U. S. Capitol Police Response To CHA Minority Members Re Intelligence Activities
U. S. Capitol Police Response To CHA Minority Members Re Intelligence Activities
U. S. Capitol Police Response To CHA Minority Members Re Intelligence Activities
PHONE: 202-224-9806
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R UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
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4W 119 DSTREET, NE
WASHINGTON, DC 2051 0-7218
cop 220124
The Honorable Rodney Davis The Honorable Jim Banks
121 6 Longworth House Office Building 1 71 3 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 205 1 5 Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Representatives:
I have received your letter ofJanuary 25, 2022. I understand your concerns about the
scope ofthe United States Capitol Police’s (USCP) security and intelligence gathering efforts
based on allegations that appeared in a recent Politico article. Unfortunately, the Politico article
contains inaccurate facts, misleading information, and unsupported conclusions. I assure each of
you that the USCP’s security efforts as it concerns off-campus and district-based events is legal,
appropriate, and strictly limited to gathering basic information about the event that ensures the
safety of Members.
In this correspondence, I first provide an overview ofthe nature ofthe USCP’s security
efforts and the purpose ofthese procedures as it pertains to these events. I then address each
question in your letter that was directed to the Capitol Police Board.
Overview
I note at the outset that none ofthe procedures described below are in any way related to
an “insider threats” program. The USCP does not conduct any “insider threats”-related
surveillance or intelligence gathering on Members, staff, or visitors to the Capitol Complex.
Rather, the USCP’s security efforts as it concerns events are consistent with the practices of
protective services agencies nation-wide charged with protecting government officials or
dignitaries.
Nationally Accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.
CWG Security Briefings PSB DPD
The USCP prepares security assessments for Member events or events Members attend at
the request of Members and in close coordination with both Sergeant at Arms (SAA) offices and
has done so for many years. These requests generally come to the USCP in two ways: through a
Member office requesting a Law Enforcement Coordination (LECOR) through their SAA or
through the Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) for a protectee event.
The USCP works with both SAA offices to compile basic information about an event
from the Member office, such as, for example, the location ofthe event, the number of people
expected to attend the event, or whether the event is public or private.
Once this basic information is obtained from a Member office, the USCP conducts an
open source check on the event itself to determine whether information of a concerning nature is
being shared in the public sphere or on social media about the event. The type of information
that the U$CP is seeking includes, for example, information indicating that any group may be
mobilizing to disrupt an event.
In instances where the USCP has identified information indicating that a group or an
individual intends to disrupt an event being attended by a Member, the USCP conducts an open
source check on those individuals to determine whether they present any security concern. The
UsCP also checks its internal records to determine whether the individual(s) is on record with
the USCP for previous suspicious or criminal activity related to Congress.
Once all ofthis information has been collected and analyzed the USCP creates an
assessment ofthe event, and the USCP provides a summary ofits findings to the SAA. This
summary also lists local police department contacts and local hospital information. To the extent
the USCP has identified any open source material about the event, for example, indicating that
groups or individual actors intend to disrupt the event, the USCP assessment and the summary
provided to the SAA contains that information.
Additionally, a Member office sometimes provides the USCP with the names of event
attendees. The USCP conducts a Google search on the names to obtain basic information if
available, and also to determine whether the persons’ background indicates any obvious security
concern.
As an example, if a Member office requests a LECOR through their SAA office for an
event being hosted by Jane Doe at Jane Doe’s home that a Member will attend, the USCP will
conduct a Google search on Jane Doe. Such a search may reveal Jane Doe is the president of X
Corporation and that demonstrators have been regularly protesting at Jane Doe’s house on
Thursday evenings. This information would be relevant for Member security, especially if the
event is to occur on a Thursday. The USCP will alert the local law enforcement covering the
event, or DPD ifthe event is for a protectee, ofthe possibility ofprotests. The USCP’s summary
of the event that is provided to the SAA also will identify the possibility of protestors appearing.
The U$CP’s research, however, will end there. No other information beyond this basic
background information concerning Jane Doe’s employer orjob title (if the information is in the
public domain), and any potential security concern, is sought.
Name checks are a critically important element of the USCP’s layered approach to
ensuring Member safety at an event. Reviewing publically available information and checking
names against the USCP’s internal records when there is a potential security concern is a
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standard security process used by other protective law enforcement agencies. Indeed, many
protective services agencies use even more extensive efforts than are used here.
Contrary to the reporting in Politico, this security practice did not start afier January 6,
2021 or with the change of leadership in the Department’ s Intelligence Division. It has been in
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place as far back as 2006, though the information obtained from a Member office, the
information the U$CP gathers and analyzes, and the way the information is reported has evolved
over time and been standardized to meet changing security needs and to ensure a consistent
approach.
I want to be absolutely clear that at no time has the USCP researched Members or
intentionally researched staff as part of this process. Further, the USCP does not conduct
criminal background checks on attendees, Members, or staff as part ofthis process. finally, even
the limited information that the Department gathers for security purposes is not compiled into
some sort of “dossier” on an individual or stored by the USCP in any searchable database. The
U$CP only maintains the final assessment ofthe event and the summary provided to the
applicable SAA office pursuant to appropriate law enforcement protocol. No other files are kept
related to our research. If any concerning information is uncovered, it is included in the
assessment only.
Below are the answers to the specific questions asked by the group:
1. Is the USCP conducting background checks, surveillance, or any other type of intelligence
activities on Members of Congress, staff contractors, visitors to the Capitol Complex, or
those attending events in congressional districts or otherwise o/fcarnpzts?
No, the USCP does not conduct background checks, surveil or conduct intelligence
activities on Members, staff, contractors, visitors or attendees to Member events other than what
is described above unless an exception applies. There are two exceptions, which are longstanding
practices and coordinated with the SAAs. The first exception is for major congressional events
( i.e. Inaugural Ceremonies; State ofthe Union; Joint Session of Congress) where non-
congressional attendees voluntarily submit to a NCIC/WALES check before their attendance is
adjudicated in coordination with the SAAs. The second exception is in instances where a
Member office or Committee has entered into a Memorandum ofUnderstanding with the USCP
to conduct criminal history record checks on individuals employed by or an applicant for a
congressional employing office. These agreements are solely at the request ofthe Member office
or Committee. Further, the USCP will not conduct such a criminal history record check without
consent and participation from the employee/applicant.
2. Ifyes, what inJbrrnation is being collected, Jbr whatpurposes, and how is it being stored?
As indicated above, the USCP prepares security assessments for Member events or events
Members will attend at the request of Member offices and in close coordination with both SAA
offices. Generally, the security assessments consist ofbasic information provided by a Member
office about the event and any potential security concerns the USCP acquires about an event by
conducting open source searches. The USCP provides a summary of its security assessment to
the applicable SAA office. The purpose ofthe security assessments and summary is to provide
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the $AA and local law enforcement, or the DPD if the Member attending an event is a protectee,
with information about any potential security concerns. The Intelligence Division keeps a record
ofthe final assessment and the summary provided to these stakeholders.
When completing security assessments for Member events or events Members attend, the USCP
does not run background checks through federal or state law enforcement databases. The USCP
only checks names ofpersons who may present security concerns based on information obtained
through open source searches against its internal records to determine whether that person is on
file with the USCP as having previously engaged in suspicious or criminal activity related to
Congress.
4. How does the USCFprotect such stored information? Who has access? Please explain in
detail.
As indicated above, the USCP does not conduct background checks, surveil or conduct
intelligence activities on Members, staff, contractors, visitors or attendees to Member events and,
therefore, does not store such information because it does not exist. The U$CP, however, retains
copies of any final security assessments created or summaries issued. These final assessments
and summaries are stored on a separate USCP drive that has access limited to officers and agents
in our Protective Services Bureau.
As indicated above, the U$CP does not conduct background checks, surveil or conduct
intelligence activities on Members, staff, contractors, visitors or attendees to Member events. As
to the limited security information it obtains upon request regarding events Members will attend,
as described herein, the USCP conducts its law enforcement activities through the authority
granted under 2 U.S.C. §l96l, 1966, 1967 and 1978.
6. lives, did any Member ofCongress direct USCP or the Capitol Police Board to conduct
these activities or to consider the adoption ofpolicies related to these activities?
No, as indicated above, the USCP does not conduct background checks, surveil or conduct
intelligence activities on Members, staff, contractors, visitors or attendees to Member events. No
Member of Congress or the Capitol Police Board has directed the USCP to conduct such
activities.
As indicated above, the U$CP does not conduct background checks, surveil or conduct
intelligence activities on Members, staff, contractors, visitors or attendees to Member events.
Thus, the information that I and Sergeant-at-Arms Walker provided at the Republican
Conference meeting on January 1 9, 2022 is correct.
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8. Ifn.o, is the Capitol Police Board considering the adoption ofregulations related to
background checks or intelligence gathering, including draft regulations that have not been
submitted to the Committee on Ho;tse Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration pursuant to 2 USC § 1967(a)?
No, the Board is not considering the adoption ofregulations related to background checks
and intelligence gathering.
The safety ofMembers and staffis ofparamount importance to the USCP. The systems
and processes the USCP has put into place as it pertains to events attended by Members are
prudent measures that are both appropriate and critical to ensuring Member safety.
While I am confident in our methods, I am asking the U$CP Office ofthe Inspector
General to review the U$CP s programs related to these security assessments to assure both this
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Committee, the Congress as a whole, and the public that these processes are legal, necessary, and
appropriate. I am prepared to answer any other questions you may have.
Sincerely,
J. Thomas Manger
Chief of Police