07_ShaktiGurang | Pakistan | India–Pakistan Relations

(i) SYNOPSIS : STRATEGY TO RESOLVE THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR DISPUTE

INTRODUCTION General 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between

India and Pakistan to the present situation. In doing so, the research would dwell on the following:(a) Why the Problem persists and reasons for the stance taken by

both countries. (b) (c) (d) (e) 2. Review of Geo-political situation. The Proxy War by Pakistan and the existing ground realities. Initiatives taken to resolve the dispute. The Recommended Strategy.

Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,

when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. The first war between the two countries was fought within months of their independence, while their armed forces were still under the command of British officers. Kashmir was divided, and remains divided, between the two countries.

(ii) There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution, but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Hypothesis 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals

discussed, long outstanding issue of J&K remains unresolved. What is at the root of this problem and how best can it be tackled.

LAYOUT

4.

The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding

paragraphs. 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on

the background of the problem, the stand of India and Pakistan on the issue and the reasons that have led to the creation of the policy and strategy of Pakistan towards Kashmir and India’s response to it. It will also examine other reasons that have been responsible for aggravating the problem, preventing it from being permanently resolved. 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts

whether it is border problem, trade or diplomacy. Things aggravated after the nuclear tests. It was expected that there would be a substantial outcome

(iii) of the Agra Summit, but nothing much came out of it either. The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain weak, and the last fifty five years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic intentions. 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for

India and Pakistan. This part will include the implications of 9/11, Op Enduring Freedom, attack on the Indian Parliament and likely Pakistani reaction and policy for the future. It will also cover the implications of the US presence in the region, for India and Pakistan. 8. The events of 9/11 and December 2001, have made the world realize

the true extent of terrorism. Besides this, the end of the Cold War and the emerging world order, have had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of international relations, creating new equations that have effected the geopolitics in the region. 9. Part III – Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and the Existing Ground

Realities. This part will include the aims of proxy war, its reasons as against a conventional war, the strategy employed, and its political, diplomatic, economic, military and psychological effects. The manner in which the

both India and Pakistan have gone about it would be discussed to include the Chenab Plan. the manner in which. 11 Part IV – Peace Initiatives. covert military. it is intended to trace the reasons for the “change of heart” of President Musharraf in viewing the Kashmir problem. This part would also include involvement of the world forum to include USA and China. Pakistan's Kashmir policy has been based on two elements. 10. overt political and moral support to the Kashmiri population which Pakistan calls a struggle for self-determination against the "Indian yoke". and the actual ground realities would also be covered. Since 1990. the Neelam Plan. and logistical support to Kashmiri militants in an apparent effort to coerce India into an agreement on Kashmir as per Pakistan's terms.(iv) Indian security forces are reacting to the situation in J & K. the Andorra Model. In this part. ." in which Pakistan-based militant organizations are doing Islamabad's bidding in Kashmir and also in other parts of India. Firstly. Through this two-part strategy Pakistan has partially succeeded in forcing India to commit a large chunk of its military to combating the ongoing insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. economic. Thereafter. and the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan. Indians call this policy Pakistan's "proxy war against India. and secondly.

there used to be just one line that emanated from the government. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. It can be said that it was Musharraf who killed Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir. is now occupying attention. 14. The issue is being discussed everywhere and by all who care about these things. This is now a thing of the past. 57 years of intense propaganda at home and abroad has made it almost a reflex reaction of most Pakistanis . Part V : The Recommended Strategy. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which . there is hope that an uneasy truce will remain in place. This part will include a wrap up of all recommendations. no other solution is likely to have a lasting effect. Although a rapid resolution of the Kashmir dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Ever since 21 October 2004. 15. other than the UN resolutions. Musharraf's 21 October 2004 plea to the Pakistanis to think out of the box has largely succeeded. discussing various possible solutions to the Kashmir problem. to join India or Pakistan. given the geopolitical situation. On Kashmir.(v) 13. that should be palatable to India. Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Apart from a politico-diplomatic settlement of the problem. with no likelihood of its revival.a UN supervised plebiscite that would give only two options to the Kashmiris.

tourism. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. one way is to engage Islamabad in India's fight against terrorism. What it means is ending the mindless hostility of the past and entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. As far as Kashmir is concerned.(vi) there is no permanent cure. Indian leaders have damaged their own credibility by attributing almost every incident of violence in India . infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. investment. it means lowering the level of violence in the state and taking a series of reciprocal measures that give relief to the locals caught in the crossfire. If India wants an end to terrorism coming from Pakistan. travel. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. CONCLUSION 16. This means opening up in the matter of trade. For Pakistan. transit. Positive acknowledgment by the Indian government of the actions taken by Pakistan. will likely help more moderate elements in Pakistan's government win domestic support for reconciliation with India. combined with an institutionalized mechanism to verify each other's claims.

cynically employing the Pakistan bogey to cover lapses of the Indian security apparatus.(vii) to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. .

.

.

2. IT EXEMPLIFIES INDIA’S UNIQUE UNITY IN DIVERSITY. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY. when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims.JAMMU AND KASHMIR IS THE CROWN BENEATH WHICH LIES ALL THAT THE INDIAN NATION – ONE OF THE WORLD’S MOST ENDURING CIVILISATIONS – STANDS FOR : THE VALUES OF SECULARISM. Kashmir's fate is still locked into the story of India's partition in 1947. Given the latest peace initiatives by both. Nothing divides India and Pakistan as Kashmir does. INTRODUCTION General 1. but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. India and Pakistan. There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution. and nobody has suffered more in the process than the people of Kashmir. it appears that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is now firmly set on the road to .

and vested interests. internal and external. Preview 4. The dissertation has been covered in the following parts:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Why the problem of J&K persists. By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. Peace Initiatives. . Aim 3. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the various options open and recommend a strategy to resolve the J & K dispute. Recommendations.though this may remain elusive for a while as spoilers.2 normalcy . Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and Ground Realities. threaten to disorder and derail the peace process. Review of the Geo-political Situation.

3 CHAPTER I : WHY THE PROBLEM OF J&K PERSISTS J & K : LOCATION OF KASHMIR VALLEY PAMIR KNOT 350 KMS KASHMIR VALLEY : AN ARTIST’S IMPRESSION GREAT HIMALAYAN RANGE SHAMSHABARI RG SHAMSHABARI RANGE KARAKORAM INDUS ZOJILA BARAMULA GREAT HIMALAYAN KASHMIR VALLEY URI SRINAGAR POONCH LADAKH ANANTNAG PIR PANJAL RANGE JHELUM CHENAB ZANSKAR PIR PANJAL LC UDHAMPUR Geography 5. The region has been dubbed "disputed territory" between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. is surrounded by China in the northeast. A border called the Line of Control (LC). agreed to in 1972.236 square kilometres region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent. divides the two parts. a 222. The eastern area of Kashmir comprising the northeastern part of the . and by Afghanistan in the northwest. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of J&K. while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. Kashmir. the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south. by Pakistan in the west.

after the lapse of paramountcy.4 region (Aksai Chin). On this logic. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. came under the control of China since 1962. therefore found ready acceptance internationally. The British supported this view using the legalistic argument that their relationship with the princely states was based on the treaties with them. particularly during the Cold War period. Genesis 6. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and the Pakistan-controlled parts. Present and Future. though partition of the country was effected on the basis of religion. p 182-199. . the 1 S K Sinha. their rulers could decide which country to accede to. Whereas the Congress wanted this done in a democratic manner on the basis of the wishes of the people.” USI Journal. April-June 2005. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. this applied to the provinces only and not to the princely states1. Jinnah and the Muslim League favoured the decision being taken solely by the ruler of each state. However. The Pakistani projection that J & K being a Muslim country. In the case of the latter. The origin and genesis of the J & K imbroglio is related to the partition of the country on the basis of religion.

Pakistan is of the view that the day the Instrument of Accession was signed. Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. However. Jinnah being impatient. However. 8. launched a tribal invasion of J&K on 22 October 1947. the ruler had fled to Jammu and was therefore not in control of the happenings in the valley. it was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. This demolishes the belief that being a Muslim dominated state. the dispute has dual purposes. have led it to see Kashmir in uncompromising terms. It was only on 26 October 1947 that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession merging the state with India. could not decide for sometime. On the other. it served to unite an otherwise fractured polity. and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege.5 rulers should be free to decide the future of their states. politically and militarily. Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K. Furthermore. the imbalance in institutional strength. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System. this created a mess for Pakistan. Since it has both ideological and . On one hand. and so entered into a “Standstill agreement” with Pakistan. Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses. the atrocities committed by the tribesmen alienated the Kashmiri people making Pakistan lose out on both accounts. J&K should have rightly gone to Pakistan 7. Thereafter.

in keeping with the provisions of partition. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. India’s response has been reactive and very limited. to the increasingly apparent shift in official policy . 10. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all regional and world forums. India’s bottom line on Kashmir has remained unchanged over the decades . 9. neither of which is easily compromised. including territories presently under Pakistani and Chinese control. from support for incorporating into India all of J&K. which unfortunately has been feebly articulated and has few takers. has therefore been to evict Pakistan from its illegal occupation of territory.6 nationalist implications. and any settlement of the crisis must be effected within the confines of the Indian constitution. India insists that the UN resolutions were redundant as the State had been acceded to it by the then ruler. In brief.the state of J&K is an integral part of the Indian Union. The unfinished agenda of partition according to India. the Indian attitude has been that of indifference till the situation went out of control. Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future shape of a possible solution. Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir has become rigid and unyielding. and has not been able to respond in the correct manner. 11. Maharaja Hari Singh. to the territorial status quo. India has always been driven by polite diplomacy. Where Pakistani diplomacy has succeeded.

7 for recognition of the LC as the international border. The cease-fire line or the LC was to be a temporary boundary till the matter was resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. the UN could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the Soviet Union began using its right of veto against any of these. 12. J&K being a Muslim dominated state should have gone to Pakistan. acts as a further hurdle to arriving at a general consensus. . India brought the matter to the notice of UN Security Council. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. 13. Any movement forward on Kashmir is also made more difficult by the lack of a national consensus in India on how the conflict within Kashmir and with Pakistan should be addressed. The resolution of April 1948 demanded from India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities. The cease-fire was effected by the end of 1948. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. India remains publicly opposed to any international involvement in the dispute. Sensationalisation of terrorist acts by the Indian media. However. and the State was split into Indian Kashmir and POK. A few months into the war that started after partition. after 1957. the UN passed a series of resolutions. There is no denying the fact that these were influenced by the West’s perception that partition being on the basis of religion. From April 1948 to 1957.

15. and of Kashmir: Kashmiri. social. Pahari. 3 percent of the state's total population have been driven out). i. Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state. military situation over the years have rendered the UN resolution on Kashmir of 1948 obsolete. and 3 percent Buddhists. . There are three distinct geographical regions . this was never to be as Pakistan did not vacate the area and as a result.8 14. Sikhs. of which over 90 % of the region's minorities. 33 percent Hindus. Gujari. The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti. The large-scale changes in the diplomatic. and 3 percent of the population). the referendum could not happen. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir after it would be vacated by Pakistan.Ladakh (with 58 percent of the area. Furthermore. It is a multiethnic. However. Christians and others. Jammu (26 percent area. J&K is not a state where only Kashmiri Muslims live. multi-religious state with 64 percent Muslims. 45 percent population). Demographic Characteristics. with India being allowed to retain some force to maintain law and order.e. 52 percent population. In addition. of Jammu: Dogri. Contrary to most reports in the media. political. Punjabi. and Kashmir (16 percent area.

and has the ability to cripple the normal functioning of the 2 www. approximately 13 percent are Shia Muslims. Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. Shia Muslims do not wish to have anything to do with Sunni-dominated Pakistan.tripod. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non- pastoral Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley who constitute 22 percent of the state's population. 14 percent of the people in Kashmir province are the pastoral nomadic Gujar and Bakarwal people.india_resource. (or about 1. knowing fully well the fate that awaits them there.9 million people). .9 16. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession. 17. They are strong supporters of association with India and have demonstrated this by organizing Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) to assist the security forces in surveillance of terrorist activity2. and by and large stand behind J&K's association with India except for a few in Doda district. The reason that many believe separatism to be a widespread sentiment in J&K is because this dominant section has succeeded in completely drowning out all other voices in the state. J&K: Self Determination.com. This segment of the population dominates the politics of the state. Of the state's 49 percent who reside in the Kashmir province. They are non-Kashmiris. October 1999. Dr Maharaj Kaul.

07.917 REDUCTION DUE TO MIGRATION OF APPROX 3 LACS KASHMIRI PANDITS.00.435 27.435 27.5 9 3 2 .943 LADAKH 6.236 1. In that case.2 .33.2 5 .0 1 . by sabotage.3 4 . it should be given to it.0 0 0 3 .5 9 PUNJABI K A S H M IR I DARDS C H IT R A L I BALTI TOTAL .14.14. DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN PRE MILITANCY TOTAL POPULATION .96.1.184 336 1.90. The plea of Pakistan that as J&K is a Muslim dominated state.943 46.5 0 .5 0 .313 SIKHS .406 10 * 50 90 KASHMIR 2.940* 51.940* 62.929 LADAKH 6.313 SIKHS .649 BUDDHISTS .940* 5.95.3 5 . worst still.278 51.83.MUSLIMS . implies the theory that Muslims cannot stay with the people of other religion.0 0 0 (1 9 4 7 ) .1.69.1.1 5 .11.406 3 * LADAKH 50 97 KASHMIR 2.07. P A K IS T A N I PUNJABI SETTLERS HAVE OUTNUM BERED THE SO NS O F T H E S O IL .33.5 0 0 8 7 .72.83.1.649 BUDDHISTS . there would be no justification for the presence of another 110 million .90.29.1 1 .5 0 0 .7 5 0 1 .0 0 0 OVER ALL% 7 6 .69. either by inaction or insufficient action against Pakistani infiltration and terror or.236 1.95.0 0 0 3 0 .7 5 0 6 .MUSLIMS .72. If the UN too accepts this. it implies acceptance of the ‘Two-Nation’ that Muslims and Hindus must live separately.00.5 0 0 .8 3 .0 0 0 18.969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .2 8 .917 ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN POST ONSET OF TERRORISM TOTAL POPULATION .5 1 .29.11.10 society in Kashmir province.0 8 .969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD D E M O G R A P H IC P A T T E R N (P O K ) A S P E R A V A IL A B L E D A T A T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N IN P O K .0 0 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 L A C S A N D 5 0 T H O U S A N D NORTHERN AREAS P A K O C C U P IE D K A S H M IR 10% 90% POK 14 % 1 7% 14 % 5% 50% NORTHERN AREAS 8 7 . ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND JAMMU KASHMIR LADAKH JAMMU KASHMIR 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .184 336 1.

In other cases of partition elsewhere in the world. Germany-Czechoslovakia. that is. Presently. never took place. are recent examples where full-scale exchanges were organized along with partition. Bulgaria-Turkey.11 Muslims presently in India. Ideally the UN Security Council should have overseen this and ensured that the issue was resolved permanently. even after their homeland was created. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid1980s. there were always exchanges of population. 19. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was natural after partition of a country. The Siachen Dispute. The CFL ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and northeast . Muslims are still in India. Poland-Germany. Croatia-Serbia. BosniaSerbia. should have been sent to Pakistan. 20. The cases of Greece-Turkey. while Pakistan and Bangladesh have driven out most of their non-Muslim population. who according to the principle of partition in 1947. In fact. the exchange of population. it is unnecessary to partition a country if the population is not to be exchanged. but have instead been allowed to stay on only because India being secular does not accept the ‘Two-Nation’ theory.

in vague language that is the root of the Siachen dispute. The last two 3 Indian Express. 22. and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. and then north to the glaciers. Third. 2006. 21. the Owen Dixon report 1950. Second. located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Both sides agreed. not India. 25 April. the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. that the CFL extends to the terminal point. the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan. This is what led India to Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge. NJ 9842. The Pakistani view is based on several factors.12 until map grid-point NJ 9842. The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps. located Siachen in the Northern Areas3. First. submitted to the UN. . Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of PoK. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842.

the LC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. The day after the declaration. represented by Premier Kosygin moderated between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan. The problem therefore. Peace had been achieved by the intervention of the great powers who pushed the two nations to a cease fire for fears the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers.13 reasons are the Karachi Agreement 1949. In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses . Indian Prime Minister Shastri died of a sudden heart attack. persists. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972. 23. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any . and the Simla Agreement 1972. The Tashkent Agreement. The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan after the 1965 War. 24. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the USSR (now in Uzbekistan) beginning on 04 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. when it was agreed that the LC would not be unilaterally altered. After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. The Soviets.and were disappointed at the return to the status quo. where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated.

The treaty has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The 1972 Simla Summit. seeking to adhere to the status quo by all means. though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating to the point of armed conflict. It also conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. The agreement was therefore nullified. the Prime Minister of India. The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations.14 renunciation of then guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. The Simla Treaty. was signed between India and Pakistan on 02 July 1972 following the 1971 India-Pakistan War. popularly known as the Simla Pact or the Simla Agreement. and Indira Gandhi. The treaty was signed in Simla. This was not merely a change of nomenclature but a consequence of an agreement. . It is significant that the Cease-Fire Line was changed to the LC during this summit. the President of Pakistan. 25.

the then President of Pakistan. • DID NOT DELINEATE BEYOND NJ 9842. 1971 SHALL BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES ….4 It is asserted that the main reason behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause. and a lot more to do with water. THE LINE OF CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF DEC 17. London. “Issues of Kashmir and Indus are intertwined”. MARKED ON MAPS AND RATIFIED. and Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. • IMPLIED THAT LC IS INVIOLABLE. 4 www. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh. and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan. Options. 27. It is a real estate dispute for strategic reasons. revealed General Pervez Musharraf in his dissertation while attending the prestigoius course at the Royal College of Defence Studies. . on 19 September 1960.IN J & K.. the then Indian Prime Minister.NEITHER SIDE SHALL SEEK TO ALTER IT UNILATERALLY…. J&K is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters.strategicforesight. • LC DELINEATED. “ ….15 SIMLA AGREEMENT 02 JUL 1972 • RETENTION OF TERRITORIES. Thus. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan.” 26.com.BOTH SIDES FURTHER UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS LINE…. Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J&K.

In fact. the Ravi. The treaty has survived all the wars since then. Beas and the Ravi) and three Western Rivers (Indus. for a month. it explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. the Chenab and Jhelum. 5 in. Ramananda Sengupta. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan.” . The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej. the Beas. The treaty also does not allow either country to opt out unilaterally. when India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing into Pakistan. Jhelum and the Chenab).rediff. Under the Treaty.16 The Treaty however. even though the fact remains that India controls the headwaters. Unlike April 1948.com. is effective from 01 April 19605. the Geneva Conventions and the Indus Water Treaty make such an action illegal today. the waters of the Eastern Rivers stand allocated to India and those of the Western largely to Pakistan. The Indus River rises from Mansarovar in Tibet and its principal tributaries are the Sutlej.

The Baglihar dam project located on the Chenab River in Doda district in the Jammu division. Today India and Pakistan are both faced with rapidly escalating problems of acute river resource scarcity. because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. Obviously not enough. This is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border.17 28. Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical control over the concerned headwaters to ease fears about India's potential ability to turn a huge chunk of its land into desert. . Increased tensions over water will exacerbate or intensify overall tensions. creating a more favorable environment for interstate conflict. virtually ensures a still deeper and volatile nexus between water and Kashmir in coming years. is presently the focus of intense diplomacy between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s mounting water insecurity. making resolution of security issues even more difficult.

Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September “war on terrorism” to their advantage. 30. and more importantly. acknowledged by the USA. . The Indian position and her viewpoint on terrorism was much better understood now. India has attempted to portray the challenge in Kashmir as purely a matter of combating terrorism. Pakistan. and to make the case that it has a right to pursue extremists operating from Pakistan exactly as the US and its allies have hunted down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. for its part.18 CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 11 September 2001 29. to gain some leeway for maintaining the general policy of adventurism that seeks to bleed Indian resources in Kashmir. has sought to use its broad cooperation with the US on operations in Afghanistan. and Pakistan’s shady support to the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorists was exposed to the world.

19 Operation Enduring Freedom 31. It also led to the closure of militant training camps in Pakistan. USA will apply pressure on Musharraf to live up to his promise of not supporting terrorism. This operation was another major development in the region that helped India greatly in its endeavour to counter the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan across the LC. in total contradiction of its long-term support to the Taliban. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror. though the ones in POK were still operative. Pakistan was forced to crack down on radical Islamic groups in the country. has had a significant effect on the politics of the region. which is . US Presence in Pakistan 33. India’s tough stance and diplomatic offensive put Pakistan under pressure and on the back foot with regard to her Kashmir policy. The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were now willing to include India in its war against terror. international pressure was applied on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators. As a result. causing rifts in its society. This was acknowledged as being invaluable for the success of the operation. Pakistan was forced to give support to the USA. Attack on the Indian Parliament : 13 December 2001 32.

However. “The Jehad Lives On”. resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before. and 15 November 20036. the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. operating freely and advocating jehad. Amir Mir. though under different names such as Jamaat ud Daawa for the LeT. Though most of the groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy. as Pakistan-US relationship develops. the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). it could fructify resulting in tangible inflow of military hardware and economic assistance. The jehadi groups were banned in two phases. . Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). a cursory glance over the activities of four banned militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business. with changed names and identities. after the initial crackdown. 07 March 2005. This would keep Musharraf under pressure locally as it is resented by fundamentalists. Presently there are 59 6 South Asia Intelligence Review. Cross Border Terrorism in India 34. on 12 January 2002. Vol 3. No 34. Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan.20 what India wants. However.

Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the entry of the latter in Baluchistan. the involvement of the Pakistani government. the latest one being the Mumbai blasts of 11 July 2006. and four in Gilgit-Baltistan7. While China is constructing the Gwadar port to ensure its energy requirements for the future do not disrupted by the US. Internal Situation in Pakistan and its Implications on Regional Politics 36. with the focus now on targeting tourists and civilians. 28 in POK. 01 August. designed to create mayhem throughout India. are now targets of terrorism.21 training camps still operational. This confrontation that could convert into a new Baluch 7 The Pioneer. it is bound to interfere with the latter’s hegemonic intentions in South and West Asia. Terrorist modules have surfaced within India with mentors still across the border. suggests a different hue and change of strategy in the proxy war in India. 2006. the idea being to give the movement a local colour.religious sentiments. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over India. suggesting very clearly. economic infrastructure and ethno. . No longer confined to J&K. 35. terrorist activity in J&K has regained impetus. with 27 being in Pakistan. Since April 2006. The “jehadi flavour” is missing and targets being selected are state objectives.

22 insurgency. For Pakistan. About 60 percent of China's energy supplies come from . Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. at China's doorstep. the value of Gwadar's distance from India becomes evident if one considers how vulnerable Karachi port. is to Indian pressure. Construction of Gwadar Port by China 37. will influence the geo-politics of the region. Chinese vice premier. nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. which handled 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade. For China. In March 2002. Gwadar is situated 725 kilometres to the west of Karachi. laid the foundation for Gwadar port. which makes it 725 kilometres further away from India than Karachi. along with the Taliban problem in Waziristan. and could indirectly effect the J&K issue as well. Wu Bangguo. The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan. and so provides Pakistan with crucial strategic depth vis-a-vis India along its coastline. 38.

The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls". . which has a very high presence in the region. Thailand. 39. The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh. and China has been anxious that the US. China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea.23 the Middle East. Cambodia and the South China Sea. According to its "string of pearls" strategy. in the process stimulating the economic development of China's backward Xinjiang region. would provide Beijingan opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources. in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests. could choke off these supplies to China in case of a conflict with Taiwan. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access. Myanmar.

24 The Baluch Uprising 40. Insurgency revived again in 20048. with the latest in being the killing of Baluch leader. The tribal area of North Waziristan has seen an increase in clashes between Pakistani forces and pro Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. April-June 2005. Strategic Analysis. The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from the Gwadar project would depend on the challenges to it from within their borders. The Waziristan Problem 41. Alok. The Pakistani army has led many incursions into the region. Baluchis are desperate to be recognised as autonomous people. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province) is a cause for great concern for the US and her allies in the War on Terror. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. 8 . Vol 29. and to gain self-determination. The Gwadar project is bitterly opposed by Baluch nationalists who see it as yet another example of Pakistan's Punjabidominated ruling elite siphoning away Baluchi wealth and resources without this backward region or its people gaining. No 2. Nawab Bugti. The government's Bansal.

the fundamental coalition of the NWFP. The Taliban is being funded by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and many of his senior colleagues and jihadi cadres have been given sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. Taliban’s organizational capabilities. 42. The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as "creating a climate of uncertainty" and threatening "the safety of all ships on the high seas". The Taliban is intact under the protection of the ISI. The Amir of the Taliban. This increasing influence of the Taliban could result in its revival and would worsen the situation in Afghanistan and J&K as well. it would result in a deadly convergence of interests in a .25 writ has been forcefully replaced by that of Taliban. the infrastructure has remained undecimated so that Pakistan could use them to protect its strategic interests. and the ISI. which has enforced its rabidly conservative code as had been the vogue in Afghanistan when Taliban ruled that country. Impact on US Interests 42. Think tanks in Pakistan are of the view that as China’s power in the region will multiply with the completion of the Gwadar project. the latest being a peace deal between it and Musharraf.

only time will tell. whereby the Kashmir issue would then become a back burner. This mountain outback has been split into five districts. miles to the Chinese through an agreement on 02 March 1963. A chief executive. With Waziristan already under the grip of the Taliban. 2005. in order to facilitate China 9 The Dawn. is the local administrative head. As to how Pakistan handles this. The Northern Areas have no status. They are neither a province of Pakistan nor a part of "Azad Kashmir". Karachi. Skardu. in order to keep Pakistan engaged and in constant fear.495 square kilometers.26 delicate geo-political area.700 sq. Gilgit. normally a retired Pakistani army officer. appointed by Islamabad. The reason why the Northern Areas have been kept by Pakistan is because of its unilateral ceding of 2. Ghizer and Ghanche. the internal security situation in Pakistan will implode if a CIA and possible Indian backed impetus is given to the Baluch uprising. viz. 13 January.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72. They are ruled directly from Islamabad through a Northern Areas Council which is headed by Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmir Affairs. there is a possibility that the US could attempt to disturb the peace in Baluchistan by putting a damper on growing Chinese presence there9. Therefore. . A population of 1. Diamir. The Northern Areas 43.

is vulnerable for conversion to a separatist movement. which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties. Over the years. the Northern Areas have a Shia majority.27 to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories". Since 1988. especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972. the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. radically altering the demographic profile of the area. 73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army. reducing the indigenous people to a minority. and being in a volatile state. The situation in the Northern Areas is therefore very delicate. Kargil in 1999 added to the discontent in the region. The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. Unlike the rest of Pakistan. 44. Large numbers of Sunnis have been brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit. . The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region.

An effective propaganda system and the spread of disinformation by Pakistan. led to loss of faith on the political system by the Kashmiris. FOREIGN MERCENARIES ASSUMED MANTLE OF TERRORISM IN THE STATE IN 1996. gradual erosion of Article 370 and autonomy.CONDUCT OF PROXY WAR BY PAKISTAN AND EXISTING GROUND REALITIES IMPORTANT EVENTS WHICH DICTATED THE COURSE OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY LINKAGE TO GLOBAL TERRORISM ORIGIN – RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN – 1980s PAK COMPLICITY WITH AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN WITHDRAWAL OF USSR FROM AFGHANISTAN IN 1988 .PAK PRESIDENT TARGETED TWICE IN 2003 AS ALSO CORPS COMMANDER PAK 5 CORPS PAK SET UP OF TERRORISM PAK PAK EPICENTRE ELABORATE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RECRUITING. Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy.28 CHAPTER III . Apart from the historical. TRG OF TERRORISTS SECCESSIONIST MOVEMENT COMMENCES IN AUG 1989 •SPEARHEADED BY JKLF (PRO FREEDOM).HUGE SURPLUS OF WARLIKE STORES AND MUJAHIDEEN IN PAK EVIL HAS COME HOME TO ROOST . there were a few internal problems that helped Pakistan in preparation of the blue print of proxy war. ENCOURAGED AND SPONSORED BY PAK. created huge . squabbling between the National Conference and Congress (I) and imposition of President’s rule twice. Political hegemony. DANGEROUS DIMENSIONS – NUC TERRORISM DUE TO RAMPANT PROLIFERATION INFLUENCE OF AL QAEDA – PARTICIPATION IN WORLD WIDE TERRORIST STRIKES KASHMIR •MASS MIGRATION OF HINDU POPULATION IN 1990. helped the Pakistani cause to a great extent. mass poll rigging. The withdrawal of the erstwhile USSR from Afghanistan in 1988. •REPLACED BY GROUPS LIKE HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN FAVOURING •FINALLY. geographical and ethnic causes. MERGER WITH PAK. Proxy War 45.

It was also imperative that the ‘jehadis’ initially ‘bred’ for Afghanistan. assembly. Political Situation. that commenced in 2003 and was completed by . 48. which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993. polling in the municipal elections was 87 percent. All these conditions were catalytic in starting the proxy war by Pakistan. The stance adopted by the APHC will therefore.29 surplus of military wherewithal for Pakistan to pursue the aim of seeking revenge for its defeat of 1971. with parliamentary. Even though Mr Manmohan Singh is talking with them. Internal Security Situation in J&K. The APHC. 47. Ground Realities 46. (a) LC Fence. be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. and municipal elections being held peacefully. does not represent the entire state of J&K. as before. With the completion in construction of the 750- kilometre LC fence. always be in consonance with Pakistan’s demands. under the threat of elimination by the ISI. it is apparent that nothing fruitful will materialize as APHC members continue to remain. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever since ceasefire was declared on 26 November 2003. Even in the trouble torn district of Kupwara.

49. The LC fence has helped reverse the earlier losses. 917 were eliminated in the state. Being entrusted with new responsibilities that involve faith and trust. A revamped and motivated police organisation now exists in the state. 976 were eliminated. A number of development activities have been undertaken both. the force is now fully motivated and geared to take on their tasks effectively. there ahs been a profound effect on the levels of cross border infiltration into the state. still exists. (b) Coordination between Government Agencies and Local Though the menace of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) Populace. The number of schools and colleges that . the local people have become more confident and are forthcoming as far as cooperation with government intelligence agencies and security forces are concerned.30 October 2004. (c) Role of the State Police. by the state government and the security forces in the form of Operation Sadhbhavana. ever since the ceasefire has come into effect. and with a drop in sustenance from across the border. while 516 militants are known to have infiltrated. Similarly. In the face of unabated counter terrorism operations by India. For instance. while 231 militants infiltrated. in 2005. in 2004. Development Activities. militant cadres have become easy prey.

and thereon to Udhampur only 56 kilometres away. the proposed link from Udhampur to Qazikund in the Valley. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. While it took 25 years to link Pathankot to Jammu in 1972. the Rupees 1500 crore Asian Development Bank project over three years. Similarly. completion of the Old Mughal Road by 2009. and four laning of the JammuSrinagar National Highway. The railway link with the mainland is bound to have a profound effect on the psyche of the locals. for education. due to the shutting down of . However. to mention only a few. is expected to be complete by 2010. another 21 years. Similarly.31 have been opened in the last four years has been more than the total from 1947 to 2002. been instrumental in assisting India in mainstreaming the local population of J&K with the mainland. removing the fear of being alienated from the rest of the country. Mainstreaming the Local Populace. militancy forced them to move out to other parts of India. The line within the valley is almost complete and this portion is expected to get operational by 2007. Earlier Kashmiri traders were not known to leave the state for selling their wares. A new beginning in linking the state to the mainland is the planned Jammu-Srinagar railway link. economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam. have all given a face lift to the state. 50. Militancy has in a way. 51.

parents were forced to educate children in other cities of India. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A OPEN 24 HOURS. INDICATORS OF NORMALCY SANCTITY OF CEASE FIRE MAINTAINED. CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES LAUNCHED. a number of educational and general awareness tours for school and college students have been conducted. SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL LOK SABHA ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF NATIONAL WINTER GAMES. LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS BEING RESCUED FROM TERRORISTS.32 schools and colleges. As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of locals. The interest shown by the local youth during recruitment rallies is proof of the fact that militancy is on the decline. 52. APHC TALKS WITH THE CENTRE IN PROGRESS. . POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THE RISE.

Peace Overtures 53. Lahore-Delhi bus service takes Vajpayee across the border with the first comprehensive peace package.33 CHAPTER IV – PEACE INITIATIVES MOMENT OF RECKONING BLED BY THE PROXY WAR (WAR OF A THOUSAND CUTS) LET LOOSE BY OUR ADVERSARY. July 2001. (c) (d) May 2001. EVENTS OF SEP 9/11 AND GULF WAR II HAVE MANIFESTED IN A YEARNING FOR PEACE THE WORLD OVER. Agra ends in disaster as Musharraf tries to make Kashmir the core issue. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have progressed. Kargil incursions by Pakistan lead to total breakdown in diplomatic ties. (b) July 1999. Vajpayee invites Musharraf for Agra Summit. are as follows:(a) February 1999. THIS IS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR BOTH INDIA AND PAK. THE NATION HAS RETAINED ITS BALANCE AS ALSO THE RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK SUCCESSFULLY. .

(m) January 2006. India accepts ceasefire the next day. Srinagar-Muzaraffarabad bus service inaugurated. Composite dialogue restarted. (g) January 2004. (f) November 2003. Spurt in terror attacks in India makes New York meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf a non starter. First Round Table Conference called by PM Manmohan Singh. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf sign joint statement in New York. (n) February 2006. Musharraf invites himself for cricket match to India. . (j) October 2004. (l) September 2005. Vajpayee again extends hand of friendship to Pakistan. signs joint statement. (h) September 2004. Musharraf asks India to demilitarise certain regions and asks for self governance in J & K. Peace process restarts.34 (e) May 2003. with the APHC is boycotted by the latter. Vajpayee goes to Islamabad. Musharraf says UN resolutions on Kashmir were redundant. (k) April 2005. Musharraf proposes dividing Kashmir along religious lines and distributing between India and Pakistan. Proposes unilateral ceasefire on 23 November.

(q) 11 July 2006. security and friendship with Pakistan. Second Round Table Conference between Delhi and the APHC is boycotted by the latter. a partition of J&K along the flow of this river that matches . ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE RAISED BY PAK. Manmohan Singh proposes peace. ”THE FIVE DECADE OLD INSISTENCE ON HOLDING A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR IS NO LONGER A TERM OF REFERENCE CARVED IN STONE” PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF DECEMBER 2003 Initiatives by Pakistan under Musharraf 54. MOST OF THE OIC COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST THE MOTION.35 (o) March 2006. IRRELEVANCE OF UN RESOLUTION IN NOV 2003. ONLY 88 OUT OF 191 SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. The Chenab Plan. Foreign Secretary level talks take place on the sidelines of SAARC scheduled for end July 2006. (p) May 2006. IN A VOTE CALLED BY INDIA. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as the Chenab Plan. Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai. Amritsar-Nankana bus service inaugurated.

55. which includes the 10 www. Sindh receives water only from the enhanced Indus River. India. which clearly explains the reason for Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley. The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per cent of the water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population. 56. Doda and Rajouri in Jammu. Options.com. and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. would have to forgo all its claims to PoK. .000 sq km of area.strategicforesight. accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32. Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. Furthermore. as well as the Muslim areas of Poonch. Comments. under its jurisdiction. Therefore. Compared to Punjab. it would dry up Sindh. In turn. This would then warrant a major rearrangement of the irrigation network in Punjab. if India loses the Kashmir Valley and in retaliation blocks the Chenab.36 its communal faultlines10. which is already on the brink of a water crisis. would be brought within Pakistan’s borders. which is boosted up by the Chenab-Jhelum combine. with the inclusion of Ladakh which lies north of the Chenab River. Losing Chenab to India would thus mean drastic reduction in water supplies to Sindh.

37 districts of Anantnag. Kupwara. 22 January. 2002. Srinagar. Following the non- acceptance of partition of J&K on ethnic lines. The Andorra Model. Poonch. This model suggests a semiindependent status for the Valley11. Demilitarisation and Self Governance. and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. . Applied to the Kashmir Valley. Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. the defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. Under a 1993 agreement. Rajouri. Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. Musharraf suggested demilitarization of selected areas in the Kashmir Valley as essential for 11 Guardian. Budgam. 58. that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of J&K. Pulwama. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to Pakistan Indus. but the whole entity would become a demilitarised zone. 57. There would be no change in the present LC. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence. Baramulla. The Valley’s borders would be soft enough to allow movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it. Doda. excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan.

and that Pakistan would join India to ensure that no incidents of terrorism take place12. then self-governance. Baramulla and Kupwara. followed by condominium or joint control. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that demilitarization is the only option to resolve the Kashmir problem. 2006. Comments. 60. 13 February. Demilitarisation.38 furthering the peace process. Umar Farooq Mirwaiz. 23 June. 09 January. Chairman APHC has also supported this view. Times of India. 59. His suggestion was to demilitarize Kashmir. as sticking to traditional positions was no solution and the idea of self-governance could provide the way out14. Daily Excelsior. they would be in full 12 13 14 The Tribune. 2006. Pakistani trained militants are well entrenched in these areas and the moment the Indian Army vacate these. His proposal was for India to withdraw troops from the sensitive towns of Srinagar. give self governance to its people with a joint management arrangement on top13. . 2006. means handing over the Kashmir Valley on a platter to Pakistan. stating that that selfgovernance and demilitarisation of Kashmir could be an interim arrangement under which the people of Kashmir could get a sense of 'being masters of their own destiny'.

J. . also disagreed with this proposal as the terrorist infrastructure across the border was still intact. asserting that it was a “sovereign” decision to be taken by New Delhi based on the security situation and could not be “dictated by any foreign government”15.39 control. The Indian Government also reacted promptly by categorically rejecting Musharraf's suggestion. The Neelam River enters Pakistan from India in the Gurais sector of the LC. India’s Response : The Neelam Plan 61. 2006.Singh. While the Chenab plan is based on the bigoted principles of division along ethnic lines. 14 January. 15 The Hindu. the Neelam Plan is focused on clamping down on terrorism and prevention of religious clashes in India. General J. so that the Northern Areas become independent. 62. and then runs west till it meets the Jhelum north of Muzzafarabad. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present position of complete and equal integration of J&K into India and from that position could envisage shifting the LC to the west and north along the Neelam River. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of what Pakistanis call Azad Kashmir. The Chief of Army Staff. The rest of PoK could then join Pakistan.

to find a solution to the Kashmir issue.40 63. a number of leaders did not participate. The Second Round Table conference was held in Srinagar on 24 16 in. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. According to the Neelam Plan. the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. it will get direct access to the Deosai Plain. This would bring about a demilitarisation of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilisation in places like Siachen. Latest Initiative by India 64. The plan would also be appealing to the US. Though the round table conference was a success. Astore. it had initiated a broad dialogue in order to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the state by including groups outside the electoral process as well. will become a free country.com. as being a strategic location. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure of terrorist training and coordination camps in Gilgit. Arindam Banerji.rediff. Skardu and the Deosai Plains area16. India had made it clear that the APHC was not the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and therefore. Kargil and Drass. In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process. invited all separatist and non-separatist groups for a round table conference on 25 February 2006 in New Delhi. . “The Neelam Plan”. for actions against China.

41 and 25 May 2006. 21 April. This too would be only after joint authentication of the AGPL which would then be made public both nationally and internationally. .” 18 Times of India. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have taken place. The Indian Army has confirmed that first disengagement of forces from present locations would take place. The Army is justifiably concerned that Pakistani troops might move into the positions vacated if some sort of joint authentication does not take place before disengagement.org. 65. Talks are now centred on the specific grid references to be followed. to be followed by demilitarization. This too was boycotted by the APHC due to a threat from the Hizbul Mujaheddin17. Terrorism Update. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir. 2006. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute. New Delhi. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of the heights. the most notable one being the expulsion of non-Muslim 17 www. It would then be extremely difficult to dislodge them from these positions. that can ultimately pave the way for demilitarization.satp.18 Is Plebiscite in J&K an Option? 66.

Dr Dipak Basu. In 1992.join India or join Pakistan . In the Northern Areas too. were to have a referendum under truly neutral supervision.the results could be shocking to votaries of secession. Notwithstanding the above. On the other hand. there were negligible Muslims in 1947. presently there are no non-Muslims left. join Pakistan or be independent -. all Hindus from Indian Kashmir were also forcibly expelled by militants who had infiltrated from Pakistan. 22 May 2005 . if the people of the state are given only two choices .com. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”.the majority vote could still go in 19 Bose66@hotmail. The majority could very well go with India. if the option of plebiscite was to be exercised and the undivided state including POK and the Northern Areas. The original people of Kashmir have long since left.42 communities from POK by Pakistan. 67. thus making it impossible to determine who is now eligible to vote for the plebiscite as an original Kashmiri inhabitant. because the separatists would split the vote between proPakistan and pro-independence groups. There have also been large-scale infiltrations of Muslims into traditional the Buddhist area Ladakh and the Hindu areas of Jammu19.join India. and the people were given three options . Pakistan has changed the demography of its occupied area in Kashmir by resettling large number of Punjabi exservicemen and Afghans from the North-West Frontier Province. 68. This did not happen only in POK.

8 million people in the undivided state.9 million Sunni Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. Moreover. By the early 1980s. This has much to do with its own internal compulsions. China could not deny the same principle in the case of Kashmir. and some sprinkling of support for Pakistan from other Muslim groups in the state. J&K’s population is 8. it still gives India a vote of 6. lest it be applied by the West to the case of Tibet. by the late 1980s. Going by simple arithmetic.2 million.8 million and Northern Areas is 1. there has been a change in the Chinese Kashmir policy. Having shown its preference for bilateral talks to resolve the dispute.6 million and leaves Pakistan with 6. and all of POK and Northern Areas vote for Pakistan.43 India's favor. In the last two decades.5 million. POK's is 2. the results of the referendum would be too close to call. Even if provisions were made in this for erosion of support for India as a result of the current turmoil. China's own territorial disputes with the South-East Asian countries over the Spratley Group of Islands led to military clashes. Therefore. 70. as relations between India and China improved by the end of the . the new thinking in China developed an anathema for the word ‘self-determination’. of the 12. If the 1.5 million. Views of China 69.

Besides. China advocated bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. 71. In fact. Besides the above. after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 20 The Hindu. the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam and therefore is a source of religious terrorism. therefore.44 1980s. Any support to Pakistan on Kashmir. . 27 February. Muslim fundamentalism is on the increase in Central Asia. will only lead to more problems in the adjoining more vulnerable Chinese province of Xinjiang20. 2006. China has already protested to Pakistan on this issue. There are reports of Uighur Muslim terrorists getting trained in Pakistani camps. The rise of secessionist tendencies in its Muslim province of Xinjiang also made China aware of the dangers of ‘self-determination.

A similar thought has been echoed by President Musharraf recently when he stated that UN resolutions on Kashmir . The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. General 72. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which there is no permanent cure.45 CHAPTER V – THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY NORMALCY IS THE POINT WHERE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION UNIMPEDED AND STATE POLICE ASSISTED BY CPOs IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER. ARMY RETURNS TO THE BARRACKS TO ATTEND TO ITS PRIMARY TASKING. This line of thinking is probably closest to what India has in mind and perhaps the only way to make a paradigm shift in bilateral relations.

must be realistic and cannot be evolved in an ad-hoc manner. the ingredients of a possible strategy to resolve the J&K dispute. With this as the backdrop. a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de- hyphenate itself from Pakistan. Furthermore. other than with the establishment. This has to be comprehensively addressed on all fronts. Long Term Proactive Strategy 73. There have been some major achievements of the dialogue process such as continuation of the ceasefire and movement across the LC. India must get on with its development plan on all fronts to include defence. are given in the succeeding paragraphs. social and military. has been restored. . leaving it far behind. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K dispute. 74. India must endeavour to project itself as the leading power in the region. a clear message should be conveyed to Pakistan to stop meddling in Indian affairs. with the aim of delinking from Pakistan. political. not to get intimidated by smaller countries like Pakistan. In doing this. People to people contact on both sides of the LC.46 were redundant and independence was not possible. and needs to be evolved from India’s national aims and objectives to protect core values. economic. The strategy hereafter.

allowing Pakistan to extract its pound of flesh. normalcy and even talk of greater autonomy in J&K. Global developments in the foreseeable future are likely to leave Pakistan behind and development is an essential answer to terrorism. The India-Pakistan hyphen would get restored again. India should enhance its economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap with Pakistan sufficiently. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror by striking targets across the country. There would be international pressure on India to pull back from the brink. 76. 2006 . 19 July. It should therefore not evoke knee-jerk protests that detract attention from the main task. This should not throw India off stride as striking at soft targets is not difficult and is imminent in the future as well. In reciprocation. and will use every trick in the book to subvert the peace process. Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan. which would then act as an economic and military deterrence. The idea is to defeat 21 The Tribune. it would be like rising to the bait and gifting a cause to the “jehadis”21. India must therefore learn to get its act together as the “jehadis” fear development. One such strategy could be covert support to the Baluchis to give further impetus to their cause. India and the US. if India were to reverse the peace process. New Delhi. serves the interest of both.47 75.

For doing this. POTA forthwith. in which both. It must also modernise and enlarge its intelligence network. equipment and ethos. intelligentsia and the people as a whole. As citizens. the government and the people meet halfway to solve problems. and identify and punish all those whom the ISI has been able to plant in its strategically important organizations. The “Bhagidari” campaign that means equal partnership.g. Domestic Strategy 77. and at the roots of terrorist ideology – fundamentalists. It needs to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action. India must ensure a crackdown on radical outfits. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not succeeded so far. in combating the menace of terrorism in all its forms. the state police and para military forces in training. needs to be emphasised upon. it must adopt proactive policies to confront terrorists militarily. revive. must be conveyed to the general public through awareness campaigns. The people of India have . narcotics / drug trade. the people have to understand that they have to reciprocate in the correct manner to the State.48 Pakistan in every manner so that it is forced to come to the negotiating table on India’s terms. social evils and sources of terrorism e. The need for support of the citizenry. 78.

thus leaving little space for manoeuvre for the military establishment. 79. Endeavour must therefore be made to win over members of both faction of the APHC by whatever means possible. cross border train and bus services. and availability of medical services in India to Pakistanis. Attitudinal Change 81. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. however. but need to be given more emphasis to. For Pakistan. India and Pakistan must pursue relentlessly the Track II and Track III forms as well. What it means is . Though claiming to represent the people of Kashmir. Track II and Track III Diplomacy 80. so as to get rid of this menace and hurdle permanently. A liberal visa regime permitting exchange of student delegations. intellectuals. Pakistan. it is only after an incident happens. should be encouraged. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. Unfortunately.49 shown tremendous unity in times of crises. For Track I dialogue to succeed. the APHC is basically an organization meant to appease Pakistan. social workers. India must exercise the option of moving “into the Pakistani society”. This quality needs to be channelised and made use of in the correct manner. Both forms of dialogue are being currently implemented.

82. the present deployment of troops of India and Pakistan. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. and any settlement would help to move the J&K talks forward. It should not only maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy. India. investment. The Siachen issue feeds into the peace process. transit. travel. If successful. India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the peace process. demilitarization of the Siachen region would be deemed to be the best possible CBM implemented by India so far. there are good military reasons why the Army insists that before any relocation takes place. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute 83. Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving the major issue of J&K. entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. This means opening up in the matter of trade.50 changing its attitude and ending the mindless hostility of the past. in other words the . However. tourism. but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful option.

Pakistan can do without the Kashmir Valley. The requirement now is for India to break away from being cast in the 22 www. Water needs to be managed as an economic good and thus it is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both countries22. since no pre-conditions are being insisted upon. This deal has therefore marked a new phase in India-US ties. Options. would involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in J&K.com. is demarcated both on ground and maps. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the Indus Basin. will always be on the winning side in the water-war. but cannot let go of the Chenab river over which India has total control. . With the India-US nuclear deal almost through. to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan. Considering the severity of its internal water situation with regard to its Punjab and Sindh. The plan. Resolution of the Indus Waters Problem 84. India being the upper riparian State. Unless the two sides agree where the line lies. Expansion in India-US Relations 85.51 AGPL. only then is any redeployment possible.strategicforesight. a radical shift has obviously occurred in American perceptions.

. It is also seeing India being tied up with the US in a long lasting relation that could jeopardise its monopoly and lead to its containment in Asia. China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this reason that it has stated that if the two countries were together the 21st century would belong to Asia. India would be well on the road to becoming a major power in Asia. adequate care must be taken to ensure that improvement in India-US relations does not accentuate the India-Pakistan problem. As US is China’s biggest trading partner and India too is developing as a potential market. At the same time. India must therefore take advantage of this relationship and skillfully institute a combination of a political. give sudden impetus to the J&K problem.52 same mould as Pakistan. Full advantage of this must be taken by India to exert pressure on Pakistan by China as well. could in a bid to highlight its existence in the region. diplomatic and economic strategy to apply pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. Development of India-Chinese Relations 86. There is a possibility that Pakistan. Once India-US relations expand. it is unlikely that China would attempt to harm this developing relationship with India. way ahead of Pakistan.

. there could be developments that would destabilize the region. People are the best arbiters of interstate disputes. democracy and respect for human rights are the best recipes. political and cultural development of a nation. a democratic transition in Pakistan would likely improve the prospects of a substantive and sustainable dialogue between Pakistan and India on all contentious issues. is the most effective instrument for the social.53 Return of Democracy in Pakistan 87. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly widespread in Pakistan. and for their will to prevail. the politically dominant military and the religious parties are the strongest proponents of claims to the state. where the people choose their own representatives and leaders. economic. If a society is not free. providing also for the preservation and strengthening of the identity of the various ethnic. Pakistani military continues to dictate the Kashmir policy. including Kashmir. Participatory government. It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best equipped to enable the people to fulfill their aspirations and govern their own destiny in an atmosphere of freedom. 88. religious and racial communities that constitute today’s nation states. conversely.

Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict. With the birth of the European Union (EU). Economics is competing for space and politics. In the . The endeavour should be to spread the fruits of development in the state. multinationals have mushroomed that are not inhibited by national frontiers. national boundaries in Europe have lost their importance and wars appear to have become an anachronism there.54 Economic and Social Repair of Kashmir 89. and address the outdated education system of Madrassas by quality modernisation. Revival of SAARC 90. In the era of globalisation. and promote moderate and secular polity by media. A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop of political and economic trends in the world. which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. intelligentsia and religious institutions. Efforts must be made to upgrade communication systems so that television and telecommunication spreads to remote and border areas. There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won.

SAARC can become a more vibrant version of the EU. India must maintain highly capable conventional armed forces. . including political differences. Through unity would come peace and prosperity that would in all probabilities also solve the Kashmir issue. Economic synergy leads more often than not to the solution of disputes. To realize this dream would imply a conscious effort on the part of the members of SAARC. to strengthen the organization through cohesion within the region. which demands a mix of deterrences. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously these days. making it one solid entity. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and harmony tomorrow. constantly increasing its strategic space the world over. makes it imperative to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. India should always adopt a strategy of 'dissuasive deterrence' vis-a-vis Pakistan. Developing a Credible Military Deterrent 92. 91. To ensure this effectively. national borders have lost their significance. and India in particular.55 modern cyber age. This significance of the armed forces. thereby making no cuts in the existing favourable force level and pro-active military stance. Given this scenario. both nuclear and conventional.

by undertaking ‘Hot Pursuit Strikes’ across the LC and into POK. An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. the option of a limited military venture confined to only the LC portion of the state. so that social. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms. as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination. A reactive response is not the answer. technical. should not be lost sight of. In Pakistan’s turbulent politics. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations. conveying appropriately that Pakistan faces possible annihilation if they ever make this mistake. . This should encompass human. In resolving the J&K issue. both external and internal. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment. The evolution of a superior intelligence system is imperative. India must also learn to call Pakistan’s bluff in so far as the nuclear bogey is concerned. Strategy to Tackle the Proxy War 94. this would become particularly relevant if Musharraf gets assassinated or overthrown. electronic intelligence. economic and political issues can be addressed effectively.56 93. India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine.

IMPORTANT TENETS FOR CAMPAIGN PLG SVL. Public information techniques must be spruced up to counter false propaganda generated by agencies close to the militants. The media that has a great reach today.57 95. must be launched by security forces. Youth in the impressionable age group of 12 to 18 years must be the target of all psychological campaigns. Perception Management and Public Information. MD. should be used as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to shape public opinion and to counter false propaganda. A well planned psychological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the civil populace. TRACKER AND GD DOGS PSEUDO GANG IKHWANS AND OTHER SURRENDERED TERRORISTS GHATAKS Media Strategy 96. It should be the “positive content provider” of the achievements of . Operation Sadhbhavana should be pursued relentlessly for developing infrastructure and spreading awareness. SIG INTERCEPTION. ANTI IED AND DF DEVICES HEPTRS FOR RECCE AND EXPEDITIOUS DPLY OF TPS INF BNS( HOME & HEARTH) VILLAGE DEF COMMITTEES OPTIMAL UTILISATION OF FORCE MULTIPLIERS ED. The media must be taken along as a ‘weapon’ of the state and not of the terrorists.

58 the security forces and government apparatus in the state. Apply the “water-war card” and threaten drying up Sindh. (d) India would get branded as the perpetrator of instability in the region. India’s stand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council would get that much weak. 98. the media must project the true colour of militancy. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and support the Shias in the Northern Areas. US influence may not be readily available due to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror. Options Available for Resolving the Issue 97. in keeping with the Neelam Plan. Attempt must be made to change the alignment of the LC. China would get sucked into the J&K issue. Rather than highlighting human right aberrations by the security forces. The implications of this option are the following:(a) (b) (c) The peace process would get derailed. Option 1. Exercise the military option and resolve the dispute militarily. This would invite severe international criticism. Abrogate the IWT of 1960. Gains achieved due to India’s conventional superiority can be used as a bargaining tool to settle the J&K issue permanently. .

59 (e) High probability of the water-war leading to a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. Pakistan and the people of both Kashmirs. The Pros:(a) Granted autonomy. but only so far as defence. exists. foreign policy and communications are concerned. Communication is being included so that both Kashmirs do not feel landlocked. . the aspirations of the people of Kashmir would get taken care of. Option 2. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be acceptable to all three parties . This would be disadvantageous to India. (c) Both. would continue to control their parts of J&K. India and Pakistan. 99.India. 100. and could be modeled on the following lines:(a) (b) Demilitarise on an incremental basis from both sides of the LC. (f) It could lead to a situation where third party mediation may become necessary. The LC would continue to exist but could then be termed instead as the Line of Cooperation. (d) The LC would be made ‘soft’ to enable citizens of the two sides to travel freely without any passports or travel documents. but is not impossible. This may seem utopian.

which . There is a possibility that with a “soft” LC and the Kashmir Valley being Sunni dominant.60 (b) If successful. making its candidature for a permanent in the UN Security Council stronger. (b) India has been consistently maintaining its secular identity so far. (c) India would emerge as the benefactor. it would be a tremendous gain. 101. it would lead to stabilizing of the situation in the sub-continent. by her borders being secure. The Cons:(a) Considering that J&K was acceded to India. As a sizeable portion of the 140 million Muslims in India are Shias. it could turn its focus onto J&K. there is no stopping this evil from engulfing the whole country in the years ahead. (c) There is no guarantee that Musharraf would be able to rein in the militants. For Pakistan. (d) A settlement of the J&K imbroglio would remove the threat of nuclear war from the sub continent. This has been possible to a great extent. especially cadres of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. acceptance of the proposal would imply loss of real estate. sectarian violence could spill over from neighbouring POK. (d) If the Taliban gets revived and stabilised in North Waziristan and Southern Afghanistan.

(f) Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts already.61 with a soft LC could once again come into the grip of a secessionist movement. (g) Even if democracy returns in Pakistan. this could become a major constraint. Fissures within the Pakistani military and the ISI. a possible change in government could derail the entire process. in India the political environment being extremely dynamic. His presence to see the plan fructify is therefore questionable. the military would always have a role in all policy decisions. (h) Implementation of the proposal in one state of India. Given the kind of suspicion that governs India-Pakistan relations. could put an end to this proposal. It is therefore unlikely that Pakistan would agree to . there is no surety of the plan being completed successfully. The Pakistani military establishment has never wanted anything short of liberation of Kashmir. act as a wedge between Pakistan and the area illegally acceded to China. (j) Positions held by Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier region. Similarly. would trigger off similar claims from states in the grip of secessionist movements. In present day coalition politics. (e) The proposal would have to be implemented over a period of time.

giving a clear message at the same time. that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled as a pre-requisite. 103. The implications of this option are the following:(a) Sends a strong message to Pakistan. Give top priority to mainstreaming the local populace. Contain Pakistan and through a “wait and watch” strategy. Continue covert support to the Karzai regime. Apply the Indus water strategy discreetly.62 authentication of these actual held positions on ground and map. see how its internal security situation develops. Continue dialogue and CBMs with Pakistan. Demilitarization by India would thus not be possible. as is warranted of a regional power. Attempt reining in of the APHC. . Support the move for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Follow the present line and maintain status quo. Option 3. sideline it. Encourage maximum people to people contact across the LC through Tracks II and III diplomacies. a synergised counter insurgency plan in J&K in order to contain militancy. (c) The India-Pakistan hyphen does not get restored. 102. Stoke the problem in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. (b) The above message is conveyed from a position of dominance. alternately. not to meddle in Indian affairs. Pursue relentlessly.

are better. . (f) (g) Chances of reining in the APHC. not to take the government lightly on these issues. The Will of the people will begin to prevail paving the way for a return to democracy. mainstreaming and face-lifting efforts undertaken by the J&K government. (h) The option increases the chances of Pakistan imploding as a consequence of mis-management of its internal security situation. (e) Military eliticism and invincibility of the Pakistan Army would get threatened. to fructify. The problem of the Northern Areas would get adequately highlighted in international forums This would become an issue for India to counter Pakistani claims to J&K. (h) Finally. (j) It would give time for the economic drive. in the future. the issue of J&K would become a back-burner. (g) It enables consideration of the global scenario post US elections of 2008. Though it could lead to instability in the region. for strategizing a solution to the J&K problem. if any.63 (d) The problem of J&K can be tackled on terms favourable to India and would not result in a compromise on territorial integrity. it would be a lesson for other states in India facing secessionist movements.

64 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the

instability it would cause in the region. The US war on terror, would also not permit this. In cases of extreme provocation, however, it would be necessary to resort to a certain amount of “arm twisting” of Pakistan, for which this option should not be ruled out. Option 2, though ideally suited to solve the problem permanently, is plagued with a number of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. It also implies loss of real estate by India and giving away the Kashmir valley on a platter, as it being Muslim (Sunni) dominated, would automatically identify itself more with Pakistan and tilt towards it in the years to come. 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan concerning the Taliban, being very unstable, the time for Option 2 is not correct. This option would in any case, take at least five years if not more, to stabilize, by when the geo-political situation in Asia could change as has been discussed already. It would therefore be worth the while to “wait and watch” and hence the strategy proposed in Option 3, is recommended.

CONCLUSION

106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that India needs to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. It is difficult to see any

65 light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation’s solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.

(11,905 Words)

66 SITUATION IN J&K

VISIBLE GRNDSWELL FOR PEACE
100 80 60
45

VIOLENT INCIDENTS
(15 AUG 05) 2003
215

POLLING PERCENTAGE : ELECTIONS
84 81

40 20 0

44 37 35 22

45 34
20 13 36

44

39

1999 – LOK SABHA 2004 – LOK SABHA 2005 - MUNICIPAL

250 200

2002

20
14

16

2005 2004
105 109 93 90 60 131 131 89 66 76 61 67 96 112 103 95 77 127 108 99 96 82 72 68 69 75 64 54 140 118 86

JAM M U

UDHAM PUR

BARAM UL L A

SRINAGA R

ANANT NA G

L EH

TOURISTS IN J&K
400000 350000
350000

PILGRIMS TO AMARNATH
376729 388115
400000 382157 375293

150 100 50
99 70 67 53 61 49 41 36 FEB 69 72 52

300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 111912 72591 27356 191164

300000 250000 200000 149920 150000 100000 50000 0 114366 119037 110793 173334 153314

39 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

66% OF PREVIOUS YR

0
JAN
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

MAR

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2002

2003

2004

2005

COMPARISON OF ATTRITION ON TERRORISTS BY ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)

TERRORIST INITIATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS
HIGH RISK
2002 (194) (66) (64) (18)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

169

1397

10 11 10
SNEAK ATTACKS

5

15

8

9

1

47 45

12

2003 2004 2005

AMBUSHES

ENCOUNTERS

885 597

2003 2004 2005
1 8 71 4 8 1 8 2 1 6 6 1 3 7 8 5

LOW RISK

5 3 5

4 8 3 4 8 8

2 4 0

2 2 9 1 5 7 1 0 3 6 3 5 3

2 4 8

2002 2003
5

(1088) (900) (1067) (454)

89

70

35
G R E N AT T A C K S IE D AT T A C K S S T R A Y F IR IN G S E L E C T IV E K I L L IN G S (C IV ) C AR

2004 2005

B O M B S

ARMY

CPOs/PMF

TERRORISTS ARE ON THE BACKFOOT

TERRORIST INITIATED

COMPARISON OF ATTRITION RATIOS OF ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)

PRESERVATION OF OWN COMB POTENTIAL
OWN CAS 2001-05
1200 1000 800
2003 2004 2005
956 642 639 336

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 OVERALL ARMY CPOs/PMF
0.7 0.5 0.7 4.5 3.1 4.8 6.7 5.4 7

2856
430 189

600 400 200 0

1013
222 207 163 85

FATAL 2001 2002 2003

NON FATAL 2004 2005

.

15. 12. Mishra. Issue 7. Alok. Chadda. Present and Future. Bansal. Sinha. No 2. No 34. Omprakash. but Uneasy Truce will Hold”. Taylor. New Delhi. South Asia Intelligence Review. Terror and Containment. Mitra. Sreedhar. 2003. Daily Excelsior 09 Jan 06. Dietmar Rothermund. Subrata. 7. 1998. 8. Ethnicity. New Delhi. S K. 4. New Delhi. 9. . Maya. 11. 1998. 3. New Delhi. Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region. 10. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. 13. 14. Sucheta Ghosh. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. Vol 3. Gill. Amir Mir. Santhanan. July 2005. 2. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. Sahai. Matt. Times of India 23 Jun 06. Shashi B. Sudhir Saxena. New Delhi. Ajai Sahni.” USI Journal April-June 2005. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. April-June 2005. Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia. Indian Express 25 Apr 06. Security and Separation in India. 1997. Strategic Insights Volume IV. New Delhi. 5. 07 March 2005. Manish. 2001. “The Jehad Lives On”. K P S. Vol 29. “Path to Kashmir will be Ardous. Guardian 22 Jan 02. K. 6. 2003. Strategic Analysis. The Tribune 13 Feb 06.

2006. 21. The Tribune. The Dawn. 25. “Options”. 23.com. Dr Dipak Basu. The Pioneer. Arindam Banerji. 2005. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”.rediff. in. 2006. 27 Feb 06. Bose66@hotmail. 24. The Hindu 14 Jan 06. www.india_resource. The Hindu. 13 January.” 22. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir”.org. Ramananda Sengupta. New Delhi.com.16. Times of India New Delhi 21 Apr 06. www. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession”. 22 May 2005 19.strategicforesight. “The Neelam Plan”. 18. Karachi.satp. “J&K: Self Determination. www. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. October 1999. 17.com. 19 July. 20.rediff. . in.com. 01 August. 27.com. Dr Maharaj Kaul. 26.tripod. Terrorism Update.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful