(i) SYNOPSIS : STRATEGY TO RESOLVE THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR DISPUTE

INTRODUCTION General 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between

India and Pakistan to the present situation. In doing so, the research would dwell on the following:(a) Why the Problem persists and reasons for the stance taken by

both countries. (b) (c) (d) (e) 2. Review of Geo-political situation. The Proxy War by Pakistan and the existing ground realities. Initiatives taken to resolve the dispute. The Recommended Strategy.

Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,

when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. The first war between the two countries was fought within months of their independence, while their armed forces were still under the command of British officers. Kashmir was divided, and remains divided, between the two countries.

(ii) There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution, but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Hypothesis 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals

discussed, long outstanding issue of J&K remains unresolved. What is at the root of this problem and how best can it be tackled.

LAYOUT

4.

The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding

paragraphs. 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on

the background of the problem, the stand of India and Pakistan on the issue and the reasons that have led to the creation of the policy and strategy of Pakistan towards Kashmir and India’s response to it. It will also examine other reasons that have been responsible for aggravating the problem, preventing it from being permanently resolved. 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts

whether it is border problem, trade or diplomacy. Things aggravated after the nuclear tests. It was expected that there would be a substantial outcome

(iii) of the Agra Summit, but nothing much came out of it either. The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain weak, and the last fifty five years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic intentions. 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for

India and Pakistan. This part will include the implications of 9/11, Op Enduring Freedom, attack on the Indian Parliament and likely Pakistani reaction and policy for the future. It will also cover the implications of the US presence in the region, for India and Pakistan. 8. The events of 9/11 and December 2001, have made the world realize

the true extent of terrorism. Besides this, the end of the Cold War and the emerging world order, have had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of international relations, creating new equations that have effected the geopolitics in the region. 9. Part III – Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and the Existing Ground

Realities. This part will include the aims of proxy war, its reasons as against a conventional war, the strategy employed, and its political, diplomatic, economic, military and psychological effects. The manner in which the

and the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan. and the actual ground realities would also be covered. Thereafter. Pakistan's Kashmir policy has been based on two elements. the manner in which. the Andorra Model. Indians call this policy Pakistan's "proxy war against India. Firstly. and secondly.(iv) Indian security forces are reacting to the situation in J & K. 11 Part IV – Peace Initiatives. overt political and moral support to the Kashmiri population which Pakistan calls a struggle for self-determination against the "Indian yoke". the Neelam Plan. . both India and Pakistan have gone about it would be discussed to include the Chenab Plan." in which Pakistan-based militant organizations are doing Islamabad's bidding in Kashmir and also in other parts of India. Since 1990. it is intended to trace the reasons for the “change of heart” of President Musharraf in viewing the Kashmir problem. covert military. Through this two-part strategy Pakistan has partially succeeded in forcing India to commit a large chunk of its military to combating the ongoing insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. 10. and logistical support to Kashmiri militants in an apparent effort to coerce India into an agreement on Kashmir as per Pakistan's terms. economic. This part would also include involvement of the world forum to include USA and China. In this part.

given the geopolitical situation. no other solution is likely to have a lasting effect. there used to be just one line that emanated from the government. other than the UN resolutions. 14.(v) 13. This is now a thing of the past. that should be palatable to India. This part will include a wrap up of all recommendations. On Kashmir. is now occupying attention. Ever since 21 October 2004. with no likelihood of its revival. The issue is being discussed everywhere and by all who care about these things. Musharraf's 21 October 2004 plea to the Pakistanis to think out of the box has largely succeeded. Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Although a rapid resolution of the Kashmir dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. there is hope that an uneasy truce will remain in place. Apart from a politico-diplomatic settlement of the problem. to join India or Pakistan.a UN supervised plebiscite that would give only two options to the Kashmiris. Part V : The Recommended Strategy. 57 years of intense propaganda at home and abroad has made it almost a reflex reaction of most Pakistanis . discussing various possible solutions to the Kashmir problem. 15. It can be said that it was Musharraf who killed Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which .

Indian leaders have damaged their own credibility by attributing almost every incident of violence in India .(vi) there is no permanent cure. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. travel. one way is to engage Islamabad in India's fight against terrorism. What it means is ending the mindless hostility of the past and entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. If India wants an end to terrorism coming from Pakistan. transit. tourism. investment. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. For Pakistan. Positive acknowledgment by the Indian government of the actions taken by Pakistan. CONCLUSION 16. will likely help more moderate elements in Pakistan's government win domestic support for reconciliation with India. As far as Kashmir is concerned. it means lowering the level of violence in the state and taking a series of reciprocal measures that give relief to the locals caught in the crossfire. combined with an institutionalized mechanism to verify each other's claims. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. This means opening up in the matter of trade.

(vii) to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. . cynically employing the Pakistan bogey to cover lapses of the Indian security apparatus.

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JAMMU AND KASHMIR IS THE CROWN BENEATH WHICH LIES ALL THAT THE INDIAN NATION – ONE OF THE WORLD’S MOST ENDURING CIVILISATIONS – STANDS FOR : THE VALUES OF SECULARISM. Kashmir's fate is still locked into the story of India's partition in 1947. but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. INTRODUCTION General 1. IT EXEMPLIFIES INDIA’S UNIQUE UNITY IN DIVERSITY. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY. and nobody has suffered more in the process than the people of Kashmir. India and Pakistan. when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. Given the latest peace initiatives by both. There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution. 2. it appears that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is now firmly set on the road to . Nothing divides India and Pakistan as Kashmir does.

The dissertation has been covered in the following parts:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Why the problem of J&K persists. internal and external. and vested interests.though this may remain elusive for a while as spoilers.2 normalcy . By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the various options open and recommend a strategy to resolve the J & K dispute. Recommendations. . Review of the Geo-political Situation. threaten to disorder and derail the peace process. Aim 3. Preview 4. Peace Initiatives. Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and Ground Realities.

Kashmir. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of J&K. the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south. by Pakistan in the west. A border called the Line of Control (LC). a 222.236 square kilometres region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent. while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan.3 CHAPTER I : WHY THE PROBLEM OF J&K PERSISTS J & K : LOCATION OF KASHMIR VALLEY PAMIR KNOT 350 KMS KASHMIR VALLEY : AN ARTIST’S IMPRESSION GREAT HIMALAYAN RANGE SHAMSHABARI RG SHAMSHABARI RANGE KARAKORAM INDUS ZOJILA BARAMULA GREAT HIMALAYAN KASHMIR VALLEY URI SRINAGAR POONCH LADAKH ANANTNAG PIR PANJAL RANGE JHELUM CHENAB ZANSKAR PIR PANJAL LC UDHAMPUR Geography 5. is surrounded by China in the northeast. and by Afghanistan in the northwest. agreed to in 1972. The region has been dubbed "disputed territory" between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. The eastern area of Kashmir comprising the northeastern part of the . divides the two parts.

particularly during the Cold War period. However. Whereas the Congress wanted this done in a democratic manner on the basis of the wishes of the people. In the case of the latter. came under the control of China since 1962. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. The Pakistani projection that J & K being a Muslim country.4 region (Aksai Chin). therefore found ready acceptance internationally. April-June 2005. On this logic. Jinnah and the Muslim League favoured the decision being taken solely by the ruler of each state. p 182-199. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. the 1 S K Sinha. Genesis 6.” USI Journal. this applied to the provinces only and not to the princely states1. after the lapse of paramountcy. Present and Future. . The origin and genesis of the J & K imbroglio is related to the partition of the country on the basis of religion. their rulers could decide which country to accede to. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and the Pakistan-controlled parts. though partition of the country was effected on the basis of religion. The British supported this view using the legalistic argument that their relationship with the princely states was based on the treaties with them.

and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege. It was only on 26 October 1947 that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession merging the state with India. Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K. Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. On the other. 8. could not decide for sometime. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System. the ruler had fled to Jammu and was therefore not in control of the happenings in the valley. However. Pakistan is of the view that the day the Instrument of Accession was signed. it served to unite an otherwise fractured polity. Furthermore. However. Jinnah being impatient. launched a tribal invasion of J&K on 22 October 1947. Thereafter. J&K should have rightly gone to Pakistan 7. On one hand. it was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. politically and militarily. this created a mess for Pakistan.5 rulers should be free to decide the future of their states. the atrocities committed by the tribesmen alienated the Kashmiri people making Pakistan lose out on both accounts. and so entered into a “Standstill agreement” with Pakistan. Since it has both ideological and . have led it to see Kashmir in uncompromising terms. the imbalance in institutional strength. the dispute has dual purposes. Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses. This demolishes the belief that being a Muslim dominated state.

Maharaja Hari Singh. 9. has therefore been to evict Pakistan from its illegal occupation of territory. India insists that the UN resolutions were redundant as the State had been acceded to it by the then ruler. and has not been able to respond in the correct manner. from support for incorporating into India all of J&K. which unfortunately has been feebly articulated and has few takers. Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future shape of a possible solution. to the increasingly apparent shift in official policy . including territories presently under Pakistani and Chinese control. 10. Where Pakistani diplomacy has succeeded. the Indian attitude has been that of indifference till the situation went out of control. In brief. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all regional and world forums. The unfinished agenda of partition according to India. Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir has become rigid and unyielding. neither of which is easily compromised.6 nationalist implications. and any settlement of the crisis must be effected within the confines of the Indian constitution. in keeping with the provisions of partition.the state of J&K is an integral part of the Indian Union. 11. India’s response has been reactive and very limited. India’s bottom line on Kashmir has remained unchanged over the decades . to the territorial status quo. India has always been driven by polite diplomacy.

after 1957. There is no denying the fact that these were influenced by the West’s perception that partition being on the basis of religion. However. J&K being a Muslim dominated state should have gone to Pakistan. The cease-fire line or the LC was to be a temporary boundary till the matter was resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. India brought the matter to the notice of UN Security Council. and the State was split into Indian Kashmir and POK. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. Any movement forward on Kashmir is also made more difficult by the lack of a national consensus in India on how the conflict within Kashmir and with Pakistan should be addressed. The resolution of April 1948 demanded from India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities. the UN could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the Soviet Union began using its right of veto against any of these.7 for recognition of the LC as the international border. From April 1948 to 1957. acts as a further hurdle to arriving at a general consensus. 13. 12. the UN passed a series of resolutions. India remains publicly opposed to any international involvement in the dispute. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. Sensationalisation of terrorist acts by the Indian media. A few months into the war that started after partition. The cease-fire was effected by the end of 1948. .

15. political. 52 percent population. 45 percent population). 33 percent Hindus. Punjabi. i. military situation over the years have rendered the UN resolution on Kashmir of 1948 obsolete. Christians and others. Sikhs. Furthermore. social. It is a multiethnic. of Jammu: Dogri. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir after it would be vacated by Pakistan. The large-scale changes in the diplomatic. of which over 90 % of the region's minorities. J&K is not a state where only Kashmiri Muslims live.e. multi-religious state with 64 percent Muslims. The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti. 3 percent of the state's total population have been driven out). and of Kashmir: Kashmiri. Pahari.Ladakh (with 58 percent of the area. and 3 percent Buddhists. In addition. and 3 percent of the population). There are three distinct geographical regions . Demographic Characteristics. .8 14. the referendum could not happen. Gujari. Jammu (26 percent area. this was never to be as Pakistan did not vacate the area and as a result. with India being allowed to retain some force to maintain law and order. and Kashmir (16 percent area. However. Contrary to most reports in the media. Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state.

9 million people). They are non-Kashmiris. Shia Muslims do not wish to have anything to do with Sunni-dominated Pakistan. . They are strong supporters of association with India and have demonstrated this by organizing Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) to assist the security forces in surveillance of terrorist activity2.tripod. Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh.com. Of the state's 49 percent who reside in the Kashmir province. (or about 1. The reason that many believe separatism to be a widespread sentiment in J&K is because this dominant section has succeeded in completely drowning out all other voices in the state. 14 percent of the people in Kashmir province are the pastoral nomadic Gujar and Bakarwal people. Dr Maharaj Kaul. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession. approximately 13 percent are Shia Muslims.india_resource. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non- pastoral Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley who constitute 22 percent of the state's population. and has the ability to cripple the normal functioning of the 2 www. 17. and by and large stand behind J&K's association with India except for a few in Doda district.9 16. J&K: Self Determination. knowing fully well the fate that awaits them there. October 1999. This segment of the population dominates the politics of the state.

5 0 .0 0 0 3 0 .406 10 * 50 90 KASHMIR 2. it should be given to it.5 0 . it implies acceptance of the ‘Two-Nation’ that Muslims and Hindus must live separately.5 9 PUNJABI K A S H M IR I DARDS C H IT R A L I BALTI TOTAL .0 0 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 L A C S A N D 5 0 T H O U S A N D NORTHERN AREAS P A K O C C U P IE D K A S H M IR 10% 90% POK 14 % 1 7% 14 % 5% 50% NORTHERN AREAS 8 7 .96.5 9 3 2 .11.969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD D E M O G R A P H IC P A T T E R N (P O K ) A S P E R A V A IL A B L E D A T A T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N IN P O K .7 5 0 6 .917 REDUCTION DUE TO MIGRATION OF APPROX 3 LACS KASHMIRI PANDITS.929 LADAKH 6.69.5 0 0 .649 BUDDHISTS .0 0 0 18.07.940* 5. by sabotage.7 5 0 1 .1.5 0 0 .2 8 .184 336 1.1 1 .69.943 LADAKH 6.313 SIKHS .649 BUDDHISTS .969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .0 0 0 (1 9 4 7 ) .0 0 0 OVER ALL% 7 6 .435 27. there would be no justification for the presence of another 110 million .3 4 .2 .MUSLIMS .14.95.90.943 46.1.1 5 .72.90.29.917 ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN POST ONSET OF TERRORISM TOTAL POPULATION . In that case.33.184 336 1. P A K IS T A N I PUNJABI SETTLERS HAVE OUTNUM BERED THE SO NS O F T H E S O IL .0 8 .2 5 .1.00.72.07.313 SIKHS .83. implies the theory that Muslims cannot stay with the people of other religion.236 1.8 3 .10 society in Kashmir province.940* 51.940* 62.11. The plea of Pakistan that as J&K is a Muslim dominated state.278 51.33.83.14.236 1.0 0 0 3 .00.3 5 .MUSLIMS . DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN PRE MILITANCY TOTAL POPULATION . ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND JAMMU KASHMIR LADAKH JAMMU KASHMIR 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS . If the UN too accepts this.1.435 27. either by inaction or insufficient action against Pakistani infiltration and terror or.29.5 1 .406 3 * LADAKH 50 97 KASHMIR 2.95.0 1 .5 0 0 8 7 . worst still.

but have instead been allowed to stay on only because India being secular does not accept the ‘Two-Nation’ theory. even after their homeland was created. there were always exchanges of population. while Pakistan and Bangladesh have driven out most of their non-Muslim population. 20. 19. it is unnecessary to partition a country if the population is not to be exchanged. are recent examples where full-scale exchanges were organized along with partition. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was natural after partition of a country. who according to the principle of partition in 1947. BosniaSerbia. Bulgaria-Turkey. The CFL ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and northeast . Muslims are still in India. Croatia-Serbia. never took place. should have been sent to Pakistan. In fact. that is. The cases of Greece-Turkey. Ideally the UN Security Council should have overseen this and ensured that the issue was resolved permanently. In other cases of partition elsewhere in the world. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid1980s. Presently. Germany-Czechoslovakia. the exchange of population. Poland-Germany. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. The Siachen Dispute.11 Muslims presently in India.

located Siachen in the Northern Areas3. This is what led India to Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge. 22. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842. located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps. NJ 9842. 25 April. submitted to the UN. Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of PoK. not India. First. and then north to the glaciers. the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan. The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. that the CFL extends to the terminal point. The last two 3 Indian Express. in vague language that is the root of the Siachen dispute. Second. Both sides agreed.12 until map grid-point NJ 9842. the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. 21. the Owen Dixon report 1950. 2006. The Pakistani view is based on several factors. Third. and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. .

In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses .13 reasons are the Karachi Agreement 1949. Peace had been achieved by the intervention of the great powers who pushed the two nations to a cease fire for fears the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the USSR (now in Uzbekistan) beginning on 04 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. The Tashkent Agreement. where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated.and were disappointed at the return to the status quo. The Soviets. The problem therefore. After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. persists. 23. represented by Premier Kosygin moderated between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan. The day after the declaration. and the Simla Agreement 1972. when it was agreed that the LC would not be unilaterally altered. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any . the LC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan after the 1965 War. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972. Indian Prime Minister Shastri died of a sudden heart attack. 24.

was signed between India and Pakistan on 02 July 1972 following the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations. by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. . seeking to adhere to the status quo by all means. the President of Pakistan. though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating to the point of armed conflict. the Prime Minister of India. The treaty was signed in Simla. The 1972 Simla Summit. The Simla Treaty. The agreement was therefore nullified. and Indira Gandhi.14 renunciation of then guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. popularly known as the Simla Pact or the Simla Agreement. It is significant that the Cease-Fire Line was changed to the LC during this summit. It also conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. The treaty has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. 25. This was not merely a change of nomenclature but a consequence of an agreement.

and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan. on 19 September 1960. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters. 4 www.NEITHER SIDE SHALL SEEK TO ALTER IT UNILATERALLY….strategicforesight. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. . Thus. and Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. J&K is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. 1971 SHALL BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES ….IN J & K. MARKED ON MAPS AND RATIFIED.com. • IMPLIED THAT LC IS INVIOLABLE. revealed General Pervez Musharraf in his dissertation while attending the prestigoius course at the Royal College of Defence Studies.BOTH SIDES FURTHER UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS LINE…. • LC DELINEATED. 27. the then Indian Prime Minister. and a lot more to do with water. THE LINE OF CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF DEC 17. Options. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh.15 SIMLA AGREEMENT 02 JUL 1972 • RETENTION OF TERRITORIES. • DID NOT DELINEATE BEYOND NJ 9842.. “Issues of Kashmir and Indus are intertwined”. “ …. London. It is a real estate dispute for strategic reasons.4 It is asserted that the main reason behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause.” 26. Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J&K. the then President of Pakistan.

“Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. when India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing into Pakistan.” . even though the fact remains that India controls the headwaters. Unlike April 1948. the Ravi. 5 in. is effective from 01 April 19605. The treaty has survived all the wars since then.com. Jhelum and the Chenab). Ramananda Sengupta. the Beas. for a month. it explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. Beas and the Ravi) and three Western Rivers (Indus. the waters of the Eastern Rivers stand allocated to India and those of the Western largely to Pakistan. the Geneva Conventions and the Indus Water Treaty make such an action illegal today.rediff. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej. In fact. the Chenab and Jhelum. The Indus River rises from Mansarovar in Tibet and its principal tributaries are the Sutlej.16 The Treaty however. The treaty also does not allow either country to opt out unilaterally. Under the Treaty.

. Pakistan’s mounting water insecurity. is presently the focus of intense diplomacy between India and Pakistan. virtually ensures a still deeper and volatile nexus between water and Kashmir in coming years. creating a more favorable environment for interstate conflict. Increased tensions over water will exacerbate or intensify overall tensions. Today India and Pakistan are both faced with rapidly escalating problems of acute river resource scarcity. The Baglihar dam project located on the Chenab River in Doda district in the Jammu division. Obviously not enough. Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical control over the concerned headwaters to ease fears about India's potential ability to turn a huge chunk of its land into desert. because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. making resolution of security issues even more difficult.17 28. This is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border.

Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September “war on terrorism” to their advantage. India has attempted to portray the challenge in Kashmir as purely a matter of combating terrorism.18 CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 11 September 2001 29. to gain some leeway for maintaining the general policy of adventurism that seeks to bleed Indian resources in Kashmir. and to make the case that it has a right to pursue extremists operating from Pakistan exactly as the US and its allies have hunted down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. 30. for its part. The Indian position and her viewpoint on terrorism was much better understood now. has sought to use its broad cooperation with the US on operations in Afghanistan. . and Pakistan’s shady support to the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorists was exposed to the world. acknowledged by the USA. Pakistan. and more importantly.

This was acknowledged as being invaluable for the success of the operation. international pressure was applied on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror. It also led to the closure of militant training camps in Pakistan.19 Operation Enduring Freedom 31. which is . India’s tough stance and diplomatic offensive put Pakistan under pressure and on the back foot with regard to her Kashmir policy. though the ones in POK were still operative. USA will apply pressure on Musharraf to live up to his promise of not supporting terrorism. As a result. has had a significant effect on the politics of the region. US Presence in Pakistan 33. Pakistan was forced to give support to the USA. The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were now willing to include India in its war against terror. in total contradiction of its long-term support to the Taliban. causing rifts in its society. Pakistan was forced to crack down on radical Islamic groups in the country. Attack on the Indian Parliament : 13 December 2001 32. This operation was another major development in the region that helped India greatly in its endeavour to counter the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan across the LC.

on 12 January 2002. Amir Mir. though under different names such as Jamaat ud Daawa for the LeT. the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan. resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before. This would keep Musharraf under pressure locally as it is resented by fundamentalists. operating freely and advocating jehad. Vol 3. 07 March 2005. No 34. as Pakistan-US relationship develops. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). it could fructify resulting in tangible inflow of military hardware and economic assistance. However. after the initial crackdown. The jehadi groups were banned in two phases. a cursory glance over the activities of four banned militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business. Cross Border Terrorism in India 34. with changed names and identities. and 15 November 20036. Though most of the groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy. However. the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure.20 what India wants. Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). . Presently there are 59 6 South Asia Intelligence Review. “The Jehad Lives On”.

01 August. with the focus now on targeting tourists and civilians. suggesting very clearly. Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the entry of the latter in Baluchistan. terrorist activity in J&K has regained impetus. The “jehadi flavour” is missing and targets being selected are state objectives. This confrontation that could convert into a new Baluch 7 The Pioneer. are now targets of terrorism. . the idea being to give the movement a local colour. designed to create mayhem throughout India. 28 in POK. it is bound to interfere with the latter’s hegemonic intentions in South and West Asia. Since April 2006.religious sentiments. the latest one being the Mumbai blasts of 11 July 2006. with 27 being in Pakistan. 35.21 training camps still operational. and four in Gilgit-Baltistan7. While China is constructing the Gwadar port to ensure its energy requirements for the future do not disrupted by the US. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over India. suggests a different hue and change of strategy in the proxy war in India. 2006. Terrorist modules have surfaced within India with mentors still across the border. economic infrastructure and ethno. No longer confined to J&K. the involvement of the Pakistani government. Internal Situation in Pakistan and its Implications on Regional Politics 36.

For Pakistan. and could indirectly effect the J&K issue as well. For China. will influence the geo-politics of the region. the value of Gwadar's distance from India becomes evident if one considers how vulnerable Karachi port. Gwadar is situated 725 kilometres to the west of Karachi. 38. along with the Taliban problem in Waziristan. which makes it 725 kilometres further away from India than Karachi. In March 2002. at China's doorstep. which handled 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade. Wu Bangguo. is to Indian pressure. nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. Construction of Gwadar Port by China 37. laid the foundation for Gwadar port. Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. Chinese vice premier. The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan. and so provides Pakistan with crucial strategic depth vis-a-vis India along its coastline. About 60 percent of China's energy supplies come from .22 insurgency.

Myanmar. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access. The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls". and China has been anxious that the US. would provide Beijingan opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources. could choke off these supplies to China in case of a conflict with Taiwan. . in the process stimulating the economic development of China's backward Xinjiang region. China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea. The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh.23 the Middle East. Thailand. in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests. According to its "string of pearls" strategy. 39. Cambodia and the South China Sea. which has a very high presence in the region.

The tribal area of North Waziristan has seen an increase in clashes between Pakistani forces and pro Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Baluchis are desperate to be recognised as autonomous people. April-June 2005. The Pakistani army has led many incursions into the region. and to gain self-determination. The government's Bansal. Insurgency revived again in 20048. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. The Gwadar project is bitterly opposed by Baluch nationalists who see it as yet another example of Pakistan's Punjabidominated ruling elite siphoning away Baluchi wealth and resources without this backward region or its people gaining. with the latest in being the killing of Baluch leader. The Waziristan Problem 41. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province) is a cause for great concern for the US and her allies in the War on Terror. Nawab Bugti. The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from the Gwadar project would depend on the challenges to it from within their borders. 8 .24 The Baluch Uprising 40. No 2. Alok. Vol 29. Strategic Analysis.

Think tanks in Pakistan are of the view that as China’s power in the region will multiply with the completion of the Gwadar project. Impact on US Interests 42. the fundamental coalition of the NWFP. This increasing influence of the Taliban could result in its revival and would worsen the situation in Afghanistan and J&K as well. The Taliban is being funded by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as "creating a climate of uncertainty" and threatening "the safety of all ships on the high seas". the latest being a peace deal between it and Musharraf.25 writ has been forcefully replaced by that of Taliban. The Amir of the Taliban. it would result in a deadly convergence of interests in a . The Taliban is intact under the protection of the ISI. the infrastructure has remained undecimated so that Pakistan could use them to protect its strategic interests. Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and many of his senior colleagues and jihadi cadres have been given sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. which has enforced its rabidly conservative code as had been the vogue in Afghanistan when Taliban ruled that country. and the ISI. 42. Taliban’s organizational capabilities.

5 million inhabits a vast area of 72. whereby the Kashmir issue would then become a back burner. A chief executive. They are ruled directly from Islamabad through a Northern Areas Council which is headed by Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmir Affairs. appointed by Islamabad. As to how Pakistan handles this. Ghizer and Ghanche. This mountain outback has been split into five districts. With Waziristan already under the grip of the Taliban. in order to keep Pakistan engaged and in constant fear. Diamir. The Northern Areas have no status. Therefore. the internal security situation in Pakistan will implode if a CIA and possible Indian backed impetus is given to the Baluch uprising. 2005.26 delicate geo-political area. in order to facilitate China 9 The Dawn. normally a retired Pakistani army officer. They are neither a province of Pakistan nor a part of "Azad Kashmir". is the local administrative head. The reason why the Northern Areas have been kept by Pakistan is because of its unilateral ceding of 2.495 square kilometers. Skardu. only time will tell.700 sq. . viz. miles to the Chinese through an agreement on 02 March 1963. A population of 1. 13 January. Gilgit. Karachi. there is a possibility that the US could attempt to disturb the peace in Baluchistan by putting a damper on growing Chinese presence there9. The Northern Areas 43.

Unlike the rest of Pakistan. radically altering the demographic profile of the area.27 to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories". 73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army. is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. Over the years. which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties. the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. and being in a volatile state. The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region. Since 1988. 44. The situation in the Northern Areas is therefore very delicate. . The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. Large numbers of Sunnis have been brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit. reducing the indigenous people to a minority. Kargil in 1999 added to the discontent in the region. is vulnerable for conversion to a separatist movement. especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972.

mass poll rigging. An effective propaganda system and the spread of disinformation by Pakistan. Apart from the historical.28 CHAPTER III . created huge . •REPLACED BY GROUPS LIKE HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN FAVOURING •FINALLY.CONDUCT OF PROXY WAR BY PAKISTAN AND EXISTING GROUND REALITIES IMPORTANT EVENTS WHICH DICTATED THE COURSE OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY LINKAGE TO GLOBAL TERRORISM ORIGIN – RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN – 1980s PAK COMPLICITY WITH AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN WITHDRAWAL OF USSR FROM AFGHANISTAN IN 1988 . squabbling between the National Conference and Congress (I) and imposition of President’s rule twice. gradual erosion of Article 370 and autonomy. there were a few internal problems that helped Pakistan in preparation of the blue print of proxy war.HUGE SURPLUS OF WARLIKE STORES AND MUJAHIDEEN IN PAK EVIL HAS COME HOME TO ROOST . ENCOURAGED AND SPONSORED BY PAK. geographical and ethnic causes. helped the Pakistani cause to a great extent. led to loss of faith on the political system by the Kashmiris. MERGER WITH PAK. Proxy War 45. TRG OF TERRORISTS SECCESSIONIST MOVEMENT COMMENCES IN AUG 1989 •SPEARHEADED BY JKLF (PRO FREEDOM). Political hegemony. Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy. FOREIGN MERCENARIES ASSUMED MANTLE OF TERRORISM IN THE STATE IN 1996. DANGEROUS DIMENSIONS – NUC TERRORISM DUE TO RAMPANT PROLIFERATION INFLUENCE OF AL QAEDA – PARTICIPATION IN WORLD WIDE TERRORIST STRIKES KASHMIR •MASS MIGRATION OF HINDU POPULATION IN 1990.PAK PRESIDENT TARGETED TWICE IN 2003 AS ALSO CORPS COMMANDER PAK 5 CORPS PAK SET UP OF TERRORISM PAK PAK EPICENTRE ELABORATE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RECRUITING. The withdrawal of the erstwhile USSR from Afghanistan in 1988.

be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. (a) LC Fence. Even in the trouble torn district of Kupwara. The APHC. as before. it is apparent that nothing fruitful will materialize as APHC members continue to remain. All these conditions were catalytic in starting the proxy war by Pakistan. does not represent the entire state of J&K. assembly. 47. always be in consonance with Pakistan’s demands. Ground Realities 46. with parliamentary.29 surplus of military wherewithal for Pakistan to pursue the aim of seeking revenge for its defeat of 1971. polling in the municipal elections was 87 percent. Internal Security Situation in J&K. and municipal elections being held peacefully. 48. Even though Mr Manmohan Singh is talking with them. It was also imperative that the ‘jehadis’ initially ‘bred’ for Afghanistan. With the completion in construction of the 750- kilometre LC fence. that commenced in 2003 and was completed by . The stance adopted by the APHC will therefore. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever since ceasefire was declared on 26 November 2003. Political Situation. under the threat of elimination by the ISI. which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993.

30 October 2004. by the state government and the security forces in the form of Operation Sadhbhavana. The LC fence has helped reverse the earlier losses. Development Activities. For instance. ever since the ceasefire has come into effect. there ahs been a profound effect on the levels of cross border infiltration into the state. in 2004. 976 were eliminated. and with a drop in sustenance from across the border. A revamped and motivated police organisation now exists in the state. in 2005. Similarly. (b) Coordination between Government Agencies and Local Though the menace of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) Populace. (c) Role of the State Police. 49. while 231 militants infiltrated. the force is now fully motivated and geared to take on their tasks effectively. In the face of unabated counter terrorism operations by India. still exists. 917 were eliminated in the state. Being entrusted with new responsibilities that involve faith and trust. A number of development activities have been undertaken both. The number of schools and colleges that . while 516 militants are known to have infiltrated. the local people have become more confident and are forthcoming as far as cooperation with government intelligence agencies and security forces are concerned. militant cadres have become easy prey.

due to the shutting down of . A new beginning in linking the state to the mainland is the planned Jammu-Srinagar railway link. Mainstreaming the Local Populace. the proposed link from Udhampur to Qazikund in the Valley. The railway link with the mainland is bound to have a profound effect on the psyche of the locals. Earlier Kashmiri traders were not known to leave the state for selling their wares. to mention only a few. 51. and four laning of the JammuSrinagar National Highway. removing the fear of being alienated from the rest of the country. and thereon to Udhampur only 56 kilometres away. another 21 years. Similarly. The line within the valley is almost complete and this portion is expected to get operational by 2007. Similarly. have all given a face lift to the state. militancy forced them to move out to other parts of India. 50.31 have been opened in the last four years has been more than the total from 1947 to 2002. the Rupees 1500 crore Asian Development Bank project over three years. However. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. for education. been instrumental in assisting India in mainstreaming the local population of J&K with the mainland. While it took 25 years to link Pathankot to Jammu in 1972. economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam. completion of the Old Mughal Road by 2009. Militancy has in a way. is expected to be complete by 2010.

As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of locals. . 52. LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS BEING RESCUED FROM TERRORISTS.32 schools and colleges. SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL LOK SABHA ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF NATIONAL WINTER GAMES. CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES LAUNCHED. APHC TALKS WITH THE CENTRE IN PROGRESS. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A OPEN 24 HOURS. The interest shown by the local youth during recruitment rallies is proof of the fact that militancy is on the decline. parents were forced to educate children in other cities of India. a number of educational and general awareness tours for school and college students have been conducted. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THE RISE. INDICATORS OF NORMALCY SANCTITY OF CEASE FIRE MAINTAINED.

Lahore-Delhi bus service takes Vajpayee across the border with the first comprehensive peace package. Peace Overtures 53. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have progressed. Agra ends in disaster as Musharraf tries to make Kashmir the core issue.33 CHAPTER IV – PEACE INITIATIVES MOMENT OF RECKONING BLED BY THE PROXY WAR (WAR OF A THOUSAND CUTS) LET LOOSE BY OUR ADVERSARY. (b) July 1999. EVENTS OF SEP 9/11 AND GULF WAR II HAVE MANIFESTED IN A YEARNING FOR PEACE THE WORLD OVER. . THIS IS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR BOTH INDIA AND PAK. Kargil incursions by Pakistan lead to total breakdown in diplomatic ties. July 2001. THE NATION HAS RETAINED ITS BALANCE AS ALSO THE RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK SUCCESSFULLY. are as follows:(a) February 1999. Vajpayee invites Musharraf for Agra Summit. (c) (d) May 2001.

(j) October 2004. (n) February 2006. Peace process restarts. Composite dialogue restarted.34 (e) May 2003. (g) January 2004. with the APHC is boycotted by the latter. (m) January 2006. signs joint statement. . Musharraf says UN resolutions on Kashmir were redundant. (f) November 2003. Spurt in terror attacks in India makes New York meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf a non starter. Vajpayee again extends hand of friendship to Pakistan. India accepts ceasefire the next day. Proposes unilateral ceasefire on 23 November. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf sign joint statement in New York. First Round Table Conference called by PM Manmohan Singh. Musharraf invites himself for cricket match to India. (l) September 2005. (h) September 2004. Vajpayee goes to Islamabad. Musharraf asks India to demilitarise certain regions and asks for self governance in J & K. (k) April 2005. Srinagar-Muzaraffarabad bus service inaugurated. Musharraf proposes dividing Kashmir along religious lines and distributing between India and Pakistan.

Second Round Table Conference between Delhi and the APHC is boycotted by the latter.35 (o) March 2006. MOST OF THE OIC COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST THE MOTION. Amritsar-Nankana bus service inaugurated. Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai. ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE RAISED BY PAK. Foreign Secretary level talks take place on the sidelines of SAARC scheduled for end July 2006. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as the Chenab Plan. Manmohan Singh proposes peace. security and friendship with Pakistan. (p) May 2006. The Chenab Plan. ONLY 88 OUT OF 191 SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. ”THE FIVE DECADE OLD INSISTENCE ON HOLDING A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR IS NO LONGER A TERM OF REFERENCE CARVED IN STONE” PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF DECEMBER 2003 Initiatives by Pakistan under Musharraf 54. IRRELEVANCE OF UN RESOLUTION IN NOV 2003. (q) 11 July 2006. a partition of J&K along the flow of this river that matches . IN A VOTE CALLED BY INDIA.

which includes the 10 www. Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. This would then warrant a major rearrangement of the irrigation network in Punjab. 56. and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. . In turn. Comments. Doda and Rajouri in Jammu. which clearly explains the reason for Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley. 55. Furthermore. as well as the Muslim areas of Poonch. Sindh receives water only from the enhanced Indus River. Compared to Punjab. would have to forgo all its claims to PoK. Losing Chenab to India would thus mean drastic reduction in water supplies to Sindh. Therefore. which is boosted up by the Chenab-Jhelum combine. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population.strategicforesight. if India loses the Kashmir Valley and in retaliation blocks the Chenab. with the inclusion of Ladakh which lies north of the Chenab River. accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32. India. under its jurisdiction. which is already on the brink of a water crisis.com.000 sq km of area. The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per cent of the water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan. Options. would be brought within Pakistan’s borders. it would dry up Sindh.36 its communal faultlines10.

excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan. Following the non- acceptance of partition of J&K on ethnic lines. that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of J&K.37 districts of Anantnag. Rajouri. Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. There would be no change in the present LC. 2002. Applied to the Kashmir Valley. The Valley’s borders would be soft enough to allow movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. Srinagar. 57. Baramulla. Demilitarisation and Self Governance. . Under a 1993 agreement. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to Pakistan Indus. Doda. Musharraf suggested demilitarization of selected areas in the Kashmir Valley as essential for 11 Guardian. Budgam. The Andorra Model. Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. 22 January. but the whole entity would become a demilitarised zone. the defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. Poonch. This model suggests a semiindependent status for the Valley11. 58. Pulwama. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence. Kupwara. and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur.

His proposal was for India to withdraw troops from the sensitive towns of Srinagar. Umar Farooq Mirwaiz. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that demilitarization is the only option to resolve the Kashmir problem. 59. His suggestion was to demilitarize Kashmir. means handing over the Kashmir Valley on a platter to Pakistan. 60. Demilitarisation. . Pakistani trained militants are well entrenched in these areas and the moment the Indian Army vacate these. Chairman APHC has also supported this view. followed by condominium or joint control. as sticking to traditional positions was no solution and the idea of self-governance could provide the way out14. 2006.38 furthering the peace process. and that Pakistan would join India to ensure that no incidents of terrorism take place12. Baramulla and Kupwara. then self-governance. Daily Excelsior. they would be in full 12 13 14 The Tribune. 13 February. 2006. Comments. give self governance to its people with a joint management arrangement on top13. 09 January. Times of India. 2006. 23 June. stating that that selfgovernance and demilitarisation of Kashmir could be an interim arrangement under which the people of Kashmir could get a sense of 'being masters of their own destiny'.

India’s Response : The Neelam Plan 61. also disagreed with this proposal as the terrorist infrastructure across the border was still intact. The Neelam River enters Pakistan from India in the Gurais sector of the LC. so that the Northern Areas become independent. the Neelam Plan is focused on clamping down on terrorism and prevention of religious clashes in India. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of what Pakistanis call Azad Kashmir.Singh. and then runs west till it meets the Jhelum north of Muzzafarabad. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present position of complete and equal integration of J&K into India and from that position could envisage shifting the LC to the west and north along the Neelam River. The Chief of Army Staff. 2006. 62. General J.39 control. asserting that it was a “sovereign” decision to be taken by New Delhi based on the security situation and could not be “dictated by any foreign government”15. 15 The Hindu. . The rest of PoK could then join Pakistan. 14 January. While the Chenab plan is based on the bigoted principles of division along ethnic lines.J. The Indian Government also reacted promptly by categorically rejecting Musharraf's suggestion.

com. Skardu and the Deosai Plains area16. “The Neelam Plan”. The plan would also be appealing to the US. According to the Neelam Plan. This would bring about a demilitarisation of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilisation in places like Siachen. Arindam Banerji.40 63. for actions against China. Kargil and Drass. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure of terrorist training and coordination camps in Gilgit. it will get direct access to the Deosai Plain. will become a free country. Astore. a number of leaders did not participate. Latest Initiative by India 64. India had made it clear that the APHC was not the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and therefore. invited all separatist and non-separatist groups for a round table conference on 25 February 2006 in New Delhi.rediff. Though the round table conference was a success. it had initiated a broad dialogue in order to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the state by including groups outside the electoral process as well. . The Second Round Table conference was held in Srinagar on 24 16 in. the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. to find a solution to the Kashmir issue. In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process. as being a strategic location. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Resolution of the Siachen Dispute.satp. This too was boycotted by the APHC due to a threat from the Hizbul Mujaheddin17.org. 65.41 and 25 May 2006.” 18 Times of India. . The Army is justifiably concerned that Pakistani troops might move into the positions vacated if some sort of joint authentication does not take place before disengagement.18 Is Plebiscite in J&K an Option? 66. 21 April. New Delhi. Terrorism Update. The Indian Army has confirmed that first disengagement of forces from present locations would take place. the most notable one being the expulsion of non-Muslim 17 www. to be followed by demilitarization. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir. This too would be only after joint authentication of the AGPL which would then be made public both nationally and internationally. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of the heights. Talks are now centred on the specific grid references to be followed. 2006. that can ultimately pave the way for demilitarization. It would then be extremely difficult to dislodge them from these positions. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have taken place.

the results could be shocking to votaries of secession.the majority vote could still go in 19 Bose66@hotmail. because the separatists would split the vote between proPakistan and pro-independence groups.join India. presently there are no non-Muslims left.42 communities from POK by Pakistan. there were negligible Muslims in 1947. 67. The majority could very well go with India. if the option of plebiscite was to be exercised and the undivided state including POK and the Northern Areas. In the Northern Areas too. This did not happen only in POK. In 1992. Dr Dipak Basu. There have also been large-scale infiltrations of Muslims into traditional the Buddhist area Ladakh and the Hindu areas of Jammu19. 68. Pakistan has changed the demography of its occupied area in Kashmir by resettling large number of Punjabi exservicemen and Afghans from the North-West Frontier Province. were to have a referendum under truly neutral supervision. if the people of the state are given only two choices . “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. and the people were given three options .join India or join Pakistan . 22 May 2005 . join Pakistan or be independent -. thus making it impossible to determine who is now eligible to vote for the plebiscite as an original Kashmiri inhabitant.com. all Hindus from Indian Kashmir were also forcibly expelled by militants who had infiltrated from Pakistan. Notwithstanding the above. The original people of Kashmir have long since left. On the other hand.

Even if provisions were made in this for erosion of support for India as a result of the current turmoil. the results of the referendum would be too close to call. it still gives India a vote of 6.8 million people in the undivided state.5 million. Going by simple arithmetic.2 million. Having shown its preference for bilateral talks to resolve the dispute. By the early 1980s. POK's is 2. Therefore.8 million and Northern Areas is 1. lest it be applied by the West to the case of Tibet.5 million. Views of China 69.9 million Sunni Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. J&K’s population is 8. China could not deny the same principle in the case of Kashmir. This has much to do with its own internal compulsions. 70. Moreover.43 India's favor. and all of POK and Northern Areas vote for Pakistan. If the 1. as relations between India and China improved by the end of the . by the late 1980s.6 million and leaves Pakistan with 6. In the last two decades. and some sprinkling of support for Pakistan from other Muslim groups in the state. there has been a change in the Chinese Kashmir policy. the new thinking in China developed an anathema for the word ‘self-determination’. of the 12. China's own territorial disputes with the South-East Asian countries over the Spratley Group of Islands led to military clashes.

There are reports of Uighur Muslim terrorists getting trained in Pakistani camps. The rise of secessionist tendencies in its Muslim province of Xinjiang also made China aware of the dangers of ‘self-determination. 27 February. . the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam and therefore is a source of religious terrorism. therefore.44 1980s. Besides. Muslim fundamentalism is on the increase in Central Asia. China has already protested to Pakistan on this issue. 20 The Hindu. China advocated bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. In fact. 71. will only lead to more problems in the adjoining more vulnerable Chinese province of Xinjiang20. 2006. Any support to Pakistan on Kashmir. Besides the above. after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

General 72. ARMY RETURNS TO THE BARRACKS TO ATTEND TO ITS PRIMARY TASKING. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. A similar thought has been echoed by President Musharraf recently when he stated that UN resolutions on Kashmir .45 CHAPTER V – THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY NORMALCY IS THE POINT WHERE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION UNIMPEDED AND STATE POLICE ASSISTED BY CPOs IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which there is no permanent cure. This line of thinking is probably closest to what India has in mind and perhaps the only way to make a paradigm shift in bilateral relations.

and needs to be evolved from India’s national aims and objectives to protect core values. In doing this. with the aim of delinking from Pakistan. the ingredients of a possible strategy to resolve the J&K dispute. leaving it far behind. 74. With this as the backdrop. must be realistic and cannot be evolved in an ad-hoc manner. political. other than with the establishment. social and military. has been restored. There have been some major achievements of the dialogue process such as continuation of the ceasefire and movement across the LC. People to people contact on both sides of the LC. a clear message should be conveyed to Pakistan to stop meddling in Indian affairs. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K dispute. a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de- hyphenate itself from Pakistan. economic. This has to be comprehensively addressed on all fronts. Long Term Proactive Strategy 73. The strategy hereafter. are given in the succeeding paragraphs. India must endeavour to project itself as the leading power in the region. Furthermore. . not to get intimidated by smaller countries like Pakistan. India must get on with its development plan on all fronts to include defence.46 were redundant and independence was not possible.

normalcy and even talk of greater autonomy in J&K. 19 July. if India were to reverse the peace process. Global developments in the foreseeable future are likely to leave Pakistan behind and development is an essential answer to terrorism. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror by striking targets across the country. Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan. In reciprocation. One such strategy could be covert support to the Baluchis to give further impetus to their cause. it would be like rising to the bait and gifting a cause to the “jehadis”21. allowing Pakistan to extract its pound of flesh. This should not throw India off stride as striking at soft targets is not difficult and is imminent in the future as well. India and the US. 2006 . There would be international pressure on India to pull back from the brink. 76. It should therefore not evoke knee-jerk protests that detract attention from the main task. The India-Pakistan hyphen would get restored again. serves the interest of both. India must therefore learn to get its act together as the “jehadis” fear development.47 75. which would then act as an economic and military deterrence. India should enhance its economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap with Pakistan sufficiently. The idea is to defeat 21 The Tribune. and will use every trick in the book to subvert the peace process. New Delhi.

the people have to understand that they have to reciprocate in the correct manner to the State. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not succeeded so far. social evils and sources of terrorism e. For doing this. It must also modernise and enlarge its intelligence network. in which both. and at the roots of terrorist ideology – fundamentalists. and identify and punish all those whom the ISI has been able to plant in its strategically important organizations. it must adopt proactive policies to confront terrorists militarily. The need for support of the citizenry. must be conveyed to the general public through awareness campaigns. equipment and ethos. needs to be emphasised upon. As citizens. It needs to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action. the state police and para military forces in training. the government and the people meet halfway to solve problems.g. intelligentsia and the people as a whole. narcotics / drug trade. revive. India must ensure a crackdown on radical outfits. Domestic Strategy 77. 78.48 Pakistan in every manner so that it is forced to come to the negotiating table on India’s terms. POTA forthwith. The people of India have . The “Bhagidari” campaign that means equal partnership. in combating the menace of terrorism in all its forms.

Unfortunately. A liberal visa regime permitting exchange of student delegations. For Track I dialogue to succeed. the APHC is basically an organization meant to appease Pakistan. cross border train and bus services. What it means is . intellectuals. India and Pakistan must pursue relentlessly the Track II and Track III forms as well.49 shown tremendous unity in times of crises. so as to get rid of this menace and hurdle permanently. it is only after an incident happens. Pakistan. social workers. For Pakistan. Both forms of dialogue are being currently implemented. 79. Endeavour must therefore be made to win over members of both faction of the APHC by whatever means possible. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. but need to be given more emphasis to. should be encouraged. This quality needs to be channelised and made use of in the correct manner. and availability of medical services in India to Pakistanis. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. Track II and Track III Diplomacy 80. Attitudinal Change 81. India must exercise the option of moving “into the Pakistani society”. however. thus leaving little space for manoeuvre for the military establishment. Though claiming to represent the people of Kashmir.

This means opening up in the matter of trade. The Siachen issue feeds into the peace process. but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful option. However. transit. It should not only maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy. there are good military reasons why the Army insists that before any relocation takes place. Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving the major issue of J&K. 82. and any settlement would help to move the J&K talks forward. If successful. entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. investment. travel. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute 83. tourism. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the peace process. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. in other words the . India. the present deployment of troops of India and Pakistan. demilitarization of the Siachen region would be deemed to be the best possible CBM implemented by India so far.50 changing its attitude and ending the mindless hostility of the past.

Unless the two sides agree where the line lies. to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan. Water needs to be managed as an economic good and thus it is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both countries22. a radical shift has obviously occurred in American perceptions. With the India-US nuclear deal almost through. The requirement now is for India to break away from being cast in the 22 www. Resolution of the Indus Waters Problem 84. Options.51 AGPL. would involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in J&K. India being the upper riparian State. is demarcated both on ground and maps. This deal has therefore marked a new phase in India-US ties. Expansion in India-US Relations 85. The plan. since no pre-conditions are being insisted upon. Pakistan can do without the Kashmir Valley. only then is any redeployment possible. but cannot let go of the Chenab river over which India has total control.com. . will always be on the winning side in the water-war.strategicforesight. Considering the severity of its internal water situation with regard to its Punjab and Sindh. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the Indus Basin.

India would be well on the road to becoming a major power in Asia. could in a bid to highlight its existence in the region. way ahead of Pakistan. give sudden impetus to the J&K problem. As US is China’s biggest trading partner and India too is developing as a potential market. There is a possibility that Pakistan. India must therefore take advantage of this relationship and skillfully institute a combination of a political. It is also seeing India being tied up with the US in a long lasting relation that could jeopardise its monopoly and lead to its containment in Asia. . China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this reason that it has stated that if the two countries were together the 21st century would belong to Asia. it is unlikely that China would attempt to harm this developing relationship with India. adequate care must be taken to ensure that improvement in India-US relations does not accentuate the India-Pakistan problem. Full advantage of this must be taken by India to exert pressure on Pakistan by China as well.52 same mould as Pakistan. Once India-US relations expand. At the same time. diplomatic and economic strategy to apply pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. Development of India-Chinese Relations 86.

Participatory government. economic. there could be developments that would destabilize the region. . political and cultural development of a nation. If a society is not free. democracy and respect for human rights are the best recipes. People are the best arbiters of interstate disputes. a democratic transition in Pakistan would likely improve the prospects of a substantive and sustainable dialogue between Pakistan and India on all contentious issues. including Kashmir. the politically dominant military and the religious parties are the strongest proponents of claims to the state. religious and racial communities that constitute today’s nation states. It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best equipped to enable the people to fulfill their aspirations and govern their own destiny in an atmosphere of freedom. is the most effective instrument for the social. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly widespread in Pakistan. where the people choose their own representatives and leaders. conversely. and for their will to prevail.53 Return of Democracy in Pakistan 87. Pakistani military continues to dictate the Kashmir policy. providing also for the preservation and strengthening of the identity of the various ethnic. 88.

The endeavour should be to spread the fruits of development in the state. and address the outdated education system of Madrassas by quality modernisation. national boundaries in Europe have lost their importance and wars appear to have become an anachronism there. With the birth of the European Union (EU). A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop of political and economic trends in the world. which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. Efforts must be made to upgrade communication systems so that television and telecommunication spreads to remote and border areas. There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won. multinationals have mushroomed that are not inhibited by national frontiers. Economics is competing for space and politics. Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict. Revival of SAARC 90. In the era of globalisation. In the . intelligentsia and religious institutions.54 Economic and Social Repair of Kashmir 89. and promote moderate and secular polity by media.

Through unity would come peace and prosperity that would in all probabilities also solve the Kashmir issue. Economic synergy leads more often than not to the solution of disputes. makes it imperative to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. which demands a mix of deterrences. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously these days. thereby making no cuts in the existing favourable force level and pro-active military stance. To ensure this effectively. including political differences. both nuclear and conventional. and India in particular. . Developing a Credible Military Deterrent 92. Given this scenario. This significance of the armed forces. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and harmony tomorrow. India must maintain highly capable conventional armed forces. India should always adopt a strategy of 'dissuasive deterrence' vis-a-vis Pakistan. 91. SAARC can become a more vibrant version of the EU. To realize this dream would imply a conscious effort on the part of the members of SAARC. national borders have lost their significance. making it one solid entity.55 modern cyber age. to strengthen the organization through cohesion within the region. constantly increasing its strategic space the world over.

economic and political issues can be addressed effectively. Strategy to Tackle the Proxy War 94. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment. This should encompass human. as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination. should not be lost sight of. technical. An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations. the option of a limited military venture confined to only the LC portion of the state. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms. electronic intelligence. . In Pakistan’s turbulent politics. A reactive response is not the answer. by undertaking ‘Hot Pursuit Strikes’ across the LC and into POK. so that social.56 93. India must also learn to call Pakistan’s bluff in so far as the nuclear bogey is concerned. conveying appropriately that Pakistan faces possible annihilation if they ever make this mistake. both external and internal. India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. In resolving the J&K issue. this would become particularly relevant if Musharraf gets assassinated or overthrown. The evolution of a superior intelligence system is imperative.

SIG INTERCEPTION. Operation Sadhbhavana should be pursued relentlessly for developing infrastructure and spreading awareness. IMPORTANT TENETS FOR CAMPAIGN PLG SVL. ANTI IED AND DF DEVICES HEPTRS FOR RECCE AND EXPEDITIOUS DPLY OF TPS INF BNS( HOME & HEARTH) VILLAGE DEF COMMITTEES OPTIMAL UTILISATION OF FORCE MULTIPLIERS ED. MD. Perception Management and Public Information. must be launched by security forces. TRACKER AND GD DOGS PSEUDO GANG IKHWANS AND OTHER SURRENDERED TERRORISTS GHATAKS Media Strategy 96. should be used as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to shape public opinion and to counter false propaganda. The media must be taken along as a ‘weapon’ of the state and not of the terrorists. Public information techniques must be spruced up to counter false propaganda generated by agencies close to the militants.57 95. A well planned psychological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the civil populace. It should be the “positive content provider” of the achievements of . Youth in the impressionable age group of 12 to 18 years must be the target of all psychological campaigns. The media that has a great reach today.

58 the security forces and government apparatus in the state. India’s stand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council would get that much weak. Gains achieved due to India’s conventional superiority can be used as a bargaining tool to settle the J&K issue permanently. Exercise the military option and resolve the dispute militarily. (d) India would get branded as the perpetrator of instability in the region. . Attempt must be made to change the alignment of the LC. 98. Abrogate the IWT of 1960. Option 1. The implications of this option are the following:(a) (b) (c) The peace process would get derailed. in keeping with the Neelam Plan. Options Available for Resolving the Issue 97. US influence may not be readily available due to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror. Apply the “water-war card” and threaten drying up Sindh. This would invite severe international criticism. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and support the Shias in the Northern Areas. China would get sucked into the J&K issue. the media must project the true colour of militancy. Rather than highlighting human right aberrations by the security forces.

This would be disadvantageous to India.59 (e) High probability of the water-war leading to a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. but is not impossible. the aspirations of the people of Kashmir would get taken care of.India. The LC would continue to exist but could then be termed instead as the Line of Cooperation. but only so far as defence. Pakistan and the people of both Kashmirs. 100. Communication is being included so that both Kashmirs do not feel landlocked. would continue to control their parts of J&K. The Pros:(a) Granted autonomy. India and Pakistan. foreign policy and communications are concerned. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be acceptable to all three parties . (d) The LC would be made ‘soft’ to enable citizens of the two sides to travel freely without any passports or travel documents. (c) Both. This may seem utopian. 99. (f) It could lead to a situation where third party mediation may become necessary. Option 2. . and could be modeled on the following lines:(a) (b) Demilitarise on an incremental basis from both sides of the LC. exists.

(d) If the Taliban gets revived and stabilised in North Waziristan and Southern Afghanistan. especially cadres of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. it could turn its focus onto J&K. (d) A settlement of the J&K imbroglio would remove the threat of nuclear war from the sub continent. it would lead to stabilizing of the situation in the sub-continent. For Pakistan. There is a possibility that with a “soft” LC and the Kashmir Valley being Sunni dominant. making its candidature for a permanent in the UN Security Council stronger. there is no stopping this evil from engulfing the whole country in the years ahead. (b) India has been consistently maintaining its secular identity so far. by her borders being secure. which . (c) There is no guarantee that Musharraf would be able to rein in the militants. acceptance of the proposal would imply loss of real estate. (c) India would emerge as the benefactor. As a sizeable portion of the 140 million Muslims in India are Shias. 101.60 (b) If successful. This has been possible to a great extent. The Cons:(a) Considering that J&K was acceded to India. it would be a tremendous gain. sectarian violence could spill over from neighbouring POK.

(f) Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts already. a possible change in government could derail the entire process.61 with a soft LC could once again come into the grip of a secessionist movement. there is no surety of the plan being completed successfully. could put an end to this proposal. act as a wedge between Pakistan and the area illegally acceded to China. this could become a major constraint. Fissures within the Pakistani military and the ISI. in India the political environment being extremely dynamic. In present day coalition politics. Given the kind of suspicion that governs India-Pakistan relations. (j) Positions held by Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier region. It is therefore unlikely that Pakistan would agree to . (g) Even if democracy returns in Pakistan. Similarly. (h) Implementation of the proposal in one state of India. The Pakistani military establishment has never wanted anything short of liberation of Kashmir. (e) The proposal would have to be implemented over a period of time. His presence to see the plan fructify is therefore questionable. would trigger off similar claims from states in the grip of secessionist movements. the military would always have a role in all policy decisions.

Contain Pakistan and through a “wait and watch” strategy. sideline it. (b) The above message is conveyed from a position of dominance. alternately. a synergised counter insurgency plan in J&K in order to contain militancy. The implications of this option are the following:(a) Sends a strong message to Pakistan. giving a clear message at the same time. not to meddle in Indian affairs. Pursue relentlessly. Apply the Indus water strategy discreetly. Option 3. Attempt reining in of the APHC. Encourage maximum people to people contact across the LC through Tracks II and III diplomacies. 102. Stoke the problem in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. Support the move for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Continue covert support to the Karzai regime. that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled as a pre-requisite. (c) The India-Pakistan hyphen does not get restored.62 authentication of these actual held positions on ground and map. Continue dialogue and CBMs with Pakistan. . Give top priority to mainstreaming the local populace. see how its internal security situation develops. Demilitarization by India would thus not be possible. as is warranted of a regional power. 103. Follow the present line and maintain status quo.

are better. in the future. mainstreaming and face-lifting efforts undertaken by the J&K government. Though it could lead to instability in the region. (h) The option increases the chances of Pakistan imploding as a consequence of mis-management of its internal security situation. the issue of J&K would become a back-burner. (e) Military eliticism and invincibility of the Pakistan Army would get threatened. if any. (h) Finally.63 (d) The problem of J&K can be tackled on terms favourable to India and would not result in a compromise on territorial integrity. The problem of the Northern Areas would get adequately highlighted in international forums This would become an issue for India to counter Pakistani claims to J&K. . (f) (g) Chances of reining in the APHC. to fructify. not to take the government lightly on these issues. for strategizing a solution to the J&K problem. (g) It enables consideration of the global scenario post US elections of 2008. it would be a lesson for other states in India facing secessionist movements. (j) It would give time for the economic drive. The Will of the people will begin to prevail paving the way for a return to democracy.

64 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the

instability it would cause in the region. The US war on terror, would also not permit this. In cases of extreme provocation, however, it would be necessary to resort to a certain amount of “arm twisting” of Pakistan, for which this option should not be ruled out. Option 2, though ideally suited to solve the problem permanently, is plagued with a number of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. It also implies loss of real estate by India and giving away the Kashmir valley on a platter, as it being Muslim (Sunni) dominated, would automatically identify itself more with Pakistan and tilt towards it in the years to come. 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan concerning the Taliban, being very unstable, the time for Option 2 is not correct. This option would in any case, take at least five years if not more, to stabilize, by when the geo-political situation in Asia could change as has been discussed already. It would therefore be worth the while to “wait and watch” and hence the strategy proposed in Option 3, is recommended.

CONCLUSION

106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that India needs to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. It is difficult to see any

65 light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation’s solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.

(11,905 Words)

66 SITUATION IN J&K

VISIBLE GRNDSWELL FOR PEACE
100 80 60
45

VIOLENT INCIDENTS
(15 AUG 05) 2003
215

POLLING PERCENTAGE : ELECTIONS
84 81

40 20 0

44 37 35 22

45 34
20 13 36

44

39

1999 – LOK SABHA 2004 – LOK SABHA 2005 - MUNICIPAL

250 200

2002

20
14

16

2005 2004
105 109 93 90 60 131 131 89 66 76 61 67 96 112 103 95 77 127 108 99 96 82 72 68 69 75 64 54 140 118 86

JAM M U

UDHAM PUR

BARAM UL L A

SRINAGA R

ANANT NA G

L EH

TOURISTS IN J&K
400000 350000
350000

PILGRIMS TO AMARNATH
376729 388115
400000 382157 375293

150 100 50
99 70 67 53 61 49 41 36 FEB 69 72 52

300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 111912 72591 27356 191164

300000 250000 200000 149920 150000 100000 50000 0 114366 119037 110793 173334 153314

39 APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

66% OF PREVIOUS YR

0
JAN
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

MAR

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2002

2003

2004

2005

COMPARISON OF ATTRITION ON TERRORISTS BY ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)

TERRORIST INITIATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS
HIGH RISK
2002 (194) (66) (64) (18)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

169

1397

10 11 10
SNEAK ATTACKS

5

15

8

9

1

47 45

12

2003 2004 2005

AMBUSHES

ENCOUNTERS

885 597

2003 2004 2005
1 8 71 4 8 1 8 2 1 6 6 1 3 7 8 5

LOW RISK

5 3 5

4 8 3 4 8 8

2 4 0

2 2 9 1 5 7 1 0 3 6 3 5 3

2 4 8

2002 2003
5

(1088) (900) (1067) (454)

89

70

35
G R E N AT T A C K S IE D AT T A C K S S T R A Y F IR IN G S E L E C T IV E K I L L IN G S (C IV ) C AR

2004 2005

B O M B S

ARMY

CPOs/PMF

TERRORISTS ARE ON THE BACKFOOT

TERRORIST INITIATED

COMPARISON OF ATTRITION RATIOS OF ARMY & CPOs/PMF
(15 AUG 05)

PRESERVATION OF OWN COMB POTENTIAL
OWN CAS 2001-05
1200 1000 800
2003 2004 2005
956 642 639 336

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 OVERALL ARMY CPOs/PMF
0.7 0.5 0.7 4.5 3.1 4.8 6.7 5.4 7

2856
430 189

600 400 200 0

1013
222 207 163 85

FATAL 2001 2002 2003

NON FATAL 2004 2005

.

Ethnicity. 15. Maya. No 34. 1997. Mitra. Mishra. Manish. Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia. Sinha. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. Shashi B. New Delhi. Omprakash. 14. Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region. 3. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. K. Alok. 2003. Subrata. Vol 29. S K. New Delhi. July 2005. Santhanan. 4. Issue 7. 9. 2003. Ajai Sahni. New Delhi. Guardian 22 Jan 02. Times of India 23 Jun 06. Amir Mir.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Vol 3. Sudhir Saxena. 1998. Indian Express 25 Apr 06. 5. 07 March 2005. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. . 2. Sahai. New Delhi. Sreedhar. 2001. Strategic Insights Volume IV. 11. No 2. K P S. 6. New Delhi. April-June 2005. Terror and Containment. Bansal. 13. “The Jehad Lives On”. Sucheta Ghosh. Present and Future. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. Chadda. “Path to Kashmir will be Ardous. 10. Taylor. but Uneasy Truce will Hold”. Matt. Dietmar Rothermund. 1998. 8. Daily Excelsior 09 Jan 06. South Asia Intelligence Review. The Tribune 13 Feb 06. Strategic Analysis. New Delhi.” USI Journal April-June 2005. 7. Security and Separation in India. 12. Gill.

rediff. Dr Dipak Basu.com. “Options”. Times of India New Delhi 21 Apr 06. 24.satp. Terrorism Update.com.strategicforesight.com. 2006. 13 January. 18. www. Karachi.rediff. “The Neelam Plan”. www. 26. October 1999. New Delhi. 17.” 22. 19 July. 20.16. in. www. 27. in. 21. The Tribune.tripod. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. The Hindu. 22 May 2005 19.india_resource. “J&K: Self Determination. 2005. 2006. 27 Feb 06.com. 25. Bose66@hotmail. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir”.com. The Hindu 14 Jan 06. Dr Maharaj Kaul. Arindam Banerji. . 01 August. 23. Ramananda Sengupta. The Dawn. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession”. The Pioneer.org.

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