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# Math. Log. Quart.

47 (2001) 4, 513 – 523

Mathematical Logic Quarterly
c WILEY-VCH Verlag Berlin GmbH 2001

On Representing Concepts in Finite Models
Marcin Mostowski1) Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Warsaw University, 00-047 Warszawa, ul. Krakowskie Przedmie´cie 3, Poland 2) s
Abstract. We present a method of transferring Tarski’s technique of classifying ﬁnite order concepts by means of truth-deﬁnitions into ﬁnite model theory. The other considered question is the problem of representability relations on words or natural numbers in ﬁnite models. We prove that relations representable in ﬁnite models are exactly those which are of degree ≤ 0 . Finally, we consider theories of suﬃciently large ﬁnite models. For a given theory T we deﬁne sl(T ) as the set of all sentences true in almost all ﬁnite models for T . For theories of suﬃciently large models our version of Tarski’s technique becomes practically the same as the classical one. We investigate also degrees of undecidability for theories of suﬃciently large ﬁnite models. We prove for some special theory ST that its degree is stronger than 0 but still not more than Σ0 . 2 Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation: 03B15, 03C13, 03C85, 03D25, 03D40. Keywords: Finite model theory, Finite order logic, Truth-deﬁnition, Degrees of unsolvability, Representability.

1 Introduction Actually, Finite Model Theory is one of the main ﬁelds of interests in a larger area of Model Theory, or more generally semantics. It seems that the question, which research tools can be transferred from the general case to this speciﬁc one, is still not solved. In [3]3) and [4] independently, the idea of representing semantics for languages restricted to ﬁnite models in themselves has been formulated and exploited. In the general case this idea gives a key to the famous Tarski theorem about undeﬁnability of truth ([5]). Like the original theorem, it supports some important hierarchy theorems for ﬁnite order logic. Partial results in this direction for the case of ﬁnite models have been obtained. Additionally an answer for the question “which concepts can be represented in ﬁnite models ?” has been found.
1) The presented paper covers [4], which circulated for several years, but never has been published. The ﬁrst public presentation it had in 1994 at “Second Order Logic” workshop in Warsaw. Some new material, mainly Theorem 5, has been presented in 1998 at “Finite Model Theory” workshop in Oberwolfach. 2) e-mail: marcinmo@mail.uw.edu.pl 3) The philosophy of [3] is slightly diﬀerent than that of [4]. Makowsky and Pnueli consider formulae as ﬁnite models. From purely technical point of view this gives similar results.

c WILEY-VCH Verlag Berlin GmbH, 13086 Berlin, 2001 0942-5616/01/0411-0513 \$17.50+.50/0

. For each set U we deﬁne Uτ by induction as follows: Uι = U. for each i. and each ﬁrst order term is of type ι. . We denote by ιn the i type (ι. size(τ1 . . .. . . . τn ) = size(τ1 ) + · · · + size(τn ) . τn )) = n. Variables of type ι are ﬁrst order. . . i1 . Thus any valuation a has to satisfy the condition a(τ. . ω · ∃xτ ϕ. . . τn ). and each i. and in general type (τ. n-ary predicates from a vocabulary are of type ιn . . The deﬁnition of satisfaction and other basic details can be found in one of surveys [1] or [2]. . for each n-ary predicate P from σ and each ﬁrst order terms t1 . . . t of vocabulary σ. ω For each vocabulary σ the set of ﬁnite order formulae Fσ is deﬁned as the smallest set containing: · P (t1 . .. . ψ ∈ Fσ . . order((τ1 . We deﬁne the size of a type. . for i ∈ ω. . tn ). . and the third one deﬁnes size of a sequence of types. . The set Typ of types is deﬁned as the smallest set containing ι. . for each ﬁrst order terms t. tn ).τn ) = P (Uτ1 × · · · × Uτn ) . However we will consider also some particular logics. . . . and for each τ1 . and of a sequence of types as follows: size(ι) = 1. .514 2 Basic concepts Marcin Mostowski Essentially all considered ideas can be applied to any logic such that the truth-relation “M ϕ” for this logic is decidable. . . i ∈ ω. order(τn )) + 1. i) is interpreted as the value of i-th variable of type τ . . . . . For each τ ∈ Typ we have countably many variables of type τ denoted by xτ . . τn )) = max(order(τ1 ). size((τ1 . . We say that a formula ϕ is of order at most n if each variable in ϕ is of order at most n. τn ) ∈ Typ. xτn ). . . . . 1 n · xτ (xτ1 . . i i i n-times n-times · xι (t1 . i) ∈ Uτ . such that a(τ. Let us notice that the second condition deﬁnes size of a complex type. i Semantics for the logic Lω is given by ordinary ﬁrst order models and valuations deﬁned as functions a with domain Typ × ω. . . n ∈ ω and t1 . . for each τ = (τ1 .. for each ϕ. . . i n ω · ¬ϕ. · t = t . . We consider ﬁnite order logic Lω with ﬁnite vocabularies deﬁned as usually for elementary logic. . . . mainly ﬁnite order logic and its sublogics. tn ∈ Tσ . for each ϕ ∈ Fσ .. . in ∈ ω . By induction we deﬁne the order of a type τ ∈ Typ or a variable of type τ by order(ι) = 1. (ϕ ⇒ ψ). τ ∈ Typ. τn ∈ Typ also containing (τ1 . . . τ ) will be denoted by τ n . . ι). U(τ1 . . . . The set of terms of vocabulary σ will be denoted by Tσ . . . . . tn of vocabulary σ.

Rk deﬁned by induction.On Representing Concepts in Finite Models We will consider the following classes of formulae: 515 · for some ﬁxed n > 0. More generally. and base(m) picks a number from which we start enumeration of words of length m. Additionally. . order(τ1 ) = · · · = order(τm ) = n. 1. classes Σm and Πm . by G(α) = base(lh(α)) + val(α). because it can happen that they are not semantically closed on n n negation. . the class of all formulae of the form Q1 xτ1 . e. . we can formulate it in such a way that for each ﬁnite number of expressions α1 . in any ﬁnite model we know that a priori there is no formula deﬁning more than a ﬁnite number of formulae. m. . Each class of those forms will be called a natural class of formulae. . k > 0. . It is known that we can enumerate all nonempty words over A representing them by natural numbers. e. then ψ is equivalent to some formula belonging to X. . We say that two formulae are (ﬁnitely) equivalent if and only if they have the same (ﬁnite) models. Moreover. Relatively to the correspondence given by G concatenation of words from A∗ can be represented by the binary operation ∗. . Having any standard coding of syntax in arithmetic. Rk . . However for many questions we do not need inﬁnitely many formulae. . for deciding all relationships for these expressions deﬁned as Boolean combinations of R1 . size(τ1 . . giving the same truth values. base(m) = nm−1 + · · · + n0 . τm ) ≤ k. Qm xτm ϕ. if ψ is obtained from ϕ by single substitution of ϕ in a place of a predicate in an elementary formula. For any classes X. n − 1. deﬁned as follows: x ∗ y = x · nlh(y) + y. lh(α) is the length of α. the class of all formulae of order at most n. . . m 1 where ϕ is of order at most n − 1. . ∃. called a class of restricted order. where lh(y) is the smallest m such that y < base(m + 1). . we say that X is semantically reducible to Y if and only if for each formula ϕ ∈ X there is ψ ∈ Y such that ϕ and ψ are ﬁnitely equivalent. for i = 0. where val(α) is a natural number denoted by α in numerical system based on n. Let us observe that some known classes could not be natural in this sense. . we can deﬁne our description in such a way that if a given initial segment is suﬃcient. · for some ﬁxed n > 1. αn and syntactic relations R1 . . . Qi is one of the quantiﬁers ∀. . g. . . when ai is interpreted as a cipher i. m}. Particularly. . Let A = {a0 . . . . we will call natural all classes X deﬁned by simple syntactic criteria and satisfying the following condition: For each ϕ ∈ X. an−1} be a ﬁxed ﬁnite alphabet. . . we can restrict our arithmetical universe to some initial segment {0. and for i = 1. called a class of restricted size. . then any larger segment is suﬃcient too. in ﬁnite models we have no pairing function. . . Y of formulae. . g. . . 3 Representing syntax in ﬁnite models Considering any theory restricted to ﬁnite models seems at ﬁrst sight to suggest that we cannot deﬁne syntax of any recursive language. . .

t ) = ϕ(t) . Let X be a class of formulae from Fσ . We say that a formula ϕ(xι ) is a ﬁnite version of truth-deﬁnition for X in ST if and only if for each closed 0 . an individual constant Max. Name(t))). Name(xι ))) . we deﬁne ψ as ϕ(Subst(t. M Name(sk (0)) = sk (0) . P r o o f . We assume that all expressions of our language are represented as words over the alphabet A. s is interpreted as the function acting on all elements diﬀerent than Max like ≤-successor function. · a unary function symbol Name such that for each k there is m > k such that for any ST-model M of cardinality greater than m. ∗ is interpreted as the above described operation of concatenation. a binary relation symbol ≤. 0 as ≤-smallest element. Max as ≤-greatest element. ✷ ω D e f i n i t i o n 1. For each expression α we deﬁne α as the term sG(α) (0). and t ∈ Tσ 0 there is m > k such that for any ST-model M of cardinality greater than m: M Subst( ϕ(xι ) . Let ϕ(xι ) ∈ X be given. A proper m has to be chosen in such a way that the 0 0 syntax of ψ would be described in any model of size at least m.516 For representing syntax we need the following symbols: · · · · · a binary operation symbol ∗. L e m m a 1 (Coding syntax). there are 0 0 m ∈ ω and a closed formula ψ ∈ X such that for each model M of ST of cardinality ≥ m. ω · a binary function symbol Subst such that for each k. where s0 (0) is 0. There is a theory ST in the vocabulary σ such that in each model of ST. Essentially the following lemma easily follows from our characterisation of FMrepresentability given in Theorem 5 below. and satisfying s(Max) = Max. T h e o r e m 1 (Finite version of diagonalization lemma). Marcin Mostowski We ﬁx the vocabulary σ containing all listed symbols. Additionally in ST the following predicates and function symbols are deﬁnable by formulae with quantiﬁers binding only ﬁrst order variables: · a unary predicate Form such that for each k there is m > k such that for any ST-model M of cardinality greater than m. ≤ is interpreted as linear ordering. 0 This lemma follows easily from more general considerations in Section 5. and sm+1 (0) is s(sm (0)). ϕ(xι ) ∈ Fσ . For any natural class of formulae X and each formula ϕ(xι ) ∈ X having only one free variable xι . an individual constant 0. M ψ ≡ ϕ( ψ ). similarly as s. Form(x) is satisﬁed by a in M if and ω only if for some ϕ ∈ Fσ such that G(ϕ) < k the element a is the value of ϕ . a unary fuction symbol s for the successor function. 4 Truth deﬁnitions in ﬁnite models In what follows we will ﬁx a theory ST satisfying the conditions of the Lemma 1. when passing Max giving the ≤-greatest element as value. where t 0 is ϕ(Subst(xι .

4) Let X be a class of formulae of order at most m and quantiﬁer preﬁxes of restricted size. We skip standard technical details. by representing valuations by sets (Typ × ω) × (U ω ). Let us observe that quantiﬁcation on m-ary relations over a given set U .7. One of the reasons of this is that in ﬁnite models we have no pairing function. Of course in each ﬁnite model we could have only ﬁnite parts of these sets. for instance. 0 However ϕ(xι ) is a truth-deﬁnition. . P r o o f . Particularly. Moreover this has to be done in a uniform way. ✷ 5 Hierarchies in ﬁnite models For obtaining any non collapsing results for hierarchies of formulae we need additionally positive results. Let k > 0 and X be the class of all formulae of order ≤ k. Thus for ψ we can chose an m such that for 0 each ST-model M of cardinality ≥ m we have M ψ ≡ ϕ( ψ ). Then there is a truth-deﬁnition for X of order k + 2. 0 Then by Diagonalization Lemma we chose a proper ψ ∈ X and m ∈ ω for the formula ¬ϕ(xι ). k be the restricting numbers. showing only how to modify any standard proof to obtain its ﬁnite version. Let us assume that ϕ(xι ) ∈ X is a ﬁnite version of truth-deﬁnition for X. but for each ﬁxed formula we do not need more. and let m. and in any concrete case having given m we can treat elements of U ω as representing m-tuples in a redundant way. but with the quantiﬁer preﬁx of order m having size greater than k. We should jump by 2 because we have no pairing function. proposed here. M ψ ≡ ϕ( ψ ). we can consider it as the method 4) Essentially equivalent facts are stated in [3] for second order logic. by modifying Leivant’s proof for Theorem 3. For no natural class of formulae X (closed on negation!footnoteLet us recall that by our deﬁnition. what is impossible.On Representing Concepts in Finite Models 517 formula ψ ∈ X there is m ∈ ω such that for all models for ST of cardinality ≥ m. g. P r o o f .) there is a ﬁnite version of truth-deﬁnition in ST belonging to the set X. Therefore. Because we have no pairing function. Then we can construe a required formula e. we have to represent relations of arbitrary arities by higher order relations of a ﬁxed arity. version for ﬁnite models). in a situation when we do not know m. can be replaced by quantiﬁcation over ω-ary relations (subsets of U ω ). no reducibility of quantiﬁcation ∃xτ ∃yτ to ∃xτ can be obtained. ✷ The method of extending ideas of Tarski to ﬁnite case.1 in [2]. has also some interesting nontechnical aspects. Let us observe that our idea cannot be applied for jumping by 1. all natural classes of formulae are closed on negations. ✷ From the above by the standard construction we obtain also the following T h e o r e m 4. T h e o r e m 3. giving k + 1 order truth-deﬁnition for formulae of order k. T h e o r e m 2 (Tarski theorem. Therefore for every ST-model M of cardinality greater than both m and m we have M ψ ≡ ¬ψ. Then there is a truth-deﬁnition for X of order m. Thus for each ST-model M of cardinality ≥ m we obtain M ψ ≡ ¬ϕ( ψ ). They are slightly more diﬃcult than in inﬁnite case.

P r o p o s i t i o n 2. . . . . Let R ⊆ ωn and ϕ(x1 . . Therefore R(a1 . . . provided card(M ) > m and M ST. . ✷ 5) Its formulation has been suggested by R. . . ϕ(a1 . Let R ⊆ ωn be FM-represented by the formula ϕ(x1 . Mn . . . Let R ⊆ ωn . . . an ) holds. xn) be an ST-formula with no free variables besides x1 . . . ✷ 2 5) Let us consider still another characterisation of FM-representability. Then for all a1 . xn ) if and only if for each k ∈ ω there is m ∈ ω such that for each model M of ST with card(M ) > m. . . M ϕ(a1 . . Let us assume that there is an m0 ∈ ω such that M ϕ(a1 . . xn). an ) is false in almost all ST-models exactly when R(a1 . . . . during Finite Model Theory workshop in Oberwolfach 1998. . . . and ϕ(a1 . .518 Marcin Mostowski of thinking of relatively small expressions of our languages in a relatively large. We take k = max(a1 . . The above m we call a lower bound (or a witness) for k. . there is m ∈ ω such that for all models M of ST with card(M ) > m we have R(a1 . . an ). . where card(M ) > m0 and M ST. Let us ﬁx a1 . . . . ✷ C o r o l l a r y 1. . an ) if and only if M ϕ(a1 . an ≤ k. . . . . . . . . an ). . . . . . The following proposition easily follows. . . . ( ⇐ ). . . . . . an ) if and only if there exists m ∈ ω such that for each model M of ST with card(M ) > m. . . . . Mn such that each ﬁnite model which does not have the property W is isomorphic to one of M1 . . . . but still ﬁnite. . . . Then R is FM-represented by the formula ϕ(x1 . . . . ( ⇒ ). . . . . an ). . numbers. . . . P r o o f . 6 Representing sets of natural numbers in ﬁnite models In this section we consider the general problem of representability in ﬁnite models. . Then for some m > max(a1 . Let us assume that R(a1 . an ) for all a1 . . Each FM-representable relation is Σ0 on ω. an ) if and only if M ϕ(a1 . . . Let R ⊆ ωn be FM-represented by the formula ϕ(x1 . . . . . an . . Since R is represented by ϕ(x1 . . . . . . R and ϕ. world – which would be actually the case of our world. . . M ϕ(a1 . . an ). . R(a1 . . an ). an ∈ ω. . xn) if and only if for each a1 . . We say that R is FM-represented by ϕ(x1 . . . R(a1 . an ). an ). . . . Fagin. . an ). an ≤ k. . . . xn ). xn . and similar) can be represented in “suﬃciently large” ﬁnite models ? According to our earlier considerations the general problem can be reduced to the slightly more speciﬁc question: Which relations on natural numbers can be represented in ﬁnite models ? Instead of “represents in ﬁnite models” we say shortly FM-represents. . . We say that almost all ﬁnite models have a given property W if and only if there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁnite models M1 . . . D e f i n i t i o n 2. . . . . . an . . The problem can be formulated as follows: Which sets of ﬁnite objects (expressions. an ) is true in almost all ST-models exactly when R(a1 . . . . For characterisation of FM-representable relations we will use the following P r o p o s i t i o n 1. an ) does not hold. xn ). for all a1 . . We say that R is FM-representable if and only if there is a formula such that R is represented by it.

an ). an ) and M ϕ(a1 . P r o o f . ( ⇒ ). . T h e o r e m 5. . . . a1 . . card(M ) > i. Now we deﬁne the algorithm I computing R as follows: input a1 . . i. . . . . R(a1 . and M ϕ(a1 . . Now let R be of degree ≤ 0 . an . . Let f(a1 . . . . a1 . . an ). an ) or M ϕ(a1 . Let R ⊆ ωn . Let R ⊆ ωn be recursively enumerable. . . . an i := 0 while S(i. . . ( ⇐ ). By Proposition 5. . ✷ Now we are going to prove the main theorem characterising FM-representability. provided card(M ) > m and M ST. ✷ Additionally we have the following P r o p o s i t i o n 5. . . Let R be FM-representable by the formula ϕ(x1 . . . . . . there is a ∈ ω with S(a. . . an ) : a1 . an ) be a witness for a. M of ST such that card(M ) = i. . . We should ﬁnd a formula ϕ(x1 . . . . . xn ) saying “there is a computation C < Max for the machine H working with input x0 . We deﬁne a recursively enumerable oracle S as follows: S(i. if there exists a ∈ ω such that S(a. . . ✷ P r o p o s i t i o n 4. . Then we take m = max{f(a1 . . an ). an ) and M ϕ(a1 . . . . . . an < k. an ) if and only if M ∃x ψ(x. . Thus S is computed by a Turing machine H that for each input answers either “YES” or “NO”. . . e. and S is FM-represented by a formula ψ(x0 . Actually we have for each a1 . . . . The set of FM-representable relations is closed with respect to intersections and complements. . an )). . . a1 . Then there is a recursive set S ⊆ ωn+1 such that for each a1 . xn ) FM-representing R. .On Representing Concepts in Finite Models 519 Now let us study which relations are FM-representable. where Mi is the unique model for ST of cardinality i. a1 . . a1 . . . recursive with some recursively enumerable oracle. There are a recursively enumerable subset S of ω and a deterministic oracle Turing machine H such that H with oracle S decides R. . Each recursively enumerable relation is FM-representable. Let us start with the following two easy observations. . an ) if and only if there are models M. P r o o f . . . . an ) if and only if there exists a ∈ ω such that S(a. . . . . a1 . Let R ⊆ ωn . . . an ). xn ). . an ) do i := i + 1 output the truth value of Mi (I) ϕ(a1 . an ∈ ω. . . . . Then R is FM-representable if and only if R is of degree ≤ 0 . . . . Let us ﬁx k. . . Each recursive relation is FM-representable. . . . . . . a1 . . and otherwise let it be k. . . Let us observe that I halts for every input because ϕ FM-represents R. . . xn and answering ‘YES’ ”. . P r o p o s i t i o n 3. . an < k}.

an ) ∈ R if and only if M ϕ(a1 . f is the smallest witnessing function if for each a1 . an ) will say “there is a computation C of H starting with input a1 . . Then we deﬁne a recursively enumerable subset S of ωn+1 as in the ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 5 and modify the . D e f i n i t i o n 3. Now let us consider the problem how large models we should consider for deciding concrete questions. xn ) be a formula. . Of course there are cases for which we cannot decide it neither positively nor negatively. We can decide it negatively only if R is co-recursively enumerable. then (a1 .520 Marcin Mostowski S is FM-representable. . and f : ωn −→ ω be the smallest witnessing function for R and ϕ. . For a given k and a1 . an ) is the smallest k such that for each ST-model M of cardinality ≥ k (a1 . . an and ﬁnishing with answer ‘YES’ such that for each oracle query for y the next step in C contains the answer ‘YES’ exactly when y ∈ S ”. i. Let R ⊆ ωn . e. an ). an ∈ ω. Then TautL is FMrepresentable. the relation S and the formula ψ(x) FM-representing S. . yj are all values such that an oracle query “yi ∈ S ?” occurs in C. an ∈ ω and each ST-model M . . Because for a given input there is only one computation C. . . . . where y1 . an ) ∈ R if and only if M ϕ(a1 . . . The implication ( ⇐ ) follows from the previous proposition. . . . . . By Trachtenbrot’s theorem. for i = 1. . there is a proper formula ψ(x) that FM-represents S. . . ϕ(x1 . Then R is FM-representable by the formula ϕ if and only if the smallest witnessing function f : ωn −→ ω for R and ϕ is a total function of degree ≤ 0 . Then we say that f is a witnessing function for R and ϕ if and only if for each a1 . Let R ⊆ ωn . . an ). . ✷ Let us consider a logic L such that the truth-relation “M ϕ ” for L is decidable. . We can decide it positively only if R is recursively enumerable. an ) ?”. . . . Therefore we can decide it both positively and negatively only if R is decidable. TautL is not axiomatizable (recursively enumerable). . . P r o o f . . . . . . an < k our formula ϕ(a1 . It means that for our queries “ϕ ∈ TautL ?” the size of “suﬃciently large” models grows very fast. Let R ⊆ ωn . xn ) be a formula. and f : ωn −→ ω be a partial function. For ( ⇒ ) let us assume that ϕ FM-represents R ⊆ ωn . However as a corollary from our earlier considerations we have the following P r o p o s i t i o n 6. . . . Being in a suﬃciently large ﬁnite model we have a formula FM-representing TautL . . . . but it can happen that we could not know whether our world is not too small for some concrete questions “ϕ ∈ TautL ?”. an ). for any reasonable logic L. . . f(a1 . . . Let us observe that in general the smallest witnessing function can be partial. . we can chose our witness number as follows: m is greater than the code of C and any witness for y1 . ϕ(x1 . . . if card(M ) > f(a1 . . . . . Then ϕ FM-represents R if and only if f is a total function. . . j. In general being inside a ﬁnite model and having a formula ϕ FM-representing a relation R it can happen that we do not know whether our model is large enough for deciding a concrete question of the form “R(a1 . . . . . . Moreover the smallest witnessing function cannot be of too high degree because of the following T h e o r e m 6. Let TautL be the set of all L-tautologies in ﬁnite models. . . . . . . . . . yj .

what proves that f is of degree ≤ 0 . (i) Let ϕ be an ST-sentence. then ϕ ∈ sl(T ). xn ) is determined. Instead of ϕ ∈ sl(T ) we write also sl(T ) ϕ. . an i := 0 (I ) while S(i. . . xn ) FM-represents R. The implication ( ⇒ ) follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of FMrepresentability and determination. Let T be any theory of ﬁnite models. . . 521 By our assumptions the while-loop always halts and I computes the smallest witnessing function f for R and ϕ. . . . . . an ) do i := i + 1 output i. There is a relation R ⊆ ωn FM-represented by ϕ(x1 . . . 7 Theories of suﬃciently large models Now let us consider how to formulate deﬁnability problems for logics restricted to ﬁnite models in more traditional way. . (ii) Let ϕ(x1 . . . ϕk ϕ semantically valid in almost all ﬁnite models we have that if ϕ1 . . . We say that ϕ(x1 . . . an ∈ ω. . an ) ∈ ωn : M ϕ(a1 . . it is equivalent to sl(T ) = {ϕ : M ϕ for almost all T-models M}. xn ) be an ST-formula. . an ) is determined. . ✷ From our deﬁnitions it follows that ϕ(x1 . a1 . . . as applicable to larger class of logics or theories. . . . . xn) be determined and R = {(a1 . . The following proposition gives a useful criterion for checking whether a given formula FM-represents anything. For each theory (logic) of ﬁnite models T the set sl(T ) is closed with respect to ﬁnite logical consequences in the following sense: for each inference ϕ1 . We say that ϕ is determined if and only if there is k ∈ ω such that for all ST-models M. . an ) for almost all ST-models M }. P r o p o s i t i o n 7. ϕk ∈ sl(T ). . . . . . . ✷ . Then by a suﬃciently large version of T (denoted by sl(T )) we mean the theory sl(T ) = {ϕ : there exists k such that M ϕ for all models of T with card(M ) ≥ k }. ϕ(a1 . . Assuming that we restrict our attention to logics with ﬁnite vocabularies. . . . . . what is justiﬁed by the following P r o p o s i t i o n 8. P r o o f . xn ) if and only if ϕ(x1 . . xn ) is determined if and only if for each a1 . For ( ⇐ ) let ϕ(x1 . . . . . . Our considerations. . .On Representing Concepts in Finite Models algorithm I deﬁned there as follows: input a1 . . or T sl ϕ. . ✷ Finally let us consider another question: “Which ST-formulae FM-represent some relations ?” D e f i n i t i o n 4. . . will be of more general character. . . xn ) be an ST-formula. . . Moreover f is recursive with oracle S. Let ϕ(x1 . M ϕ if and only if M ϕ. . M of cardinality ≥ k.

T has arbitrary large ﬁnite models. ¬ϕ ∈ sl(T ). Thus we obtain (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ψ ﬁnitely equivalent to ϕ . Let X. and for each ϕ ∈ Y and each elementary formulae ψ. (3) ⇒ (1). ✷ Essentially the conditions of the above proposition are satisﬁed for all natural classes X. Let us assume that T is not sl-consistent. if card(M ) > k0 . Let us observe that if ϕ ≡ ϕ is true in suﬃciently large models. Let us assume that T does not have arbitrary large models. For any logic L and any theory T in L the following conditions are equivalent: 1. Let k = max(k0 . 2. In ﬁnite models A is inconsistent.}. Proof. Then ϕ. There is no ST-sentence ϕ such that ϕ. (2) ⇒ (3). 2. where ψn is the formula ∀x1 . The main properties of sl-consistency are shown by the following P r o p o s i t i o n 9. and if card(M ) > k1 . we have the following C o r o l l a r y 2. 3. There is no L-sentence ϕ such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ belong to sl(T ). Then there are k0 . then M ϕ ”. Let us assume that T has arbitrary large ﬁnite models. what is impossible. Y ⊆ Fσ . saying that there are more than n elements. ∀xn ∃y (x1 = y ∧ · · · ∧ xn = y). It means that there is m ∈ ω such that card(M ) < m for each T -model M . Then for each T -model M of cardinality > k we have M ϕ and M ¬ϕ. Y ⊆ F ω . what proves that T is not sl-consistent.522 Marcin Mostowski Of course sl(T ) does not have to be closed with respect to inﬁnite inferences. Let us ﬁx an L-sentence ϕ. Let ϕ be a ﬁxed L-sentence. . k1 ). Moreover A ⊆ sl(T ) for any theory T . Then for each T -model M it holds the implication “if card(M ) > m. ¬ϕ ∈ sl(ST). P r o o f . However T has models of cardinality > k. . D e f i n i t i o n 5. then M ϕ. . ψ there is formula ϕ ∈ Y equivalent to (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ψ . g. and let ψ be an elementary formula true exactly in those models in which ϕ is true but not ϕ. ✷ Because ST has arbitrary large models. k1 such that for each T -model M . Deﬁnability and non-deﬁnability relations can be studied through the proposed construction on the basis of the following ω P r o p o s i t i o n 10. . e. (1) ⇒ (2). then M ¬ϕ. but sl(T ) can be still consistent in any intuitive sense.. . For contradiction let us assume that there is an L-sentence ϕ such that ϕ. Therefore we have the following . ¬ϕ ∈ sl(T ). let us consider the set A = {ψn : n = 1. then there are (up to isomorphisms) at most ﬁnitely many models where ϕ ≡ ϕ does not hold. Then X is semantically reducible to Y if and only if for each ϕ ∈ X there is ψ ∈ Y such that Lω sl ϕ ≡ ψ. Let ψ be an elementary formula excluding those models in which ϕ is true but not ϕ . We say that a theory T is sl-consistent if and only if sl(T ) does not contain all formulae. T is sl-consistent. The only nontrivial implication is from right to left.

. A. Let R ⊆ ωn be of degree at most 0 . for sl(ST) or even for sl(Lω ). Y. North-Holland Publ. 2 For proving that sl(ST) is not 0 . . Let X. more exactly that A = { ψ : ψ ∈ sl(ST)} is in 0 . It follows that for each sentence ψ. 2000) . Tarski. pp. [2] Leivant. Warszawa. . pp. . an ) ?” can be reduced to the query “ϕ(a1 . Amsterdam 1977. [3] Makowsky. Manuscript 1993. Logic. then also ψ0 is determined. what contradicts to Corollary 2. for each sentence ψ ∈ X. In: A. ¬ψ0 ∈ sl(ST). . Annals Pure Appl. Nakladem Toe e warzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego 1933. In: Handbook of Logic in Artiﬁcial Inteligence and Logic Programming. Additionally. xn ) FM-representing R. it would answer the question whether complexity of sl(ST) depends on the underlying logic. English translation of the german version: The concept of truth in formalized languages. Clarendon Press. Our theorem holds for both ﬁrst-order and ﬁnite-order logics. Oxford 1956. Theories of ﬁnite type related to mathematical practice. Truth-Deﬁnitions in Finite Models.). D. [5] Tarski. Thus for each a1 . . Thus we have ψ0 . 1999. so sl(ST) is of degree ≤ 0 . Because ϕ(x) FM-represents something. . J.. Then by Theorem 5 there is an ST-formula ϕ(x1 . Oxford 1994. 2 are suﬃciently rich to describe many computational properties. Moreover by Theorem 1 we have an ST-sentence ψ0 such that ST sl (ψ0 ≡ ¬ϕ( ψ0 ). ✷ Theorem 8 means that sl(ST) is quite strongly non axiomatizable. . Semantics. .. Unfortunately being essentially weaker than the elementary arithmetic they are axiomatizable only in trivial cases. By the ﬁrst part there is an ST-formula ϕ(x) such that for each ST-sentence ψ we have ψ ∈ sl(ST) if and only if ϕ( ψ ) ∈ sl(ST). This gives that ψ0 ∈ sl(ST) if and only if ¬ψ0 ∈ sl(ST). 913 – 971. S. Y be natural classes of formulae such that some ϕ(x) ∈ Y deﬁnes truth for X in ﬁnite models. g. Barwise. P r o o f . what means that sl(ST) is not sl-consistent. . T h e o r e m 8. Metamathematics. ✷ Let us observe that theories of the form sl(T ).. Revised: September 9.On Representing Concepts in Finite Models 523 T h e o r e m 7. Therefore it would be interesting to give a good axiomatizable approximation e. σ The other interesting problem is the question of exact classiﬁcation of sl(ST). . M. Clarendon Press. Then ST sl ψ ≡ ϕ( ψ ). B. Higher Order Logic. Arity and alternation in second-order logic. 189 – 202. let us assume for the contrary that sl(ST) is 0 . (Received: December 29. . Comp. an ) ∈ sl(ST) ?” Of course this reduction is recursive. pp. ϕ(x) is determined.. 152 – 278. Because ¬ϕ( ψ0 ) is determined. and moreover sl(ST) is of degree ≤ 0 but not 0 . . usually being Σ0 arithmetical sets. 228 – 321. Poj¸cie prawdy w j¸zykach nauk dedukcyjnych. . ed. In: Handbook of Mathematical Logic (J. . sl(ST) is Σ0 . A. [4] Mostowski. By deﬁnition. and Pnueli. Logic 78 (1996). which seems to be essentially stronger than sl(ST). References [1] Feferman. either ¬ϕ( ψ ) ∈ sl(ST) or ϕ( ψ ) ∈ sl(ST)... Additionally either ψ0 ∈ sl(ST) or ¬ψ0 ∈ sl(ST). an ∈ ω the query “R(a1 . . Each set of degree at most of 0 is recursively reducible to sl(ST).