INTRODUCTION General 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between

India and Pakistan to the present situation. In doing so, the research would dwell on the following:(a) Why the Problem persists and reasons for the stance taken by

both countries. (b) (c) (d) (e) 2. Review of Geo-political situation. The Proxy War by Pakistan and the existing ground realities. Initiatives taken to resolve the dispute. The Recommended Strategy.

Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,

when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. The first war between the two countries was fought within months of their independence, while their armed forces were still under the command of British officers. Kashmir was divided, and remains divided, between the two countries.

(ii) There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution, but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Hypothesis 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals

discussed, long outstanding issue of J&K remains unresolved. What is at the root of this problem and how best can it be tackled.



The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding

paragraphs. 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on

the background of the problem, the stand of India and Pakistan on the issue and the reasons that have led to the creation of the policy and strategy of Pakistan towards Kashmir and India’s response to it. It will also examine other reasons that have been responsible for aggravating the problem, preventing it from being permanently resolved. 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts

whether it is border problem, trade or diplomacy. Things aggravated after the nuclear tests. It was expected that there would be a substantial outcome

(iii) of the Agra Summit, but nothing much came out of it either. The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain weak, and the last fifty five years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic intentions. 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for

India and Pakistan. This part will include the implications of 9/11, Op Enduring Freedom, attack on the Indian Parliament and likely Pakistani reaction and policy for the future. It will also cover the implications of the US presence in the region, for India and Pakistan. 8. The events of 9/11 and December 2001, have made the world realize

the true extent of terrorism. Besides this, the end of the Cold War and the emerging world order, have had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of international relations, creating new equations that have effected the geopolitics in the region. 9. Part III – Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and the Existing Ground

Realities. This part will include the aims of proxy war, its reasons as against a conventional war, the strategy employed, and its political, diplomatic, economic, military and psychological effects. The manner in which the

Indians call this policy Pakistan's "proxy war against India. and logistical support to Kashmiri militants in an apparent effort to coerce India into an agreement on Kashmir as per Pakistan's terms. the Andorra Model. Firstly. Through this two-part strategy Pakistan has partially succeeded in forcing India to commit a large chunk of its military to combating the ongoing insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. 10. covert military. Pakistan's Kashmir policy has been based on two elements. it is intended to trace the reasons for the “change of heart” of President Musharraf in viewing the Kashmir problem. and the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan. and the actual ground realities would also be covered. In this part. Thereafter. Since 1990. the manner in which. .(iv) Indian security forces are reacting to the situation in J & K. 11 Part IV – Peace Initiatives. the Neelam Plan. overt political and moral support to the Kashmiri population which Pakistan calls a struggle for self-determination against the "Indian yoke". economic. This part would also include involvement of the world forum to include USA and China." in which Pakistan-based militant organizations are doing Islamabad's bidding in Kashmir and also in other parts of India. both India and Pakistan have gone about it would be discussed to include the Chenab Plan. and secondly.

discussing various possible solutions to the Kashmir problem. The issue is being discussed everywhere and by all who care about these things. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which . Musharraf's 21 October 2004 plea to the Pakistanis to think out of the box has largely succeeded. Part V : The Recommended Strategy. 15. 57 years of intense propaganda at home and abroad has made it almost a reflex reaction of most Pakistanis . with no likelihood of its revival.a UN supervised plebiscite that would give only two options to the Kashmiris. there is hope that an uneasy truce will remain in place. Ever since 21 October 2004. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. there used to be just one line that emanated from the government. given the geopolitical situation. Apart from a politico-diplomatic settlement of the problem. Pakistan and the Kashmiris. It can be said that it was Musharraf who killed Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir. This is now a thing of the past. other than the UN resolutions. On Kashmir. This part will include a wrap up of all recommendations. to join India or Pakistan.(v) 13. 14. Although a rapid resolution of the Kashmir dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. is now occupying attention. no other solution is likely to have a lasting effect. that should be palatable to India.

investment. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. For Pakistan. What it means is ending the mindless hostility of the past and entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. This means opening up in the matter of trade. tourism. Positive acknowledgment by the Indian government of the actions taken by Pakistan. travel. As far as Kashmir is concerned. one way is to engage Islamabad in India's fight against terrorism. combined with an institutionalized mechanism to verify each other's claims.(vi) there is no permanent cure. Indian leaders have damaged their own credibility by attributing almost every incident of violence in India . learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. CONCLUSION 16. transit. it means lowering the level of violence in the state and taking a series of reciprocal measures that give relief to the locals caught in the crossfire. If India wants an end to terrorism coming from Pakistan. will likely help more moderate elements in Pakistan's government win domestic support for reconciliation with India. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered.

(vii) to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. . cynically employing the Pakistan bogey to cover lapses of the Indian security apparatus.



JAMMU AND KASHMIR IS THE CROWN BENEATH WHICH LIES ALL THAT THE INDIAN NATION – ONE OF THE WORLD’S MOST ENDURING CIVILISATIONS – STANDS FOR : THE VALUES OF SECULARISM. but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. India and Pakistan. Nothing divides India and Pakistan as Kashmir does. 2. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY. INTRODUCTION General 1. when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. and nobody has suffered more in the process than the people of Kashmir. it appears that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is now firmly set on the road to . IT EXEMPLIFIES INDIA’S UNIQUE UNITY IN DIVERSITY. There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution. Kashmir's fate is still locked into the story of India's partition in 1947. Given the latest peace initiatives by both.

Review of the Geo-political Situation. threaten to disorder and derail the peace process. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the various options open and recommend a strategy to resolve the J & K dispute.2 normalcy .though this may remain elusive for a while as spoilers. Aim 3. Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and Ground Realities. Preview 4. Peace Initiatives. By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. . internal and external. Recommendations. and vested interests. The dissertation has been covered in the following parts:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Why the problem of J&K persists.

the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south. A border called the Line of Control (LC). while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. The eastern area of Kashmir comprising the northeastern part of the . and by Afghanistan in the northwest. divides the two parts. agreed to in 1972. a 222. is surrounded by China in the northeast.3 CHAPTER I : WHY THE PROBLEM OF J&K PERSISTS J & K : LOCATION OF KASHMIR VALLEY PAMIR KNOT 350 KMS KASHMIR VALLEY : AN ARTIST’S IMPRESSION GREAT HIMALAYAN RANGE SHAMSHABARI RG SHAMSHABARI RANGE KARAKORAM INDUS ZOJILA BARAMULA GREAT HIMALAYAN KASHMIR VALLEY URI SRINAGAR POONCH LADAKH ANANTNAG PIR PANJAL RANGE JHELUM CHENAB ZANSKAR PIR PANJAL LC UDHAMPUR Geography 5. by Pakistan in the west. The region has been dubbed "disputed territory" between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. Kashmir. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of J&K.236 square kilometres region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent.

However. Genesis 6.4 region (Aksai Chin). Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and the Pakistan-controlled parts. In the case of the latter. therefore found ready acceptance internationally. Present and Future.” USI Journal. The British supported this view using the legalistic argument that their relationship with the princely states was based on the treaties with them. their rulers could decide which country to accede to. this applied to the provinces only and not to the princely states1. Whereas the Congress wanted this done in a democratic manner on the basis of the wishes of the people. after the lapse of paramountcy. came under the control of China since 1962. the 1 S K Sinha. though partition of the country was effected on the basis of religion. Jinnah and the Muslim League favoured the decision being taken solely by the ruler of each state. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. particularly during the Cold War period. p 182-199. The origin and genesis of the J & K imbroglio is related to the partition of the country on the basis of religion. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. On this logic. The Pakistani projection that J & K being a Muslim country. . April-June 2005.

it was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. J&K should have rightly gone to Pakistan 7. could not decide for sometime. Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K. However. and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege. politically and militarily. It was only on 26 October 1947 that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession merging the state with India. This demolishes the belief that being a Muslim dominated state.5 rulers should be free to decide the future of their states. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System. the ruler had fled to Jammu and was therefore not in control of the happenings in the valley. the atrocities committed by the tribesmen alienated the Kashmiri people making Pakistan lose out on both accounts. Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. launched a tribal invasion of J&K on 22 October 1947. Jinnah being impatient. However. Thereafter. this created a mess for Pakistan. and so entered into a “Standstill agreement” with Pakistan. Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses. 8. On the other. the imbalance in institutional strength. the dispute has dual purposes. Furthermore. Since it has both ideological and . Pakistan is of the view that the day the Instrument of Accession was signed. On one hand. have led it to see Kashmir in uncompromising terms. it served to unite an otherwise fractured polity.

including territories presently under Pakistani and Chinese control. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all regional and world forums. which unfortunately has been feebly articulated and has few takers.the state of J&K is an integral part of the Indian Union. has therefore been to evict Pakistan from its illegal occupation of territory. Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir has become rigid and unyielding. Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future shape of a possible solution. Where Pakistani diplomacy has succeeded. to the territorial status quo. in keeping with the provisions of partition. from support for incorporating into India all of J&K. India’s bottom line on Kashmir has remained unchanged over the decades . the Indian attitude has been that of indifference till the situation went out of control. Maharaja Hari Singh. The unfinished agenda of partition according to India. India has always been driven by polite diplomacy. In brief. and has not been able to respond in the correct manner. 10. neither of which is easily compromised. to the increasingly apparent shift in official policy . 9. 11. India’s response has been reactive and very limited. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. India insists that the UN resolutions were redundant as the State had been acceded to it by the then ruler. and any settlement of the crisis must be effected within the confines of the Indian constitution.6 nationalist implications.

and the State was split into Indian Kashmir and POK. J&K being a Muslim dominated state should have gone to Pakistan. 12. Sensationalisation of terrorist acts by the Indian media. 13. A few months into the war that started after partition. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. . The cease-fire line or the LC was to be a temporary boundary till the matter was resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Any movement forward on Kashmir is also made more difficult by the lack of a national consensus in India on how the conflict within Kashmir and with Pakistan should be addressed. India brought the matter to the notice of UN Security Council. The cease-fire was effected by the end of 1948. acts as a further hurdle to arriving at a general consensus.7 for recognition of the LC as the international border. However. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. after 1957. the UN could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the Soviet Union began using its right of veto against any of these. The resolution of April 1948 demanded from India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities. From April 1948 to 1957. the UN passed a series of resolutions. India remains publicly opposed to any international involvement in the dispute. There is no denying the fact that these were influenced by the West’s perception that partition being on the basis of religion.

The large-scale changes in the diplomatic. Pahari. Furthermore. social. . 52 percent population. The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti. J&K is not a state where only Kashmiri Muslims live. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir after it would be vacated by Pakistan. political. this was never to be as Pakistan did not vacate the area and as a result. It is a multiethnic. i. and 3 percent Buddhists. Contrary to most reports in the media.Ladakh (with 58 percent of the area. Sikhs. Jammu (26 percent area. 15. 45 percent population). and Kashmir (16 percent area. There are three distinct geographical regions . of Jammu: Dogri. multi-religious state with 64 percent Muslims. 3 percent of the state's total population have been driven out). military situation over the years have rendered the UN resolution on Kashmir of 1948 obsolete. Punjabi. However. and of Kashmir: Kashmiri.e. with India being allowed to retain some force to maintain law and order. of which over 90 % of the region's minorities. Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state. In addition. and 3 percent of the population). the referendum could not happen. Demographic Characteristics.8 14. 33 percent Hindus. Gujari. Christians and others.

and by and large stand behind J&K's association with India except for a few in Doda district. (or about 1. J&K: Self Determination. approximately 13 percent are Shia Muslims. and has the ability to cripple the normal functioning of the 2 www. Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. . Of the state's 49 percent who reside in the Kashmir province.9 16. 17.com. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession. October 1999. Shia Muslims do not wish to have anything to do with Sunni-dominated Pakistan. This segment of the population dominates the politics of the state. Dr Maharaj Kaul. They are strong supporters of association with India and have demonstrated this by organizing Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) to assist the security forces in surveillance of terrorist activity2.india_resource. They are non-Kashmiris.tripod. knowing fully well the fate that awaits them there. The reason that many believe separatism to be a widespread sentiment in J&K is because this dominant section has succeeded in completely drowning out all other voices in the state. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non- pastoral Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley who constitute 22 percent of the state's population. 14 percent of the people in Kashmir province are the pastoral nomadic Gujar and Bakarwal people.9 million people).

0 1 . either by inaction or insufficient action against Pakistani infiltration and terror or.1. worst still.0 0 0 3 0 .90.1 5 .5 0 .72. ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND JAMMU KASHMIR LADAKH JAMMU KASHMIR 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .7 5 0 6 .1.2 8 .929 LADAKH 6. by sabotage.649 BUDDHISTS .96.14.0 0 0 OVER ALL% 7 6 . P A K IS T A N I PUNJABI SETTLERS HAVE OUTNUM BERED THE SO NS O F T H E S O IL .33.MUSLIMS .11. The plea of Pakistan that as J&K is a Muslim dominated state.90.7 5 0 1 .5 9 PUNJABI K A S H M IR I DARDS C H IT R A L I BALTI TOTAL .943 46.435 27.184 336 1.14.MUSLIMS .917 ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN POST ONSET OF TERRORISM TOTAL POPULATION .940* 51.1 1 .5 9 3 2 .184 336 1. there would be no justification for the presence of another 110 million .5 1 . it implies acceptance of the ‘Two-Nation’ that Muslims and Hindus must live separately.435 27.0 8 . DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN PRE MILITANCY TOTAL POPULATION .07.278 51.83.236 1.29.313 SIKHS . it should be given to it.69.2 .3 5 .95.917 REDUCTION DUE TO MIGRATION OF APPROX 3 LACS KASHMIRI PANDITS.5 0 0 .0 0 0 (1 9 4 7 ) .07.10 society in Kashmir province.0 0 0 3 . If the UN too accepts this.72.2 5 .5 0 0 8 7 . In that case.406 3 * LADAKH 50 97 KASHMIR 2.00.0 0 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 L A C S A N D 5 0 T H O U S A N D NORTHERN AREAS P A K O C C U P IE D K A S H M IR 10% 90% POK 14 % 1 7% 14 % 5% 50% NORTHERN AREAS 8 7 .940* 5.11.5 0 0 .649 BUDDHISTS .969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD D E M O G R A P H IC P A T T E R N (P O K ) A S P E R A V A IL A B L E D A T A T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N IN P O K .943 LADAKH 6.83.236 1.313 SIKHS .406 10 * 50 90 KASHMIR 2.940* 62.969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .5 0 .0 0 0 18. implies the theory that Muslims cannot stay with the people of other religion.3 4 .95.8 3 .69.1.

The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid1980s. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. In fact. 19. Croatia-Serbia. even after their homeland was created. are recent examples where full-scale exchanges were organized along with partition. but have instead been allowed to stay on only because India being secular does not accept the ‘Two-Nation’ theory. Ideally the UN Security Council should have overseen this and ensured that the issue was resolved permanently. never took place. Germany-Czechoslovakia. that is. while Pakistan and Bangladesh have driven out most of their non-Muslim population. the exchange of population. The cases of Greece-Turkey.11 Muslims presently in India. there were always exchanges of population. The CFL ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and northeast . Bulgaria-Turkey. 20. it is unnecessary to partition a country if the population is not to be exchanged. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was natural after partition of a country. Muslims are still in India. BosniaSerbia. The Siachen Dispute. Poland-Germany. who according to the principle of partition in 1947. should have been sent to Pakistan. Presently. In other cases of partition elsewhere in the world.

located Siachen in the Northern Areas3. The last two 3 Indian Express. 25 April. 2006. Third. the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. . and then north to the glaciers. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842. There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. submitted to the UN. 21. Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of PoK. that the CFL extends to the terminal point. Both sides agreed. the Owen Dixon report 1950. and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. not India. The Pakistani view is based on several factors. in vague language that is the root of the Siachen dispute.12 until map grid-point NJ 9842. First. 22. NJ 9842. The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. Second. the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan. located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps. This is what led India to Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge.

The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan after the 1965 War. persists. After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. The problem therefore. Indian Prime Minister Shastri died of a sudden heart attack. Peace had been achieved by the intervention of the great powers who pushed the two nations to a cease fire for fears the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any . The Soviets.and were disappointed at the return to the status quo. and the Simla Agreement 1972. The Tashkent Agreement. In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses . the LC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. 24. 23. The day after the declaration. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the USSR (now in Uzbekistan) beginning on 04 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972. when it was agreed that the LC would not be unilaterally altered. represented by Premier Kosygin moderated between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan.13 reasons are the Karachi Agreement 1949.

The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations. This was not merely a change of nomenclature but a consequence of an agreement. was signed between India and Pakistan on 02 July 1972 following the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The treaty was signed in Simla. the President of Pakistan. The 1972 Simla Summit. The Simla Treaty. though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating to the point of armed conflict. It also conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. The treaty has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. 25. by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. popularly known as the Simla Pact or the Simla Agreement. It is significant that the Cease-Fire Line was changed to the LC during this summit.14 renunciation of then guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. . seeking to adhere to the status quo by all means. and Indira Gandhi. The agreement was therefore nullified. the Prime Minister of India.

and Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan. MARKED ON MAPS AND RATIFIED. J&K is a source of Pakistan's water and food security.NEITHER SIDE SHALL SEEK TO ALTER IT UNILATERALLY…. “Issues of Kashmir and Indus are intertwined”. 4 www. the then Indian Prime Minister. Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J&K. 27.strategicforesight.com. and a lot more to do with water. “ ….. Options. It is a real estate dispute for strategic reasons. London. . revealed General Pervez Musharraf in his dissertation while attending the prestigoius course at the Royal College of Defence Studies.15 SIMLA AGREEMENT 02 JUL 1972 • RETENTION OF TERRITORIES. 1971 SHALL BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES ….IN J & K. THE LINE OF CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF DEC 17. on 19 September 1960. Thus.BOTH SIDES FURTHER UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS LINE…. the then President of Pakistan.” 26. • LC DELINEATED.4 It is asserted that the main reason behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause. • DID NOT DELINEATE BEYOND NJ 9842. • IMPLIED THAT LC IS INVIOLABLE. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters.

rediff. 5 in. Jhelum and the Chenab). when India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing into Pakistan.com. The treaty also does not allow either country to opt out unilaterally.16 The Treaty however. In fact. the Geneva Conventions and the Indus Water Treaty make such an action illegal today. the waters of the Eastern Rivers stand allocated to India and those of the Western largely to Pakistan.” . the Ravi. for a month. The Indus River rises from Mansarovar in Tibet and its principal tributaries are the Sutlej. Under the Treaty. the Beas. Beas and the Ravi) and three Western Rivers (Indus. is effective from 01 April 19605. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. the Chenab and Jhelum. The treaty has survived all the wars since then. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej. it explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. Ramananda Sengupta. Unlike April 1948. even though the fact remains that India controls the headwaters.

17 28. is presently the focus of intense diplomacy between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s mounting water insecurity. . because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. virtually ensures a still deeper and volatile nexus between water and Kashmir in coming years. making resolution of security issues even more difficult. Today India and Pakistan are both faced with rapidly escalating problems of acute river resource scarcity. Obviously not enough. Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical control over the concerned headwaters to ease fears about India's potential ability to turn a huge chunk of its land into desert. creating a more favorable environment for interstate conflict. Increased tensions over water will exacerbate or intensify overall tensions. The Baglihar dam project located on the Chenab River in Doda district in the Jammu division. This is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border.

and to make the case that it has a right to pursue extremists operating from Pakistan exactly as the US and its allies have hunted down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Indian position and her viewpoint on terrorism was much better understood now. and more importantly. . India has attempted to portray the challenge in Kashmir as purely a matter of combating terrorism. for its part.18 CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 11 September 2001 29. has sought to use its broad cooperation with the US on operations in Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September “war on terrorism” to their advantage. to gain some leeway for maintaining the general policy of adventurism that seeks to bleed Indian resources in Kashmir. and Pakistan’s shady support to the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorists was exposed to the world. Pakistan. 30. acknowledged by the USA.

US Presence in Pakistan 33. USA will apply pressure on Musharraf to live up to his promise of not supporting terrorism. India’s tough stance and diplomatic offensive put Pakistan under pressure and on the back foot with regard to her Kashmir policy. in total contradiction of its long-term support to the Taliban. Pakistan was forced to crack down on radical Islamic groups in the country. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror. As a result. It also led to the closure of militant training camps in Pakistan.19 Operation Enduring Freedom 31. Attack on the Indian Parliament : 13 December 2001 32. though the ones in POK were still operative. This operation was another major development in the region that helped India greatly in its endeavour to counter the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan across the LC. causing rifts in its society. has had a significant effect on the politics of the region. which is . Pakistan was forced to give support to the USA. international pressure was applied on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators. The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were now willing to include India in its war against terror. This was acknowledged as being invaluable for the success of the operation.

the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). as Pakistan-US relationship develops. No 34. Though most of the groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy. However.20 what India wants. resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before. the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. it could fructify resulting in tangible inflow of military hardware and economic assistance. The jehadi groups were banned in two phases. Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). However. Amir Mir. Presently there are 59 6 South Asia Intelligence Review. Vol 3. a cursory glance over the activities of four banned militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business. Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan. on 12 January 2002. and 15 November 20036. though under different names such as Jamaat ud Daawa for the LeT. “The Jehad Lives On”. 07 March 2005. . after the initial crackdown. Cross Border Terrorism in India 34. operating freely and advocating jehad. This would keep Musharraf under pressure locally as it is resented by fundamentalists. with changed names and identities. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).

designed to create mayhem throughout India. No longer confined to J&K. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over India. the latest one being the Mumbai blasts of 11 July 2006. the idea being to give the movement a local colour. economic infrastructure and ethno. with 27 being in Pakistan.21 training camps still operational. 2006. Since April 2006. The “jehadi flavour” is missing and targets being selected are state objectives. suggesting very clearly. . 35. suggests a different hue and change of strategy in the proxy war in India. Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the entry of the latter in Baluchistan. Internal Situation in Pakistan and its Implications on Regional Politics 36. terrorist activity in J&K has regained impetus. While China is constructing the Gwadar port to ensure its energy requirements for the future do not disrupted by the US. 01 August. the involvement of the Pakistani government. and four in Gilgit-Baltistan7. it is bound to interfere with the latter’s hegemonic intentions in South and West Asia. with the focus now on targeting tourists and civilians.religious sentiments. 28 in POK. This confrontation that could convert into a new Baluch 7 The Pioneer. Terrorist modules have surfaced within India with mentors still across the border. are now targets of terrorism.

and so provides Pakistan with crucial strategic depth vis-a-vis India along its coastline. Chinese vice premier. For China. laid the foundation for Gwadar port. is to Indian pressure. Gwadar is situated 725 kilometres to the west of Karachi. 38. nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. the value of Gwadar's distance from India becomes evident if one considers how vulnerable Karachi port. The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan.22 insurgency. will influence the geo-politics of the region. Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. which handled 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade. Wu Bangguo. In March 2002. About 60 percent of China's energy supplies come from . For Pakistan. along with the Taliban problem in Waziristan. Construction of Gwadar Port by China 37. and could indirectly effect the J&K issue as well. at China's doorstep. which makes it 725 kilometres further away from India than Karachi.

The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls". According to its "string of pearls" strategy. in the process stimulating the economic development of China's backward Xinjiang region. Thailand. The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh. Cambodia and the South China Sea. China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea. in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests. which has a very high presence in the region. 39. Myanmar. could choke off these supplies to China in case of a conflict with Taiwan. would provide Beijingan opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources. .23 the Middle East. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access. and China has been anxious that the US.

Vol 29. The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from the Gwadar project would depend on the challenges to it from within their borders. The Waziristan Problem 41. The Pakistani army has led many incursions into the region. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province) is a cause for great concern for the US and her allies in the War on Terror.24 The Baluch Uprising 40. Nawab Bugti. Insurgency revived again in 20048. 8 . “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. The tribal area of North Waziristan has seen an increase in clashes between Pakistani forces and pro Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Alok. The government's Bansal. The Gwadar project is bitterly opposed by Baluch nationalists who see it as yet another example of Pakistan's Punjabidominated ruling elite siphoning away Baluchi wealth and resources without this backward region or its people gaining. and to gain self-determination. April-June 2005. with the latest in being the killing of Baluch leader. Baluchis are desperate to be recognised as autonomous people. Strategic Analysis. No 2.

The Amir of the Taliban.25 writ has been forcefully replaced by that of Taliban. the infrastructure has remained undecimated so that Pakistan could use them to protect its strategic interests. The Taliban is intact under the protection of the ISI. Impact on US Interests 42. Think tanks in Pakistan are of the view that as China’s power in the region will multiply with the completion of the Gwadar project. the fundamental coalition of the NWFP. 42. and the ISI. it would result in a deadly convergence of interests in a . the latest being a peace deal between it and Musharraf. The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as "creating a climate of uncertainty" and threatening "the safety of all ships on the high seas". This increasing influence of the Taliban could result in its revival and would worsen the situation in Afghanistan and J&K as well. which has enforced its rabidly conservative code as had been the vogue in Afghanistan when Taliban ruled that country. The Taliban is being funded by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and many of his senior colleagues and jihadi cadres have been given sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. Taliban’s organizational capabilities.

only time will tell. miles to the Chinese through an agreement on 02 March 1963. As to how Pakistan handles this.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72. the internal security situation in Pakistan will implode if a CIA and possible Indian backed impetus is given to the Baluch uprising. A chief executive. They are ruled directly from Islamabad through a Northern Areas Council which is headed by Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmir Affairs. With Waziristan already under the grip of the Taliban. .26 delicate geo-political area. This mountain outback has been split into five districts. Ghizer and Ghanche. Skardu. appointed by Islamabad. 13 January. is the local administrative head. in order to facilitate China 9 The Dawn.700 sq. in order to keep Pakistan engaged and in constant fear. Karachi. A population of 1. viz. Diamir. The Northern Areas have no status.495 square kilometers. They are neither a province of Pakistan nor a part of "Azad Kashmir". The Northern Areas 43. 2005. The reason why the Northern Areas have been kept by Pakistan is because of its unilateral ceding of 2. Therefore. Gilgit. normally a retired Pakistani army officer. whereby the Kashmir issue would then become a back burner. there is a possibility that the US could attempt to disturb the peace in Baluchistan by putting a damper on growing Chinese presence there9.

Over the years. and being in a volatile state. successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories". Large numbers of Sunnis have been brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit. is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. reducing the indigenous people to a minority. 44. The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties. Unlike the rest of Pakistan. 73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army. the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. Since 1988. radically altering the demographic profile of the area. especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972. is vulnerable for conversion to a separatist movement. The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region. the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. Kargil in 1999 added to the discontent in the region. .27 to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. The situation in the Northern Areas is therefore very delicate.


assembly. which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993. Ground Realities 46. 48. All these conditions were catalytic in starting the proxy war by Pakistan.29 surplus of military wherewithal for Pakistan to pursue the aim of seeking revenge for its defeat of 1971. under the threat of elimination by the ISI. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever since ceasefire was declared on 26 November 2003. 47. as before. It was also imperative that the ‘jehadis’ initially ‘bred’ for Afghanistan. and municipal elections being held peacefully. it is apparent that nothing fruitful will materialize as APHC members continue to remain. Political Situation. with parliamentary. With the completion in construction of the 750- kilometre LC fence. The stance adopted by the APHC will therefore. (a) LC Fence. The APHC. polling in the municipal elections was 87 percent. Even though Mr Manmohan Singh is talking with them. always be in consonance with Pakistan’s demands. that commenced in 2003 and was completed by . be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. does not represent the entire state of J&K. Internal Security Situation in J&K. Even in the trouble torn district of Kupwara.

by the state government and the security forces in the form of Operation Sadhbhavana. (c) Role of the State Police. Being entrusted with new responsibilities that involve faith and trust. 49. (b) Coordination between Government Agencies and Local Though the menace of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) Populace. in 2004. the local people have become more confident and are forthcoming as far as cooperation with government intelligence agencies and security forces are concerned. 976 were eliminated. while 516 militants are known to have infiltrated. ever since the ceasefire has come into effect. there ahs been a profound effect on the levels of cross border infiltration into the state. The number of schools and colleges that . the force is now fully motivated and geared to take on their tasks effectively. In the face of unabated counter terrorism operations by India. in 2005. A revamped and motivated police organisation now exists in the state. Similarly.30 October 2004. while 231 militants infiltrated. For instance. militant cadres have become easy prey. Development Activities. 917 were eliminated in the state. and with a drop in sustenance from across the border. A number of development activities have been undertaken both. The LC fence has helped reverse the earlier losses. still exists.

Earlier Kashmiri traders were not known to leave the state for selling their wares. The line within the valley is almost complete and this portion is expected to get operational by 2007. The railway link with the mainland is bound to have a profound effect on the psyche of the locals. economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam. Similarly. the Rupees 1500 crore Asian Development Bank project over three years. 50. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. militancy forced them to move out to other parts of India. 51. Mainstreaming the Local Populace. have all given a face lift to the state. to mention only a few. been instrumental in assisting India in mainstreaming the local population of J&K with the mainland. removing the fear of being alienated from the rest of the country. and thereon to Udhampur only 56 kilometres away. completion of the Old Mughal Road by 2009. While it took 25 years to link Pathankot to Jammu in 1972.31 have been opened in the last four years has been more than the total from 1947 to 2002. Similarly. due to the shutting down of . Militancy has in a way. and four laning of the JammuSrinagar National Highway. However. the proposed link from Udhampur to Qazikund in the Valley. A new beginning in linking the state to the mainland is the planned Jammu-Srinagar railway link. is expected to be complete by 2010. another 21 years. for education.

32 schools and colleges. As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of locals. INDICATORS OF NORMALCY SANCTITY OF CEASE FIRE MAINTAINED. parents were forced to educate children in other cities of India. . SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL LOK SABHA ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF NATIONAL WINTER GAMES. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THE RISE. a number of educational and general awareness tours for school and college students have been conducted. LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS BEING RESCUED FROM TERRORISTS. APHC TALKS WITH THE CENTRE IN PROGRESS. CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES LAUNCHED. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A OPEN 24 HOURS. The interest shown by the local youth during recruitment rallies is proof of the fact that militancy is on the decline. 52.

July 2001. Lahore-Delhi bus service takes Vajpayee across the border with the first comprehensive peace package. Vajpayee invites Musharraf for Agra Summit. THIS IS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR BOTH INDIA AND PAK. are as follows:(a) February 1999. Peace Overtures 53. EVENTS OF SEP 9/11 AND GULF WAR II HAVE MANIFESTED IN A YEARNING FOR PEACE THE WORLD OVER. Agra ends in disaster as Musharraf tries to make Kashmir the core issue.33 CHAPTER IV – PEACE INITIATIVES MOMENT OF RECKONING BLED BY THE PROXY WAR (WAR OF A THOUSAND CUTS) LET LOOSE BY OUR ADVERSARY. Kargil incursions by Pakistan lead to total breakdown in diplomatic ties. (c) (d) May 2001. . THE NATION HAS RETAINED ITS BALANCE AS ALSO THE RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK SUCCESSFULLY. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have progressed. (b) July 1999.

(n) February 2006. Srinagar-Muzaraffarabad bus service inaugurated. First Round Table Conference called by PM Manmohan Singh. Proposes unilateral ceasefire on 23 November. Musharraf invites himself for cricket match to India. Peace process restarts. (k) April 2005. Musharraf asks India to demilitarise certain regions and asks for self governance in J & K. Musharraf says UN resolutions on Kashmir were redundant. (m) January 2006. signs joint statement. Spurt in terror attacks in India makes New York meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf a non starter. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf sign joint statement in New York. (j) October 2004. (l) September 2005. . Vajpayee again extends hand of friendship to Pakistan. (f) November 2003. Musharraf proposes dividing Kashmir along religious lines and distributing between India and Pakistan. India accepts ceasefire the next day. (h) September 2004. Composite dialogue restarted. Vajpayee goes to Islamabad.34 (e) May 2003. (g) January 2004. with the APHC is boycotted by the latter.

ONLY 88 OUT OF 191 SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION.35 (o) March 2006. Manmohan Singh proposes peace. Amritsar-Nankana bus service inaugurated. The Chenab Plan. security and friendship with Pakistan. a partition of J&K along the flow of this river that matches . Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai. (p) May 2006. ”THE FIVE DECADE OLD INSISTENCE ON HOLDING A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR IS NO LONGER A TERM OF REFERENCE CARVED IN STONE” PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF DECEMBER 2003 Initiatives by Pakistan under Musharraf 54. MOST OF THE OIC COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST THE MOTION. ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE RAISED BY PAK. IN A VOTE CALLED BY INDIA. IRRELEVANCE OF UN RESOLUTION IN NOV 2003. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as the Chenab Plan. Foreign Secretary level talks take place on the sidelines of SAARC scheduled for end July 2006. (q) 11 July 2006. Second Round Table Conference between Delhi and the APHC is boycotted by the latter.

Comments. accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32. Furthermore. 56. would be brought within Pakistan’s borders. 55. Doda and Rajouri in Jammu. Therefore. and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. Options. This would then warrant a major rearrangement of the irrigation network in Punjab. which clearly explains the reason for Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley. Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. . The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per cent of the water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan.strategicforesight. which includes the 10 www. under its jurisdiction. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population.com. with the inclusion of Ladakh which lies north of the Chenab River. which is boosted up by the Chenab-Jhelum combine. as well as the Muslim areas of Poonch. Compared to Punjab.36 its communal faultlines10. India. In turn. it would dry up Sindh. Sindh receives water only from the enhanced Indus River. which is already on the brink of a water crisis. if India loses the Kashmir Valley and in retaliation blocks the Chenab. would have to forgo all its claims to PoK.000 sq km of area. Losing Chenab to India would thus mean drastic reduction in water supplies to Sindh.

and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur. Demilitarisation and Self Governance. . Pulwama. This model suggests a semiindependent status for the Valley11. There would be no change in the present LC. Following the non- acceptance of partition of J&K on ethnic lines. excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan. Applied to the Kashmir Valley. Srinagar. Kupwara. Baramulla. Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. the defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. Doda. The Valley’s borders would be soft enough to allow movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it. The Andorra Model. Poonch. but the whole entity would become a demilitarised zone. 58. 22 January. Musharraf suggested demilitarization of selected areas in the Kashmir Valley as essential for 11 Guardian. Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to Pakistan Indus.37 districts of Anantnag. 57. Under a 1993 agreement. that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of J&K. 2002. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. Rajouri. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence. Budgam.

Baramulla and Kupwara. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that demilitarization is the only option to resolve the Kashmir problem. Demilitarisation. . His suggestion was to demilitarize Kashmir. Chairman APHC has also supported this view. followed by condominium or joint control. and that Pakistan would join India to ensure that no incidents of terrorism take place12. Times of India. they would be in full 12 13 14 The Tribune. 09 January. 13 February. 2006. Daily Excelsior. 2006. Comments. give self governance to its people with a joint management arrangement on top13. His proposal was for India to withdraw troops from the sensitive towns of Srinagar. stating that that selfgovernance and demilitarisation of Kashmir could be an interim arrangement under which the people of Kashmir could get a sense of 'being masters of their own destiny'. 2006. 59. 60. 23 June. as sticking to traditional positions was no solution and the idea of self-governance could provide the way out14. then self-governance. means handing over the Kashmir Valley on a platter to Pakistan.38 furthering the peace process. Pakistani trained militants are well entrenched in these areas and the moment the Indian Army vacate these. Umar Farooq Mirwaiz.

39 control. The Chief of Army Staff. The rest of PoK could then join Pakistan. . the Neelam Plan is focused on clamping down on terrorism and prevention of religious clashes in India. asserting that it was a “sovereign” decision to be taken by New Delhi based on the security situation and could not be “dictated by any foreign government”15. 2006. and then runs west till it meets the Jhelum north of Muzzafarabad.J. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of what Pakistanis call Azad Kashmir.Singh. The Indian Government also reacted promptly by categorically rejecting Musharraf's suggestion. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present position of complete and equal integration of J&K into India and from that position could envisage shifting the LC to the west and north along the Neelam River. General J. India’s Response : The Neelam Plan 61. 15 The Hindu. 62. The Neelam River enters Pakistan from India in the Gurais sector of the LC. While the Chenab plan is based on the bigoted principles of division along ethnic lines. 14 January. also disagreed with this proposal as the terrorist infrastructure across the border was still intact. so that the Northern Areas become independent.

In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process.rediff. The plan would also be appealing to the US. India had made it clear that the APHC was not the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and therefore. According to the Neelam Plan. Arindam Banerji. it had initiated a broad dialogue in order to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the state by including groups outside the electoral process as well. . for actions against China. The Second Round Table conference was held in Srinagar on 24 16 in. Astore. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. a number of leaders did not participate. This would bring about a demilitarisation of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilisation in places like Siachen. Skardu and the Deosai Plains area16.40 63. will become a free country. to find a solution to the Kashmir issue. as being a strategic location. the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. Though the round table conference was a success. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure of terrorist training and coordination camps in Gilgit. Latest Initiative by India 64.com. invited all separatist and non-separatist groups for a round table conference on 25 February 2006 in New Delhi. “The Neelam Plan”. it will get direct access to the Deosai Plain. Kargil and Drass.

. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of the heights. The Army is justifiably concerned that Pakistani troops might move into the positions vacated if some sort of joint authentication does not take place before disengagement. to be followed by demilitarization. The Indian Army has confirmed that first disengagement of forces from present locations would take place. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir. the most notable one being the expulsion of non-Muslim 17 www. Talks are now centred on the specific grid references to be followed. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute.org. 2006.18 Is Plebiscite in J&K an Option? 66. that can ultimately pave the way for demilitarization. This too was boycotted by the APHC due to a threat from the Hizbul Mujaheddin17. 21 April. 65.” 18 Times of India. It would then be extremely difficult to dislodge them from these positions. Terrorism Update. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have taken place.satp. This too would be only after joint authentication of the AGPL which would then be made public both nationally and internationally.41 and 25 May 2006. New Delhi.

22 May 2005 .the majority vote could still go in 19 Bose66@hotmail. 67. and the people were given three options . 68. The original people of Kashmir have long since left. were to have a referendum under truly neutral supervision. join Pakistan or be independent -. Notwithstanding the above. Pakistan has changed the demography of its occupied area in Kashmir by resettling large number of Punjabi exservicemen and Afghans from the North-West Frontier Province. if the option of plebiscite was to be exercised and the undivided state including POK and the Northern Areas. The majority could very well go with India.42 communities from POK by Pakistan. because the separatists would split the vote between proPakistan and pro-independence groups. In 1992. all Hindus from Indian Kashmir were also forcibly expelled by militants who had infiltrated from Pakistan.the results could be shocking to votaries of secession.com. Dr Dipak Basu. In the Northern Areas too. thus making it impossible to determine who is now eligible to vote for the plebiscite as an original Kashmiri inhabitant. there were negligible Muslims in 1947. There have also been large-scale infiltrations of Muslims into traditional the Buddhist area Ladakh and the Hindu areas of Jammu19. On the other hand. presently there are no non-Muslims left. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. This did not happen only in POK.join India.join India or join Pakistan . if the people of the state are given only two choices .

of the 12. the new thinking in China developed an anathema for the word ‘self-determination’.43 India's favor. Therefore. Having shown its preference for bilateral talks to resolve the dispute. China's own territorial disputes with the South-East Asian countries over the Spratley Group of Islands led to military clashes. Moreover. POK's is 2. 70. it still gives India a vote of 6. Views of China 69.5 million. By the early 1980s.2 million. and some sprinkling of support for Pakistan from other Muslim groups in the state. by the late 1980s.9 million Sunni Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. there has been a change in the Chinese Kashmir policy. J&K’s population is 8. China could not deny the same principle in the case of Kashmir.8 million people in the undivided state.8 million and Northern Areas is 1. Even if provisions were made in this for erosion of support for India as a result of the current turmoil. This has much to do with its own internal compulsions. Going by simple arithmetic. as relations between India and China improved by the end of the . the results of the referendum would be too close to call. If the 1.5 million. lest it be applied by the West to the case of Tibet. In the last two decades.6 million and leaves Pakistan with 6. and all of POK and Northern Areas vote for Pakistan.

20 The Hindu. Muslim fundamentalism is on the increase in Central Asia. therefore. In fact. 27 February. after the break-up of the Soviet Union. the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam and therefore is a source of religious terrorism. Besides. China advocated bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. 2006. Besides the above. 71. will only lead to more problems in the adjoining more vulnerable Chinese province of Xinjiang20. The rise of secessionist tendencies in its Muslim province of Xinjiang also made China aware of the dangers of ‘self-determination.44 1980s. There are reports of Uighur Muslim terrorists getting trained in Pakistani camps. Any support to Pakistan on Kashmir. China has already protested to Pakistan on this issue. .

which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which there is no permanent cure. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. General 72. ARMY RETURNS TO THE BARRACKS TO ATTEND TO ITS PRIMARY TASKING. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. A similar thought has been echoed by President Musharraf recently when he stated that UN resolutions on Kashmir . This line of thinking is probably closest to what India has in mind and perhaps the only way to make a paradigm shift in bilateral relations.45 CHAPTER V – THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY NORMALCY IS THE POINT WHERE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION UNIMPEDED AND STATE POLICE ASSISTED BY CPOs IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER.

. a clear message should be conveyed to Pakistan to stop meddling in Indian affairs. This has to be comprehensively addressed on all fronts. India must endeavour to project itself as the leading power in the region. must be realistic and cannot be evolved in an ad-hoc manner. political. India must get on with its development plan on all fronts to include defence. not to get intimidated by smaller countries like Pakistan. the ingredients of a possible strategy to resolve the J&K dispute. 74. The strategy hereafter. There have been some major achievements of the dialogue process such as continuation of the ceasefire and movement across the LC. are given in the succeeding paragraphs. With this as the backdrop. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K dispute. with the aim of delinking from Pakistan. social and military. economic. a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de- hyphenate itself from Pakistan. Long Term Proactive Strategy 73. and needs to be evolved from India’s national aims and objectives to protect core values. People to people contact on both sides of the LC. Furthermore. leaving it far behind. In doing this. other than with the establishment.46 were redundant and independence was not possible. has been restored.

which would then act as an economic and military deterrence. 76. New Delhi. It should therefore not evoke knee-jerk protests that detract attention from the main task. There would be international pressure on India to pull back from the brink. India must therefore learn to get its act together as the “jehadis” fear development. Global developments in the foreseeable future are likely to leave Pakistan behind and development is an essential answer to terrorism. normalcy and even talk of greater autonomy in J&K.47 75. This should not throw India off stride as striking at soft targets is not difficult and is imminent in the future as well. The idea is to defeat 21 The Tribune. if India were to reverse the peace process. 19 July. allowing Pakistan to extract its pound of flesh. 2006 . serves the interest of both. One such strategy could be covert support to the Baluchis to give further impetus to their cause. it would be like rising to the bait and gifting a cause to the “jehadis”21. India should enhance its economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap with Pakistan sufficiently. India and the US. The India-Pakistan hyphen would get restored again. In reciprocation. and will use every trick in the book to subvert the peace process. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror by striking targets across the country. Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan.

revive. social evils and sources of terrorism e. and identify and punish all those whom the ISI has been able to plant in its strategically important organizations. intelligentsia and the people as a whole. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not succeeded so far. It needs to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action. the government and the people meet halfway to solve problems. For doing this. Domestic Strategy 77. 78.48 Pakistan in every manner so that it is forced to come to the negotiating table on India’s terms. must be conveyed to the general public through awareness campaigns. in which both.g. POTA forthwith. equipment and ethos. narcotics / drug trade. and at the roots of terrorist ideology – fundamentalists. As citizens. the state police and para military forces in training. The “Bhagidari” campaign that means equal partnership. The people of India have . in combating the menace of terrorism in all its forms. It must also modernise and enlarge its intelligence network. The need for support of the citizenry. the people have to understand that they have to reciprocate in the correct manner to the State. needs to be emphasised upon. it must adopt proactive policies to confront terrorists militarily. India must ensure a crackdown on radical outfits.

Unfortunately. Pakistan. and availability of medical services in India to Pakistanis. Endeavour must therefore be made to win over members of both faction of the APHC by whatever means possible. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. Attitudinal Change 81. should be encouraged. Both forms of dialogue are being currently implemented. India must exercise the option of moving “into the Pakistani society”. so as to get rid of this menace and hurdle permanently. For Pakistan. social workers. A liberal visa regime permitting exchange of student delegations. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. intellectuals. thus leaving little space for manoeuvre for the military establishment. India and Pakistan must pursue relentlessly the Track II and Track III forms as well.49 shown tremendous unity in times of crises. however. the APHC is basically an organization meant to appease Pakistan. What it means is . Track II and Track III Diplomacy 80. cross border train and bus services. This quality needs to be channelised and made use of in the correct manner. but need to be given more emphasis to. it is only after an incident happens. 79. For Track I dialogue to succeed. Though claiming to represent the people of Kashmir.

in other words the . the present deployment of troops of India and Pakistan. tourism. 82. Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving the major issue of J&K. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. there are good military reasons why the Army insists that before any relocation takes place. demilitarization of the Siachen region would be deemed to be the best possible CBM implemented by India so far. but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful option. investment. If successful. transit. India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the peace process. travel. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute 83. entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. This means opening up in the matter of trade. It should not only maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy. The Siachen issue feeds into the peace process. and any settlement would help to move the J&K talks forward. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. India.50 changing its attitude and ending the mindless hostility of the past. However.

but cannot let go of the Chenab river over which India has total control. Unless the two sides agree where the line lies. is demarcated both on ground and maps. With the India-US nuclear deal almost through. Water needs to be managed as an economic good and thus it is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both countries22. . only then is any redeployment possible.strategicforesight.51 AGPL. Options. Resolution of the Indus Waters Problem 84. to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan. would involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in J&K. a radical shift has obviously occurred in American perceptions. since no pre-conditions are being insisted upon. Pakistan can do without the Kashmir Valley. The plan. Expansion in India-US Relations 85. The requirement now is for India to break away from being cast in the 22 www. This deal has therefore marked a new phase in India-US ties. India being the upper riparian State.com. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the Indus Basin. Considering the severity of its internal water situation with regard to its Punjab and Sindh. will always be on the winning side in the water-war.

adequate care must be taken to ensure that improvement in India-US relations does not accentuate the India-Pakistan problem. India would be well on the road to becoming a major power in Asia. way ahead of Pakistan. It is also seeing India being tied up with the US in a long lasting relation that could jeopardise its monopoly and lead to its containment in Asia. could in a bid to highlight its existence in the region. diplomatic and economic strategy to apply pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. As US is China’s biggest trading partner and India too is developing as a potential market. Once India-US relations expand. Development of India-Chinese Relations 86.52 same mould as Pakistan. There is a possibility that Pakistan. it is unlikely that China would attempt to harm this developing relationship with India. Full advantage of this must be taken by India to exert pressure on Pakistan by China as well. At the same time. . give sudden impetus to the J&K problem. China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this reason that it has stated that if the two countries were together the 21st century would belong to Asia. India must therefore take advantage of this relationship and skillfully institute a combination of a political.

economic. providing also for the preservation and strengthening of the identity of the various ethnic. there could be developments that would destabilize the region. If a society is not free. and for their will to prevail. conversely. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly widespread in Pakistan. democracy and respect for human rights are the best recipes. religious and racial communities that constitute today’s nation states. where the people choose their own representatives and leaders. Pakistani military continues to dictate the Kashmir policy. political and cultural development of a nation.53 Return of Democracy in Pakistan 87. a democratic transition in Pakistan would likely improve the prospects of a substantive and sustainable dialogue between Pakistan and India on all contentious issues. . It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best equipped to enable the people to fulfill their aspirations and govern their own destiny in an atmosphere of freedom. the politically dominant military and the religious parties are the strongest proponents of claims to the state. is the most effective instrument for the social. Participatory government. including Kashmir. People are the best arbiters of interstate disputes. 88.

Revival of SAARC 90. multinationals have mushroomed that are not inhibited by national frontiers. national boundaries in Europe have lost their importance and wars appear to have become an anachronism there. With the birth of the European Union (EU). and address the outdated education system of Madrassas by quality modernisation. Economics is competing for space and politics. The endeavour should be to spread the fruits of development in the state. intelligentsia and religious institutions. which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. Efforts must be made to upgrade communication systems so that television and telecommunication spreads to remote and border areas. In the era of globalisation. There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won.54 Economic and Social Repair of Kashmir 89. and promote moderate and secular polity by media. A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop of political and economic trends in the world. In the . Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict.

makes it imperative to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. To realize this dream would imply a conscious effort on the part of the members of SAARC.55 modern cyber age. India should always adopt a strategy of 'dissuasive deterrence' vis-a-vis Pakistan. national borders have lost their significance. This significance of the armed forces. Through unity would come peace and prosperity that would in all probabilities also solve the Kashmir issue. . To ensure this effectively. 91. which demands a mix of deterrences. SAARC can become a more vibrant version of the EU. Economic synergy leads more often than not to the solution of disputes. to strengthen the organization through cohesion within the region. including political differences. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and harmony tomorrow. making it one solid entity. Developing a Credible Military Deterrent 92. and India in particular. India must maintain highly capable conventional armed forces. thereby making no cuts in the existing favourable force level and pro-active military stance. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously these days. constantly increasing its strategic space the world over. Given this scenario. both nuclear and conventional.

The evolution of a superior intelligence system is imperative. should not be lost sight of. In Pakistan’s turbulent politics. the option of a limited military venture confined to only the LC portion of the state. A reactive response is not the answer. this would become particularly relevant if Musharraf gets assassinated or overthrown. so that social. by undertaking ‘Hot Pursuit Strikes’ across the LC and into POK. An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. . Strategy to Tackle the Proxy War 94. electronic intelligence. both external and internal. India must also learn to call Pakistan’s bluff in so far as the nuclear bogey is concerned. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms. economic and political issues can be addressed effectively. In resolving the J&K issue. as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations.56 93. India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. conveying appropriately that Pakistan faces possible annihilation if they ever make this mistake. technical. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment. This should encompass human.

The media that has a great reach today. MD. A well planned psychological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the civil populace. IMPORTANT TENETS FOR CAMPAIGN PLG SVL. should be used as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to shape public opinion and to counter false propaganda. Operation Sadhbhavana should be pursued relentlessly for developing infrastructure and spreading awareness. It should be the “positive content provider” of the achievements of . SIG INTERCEPTION. ANTI IED AND DF DEVICES HEPTRS FOR RECCE AND EXPEDITIOUS DPLY OF TPS INF BNS( HOME & HEARTH) VILLAGE DEF COMMITTEES OPTIMAL UTILISATION OF FORCE MULTIPLIERS ED. must be launched by security forces. TRACKER AND GD DOGS PSEUDO GANG IKHWANS AND OTHER SURRENDERED TERRORISTS GHATAKS Media Strategy 96. Perception Management and Public Information. The media must be taken along as a ‘weapon’ of the state and not of the terrorists.57 95. Public information techniques must be spruced up to counter false propaganda generated by agencies close to the militants. Youth in the impressionable age group of 12 to 18 years must be the target of all psychological campaigns.

in keeping with the Neelam Plan. Options Available for Resolving the Issue 97. India’s stand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council would get that much weak. (d) India would get branded as the perpetrator of instability in the region. Abrogate the IWT of 1960. The implications of this option are the following:(a) (b) (c) The peace process would get derailed. the media must project the true colour of militancy. . Gains achieved due to India’s conventional superiority can be used as a bargaining tool to settle the J&K issue permanently. China would get sucked into the J&K issue. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and support the Shias in the Northern Areas. Attempt must be made to change the alignment of the LC. Rather than highlighting human right aberrations by the security forces. Option 1. Apply the “water-war card” and threaten drying up Sindh. Exercise the military option and resolve the dispute militarily. US influence may not be readily available due to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror. 98. This would invite severe international criticism.58 the security forces and government apparatus in the state.

Communication is being included so that both Kashmirs do not feel landlocked.59 (e) High probability of the water-war leading to a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. This would be disadvantageous to India. foreign policy and communications are concerned. 100. (c) Both. . (d) The LC would be made ‘soft’ to enable citizens of the two sides to travel freely without any passports or travel documents. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be acceptable to all three parties . but only so far as defence. (f) It could lead to a situation where third party mediation may become necessary. Pakistan and the people of both Kashmirs. exists. The Pros:(a) Granted autonomy. Option 2. but is not impossible. the aspirations of the people of Kashmir would get taken care of. The LC would continue to exist but could then be termed instead as the Line of Cooperation.India. 99. would continue to control their parts of J&K. and could be modeled on the following lines:(a) (b) Demilitarise on an incremental basis from both sides of the LC. India and Pakistan. This may seem utopian.

The Cons:(a) Considering that J&K was acceded to India. acceptance of the proposal would imply loss of real estate. by her borders being secure. (c) There is no guarantee that Musharraf would be able to rein in the militants. (d) If the Taliban gets revived and stabilised in North Waziristan and Southern Afghanistan. which . it would be a tremendous gain. (d) A settlement of the J&K imbroglio would remove the threat of nuclear war from the sub continent. As a sizeable portion of the 140 million Muslims in India are Shias. making its candidature for a permanent in the UN Security Council stronger. (b) India has been consistently maintaining its secular identity so far. it could turn its focus onto J&K. There is a possibility that with a “soft” LC and the Kashmir Valley being Sunni dominant. there is no stopping this evil from engulfing the whole country in the years ahead.60 (b) If successful. especially cadres of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. it would lead to stabilizing of the situation in the sub-continent. 101. (c) India would emerge as the benefactor. This has been possible to a great extent. For Pakistan. sectarian violence could spill over from neighbouring POK.

there is no surety of the plan being completed successfully. in India the political environment being extremely dynamic. The Pakistani military establishment has never wanted anything short of liberation of Kashmir. In present day coalition politics. (h) Implementation of the proposal in one state of India. (f) Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts already. this could become a major constraint. (j) Positions held by Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier region. It is therefore unlikely that Pakistan would agree to .61 with a soft LC could once again come into the grip of a secessionist movement. a possible change in government could derail the entire process. Given the kind of suspicion that governs India-Pakistan relations. the military would always have a role in all policy decisions. would trigger off similar claims from states in the grip of secessionist movements. could put an end to this proposal. (g) Even if democracy returns in Pakistan. His presence to see the plan fructify is therefore questionable. Fissures within the Pakistani military and the ISI. (e) The proposal would have to be implemented over a period of time. Similarly. act as a wedge between Pakistan and the area illegally acceded to China.

Pursue relentlessly. 103. not to meddle in Indian affairs. The implications of this option are the following:(a) Sends a strong message to Pakistan. that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled as a pre-requisite. Contain Pakistan and through a “wait and watch” strategy. Follow the present line and maintain status quo. Support the move for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Apply the Indus water strategy discreetly. Continue covert support to the Karzai regime. (c) The India-Pakistan hyphen does not get restored. giving a clear message at the same time. Attempt reining in of the APHC. a synergised counter insurgency plan in J&K in order to contain militancy. Encourage maximum people to people contact across the LC through Tracks II and III diplomacies. alternately. Stoke the problem in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. as is warranted of a regional power. Give top priority to mainstreaming the local populace. 102. Demilitarization by India would thus not be possible. sideline it. Continue dialogue and CBMs with Pakistan.62 authentication of these actual held positions on ground and map. . see how its internal security situation develops. Option 3. (b) The above message is conveyed from a position of dominance.

for strategizing a solution to the J&K problem. (j) It would give time for the economic drive. in the future. . The Will of the people will begin to prevail paving the way for a return to democracy. it would be a lesson for other states in India facing secessionist movements. not to take the government lightly on these issues.63 (d) The problem of J&K can be tackled on terms favourable to India and would not result in a compromise on territorial integrity. Though it could lead to instability in the region. The problem of the Northern Areas would get adequately highlighted in international forums This would become an issue for India to counter Pakistani claims to J&K. are better. (f) (g) Chances of reining in the APHC. the issue of J&K would become a back-burner. if any. (g) It enables consideration of the global scenario post US elections of 2008. (h) The option increases the chances of Pakistan imploding as a consequence of mis-management of its internal security situation. (h) Finally. mainstreaming and face-lifting efforts undertaken by the J&K government. to fructify. (e) Military eliticism and invincibility of the Pakistan Army would get threatened.

64 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the

instability it would cause in the region. The US war on terror, would also not permit this. In cases of extreme provocation, however, it would be necessary to resort to a certain amount of “arm twisting” of Pakistan, for which this option should not be ruled out. Option 2, though ideally suited to solve the problem permanently, is plagued with a number of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. It also implies loss of real estate by India and giving away the Kashmir valley on a platter, as it being Muslim (Sunni) dominated, would automatically identify itself more with Pakistan and tilt towards it in the years to come. 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan concerning the Taliban, being very unstable, the time for Option 2 is not correct. This option would in any case, take at least five years if not more, to stabilize, by when the geo-political situation in Asia could change as has been discussed already. It would therefore be worth the while to “wait and watch” and hence the strategy proposed in Option 3, is recommended.


106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that India needs to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. It is difficult to see any

65 light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation’s solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.

(11,905 Words)


100 80 60

(15 AUG 05) 2003

84 81

40 20 0

44 37 35 22

45 34
20 13 36



1999 – LOK SABHA 2004 – LOK SABHA 2005 - MUNICIPAL

250 200




2005 2004
105 109 93 90 60 131 131 89 66 76 61 67 96 112 103 95 77 127 108 99 96 82 72 68 69 75 64 54 140 118 86







400000 350000

376729 388115
400000 382157 375293

150 100 50
99 70 67 53 61 49 41 36 FEB 69 72 52

300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 111912 72591 27356 191164

300000 250000 200000 149920 150000 100000 50000 0 114366 119037 110793 173334 153314



1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
















(15 AUG 05)

2002 (194) (66) (64) (18)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0



10 11 10






47 45


2003 2004 2005



885 597

2003 2004 2005
1 8 71 4 8 1 8 2 1 6 6 1 3 7 8 5


5 3 5

4 8 3 4 8 8

2 4 0

2 2 9 1 5 7 1 0 3 6 3 5 3

2 4 8

2002 2003

(1088) (900) (1067) (454)




2004 2005






(15 AUG 05)

OWN CAS 2001-05
1200 1000 800
2003 2004 2005
956 642 639 336

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 OVERALL ARMY CPOs/PMF
0.7 0.5 0.7 4.5 3.1 4.8 6.7 5.4 7

430 189

600 400 200 0

222 207 163 85

FATAL 2001 2002 2003

NON FATAL 2004 2005


07 March 2005. The Tribune 13 Feb 06. Present and Future. New Delhi. 10. Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia. Guardian 22 Jan 02. 3. K P S. 5. Dietmar Rothermund. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. 1998. Times of India 23 Jun 06. 6. 2003. Alok. Omprakash. 2001. 2. 4. Strategic Analysis. Gill.” USI Journal April-June 2005. 15. 7. Mitra. Taylor. 2003. Strategic Insights Volume IV. April-June 2005. 14. Vol 3. Shashi B. “The Jehad Lives On”. 1998. 12. Sucheta Ghosh. South Asia Intelligence Review. 8. Santhanan. Amir Mir. New Delhi. Security and Separation in India. Ethnicity. Bansal. Daily Excelsior 09 Jan 06. “Path to Kashmir will be Ardous. Mishra. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. July 2005. Maya. Chadda. Subrata. Sinha. 13. Sreedhar. Ajai Sahni. 1997. Issue 7. but Uneasy Truce will Hold”. Indian Express 25 Apr 06. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. Manish. Sudhir Saxena. New Delhi. . “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. K. Sahai.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. S K. New Delhi. Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region. New Delhi. Terror and Containment. New Delhi. 11. 9. No 34. Matt. Vol 29. No 2.

“Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. New Delhi. 27. Dr Maharaj Kaul. www. 2006. The Pioneer. The Tribune. “The Neelam Plan”. 18. Terrorism Update.16. Arindam Banerji.” 22. October 1999.rediff.com.tripod. in. Karachi.com. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. 01 August. www.strategicforesight. 17. 22 May 2005 19.rediff.satp. 13 January. 24. Times of India New Delhi 21 Apr 06. The Dawn. 19 July. 21. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir”.india_resource. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession”.com. Ramananda Sengupta. 27 Feb 06. “Options”. Dr Dipak Basu. 2006. in. 2005.com. Bose66@hotmail. 20. 25. .org. www. The Hindu 14 Jan 06. “J&K: Self Determination. The Hindu. 23. 26.com.

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