Kieran Lall CSC 23/05/2011

‘Technological superiority was the major determinant of

victory in warfare throughout the period 1792-1918’. To what
extent do you agree? Illustrate your answer with appropriate
examples drawn from the period. (25 marks)

Whilst it is true that technological superiority was a major determinant of victory in

warfare during this period, it often acted in conjunction with other factors such as
leadership, tactics and economic factors to produce a winning outcome in battles and
conflicts. In direct contrast to this, there have been occasions whereby even the most
technologically advanced sides have ended up losing battles against vastly inferior
opponents. However, the importance of technological superiority as being the major
determinant of victory in warfare alone should not be underestimated. Indeed, Dr
Matthew Bennett argues that technological developments ‘really transformed modern
warfare’. Advancements in technology can be seen as having a knock-on effect on
almost every other factor in the nature of warfare throughout the time period, which
will be explored in this essay.

Many historians would argue that the weapons available to military forces are the
chief determinant of tactics used. This notion is reflected strongly in source E,
whereby van Creveld argues that ‘war is completely permeated by technology and
governed by it’. This implies that technological superiority goes deeper than simply
influencing tactics, and cites technological superiority as having an impact on almost
every level in a conflict. From this, it could be argued strongly that technological
superiority was the major determinant of victory in warfare during this period, as its
effects were wide reaching and touched upon all levels of warfare. At the very start
of the period, in 1792, advancements in artillery technology such as the grape and
canister shots meant that cannons could determine the outcome of an entire battle,
devastating an opposing infantry if used in the correct strategic manner. In fact,
French artillery (which was Europe’s finest at the time) was responsible for several
early victories for the French, most notably Valmy in September 1792. This would
seem to suggest that technological superiority was responsible for victory in warfare,
particularly at the start of the period being examined.

Technological superiority certainly played a huge role during the Crimean war, as the
‘19th century’s railroads and rifles’ as quoted in source D came to the fore. Not only
did the British and the French have a greater range and power of artillery thanks to the
percussion cap rifles, but the first real utilisation of the railway played a major role in
the outcome of the conflict. The allies had a lead in terms of transport and logistics,
which came from their technological superiority. British engineers built the first
tactical military railway, which allowed large quantities of weapons, supplies and
troops to be taken to the Crimea quickly and efficiently, providing a stark contrast to
the Russians, who lacked the technological ability in terms of weapons and logistics
to make use of their potential advantage in numbers and geography. Here we can
clearly see that technological superiority was important not only in affecting the
firepower and range of weaponry, but also increasing the efficiency and speed of
logistics. Due to the industrial revolution of the 19th century, factory systems were
able to mass produce weaponry and ammunition, improve technology and provide
more effective means of communication. During this period in particular, it became
clear that the sides with the greatest economic strength could employ their
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technological superiority to the greatest effect, usually resulting in victory. This

perhaps shows that technological superiority was the major determinant of victory in
warfare in the period, but only when the states’ economic power was sufficient
enough to mass produce weaponry and build supply lines. Therefore we do not see
technological superiority acting completely in isolation, but having a close
relationship to other factors in determining victory in warfare.

From the Crimea onwards, it became clear that technological superiority in terms on
supplies and logistics would have a much greater effect on the nature of warfare.
Railways were again important to the Prussians in the Wars of German Unification,
whilst the telegraph was also used to good effect by the Prussian army, giving them
the edge before and during battles. Between the years 1850-1870, the volume of
railways trebled, which ultimately allowed the Prussians to mobilise 460,000 men in
just 18 days, more than double the amount that the French could muster. In addition
to this, as the French did not have the finances to change their artillery to the more
effective breach loading weapons, they ultimately lost out due to their lack of
technological superiority, which can ultimately be attributed to a lack of resources.
This would point towards economic factors having a large input into whether
technology would be the major determinant of victory in warfare. In fact, the Wars of
German Unification seemed to indicate that victory would go to the powers that could
mobilise their troops fastest and equip them with the very latest in military
technology, which would require large sums of money. Prime examples of this
include the battle of Koniggratz in July 1866, where the Prussians owed their victory
to the superiority of their infantry, who were armed with breech loading ‘needle guns’
able to outshoot the muzzle-loaders of the Austrian army. This reflects the argument
of source C, which although states that technological superiority was only a
temporary factor, Howard does not deny that ‘range and destructiveness of firepower
is in itself enough to carry the day’ at times.

There will of course always be exceptions to every rule in warfare, whereby a side
with technological superiority will end up being defeated by a vastly inferior side.
Perhaps the best example of this can be demonstrated when studying the battle of
Isandhlwana in 1879. Here, the British forces were subject to great slaughter at the
hands of the Zulu’s, even though the British were much better armed having been
equipped with the latest Martini-Henry rifles as opposed to spears. This goes to show
that technological superiority is not always the determining factor of victory in
warfare, as much smaller forces could overturn larger ones with good tactics and the
correct application of their firepower. Indeed, the British simply could not cope with
the guerrilla tactics of the Zulus. Moreover, the fact that the British were so
technologically superior may have actually brought in an air of complacency and
arrogance amongst their troops, which may also have contributed to their
comprehensive defeat.

Although technological superiority could be the major determinant of victory in

warfare, in times of relative technological parity other factors had to play a more
significant role in determining the outcome of conflicts. In particular good leadership
was crucial, as this would not only determine tactics and strategy, but also the manner
in which the available technology was employed to produce the most devastating
effect. Napoleon Bonaparte used vast, but ill disciplined and poorly supplied forces
during the late 18th and early 19th century in cross continental campaigns. For
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example, his invasion force of Russia consisted of around 600,000 men, showing how
the scale of war under Napoleon rose to unprecedented levels. Instead of using the
latest technological weapons to blast great holes through his enemies, Bonaparte
instead refined and invented new tactics, such as pinning down the enemy from the
front whilst other units outflanked the enemy and attacked from the rear. This tactic
proved to be highly successful for a period of time, resulting in the humiliation and
financial ruin of allied forces. Due to his vast troop numbers, Napoleon boasted that
he could afford ‘300,000 casualties a month’, and that this is what gave him the edge
in battle rather than technological superiority. This matches well with the first half of
source C, which argues that technological superiority was only ‘temporary’ and
unlikely to be a decisive factor. Howard then goes on to argue that numbers were
much more important, and this is trend was certainly reflected during the period in
which Napoleon came to prominence in the early 19th century.

Further examples of technological superiority playing a lesser role in determining

victory in warfare can be seen during the First World War and the American civil war.
These conflicts, in a similar fashion to the Napoleonic wars, had relative parity in
terms of the technology employed by each side. When we come to examine the
American civil war, it becomes clear that the muzzle loading percussion-capped rifle
dominated in the field. Although this weapon was far more advanced than the
flintlock rifles (which only had a range of 100 yards compared to the 600 yards of the
percussion cap) along with the rest of the 19th century military technology employed,
they were operated under 18th century tactics. This meant that the leadership from
both the Confederate and Union generals would have to be decisive and innovative in
order to break one another down. Robert E. Lee, the real architect of Confederate
strategy, actually drew a vast amount of his military theories from Napoleon, who was
also fighting in a time of technological parity. His offensive style had initial success
against the ‘cautious’ McClellan of the Union. However, the Union generals could
afford to make mistakes and sustain casualties, resulting in eventual victory. From
this conflict we can see that technology actually played the role of ‘servant’ rather
than master, as highlighted in source D.

When studying the nature of the First World War source D can once again be called
into question. Although the source argues that ‘technology continues to change the
face of the battle’, there appear to be ‘limits to its usefulness’. Whilst the First World
War saw the introduction of some of the most advanced military technology ever,
such as warplanes and tanks, these in actual fact had little effect in determining
victory for either side, due to the fact that both the allies and the Germans had
relatively similar resource pools to draw from in terms of weaponry. This new
technology (although ground breaking) was slow, unreliable and was short ranging,
which made vehicles and other equipment difficult to man and operate effectively.
Further advancements in weaponry only sought to prolong this particular conflict, as
defensive technology came to be on a par with that of the attack. For example, the
use of artillery resulted in the growth of trenches together with the machine gun.
These defences would prove notoriously difficult to break down over the coming
years, so it could be argued that advancements in technology actually resulted in
bringing back a war that was static and one of attrition instead, rather than being a
decisive factor in determining victory in warfare. It was only in the final months of
the war, from 1917-18, where the tactics used by generals was sophisticated enough
to make good use of the new technology and eventually break the deadlock. Many
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historians would actually argue that during the First World War technology
outstripped tactics, which meant that the new weapons of unprecedented destructive
ability could not be effective until strategy caught them up. Therefore, technological
superiority cannot be viewed as being the major determinant of victory in warfare
when viewed in this context.

In conclusion, the argument of source E that none of the other principal factors in
determining victory in warfare is ‘immune to the impact that technology has had’
appears to be true. Throughout the period we have seen that technology has played a
crucial role in influencing almost every aspect of warfare, including tactics, supplies,
logistics and the very composition of the armed forces. However, technological
superiority rarely acted alone during the years 1792-1918, and most particularly in
times of technological parity. In particular, conflicts such as the American Civil War
demonstrated that intelligent leadership was needed in order to apply the correct
tactics, which in turn would influence the manner in which the military technology
was used. If the tactics employed by the leadership were innovative and effective,
then the technological advantages in terms of weaponry and logistics would
invariably play a large part in securing victory.