A New Disputed Question of St.
Thomas Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul
A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul
From the Latin text edited by Leonard A. Kennedy and published in Archives d'Historie Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, Paris; 1979. Vatican Library, Cod. lat. 781, ff. 47ra-48rb Translated by John Thomas Mellein, O.P. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California The following text is a translation of a disputed question on the immortality of the soul. Fr. Kennedy edited the Latin text and published the edition in AHDLMA, 1979. In his helpful introduction, he discusses the condition and relation of the 3 extant manuscripts, as well as the authenticity of the text. He holds that it is an authentic work of Thomas. Current Thomistic studies seem to have neglected this text; this may be in part because the authorship of the question has not been verified. Some scholars are inclined to think it was actually written by Thomas, and I am inclined to agree. The authenticity, however, is hard to verify, since there is no record of the disputation in any of our sources of Thomas’ life. Further, it is difficult to determine when Thomas would have held this disputation, especially since we already have a disputed question on the immortality of the soul which we know to be authentic. That would mean that Thomas disputed the same question twice. While this is not impossible, it does cast some doubt on the authenticity of the following disputed question. In any case, the manner of treatment, as well as the resolution, is clearly Thomistic. If Thomas did not write it, then it was written be someone who knew Thomas’ work almost as well as Thomas himself. [47ra] This question is on the immortality of the soul. And it seems that it is not immortal. 1. For a difference of a higher genus uniformly divisive is participated by all inferior genera. Corruptible, however, is a difference divisive of being; for being is divided into corruptible and incorruptible. Therefore, all corruptibles are uniformly corruptible. But stone and plant and brute are corruptible in such a way that, once corrupted, the forms of their bodies cease to be. Therefore, when the human being is corrupted, its form, namely the human soul, ceases to be. Therefore, etc. 2. Moreover, it is proper to the soul to be a form essentially; for if it is in the human being per accidens, then "human being" is not a substance but a quality. But when what is essential to a thing is removed, that thing is not able to be. Since, therefore, when the body corrupts, the soul ceases to be a form, it seems that, after the corruption of the body, the soul is not able to be. Therefore, etc. 3. Moreover, the first defect of a creature is to be from nothing, and other things follow from this, such as mutability, corruptibility, and things of this kind. But the soul is from nothing since it is a certain creature. Therefore, etc.
But nothing prevents something illuminated by the sun. because the body. In the soul there is some composition. But this is able to happen if. at least from that by which it is. not by nature. 9. that which belongs to anything according to itself. when the body is corrupted. But on the contrary. the soul is corrupted. According to 1 Augustine. And he shows that the soul is neither matter nor form nor this something. in book II of De Anima. and again. 11. Therefore. nothing prevents that when the body is corrupted. Therefore. belongs to the human soul insofar as it is compared to another. indissoluble. and "this something". by the will of God. an angel receives immortality by grace.4. but form giving being to the body. Moreover. therefore. 6. Therefore neither is the soul by its own nature immortal. the body being restored. is more properly said to be corruptible than immortal. Moreover. because the soul is a "this something". the same soul comes back into being. the soul is as it were a kind of light by which the body is illuminated by God. although it is corrupted. however. either through its own corruption or in some other way. 7. The soul. since light is also a form of an illuminated body. is restored nevertheless through resurrection to the glory of immortality. But it seems that no operation of the soul can exist without the body. it is impossible for the soul to be separated from the body. just as the Philosopher said in book I of De Anima. But it is said that there is not a similarity between light and the soul. and yet the celestial bodies are not composed from contraries. If it is said that only those things are dissoluble which are composed from contraries. and what it is. it is dissoluble and not incorruptible. wherever there is any composition. if there can be no operation of 2 the soul without the body. considered in itself. Therefore. as it is ordered to beatitude. there is the possibility of dissolution. Since understanding does not occur without a phantasm. however. Moreover. it is not only those things which are composed from contraries that are dissoluble. since it is from nothing. 10. however. namely. there is no difference in this respect between the soul and light. Moreover. the soul also ceases to be. Moreover. Immortality. the 1 Philosopher divides substance in three: into matter. the soul is not
. since it is able to be a participant in eternal beatitude. is said of it first and more properly than that which belongs to it through comparison to another. form. this is against what Plato says in the Timaeus that the celestial bodies by their own nature are 2 dissoluble. 5. Therefore it seems that nothing prevents us from calling the soul mortal. however. the soul according to its own nature is not superior to an angel. This is clearly true of the operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts of the soul. from being illuminated again by the same light. 8. [47rb] it seems to be corruptible. according to faith the soul is held to be immortal. Moreover. light however is not. after it ceases to be illuminated. Therefore. and phantasms are not able to be without bodily instruments.
Therefore. however. But the esse of the soul is contrary to the divine esse. it is said in Liber de Causis that every substance which is from contraries or is supported by contraries is corruptible. for the world always to have been. The human soul. Since. But it is said that God communicates to others the immortality which he has from himself. 18. But the vegetative soul is in such a way the form of the body that when the body is corrupted. etc. Therefore. when the esse of things is contrary. and the soul is immortal. therefore. since it is not impossible for the world always to have been. the sensible soul would also be incorruptible. it necessarily follows that there would be an actual infinite. in the human being. therefore. Therefore. But the human soul began to be in time. therefore. it follows that the sensible soul in the human being and the horse are not of one genus. then there are an infinite number of dead people. But it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite. For if the world always was. everything 1 which begins to be in time. the corruptible and 1 incorruptible are not of the same genus. as is clear in the insane and others of this kind. for it is the form of a body composed 5 from contraries. the souls of whom remain. 14. if the soul is immortal. therefore. It is possible. as was said. for many people maintained this. Moreover. the soul also is corrupted. Therefore also the human soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted. 15. the mode of the soul is that it is mortal.able to be separated from the body. 6 that God alone has immortality. however. 16. since a thing is placed in a
. Moreover. as 3 the Gloss on the same passage says. the soul ceases to be. Moreover. If. the rational soul were incorruptible. is not immortal. the world always was. Moreover. The definition4of soul in common is that it is the form of an organic physical body. Therefore it is corruptible. 12. however. as the created to the uncreated. the weakness of the body impedes even the superior part of our intellect. however. is nevertheless supported by contraries. Moreover. having life potentially. If. leads the soul totally into non-being. Death of the body. And thus when the body corrupts. 17. the sensible and rational soul is the same according to substance. just as the philosopher proved in the first book of De Caelo et Mundo. since the mode of the divine esse is that God is immortal. so that it does not proceed freely into act. Moreover. But on the contrary. Therefore it ceases to be. Therefore. 13. as the Philosopher says in book X of the Metaphysics. by which the divine is contemplated. is corruptible. The soul of a horse. Moreover. 19. for it did not always exist. the Apostle says in I Tim. Therefore. the human being and the horse do not come under the genus “animal”. etc. nothing impossible follows. it remains that it is impossible for the soul to be immortal. The human soul. although it is not composed from contraries. and thus it is necessary that this definition applies universally to every soul. if a possible thing is posited. in time also ceases to be. their mode of existing is contrary also.
However. 20. is not incorruptible. when the body ceases. since the soul is the principle of the operations of life. In connection with this question it was asked whether any creature would be able to subsist even for a moment if it were not preserved in being by God.
. 59. as the house remains when the operation of the builder ceases. is manifestly false. But when an obstacle is placed between the moon and the sun.. insofar as it is of itself. Cassiodorus says about the Psalm. according to what Isaiah 3 says in Ch. 2. who are of lesser power. 21. 1. But on the contrary there is what the Philosopher says in book II of De Anima. The rational soul. “Truly in a dream humans pass away. just as the moon receives light from the sun. the artifacts remain. by its own nature is the image of God.” that 3 the soul would not be the image of God if it were closed up by the limits of death. Moreover. since an angel understands very differently from a human soul. Since. This. it seems that the soul is deprived of life through sin and so it is not immortal. Therefore it is naturally immortal. which comes to be through the interposition of the earth. however. if the operation of God be removed. For every creature. the moon looses its own light. does it seem that God would be able to give this ability to his own creature. Moreover. But it is a proper motion of the soul and of every creature to tend into nothing. there is not found among the operations of the human soul any operation of a separate substance. that the intellect is separated from other parts of the soul as the perpetual is separated from the 1 corruptible. 3. therefore. the soul is not prevented from tending into nothing. Moreover. sin is an obstacle which is placed between the soul and God. through divine administration. the soul receives life from God. and whether God would be able to give to any creature the ability to be preserved in being through the principles by which it is constituted in being. it ceases. 22. Therefore it is not immortal. therefore. therefore. because it naturally has memory. But the human soul knows truth which is perpetual and incorruptible. The soul. “your sins separate you and your God”. however. Moreover. as is clear in an eclipse of the moon. Augustine says in book X of City of God that God guides the things which he has established in such a way as to permit them to exercise their own proper motion.. Moreover. And it seems that this is so because created artists. and will. so that. there ought to be some proportion between the knower and the known. Therefore the human soul is also incorruptible.genus or species through its own form. according to which the image of God is considered to be in it. when their own operation ceases. Therefore the soul is not a substance separable from the body. understanding. therefore. Therefore. tends into nothing. are able to give this ability to their own artifacts. because there is great difference even in the very act of understanding between the soul and a separate substance. Much more. it is necessary that the mode of its own substance be demonstrated from its operation.
Whence the body. and the conclusions of sciences. and principles. but rather according to something which is common to both incorruptible and corruptible things. which are moved locally by the soul. just as the souls of2 humans are immortal. which is to understand. It ought to be said that in the order of things the soul is found midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures. unless the soul itself were incorruptible. understands incorruptible things according as they are incorruptible. 2. but also to the souls of brutes. namely that the soul is self-moving. The human soul. And from this Plato concluded that the soul is immortal. since an infinite number of particulars are able to be considered under it. it cannot be separated from its own mover. therefore. and is contrary to reason. For the eye does not know an incorruptible thing insofar as it is incorruptible. since the human soul understands. it is necessary that the reasons for immortality be taken from that which is proper to the human soul among the other souls. while the nonliving are not moved unless moved by others. For since the living are seen to differ from the non-living in that the living are self-moving. which is moved by the soul. even if one proceeds through certain signs of its immortality as by certain ways. that both the perfection and the perfectible be contained under one genus. when it understands their universals. according to Plato. which would not be. Nevertheless.[47va] The Solution. But since to move itself. Indeed Plato shows that the soul is immortal since it is self-moving. is shown 4 to be false by Aristotle in book I of De Anima. it ought to be known that for showing the immortality of the soul. they held that the life of the living is to be moved in this way. For the object understood is the perfection of the one understanding. according as it understands a universal. since there appears no operation in brutes except that which is exercised through the body. whence the immortality of the soul is not irrationally doubted. Likewise. But an infinite power cannot be in a
. for as it is said in book II of the Ethics. And this is not an instance. light. therefore. so much so that it does not even understand corruptible things except insofar as they are incorruptible. But 3 this is both repugnant to the faith. as are animals. Whence if those things which are understood by the human soul are incorruptible in their mode of being. from which it seems that the soul itself is also corruptible. Since. and from this it seems to be incorruptible. nevertheless there is one way demonstrating its immortality. immortality is proper to the human soul. so also are the souls of brutes. It is like corruptible substances in that it is the form of a corruptible body. It is necessary. it is necessary for the human soul to be in the genus of incorruptibles. for the same reason it follows that. and universals. it is shown that in some way it is of infinite power.” For the soul is like incorruptible substances in that it understands. Also. dies when it is separated form the soul. belongs not only to the human soul. And Plato maintained this very thing. which is virtually infinite. and showing propter quid that it is immortal. 1. For since the human soul understands necessary and perpetual things. “The extremes dispute about the 4 middle region. however. since nothing is separated from itself. Whence neither in1itself can the motion of life cease. the reason for this position. as truth itself. the soul is a first self-moving being. that the corruptible eye can see the incorruptible body of the sun or the moon. on the other hand. From this it is evidently clear that the human soul was made to be perfected by incorruptibles as by its proper perfections. namely. which moves it. as is clear in Liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus. it is manifestly clear that it is incorruptible. Since.
2 Whence John says in Ch. Whence it is necessary that the mode of desire is according to the mode of cognition. or water. The final end of the human soul seems to be to know the first cause of things. And similarly those who posited air. to say that the soul is composed of the principles of all things. The natural philosophers of antiquity. but as having from another an inclination to a naturally desired end. as is proved elsewhere. Its natural desire. in order that the soul. So they chose this way. And so whatever one of them thought were the principles of things. For those who maintained that fire was the principle of all things. Whence from the reason of cognition it is necessary to investigate what is the substance of the soul. 3.
. appetite. however. might be found 2 similar to those things which are from the principles. which have merely sensitive cognition. therefore. and with these love and hate. when they see effects and are ignorant of their causes. These and similar reasons are taken from certain signs of immortality. It is a common conception of all that cognition comes about through a kind of similitude of the knower to the known. But the substance of the soul is not known except from its operation. therefore. Since. which is clear from this that human beings experience wonder. follows local motion. But this desire is not found to be the same in all things. And so the natural desire does not rest until some effect having a cause is found. and the wonder itself is a moving force to seeking cognition of the cause. For it is clear that cognition follows appetite. But the human soul understands existence and the good absolutely. Whence neither is their desire directed to existence and the good except as here and now. Among the operations of the soul (setting aside the operations of the vegetative soul. 17. of such principles did he think the soul to be also. otherwise it would be in vain. desire or appetite follows cognition as something directing them. Whence it remains that the substance of the intellective soul cannot be corruptible. said that the soul was fire. not as here and now. which is taken from the mode of its substance. For those things which lack cognition desire existence and the good not as if from themselves. judged it necessary that things known were in the knowing soul according to the same mode of being. Likewise. It is therefore necessary that the soul remain after the body. 5. conceived a similar opinion of the soul. etc. namely. it seemed to follow that the soul had to be composed of all things. if not being able to attain to its proper end. 4. Brute animals. but as simply and for all time. as is 1 said in beginning of the Metaphysics. or even all four elements. a natural desire cannot be in vain. it is manifest that the final end of the human soul is in the cognition of the first cause. because it is composed of the principles. “This is life eternal. from which a reason for incorruptibility is not able to be taken) the first operation and root [47vb] of the others is cognition. it is necessary that the human soul be immortal. But in those things which have cognition. But there is a reason showing propter quid that the soul is immortal. therefore.” But the human soul does not attain to 1 this end as long as it is conjoined to the body. is for existence and the good. which seemed absurd. since the power of a substance is proportioned to it and is founded upon its principles. does not know existence and the good except as here and now. Since therefore the final end is that in which natural desire is completely at rest.corruptible substance. Likewise. a thing naturally desires to be and to remain in its own being. however. But since the soul knows all things.
For the soul comes to know in act from knowing in potency as much according to sense as according to understanding. and not because it is in potency. For this reason. because it uses a bodily instrument because it is the act of the bodily instrument. as an organ which receives the forms of sensible things of some genus. lacks every form of that genus in order that it might be able to receive them all. For vision is not an operation of sight alone. Whence it [the knowing power] does not follow from composition or mixture of any of them [the corporeal powers]. And thus reception of forms corresponding to this kind of cognition can occur in a bodily instrument. not through any bodily organ. would remain unknown according to this position. It is necessary from this. however. but in act. going out from sight alone. as in sense. that sensitive cognition occurs through the reception of forms without the casting off of others. It is therefore impossible that intellective cognition comes to be in us through any bodily organ. which indeed through its sensitive power as through its own form can know those things whose forms it receives. if it were sufficient for the soul to have cognition of things that it be composed from the principles of things. it is necessary for that through which intellectual cognition in us is completed to be stripped of every nature of sensible things. For it is not able to be corrupted per se. Whence it remains that the knowing power is over against all corporeal power. For nothing is moved except a body. And granted that no knowing power follows upon a property of any body. nevertheless there is among them [the bodily properties] some kind of bodily knowing power. since it is not moved per se. But the soul is not found to be knowing things because it is in potency to known things in the way that corporeal matter is in potency to forms. was not sufficient. according as one potency is cast off and another introduced. the most important being in reality. But that which is subsisting per se and incorporeal is of necessity incorruptible. would not have a similitude with all things. For corporeal matter is educed from potency to act with change and passivity. the soul. the intellect is something operating per se. which are here and now. but only cognition of the thing is acquired. But each thing is known precisely 3 because it is in act. Again. we are in potency to knowing the natures of all sensible things through the intellect. Therefore. each thing is known more through its own form than through matter. but from the eye. But each thing is found to act in the way in which it is. because sensitive cognition is of singulars. as a pupil lacks every color. since cognition would come to it from the composition of its own substance. But we see that this is false. for through the one the other is known. but it depends on a higher principle. just as it is an agent per se. however. as is shown in book IX of the Metaphysics. moreover. and likewise of each of the contraries.This position. Whence it is shown that the soul is cognitive of things rather because it is in potency to all than because it is composed in act from all. indeed. having an operation which goes out from it alone. But the previously mentioned similitude was according to matter alone. which is composed of sight and the pupil. If. but they subsist composed and they have being through their forms. therefore. for nothing is cast off from it. then it would not be knowing things in potency. and
. The intellect. because all things are not in common material principles. which indeed are not subsisting per se. therefore. if composed from principles of this kind. that is. Whence the form. does not happen in the soul when it is knowing in act. And. which is not found in bodily forms. But no body is of this kind. considered in its own nature. except in potency. and so it is with the other instruments of the senses. namely the sensitive power. except in potency. is something subsisting per se. This. Whence such a mode of similitude does not suffice for cognition. or from any property of any of them.
the thing becomes knowable. but the thing seen. therefore. says. This indeed is not able to be. since color is in it. therefore. therefore. And nevertheless it ought to be known that being. 3. that that by which the human being understands is in every way incorruptible. for we would not speak of the intellect unless we perceive that we understand. which is manifestly false. however. saying that the phantasms which are in us are objects of the separated possible intellect. it is impossible for that by which it understands formally to be a substance existing separately from it. it is liable to other defects. therefore. is a certain separated 1 substance. “I call the 1 intellect that by which the soul understands. For it is necessary that that by which something operates is its actual form. To the first objection. 2. Whence also Aristotle. “Concerning the 4 part of the soul. [Replies to the Objections] 1. Whence the ratio of the corruptible is not changed whether the form be corrupted per accidens or is in every way incorruptible. that that by which we understand. If. therefore. remains nevertheless a form as having formative power. are not univocally but analogically predicated of things.” Whence it is clear that he says that the possible intellect is separate since it has an operation separate from the body. then the intellect would not be joined to us as to knowing beings. To the third it ought to be said that to be from nothing is not the cause of other defects as that from which they necessarily follow. It remains. And what is subsisting is not corrupted per accidens. the form. the human soul is in every way incorruptible. is not generated and corrupted except per accidens. Since the creature is from nothing and is said to return into nothing if left to itself. since nothing acts unless it is in act. phantasms are the objects of the intellect. and therefore in things of this kind it is not necessary to seek altogether the same ratio. It remains. etc. and through them the possible intellect is joined to us. there is not any power designated
. It remains. A form. and each one according to the mode of its own genus and species. as has been said and shown. For the corruption of the human being is only from the defect of the body. however. and which is called the possible intellect. therefore. it ought to be said that what is generated and corrupted per se is composed. nor is it anything of the soul which is the form of our body. For it is manifest that the human being is an understanding being. certain people say that that by which the human being understands and is altogether in potency. But the ratio of the thing is not changed by those things which are per accidens . But when the body corrupts. by which the soul knows and is wise. But this being supposed. If. Since the object of any knowing power is in some thing. since [48ra] the phantasms are in us. and those things which pertain to being.” and later. which becomes indisposed to receiving its being from the soul. through which it is in act.something is not corrupted per se unless it is moved. 2 Nor does that mode of joining suffice which certain people devised. but as to known beings. that if the possible intellect is incorruptible. even if it does not remain as forming in act. as the 3 Philosopher says. But it is impossible that anything work formally by anything which is diverse from it in substance. but since the creature is from nothing. the human being is an understanding being. but not the one knowing. since corruption is an end of motion. namely the possible intellect. be something of our soul or nature. beginning to treat of the possible intellect. To the second it ought to be said that the soul through its own essence is the form of the human being. and not since it is a substance separate from the human being. just as the wall is not the one seeing.
Whence it is impossible for a substance which is form alone to be corruptible. In immaterial but created substances. who maintains that they are not composed from contraries. except on account of a power which is in itself. this is only through the gift of grace. when something is changed from white to black. Whence. it is necessary that it be such in its own nature that it can obtain beatitude. To the seventh it ought to be said that. shows from this that 1 they are incorruptible according to their own nature. are changeable according to choice. And. The reason presented in opposition. and this kind of separation cannot be understood in a substance which is form alone. since there is in the soul no power for corruption. that it is corruptible according to its own nature and incorruptible through its relation to beatitude. for those things which lack contrariety do not drive each other out. It is not true. therefore. it cannot be called corruptible for the foregoing reason. or from esse and what it is. as was said (there cannot be something separating form from matter unless it be something inducing a form. proceeded from contrary opinions. And thus true immortality is true immutability. for esse itself is that by which each thing is. however. And thus only composition which is from contraries is a cause of corruptibility. since something is cast off. esse. Whence a material substance does not lose esse unless the matter is separated from the form. the white is corrupted. to withdraw his own operation by which he preserves the thing in being. however. 4. For it is not composed of matter and form. in those things which are for the sake of an end. there can be no corruption. This. however. maintained that they were composed from contraries. To the fourth it ought to be said that. if they are fixed unchangeably in the good. For Plato. 1 which no creature has except through grace. and not the converse. and under whose power it lies. in any change there is some death and corruption. To the fifth it ought to be said that the composition which is in the soul cannot be a reason for its corruptibility. it is necessary that the mode of its substance be in accord with what fits its end.
. is to be incorruptible. Whence.in the creature but in the creator. there is composition of matter and form. since the intellective soul was made for beatitude. since he does this voluntarily. another is driven out. just as a saw has sharp iron teeth in order that it might cut. For an angel and souls. for nothing acts intending something not to be. Thus it remains that corruption does not come to be unless. however. 2 but Aristotle. but intending something to be and to be good). who said that the heavenly bodies were corruptible according to their own nature. by the inducing of one form. but of that by which it is and from what it is. just as. by whose power the creature is brought into being and preserved in being. according to Augustine. which according to substance are incorruptibles from their own nature. which would not come to be if there were no contrariety between the forms. 7. for nothing is able to be separated from itself. however. is not called corruptible or changeable. 5. which is the same thing. To the sixth it ought to be said that where there is no contrariety. in whom alone his substance is the same as his esse. Something. 6. following per se upon the form. however. For since there is no corruption except through the separation of form from matter. But a substance subsisting in esse is its own form. This kind of composition is found necessarily in everything other than God. In material substances. esse is other than the substance of the thing.
and incorruptible. the same reasoning does not apply to light and the intellective soul. To the eighth it ought to be said that in the final reformation of the world. however. as was shown. maintaining a multitude of incorruptible souls with the eternity of the world. nevertheless. because some part of it is incorruptible by nature. certain people saying that what is perpetual and incorruptible of the things pertaining to the soul. To the ninth it ought to be said that [48rb] if there is an intermission of illumination.8.” 11. 9. then nothing prohibits the intellective soul from being called a “this something. If.5And this was the position of the Platonists. 6 and its production is never begun. and the stick moves the stone). it would be according to the opinion of Plato. Whence on account of this the human being will be able to obtain incorruptibility. 10. nothing achieves incorruption which does not have some order to incorruption. since light is not something subsisting as is the 3 intellective soul. however. but something composed from soul and body. such as Avicenna and Algazel. by “this something” is understood anything subsisting. And certain people. If. just as neither in other forms is it the same health in number which is recovered after convalescence and which was had before the illness. however. neither animals nor plants nor minerals will remain. namely the soul. maintained revolutions of souls so that souls. not per se but per accidens. which were first set loose from bodies. as it is shown. 3 namely the possible or agent intellect. 4 after some time again returned to bodies. for phantasms which are objects of the intellect are in corporeal organs. neither upwards nor downwards. To the tenth it ought to be said that if by “this something” is understood a complete individual in some species. in which every corruption ceases. however. If. said that it is not unbefitting to maintain an actual infinite. is only one for all humans. it is granted that the light is same in number. and subsisting. 12. the soul were corruptible. In the first way the intellect does not 2 need the body. and the same reasoning applies to the numbering of motion and the termination of motion. and not something composed 1 from soul and body. in those
. To the eleventh it ought to be said that a cognitive power needs the body in two ways: in one way as an instrument. To the twelfth it ought to be said that those maintaining the eternity of the world and the incorruptibility of the soul escape this objection in three ways. Otherwise. and this is not opposed to the incorruption of the soul. For there is said to be an infinite per se in those things of which there is a multitude according to some order of one thing dependent on another (just as when the hand moves the stick. There is said to be an infinite per accidens. and from this it is held that it is an agent per se. on account of which in that state. But the elements will remain because they are incorruptible as a whole. This cannot proceed into infinity. even if they are corrupted in 2 part. In the second way it needs the body. Others. however. for it is necessary that something be dependent from infinity. according to those maintaining that the nature of the human species is not the soul only. since the motion which ends at each of the two is not the same in number. as sight needs the pupil. as sight needs a stone or a mirror.” since it is not perfect. the light which is second and which was first was do not seem to be the same light in number. the soul is not a “this something. in another way it needs the body as an object representing an object. who maintained that the human being is a soul using a body. there would not remain in the human body some order to attaining incorruption. lest they be forced to maintain an actual infinite.
namely imagination. From this we are given to understand that it is not on account of a defect of its own power that that which is incorruptible should be from a certain time and not before. by divine gift. and thus its time is not able to be limited by its principles so that it was not before. nor is a power of this kind in them diminished through a long duration of time. which indeed belongs to God from himself. that is. To the sixteenth it ought to be said that weakness of the body impedes the operation of the intellect per accidens. 13. 16. nor is it supported by contraries. there is nothing to prevent one from maintaining many souls in act. 14. just as one worker works by many hammers in such a way that when one hammer is broken another is substituted. it does not follow that each is called a form equivocally. The Catholic faith. should not always have been. which does not maintain an eternal world. For it does not matter how the work is done. To the thirteenth it ought to be said that the Philosopher proves in the first book of De Caelo 2 et Mundo that what is incorruptible is also unbegotten. since one hammer does not depend on another. is freed from these difficulties. 17. for what is incorruptible has the power to be for an infinite time. whether through a finite or infinite [number of hammers] if he continues for an infinite time. and thus it is not corruptible per accidens. when it is alienated from the senses. cogitation. which are incorruptible. This power having been received. to others. however. 18. the soul then acquires the mode of being by which the separate substances exist. To the fifteenth it ought to be said that a effect is not contrary to its cause. Whence it happens that souls. To the seventeenth it ought to be said that. because they have not always received the power by which they were. so that it is able to see the future. a sign of which is that even while it is in the body. To the eighteenth it ought to be said that form as supported by contraries is understood to be something which needs a body composed of contraries for the substantiation of its own esse. Neither is it necessary that they be in every way univocal. namely to understand through an influx of a superior intellect. Whence since the vegetative soul is corruptible. And they attain to the same mode of understanding [as the separate substances]. for form and act and things of this kind are among these things which are predicated analogically of diverse things. insofar as the inferior powers by which the intellect acquires are impeded. To the fourteenth it ought to be said that the immortality which belongs to God alone is altogether immutability. and thus it is not corruptible per se. it perceives something more abundantly from the influence of a superior intellect. For the opposition of created and uncreated is not according to contrariety. but according to affirmation and negation. just as was said above. they always are. however. and memory. form is not corruptible except per accidens. Whence through this it is shown that human soul is incorruptible.
. And so they say that since one soul1 does not depend on another.things whose multitude does not have an order of one to another. and yet the rational soul is not. the divine. 15. because it is neither composed from contraries. But when the body is totally corrupted. whence the esse of the creature is not contrary to the divine esse. however.
35. ed. p. as in Aquinas' Quaestio Disputata de Anima. but it is the cause that things are.-P. a. but “man” and “horse” are in one genus. namely to understand. VII. 412a29-30. And thus it is shown that it is separable. II. VI.. 69. Patrologiae. but not in the same way as that in which the separable substances are. Moreover. De Caelo et Mundo. J.
. 725). De Anima. it is necessary that when the divine operation is removed. 94. 14. 1. 1.series graeca (Paris. II. c. 41ab. 1058b26-29. 868. 27.. But by a kind of metaphorical speech it can be said that a creature of itself tends into non-being because. II. Nor is it to be said that to tend into non-being is a proper motion of a creature. 1955. although it does not understand according to the same mode. it would be in another genus from that in which the soul of a horse would be. obj. but through reduction. It is found in Damascene's De Fide Orthodoxa. To the questions proposed at the end. 1. 2 Augustine. De Civitate Dei. And because God cannot give to any creature the ability not to be his effect. 20. Buytaert. as principles. To the twenty-second it ought to be said that sin is an obstacle between the soul and God impeding the influence of grace. De Anima. cf. but not impeding the influence of natural being. prop. he is not able to give it the ability to be preserved in being without his operation. 2 Plato. it would cease to be. 3. the human soul were reckoned in a genus by itself. I. H. 30. nor of diverse species or genera. since every motion of a creature is toward being and toward the good. 10. 1 Aristotle. tr. Migne. I. Whence the human soul and equine soul are neither of one species or genus. tr. 21. 3 Is 59:2. 2 I Tim 6:16. 2 Aristotle. X. if it were abandoned by God. ed. and therefore on account of this things do not tend to non-being. Calcidius. 4 Aristotle. John Damascene. col. E. 1857-1866). Explicit. 403a10-11. 1962. To the nineteenth it ought to be said that forms and any parts are not in the species or in the genus directly. 7 vol. Timaeus. it is finally to be said that since an effect is taken away when its cause is removed. col. as the builder is the cause of the house. p. Burgundio. 1590) at I Tim 6:16 (vol. by his operation things are preserved in being. 3. vol. 5 Liber de Causis. M. To the twenty-first it ought to be said that the soul has some act according to the genus of a separate substance.19. Metaphysics. To the twentieth it ought to be said that God does not so permit creatures to exercise proper motions that his own operation is excluded: otherwise he would not rule them. Note: all footnotes in this text are reproduced from Kennedy’s text unless otherwise indicated. 1 Aristotle. For the operation of God is not only the cause by which things are made. If. 3 Glossa Ordinaria (Paris. 1 Elsewhere Aquinas attributes this to St.. in J. 412a6-21. the being of things which is caused by it is taken away. however. 1 Aristotle. Waszink. De Anima. 22. 12.
1953). Ser. 35. 97. 1975. Timaeus. Leyden. Verbeke and J. De Caelo et Mundo. line 32. cap. 3 Aristotle. Liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus. cap. 2 Plato. p. line 92. cf. col. I.V. Metaphysics. Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros. 6 Lit. Frankfurt. in P. 1 Aristotle. esp. Waszink. lat. Leipzig. 5 (Cambridge. I. 357-358. 16-17. 2 In the solution.1 Aristotle. 1051a29-30.ed. IX. 413b 24-25. 11. 3 Aristotle.. 1285D. J. Mass. ibid. 1 For example. but probably Cassiodorus. 4 Aristotle. 4 Aristotle. 409b23-410a12. 429a23-24. ed. div. 429a10. 2. to 52. to p. Augustine. De Anima. 1963. 4. Sermon 212. cap. 3 Gennadius. 1 Response to the first objection. 4. 2 Aquinas. III. 96. p. C. 1962. Part I. III.R.H. 7. 1107b32. Moncho. repr.. Metaphysics. 4 Nemesius. II. tract. lines 556-563. Quaestio Disputata de Potentia.L. T. 5. Augustine. ed. 542. X. col. 3 Averroes. III. I. or PL (Paris. De Natura Hominis. De Civitate Dei. X.46. 3 Objection 10. 2. 2 Nemesius. 7. St. Metaphysica. 3. 984-985. Ser. 2 Jn 17:3. 2 Ps 38:7. De Anima. 6. XXXVIII. 40-41. 4. p. line 15. De Caelo. Willis. 1953).” Trans. 3 Cf. 2 Averroes. 58. III. Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros. p. De Veritate. tract. 12. p. 3. 47. ed. De Anima. Summa Contra Gentiles. in the translation by Burgundio of Pisa. 5 (Cambridge. in the translation by Burgundio of Pisa. ed. 20 (Cambridge. 5. line 92. 1. Metaphysics. 4 Aristotle. 2. Adriaen. 405b31-407b25. 41AB. line 15. 1844-1882) vol. J. III. VIII. 1 Macrobius. De Anima. Muckle. De Anima. Mass. I have not been able to find this teaching in any of Avicenna's works available to Aquinas. G. I. cit. 2 Aristotle.II. In Somnium Scipionis. 9. I. i. 283b7-22. 270a13-23. lines 25-32. “its generation is never completed. In Ps.. Cassiodorus. 431a14-16. C. cit. III. line 1. J. De Natura Hominis. 1953) lines 213-219. Algazel. 1958. 9. 1
. M. De Anima. lat. 5 Avincenna. C. II. to p.. De Natura Hominis. 46. III. 13. I. 9. 1 For example. Toronto. p. 1 Aristotle. W. 1 Averroes. 45. Also St. 982b11-22. ed. 134. II. 45. ed. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus. 10. (Kennedy) 2 Aristotle. 30. Halporn. C. Mass. 51. 1 Nemesius. 3. 1 Aristotle. 70. 1 Algazel.. 1961) 97 B. Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros. De Anima. ad. 2. 1933. Ethics.I (1508. 1973. lines 513-520.. ed.