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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN STRATEGIC INFORMATION OPERATIONS by Bryan R. Freeman June 2005 Thesis Advisor: Hy Rothstein
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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: 2. REPORT DATE June 2005 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s Thesis 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations
6. AUTHOR(S) Capt. Bryan R. Freeman, USMC 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Organizing for and conducting effective public affairs (PA), public diplomacy (PD), and psychological operations (PSYOPS) in support of national security objectives is a complex endeavor. In many instances, the desired psychological “effects” are contingent on the efficiency of the organizational structure conducting the programs themselves along with the development and dissemination of appropriate messages and themes. At the present, the USG’s ability to influence on a global scale is deficient due to fragmented organizational structure and underdeveloped doctrine relating to strategic influence. Duplication of efforts, inconsistent themes, and the lack of a long-term, strategically focused, integrated information strategy have been inhibiting factors to American foreign policy success. This thesis will examine public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological operations, and look at how the U.S. Government (USG) has organized for and conducted strategic influence as it relates to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Information operations, public affairs, public diplomacy, psychological operations, influence operations, strategic communications, strategic influence, information programs 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified
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AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN STRATEGIC INFORMATION OPERATIONS Bryan R. distribution is unlimited THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. Oregon State University. Department of Information Sciences iii ..Approved for public release. Freeman Captain. United States Marine Corps B. 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2005 Author: Bryan R.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Freeman Approved by: Hy Rothstein Thesis Advisor Steve Iatrou Second Reader/Co-Advisor Dan Boger Chairman.
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inconsistent themes. public affairs and psychological operations. This thesis will examine public diplomacy. and psychological operations (PSYOPS) in support of national security objectives is a complex endeavor. efforts. Government (USG) has organized for and conducted strategic influence as it relates to Operation Iraqi Freedom. v . the desired psychological “effects” are contingent on the efficiency of the organizational structure conducting the programs themselves along with the development and dissemination of appropriate messages and themes. the USG’s ability to influence on a global scale is deficient due to fragmented organizational structure and underdeveloped Duplication of doctrine relating to strategic influence.ABSTRACT Organizing for and conducting effective public affairs (PA). and look at how the U. integrated information strategy have been inhibiting factors to American foreign policy success.S. In many instances. public diplomacy (PD). strategically focused. and the lack of a long-term. At the present.
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........... RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS...37 C.... OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE ... PSYOPS IN SUPPORT OF OIF ...13 A.............13 B............... OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ................. AMERICA’S STRATEGIC INFLUENCE COMPONENTS........................................... HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.21 1.................3 B.......................................... PUBLIC DIPLOMACY .......3 A....59 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .15 C.....24 3......................................46 V.......55 B...............37 B..........8 E.................................. CONCLUSION .....1 B.. THE COLD WAR ............. WORLD WAR II ...................29 H.................................. RECOMMENDATIONS ........16 D......4 C...........TABLE OF CONTENTS I......2 II......................................37 A.........22 2................. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN OIF ........ INTRODUCTION .............28 G...........57 LIST OF REFERENCES ................5 D......... “SELLING” THE WAR ...........25 E.......... INTRODUCTION ......... National Security Act Of 1947 ............. NSC 68 ..................................... METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... THE REAGAN ERA ..... THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY .... INTRODUCTION..... A NEW WORLD ORDER ...............33 IV.............................................................................................. Smith-Mundt Act ............... INTRODUCTION ........................55 A.......... PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS .....................................................43 D..........10 III........... WORLD WAR I ................................65 vii ......................1 A......25 F........... VIETNAM-ERA ......................... INFORMATION OPERATIONS ......................................
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Madeline and Jay. Hy Rothstein. without their continued support this would not have been possible. and children. I’d also like to acknowledge my wife. ix . effort. for his insight.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I’d like to thank my advisor. Angela. and patience in guiding me through this process.
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There are numerous reasons why a fissure exists between America and the Middle East: a broad cultural divide. 1 . the United States Government (USG) and the American people have wondered why we have been unable to effectively influence the majority of the population in the Middle East. strategic security Organizing influence objectives for and conducting in support an of effective national campaign is a complex enterprise. Since that time. the government has struggled with the question of how to both organize for and effectively conduct a strategic influence campaign in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE INTRODUCTION Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th. differences. However.I. Synergizing the effects of the various tools for strategic communications is a pivotal element of any successful information campaign. the States’ present conduct strategic influence in the Middle East is hindered by a dysfunctional organizational structure relative to strategic information operations and an institutional reluctance to recognize or value strategic influence as an effective instrument of statecraft. nevertheless and it ideological would seem incongruities. among logical that a nation with the vast resources of the United States United would be able to bridge capacity the to gap. A. political others. Also. and no less crucial to success is the crafting of appropriate messages and themes relative to a particular audience.
psychological operations. and the various changes in focus and policies from the beginning of the 20th Century to the present. the conclusions and recommendations section will attempt to tie it all together and make suggestions as to how the mission of strategic influence can be better accomplished in the future.B. the qualitative nature of the subject matter this paper will utilize several different approaches to aid in analyzing the U. strategic influence: public diplomacy. and public affairs as they relate to Operation Iraqi Freedom. to some degree. Chapter IV will examine public diplomacy. METHODOLOGY Due to the complexity and. strategic information programs. Next is a look at various U. First.S. primary thesis three components of U. their organizational structure.S. organizational strategic this structure and and examine inter-relationships influence the of information will components. public affairs.S. and psychological operations. Finally. 2 .
AMERICA’S STRATEGIC INFLUENCE COMPONENTS A. foreign and should. half-truths. and psychological operations are essential components of our overall national security strategy (NSS). 3 . Coordinating the two requires a delicate balance of truth. and propaganda. information The complexity and ever-increasing scope of the information environment has created a dilemma for the United States Government (USG) in that the traditional methodology and application of strategic influence. The proliferation of news sources. Since 9-11. as we know it from the Cold War.II. INTRODUCTION Public diplomacy. both satellite and internetbased has made it increasingly difficult to influence opinions and attitudes on a global scale. of strategic influence for The effective implementation can. public affairs. The requirement for a symbiotic relationship between foreign policy and strategic influence has always existed. the USG has had to almost entirely reinvent its strategic structure influence to meet methodology new and organizational requirements. be an programs enabling factor achieving policy objectives across a broad spectrum. may not provide a practical means to significantly deter or influence. opinions and actions. they While have all three elements but play complimentary roles separate relatively similar missions in the scope of an information campaign: to influence and shape perception.
is an elementary ingredient of command. IO applies to the full range of military operations: strategic. to facilitate civilmilitary operations (CMO). When that data is converted into knowledge and perception. what was once known as ‘information warfare’. psychological operations. intelligence. The Joint Doctrine operations for Information as Operations taken defines to information adversary (IO) “actions affect and decision-making processes. 2 Ibid. by DoD definition2. and information systems (C4I). unprocessed data. and serves to shape ideologies.B. as raw. In its various forms. Chapter II. communications. INFORMATION OPERATIONS ‘Information Operations’ is a relatively new term that describes the sum of various emerging technologies and information manipulation methods used in the conduct of. Information. IO is a tool that seeks to influence that decision-making process. computer. operational. information systems while defending our own”1. and tactical. the term ‘information it also operations’ includes the has a Although technological of non- connotation employment technical means. Joint Publication 3-13. 4-7. Information from sources such as the media influences perceptions and attitudes. Information operations. information. combat. 9 October 1998. 4 . or tactical deception. such as the exploitation of social and cultural factors or the use of less technical means of communication to convey information. it becomes an important part of the commander’s decision-making process. consist of: • • Military Deception (MilDec) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 1 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.
Joseph Nye Jr. 3 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Civil Affairs. The International Herald Tribune. Nye Jr. coined the term “soft power”. Noted author. and market economies. which he describes as the “ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals.”4 wielded or exercised in the form Soft power is of strategic communications involving public diplomacy. 9 October 1998. and psychological operations. “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”.3 There is a distinct difference between the elements of IO as defined by the DoD and what actually constitutes that which enables strategic influence. and Public Diplomacy. Joint Publication 3-13. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Public diplomacy as a tool for influencing foreign governments and populations has renewed importance for the USG given that it is now intimately involved in the GWOT. 5 . public affairs. Its scope is more strategic in nature in that its application is aimed at achieving political ends by exposing foreign audiences to American culture. and • • Operational Security (OPSEC) Electronic Warfare (EW) There are other components that loosely fall under the umbrella of Information Operations but are not considered ‘core elements’ or pillars of IO. C. Physical Destruction. 4 Joseph S.• Computer Computer Defense) Network Network Operations (which includes Exploitation. Chapter II. 10 Jan 2003. those include: Public Affairs. democratic ideals.. Attack. 4-7.
6 Tuch. speakers. most of all. Martin's Press. author of Communicating with the World. It involves exchanges. based upon study and analysis and thought. Public Diplomacy Forum. who stated: Public diplomacy is the studied attempt to understand foreign cultures and institutions so as to enhance the communication and advocacy of the national goals and interests of the United States.”6 Another definition of public diplomacy comes from Joseph Duffey. programmed visits. and other nations.According to the State Department. Available from http://www. influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.S. broadcasting and. Internet. public diplomacy is an “official government effort to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U. 1990. NY.org/1. public diplomacy is an effort focused on advocating American policy and ideals to foreign audiences around the globe. The now-defunct U.gov.htm Accessed 5 April 2004. Internet. intellectual encounters. 6 . Hans.7 Those elements engaged in the conduct of public diplomacy and concerned with its strategic depth must be cognizant of the targeted population or actors and the 5 “What is Public Diplomacy?”. September 1998. 7 United States Information Agency. director of the USIA from 19931999. Communicating with the World.usia. Available from http://www. It is the active engagement in such communication. strategic planning. conferences. 3. Information Agency defined public diplomacy as “promoting the national interest and the national security of the and United States through understanding.S. St. informing.”5 According to Hans Tuch. Accessed 13 December 2004.public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy uses various means of communication mediums to foster a shared understanding of American ideals and principles. in various broadcasting languages. in that it attempts between to a cultivate nation and universal citizens perceptions of other and support by countries identifying its own institutions and activities with those citizens’ interests. A common or shared understanding. • • • • • • • • • Important elements that must be understood include. sponsoring exhibiting U. about and values news policies transmitting 7 . but are not limited to: Religion Regional politics Social structure Literacy rates and language Relationships citizens Economic structure and viability Regional media influences Technology Education levels between the government and its Public diplomacy differs from conventional diplomacy. academic American and to exchanges culture.S. promotes a greater sense of unity amongst various of cultures policy and facilitates The the USG the accomplishment attempts to foreign objectives. which seeks collaboration between governments. exercise of and literary public diplomacy through distribution scholarships art and materials. theoretically.environment in which they exist. programs.
PSYOPS (IO) are a component of information information influencing objectives. however. September 1998.gov. the significant difference is that public affairs premise is used to inform domestic diplomacy audiences is to while the behind public influence internationally.oppressed peoples who lack information sources other than those generated by a despotic government. utilized correctly. Publication 8 United States Information Agency. That doesn’t mean to say that public affairs. is not an influencing factor on intended audiences. Public Diplomacy Forum. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS Psychological operations or psychological warfare employs specific techniques to influence audiences outside of the United States.8 From all appearances. either operations to a foreign in that conveys for the selected purpose of audience support behavior of military/political Because PSYOP messages are not intended to be or comprehensive. either in a subtle manner or through overt means. diplomacy.usia. its stated purpose is separate from public D. 8 . Accessed 13 December 2004. have been its kept mission separate When and from objective organizational public affairs structure and public diplomacy. Available from http://www. influence enemy commanders and political decision-makers. Internet. PSYOPS can reduce the efficiency of the enemy’s military forces. However. by itself. within their lower enemy The moral Joint and create confusion for Joint ranks. public diplomacy seems like a rather benign informational component similar to public affairs.
the Soviet Union. 5 September 2003 9 . had developed a missile defense system that could defend American soil against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strikes. President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980’s is a good example of how strategic psychological operations. Joint Publication 3-53. JP 3-53. and further encouraging the breakdown of enemy PSYOP messages. bankrupted itself trying to counter the program thus ending the Cold War. by themselves or in concert with 9 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. operations loudspeaker and other the circulation and radio television means of transmitting information that may encourage enemy forces to defect. can provide long-term. in this case the Soviet Union. desert. PSYOP may include political or positions.Psychological Operations. At includes broadcasts. of psychological leaflets. describes three categories of PSYOPS:9 • • • diplomatic Strategic Operational Tactical At the strategic level. By ‘selling’ the idea that the U. Continual attacks can magnify PSYOPS effects. announcements. broadcasts. strategically-focused manipulation of another political entity. the operational level. for all intent and purpose. or surrender. or official communications for the consumption of targeted decisionmakers or those who influence the decision-making process.S. It could either be political leaders themselves or foreign populations. accelerating the lowering of morale forces. in concert with a wellplanned and executed deception plan.
printed handbills. In layman’s terms. PSYOPS are conducted through the use of loudspeakers. the three levels of PSYOPS can be thought of as increasing concentric circles (tactical to strategic). All three of these types of psychological operations 10 are utilized to establish and reinforce perceptions of the United States’ military and political resolve.military deception (MilDec). E. as well as other means of conveying information to populations in a crisis region such as meetings between military commanders and civic or and religious operational leaders. are crafted such that they directly or indirectly influence military operations within a specific area of responsibility (AOR). PSYOP Although many of the are tactical dissemination means similar. The Assistant is Secretary responsible The primary are of Defense for Public public Affairs affairs with (ASD/PA) for managing of activities. translated into some sort of action by those units that rendered them relatively ineffective against Coalition forces during the initial attack to Baghdad. Operational-level PSYOP was conducted against the Iraqis in OIF in the form of e-mail and text messaging to regime military leaders that. Joint Publication 3-53. foreign means communicating affairs audiences through public messages. At the tactical level. in turn. 5 September 2003 I-4. their scope is different. 10 . Their messages should be conducted in concert with PSYOP 10 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. PUBLIC AFFAIRS The Department information of Defense (DoD) used possesses to a very (and healthy capability inform influence) foreign audiences during both peacetime and war.
public affairs 11 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. Joint Publication 3-61. defense-related web site production and maintenance. as well as other audiences that include members of the U. public announcements.programs. Public initiatives affairs include in news support of national strategic releases. 14 May 1997.S. Managing perceptions affairs public coordinated is crucial comprehensive influencing public overall perception of political objectives or military operations. The primary purpose of public affairs within DoD is to provide current and accurate information to military commanders. and by directive. press briefings. 12 Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. Congress. affects the legitimacy of an operation or campaign and ultimately may determine through campaign a its success or and to failure. 11 . Joint Publication 3-53. vi.12 The satellite global media coverage makes that is provided for by communications the planning public affairs more important than ever before. active duty and reserve military personnel. their families. The development of an information campaign plan that can capitalize on both the ability of the media to influence domestic audiences and psychological operations to favorably influence public opinion and perceptions abroad is essential. which. 5 September 2003 ix-x. The Department of Defense’s public affairs programs are generally coordinated in accordance with the interagency process and are intended to support 11 the Department of State’s public diplomacy efforts. and regional command information programs. community relations. However. in turn. official visits. The reporting of news influences public opinion. their staff and the private media structure. their staffs.
14 May 1997. official visits.15 However. The Department of Defense (DoD) claims to conduct public diplomacy through combined training exercises with foreign military’s. as provided by the DoD. Information intended for domestic consumption has ramifications far beyond the border of the United States. 15 Ibid. Joint Publication 3-61. activities. Principles of Information. these definitions. 13 Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. officer exchange programs.5. and military contacts with foreign officials. DOD Directive 5122.may not be used as a form of military deception or as an element domestic publicity included of or a disinformation audiences. sway or of campaign nor can against either or foreign to “propaganda designed in direct Defense] public opinion…be affairs [Department public programs. contradict the reality of public affairs.”13 Public affairs may not “focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion” and by directive “must be separate and distinct”14 from psychological operations. 14 Department of Defense. and institutions as well as to give an accounting of government management of public assets. Appendix A. Public affairs contrasts with public diplomacy in that its aim is to encourage public awareness on the domestic front and gain support for government policies. 12 .
port calls throughout the world with The ships made the purpose of impressing foreign leaders and reinforcing the impression that America had become a world naval power capable of projecting influence around the globe. the ‘Great White Fleet’. The had a executive significantly greater amount of power in relation to its ability to make and 16 The Great White Fleet ordered to sail around the world by President Theodore Roosevelt from 16 December 1907 to 22 February 1909 consisted of sixteen new battleships of the Atlantic Fleet. The battleships were painted white except for gilded scrollwork on their bows. due to their bright white-painted hulls. During Roosevelt’s presidency. 13 . The aggregate of the U. Naval warships that participated were given the name. INTRODUCTION Strategic influence is certainly not a new phenomenon and has been a significant factor in the successes (or failures) of empires throughout the ages. however it wasn’t until the early 20th Century that America became a viable world power with the necessity to influence on a global scale. much more centralized Authority and decision-making were a process due to a less cumbersome branch of bureaucratic government. In the first noteworthy ‘American’ global influence effort of the 20th Century. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE A. unlike today. The United States has engaged in strategic influence campaigns in some form or fashion since its foundation.III. structure.S. public diplomacy or foreign affairs was a less complicated endeavor. President Teddy Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” diplomacy was embodied in the Great White Fleet16 that sailed around the world from December 1907 to February 1909.
Between World War I until the present. and an integrated information throughout and the influence past one strategy hundred has eluded In the order USG to years. in terms of public diplomacy and foreign policy. study. throughout the last one hundred or so years. Definitions of what actually constitutes our strategic influence capabilities have changed numerous times.execute affairs. Unfortunately. 14 . understand how we should organize for and conduct strategic influence programs in the present it is first necessary to take a look at how that mission has been accomplished in the historical context. less populace to and a due world to where information flowed consumers technological limitations. has consistently struggled with the question of how to effectively organize for and conduct strategic influence or strategic psychological warfare.S. literally. there have been. the U. Also. organizations dedicated to conducting strategic influence have been created and then disbanded. strategic influence and/or government sponsored-information programs. the world geopolitical landscape was less complex than it is the 21st Century. particularly in the realm of foreign This was partly a function of a simpler. dozens of or different provide organizations oversight for formed to conduct. informed slowly policy.
also known as the Creel Committee (named fiery chairman. Accessed 28 September 2004.org/ sources/ creel. of a number of sophisticated propaganda In his 1920 memoirs entitled How We Advertised America. after its public opinion in support of the war against The CPI. Creel declared the following: …[the] war was not fought in France alone…it was the fight for the minds of men.S. (New York: Harper & Brothers.html.B. …In all things. from first to last. Creel. a vast enterprise in salesmanship. and the battle-line ran through every home in every country…It was in this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that the Great War differed most essentially from all previous conflicts. and moral verdicts took on all the value of military decisions. Internet. WORLD WAR I In 1917. trained by the CPI. George Creel). George. for the ‘conquest of convictions’. 15 . The program consisted of a number of speakers. the world’s greatest adventure in advertising…”18 Creel’s most famous endeavor in the realm of propaganda was the concept of the “Four-Minute Men”. but between opposing ideals. with a reputation reached out to the entertainment and advertising industries to help with the development techniques. following America’s entry in to the ‘Great War’17. The trial of strength was not only between massed bodies of armed men. it was a plain publicity proposition. 18 Creel. http://www. utilized every available method to shape public opinion and garner support for the U. 1920) 3-9. without half or change. entry into the war. “How We Advertised America”. as a controversial muckraker.historytools. then President Woodrow Wilson instituted the Committee of Public Information (CPI) for the purpose of swaying Germany. 17 who would go into movie houses or other public The term “Great War” refers to World War I (1915-1918).
19 C. Internet. In the mid-1930’s.gathering places to espouse concepts such as the purchase of Liberty Bonds. 16 .555. one public of.’s ability to manipulate the information environment.phtml?title=Committee on Public Information.190 speeches between 1917 and 1918.000 ‘Four-Minute Men’ (and women) made a total of 7. War At the beginning of the war. WORLD WAR II The Second World War provided the first valid examination of U. roughly 75. Available from www. the U. used propaganda—a and most affairs. According to CPI’s records. strategic influence and information warfare began to garner attention within the USG due to the rise of the Nazi party in Germany. The Nazi’s viewed strategic influence as a weapon in and of itself and leveraged preparation this for capability it’s to the fullest on extent Eastern in and upcoming attacks Western Europe. hence the name.S. the USG and the lacked the necessary organizational Department structure for conducting an integrated influence campaign of any substance. During creative mix World of War public II. if relations. approximately minutes length. Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party had devoted much of their time and effort to the development to of comprehensive feelings of propaganda programs designed increase nationalism in the German population as well as manipulate and strike fear in their European neighbors.disinfopedia. or enlistment in the Armed Forces.org/wiki. The speeches four themselves in were relatively short. not the psychological operations--as 19 “Committee on Public Information”. donations to the Red Cross.S. Accessed 26 September 2004.
limited scale raids. Posters igniting powerful anti-Japanese and German pushing in aimed for the armed enemy purchase forces. 46. of and U.. the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach. public affairs/propaganda scale that campaign would was initiated to bear on unprecedented bring the real source of American might: the public.C.S. “Military Psychological Operations”.20 The premise war behind the creation of OWI was to consolidate information and psychological operations 20 Paddock. U. war bonds and feelings. OSS was responsible for the conduct of special operations missions—namely sabotage. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington. and other special missions in support of theater objectives. 17 . To organize for the conduct of strategic information programs. 1989). factor in the transformation from political Arguably. would organize and implement Secondly. enlistment operations the at psychological propaganda was pivotal in instilling patriotic fervor on the home front and spurred other nations to active participation in the war effort. it had a mandate to utilize all informational means available to inspire patriotic fervor in the American A an public and attract people to support the war effort. Alfred J. Frank B. the OWI psychological strategic operations or propaganda campaigns to support the overseas influence effort. propaganda efforts controlled the path that the war took.: National Defense University Press. neutrality to active involvement in the war. President Roosevelt formed two new organizations. First.S. D. ed. troops.important. OWI had two significant roles.
. Alfred J.: National Defense University Press.22 21 Paddock. ed. 1989).under one unified agency thereby streamlining the decisionmaking process under one controlling entity. in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach. D. Committee on Meanwhile. 18 . the discernible increase in wartime propaganda had formed the need to separate the psychological warfare and propaganda function from the planning and conduct of special Overlap operations missions and intelligence operations. the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and the Joint Psychological OSS created Warfare the Advisory Subcommittee.C. “Military Psychological Operations”. headed another committee: the Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Committee. Frank B. and included of of (DoS) the Office Information. to coordinate and of all The purpose of this organization was information civilian the State War activities that these with other government independently Department agencies operated the War Department. However. Colonel Donovan. 46. Supporting Psychological Warfare and the director. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington. 22 Ibid. Subsequent executive directives refined the mission of each agency and illuminated each agency’s area of responsibility in an effort to reduce inhibiting factors effecting functionality.21 Recognizing a capabilities shortfall within the realm of strategic communications. between the two efforts had created squabbling among the principles involved leading to ineffective and duplicative efforts minus appropriate coordination and de-confliction.
the JCS also chose to eliminate its own standing committees dealing with PSYOPS and turned over responsibilities to the OSS. 19 .23 Despite the dissolution of the various offices located in and around Washington DC. in the same document which provided the guidance to disband the various psychological warfare offices. Subsequently.: National Defense University Press. 1989). the number of organizations actively involved in the planning and conduct of influence and psychological operations had multiplied exponentially since the onset of World War II.C. the ability to control. At the end of 1942.While the intent was to streamline the process of message construction and dissemination along with improving bureaucratic process and organization.. gave each theater commander. coordinate. Frank B. and implement psychological warfare 23 Paddock. which was better organized and equipped to carry out the task of strategic communications. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington. despite the fact that America was firmly entrenched in a two-front global conflict. 46. ed. They chose to eliminate the Psychological Warfare Branch due to interagency squabbles regarding each office’s mission and scope. the military services still maintained an organic PSYOPS capability but these were The limited to the operational and tactical levels of war. Pacific and European. in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach. “Military Psychological Operations”. JCS. The increase vice decrease or simplification of organizational structure became more of an impediment to progress than a facilitator of productive efforts. the War Department recognized the need to cut out some of the unneeded elements of the entire psychological and strategic influence bureaucracy. D. Alfred J.
”25 PWD’s mission statements. PWB/AFHQ had been reconstituted as In the Psychological Warfare Division. in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach. 25 Paddock..24 The Eisenhower. largest General Dwight Warfare and/or tactical level in support of theater Psychological Branch at his headquarters in North Africa in November of 1942--the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ). 24 Paddock. as “the PWD/SHAEF of defined propaganda psychological designed to dissemination undermine the enemy’s will to resist.C.in their respective areas of operations (AO). To control information occupied Germany. The JCS document implied that theater commanders would be allowed to determine their own relationship with OWI and OSS. as needed. 1989). were: 1. “Military Psychological Operations”. 2. services in Allied- 3. Frank B. as stated by General Eisenhower. each theater commander created his own Psychological Warfare Branch that would then have the latitude to conduct PSYOPS or influence operations at the operational objectives. Alfred J. 12. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington. Political Warfare and Psychological Operations. D.: National Defense University Press. Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe warfare (PWD/SHAEF). ed. 46. early 1944. Subsequently. Supreme created Allied the Commander. demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters. 20 . To wage psychological warfare against the enemy To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.
S.27 The global struggle waged during World War II provided the thrust for the development of strategic influence as an integrating enabler of U. 20.. Eisenhower noted in his after-action report of the war: The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final victory cannot.26 For the allies. psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal. Political Warfare and Psychological Operations.14. I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy’s will to resist and supporting the fighting morale of our potential Allies in the occupied countries. the foundation for modern propaganda and psychological warfare that would play an even larger role in U. of course. in essence. However. Without doubt. 27 Ibid. 21 . To conduct consolidation propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries. be measured in terms of towns destroyed or barriers passed. General Eisenhower felt that PSYOP had played such a momentous role in the defeat of Germany that it was vital to maintain a PSYOP capability and conduct further study of it’s utility in future conflict.4. foreign affairs during the Cold War. D. psychological warfare’s impact on the war effort and how it contributed to the defeat of Germany were hard to accurately assess. foreign policy and provided. THE COLD WAR The requirements for conducting strategic influence and psychological warfare increased dramatically during the early years of the Cold War—a war of conflicting ideologies 26 Paddock. However.S.
Government officials recognized that if the U.S.28 The origins of to In the period the immediately following 1945. Harry Truman signed the National Security Act that provided for the establishment of integrating policies and procedures for all departments.gov/nsc/history. and with each side looking for a strategic edge.between the United States and the Soviet Union. The early years of the Cold War saw the USG’s establishing three critical pieces of legislation which would provide the framework for American influence and strategic information programs for the next three decades: the National Security Act of 1947. was going to be able contain Soviet expansionism it had to step up its own strategic information programs. the National Security Act World date War back II. and the NSC-68. Accessed 10 August 2004. National Security Act Of 1947 As the first “Cold War” President. both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized that propaganda. The propaganda reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s pre-World War II influence apparatus. the Smith-Mundt Act. Available from http://www. control of information. and strategic influence could provide the edge that both sought so ardently. Internet. In the late 1940’s and early 50’s it had become apparent in the West that the Soviet Union was developing into a formidable opponent both as a military power and in terms of their ability foreign to leverage propaganda Soviet as a key instrument machine of was policy.html. agencies. 22 . 1. and functions of the federal government relating to national security. At the dawn of the nuclear age.whitehouse. 28 “History of the National Security Council”.
gov/nsc/ history. 30 The National Security Act of 1947 realigned and reorganized the U.S.org/ rp/cia/ciahist. Johnson (Pacific Grove.32 grassroots 29 Eberstadt. Ferdinand. Karl F. 31 “History of the National Security Council”. subversive Those operations would include using and influence operations to psychological undermine Soviet and Soviet-bloc political. the National Security Act also transformed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who would be responsible for the conduct of intelligence gathering and clandestine operations in support of national security objectives.fas. and economic viability. foreign policy. established and overseas broadcasting These CIA-sponsored radio programs. It merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the Department of Defense headed by the Secretary of Defense.29 Aside from the military reorganization30. ed. 32 “Central Intelligence Agency”. the CIA covertly stations.’ armed forces. http://www. Internet. “Postwar Organization for National Security.” in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council.S. Internet.htm. The act was amended in 1949 to put all three branches of the armed forces under the subordination of the Department of Defense. Available from http://www. The History of. CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. Inderfuth and Loch K. government Soviet-bloc spread of policies.31 In response to the mission of utilizing information as an instrument of strategic funded influence.html#summary. military. 29-30. 23 . Accessed 10 August 2004. The study concluded that the military and supporting executive agencies were not integrated effectively and lacked a unity of effort. and intelligence community after WWII. 1988). countries Communism were in at an the broadcast attempt to to within the destabilize level. designed to creatively illuminate people U. Accessed 29 September 2004.Secretary security of the Navy to commissioned study how a group of national national experts the post-war security apparatus should be organized.whitehouse.
html.S.S. VA: James Madison University. Accessed 10 June 2004.state. and laid the groundwork for the creation of the U. and dissemination abroad. and through information centers and 34 instructors abroad. foreign information programs and provided: for the preparation. Accessed 2 September 2004. cornell. of information about the United States. 24 . Information Agency (USIA). public diplomacy and strategic influence following World War II and established the U. Information Agency (USIA).edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00001461----000-. Smith-Mundt Act Following an official visit to Europe in which they witness first hand the enormity of the Soviet propaganda machine. Subchapter 5. The Smith-Mundt Act.law. publications. 10-11. http://exchanges. International Visitor Leadership Program. excerpt available from http://assembler. a significant organization relative to strategic influence programs and one which will be discussed in detail later on in this thesis. Chapter 18.. Title 22. which had very little opposition in Congress. Code. 34 Smith-Mundt Act. The Smith-Mundt Act formed the fundamental charter for U. Paragraph 1461 (1948). “breathed life into overseas information programs”.S. Presidentially Mandated Strategic Psychological Warfare Policy Coordination Under Truman and Eisenhower: The Psychological Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board (Harrisonburg.S. through press. motion pictures. its people. Alexander Smith and Representative Karl Mundt sponsored the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) to counter hostile Soviet propaganda. 1999). and its policies. radio. and other information media. Senator H.gov/ education/ivp/history.htm.35 33 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Internet. U. Benjamin R.S. 35 Rose.33 Smith-Mundt allotted the necessary funding for U.2.
policies and programs. Internet. each Department of Defense. following the North Korean attack on South Korea. 36 The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program. THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY In the early to mid-1950s. psychological. Cold War tensions took on a significant new dynamic.36 Members of President Truman’s administration argued that America needed to increase its strategic influence efforts to counter the Soviets emergence as an atomic power. there were three different organizations intimately involved with strategic information policies and programs: CIA. The Soviet Union had detonated their first atomic bomb at a remote test site in Kazakhstan on 29 August. 38 Ibid. NSC 68 In 1949. and the State Department. 25 . 37 Paddock.37 In 1950.3. Truman signed NSC 68 which directed the increase of both overt and covert political.S. and economic warfare with the sole purpose of creating political and social directly “contain” borders unrest in within Soviet-bloc with Union George within aid countries—this Kennan’s its own and strategy was to accordance Soviet the geographic strategic utilizing economic packages information programs to foster pro-American or anti-Soviet inclinations among various “buffer” states. 40.html. http://nuclearweaponarchive.38 E. Army Special Warfare. To ensure continuity of organization established liaison elements for the purpose of synchronizing strategic influence efforts with the other departments.org/Russia/Sovwpnprog. U. Accessed 8 October 2004.
Jr. 94. that the PSB had never fully The study also concluded integrated with its existing security psychological objectives.”39 Shortly the after taking office. Eisenhower replaced the Psychological Strategy Board with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).S. whose mission was to “coordinate and integrate psychological with national strategy and. Eisenhower’s experiences during World War II had validated his beliefs that the geopolitical with a landscape could be shaped to our To advantage comprehensive information strategy. on Eisenhower established Information the and U. Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare. Eisenhower noted “psychological operations are established instruments of our national power. 25 January 1954). information programs were inadequate and that the overall strategy under Truman was too reactive to the Soviets propaganda programs and lacked any inherent offensive posture.: National Security Council. The Evolution of the National Security Council System Under President Nixon (Ann Arbor.S. National Security Council Memorandum (Washington D.C.. 2. more importantly. MI: University Microfilms. Thomas J. 1971). illustrate that point. to act as the coordinating and integrating arm of the National Security Council for 39 Saxon. make President’s Committee whose International was to Activities information (PCIIA) purpose the study War strategy for Cold recommendations as to how it could or should be improved. 40 National Security Council. in a NSC directive. 26 .The election brought of Dwight a Eisenhower new focus in on 1952 to the and Presidency about PSYOPS strategic information programs in general.40 Shortly warfare strategy national after the PCIIA’s report was published. PCIIA concluded that U.
USIA also concerning from the departments originating foreign information outlets. Inderfuth and Loch K.S.html. strategic information programs during the Cold War were more reactive to Soviet propaganda campaigns vice proactive and foreign policy suffered as a result. and operations for the foreign information program. 59. 27 . the U. The CIA still conducted covert operations and influence campaigns and the USIA maintained In the control 1960’s. Karl F. Johnson (Pacific Grove.S. USIA’s purview. Accessed 19 September 2004. Internet. During the twenty or so years from the Kennedy administration.all aspects of the implementation significantly. CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. Robert. utilized strategic information programs as a component of national security strategy. provided official guidance treatment to of other news Additionally. USIA’s information 41 Cutler.” in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council. until the time that Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. ed. was confined only to areas where military operations were not being conducted. however. http://www. edu/gen/20th/usia. strategic influence efforts and capabilities began to fragment.”41 More the Information Agency (USIA) was officially established as an independent agency for the purpose of providing a foreign information dissemination programs. U. however it was not a priority. of overt foreign information programs. 43 Ibid. The Department of Defense and JCS disbanded their psychological warfare offices. 1988).42 USIA was responsible for the coordination of policies. plans. “The Development of the National Security Council. the U.S. 42“United States Information Agency”. of national United security States policy. in the early 1960’s.43 Following Eisenhower’s presidency.acusd.
S.html#The%20challenges%20 of%<em>Detente</em.45 support operational PSYOPS F. VIETNAM-ERA The war in Vietnam was destructive to the level of American confidence enjoyed in the early 1950’s and 60’s. Department of the Army.program strategy shifted from persuasion and an advisory role to more of an informative function with a focus on objective reporting until of news events. Department of the Army. The war along with the in Watergate both the scandal had shattered of the American confidence institution Presidency and also affected U. the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. Available from http:// www. Accessed 5 October 2004. Vol 1.S.46 44 U. April 1976). the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. Department of The Army Pamphlet 525-7-1 (Washington D. credibility among foreign audiences. 28 . 45 Ibid. Internet. and the hastening of the nuclear arms race raised questions about the United States’ capacity to have influence over international affairs. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975. The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application. 46“Cold War (1962-1991)”. to Each create a of subsequent permanent strategic were still administration organization information 1980 to failed the dedicated operations.C.44 USIA remained the lead agency regarding strategic information programs but.factindex. to the emphasis of shifted away from in strategic Southeast influence Asia.: U.S. again. conduct Various departments expected to coordinate their activities with other agencies but there was still no controlling entity. 110. the growth of international terrorism.com/c/co/cold_war__1962_1991_.
The USG’s lack of focus on strategic influence during this period and its tactical and operational-level focus on Vietnam led to a reduction in effectiveness against the Soviet’s strategic propaganda effort. It appeared that the
tide of history was turning in favor of the Communists. While the United States was mired in recession and the Vietnam conflict, pro-Soviet governments were making The
inroads abroad, particularly in the Third World.47
United States had, for all intent and purpose, lost the Vietnam War allowing the peninsula to become a unified, sovereign country under Communist rule. other were Communist popping up governments throughout and Meanwhile, several insurgencies Asia, and
Latin America as well. In reaction to the appearance that the U.S. was
‘losing’ the Cold War in the late 1970’s, many academics, politicians, journalists, and policy makers rebelled
against then President Jimmy Carter’s liberal policies on defense and the ‘containment’ of Communism. experts, both Democrat and Republican, Many of these chose to align
themselves with Ronald Reagan, who pledged openly to tackle Soviet expansionism head on.48
THE REAGAN ERA Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 with a mandate to
The Reagan administration was committed to stemming
47 “Cold War (1962-1991)”. Internet. Available from http:// www.factindex.com/c/co/cold_war__1962_1991_.html#The%20challenges%20 of%<em>Detente</em. Accessed 5 October 2004. 48 “The Cold War since 1970”. BrainEncyclopedia.com. Internet. Available from http://www.brainencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/ t/th/the_cold _war_since_1970.html. Accessed 5 October 2004.
the spread of Communism, particularly in the Third World. Reagan, however, would not allow the U.S. to be pulled into any protracted, long-term interventions as had happened in Vietnam. Instead, he preferred quick campaigns to attack
or overthrow leftist governments utilizing both military and informational means. Under Reagan, strategic influence
was elevated from a supporting or subordinate role in U.S. national security strategy to a main area of focus along with traditional diplomacy, military, and economic
strength.49 strategy was
The foundation for Reagan’s global influence laid out in three directives: National
Security Decision Directives (NSDD) 45, 77, and 130. NSDD 45 focused on U.S. international broadcasting
programs and declared it a fundamental component of U.S. national security policy.50 It also provided the necessary
funding and political mandate to increase U.S. propaganda programs abroad through international broadcasting programs like Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty.51 NSDD 45 also established Radio Marti’ for the purpose of rallying anti-Castro support in Cuba and among Cuban exiles in and around south Florida.52 NSDD 77 established a Special Planning Group (SPG), under the control of the NSC, to conduct planning and
49 “The man who beat communism”. Economist.com. Internet. Available from http://www.economist.com/printedition/displaystory.cfm?Story_ID=2747709. Accessed 20 October 2004. 50 Reagan, Ronald W,. “United States International Broadcasting”, National Security Decision Directive Number 45 (Washington D.C.: The White House, 15 July 1982), 1. Internet. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd045.htm. Accessed 5 October 2004. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., 2.
coordination President’s whose other
public Security included
diplomacy Advisor the
efforts.53 chaired of the
Secretary of State, and the director of the USIA among others. NSDD 77 also established four other committees the Public Affairs Committee,
that reported to the SPG:
the International Information Committee, the International Broadcasting Committee.54 Another critical aspect of NSDD 77 was that it gave the Public Affairs Committee responsibility for planning and coordinating significant speeches relating to national security. It also and provided guidance of for public the planning, for Committee and the International Political
foreign policy events as well as other issues relating to national security.55 The responsible International for the Information planning, Committee coordination was and
implementation of international information activities in support of national security policies and objectives. This
organization’s activities were almost all USIA-related and managed by the Director of USIA.56 The International Political Committee was controlled by the State Department and had responsibility and for the of
53 Reagan, Ronald W., “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security”, National Security Decision Directive Number 77 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 14 January 1983), 1. Internet. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ nsdd/nsdd-77.htm. Accessed 5 October 2004. 54 Ibid., 2-3. 55 Ibid., 3. 56 Ibid., 2.
Additionally. 14 January 1983). NSDD 77 also directed the International Political Committee to counter Soviet information programs.htm. 23. strategic influence policies and objectives above and beyond what NSDD 45 and 77 had provided the previous four years. national interests. the administration felt that it was necessary to refocus U. NSDD 130 also stated that it was “vital that the Armed Forces maintain a strong and active international 57 Reagan.S. Accessed 5 October 2004. 1. the directive gave the Department of State the responsibility of providing direction to other agencies regarding the implementation of political action strategies in support of the International Political Committee’s established objectives.C. strategic influence operations occurred in March of 1984 when the President signed NSDD 130. A defining moment in U.: The White House. “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security”. Ronald W.org/irp/offdocs/ nsdd/nsdd-77. Available from http://www.S. National Security Decision Directive Number 77 (Washington.fas. NSDD instrument 130 for envisioned shaping information fundamental as “a strategic and political ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments…” and declared information as a key strategic instrument to affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to U.international political activities relating to national security matters.S. 32 .57 Towards the end of Reagan’s first term as President. D. This document reiterated the administration’s commitment to strategic information.. Internet.
org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-77. ability to construct and maintain a multi-national coalition during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91. Accessed 5 October 2004.”58 noted that. George Bush. the in programs. the democratization of several Third World nations. Ronald W. President Bush felt it necessary programs. 1. to along re-evaluate with their international organizational information structure and 58 Reagan.fas. “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security”. vastly different international landscape. national should in the contain people with apparatus training “sophisticated environment…”59 international information Reagan-era strategic influence. Available from http://www.. 2. A NEW WORLD ORDER President George Bush inherited an entirely different geopolitical Presidents. furthering covert overt. D.: The White House. security in order In addition. the U.htm. both in terms of it’s organization and focus. and the rebirth of U.information capability. 59 Ibid. the directive also to be effective. situation The than any War of had the previous ended.. The Reagan administration’s efforts were also instrumental in facilitating his successor’s.C. having served as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the 1970’s. eight global Cold telecommunication technology was exploding. 33 . H. and to national objectives. and America had no monolithic adversary to prepare for war against. was so successful that it directly contributed to the end of the Cold War.S. Bush. Internet. National Security Decision Directive Number 77 (Washington.S. understood and the importance domestic Due of information foreign. 14 January 1983). nationalism. 3.
due to budget constraints in the Clinton-era presidency. National Security Directive 51 (Washington D.: The White House. BBG is actually made up of several different broadcasters: the Voice of America (VOA). The BBG receives assistance from the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) in all matters pertaining to international broadcasting.htm> Accessed 5 April 2004.bushlibrary.fas. Radio Farda.60 However.tamu. Radio Sawa. and Radio and TV Marti. 61 Bush.. that the BBG became an independent organization responsible for all government and government-sponsored international broadcasting programs. Alhurra.pdf. Radio Free Asia (RFA). Available from http://www.: The White House. provided the impetus to create the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). USG and organization responsible government-sponsored. Available from http://www. prodded the Bush Administration could be to study how in strategic order to influence components consolidated increase efficiency and reduce costs. Political pressure over budget concerns. George. org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68dos.C. 34 . which superseded Reagan’s NSDD 77. William J. a result of the It was created on 1 October 1999 as 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and The Restructuring Act under the Clinton Administration. Presidential Decision Directive 68 (Washington D. Internet. as part of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. existing from a huge national debt left over from the Reagan years. “United States Government International Broadcasting”. international broadcasting programs. more than 100 million listeners tune in to BBG 60 Clinton. 17 October 1990). non-military.edu/ research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2051/0001. 1999. 30 April 1999). Accessed 5 October 2004. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).61 The Broadcasting autonomous Board of Governors (BBG) is for an all independent. Each week.mission. “The Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Missions”. Internet. National Security Directive (NSD) 51..C. it wasn’t until October 1st.
35 . The Heritage Foundation: Backgrounder. April 23. Public Diplomacy”.63 • • Despite the fact that the BBG has played a pivotal role in the dissemination of U.de/b/volltext/us-publdipl. PRESENT GEOPOLITICS AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS A significant trend in geopolitics is the development of exclusive alliances that based have upon been common economic by or the political goals facilitated information and technology explosion of the early 1990’s. 62 Johnson. Helle.S.ifa. Stephen and Dale. Internet.. 3.S. Accessed 17 September 2004. To provide clear and accurate information to regions of the world where freedom of information is suppressed or denied.gov/bbg_aboutus. Accessed 5 April 2004. Available from http://www.bbg. Internet. the BBG has established three priorities: • To provide accurate and objective news and information to priority areas in support of the war against terrorism. foreign policy following September 11th. or are suffering epidemics and illiteracy.S. U.cfm.S. 2003. Available from http://www. “How to Reinvigorate U.managed. there are still plenty of questions regarding its role as a legitimate component of U. 63 “About the BBG”. sponsored radio and TV programs broadcasted in 65 languages. To serve humanitarian efforts by assisting nations in crisis.62 In support of U. Broadcasting Board of Governors.-sponsored messages in states and regions that lack the free flow of information. The focus of these radio and TV stations is on broadcasting content that supports democracy as well as providing information which is related to the establishment of democratic institutions.pdf. I. foreign policy.S. or to areas that lack freedom and democracy.
and economic integration. It stands to reason that the growth of global communications will continue to accelerate and increase the collective awareness of events and issues worldwide making information readily accessible to even the remotest areas of the earth. so do those of the rest of the world through the exportation of new technologies. Anecdotal contrary to the belief of most U.S. actually chose to to as transpired conduct effect September or in why Iraq offensive “regime operations Afghanistan such change”. citizens. information programs designed at illuminating and.S. has For the United a States. Foreign have news agencies Qatar-based Al-Jazeera effectively countered U. perhaps justifying.The dispersal of culture. American foreign policy and intent relative to the war in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism. information capabilities grow. 36 . longer does America possess an information No monopoly. proof of this point lies in the fact that the majority of the Arab world on still is 11 unclear th as to the and what U. and trade on a global scale will continue to have New a symbiotic effect and on the world’s populations.S. revolution become double-edged sword. communication information technologies provide instant connectivity worldwide in all matters pertaining to political. ideas. the technological As U.S. social.
strategic influence efforts focused aggressively on the Arab and Muslim worlds. the USG failed to reorganize and adjust its strategy for two specific The emerging threats—asymmetric and/or non-state actors. countering the For fifty years. at least in the eyes of the administration. after the end of the Cold War. psychological operations.S. the Arab satellite news channel. However. was to explain America’s “declared justified position war” in on that the Islamic fundamentalists and the U. INTRODUCTION The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 uncovered several significant weaknesses in U. U. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM A.S.IV. has always trained and organized to win the last war and our strategic information programs and strategy were no different. and public affairs/relations. “SELLING” THE WAR Immediately following 9-11. The purpose of this interview. efforts in public diplomacy.S. information policies and strategy. integrate unified The fact that the USG could never adequately strategic influence process of or capabilities organization effort under had one interagency periods created to significant lackluster relative foreign information programs.S. Only days after the attack. America had focused on Soviet military and ideological threats. B. had was they United these 37 States pursuing organizations wherever . Secretary of State Colin Powell accepted an invitation to appear on Al-Jazeera. The focus of this chapter will be on providing an analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom through the framework of U.
its democratic values. gov/hearings/hrg030227a. The Bush administration recognized. and the concept of liberty.S. relatively early on. Internet.senate. Accessed 10 January 2005 65 Ibid. 38 . was that the rest of the world did not know or understand us or the principles on which America was founded. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. comprehensive effort to ‘educate’ the rest of the world about America.65 Secretary Security of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and National Secretary Adviser Condoleeza Rice followed Powell’s example and also agreed to be interviewed on Al64 Charlotte Beers. the administration. that U. was sworn in as the new Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy.S. for all intent and purpose. Within two months. and particularly to the Middle East. public diplomacy had failed to “sell” America to the world. Beers was. “American Public Diplomacy and Islam”.html.sought refuge. an of an effort the to re-invigorate War the on public Terror. In aspect Beers. relations Charlotte from Wall administrations’ accomplished advertising executive Street. Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.64 the main focus for Beers was to begin a Accordingly. Available from http://foreign. the information Unfortunately for environment was significantly more complex than it was in 1917. meant to be to the Bush Administration what George Creel was to Woodrow enough Wilson—a to savvy public war relations expert creative ‘spin’ the whichever way the administration wanted. 27 February 2003. hearing other a on House public in of Representatives and of subcommittee to held a diplomacy the according public Beers and who experts field diplomacy testified at the hearings. the problem for the U.
had the U.66 A government-sponsored website and a series of ads about Muslim life were also created to call attention to the “shared values” between America various plans and Muslims. 39 .S. Internet. an were Arabic-language initiated. in fact. achieve post 9-11 public diplomacy goals. How. Concurrently. both the White House and the Pentagon67 created offices specifically intended to help the U. created network in and were Southwest to develop Asian-dialects. Several new radio also TV stations. 67 The Pentagon created the ill-fated “Office of Strategic Influence” in late 2001. OSI was disbanded before any tangible programs were introduced. Furthermore. Available from http://www. Congress passed the “Freedom Promotion Act of 2002”. the USG expected a significant increase in Arab and Muslim goodwill towards American policies. evidence Their that the linked were State Al Department with in a the began 9-11 Qaeda findings published brochure called “The Network of Terrorism”.pa-aware.S.Jazeera. despite the resources public diplomacy effort 66 “The Network of Terrorism”.pdf Accessed 12 January 2005. The office was created with the purpose of providing a vehicle to undertake global strategic influence in support of the GWOT. With the influx of funding and the new emphasis on public diplomacy programs. Congress and the Bush administration pushed for an intensification of PD efforts to include boosting funding for new programs aimed at illuminating American culture and policies to the rest of the world. compiling attacks. had decreased steadily between November 2001 and December 2002. U.org/ resources/pdfs/Network%20of%Terror. which increased the budget for public diplomacy by nearly $500 million dollars annually. Subsequently. Department of State. however it didn’t come to fruition and. at its This begs the question: disposal.S.
“Hearts.68 broadcasting nearly Unfortunately. the State Department was vastly undermanned and ill-equipped to take on the burden of coordinating and executing Pre-Bush the broad strategic communications and mission. Minds and Dollars in an Unseen Front in the War on Terrorism. Whitelaw. American is Spending Millions…To Change the Very Face of Islam. and Barnes. conservatives in Congress forced the Clinton and administration Restructuring to sign (1998) the that Foreign shut Affairs down the Reform USIA. American libraries programs located were cut With the USIA went several overseas by and a foreign third.S. failure of public diplomacy relative to the Middle East is the fact that President structure Bush with inherited limited a poor PD organizational capabilities. Convinced that the USIA and other components of strategic communications were no longer vital to national security following the Cold War. 18 April 2005.S. and political differences? The most obvious or simple explanation for U. Act Responsibility for conducting public diplomacy was handed over to the Department of State under the direction of the newly created Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.resulted in even less support in the Arab world? Was. 40 . News and World Report.69 organizational structure strategy are only 68 Kaplan. or is the problem institutional in nature or is it a function of conflicting ideologies trying to find common ground that doesn’t actually exist given the religious. Latif.” U. cultural. either let go or Hundreds of USIA staff personnel were forced to retire leaving the public diplomacy corps roughly half the size that it was at prior to the end of the Cold War. 69 Ibid.
in support of strategic objectives. allowed a political and social climate to grow where the majority of the Arab world perceived the U. 8. U.S. says and what it for actually the USG does. R.70 Middle Eastern cultures perceive a sharp contradiction between what a the U. insufficient strategic influence doctrine. U. Therefore messages conveyed by America were rarely given credence by all but the most progressive of Arabs. Foreign Policy in Focus. “The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World”. the with terrorist a limited attacks. Following Administration. strategic influence. June 2003. inexplicably. Vol. was unable to adequately convey its message.. credibility in the Arab world is affected by the cultural differences between the two societies. was waging an The Muslim perception that the war for the purpose of unjust controlling the 2nd largest oil reserve in the world or conducting an all-out assault on the Muslim world itself was just that: a perception. 41 . The fact that the U. Number 2.S.S. U.S. initially. can be linked to a lack of American credibility within the Arab world and an. strategic the Bush influence capability. when Therefore credibility issue exists attempting to influence Arab perceptions. is conducted through the vacuum of American cultural influences that clearly don’t translate well in the Arab world. as anti-Islamic in both nature and practice.S. by those who were directly 70 Zaharna.S.S. and the newly declared “War on Terror”.part of the dilemma and merely describes one aspect of the inadequate public diplomacy effort in the early period following 9-11. The whole intent behind public diplomacy is to build support for American foreign policy. which are vast.
S. While it is generally accepted that Muslims and other Middle Easterners have a favorable view of American’s as individuals. as Westerners or Americans. The 71 Zaharna. on its own soil. “The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World”. 8.S. June 2003. Muslim perception is Muslim reality regardless of how we. see the Global War on Terror and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. had been attacked.S. strategic influence programs focused on getting America’s message out both to the Muslim world and the American people.’s actions—the average Middle Eastern citizen. without warning. the U. particularly with respect to our long-standing support of Israel. Government had reserved the right to use any and all means to (1) bring to justice those responsible for 9-11. and somewhat haphazardly. R. 42 . U. policies in the region. and (2) effect regime change in those countries that were suspected of either harboring or having relationships with known terrorist organizations. the content of the message made sense. Number 2. Foreign Policy in Focus. Vol.affected by the U.S.S. In the beginning. This information- centric approach parallels the ‘over-kill’ methodology that fits conveniently within the unique American paradigm where information is a form of currency and problems are solved or products sold by increasing the amount of information supplied to the consumer. The USG attempted to “sell” the GWOT in the same manner in which advertising companies sell commercial products: with a glut of sound bites and images intended to create warm feelings toward a particular product or idea.S. they do not care for U. In this case. the ‘product’ was the idea that the U.71 Initially. by a hostile foreign entity and it would use any and all means to bring those responsible to justice.
on the other hand. June 2003. Foreign Policy in Focus. effective communications provide the basis for amicable relationships and trust. Arabs. association-building in order to methods (such as face-to-face contact) connect people within loose social or tribal networks. 43 .S. R. and perceived enemies. have a deeply rooted distrust of their own media therefore over-reliance on this form of communication to appeal to Middle Easterners may not be the best course of action. Instead of focusing on one-way information exchanges. Arabs tend to rely on informal. information U.S. the USG tried of Operating within its own cultural vacuum. Vol. PSYOPS IN SUPPORT OF OIF The U.U. neutrals. “The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World”. The distinctive American technique of public diplomacy relies heavily on the mass media to broadcast its message throughout the world. to reach Arabs it by merely increasing to the its amount position action.S. supplied and explaining impending regarding policy military C. 8. the Arab world. and its coalition partners enjoyed a relative degree of success conducting psychological operations in 72 Zaharna.S. leveraging the advantages of the instant connectivity of satellite communications and the Internet.72 In retrospect. the USG grossly undervalued the deeprooted cultural differences between the West and the Islamic world. Number 2. strategic influence apparatus began ‘selling’ its military and diplomatic options to its allies. two-way. The problem was not the message but In rather how and from what perspective it was crafted.
The dropping of leaflets. both mental and physical. failure of the U. in essence. Anthony H.S. Specifically. dissolve under constant coalition pressure. July 2003. sanctions during the period following Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1991.73 Operational and tactical PSYOPS were effective at almost every stage of the operation. to support the anti-Ba’ath uprising immediately after the first Gulf War. radio and TV broadcasts. measure adequately accurately Arabs in general) attitudes toward the United States and its policies few created an environment messages within the country where U. 73 Cordesman. DoD and PSYOP planners failed to effectively lay the foundation for both ending stage the conflict Iraq.S. where the U. This was partly due to the organizational structure relating to approval authority for strategic PSYOP and also a function of poor analysis. 25-27. perhaps more importantly. The Lessons of the Iraq War: Issues Relating to Grand Strategy. USG officials underestimated the impact of U. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Wash DC.-generated would have validity.N. and news releases (in concert with the overall public affairs mission) were successful in causing the Iraqi military to. fell short was at the strategic level of psychological and political influence.support of military operations in Iraq. 44 . Reportedly. the PSYOP campaign included over 300 hours of TV and radio broadcasts and over 50 million leaflets were dropped in key areas of the country during both the build up and military phase of the operation. phase and the post-combat the Iraqi USG’s (and rebuilding failure to within or Indirectly. America’s continued support. This enabled military forces to conduct an attack that may be unprecedented in the history of warfare. However.S. and.
74 official end of combat The insurgency that followed the operations.75 degree either failure has contributed to the insurgency is debatable and fodder for another study however conflict resolution depends on convincing not just Iraqi citizens but Arabs in general that the U. July 2003. efforts and insurgency. 25 December 2004. perhaps.. Central Command (USCENTCOM) planners to “miss the boat” often due to poor use of assets and an even worse sense of timing. of Israel. Anthony H. Had the USG recognized just how deep anti-American feelings ran in the region. postcombat phase losses might not have reached the level that they have. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Wash DC. Page A01. 25-27. 45 . No public relations effort or information operation can make up for bad policy or policies that appear to be anti-Muslim in intent and practice. Pentagon officials failure to plan for Phase IV operations along with an inability to capitalize on PSYOP targets of opportunity has. in its public diplomacy campaign and PSYOP effort. can be attributed to these factors.S. Thomas E. has no intention of 74 Cordesman.S. The U. 75 Ricks. the top down planning and approval authority that exists within DoD and the Pentagon has been a hindrance to effective PSYOPS in Iraq and has caused U.politically and economically. Organizationally speaking. “Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan.” Washington Post.S. arguably. restore support To which civil-military operations (CMO) within Iraq. The Lessons of the Iraq War: Issues Relating to Grand Strategy. civil within the area of to responsibility subdue the (AOR) hindered order. failed to convince the average Iraqi citizen that America was not invading Iraq for the purpose of controlling its oil or that its intention was to be an occupying force.
Government domestic communications were also aided by the heightened emotions and sense of insecurity following the attack. the Bush administration and the Pentagon began to develop a calculated public affairs campaign to raise support for a potential invasion of Iraq. General Douglas MacArthur. It is no secret that the American center of gravity has always been public opinion therefore insuring domestic support is vital to maintain the level of support needed to wage war. a As the United States witnessed dissension within the public and the In domain social significantly thus affecting unstable the political of environment decisions political leaders regarding the prosecution of the war. and the people. D. Following the 9/11 attacks. US Army In On War. the military. in their own interest. the public must be convinced that those actions are. indeed. which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda. more prosperous nation.long-term occupation of Iraq and that it has viable nationbuilding plans in place to create a better. necessary and more importantly. noted military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. in the Vietnam creates Conflict. the American public was told repeatedly that military force may be necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power 46 . order to declare and wage war. identified three pivotal entities that effect a nation’s ability to conduct war: the government. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN OIF One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion. In the case of going to war in Iraq.
the USG’s public relations campaign strove to not only make the public recall the feelings they experienced during that horrific event.” United States Capitol. Internet.html.S. “State of the Union Address. Accessed 10 January 2005. At a memorial in New York. please take this to heaven.whitehouse. 2002: …For many Americans. was the administration’s laying the groundwork. An example of which comes from President Bush’s State of the Union Address given on January 29th. George W. the White House set out to make the war with Iraq the most important topic on the minds of the American public before the conflict. national security.gov/ news/2002/01/20020129-11. I don't want to play football until I can play with you again some day…76 Another key aspect of that address.C. By defining the national interests that were at stake for America and its citizens. Available from www. Every day a retired firefighter returns to Ground Zero. 47 . now more familiarly known as the “Axis of Evil Speech”. but to strengthen those feelings in the hopes of hitting a nerve and eliciting an immediate emotional response in order to create support for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Washington D.because Iraq posed an imminent threat to U. and pain that will never completely go away. to feel closer to his two sons who died there. a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy. 29 January 2002. In order to make this issue one of critical immediacy. they first relied on targeting the emotions of their audience. these four months have brought sorrow. for the invasion of Iraq based on their alleged ties to Al Qaeda 76 Bush. With 11 September 2001 still in everyone’s minds. publicly.
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. “State of the Union Address. Available from www. by. 48 .C. and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -. arming to threaten the peace of the world. able to relations experts exploit the visible proof of human rights violations found by occupying U. perhaps. They could provide these arms to terrorists. George W. Accessed 10 January 2005.S. USG the credibility public both at home and were abroad.gov/news/2002/01/20020129-11. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax.. 29 January 2002. the price of indifference would be catastrophic. it became apparent that Iraq’s WMD programs had all but ended in the mid to late-1990’s creating an undercurrent of distrust among many American citizens and undermining Subsequently. and their terrorist allies.then kicked out the inspectors . military forces gave the administration something else to focus on further rallying domestic support for the military action in Iraq.whitehouse.” United States Capitol. and nerve gas. giving them the means to match their hatred. By seeking weapons of mass destruction.html..leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.and other terrorist organizations combined with the Bush administrations belief that Iraq had not dismantled their WMD programs after 1998: …Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. Washington D.77 Following the invasion of Iraq and subsequent capture of Baghdad. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -. In any of these cases. the single most influential This was enabled public affairs 77 Bush. Internet. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world…States like these. constitute an axis of evil.
in a sense. what the media members failed to appreciate or account for was the uncommon bond that develops between those in combat therefore journalists became. Torie Clarke. However. unbiased and unvarnished. It is reasonable to assume that the Pentagon carefully considered the pros and cons of allowing this level of media access and determined the benefits 49 . which included fire fights. a part of the unit. Private media corporations such as CNN. NBC. biased by their shared hardships in a uncompromising and harsh environment. on the surface. and the everyday jubilation and sorrow that is a fundamental aspect of combat. to be a colossal compromise on the part of the military establishment. access The to Pentagon’s journalists unimpeded appeared. the embed program gave the Pentagon the opportunity to foster a bond between civilian reporters and troops in the field. in fact. media access to breaking Not only did this allow the but it also gave the news appearance that it was. a relationship which the USG gambled would create a lasting and harmonious relationship. attacks from improvised explosive devices (IED). Fox News. perhaps. with a In the embed program. and ABC) jumped at this opportunity and sent journalists by the dozen to a one-week crash course on military equipment and operations sponsored and instructed willingness by to military allow personnel. and the ‘big three’ (CBS. journalists would live unit experiencing everything that the military average soldier did on a daily basis. any other war: the embedding of reporters with military units in Iraq. The brain-child of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.effort undertaken during this or.
outweighed the potential for a public relations disaster.S. global influence and information strategy.org/resources/research/reports/war/embed/default. schools.S. mosques. and Coalition The forces from hospitals.S.79 78 Project for Excellence in Journalism. though delicate and fraught with distrust. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom. and engaging and U. Hussein’s brash claims of U.S.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division relaxing in Saddam Hussein’s Presidential Palace in downtown Baghdad. As it was. the USG was able to use embedded media to shape the information environment in perhaps the most important arena: American public opinion. troops being ‘slaughtered’ on the battlefields by elite Republican Guard troops were quickly dispelled when American network news stations showed members of the U. troops. Internet. troops highlighted the frenzied nature of the battlefield and the Ba’ath regimes blatant disregard for the laws of land warfare and the Geneva Convention. Accessed 26 April 2005.S. political and military objectives in Iraq. Available from http://www. is critical to U.S.journalism. Up-to-the-minute reporting by embedded journalists in the field with U.asp. in a manner favorable to U. military-media relationship. 50 . the Pentagon successfully leveraged the media as a strategic enabler in support of its overall IO campaign. Embedded media members reported on the insurgents’ tactics.78 Embedded media also played a significant role in reducing the ability of the Iraqis to conduct a significant propaganda campaign of their own. “Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans Getting?” April 2003. using women and children as human shields while engaging U. 79 Ibid.
has of made Despite the fact that the U.-led in Iraqi elected coalition quality significant introduced a improvements democratically life.S. the media provides a forum for the military to enlighten the public as to what it 51 . Media reports of victory and progress serve to reinforce and broaden public support for the policies and actions that the government takes on their behalf. The media also provides access to the military and conveys the complexity of its mission to the general public. government. the military must persuade the public that it can accomplish those goals at a tolerable cost. and killed or captured a majority of former Ba’ath officials. forces. service-members at Abu Ghraib prison. human rights violations by U. media support during the post-invasion period appears to have substantially lessened. Where support did the USG go wrong in maintaining the media of must for military combat operations following Political end “official” operations? leaders inform the public about foreign policy goals. The government achieves communication objectives by providing information to the media who then reports it through various news mediums. In essence. Are these newsworthy events? Yes. that support hasn’t continued in what has now become known as Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) where U.Unfortunately. and the rising death toll of U. Reporting has often focused on negative topics such as the death of civilians. however they are not indicative or reflective of the situation as a whole in Iraq.S. and Coalition forces have faced a difficult and bloody insurgency.S.S.
htm. The press has its own incentives to report on military affairs. forces his negativity the Writing from after abrupt withdrawal Ralph the Coalition Fallujah of [April the 2004]. who were being eliminated effectively and accurately. an overwhelming majority of media reports were positive as there was plenty of “good news” to report. As the stability and security operations began in Iraq and the insurgency began to intensify. “The American-Media Relationship. The global media disrupted the US and Coalition chains of command…We could have won militarily. Accessed 26 April 2005. We stopped because we were worried about what already hostile populations might think of us. and it needs the military’s cooperation to do so. we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape us—despite promising that we would bring them to justice. Robert. each helped the other to achieve their respective goals. They were beaten by al-Jazeera…The media [are] often referred to off-handedly as a strategic factor. or overall News stories began to reflect the tone towards certain of events in Iraq.nwc.mil/press/Review/2002/ winter/art5-w02. But we still don’t fully appreciate [their] fatal power…In Fallujah. 52 .” Internet. of Peters media in offered assessment power determining military outcomes: The [US] Marines in Fallujah weren’t beaten by the terrorists and insurgents.80 During OIF I.navy. Instead. we surrendered politically 80 Porch. dissension in various levels of government occurred concerning a range of political aspects of the operation in Iraq. again. Available from http://www. The media reported the positive stories that the USG provided them and.does.
81 The protracted insurgency has presented new challenges for the USG in seeking to shape the media’s portrayal of conditions on the battlefield. strategic success the tactical achieved Managing the media in this type of politically charged environment presents a different challenge for the USG altogether the given the role and the media can play in of influencing domestic international portrayal military operations.S. Moves to decisively engage and defeat insurgent groups were rapidly thwarted by media reporting of hardship and suffering in the towns and of considerable damage to the urban infrastructure. Ralph. U. defeat for by the US U. one of In both examples. in An Najaf82 typifies the problem that the USG has had in managing the media in OIF II. Marines in the first battle of Fallujah and. Ralph.83 81 Peters. then again.S. Political pressure to limit the assault quickly followed. Marines supported by two Army brigade combat teams battled over control of the city from insurgents led by cleric leader Muqtada al-Sadr. subsequently perception whatever is withdrew.and called it a success. “Kill Faster. Our enemies won the information war. 20 May 2004. The experience of U. 83 Peters. “Kill Faster.S.” New York Post. We literally didn’t know what hit us. and the Marines general forces. 53 . 82 The siege of the Iraqi holy city of An Najaf took place in August 2004 and was similar in nature to the attack on Fallujah. forces.” New York Post. 20 May 2004.
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S. policy organization Looking at it strictly based on results. had the USG’s of and strategic success of the information followed by programs drastic periods great reorganizations troop periods and ineffectiveness. information (NSS) programs.S. be Administration influence strategic conducted. NIS would provide appropriate guidance on An information themes and strategies aiding planners in the development of coherent information campaigns in order to support U. has a desperate need for an integrated information strategy consistent with both foreign and domestic policies. it appears that created and a model for how should U. no other administration since Theodore Roosevelt accomplished as much in the arena of strategic influence as the Reagan 55 . policy objectives. and Just as the National Security Strategy National Military Strategy (NMS) unify the efforts of all agencies concerned with national security and the projection and application of military power.S. A. the Reagan In a historical sense. perception that Post-war peacetime reductions strategic information requirements are not as essential as they are in wartime further hampered the continued growth of influence capabilities. a National Information Strategy (NIS) would unify the efforts of all government agencies involved in strategic communications and information operations.V. The development of and publishing of a National Information Strategy (NIS) would establish concrete objectives and give unifying guidance to all elements of U. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS Throughout the 20th have Century.S. It is evident that the U.
the current administration would be prudent to create a Special Planning Group or committee for strategic influence and information operations which would provide the necessary oversight and coordination of all elements of U. where Reagan they elevated became a strategic information programs fundamental instrument of U. national security policy. tasking operations Like all and conducted government advocacy in support of theater agencies are and programs.S.administration.S. most critical Serving as President during. through a Presidential directive. The Bush Administration would be well served to elevate. crucial that this organization be provided the appropriate 56 . public affairs. crucial It is authority inherently elements to an organizations overall functionality. arguably. and military IO. to a position of prominence within the overall States. and funding for strategic influence programs. information programs to include military information objectives. all elements of strategic communications to include public diplomacy. the period of the Cold to War. conduct of. National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United Presidential or executive-level advocacy provides the necessary impetus to improve the overall organization. No other administration before or since has been able to control and manipulate the information environment as well. Creation of a strategic information organizational structure within the National Security Council should be formally established and given appropriate authorities to apportion within responsibilities applicable and prioritization that Just are as of efforts in did the agencies programs. involved NSDD 77 strategic communication under President Reagan. coordination.
execute security is information policy and for national objectives. political systems. Developers of information strategies need to determine whose attitudes and behaviors we are trying to change and focus on those who are most apt to be influenced in a manner that support U. passions. CONCLUSION Rapid advances complex have in technology have produced an exceptionally communications information served to environment. advise. and concerns. issues. inter-connectivity perspectives.executive-level authorities to plan. support Cultural should plan of encompass and the bulk of the These who in personnel programs for. Government communication programs necessitate employing true regional experts versed in language. institutions worldwide to think and act in accordance with the perceptions and biases in of those with whom they have interact. or execute all elements of strategic communications across the entire spectrum from public diplomacy to military information operations and all other supporting or related capabilities and activities. and has ignited nations. B. policy objectives. coordinate. compelled organizations.S. and religion. experts study. Advances information 57 capabilities . history. expand the Global collective Global sparked and cognizance of major events. environmental understanding fundamental context and important to the development of an information strategy relative to a particular region. social customs. Understanding the history of a region or specific country will help focus the influence strategy.
won’t be enough to win over the Muslim world as the disdain and distrust runs too deep. has the potential to exert an unparalleled amount of influence on the rest of the world through its all- encompassing media and information capabilities but only if the USG recognizes the importance of strategic information programs and their effects on the rest of the world. the hatred and distrust for the United States and its policies in the region.S.S. and minds. Just as bullets and bombs are not likely to win wars by themselves.” the Cold The War ongoing and the counter-insurgency war in Vietnam. the United States again finds itself in a battle for “hearts Iraq. Government has a desperate need to engage in The an integrated strategic influence campaign in order to lessen the antagonistic mind-set and actions against the United States. That being said. Roughly a dozen years following the end of the Cold War. 58 . U. information programs alone will not win the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. the U. However. The USG must support its information programs with other. more tangible efforts designed to bridge the gap between the U. and eventually eradicate. and in like an will to require ambitious influence strategy effort contain.complicated the United States’ capacity to manipulate the information environment in its favor. information strategies and programs. by themselves.S. and Islam.
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65 . 5.INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. California Director. MCCDC. 3. California 2. Defense Technical Information Center Fort Belvoir. Code C40RC Quantico. 4. Marine Corps Research Center. MCCDC. California Marine Corps Representative Naval Postgraduate School Monterey. Training and Education. Virginia Director. 6. Virginia Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey. Virginia Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) Camp Pendleton. Code C46 Quantico.
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