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G.R. No.

169493

March 15, 2010

STA. CLARA SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. EUGENIA T. SAN PABLO, Respondent.

Facts: Sta. Clara filed an application with Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate MV King Frederick. Said application was granted on January 26, 2004. Accordingly, a CPC was issued to Sta. Clara. Meanwhile, Republic Act (RA) 9295 and its implementing rules and regulations were issued which requires existing operators to apply for CPCs under the new law. Thus, on May 4, 2005, Sta. Clara filed with the Legaspi Maritime Regional Office (LMRO) another application for a new CPC to operate MV King Frederick and two other vessels. Respondent opposed the MARINA decision and sought for its reversal to the CA, which the latter set aside the decision on May 31, 2005. On June 6, 2005, LMRO granted the application of Sta. Clara for a new CPC. Respondent San Pablo filed another motion to the CA to hold Sta. Clara in contempt of court and to cancel its new CPC granted by the LMRO. On June 24, 2005, Sta. Clara filed a motion for reconsideration of the previous decision of CA without disclosing that it had obtained a new CPC for MV King Frederick. CA denied Sta. Clara's motion for reconsideration and rescinded the LMRO decision. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly took judicial cognizance over the case.

Ruling: No. Although Sta. Clara filed with the CA a motion for reconsideration without disclosing the foregoing developments, by the time the CA resolved the motion for reconsideration, it was already aware of the changes in the situation of the parties: specifically, that Sta. Clara had filed a new application under RA 9295 and that the LMRO had issued Sta. Clara a new CPC. More significantly, the new CPC issued to Sta. Clara was now subject to the rules implementing RA 9295. Under Rule XV, Sec. 1 of RA 9295, a peculiar process of administrative remedy provides that the MARINA Administrator, and not the CA, is vested with primary jurisdiction over matters relating to the issuance of a CPC. The CA should have refrained from resolving the pending motions before it and should have declared the case mooted by supervening events. Besides, questions on the validity of the new CPC are cognizable by the MARINA Administrator and, consonant with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, the CA should have referred San Pablo to MARINA for the resolution of her challenge to the validity of the new CPC of Sta. Clara. The CA ought to have given due deference to the exercise by MARINA of its sound administrative discretion in applying its special knowledge, experience and expertise to determine the technical and intricate factual matters relating to the new CPC of Sta. Clara. The January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and the old CPC are now defunct. The passage of RA 9295 and the filing by Sta. Clara of an application for a new CPC under the new law supervened and rendered the January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and old CPC of no consequence. There was no more justiciable controversy for the CA to decide, no remedy to grant or deny. The petition before the CA had become purely hypothetical, there being nothing left to act upon.

The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. vs. 2010 PIO DELOS REYES (Deceased). We are not convinced that this constitutes an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.) No. of parcels of land. Pio converted portions of their landholdings into residential lands.D. the latter appealed to the DAR Secretary. Furthermore. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Land Reform (formerly Department of Agrarian Reform). speedy.R. The parties are presumed to know the hornbook rule that judgments become final and executory only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration without any appeal or motion for reconsideration having been made. in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary. 474. Petitioners. THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (PARO) OF DINALUPIHAN BATAAN. No. Pio and his children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition. Ruling YES. reasons of law. In the proceedings for his application Pio failed to submit the deed of extrajudicial partition. Facts: Pio delos Reyes applied for exclusion from the coverage of operation land transfer. Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. 168726 March 5. HONORABLE RENE C. represented by heirs. xxx DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Office of the President. Instead of filing in the Office of the President a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order.D. claiming that. They cannot prematurely resort to a petition for certiorari on the wrong assumption that a plain reading of the order hinted that it was already final and executory. The Office of the President dismissed the same. Issue Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed for prematurity the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners. and FORTUNATO QUIAMBAO. VILLA. To this end. comity. Office of the President. such as a motion for reconsideration. 474. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. CA dismissed for prematurity. under Presidential Decree (P. HONORABLE WALDO Q. Thus. Petitioners claimed that the filing for motion for consideration was useless because the decision was already final and executory on its face as the order itself stated that no further pleadings would be entertained. Xxx No further pleadings shall be entertained. Petitioners then filed a petition for relief from denial of appeal. FLORES. Respondents. The DAR Secretary granted the appeal. and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject landholdings within the coverage of P. The appellate court found that petitioners failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available from the dismissal of their petition for relief. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. which included the properties subject of the application for exclusion or retention. No.G. Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President. Resulting therefrom was the cancellation of certificates of land transfer issued in favor of private respondent Fortunato Quiambao. THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (MARO) OF HERMOSA AND ORANI. petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. In 1988. a tenant-farmer in Pio s landholdings and a farmer beneficiary. 274 and Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain. . The Office of the President dismissed petitioners appeal for being filed out of time. BATAAN. administrative agencies are afforded a chance to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Thus. 27 and LOI No.

REYNALDO DE LEON represented by his Attorney-in-Fact. The jurisdiction of a tribunal. over the subject matter of a complaint or petition is determined by the allegations therein. The CA ruled that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case as the allegations in the complaint make out a case cognizable by the court a quo. The DARAB ruled in favor of petitioner. The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving an adverse relationship between a landlord and his tenant. the Court of Appeals still rejected petitioner s arguments and denied his appeal. to wit: (1) the [herein respondent] is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but which was denied. petitioner s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Respondent alleged that he is the real owner and that he merely tolerated petitioner s stay over the land. 2009 FRANCISCO SALAZAR.R. Issue Whether there is an agrarian dispute between petitioner and respondent as to warrant the jurisdiction of the DARAB Ruling YES. and (3) [petitioner] refused to surrender possession of the land despite demand. In the meantime. However. and has a right that is protected under the agrarian reform laws. thus. The reason for petitioner s refusal to surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent is that petitioner is allegedly his tenant. FELICIANO JABONILLA. Facts Respondent lodged a civil complaint against petitioner for the recovery of possession of real property. 127965 January 20. . including a quasi-judicial agency. but also the status or relationship of the parties. Respondent. Petitioner. petitioner initiated a case before DARAB against respondent for the settlement of his claim as a tenant of the latter. a claim which respondent denies. in determining jurisdiction. which was: (2) tilled by the [herein petitioner] by [respondent s] mere tolerance. There is.G. a dispute as to the nature of the relationship between respondent and petitioner. This is in line with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which precludes the regular courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Petitioner submitted a copy of the DARAB Decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals contending mainly that the dispute between him and respondent involved a tenancy relationship over which the trial court had no jurisdiction. Expectedly. Respondent won said civil case. The dispute herein between respondent as landowner and petitioner as tenant is agrarian in nature falling within the jurisdictional domain of the DARAB. No. it is not only the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy that should be determined. vs. However.

and 6] Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction. What appears therefrom is that the application of private respondent for development permit has been endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action. 2010 HONESTO V. 2] The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction. 3] There must have been no breach of the documents in question. 2000-263 and No. 2000-3546 and Ordinance No. in his capacity as Mayor of Naga City.R.. statute." Hence this petition. or ordinance. the RTC dismissed petitioners petition. if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise. City of Naga and further favorably endorsing the same to the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) for appropriate action. No. Mayor SULPICIO S. Issue Whether or not the prayer for Declaratory relief was proper Ruling No. as there can be no issue ripe for judicial determination when the matter is within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body. ESPERA. and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but to no avail. It is settled that the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: 1] The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed. 4] There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse. JR. FERRER. appellant s application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. as a consequence. Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Naga. 5] The issue must be ripe for judicial determination. experience. ROCO.G. Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and ordinance does it show that the public respondents acted on private respondent s application with finality. vs. Facts Respondents issued Resolutions No. Thus. the HLURB. The issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination. Respondents. JR. executive order or regulation. and ROMEO E. In other words. contract or other written instrument. Petitioners herein sought for Declaratory Relief and/or Injunction with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order against said issuances. 2000-0597 which the two resolutions approved the application of private respondent s for Preliminary Approval for Locational Clearance (PALC) for a First Class Memorial Park as well as its application for Development Permit (DP) to develop the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park located at Barangay Balatas. However. and Peñafrancia Memorial Park Corporation. which is merely ancillary to the petition. has no leg to stand on. will. . the latter being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. CA held that the filing of the petition for declaratory relief with the trial court had no basis.. 174129 July 5. inasmuch as the filing of the petition below was premature. relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.