Rittherger (:19900') and

~~. FOir <'Iii! extended argolli1,ent aliOng the: same lines see Ch, 13 below.

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

The Analysis .of International /Reg,imes

'1'.5' .. '

J" ·.1

necessarily hegemony-e-could only be necessary conditions for the formation of internatienal regimes, To, obtain a fuller account, 'it is necessary to look at, demand as weU as suppl.y. The most obvious source of variation in demands is changing interests, or preferenees.of states.Preferences can bealteredby change's in domestic; polidca,~ institutions or coalitions, For instance, 'Nazi Germanywas less wilting to enter intointern.ationalarrangem.ents ill the 1930s than was Us Wei.mar predecessor; and after Second WorM War, tha Federal Republic ofUtc 1950.8 was positively anxious to be included in arrangements that would have been anathema. to the Nazis. As this example suggests, domestic political changes can either improve or worsen prospeets £or the fQrmaUon. of iaternational regimes,

Preferences are aJsoaf.fec.ted byvariatiens in levels of interdependence.Flesr, even if states were unitary decision.;makers~ their ability to attain their objectives would be affected by theactions of others. At big~er levels, of interdependence, the opportunity costs of not co-ordinatingpolicy are, greater, comparedto the costs of sac.[],HCiing autonomy as a. result of making binding agreements, The result can be expectedto be higher demand for international agreements, Secondly, high levels of interdependence are li~elyto affect. domestic poUtical institutions and ooaliUons, and therefore the preferences of governments (Katzenstein '1.985, Goareviteh 1'986~ Rogowski 1989 f Karns and ·Min_gst ]990).

Another source of change in the demand 'or regimes~ in addition to rising; levels of interdependence and changes in domestiepelities, Ues in the 'contractual envlronmear' wi.thin which states operate. In the absence; ofapptopriate institutions, the abilities .of states to make agreements .may be thwarted by externalities, uncertainty, lnformadonal asymmetries,and fears that partners wnlbehave oppostunistlcally, They may be unable to make credtble commitments even to establish mutuaUy beneficial arrangements. International regt'mcsarist'i to resolve these problems, although :if the barriers to information exehangeare suffi,d:e:ntly high, such institutions; may never be formed in the first place. If no ccntractual problems existed " no :~nsUtutio.ns wou~d be needed, and if contractual problems were utterly severe, no institutions would be possible .. Fo:r jntcro.ationa~regime,s to be devised:~ contractual probIems must be significant but not

'I:. ·1"'· overwi~e,mmg.,

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36

Robert O. Keohane

TO' account fior the increase in the number of international :regi[[Jc~~Oo'IDtr~l,(;tlU!,aH sts make two principal arguments: 6

L Regimes perform the functions of redueing unce:rt~ainty and the costs of carrying old transaerions for the,lr members; but institutions are themselves cosdy to create and maintain, As the numberand importance of related is.'5ues within a, given polky domain increase, the costs of creating Dew instimtiens will faU relative to' the costs of inventing new rulesandprocedures for each Iss-ue that a.r.ls€!cs.fn other words, increases in issue density win lead to a demand for the creation of lntemetiona; regimes.

2. Fntcrnati:onal regimes that succeed in establishing relatively clear rules, which provide standards for judgement of behaviour) arid stabUizinge.xpectati.Qns, thus reducing uncertainty, will become valued and wllltherefore 'tend to create a demand for the maintenance oj international regimes (Keohane .~ 984) ..

Aecording to this, Line of argument, we should. expect thata corabination of ,increa.s~l1g interdependence (leadingto high levels of issue density) and success of existing institutions will tend to lead both to. an expansion of institatinnal tasks and to an increase in the Dumber of functioning intenrarional regimes.' If collecnve action dilemmas are seriousviacreases in the number of players and especially in the di:ffus~()n of capabilities among them wUl raise: the costs ofco-cperadon, HOWCV1eIJ inrernattotra I regimes, may not suffer as a result; indeed, rules such as those in the GA'rf) limiting unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment to members, can be interpreted as Institutiona~ respnnses to collective .action probl~ms,

Although increasing interdependence and previous institutional success WI.U tend to expand the tasks assumed by international regimes, thisincrease in activIty will not be uniform acrossissue areaa, s~nce spedncfeatuf1cs, of the, environment will vary. In some

!l' In After Hegemony J rd(l~d to' a "funcliGtnalli theory' of internahonal, regimes.

Howe,'V:e,r,sh:u:e, 1ha,t plui:'aoocarrie~ connotation!' ofooci()l.ogit"a~ fum:lioIilRHs;m. witb whiclh Id{} ~ot i.dc:ntifY. T now usc Ehcc ~.mgua8e of 'eontractaalisrn' rather than ~rUl1ctiolla]~lm ",

1[[1 'contra'!UbJ' Vol:I:.er Riuberger and Mi.chac;~ Z:ilfn (1990; 2,9)., who ha\i'C stated t~ilt~thc functi:o~arn ~~ory of inlc:rnadona~. TC'gimcs; doe'S Dot Cl,)lnttlbll1ie to expl.aiining regimeiu:rmatiQu"I !believe {hat el(:p\h~i.m:illg re;girne fO'fmali,(lfi WR eae ·of t~~ most iRlporlant contrihutions oft thi8thcOityl.The~be-my helps us' to' un.dcntand whyj,ncre.asi[J~ int.e;rn:attonalinterdependenoe: iha'Sooen a'SsQcia.~ed withinereasi rig n,"ullibers of ifi!~Qr~aHotl<d fc~r:nei~,

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

The .Analysis of .Imernational .Regimes

37

cases rulesmay be self:'enforcing;, in others they ma.y be enforceable with appropriate regimes; in still others no conceivable i.n.ter-natlenalammgements win ensurecompliance with inconvenient [UIC5.

Thecomraenret line of argument has many rammeD,dons lor diffe.rent aspects of in.ternationalism, as sketched in the sections below, However, it bas onlybegun 1:0 be tested, and the resuhs from case studies are mixed. 'International regimes often seem to

d ' •. ' "d '. . . " ... ' . , ' ..

re nsee nn . .;e:fuunty an, .,' transaction costs, m response to nsmg

interdependence. (Keohane ],984, 'Ore 1986~ Za.dhcr 1987, Kapstein 1989).Howeyer~ severalcase studies, of regime chang,efi.nd con .. tractual arguments, insuffident to account fur observed behaviour, arguing that the effects of regimes to wbkh they point were i.nsi.g,n,ificant (Mora.vcsi,k 1989)~ that ideologlcal hegemon.y was

, - .

important (Donnelly ~986) ~ or that changes in states' conceptions

of their preferences.as attected by transnationalnetwerks, were more important than contractual Uleoriecs assume (Smith 1'981, 1'.;, M .. Haas 1990). It is d.ifficult at this point to generalize about the relative importance ofthese contractual factoss, as ccO'ili.p,an:d to the effeets of shUts ]R the distribution of capabilities and changes in the .interests or preferences of states, as, shaped by changes in interdepe.ndence,~interacUng with domestic poHti.cs. The:re seems to be some merit in the contractual. arguments, but effects pre .. dieted by these arguments are neitber uniform nor o~etw.helming]y strong.

It :is important to emphasize tba.t sensible adherents ofthe contractual approach would propose, it not, as a substitute fOf the analysis of power, interests, or interdependence, but rather as a useful supplement to those traditional modes of po1iti,calamdySiS. 8 I' discuss it here not as a. theoretical panacea but as a. relatively novel way of throwing .Iight .on some puzzlee of internationalism"

. -

It is pa.:rti.cul,a:rJ,y importantthat my discussion of contractuallsm

should. not be interpretedas im:,PIy.ing that international institutional arrangements are 'opthnal'.

In seeking to account for the increase in the number of int:er .. national regimes, the eontractnat fheorist wiUnot ignore the s(ructu.re: of world power or domestic po:~~tks. But she should also

f! As Ernst: B. Hails (1964; 2(h.SQI), lil!a,<i ,emphasilz.ed~any cfearsepar.a!tion betwccn

fllnctional and pow~r :fIrguliiie:ntsis mlskadl:lll8,. -

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

38

.Roben O.Keohan.e

expect to find anmcrementatpettern of change, promoted by

.,- ,ffi~, i;]5.· . ,f' r ·it·, ati , .. JI - "- •. t,,> ,- " ;" ;-.;, -c·- llas iL· .. · .. th .. '. '. . f ee ,- i', ]

Q_, CJl.~._ 0 , rmernanonm orgamsauons lIS we, .1. as uyuose o~. centra.

governments: we should observe responses of regimeste problems ill:volvimg externalities, uncertairnly, and high oosts of transactions. Increased interdependence sheuld lead tolntergovernmental

a- ttempts to nromote 'co ...... nerstion as in E- -i,U,.,O'Iil ..... d .·ur~lj1lc:tL,.,. :' OOrt",

."_V,,,-,_,_ ,,-_.,;:11 __ ' __ y",.. _-d!!,=_. "'_ .. ---~"'-,r"'V_;~''\'''_~_<'' !IiiJII,_ .. ,11.1 L • _,IJ"_--.t"·\;;,i -_. _ l!llll,e 11. •. h .• ' L~,':701~,'"

5.2. What Explains Varia.lions in. I n'stitutional M ember.sh.ip~ 's,trength" and .scope?

In the woddpoHUcal economy, issues of trade have been more insti~utiona.~izedthanthose of money, and much moreso, at Ieasr om a global basis, than. those involving oil. Some commodifies, such as coffee have bee;n sub] ectto elaborate internati onal regimes; others have; na('.With respect to the, pbysical environ- ,,-' nt ,-' ,.0: t." , ,II - ... - -'-, .. ,- .. --, ... ''!II : -:' tta ker d is· Ih r·' ~S fisherj·es men[, 10 erna Ulna.~ reglmesgo en:ung 1 an. c-,~.c~~a~geL' ~.~~~.c __ c ~.~'

in many areas of the open sea, and Antarcticahave preceded eomparabie attempts to :reg;u~atje deep-sea mining, transboundary flows o.f 'pollutants, including nuclear fanout~ or actions that adversely affect. the armespherie ozone layer. Even among those areas in w hich international regul aliian takes place, differences exist ln pa Items, of representation ,.secret:ariat~ au tonomy ~. the status of experts, revenue base, voting, budgeting, the monitoring of compliance, and avariety of other organizational characteristics (E .. 13. Haas 19.90: 65).

DUfereIill explanasions of va dation across issue areas could be devised. Analysts could focus on the distribution of power; 0[1 the preferences of states a'S affected by interdependence or domestic politics; on thecontractual environment; or on. some combinaliml of tbese factors. Even for the same states ~ domesticpelitics differs across issue areas j, and the states that are involved jn d if:fe:.rent issue areas are not the same .. Thus complementary interests in one area may contrast, with confHcting interests in another as a result of differences in domestic pollrlcs. The distribution of eapahilities and the lntensny .of iaterdependence differ across issue areas .. Contractual environments a:~so vary: externalities, u.!J]certa.inty~ and transaction costs: differ from one issue area to another. I emphasize contractual theories here in the hope of making some usc:ful points (,hat: might otherwise; be overlooked,

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

TI!:e .A.na~y;sis at Inle.rnational Regimes

39

I nst'itutional Membership

Different international institutions apply different criteria for membership. Two, questions differentiate the major situations. 0) Is membership in princip,te open to all states within a certain geo .. gr.aphicalarea that accept eertaingeneral principles and rules, oris. it e"p'licltly .Hmit,ed on the basis of dJormestic pdiItical arrangements or as a function of setecnon by present members? (2) If tbe former, how rigorously do members employ fhe,c.riteria embedded in the rules?

Restricted imtitutio.r1S (e .g, NATO~. OPEC, OECD~ Ee) delibor .. at~ly limit membership to a relathr,ely swaU number of sta testhat have some set of interests in common, OJ that have specified domestic po,:llitical arrangements, The rationale for these mstitutions, as t:raditionaUy constituted ~ would disappear were their memberships In become universal .. Conditi,onally open institutions (e.g. the IMF, GAIT, the GATIcodes) are open inprinciple to states that are wimng to accept a set of prescribed commitments, ·whic.b not .a11 states may be able (much less w,i,IHng)to make ... Conditionally open institutions adopt measures to exclude nonproviders: f110m. benefits secured by eo-operation. For instance, major GAlT members, during the Tokyo Round ofthe 1970s., perceived that they cou:~d benefit from agreements on a number

- f - - - - - "fl- - .. . - -'h - - - - - - - - - t- - - - - - - t d bsidi

, _': - -< 1:_ I,: 1,·'_' I : ,. ,- -I,', : .,,1, !I"-: _-, .. _ i-,', ',-,.,.; - -I-:'-~~_,,--~, ,., I: ,._' --~~I,' -, ~~,L _-:- ',I

c spec •.. e issues, sue . asgovernmen . precuremen an SUSI nes,

but that many OATT members would not makeccmmttments to provide benefits (e.g, open markets for foretgn suppliers and tIanspan:mcy and ~imita:don. of expert-peomctlng subsidie,s.) on

- = - "

these issues, They therefore agreed to codes open toall GATI'

members, but they sought to U:mU: their benefits to those countries tha.t adhered (,0 theobligations of the codes. Open institutions such as the, United Nations can be joined by all sovereign states, with the exception perhaps ofpariafu states, with minimal further requirements formembersbip. Some institutions that were origin;a~ly concehl',ed of as conditionally open, requiring commitments and a certain form of government, such as the United Nadons (which initi.aUy excluded defeated enemies and certain states considered fascist; such as Franco's Spa.ln)thave become open insti tU.nOllS; others that beganas open ,s:uchas certain fisheries regimes, have become only conoition.ally open (Young 1989a: 5t) ..

International insti,tution:s of all three types are doubtless

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

42

Robe,rt O. Keohane

be cans the 'strength~ of an intematicnal regime, tie:fcrring to 'the stringency with which rules regulate the behavior of countries'. Extreme: 'weakness' of a regime denotes lack of regnlation in the Sutton~ZacheF sense, Aggarwal seeks to specifychanges in the st:reng.th of inrernasional textile, regimes betweeQ 1950 and the early 19BOs, and to account, ,chiefly on the basis, of lnternatjonal and domestic ,structure~fQrvari.ations in the strength of these regimes, particulerly what be sees asthe precipitous declineof the:

M:ulti.fibve Arr-angement after Jl977.

The, most extensive and. sophisUcated efforts, to e:xpJ,ain whi.cJh. issues are regulat.ed.thtougbintemational institutions were undertaken by students ofregional political integrationin the, 1960s and ea.dy 19708. 'They developed a. higbJy differentiated and sophisticated conception of integIation,which is related to the 'strength" of re~Jm.es but which is expl.idt:ly mu1UdimensioflJaL These Senobl[8 not only soughtto a5Se-SS the descriptive argument that European politics was beccming more centralized. and less subject to veto by .indi.vidual states, but tried to account for intee-regional variation in the success of integrative efforts· (Nye 1971, Lindberg and Sche:ingol.d 1970).

The reinvigoration of tim European Community with the Single, European Act, a nd current discussions ofa loosely defined ~politi~ cal union" have begun to prompt renewed anentlon to processes, or poUt:icalinteg.ra.tion.. The: Eur-opean CommunIty IS becoming an example of the "pooling and sharing of sover,e:ignty" ~ described well neither by the metaphor of 'co-operation under anarchy'< -sincc (he elaborate networks. of rules, obligations, and organizatiofis ar-e far from aaaechic-e-nor by the image of ccntralizatirm implicit in the concept ofpo1i~ica] integration (Keohaneand Hoffmannt99'l). Yet as an internationalinstituticn it is sui generis~ characterized. by more diffuse, reciprocity j and. greater mutual influence on members' policies" than the typk.aJintemat~onat regime. More research is needed to understand the poUtical dynamic.s that made European regimea.cenrred on. the European. Community, so much stronger than other intemational regimes, evento the extent of eroding the ooverei:gnty of poHHcaHy and administratively capable member states.

The Scope o/lnt:ern;olional Regimes

The political integration Iiterature also directs OUf attention to variation sin the polkJr scope of lmernational regimes.We observe

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

The AnalysIs of Internalional Reg,imes

43

substantial variation in the scope, of international regimes, ranging from narrewlyregienal to global, Such variation is apparent em such di¥e,rse issues as trade, currency areas, sbipping,andregula .. tion of the physical environment .. Consider, for eiXample~,the natural resource regimes studied by Oran R. Y oung, International regimesare often quite narrowly regional: Young mentions the, N orth Pa.cific· halibut regime" the Fraser Rhr,er salmon regime" and t,be North Paeifie fur seal regisne, Yetglobal regimes have also been instituted, as is the case for whaling,

Young (1:9890: 121 fl.) suggests from a normative standpoint that the opti.maJ. size; of a. regionalautbority for natural resources sbould :reftect costs and benefits, Relative]y small reg~onal organizationsavoid serious collective action problems and can. tailor their rules to the spedfi.c conditions of the area; at some, point in their ,expansion? transaction costs win. tend to rise more rapidly than is justified by the gains cfiaereased size, such as economies of scale and the internalizatien of exrernalnles within a regime .

. Y O'ung is using what I have called at contractual. approach to make a normanvepolnt, but the poinr is also relevant tloexplan,a.tion:if we assume calcul,8Jting.ratiorull1ity by actors, we can expect that actual arrangements wiU roughly correspond to this coat-benefit IOgi.c,. One 'Wor~,bwbile way to evaluatethe validity of centraetual atgumeats would be to see whether the:-y eould explain variations in tbe scope of institutlonallzed i.n~ern.atio'naJism across issue ar-eas ..

5.3. What ACCfJunts for Variations in Property Rtghts tmd Rules?

Ernst Haas (1990: 2) has observed. that LaU international organizatiens are, denbera.te~y d.tsigned by their founders to isolv,e problems' that require collaborative acdonfora solutlon'v Prcbtems are solved by international, regimes .1 argely by creating rights and .fl!lles:as Young (1989Q~ 15) has arguooJ' "the coreQf every international regime is a cluster of rights and rules, [whore] exact content is a matter of intense interesttotheseaetors'i People who constructregimes have perposes in doiug so J and the rights and ru~es of regimes lieflectvi$i()!Ps of what sorts of be havi OUi should be encouraged or proscribed. Intemational regimes vary in their purposes even within issueareas, as is illustrated by the eontrast

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

,44,

Raben O. J(lwhane

between GA TI's espousal of non"discriminatory trade and UNCr.AD's emphasison special privileges,ior develo,p~ng countries. The content: of the rights and rules of international regimes changes over time:. Evt'nJlf we understood why certain areas of activity are, regulated while others are: not" and the strength and scope of internarional reg:lmes" we would not: fuUy oomprehend international regimes unless we had some insi,ghts into the purposes that they are meant to serve (Ruggie 11983b, 1991.a~ Nau 1"990).

The purposes of international regimes have not .only changed OVitt time ; they vary across Issue areas inthe extent to which they are designed to support, supplement, or supplant a world market economy. :International arrangementste maintai (l! currency eonvertibility ~ the GA~ITregime: Umi.Ung the rights of states to impose; restrictiona on trade, and international legal regimesproviding for enforcement of contracts:~ support the market. Lending by HLe World Bank or the IMP to developing countries and arrangements such as the; M1l11tifibre Arraegement in t~exUle trade; modify market arramgemen ts .. Proposalsfor a New Internationel Economic Order or 'for an authoritative regimeto eonrrol extraeticn of seabed! minerals would, have supplanted. markle! mechanisms with authoritativeallceatien, involving either political allocation. of resources or limitations on the rights of non-state actors.

Purposes matter, bur so do power and history. Stephen D.

Krasner (1.98:5) has sh~own that variations in aeecss to rule-making, and the leverageprovided by state sovereignty, help to account for differences I n the rules of in rcrnatlonaleconondc regimes ,. In what could be called an "arehaeological' approach to international regimes, Judith Goldstein 0'986) has em phasizedthe extent to which contemporary iaternational regimea retlect the views of dominant states at the time Qf their founding .. 80(:;1a1 scientists need to look not . only a.t t.ne purposes ofcontemporary leaders. of states, but also at the power of access, and the weignt of thepast, to. understand the coatent of contemporary international regimes,

6. CONCLUSIONS

Inrematlonal regimes have beenthe subject, during the last decade, of substaatial research in the United States, a.nd inc.tle:asing~y In

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

The A,nal'ys,(s a/International Reg'imes

45

Europe. Yet there are stUl huge gaps in our knowledge. We do not have very much solid sdentific knowledge about the sources of change in mtemadonal institutions over time, or thecauses of

•• ", W"" d t k .•. ' fi l

van-anon across issue areas- we nee ~ ~O -,eep mqiU.lnng:~ ,r81 •

of aD~abouttbe impact, of regimes on states' capabilities and preferen.ces~ and therefore ontheirpolicles, It is also intriguing to ask why international, regimes bav,e become: so much. morenumerous; why their insdtution.al a rrangements-e- including membership" strength, and scope-vary so moeh;, and what. aecounts for varia dons in the rights and rules that they establish,

,A good deal of thinking bas already been done about interne .. tional r,e8imes~altbaugh we hardl:y have weJI-specified theories, Approaches that could be useml for explaining variations among issue areas and intec£nationa~ institution.s include nee-realist argumen ts stressing reladve stale eapabtllties: arguments about interdependence and. dome-stic politics, :separatel,), or together; contractualtheories emphasizing responSf';SIC) externalities, uncertainty, and transaction costs; and models of ofganizationa.1 adaptalion and learning, None of these perspectives has established itself as superior, but an contain promising elements, To evaluate these

_' ~-

theories systematicany ~ investigatcrs require a common de:6mition

of the concept 'intematienal regime' and a. consistent empirical methodology. Such a. definition, and moethooology )3.re QOW shared across, the Atlantic. 'The next, step wiU be to' elaborate comparable categories for analysis so thatgeneraUzadons about mtematlonal regimes can be tested witb evidence from maRY eases". gathered by investigatersfrem a v,arlety of countries, with different geographi-

- - -

cal and nonnative perspectives, Then we win be" en route to a.

genuinely ·tra:nsnational~and social scientific) research programme to help us understand intemetional regimes, and broader patterns ·0'£ co-operati.on and discord, in a world characterized by astonishing change,

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

Tclif hakk: olan rnalcrya'

3

International Society and the Study ofRegimes A ReflectiveApproach

ANDREW 'H UR.REL.L

L IN'fRO'DUCTFON

This chapter se-eks to place the growth of the undoubtedly USdominated literature ,on reglme theo'rY'with~Qt:he broader traditi()n of tbought on the existence; of Jnternatkmal society. This tradition was in many w,ays a di:sUncnvely EUlope:an one whose central expression lay in the emergeace of ideas about the role and function of intemational law. M:orere'CeuUy it: has ccme to be associated wi til the work of such writers as Martin Wight and. Hedley Bull. This chapter addresses three questions: Pirst, wha.t does regimetheory tell usabout co-operation in huernanonel Ufe that theories of iaternational society do not?' Second, to what extent ean ideas about int:emaUonalla.w and society illuminate some of the weaknesses o.f regime theory? And third~ to what extent, if at all, does this analysi.s suggest areas fur further research'?

2;. THE CORE PROBLEM

Regime theory cannot be, de-scribed asa fad.;8S is sometimes alleged by its critics, because its central question is one wbich has

I wouLd Hke mthank. VQJ~er Ri.tUXl:rgC1:j• Wjlll~am. Wa~~a'CC, Ivcr NC'lm'IanA! and Lal'SAErit Cedermanfo:r their comments on atJear]~er version of this chapter.

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

50

been fundamental to the evolution of western thought about international relations: how is ce-operation possible between states claiming sovere~.ignty but competingfor power and influenoe in a situation of an an::hy? Equally the search For orig~nsis. not about finding earlier uses: of the term 'regimes", but rather about tracing similarities and differences between the multiple answers thathave heengiven to this basic question. The idea that 00- operation be-tween states was indeed possible andthat some form of international society could indeed exist has been a persistent theme of European thought and is extremely deep-rooted. The academic study oiinterna[Jional relations is often presented as being founded on t:he fundameatal differeTJ,c-e between domesti,c 'society' and internationaltanarehy'. Yet one of the most striking features of Europcanthougbt before :1914 was just bow fe-w theerlstsactually accepted such a dicho~omy.. Indeed the distortions produced by snch a rigid dichotomy and by the, parallel bifurcation of theorists into realist oridealist camps: have become at theme of much recent writing (Walker 1987, Ashley 1988),. It was perhaps Oldy theextreme nature Q:E post-war US realism that produced a situation .in. which co-operation cameto be seen as an 'anomait in need of eX,planation ..

But confusion has also 3F1:sen in the writings of those who have attempted to derive and explorean international society tradition. Thus, for example, Bull's use of the term 'Grotian' was applied in two quite distin,{."t senses and (except: In an early paper first written in the 1950s and published in 1966) he ncycrsyst:cmatic3Uy explored the difference~s between various conceptions .of international :society.1 His central purpose was to contrast. the- Grotian tradition with a Hobbesian, orrealist, tradition on one side, and with a Kantian, or cosmopolitan, traditirm on the other .. Yet theposi.tions with which the Orotian. tradition is contrasted tU01 out: .on closer inspection to be concerned with many of the same

l. Bull om~ 3~2) used the term. 'Gmti:an' iln twcsenses. first., tcdeseribe the ooclr.i:Qellilat tneir'C is such 3. tbin,S as ilnternliatiu!!lal society.; and •. second, to eomrast the soHdarrisr conception of intema!tio'Hial soci:et,' from Ih~ more plurali!>t Valtiellil:n conceptlen. The di8~inctiQn bluweeg the S()liid~ri~t and p]ur.di;:iiI: oConcepti.()fl!S, is laid outin his 'The Ol!"otian Conre;pt~on (If lntemD!tionnl Sodcty' (BuU 1966).. One ~mportlllnt fiealure of Bun's later work is tbe move away from ~.h.e plltruH:itl:rea1i~I. poSilions dominant~n The Atiareht:a"l SocktyfliJJd towards", more genu~t1,ely 'G:rotian'position (Bun :1.983). Para thoro;ugh. diisc!1i!'SSionof ~he Groil:i:<rn lraditi,uH and tbe: problems mised by it see Dull, KillgSln.l.ry'. and Roberu .. (990).

Tclif hakk: a an rnalcrva'

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