This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
INTRODUCTION General 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between
India and Pakistan to the present situation. In doing so, the research would dwell on the following:(a) Why the Problem persists and reasons for the stance taken by
both countries. (b) (c) (d) (e) 2. Review of Geo-political situation. The Proxy War by Pakistan and the existing ground realities. Initiatives taken to resolve the dispute. The Recommended Strategy.
Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,
when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. The first war between the two countries was fought within months of their independence, while their armed forces were still under the command of British officers. Kashmir was divided, and remains divided, between the two countries.
(ii) There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution, but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Hypothesis 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals
discussed, long outstanding issue of J&K remains unresolved. What is at the root of this problem and how best can it be tackled.
The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding
paragraphs. 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on
the background of the problem, the stand of India and Pakistan on the issue and the reasons that have led to the creation of the policy and strategy of Pakistan towards Kashmir and India’s response to it. It will also examine other reasons that have been responsible for aggravating the problem, preventing it from being permanently resolved. 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts
whether it is border problem, trade or diplomacy. Things aggravated after the nuclear tests. It was expected that there would be a substantial outcome
(iii) of the Agra Summit, but nothing much came out of it either. The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain weak, and the last fifty five years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic intentions. 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for
India and Pakistan. This part will include the implications of 9/11, Op Enduring Freedom, attack on the Indian Parliament and likely Pakistani reaction and policy for the future. It will also cover the implications of the US presence in the region, for India and Pakistan. 8. The events of 9/11 and December 2001, have made the world realize
the true extent of terrorism. Besides this, the end of the Cold War and the emerging world order, have had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of international relations, creating new equations that have effected the geopolitics in the region. 9. Part III – Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and the Existing Ground
Realities. This part will include the aims of proxy war, its reasons as against a conventional war, the strategy employed, and its political, diplomatic, economic, military and psychological effects. The manner in which the
and secondly. it is intended to trace the reasons for the “change of heart” of President Musharraf in viewing the Kashmir problem. This part would also include involvement of the world forum to include USA and China. the Andorra Model. and logistical support to Kashmiri militants in an apparent effort to coerce India into an agreement on Kashmir as per Pakistan's terms. 11 Part IV – Peace Initiatives. . and the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan. 10. Through this two-part strategy Pakistan has partially succeeded in forcing India to commit a large chunk of its military to combating the ongoing insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1990. overt political and moral support to the Kashmiri population which Pakistan calls a struggle for self-determination against the "Indian yoke". Pakistan's Kashmir policy has been based on two elements. Firstly. the Neelam Plan.(iv) Indian security forces are reacting to the situation in J & K. and the actual ground realities would also be covered. Thereafter. both India and Pakistan have gone about it would be discussed to include the Chenab Plan. covert military. economic. the manner in which." in which Pakistan-based militant organizations are doing Islamabad's bidding in Kashmir and also in other parts of India. Indians call this policy Pakistan's "proxy war against India. In this part.
14. Musharraf's 21 October 2004 plea to the Pakistanis to think out of the box has largely succeeded. Ever since 21 October 2004. This part will include a wrap up of all recommendations. there is hope that an uneasy truce will remain in place. The issue is being discussed everywhere and by all who care about these things.(v) 13. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which . Part V : The Recommended Strategy. On Kashmir. Although a rapid resolution of the Kashmir dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. to join India or Pakistan. It can be said that it was Musharraf who killed Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir. there used to be just one line that emanated from the government. no other solution is likely to have a lasting effect. other than the UN resolutions. with no likelihood of its revival. 15. This is now a thing of the past. is now occupying attention. Pakistan and the Kashmiris. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. 57 years of intense propaganda at home and abroad has made it almost a reflex reaction of most Pakistanis .a UN supervised plebiscite that would give only two options to the Kashmiris. that should be palatable to India. discussing various possible solutions to the Kashmir problem. Apart from a politico-diplomatic settlement of the problem. given the geopolitical situation.
This means opening up in the matter of trade. combined with an institutionalized mechanism to verify each other's claims. For Pakistan. Indian leaders have damaged their own credibility by attributing almost every incident of violence in India . Positive acknowledgment by the Indian government of the actions taken by Pakistan. If India wants an end to terrorism coming from Pakistan. CONCLUSION 16. As far as Kashmir is concerned. tourism. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution.(vi) there is no permanent cure. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. will likely help more moderate elements in Pakistan's government win domestic support for reconciliation with India. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. investment. it means lowering the level of violence in the state and taking a series of reciprocal measures that give relief to the locals caught in the crossfire. one way is to engage Islamabad in India's fight against terrorism. travel. transit. What it means is ending the mindless hostility of the past and entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India.
(vii) to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. cynically employing the Pakistan bogey to cover lapses of the Indian security apparatus. .
Nothing divides India and Pakistan as Kashmir does.JAMMU AND KASHMIR IS THE CROWN BENEATH WHICH LIES ALL THAT THE INDIAN NATION – ONE OF THE WORLD’S MOST ENDURING CIVILISATIONS – STANDS FOR : THE VALUES OF SECULARISM. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY. There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution. it appears that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is now firmly set on the road to . 2. INTRODUCTION General 1. but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Given the latest peace initiatives by both. when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. India and Pakistan. Kashmir's fate is still locked into the story of India's partition in 1947. and nobody has suffered more in the process than the people of Kashmir. IT EXEMPLIFIES INDIA’S UNIQUE UNITY IN DIVERSITY.
2 normalcy . By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. Peace Initiatives. internal and external. and vested interests. Preview 4. The dissertation has been covered in the following parts:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Why the problem of J&K persists. Aim 3. Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and Ground Realities. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the various options open and recommend a strategy to resolve the J & K dispute.though this may remain elusive for a while as spoilers. Review of the Geo-political Situation. . Recommendations. threaten to disorder and derail the peace process.
The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of J&K. by Pakistan in the west. agreed to in 1972. and by Afghanistan in the northwest.3 CHAPTER I : WHY THE PROBLEM OF J&K PERSISTS J & K : LOCATION OF KASHMIR VALLEY PAMIR KNOT 350 KMS KASHMIR VALLEY : AN ARTIST’S IMPRESSION GREAT HIMALAYAN RANGE SHAMSHABARI RG SHAMSHABARI RANGE KARAKORAM INDUS ZOJILA BARAMULA GREAT HIMALAYAN KASHMIR VALLEY URI SRINAGAR POONCH LADAKH ANANTNAG PIR PANJAL RANGE JHELUM CHENAB ZANSKAR PIR PANJAL LC UDHAMPUR Geography 5. Kashmir. The region has been dubbed "disputed territory" between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south. a 222.236 square kilometres region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent. A border called the Line of Control (LC). The eastern area of Kashmir comprising the northeastern part of the . while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. divides the two parts. is surrounded by China in the northeast.
” USI Journal. Genesis 6.4 region (Aksai Chin). In the case of the latter. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and the Pakistan-controlled parts. April-June 2005. The Pakistani projection that J & K being a Muslim country. . Jinnah and the Muslim League favoured the decision being taken solely by the ruler of each state. The British supported this view using the legalistic argument that their relationship with the princely states was based on the treaties with them. the 1 S K Sinha. Present and Future. their rulers could decide which country to accede to. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. though partition of the country was effected on the basis of religion. after the lapse of paramountcy. particularly during the Cold War period. this applied to the provinces only and not to the princely states1. The origin and genesis of the J & K imbroglio is related to the partition of the country on the basis of religion. Whereas the Congress wanted this done in a democratic manner on the basis of the wishes of the people. therefore found ready acceptance internationally. On this logic. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. came under the control of China since 1962. p 182-199. However.
and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege. this created a mess for Pakistan. the atrocities committed by the tribesmen alienated the Kashmiri people making Pakistan lose out on both accounts. politically and militarily. However. Pakistan is of the view that the day the Instrument of Accession was signed. On one hand. Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. it was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. the ruler had fled to Jammu and was therefore not in control of the happenings in the valley. the dispute has dual purposes. Furthermore. Since it has both ideological and . This demolishes the belief that being a Muslim dominated state. Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses. and so entered into a “Standstill agreement” with Pakistan. the imbalance in institutional strength. Thereafter. Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K. However. have led it to see Kashmir in uncompromising terms. It was only on 26 October 1947 that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession merging the state with India. it served to unite an otherwise fractured polity. 8. On the other. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System. J&K should have rightly gone to Pakistan 7. launched a tribal invasion of J&K on 22 October 1947.5 rulers should be free to decide the future of their states. could not decide for sometime. Jinnah being impatient.
to the territorial status quo. India has always been driven by polite diplomacy. 11. Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future shape of a possible solution. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all regional and world forums. and any settlement of the crisis must be effected within the confines of the Indian constitution. Where Pakistani diplomacy has succeeded. The unfinished agenda of partition according to India. to the increasingly apparent shift in official policy . India insists that the UN resolutions were redundant as the State had been acceded to it by the then ruler. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. including territories presently under Pakistani and Chinese control. In brief. Maharaja Hari Singh. which unfortunately has been feebly articulated and has few takers. India’s bottom line on Kashmir has remained unchanged over the decades . 9. the Indian attitude has been that of indifference till the situation went out of control.6 nationalist implications. from support for incorporating into India all of J&K. neither of which is easily compromised. 10. in keeping with the provisions of partition. India’s response has been reactive and very limited. has therefore been to evict Pakistan from its illegal occupation of territory.the state of J&K is an integral part of the Indian Union. and has not been able to respond in the correct manner. Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir has become rigid and unyielding.
. There is no denying the fact that these were influenced by the West’s perception that partition being on the basis of religion. 13. A few months into the war that started after partition. after 1957. acts as a further hurdle to arriving at a general consensus. the UN could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the Soviet Union began using its right of veto against any of these. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. India brought the matter to the notice of UN Security Council. India remains publicly opposed to any international involvement in the dispute. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. The cease-fire was effected by the end of 1948. J&K being a Muslim dominated state should have gone to Pakistan. From April 1948 to 1957. The cease-fire line or the LC was to be a temporary boundary till the matter was resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. 12. Any movement forward on Kashmir is also made more difficult by the lack of a national consensus in India on how the conflict within Kashmir and with Pakistan should be addressed. The resolution of April 1948 demanded from India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities. and the State was split into Indian Kashmir and POK. the UN passed a series of resolutions. Sensationalisation of terrorist acts by the Indian media.7 for recognition of the LC as the international border. However.
Ladakh (with 58 percent of the area. Christians and others. Furthermore. and of Kashmir: Kashmiri. . military situation over the years have rendered the UN resolution on Kashmir of 1948 obsolete. Sikhs. political. Punjabi. 33 percent Hindus. Demographic Characteristics. and 3 percent Buddhists. multi-religious state with 64 percent Muslims. 15.e. There are three distinct geographical regions . However. of Jammu: Dogri. Gujari.8 14. social. and Kashmir (16 percent area. the referendum could not happen. 3 percent of the state's total population have been driven out). Contrary to most reports in the media. and 3 percent of the population). The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti. 45 percent population). of which over 90 % of the region's minorities. J&K is not a state where only Kashmiri Muslims live. Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state. It is a multiethnic. 52 percent population. In addition. Pahari. The large-scale changes in the diplomatic. i. Jammu (26 percent area. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir after it would be vacated by Pakistan. this was never to be as Pakistan did not vacate the area and as a result. with India being allowed to retain some force to maintain law and order.
tripod. approximately 13 percent are Shia Muslims. Dr Maharaj Kaul. 14 percent of the people in Kashmir province are the pastoral nomadic Gujar and Bakarwal people. 17. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non- pastoral Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley who constitute 22 percent of the state's population. October 1999. Of the state's 49 percent who reside in the Kashmir province. . Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. They are non-Kashmiris. This segment of the population dominates the politics of the state. Shia Muslims do not wish to have anything to do with Sunni-dominated Pakistan. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession. knowing fully well the fate that awaits them there. They are strong supporters of association with India and have demonstrated this by organizing Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) to assist the security forces in surveillance of terrorist activity2.9 16. and has the ability to cripple the normal functioning of the 2 www.india_resource. (or about 1. and by and large stand behind J&K's association with India except for a few in Doda district.com.9 million people). J&K: Self Determination. The reason that many believe separatism to be a widespread sentiment in J&K is because this dominant section has succeeded in completely drowning out all other voices in the state.
969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD D E M O G R A P H IC P A T T E R N (P O K ) A S P E R A V A IL A B L E D A T A T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N IN P O K .2 5 .07.95. In that case.940* 51.5 0 .236 1. it implies acceptance of the ‘Two-Nation’ that Muslims and Hindus must live separately.69.0 0 0 (1 9 4 7 ) .917 ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN POST ONSET OF TERRORISM TOTAL POPULATION . implies the theory that Muslims cannot stay with the people of other religion.3 4 . DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN PRE MILITANCY TOTAL POPULATION .1 5 . either by inaction or insufficient action against Pakistani infiltration and terror or. there would be no justification for the presence of another 110 million .07.0 8 .33.5 0 0 .1.5 0 0 .2 8 .0 0 0 OVER ALL% 7 6 .917 REDUCTION DUE TO MIGRATION OF APPROX 3 LACS KASHMIRI PANDITS.96.29.0 0 0 3 .278 51.0 0 0 18.435 27.0 0 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 L A C S A N D 5 0 T H O U S A N D NORTHERN AREAS P A K O C C U P IE D K A S H M IR 10% 90% POK 14 % 1 7% 14 % 5% 50% NORTHERN AREAS 8 7 .MUSLIMS .406 10 * 50 90 KASHMIR 2. P A K IS T A N I PUNJABI SETTLERS HAVE OUTNUM BERED THE SO NS O F T H E S O IL .940* 62.940* 5.1 1 .5 9 3 2 .1.14.943 46.406 3 * LADAKH 50 97 KASHMIR 2.2 .72.7 5 0 6 .14. The plea of Pakistan that as J&K is a Muslim dominated state.72.236 1.184 336 1.5 9 PUNJABI K A S H M IR I DARDS C H IT R A L I BALTI TOTAL .83.33. ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND JAMMU KASHMIR LADAKH JAMMU KASHMIR 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .929 LADAKH 6.435 27.11.1. If the UN too accepts this.649 BUDDHISTS .313 SIKHS .649 BUDDHISTS .313 SIKHS .11.943 LADAKH 184.108.40.206 society in Kashmir province.90. it should be given to it.83.5 0 . worst still.7 5 0 1 .969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .5 0 0 8 7 .184 336 1. by sabotage.MUSLIMS .5 1 .00.90.95.0 0 0 3 0 .3 5 .8 3 .0 1 .00.1.
Ideally the UN Security Council should have overseen this and ensured that the issue was resolved permanently.11 Muslims presently in India. 19. while Pakistan and Bangladesh have driven out most of their non-Muslim population. who according to the principle of partition in 1947. Germany-Czechoslovakia. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid1980s. that is. In other cases of partition elsewhere in the world. In fact. 20. The cases of Greece-Turkey. but have instead been allowed to stay on only because India being secular does not accept the ‘Two-Nation’ theory. should have been sent to Pakistan. it is unnecessary to partition a country if the population is not to be exchanged. even after their homeland was created. are recent examples where full-scale exchanges were organized along with partition. Bulgaria-Turkey. Croatia-Serbia. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was natural after partition of a country. Presently. The CFL ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and northeast . Poland-Germany. never took place. BosniaSerbia. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. the exchange of population. The Siachen Dispute. there were always exchanges of population. Muslims are still in India.
There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. Second. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps. NJ 9842. the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. The last two 3 Indian Express. The Pakistani view is based on several factors. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842. located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. This is what led India to Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge. 25 April. First. in vague language that is the root of the Siachen dispute. . the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan. the Owen Dixon report 1950. The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. Both sides agreed. Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of PoK. 2006. and then north to the glaciers. submitted to the UN. that the CFL extends to the terminal point. not India. Third. 21.12 until map grid-point NJ 9842. and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. located Siachen in the Northern Areas3. 22.
when it was agreed that the LC would not be unilaterally altered. 24. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any . and the Simla Agreement 1972. persists. the LC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. The problem therefore.13 reasons are the Karachi Agreement 1949. 23. The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan after the 1965 War. The day after the declaration. The Soviets. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the USSR (now in Uzbekistan) beginning on 04 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. Peace had been achieved by the intervention of the great powers who pushed the two nations to a cease fire for fears the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers. represented by Premier Kosygin moderated between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan. In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses .and were disappointed at the return to the status quo. Indian Prime Minister Shastri died of a sudden heart attack. The Tashkent Agreement.
The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations. seeking to adhere to the status quo by all means. . was signed between India and Pakistan on 02 July 1972 following the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The treaty has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. 25. The agreement was therefore nullified. The treaty was signed in Simla. The Simla Treaty. and Indira Gandhi. This was not merely a change of nomenclature but a consequence of an agreement. the President of Pakistan. It also conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. The 1972 Simla Summit.14 renunciation of then guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating to the point of armed conflict. popularly known as the Simla Pact or the Simla Agreement. It is significant that the Cease-Fire Line was changed to the LC during this summit. the Prime Minister of India.
. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters. on 19 September 1960. • IMPLIED THAT LC IS INVIOLABLE. 4 www. 27. Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J&K. THE LINE OF CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF DEC 17. revealed General Pervez Musharraf in his dissertation while attending the prestigoius course at the Royal College of Defence Studies.strategicforesight. MARKED ON MAPS AND RATIFIED. Thus. the then President of Pakistan.” 26. “Issues of Kashmir and Indus are intertwined”.com. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. • DID NOT DELINEATE BEYOND NJ 9842. “ …. and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan. Options. 1971 SHALL BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES ….4 It is asserted that the main reason behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause.BOTH SIDES FURTHER UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS LINE…. J&K is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. the then Indian Prime Minister. and a lot more to do with water. London.NEITHER SIDE SHALL SEEK TO ALTER IT UNILATERALLY…. It is a real estate dispute for strategic reasons. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh. and Shri Jawaharlal Nehru..IN J & K. • LC DELINEATED.15 SIMLA AGREEMENT 02 JUL 1972 • RETENTION OF TERRITORIES.
The Indus River rises from Mansarovar in Tibet and its principal tributaries are the Sutlej. is effective from 01 April 19605. In fact.com. The treaty has survived all the wars since then. Ramananda Sengupta. for a month. the waters of the Eastern Rivers stand allocated to India and those of the Western largely to Pakistan. Unlike April 1948. when India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing into Pakistan.16 The Treaty however.” .rediff. the Beas. Jhelum and the Chenab). it explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. Beas and the Ravi) and three Western Rivers (Indus. the Chenab and Jhelum. the Geneva Conventions and the Indus Water Treaty make such an action illegal today. 5 in. The treaty also does not allow either country to opt out unilaterally. Under the Treaty. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej. the Ravi. even though the fact remains that India controls the headwaters.
Obviously not enough. making resolution of security issues even more difficult. Today India and Pakistan are both faced with rapidly escalating problems of acute river resource scarcity. Pakistan’s mounting water insecurity. The Baglihar dam project located on the Chenab River in Doda district in the Jammu division. is presently the focus of intense diplomacy between India and Pakistan. This is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border.17 28. because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. . Increased tensions over water will exacerbate or intensify overall tensions. virtually ensures a still deeper and volatile nexus between water and Kashmir in coming years. Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical control over the concerned headwaters to ease fears about India's potential ability to turn a huge chunk of its land into desert. creating a more favorable environment for interstate conflict.
The Indian position and her viewpoint on terrorism was much better understood now. to gain some leeway for maintaining the general policy of adventurism that seeks to bleed Indian resources in Kashmir. Pakistan. India has attempted to portray the challenge in Kashmir as purely a matter of combating terrorism. and to make the case that it has a right to pursue extremists operating from Pakistan exactly as the US and its allies have hunted down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. acknowledged by the USA.18 CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 11 September 2001 29. 30. Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September “war on terrorism” to their advantage. . for its part. has sought to use its broad cooperation with the US on operations in Afghanistan. and more importantly. and Pakistan’s shady support to the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorists was exposed to the world.
international pressure was applied on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators. in total contradiction of its long-term support to the Taliban. As a result. causing rifts in its society. though the ones in POK were still operative. Pakistan was forced to crack down on radical Islamic groups in the country. US Presence in Pakistan 33. which is . This was acknowledged as being invaluable for the success of the operation. USA will apply pressure on Musharraf to live up to his promise of not supporting terrorism. This operation was another major development in the region that helped India greatly in its endeavour to counter the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan across the LC. The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were now willing to include India in its war against terror.19 Operation Enduring Freedom 31. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror. It also led to the closure of militant training camps in Pakistan. India’s tough stance and diplomatic offensive put Pakistan under pressure and on the back foot with regard to her Kashmir policy. Attack on the Indian Parliament : 13 December 2001 32. Pakistan was forced to give support to the USA. has had a significant effect on the politics of the region.
after the initial crackdown. The jehadi groups were banned in two phases. and 15 November 20036.20 what India wants. Presently there are 59 6 South Asia Intelligence Review. Though most of the groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy. However. operating freely and advocating jehad. it could fructify resulting in tangible inflow of military hardware and economic assistance. though under different names such as Jamaat ud Daawa for the LeT. Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan. as Pakistan-US relationship develops. Amir Mir. resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before. the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. on 12 January 2002. the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). a cursory glance over the activities of four banned militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business. No 34. This would keep Musharraf under pressure locally as it is resented by fundamentalists. with changed names and identities. Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). . Vol 3. However. “The Jehad Lives On”. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). 07 March 2005. Cross Border Terrorism in India 34.
economic infrastructure and ethno. with 27 being in Pakistan. terrorist activity in J&K has regained impetus.religious sentiments. 01 August. Since April 2006. No longer confined to J&K. designed to create mayhem throughout India. 28 in POK. the involvement of the Pakistani government. While China is constructing the Gwadar port to ensure its energy requirements for the future do not disrupted by the US. This confrontation that could convert into a new Baluch 7 The Pioneer. with the focus now on targeting tourists and civilians.21 training camps still operational. 35. suggests a different hue and change of strategy in the proxy war in India. and four in Gilgit-Baltistan7. the idea being to give the movement a local colour. Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the entry of the latter in Baluchistan. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over India. it is bound to interfere with the latter’s hegemonic intentions in South and West Asia. the latest one being the Mumbai blasts of 11 July 2006. suggesting very clearly. Terrorist modules have surfaced within India with mentors still across the border. The “jehadi flavour” is missing and targets being selected are state objectives. are now targets of terrorism. . 2006. Internal Situation in Pakistan and its Implications on Regional Politics 36.
The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan. which handled 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade. is to Indian pressure. Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. For Pakistan. laid the foundation for Gwadar port. will influence the geo-politics of the region. 38. and so provides Pakistan with crucial strategic depth vis-a-vis India along its coastline. nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. and could indirectly effect the J&K issue as well. Gwadar is situated 725 kilometres to the west of Karachi. at China's doorstep. In March 2002. along with the Taliban problem in Waziristan. Chinese vice premier.22 insurgency. About 60 percent of China's energy supplies come from . For China. Wu Bangguo. which makes it 725 kilometres further away from India than Karachi. Construction of Gwadar Port by China 37. the value of Gwadar's distance from India becomes evident if one considers how vulnerable Karachi port.
and China has been anxious that the US. would provide Beijingan opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources. in the process stimulating the economic development of China's backward Xinjiang region. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access. Cambodia and the South China Sea.23 the Middle East. which has a very high presence in the region. According to its "string of pearls" strategy. The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls". could choke off these supplies to China in case of a conflict with Taiwan. China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea. Myanmar. 39. . in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests. Thailand. The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh.
The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from the Gwadar project would depend on the challenges to it from within their borders. The Waziristan Problem 41. Vol 29. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”.24 The Baluch Uprising 40. Alok. Insurgency revived again in 20048. Nawab Bugti. Strategic Analysis. April-June 2005. Baluchis are desperate to be recognised as autonomous people. 8 . No 2. The government's Bansal. The Gwadar project is bitterly opposed by Baluch nationalists who see it as yet another example of Pakistan's Punjabidominated ruling elite siphoning away Baluchi wealth and resources without this backward region or its people gaining. The Pakistani army has led many incursions into the region. with the latest in being the killing of Baluch leader. and to gain self-determination. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province) is a cause for great concern for the US and her allies in the War on Terror. The tribal area of North Waziristan has seen an increase in clashes between Pakistani forces and pro Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.
the infrastructure has remained undecimated so that Pakistan could use them to protect its strategic interests. The Taliban is intact under the protection of the ISI. Think tanks in Pakistan are of the view that as China’s power in the region will multiply with the completion of the Gwadar project. The Taliban is being funded by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). and the ISI.25 writ has been forcefully replaced by that of Taliban. it would result in a deadly convergence of interests in a . Taliban’s organizational capabilities. the latest being a peace deal between it and Musharraf. which has enforced its rabidly conservative code as had been the vogue in Afghanistan when Taliban ruled that country. 42. Impact on US Interests 42. The Amir of the Taliban. the fundamental coalition of the NWFP. Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and many of his senior colleagues and jihadi cadres have been given sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. This increasing influence of the Taliban could result in its revival and would worsen the situation in Afghanistan and J&K as well. The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as "creating a climate of uncertainty" and threatening "the safety of all ships on the high seas".
Karachi. With Waziristan already under the grip of the Taliban. is the local administrative head. As to how Pakistan handles this. 2005. normally a retired Pakistani army officer. only time will tell. Therefore. the internal security situation in Pakistan will implode if a CIA and possible Indian backed impetus is given to the Baluch uprising. A population of 1. 13 January. Ghizer and Ghanche. Gilgit.700 sq. there is a possibility that the US could attempt to disturb the peace in Baluchistan by putting a damper on growing Chinese presence there9. in order to keep Pakistan engaged and in constant fear.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72. Diamir. The Northern Areas have no status. miles to the Chinese through an agreement on 02 March 1963. The Northern Areas 43. This mountain outback has been split into five districts. viz. The reason why the Northern Areas have been kept by Pakistan is because of its unilateral ceding of 2. A chief executive. Skardu. appointed by Islamabad. in order to facilitate China 9 The Dawn. . whereby the Kashmir issue would then become a back burner. They are ruled directly from Islamabad through a Northern Areas Council which is headed by Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmir Affairs.495 square kilometers.26 delicate geo-political area. They are neither a province of Pakistan nor a part of "Azad Kashmir".
Large numbers of Sunnis have been brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit. is vulnerable for conversion to a separatist movement. the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories". Since 1988. reducing the indigenous people to a minority. The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. 44. Kargil in 1999 added to the discontent in the region. the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. The situation in the Northern Areas is therefore very delicate. is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972. and being in a volatile state. which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties. 73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army.27 to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. Unlike the rest of Pakistan. radically altering the demographic profile of the area. The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region. Over the years. .
Political hegemony. MERGER WITH PAK. FOREIGN MERCENARIES ASSUMED MANTLE OF TERRORISM IN THE STATE IN 1996.28 CHAPTER III . squabbling between the National Conference and Congress (I) and imposition of President’s rule twice. DANGEROUS DIMENSIONS – NUC TERRORISM DUE TO RAMPANT PROLIFERATION INFLUENCE OF AL QAEDA – PARTICIPATION IN WORLD WIDE TERRORIST STRIKES KASHMIR •MASS MIGRATION OF HINDU POPULATION IN 1990.CONDUCT OF PROXY WAR BY PAKISTAN AND EXISTING GROUND REALITIES IMPORTANT EVENTS WHICH DICTATED THE COURSE OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY LINKAGE TO GLOBAL TERRORISM ORIGIN – RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN – 1980s PAK COMPLICITY WITH AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN WITHDRAWAL OF USSR FROM AFGHANISTAN IN 1988 . Proxy War 45. led to loss of faith on the political system by the Kashmiris. TRG OF TERRORISTS SECCESSIONIST MOVEMENT COMMENCES IN AUG 1989 •SPEARHEADED BY JKLF (PRO FREEDOM). geographical and ethnic causes. there were a few internal problems that helped Pakistan in preparation of the blue print of proxy war. The withdrawal of the erstwhile USSR from Afghanistan in 1988. Apart from the historical. ENCOURAGED AND SPONSORED BY PAK. An effective propaganda system and the spread of disinformation by Pakistan. created huge . gradual erosion of Article 370 and autonomy. •REPLACED BY GROUPS LIKE HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN FAVOURING •FINALLY.PAK PRESIDENT TARGETED TWICE IN 2003 AS ALSO CORPS COMMANDER PAK 5 CORPS PAK SET UP OF TERRORISM PAK PAK EPICENTRE ELABORATE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RECRUITING. helped the Pakistani cause to a great extent.HUGE SURPLUS OF WARLIKE STORES AND MUJAHIDEEN IN PAK EVIL HAS COME HOME TO ROOST . Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy. mass poll rigging.
Even though Mr Manmohan Singh is talking with them. (a) LC Fence. that commenced in 2003 and was completed by . Internal Security Situation in J&K. Political Situation. 47. All these conditions were catalytic in starting the proxy war by Pakistan. Even in the trouble torn district of Kupwara. under the threat of elimination by the ISI. It was also imperative that the ‘jehadis’ initially ‘bred’ for Afghanistan. The stance adopted by the APHC will therefore. always be in consonance with Pakistan’s demands. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever since ceasefire was declared on 26 November 2003. Ground Realities 46. which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993. it is apparent that nothing fruitful will materialize as APHC members continue to remain. With the completion in construction of the 750- kilometre LC fence. does not represent the entire state of J&K.29 surplus of military wherewithal for Pakistan to pursue the aim of seeking revenge for its defeat of 1971. assembly. polling in the municipal elections was 87 percent. as before. and municipal elections being held peacefully. be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. The APHC. 48. with parliamentary.
Development Activities. there ahs been a profound effect on the levels of cross border infiltration into the state. by the state government and the security forces in the form of Operation Sadhbhavana. A number of development activities have been undertaken both. 49. For instance.30 October 2004. Being entrusted with new responsibilities that involve faith and trust. the force is now fully motivated and geared to take on their tasks effectively. in 2005. (b) Coordination between Government Agencies and Local Though the menace of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) Populace. while 231 militants infiltrated. militant cadres have become easy prey. while 516 militants are known to have infiltrated. In the face of unabated counter terrorism operations by India. (c) Role of the State Police. The number of schools and colleges that . 976 were eliminated. still exists. ever since the ceasefire has come into effect. in 2004. Similarly. The LC fence has helped reverse the earlier losses. A revamped and motivated police organisation now exists in the state. 917 were eliminated in the state. and with a drop in sustenance from across the border. the local people have become more confident and are forthcoming as far as cooperation with government intelligence agencies and security forces are concerned.
A new beginning in linking the state to the mainland is the planned Jammu-Srinagar railway link. The line within the valley is almost complete and this portion is expected to get operational by 2007. economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam. due to the shutting down of . 51. The railway link with the mainland is bound to have a profound effect on the psyche of the locals. is expected to be complete by 2010. to mention only a few. Mainstreaming the Local Populace. the proposed link from Udhampur to Qazikund in the Valley. and thereon to Udhampur only 56 kilometres away. for education. and four laning of the JammuSrinagar National Highway. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. been instrumental in assisting India in mainstreaming the local population of J&K with the mainland. Similarly. However. Militancy has in a way. 50. While it took 25 years to link Pathankot to Jammu in 1972. have all given a face lift to the state. Similarly. Earlier Kashmiri traders were not known to leave the state for selling their wares. another 21 years. the Rupees 1500 crore Asian Development Bank project over three years. removing the fear of being alienated from the rest of the country.31 have been opened in the last four years has been more than the total from 1947 to 2002. militancy forced them to move out to other parts of India. completion of the Old Mughal Road by 2009.
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THE RISE. parents were forced to educate children in other cities of India. INDICATORS OF NORMALCY SANCTITY OF CEASE FIRE MAINTAINED. 52. . a number of educational and general awareness tours for school and college students have been conducted. SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL LOK SABHA ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF NATIONAL WINTER GAMES. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A OPEN 24 HOURS. APHC TALKS WITH THE CENTRE IN PROGRESS. LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS BEING RESCUED FROM TERRORISTS. As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of locals. CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES LAUNCHED.32 schools and colleges. The interest shown by the local youth during recruitment rallies is proof of the fact that militancy is on the decline.
July 2001. Lahore-Delhi bus service takes Vajpayee across the border with the first comprehensive peace package. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have progressed. Agra ends in disaster as Musharraf tries to make Kashmir the core issue. (b) July 1999. THE NATION HAS RETAINED ITS BALANCE AS ALSO THE RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK SUCCESSFULLY. are as follows:(a) February 1999. . THIS IS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR BOTH INDIA AND PAK. Peace Overtures 53.33 CHAPTER IV – PEACE INITIATIVES MOMENT OF RECKONING BLED BY THE PROXY WAR (WAR OF A THOUSAND CUTS) LET LOOSE BY OUR ADVERSARY. EVENTS OF SEP 9/11 AND GULF WAR II HAVE MANIFESTED IN A YEARNING FOR PEACE THE WORLD OVER. Kargil incursions by Pakistan lead to total breakdown in diplomatic ties. (c) (d) May 2001. Vajpayee invites Musharraf for Agra Summit.
(f) November 2003. India accepts ceasefire the next day. Srinagar-Muzaraffarabad bus service inaugurated. First Round Table Conference called by PM Manmohan Singh. Musharraf invites himself for cricket match to India. Vajpayee goes to Islamabad. (j) October 2004. (k) April 2005. . Musharraf proposes dividing Kashmir along religious lines and distributing between India and Pakistan. with the APHC is boycotted by the latter. Musharraf asks India to demilitarise certain regions and asks for self governance in J & K. (l) September 2005. (g) January 2004. Composite dialogue restarted. Vajpayee again extends hand of friendship to Pakistan. signs joint statement.34 (e) May 2003. (n) February 2006. (h) September 2004. Musharraf says UN resolutions on Kashmir were redundant. (m) January 2006. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf sign joint statement in New York. Peace process restarts. Proposes unilateral ceasefire on 23 November. Spurt in terror attacks in India makes New York meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf a non starter.
ONLY 88 OUT OF 191 SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. Foreign Secretary level talks take place on the sidelines of SAARC scheduled for end July 2006. Second Round Table Conference between Delhi and the APHC is boycotted by the latter. Amritsar-Nankana bus service inaugurated. IRRELEVANCE OF UN RESOLUTION IN NOV 2003. (q) 11 July 2006.35 (o) March 2006. Manmohan Singh proposes peace. (p) May 2006. ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE RAISED BY PAK. Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as the Chenab Plan. The Chenab Plan. MOST OF THE OIC COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST THE MOTION. security and friendship with Pakistan. IN A VOTE CALLED BY INDIA. a partition of J&K along the flow of this river that matches . ”THE FIVE DECADE OLD INSISTENCE ON HOLDING A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR IS NO LONGER A TERM OF REFERENCE CARVED IN STONE” PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF DECEMBER 2003 Initiatives by Pakistan under Musharraf 54.
under its jurisdiction. India. with the inclusion of Ladakh which lies north of the Chenab River. would have to forgo all its claims to PoK. accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32. .36 its communal faultlines10. which is already on the brink of a water crisis. would be brought within Pakistan’s borders. Furthermore. as well as the Muslim areas of Poonch. The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per cent of the water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan. Sindh receives water only from the enhanced Indus River. Doda and Rajouri in Jammu. Losing Chenab to India would thus mean drastic reduction in water supplies to Sindh. 55.com. which clearly explains the reason for Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley. This would then warrant a major rearrangement of the irrigation network in Punjab. Comments. In turn. Compared to Punjab.strategicforesight. if India loses the Kashmir Valley and in retaliation blocks the Chenab. 56. Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population. Therefore. which includes the 10 www.000 sq km of area. which is boosted up by the Chenab-Jhelum combine. and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. Options. it would dry up Sindh.
Demilitarisation and Self Governance. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to Pakistan Indus. 2002. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence. The Valley’s borders would be soft enough to allow movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it. Baramulla. Budgam. Musharraf suggested demilitarization of selected areas in the Kashmir Valley as essential for 11 Guardian. but the whole entity would become a demilitarised zone. Pulwama. The Andorra Model. the defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. Doda. 58. 22 January. Rajouri. There would be no change in the present LC. Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. Kupwara. This model suggests a semiindependent status for the Valley11. and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur.37 districts of Anantnag. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan. that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of J&K. 57. Applied to the Kashmir Valley. Srinagar. Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. Following the non- acceptance of partition of J&K on ethnic lines. Poonch. Under a 1993 agreement. .
38 furthering the peace process. and that Pakistan would join India to ensure that no incidents of terrorism take place12. Baramulla and Kupwara. Umar Farooq Mirwaiz. as sticking to traditional positions was no solution and the idea of self-governance could provide the way out14. . 2006. 13 February. followed by condominium or joint control. 59. Times of India. Chairman APHC has also supported this view. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that demilitarization is the only option to resolve the Kashmir problem. means handing over the Kashmir Valley on a platter to Pakistan. 2006. give self governance to its people with a joint management arrangement on top13. 09 January. Daily Excelsior. Demilitarisation. then self-governance. 23 June. His suggestion was to demilitarize Kashmir. Pakistani trained militants are well entrenched in these areas and the moment the Indian Army vacate these. Comments. His proposal was for India to withdraw troops from the sensitive towns of Srinagar. 60. 2006. stating that that selfgovernance and demilitarisation of Kashmir could be an interim arrangement under which the people of Kashmir could get a sense of 'being masters of their own destiny'. they would be in full 12 13 14 The Tribune.
the Neelam Plan is focused on clamping down on terrorism and prevention of religious clashes in India. 2006. The Neelam River enters Pakistan from India in the Gurais sector of the LC. 14 January. asserting that it was a “sovereign” decision to be taken by New Delhi based on the security situation and could not be “dictated by any foreign government”15. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present position of complete and equal integration of J&K into India and from that position could envisage shifting the LC to the west and north along the Neelam River.39 control.J. The Indian Government also reacted promptly by categorically rejecting Musharraf's suggestion. and then runs west till it meets the Jhelum north of Muzzafarabad. 15 The Hindu. The rest of PoK could then join Pakistan. . also disagreed with this proposal as the terrorist infrastructure across the border was still intact. The Chief of Army Staff. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of what Pakistanis call Azad Kashmir. General J. so that the Northern Areas become independent.Singh. India’s Response : The Neelam Plan 61. 62. While the Chenab plan is based on the bigoted principles of division along ethnic lines.
In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure of terrorist training and coordination camps in Gilgit. Astore. Kargil and Drass. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. as being a strategic location. This would bring about a demilitarisation of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilisation in places like Siachen. for actions against China. it will get direct access to the Deosai Plain. will become a free country. Though the round table conference was a success. invited all separatist and non-separatist groups for a round table conference on 25 February 2006 in New Delhi. it had initiated a broad dialogue in order to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the state by including groups outside the electoral process as well. India had made it clear that the APHC was not the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and therefore.rediff. to find a solution to the Kashmir issue.40 63. Arindam Banerji. The Second Round Table conference was held in Srinagar on 24 16 in.com. The plan would also be appealing to the US. Skardu and the Deosai Plains area16. . Latest Initiative by India 64. the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. a number of leaders did not participate. “The Neelam Plan”. According to the Neelam Plan.
org.18 Is Plebiscite in J&K an Option? 66. 2006.satp. 65. It would then be extremely difficult to dislodge them from these positions. to be followed by demilitarization.41 and 25 May 2006. This too was boycotted by the APHC due to a threat from the Hizbul Mujaheddin17. New Delhi. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir. . This too would be only after joint authentication of the AGPL which would then be made public both nationally and internationally. Talks are now centred on the specific grid references to be followed. Terrorism Update. 21 April. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of the heights. the most notable one being the expulsion of non-Muslim 17 www. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute. that can ultimately pave the way for demilitarization.” 18 Times of India. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have taken place. The Army is justifiably concerned that Pakistani troops might move into the positions vacated if some sort of joint authentication does not take place before disengagement. The Indian Army has confirmed that first disengagement of forces from present locations would take place.
join India. thus making it impossible to determine who is now eligible to vote for the plebiscite as an original Kashmiri inhabitant. 67. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. Dr Dipak Basu. join Pakistan or be independent -. There have also been large-scale infiltrations of Muslims into traditional the Buddhist area Ladakh and the Hindu areas of Jammu19. were to have a referendum under truly neutral supervision. This did not happen only in POK.the results could be shocking to votaries of secession. and the people were given three options . presently there are no non-Muslims left. there were negligible Muslims in 1947.42 communities from POK by Pakistan. The majority could very well go with India. 22 May 2005 .com. all Hindus from Indian Kashmir were also forcibly expelled by militants who had infiltrated from Pakistan. if the people of the state are given only two choices . In the Northern Areas too. 68. The original people of Kashmir have long since left. On the other hand. Pakistan has changed the demography of its occupied area in Kashmir by resettling large number of Punjabi exservicemen and Afghans from the North-West Frontier Province. Notwithstanding the above. because the separatists would split the vote between proPakistan and pro-independence groups.join India or join Pakistan . if the option of plebiscite was to be exercised and the undivided state including POK and the Northern Areas.the majority vote could still go in 19 Bose66@hotmail. In 1992.
it still gives India a vote of 6. Therefore. and some sprinkling of support for Pakistan from other Muslim groups in the state.8 million people in the undivided state. POK's is 2.2 million. Views of China 69. by the late 1980s. the new thinking in China developed an anathema for the word ‘self-determination’.5 million. China's own territorial disputes with the South-East Asian countries over the Spratley Group of Islands led to military clashes. of the 12.6 million and leaves Pakistan with 6. 70. Going by simple arithmetic. Moreover.5 million. the results of the referendum would be too close to call.43 India's favor. By the early 1980s.8 million and Northern Areas is 1. lest it be applied by the West to the case of Tibet. as relations between India and China improved by the end of the . In the last two decades. If the 1. Having shown its preference for bilateral talks to resolve the dispute. there has been a change in the Chinese Kashmir policy.9 million Sunni Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. J&K’s population is 8. This has much to do with its own internal compulsions. China could not deny the same principle in the case of Kashmir. and all of POK and Northern Areas vote for Pakistan. Even if provisions were made in this for erosion of support for India as a result of the current turmoil.
Besides the above. There are reports of Uighur Muslim terrorists getting trained in Pakistani camps. In fact. 2006. Any support to Pakistan on Kashmir.44 1980s. The rise of secessionist tendencies in its Muslim province of Xinjiang also made China aware of the dangers of ‘self-determination. therefore. . 71. China advocated bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. Muslim fundamentalism is on the increase in Central Asia. after the break-up of the Soviet Union. will only lead to more problems in the adjoining more vulnerable Chinese province of Xinjiang20. the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam and therefore is a source of religious terrorism. China has already protested to Pakistan on this issue. 27 February. 20 The Hindu. Besides.
The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered.45 CHAPTER V – THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY NORMALCY IS THE POINT WHERE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION UNIMPEDED AND STATE POLICE ASSISTED BY CPOs IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER. ARMY RETURNS TO THE BARRACKS TO ATTEND TO ITS PRIMARY TASKING. This line of thinking is probably closest to what India has in mind and perhaps the only way to make a paradigm shift in bilateral relations. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. General 72. A similar thought has been echoed by President Musharraf recently when he stated that UN resolutions on Kashmir . which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which there is no permanent cure.
must be realistic and cannot be evolved in an ad-hoc manner. India must endeavour to project itself as the leading power in the region. the ingredients of a possible strategy to resolve the J&K dispute. . People to people contact on both sides of the LC. not to get intimidated by smaller countries like Pakistan. 74. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K dispute. This has to be comprehensively addressed on all fronts. with the aim of delinking from Pakistan. Furthermore. a clear message should be conveyed to Pakistan to stop meddling in Indian affairs. economic.46 were redundant and independence was not possible. political. leaving it far behind. other than with the establishment. The strategy hereafter. With this as the backdrop. social and military. There have been some major achievements of the dialogue process such as continuation of the ceasefire and movement across the LC. Long Term Proactive Strategy 73. and needs to be evolved from India’s national aims and objectives to protect core values. India must get on with its development plan on all fronts to include defence. a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de- hyphenate itself from Pakistan. has been restored. are given in the succeeding paragraphs. In doing this.
if India were to reverse the peace process. India and the US. allowing Pakistan to extract its pound of flesh. There would be international pressure on India to pull back from the brink. 2006 . This should not throw India off stride as striking at soft targets is not difficult and is imminent in the future as well. One such strategy could be covert support to the Baluchis to give further impetus to their cause. 19 July. and will use every trick in the book to subvert the peace process. 76. It should therefore not evoke knee-jerk protests that detract attention from the main task.47 75. In reciprocation. India must therefore learn to get its act together as the “jehadis” fear development. normalcy and even talk of greater autonomy in J&K. The India-Pakistan hyphen would get restored again. which would then act as an economic and military deterrence. New Delhi. India should enhance its economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap with Pakistan sufficiently. The idea is to defeat 21 The Tribune. Global developments in the foreseeable future are likely to leave Pakistan behind and development is an essential answer to terrorism. it would be like rising to the bait and gifting a cause to the “jehadis”21. Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan. serves the interest of both. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror by striking targets across the country.
and identify and punish all those whom the ISI has been able to plant in its strategically important organizations. revive.g. POTA forthwith. The need for support of the citizenry. in combating the menace of terrorism in all its forms. 78. equipment and ethos.48 Pakistan in every manner so that it is forced to come to the negotiating table on India’s terms. The people of India have . As citizens. the people have to understand that they have to reciprocate in the correct manner to the State. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not succeeded so far. needs to be emphasised upon. Domestic Strategy 77. intelligentsia and the people as a whole. It must also modernise and enlarge its intelligence network. For doing this. It needs to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action. the state police and para military forces in training. The “Bhagidari” campaign that means equal partnership. in which both. the government and the people meet halfway to solve problems. India must ensure a crackdown on radical outfits. must be conveyed to the general public through awareness campaigns. it must adopt proactive policies to confront terrorists militarily. and at the roots of terrorist ideology – fundamentalists. narcotics / drug trade. social evils and sources of terrorism e.
Unfortunately. What it means is . A liberal visa regime permitting exchange of student delegations. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. and availability of medical services in India to Pakistanis. Attitudinal Change 81. India and Pakistan must pursue relentlessly the Track II and Track III forms as well. Pakistan. intellectuals. 79. Endeavour must therefore be made to win over members of both faction of the APHC by whatever means possible. so as to get rid of this menace and hurdle permanently. cross border train and bus services. For Pakistan. Both forms of dialogue are being currently implemented. thus leaving little space for manoeuvre for the military establishment. but need to be given more emphasis to. should be encouraged. For Track I dialogue to succeed. Though claiming to represent the people of Kashmir. Track II and Track III Diplomacy 80. social workers. India must exercise the option of moving “into the Pakistani society”. the APHC is basically an organization meant to appease Pakistan. it is only after an incident happens. however.49 shown tremendous unity in times of crises. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. This quality needs to be channelised and made use of in the correct manner.
the present deployment of troops of India and Pakistan. 82. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute 83. This means opening up in the matter of trade. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. in other words the . It should not only maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy. demilitarization of the Siachen region would be deemed to be the best possible CBM implemented by India so far.50 changing its attitude and ending the mindless hostility of the past. and any settlement would help to move the J&K talks forward. travel. If successful. there are good military reasons why the Army insists that before any relocation takes place. India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the peace process. but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful option. India. transit. Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving the major issue of J&K. tourism. The Siachen issue feeds into the peace process. However. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. investment. entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India.
will always be on the winning side in the water-war. India being the upper riparian State. but cannot let go of the Chenab river over which India has total control.strategicforesight. Pakistan can do without the Kashmir Valley. With the India-US nuclear deal almost through. Considering the severity of its internal water situation with regard to its Punjab and Sindh. a radical shift has obviously occurred in American perceptions. The requirement now is for India to break away from being cast in the 22 www. The plan. to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan. Options.com. Resolution of the Indus Waters Problem 84. .51 AGPL. Water needs to be managed as an economic good and thus it is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both countries22. since no pre-conditions are being insisted upon. only then is any redeployment possible. This deal has therefore marked a new phase in India-US ties. is demarcated both on ground and maps. Expansion in India-US Relations 85. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the Indus Basin. Unless the two sides agree where the line lies. would involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in J&K.
Development of India-Chinese Relations 86.52 same mould as Pakistan. Once India-US relations expand. it is unlikely that China would attempt to harm this developing relationship with India. It is also seeing India being tied up with the US in a long lasting relation that could jeopardise its monopoly and lead to its containment in Asia. adequate care must be taken to ensure that improvement in India-US relations does not accentuate the India-Pakistan problem. could in a bid to highlight its existence in the region. Full advantage of this must be taken by India to exert pressure on Pakistan by China as well. There is a possibility that Pakistan. . At the same time. India would be well on the road to becoming a major power in Asia. way ahead of Pakistan. diplomatic and economic strategy to apply pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this reason that it has stated that if the two countries were together the 21st century would belong to Asia. give sudden impetus to the J&K problem. As US is China’s biggest trading partner and India too is developing as a potential market. India must therefore take advantage of this relationship and skillfully institute a combination of a political.
democracy and respect for human rights are the best recipes. there could be developments that would destabilize the region. It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best equipped to enable the people to fulfill their aspirations and govern their own destiny in an atmosphere of freedom. economic. where the people choose their own representatives and leaders. . religious and racial communities that constitute today’s nation states. and for their will to prevail. Pakistani military continues to dictate the Kashmir policy. If a society is not free. 88. People are the best arbiters of interstate disputes. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly widespread in Pakistan. including Kashmir. is the most effective instrument for the social. the politically dominant military and the religious parties are the strongest proponents of claims to the state. conversely. providing also for the preservation and strengthening of the identity of the various ethnic. a democratic transition in Pakistan would likely improve the prospects of a substantive and sustainable dialogue between Pakistan and India on all contentious issues. Participatory government.53 Return of Democracy in Pakistan 87. political and cultural development of a nation.
multinationals have mushroomed that are not inhibited by national frontiers. Economics is competing for space and politics. In the . There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won. and address the outdated education system of Madrassas by quality modernisation.54 Economic and Social Repair of Kashmir 89. In the era of globalisation. national boundaries in Europe have lost their importance and wars appear to have become an anachronism there. Efforts must be made to upgrade communication systems so that television and telecommunication spreads to remote and border areas. A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop of political and economic trends in the world. The endeavour should be to spread the fruits of development in the state. intelligentsia and religious institutions. With the birth of the European Union (EU). which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict. Revival of SAARC 90. and promote moderate and secular polity by media.
Through unity would come peace and prosperity that would in all probabilities also solve the Kashmir issue. This significance of the armed forces. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and harmony tomorrow. . including political differences. To ensure this effectively. thereby making no cuts in the existing favourable force level and pro-active military stance. SAARC can become a more vibrant version of the EU. constantly increasing its strategic space the world over. national borders have lost their significance. To realize this dream would imply a conscious effort on the part of the members of SAARC. making it one solid entity. India must maintain highly capable conventional armed forces. Given this scenario. which demands a mix of deterrences. Economic synergy leads more often than not to the solution of disputes. 91. Developing a Credible Military Deterrent 92. to strengthen the organization through cohesion within the region. and India in particular. both nuclear and conventional. India should always adopt a strategy of 'dissuasive deterrence' vis-a-vis Pakistan. makes it imperative to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously these days.55 modern cyber age.
India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. conveying appropriately that Pakistan faces possible annihilation if they ever make this mistake. An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms. electronic intelligence. economic and political issues can be addressed effectively. A reactive response is not the answer.56 93. should not be lost sight of. so that social. In resolving the J&K issue. this would become particularly relevant if Musharraf gets assassinated or overthrown. In Pakistan’s turbulent politics. the option of a limited military venture confined to only the LC portion of the state. . by undertaking ‘Hot Pursuit Strikes’ across the LC and into POK. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment. as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination. India must also learn to call Pakistan’s bluff in so far as the nuclear bogey is concerned. The evolution of a superior intelligence system is imperative. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations. both external and internal. Strategy to Tackle the Proxy War 94. This should encompass human. technical.
It should be the “positive content provider” of the achievements of .57 95. MD. Youth in the impressionable age group of 12 to 18 years must be the target of all psychological campaigns. TRACKER AND GD DOGS PSEUDO GANG IKHWANS AND OTHER SURRENDERED TERRORISTS GHATAKS Media Strategy 96. The media must be taken along as a ‘weapon’ of the state and not of the terrorists. IMPORTANT TENETS FOR CAMPAIGN PLG SVL. Public information techniques must be spruced up to counter false propaganda generated by agencies close to the militants. Perception Management and Public Information. should be used as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to shape public opinion and to counter false propaganda. A well planned psychological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the civil populace. The media that has a great reach today. must be launched by security forces. ANTI IED AND DF DEVICES HEPTRS FOR RECCE AND EXPEDITIOUS DPLY OF TPS INF BNS( HOME & HEARTH) VILLAGE DEF COMMITTEES OPTIMAL UTILISATION OF FORCE MULTIPLIERS ED. SIG INTERCEPTION. Operation Sadhbhavana should be pursued relentlessly for developing infrastructure and spreading awareness.
in keeping with the Neelam Plan. . China would get sucked into the J&K issue.58 the security forces and government apparatus in the state. Apply the “water-war card” and threaten drying up Sindh. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and support the Shias in the Northern Areas. This would invite severe international criticism. Attempt must be made to change the alignment of the LC. Rather than highlighting human right aberrations by the security forces. Gains achieved due to India’s conventional superiority can be used as a bargaining tool to settle the J&K issue permanently. US influence may not be readily available due to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror. (d) India would get branded as the perpetrator of instability in the region. The implications of this option are the following:(a) (b) (c) The peace process would get derailed. Option 1. the media must project the true colour of militancy. Options Available for Resolving the Issue 97. India’s stand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council would get that much weak. Abrogate the IWT of 1960. Exercise the military option and resolve the dispute militarily. 98.
59 (e) High probability of the water-war leading to a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. exists. the aspirations of the people of Kashmir would get taken care of. but only so far as defence. (c) Both. 99. This would be disadvantageous to India. (d) The LC would be made ‘soft’ to enable citizens of the two sides to travel freely without any passports or travel documents. would continue to control their parts of J&K. .India. foreign policy and communications are concerned. The LC would continue to exist but could then be termed instead as the Line of Cooperation. (f) It could lead to a situation where third party mediation may become necessary. The Pros:(a) Granted autonomy. Pakistan and the people of both Kashmirs. Option 2. 100. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be acceptable to all three parties . Communication is being included so that both Kashmirs do not feel landlocked. but is not impossible. and could be modeled on the following lines:(a) (b) Demilitarise on an incremental basis from both sides of the LC. This may seem utopian. India and Pakistan.
it would be a tremendous gain. especially cadres of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. by her borders being secure. (d) A settlement of the J&K imbroglio would remove the threat of nuclear war from the sub continent. acceptance of the proposal would imply loss of real estate. This has been possible to a great extent.60 (b) If successful. As a sizeable portion of the 140 million Muslims in India are Shias. (c) There is no guarantee that Musharraf would be able to rein in the militants. it would lead to stabilizing of the situation in the sub-continent. sectarian violence could spill over from neighbouring POK. which . 101. (b) India has been consistently maintaining its secular identity so far. The Cons:(a) Considering that J&K was acceded to India. it could turn its focus onto J&K. making its candidature for a permanent in the UN Security Council stronger. (c) India would emerge as the benefactor. There is a possibility that with a “soft” LC and the Kashmir Valley being Sunni dominant. there is no stopping this evil from engulfing the whole country in the years ahead. For Pakistan. (d) If the Taliban gets revived and stabilised in North Waziristan and Southern Afghanistan.
In present day coalition politics. in India the political environment being extremely dynamic. would trigger off similar claims from states in the grip of secessionist movements. there is no surety of the plan being completed successfully. the military would always have a role in all policy decisions. Given the kind of suspicion that governs India-Pakistan relations. could put an end to this proposal. (e) The proposal would have to be implemented over a period of time. act as a wedge between Pakistan and the area illegally acceded to China. His presence to see the plan fructify is therefore questionable. (h) Implementation of the proposal in one state of India. a possible change in government could derail the entire process. It is therefore unlikely that Pakistan would agree to . Fissures within the Pakistani military and the ISI. (f) Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts already. The Pakistani military establishment has never wanted anything short of liberation of Kashmir. (g) Even if democracy returns in Pakistan. Similarly.61 with a soft LC could once again come into the grip of a secessionist movement. (j) Positions held by Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier region. this could become a major constraint.
103. (c) The India-Pakistan hyphen does not get restored. Demilitarization by India would thus not be possible. as is warranted of a regional power. The implications of this option are the following:(a) Sends a strong message to Pakistan. Encourage maximum people to people contact across the LC through Tracks II and III diplomacies.62 authentication of these actual held positions on ground and map. see how its internal security situation develops. Contain Pakistan and through a “wait and watch” strategy. Pursue relentlessly. Follow the present line and maintain status quo. alternately. Continue dialogue and CBMs with Pakistan. . a synergised counter insurgency plan in J&K in order to contain militancy. Apply the Indus water strategy discreetly. Continue covert support to the Karzai regime. (b) The above message is conveyed from a position of dominance. sideline it. 102. Support the move for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. giving a clear message at the same time. not to meddle in Indian affairs. that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled as a pre-requisite. Give top priority to mainstreaming the local populace. Stoke the problem in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. Attempt reining in of the APHC. Option 3.
the issue of J&K would become a back-burner. not to take the government lightly on these issues. (h) The option increases the chances of Pakistan imploding as a consequence of mis-management of its internal security situation. for strategizing a solution to the J&K problem. in the future. . it would be a lesson for other states in India facing secessionist movements. are better. Though it could lead to instability in the region. (h) Finally. if any. mainstreaming and face-lifting efforts undertaken by the J&K government. (j) It would give time for the economic drive.63 (d) The problem of J&K can be tackled on terms favourable to India and would not result in a compromise on territorial integrity. (e) Military eliticism and invincibility of the Pakistan Army would get threatened. The problem of the Northern Areas would get adequately highlighted in international forums This would become an issue for India to counter Pakistani claims to J&K. (g) It enables consideration of the global scenario post US elections of 2008. The Will of the people will begin to prevail paving the way for a return to democracy. (f) (g) Chances of reining in the APHC. to fructify.
64 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the
instability it would cause in the region. The US war on terror, would also not permit this. In cases of extreme provocation, however, it would be necessary to resort to a certain amount of “arm twisting” of Pakistan, for which this option should not be ruled out. Option 2, though ideally suited to solve the problem permanently, is plagued with a number of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. It also implies loss of real estate by India and giving away the Kashmir valley on a platter, as it being Muslim (Sunni) dominated, would automatically identify itself more with Pakistan and tilt towards it in the years to come. 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan concerning the Taliban, being very unstable, the time for Option 2 is not correct. This option would in any case, take at least five years if not more, to stabilize, by when the geo-political situation in Asia could change as has been discussed already. It would therefore be worth the while to “wait and watch” and hence the strategy proposed in Option 3, is recommended.
106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that India needs to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. It is difficult to see any
65 light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation’s solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.
66 SITUATION IN J&K
VISIBLE GRNDSWELL FOR PEACE
100 80 60
(15 AUG 05) 2003
POLLING PERCENTAGE : ELECTIONS
40 20 0
44 37 35 22
20 13 36
1999 – LOK SABHA 2004 – LOK SABHA 2005 - MUNICIPAL
105 109 93 90 60 131 131 89 66 76 61 67 96 112 103 95 77 127 108 99 96 82 72 68 69 75 64 54 140 118 86
JAM M U
BARAM UL L A
ANANT NA G
TOURISTS IN J&K
PILGRIMS TO AMARNATH
400000 382157 375293
150 100 50
99 70 67 53 61 49 41 36 FEB 69 72 52
300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 111912 72591 27356 191164
300000 250000 200000 149920 150000 100000 50000 0 114366 119037 110793 173334 153314
39 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG
66% OF PREVIOUS YR
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
COMPARISON OF ATTRITION ON TERRORISTS BY ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)
TERRORIST INITIATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS
2002 (194) (66) (64) (18)
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
10 11 10
2003 2004 2005
2003 2004 2005
1 8 71 4 8 1 8 2 1 6 6 1 3 7 8 5
5 3 5
4 8 3 4 8 8
2 4 0
2 2 9 1 5 7 1 0 3 6 3 5 3
2 4 8
(1088) (900) (1067) (454)
G R E N AT T A C K S IE D AT T A C K S S T R A Y F IR IN G S E L E C T IV E K I L L IN G S (C IV ) C AR
B O M B S
TERRORISTS ARE ON THE BACKFOOT
COMPARISON OF ATTRITION RATIOS OF ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)
PRESERVATION OF OWN COMB POTENTIAL
OWN CAS 2001-05
1200 1000 800
2003 2004 2005
956 642 639 336
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 OVERALL ARMY CPOs/PMF
0.7 0.5 0.7 4.5 3.1 4.8 6.7 5.4 7
600 400 200 0
222 207 163 85
FATAL 2001 2002 2003
NON FATAL 2004 2005
Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. April-June 2005. . Guardian 22 Jan 02. New Delhi. 1997. Mishra. 10. 6. Omprakash. New Delhi. Maya. Sudhir Saxena. “Path to Kashmir will be Ardous. 8. Mitra.” USI Journal April-June 2005. Alok. 7. Vol 3. Bansal. Terror and Containment. South Asia Intelligence Review. Gill. The Tribune 13 Feb 06. Strategic Insights Volume IV. Sreedhar. 12. Sinha. Security and Separation in India. 2. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. Chadda. Santhanan. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. 1998. 2001. Dietmar Rothermund. No 2. New Delhi. New Delhi. 14. 5. 2003. K. Sahai. “The Jehad Lives On”. 15. 07 March 2005. 13. July 2005. 2003. 11. Amir Mir. Issue 7. Strategic Analysis. New Delhi. New Delhi. No 34. Manish. Ethnicity. but Uneasy Truce will Hold”. Ajai Sahni. Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region. Taylor. Sucheta Ghosh. S K. 4. Subrata. Daily Excelsior 09 Jan 06. Matt. Vol 29. 3. Present and Future. K P S. 9. Indian Express 25 Apr 06.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 1998. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia. Shashi B. Times of India 23 Jun 06.
“Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. . 21. 19 July.com. 22 May 2005 19.rediff.com. www. 01 August.com. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession”.satp. in. 26.16. Times of India New Delhi 21 Apr 06. 27. www. 24. 17. 20. Karachi.org. “Options”.rediff. Terrorism Update. 25.” 22. The Hindu 14 Jan 06. “J&K: Self Determination. The Tribune. 13 January. 2006. The Pioneer. Arindam Banerji. The Hindu. Bose66@hotmail.tripod. Ramananda Sengupta. The Dawn. 18. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. 27 Feb 06. “The Neelam Plan”.india_resource. 23.strategicforesight.com. 2006. in. www. New Delhi. October 1999.com. 2005. Dr Maharaj Kaul. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir”. Dr Dipak Basu.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.