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SECRET

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--s=--UISSION NO.
I

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( Init.;:::..;~a;:.;;..l...:.:J- )~. __

43

FLO W N

,6 M'1 R 1945

CO PY NO.

104

FOREJrORD TlUs h series the fourth report ora. night

covering 1'1 low-level va attaoks.

incendiary ning first

The broad planappears in tho
No.

for ~h1s phase
of these

reports-1Uss!on

40 against Tokyo.

This mission.

ex.eoutl:ld by all

:5

Wings of the XXI Bomber Command. was flown in honor of La. Vern.e Saunders, 18 now reouperating Brigadhr General who

B-29 pion.er. In

Walter Reed D.C.. an trom.

BOB.pite.1. Wa.shington, injurios a.ccident • r&oeived. in

airoraft

.IJR.BJl

m

HEJJ)Q.UARTERS BWBER COl&AND .APO 234

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT Field Order No. 46 Target
I

141aalon No. 43 Urba.n Area

ot

KOSE. JilPAN 16 March 1945 Table of Contents P~e

No
Tactical Narrative •••••••••••••••••• Exhibit .. Radar Approach Cbar~ japan .•••••• Exhibit - Radar Soope Photo. • ••••••••• Annex
A ~ ope rati ona • • • • • • • Exhibl t - Traok CbaJot • • Pert I .. Navigation. •••• Part II • Bombing •••• Part III - Flight Engineering Part IV - Radar • • • • • • • Part V .. Gunnery •••••• Part VI - Air-Sea Resoue •• Exhibit - Air-Sea Rescue Map

1 11 •• •• •••• •• •• •• •• ••

10

••• • ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••

••••••••

••• ••• • ••• ••• ••• • •••

12
•• •• •• •• 13 14

14
15 18 18

18 19
20

Annex B - Weather
Pert Pert

•••••••• •••••••• I - Weather Summary •••••••••••• II - Chart - Forecast Weather VII Observed Weather Part III - Prognostic Map •••••••••••• Part IV - SynoptiO Map •••

· . .. . ·..

21
2S

U
25 26

Annex C ..Communications
Part

P~rt I - Radar Counter Measures
II - RadIo •

. .. . .

• • • • • •••••••• ••••••••• . .. ••••••••

..

27 28 31 32 35

AnnexD - Inte llige'nce • • • • • • • • ~ • • • • " •• Part I - Enemy Air Opposition ••• ~ •• , • •• Pert II .. Enemy .tult1aircrai't and. il.lr-to-A:l.r Bombing •• • • • • Part III - Bombing Results and Damage Assessment •••• ••

....

....

Annex. E - Consolidated Annex F - XXI Bomber
Annex

Statistioal Command •••••• Prepared Field

Summary Order

• • • • ••

• •••

. .. .

43

57
63

G - Distribl1ti.on

By:

A-2 Seotion XXI Bomber Command

~--------------------------------------------------------------------------111TTT11111111111II
I

11I1I1II

1 By &lIth. ot the O. G. XXI BOBer O0mmu4
1

SICRIt'

1i April is
Dat.

Inlt1a18

;Il&r

111111'1"1'11111'1'11"111

XXI BOl4BER COIDJAND

HEAD-lU AR'l'ERS !PO 234

19 April 1945 SUBJECT:
TO,

Report of Oper~tion •• 16 Maroh 1945. C,olllll~nding General. Twentieth Air Force. Washington
25. D.O.

1.

IDENTIFIQAtIQN OF

MISSION.

e.. Field Order No. 46. Headquarter. XXI Bomber Oomman4. dated 1:5Maroh 1945. direoted the '73rd. 313th and 314th Bombardaul1; Wings to pnrtioipate in an a.ttack on Kobe. the fourth of the serios of low-level incendiary strike ••

b,

Tauet.

Speoified.

(1) Prtmaty Targets Inoendiary Zone No, 1 of the c1ty of Kobe, as outlined on the photograph in Da.mage Assessment Report No, 23 (Annex D. Part Ill) of this report. (2) 2.

No lIeeondnry or last resort target wile designated.
I

STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPEMTIONS

a. Selection of D-Day' Slnce the current series of inoendiary, low-level efforts was planned 1:or alternate nights and tho weather predictIon for the mission'time was favorable. firm deci,ion was made to attack on 15 Maroh.

b. Importanc!? of Targej;t Kobe not only is the sixth lo,rgeat city in JapAn with a population of 1.000,000, but ~lso is the enemy's largest port and ~ key dity in transportation. Its shipyards represent the country's larges~ ship-buliding and marine-engine eonoentrat1on. The junction of the ma i.nrallrortclliM from ShimonoIEIkiwith the main line wast to Osaka and Tok:ro is in Kobe, and a national highway. the only good td~d in and out of the City. runs through its congested business section. These important trllnsportatlon facilities integrate Kobe ci6sely with such key Induetr1al faoilities as steel. railw~ eqUipment. machinery, rubber and ard~ nanae , The highly congested core of the c1ty (an o.vero.ge popu1a.tion of over 100.000 per Bquare mile) was selected for attalJk. }. luCo&ssfu1 attack would pundicap Japan1s already inadequate ship-bu114ln~'and repair progrwni establish a bottleneck in the main eo.st·W$st rail artery of Honshu, destroy stores 1n wo.terfront warehouses; and effeot production in importo.nt war industries.
c. OtMr ,FlletOt!! 1n Sf,! e9 ti 9n of Target 1
I

(1) Bij,ldingo! Only about 10 per oent of lobo', buildings !;l.re brlOk. sheet metal, stone, or concrete. Eany of of the modern buildings are sl.lrroundedby flimsy re81deM0s or themselves oontain highly inflrummnblo industrial muterial8.

(2) Wnter SumllYI \'Tith hrge river or canal., lobe no is dependent for its water iupply on 3 lor,e teservo1rs, p, supply which ho.s nevsr been plentiful o.nd is oonll1dered ino.dequnte for brge-sonle fire righting. (3) Fin-Fight:l.nc EguiP!M!nta Although f1re hydto.nts are well distributed nnd fire-fighting equipment is believed to be the most modern available, the poor wntsr su~ply and inadequate water pressure les sens effeoti veneaa of this equipment. d. Details or Planninc.:Operution,l.

(1) Introduotiont Faots le~nad. trom the 3 prn10u. missions were used in planning this attack. In long rnnge planning prior to start of this series of nttacks (See Tactioa1 Mission Report No. 40), It Wo.s estimated tho.t approxlmo.tely 150 airc:rai't would be Q,vo.ilnble for this atto.ck; however, it was possible to schedule 342 planes since mo.intennhoe work WOos done fa.stsr than ever before in this Oommand and losses to the enemy were smaller than had been antioipated. Other facts brought out by the 3 previous missions and incorporated in planning this strike follow: (a) Greater· conoentration and merging of tire. must be a~hieved by the following methods •

.1.. YaximUlllnUlllber airoraft must be oyer of the target in the shortest period or time.
as possible. to
50

~ ~.

Aiming points must be as close together Intervalometer spa~ing must be limited

feet.

J. Bombs must not be dropped in isolated areas with no large fires burning nearby.
made by radar. (b) Approaches to ortut
(c)
be

aiming paints must be

Air disoipline must be observed olosely. A distinctive method of target marking must

used,

(d)

(e) Night landfalls made by individual navigators had been equal or superior to those made in daylight. (f) Iwo Jima was a great sattey aid and a good radar check point in ~ddition tQ furnishing facilities for homing radio range station. (g) Low altitude missions to HOnshu saved 100 miles in distance and an average 850 gallons of fuel per airoraft. {2) Selection of Aiming Points I EqUal forcel were to attaOkthe 4 aiming points selected, all within Inoendiary Z·oneNo. 1. One point was in the northwest Corner of the zone I the seoond waS south of the,main railroad line; the third was northwest of the main railroad station; and the fourth Wall northeo.at of that pOint. The predicted ground wind WaS from the west and 3 of the 4 aiming

-2-

AECLASSIf'IED -_'____ ______J

At~~~

7r5 oq ~

iJll.J.ll
po inta were in the we stern eectlon or Zone No.1. In addi tlon to the oonsiderations listed, seleotion .lso base. on rea.onl 11.ted in the introduction for operational planning. (For 1'urther information on a.illl1l1g pOints see Radal' Approach Ohart po. following this tactical narrative.)

w"

RA-'

(3)

Bombing PIMS (11)

I.

DeterminatIon

of Bomb

to",

l. Each Wing diapatched 6 pathfinder air~raft which carried incendiary bombs fuzed instantaneous noae. nondelay tnil, AN.lf16 •. the most effecti veo.vall a.ble to produce large sile fires as aiming points for the main force.
~. The main force Carried a. many SOO-pound inoendio.ry clusters containing 14-89 bombs o.swere available, with AN-M-17AI clusters comprising the load for the others. E-3e and E36 olusters were fuzed to open 2000 feet above the target. while E4.5olusters were to open 2590 feet o.bO". Theee 6.1titud.... s· gave a.' greater denSity from individual planes than from higher opening. and at the Bame time the striking velooity obtained was suffioient to penetrate the target. Since the M-59 bombs available were limited and there were no M-47's beoause of a shortage of T-19 oluster adapters. the M-l7 olusters of 4.-pound ma&nesium bombs were the only substitutes. Released from low altitude, and set to open at 3000 feet, these clusters gave the following advantagesl ~ The eh~nge of bomb type from those used on similar missions would force fire fighters to adopt new tactios. Immediate attaok with water greatly reduces the number ot fires from the M-69 type bomb, but water OaUses magnesium bombs to burn faster. ~. Twenty per cent of the bombs oontained explosive heD.ds with variable delay explosion times, This would make fire fighting d1rricul t until after explosions had oocured. g1ving other bombs time to start fires, ~. The dock and industrial area subjeot to att~ck would be damaged by th~se bombs' greater penetrat.ing ability.

A. Multiple hi~8 would oCOur since the oluster oontained 110 individual bombs. compared to the 38 in the li-69 type.
~. Every third o.lrplan.eoartied 00..6 T4E4 saO-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 3000 feet beneath the airoraft. These were to disrupt fire fighting as muoh 0.8 possible.

J. Ground spacing of 50 feet was used tor all munitions, for reaSons listed in para.gr~ph (1) Introdugtiop under Details of Planning.-Operational.
(b)

Bombi"

.Method. PlAnned.

1. Because of Kolle' B peculiar shape (10 miles long and 2 miles wide) aiming pOints had to be selected at greater distances apart than on previous mi8sions. The aiming points were designated eo thst eaoh wing hit down wind targets to prevent somke

-3-

J1Q!!1
from interfering with visibility. The initial point was the same for all aircraft. 3';19N - 135/06/30£. Altitude. and axe. of attaok for the Wings follow. ~ 73rd 3l3th 314th Altitude 6000 to 6500 7000 to 7800 5000 to 5500 Arla of Attaok

oa

degr~e8 true (2 aiming pointa on .~

axi.)

10 degrees true
06 degrees true

(See Radar Approach Chart No. RA-4 following this seotion tor additonal details on axis of attaok. aiming points. initial point •• tc.) in giving
Dl'\

1. The shape of tM city c;f'feredan advantage excellent shore line es an offset aiming pOint.

dnr bombing run over
001''' 0'!'l~n..

J.
D.

Bombardiers were instruoted to make a raradar o.iming point betore making any visual

NQylgational Planningl ReA.ona for Choice Base to 25/00N ..14~/OOE to
2'l' /161

The route was pl~nGd to avoid Iwo Jima operations by 75 miles. This enabled use of NiBhino-Shima check point.
lUI

to

.. 140/5 3E

a rada.:r

35/53N ..ISS/03/S0E

to

Landfall was designated on Hino-Saki Point. The bay area between HonshU and Shikoku provided a good radar identif!oa.tioD point and permitted easy orientation for nnvigator. if they had made ~ndfall error. which intens1f.led land ..ater contro.st and w permitted continous orientation oJ.ongOsalca. Bay during the bomb run.

3~/19N - 135/06/30E (IP) This initial point provided a peninsula
to TARGET to 3';44N - 134/55E to 33/00N.
134/45E

lobe, A left hand turn off the target avoided O.aka defenses. Planned west of Awajl-Shi~a. this point avoid. ed incoming forcsi ~d land defense area •• Remainder of the route w~a direct to base, pauin,!; west of 1"1'1"0 Jima to perm! t navigator. to use rad.io range station. and to land in event of emargenoy.

~o
Base

--'-

l

(5) FllthtEnclneer'.

Plannipg.

(a) Exoept for the bombing run, which waS to be made at 250 mph calibrated air speed for greo.ter saf'tey, the flight plnn to be flown was planned to secure mo.ximum fuel eoonomy and airorr.ftperformance, The entire mission Will to be flown by individual aircrnft. (b) AircRaft of the 73rd and 3l3th Wings oarried an average fuel load of 6600 gallons, filling wing and oenter wing tnnks to capacity. Because of greater distance, airoraft of the 314th Wing carried an additional full bomb bay tank, ~ving that Wing an average fuel load of 7300 gallons. (c) No maximum or minimum bomb load waS speoified, but average load estimated for the 73rd and 313th Wings was slightly more than 15,000 pounds and for the 314th Wing 10,000 pounds. (d) Two hundred rounds of 50~co.liber ammunition were carr1ed 1n tail turrets by the 73rd and 313th ~V1ngs. while none was specified for the 314th. (6) Radar Planningt (n) One initial point, into Osaka Bay was used for all "11ngs.
0.

sharp prOjection of land

(b) From the initial point :3approach~s into the target were used e 6, 6 and 10 flogreel True. The shnrp and distinctly shaped h~rboT shore line Was used as an offset aiming point instead of anyone deSignated point.
(0) Radar operators were provided with radar naV. igation and approaCh charts which permitted them to establish proper oourse. The 73rd Wing used the small dookin~ area for finnl correction; the 31:3thWing set its cours~ along the eastern dock areas i and the 314th Wing used 0. Course to the right of the bulge at the mouth of the Suma River. All wings used tho southern co~stI ine of Kobe IlS a timing point. (For additional information on radar pla.nning see Approach Chart RA-4 and Scope Photos (RS.lS) following the tactical narrative. )

(7) Radar Countor Measures I Routine search tor enellW radar sign~~s on fr0quencies between 100 me and 3000 mo by , Radar Observerl was planned. (8) Alr.Sea R'SQue PlanninCI
of

(a) li.a.uJ.1 The Navy was furnished with details this mission and requested to furnllh available facl11 ties for air-sea r-escue purpOles. The following were made o.vallB.blo,
the entire miSSion, at the follOWing points:

33/00N - l34/40!, 32/30N - 135/00E, 31/30N - 135/:30El :30/:30N 136/30E, and 29/30N 137/00E.

1. Five submarines were Itationed, during

l. One plane tender WaS stationed at la/OOIf144/00E until all aircraft had passed on return from the mia.ion.

-5-

A. Two Dwnbo aircraft were assit;ned .. tollowsl 1 at 22/00N - lll/40E from 2000Z to ~ end of the m1ssion and 1 at 19/00N - 143/30E from £lOOZ until the .nd of the milsion.
~, Pioket boats and crash boat. were on duty during critical periods of take-orf and landing until reli ••ed by the Oontrol Tower. (b) A6lJ. This Command .nigned 3 Super-Dumbo air .. plane. to orbit the following .ubmarine positions for the speoified time.. 32/30N - 135/00E from 161600Z to 161900Z1 31/30N - 135/301 from ;51530Z to t6l845Z, and 30/30N - 136/30E trom 161640Z to l6lB30Z. (For additional details on air-sea resoue planning, see exhib1t foUoW"'ng Part VI in Annex A) d. Details of Pl,nplng--Intelli,.nc81

(1) Enemy F"'bter RMCtigD I Information Obtm.1ne4 trca gonaral Inte1l1gen"e 80111'0eS ind1ot'.ted tba.t the Kobe area bad more fighter. than any of the Command's other priority target •• in that there were 150 Single-engine aircraft within a 50.mi1e radius and a total of 250 within a lOO-mile radius, There were tew. 11' any, twin-engine airplanes in the vicinity. These figures and pait .X~ perience indicated that our a.ircraft would sustain more attack. dur';' ing this mission than on previous Similar strikes and that enemf night fighters preferred tail attacks. Beoause of these consider .. ations, it waS decided that ammunition YlOuld be carried in the taU guns of the 73rd and 313th Wings I planes. (2) Enemy Antiaircraft,

(a) On the basi. of flak reports on previous low level attacks and the much smaller antiaircraft defenses at lobe (61 heavy gun. and 31 automlltic weapons), it WaS decided that the lime al t1tude o.fattack would be used (5000 to 7800 feet.). Staggering of aircraft in these altitudes was also planned. (b) No barra.ge bal1oDn. had been reported in the ar~a. Eighteen serachlighta. 11 much smnl1er number thnn of other henvlly defended areas, were reported. None of the seo.rchlights of the 'spread belllll' type. lI'or these renson., barrage balloon ::md 118archllght considerations did not nffect the planning of'the minion.

WIl.

(0) The best radar approach to Kobe WIlS 0.1.0 the best from the point of view of flak risk. The turn lett nt target Po.st Ako.shi a.ndthen south over the Inland .en nnd Awa.ji Islnnd brought the aircraft within the defended o.l"easot the shortest poslible time. f The turn south WIlS made before the Hlmeji detenaes were encountered,

3.

EXECUTION OF

THE MISS ION I

a. Tpke-orr I Pathfinder nirarai't of the :n4tb Wing were scheduled to take-offn.t 160940~ while those of: the 7~rd nnd 313th Wings were to tllke -ofr nt loSlOlOZ. Tnke-ofr of the tota.l forae TIO.S IMI follows:

-5-

jl.£lLil
Lalt TAke=Ott
1611saZ

lint Take-oft 73rd
313tb 314th TO'l'AL • Exoludea 151* 128 _..§L 161011Z 161009Z

169939Z
161);39Z

161135Z 1611171 161l56Z

331 •

:5 Super Dwnbo. and Inclu.4 ..

1 span

/lie llIUIbON_rS. -!4!1...

b. RouM0u1a The course tloWD 'Ro.. g8nerlllly 0.8 briefed. wlth"1.rrnn being moat effectIve ~1d on the mInIon dn.ce turhulenoe a.nd oJl;ud o OV8 l' at 1000 t'eothan!p tired ettluti~l no.v:1go.tlon. Rndor 'lio.s u_d f01'10.nd1'o.l1 o.nd. bomb run. A.wo.ji Sb1mn and t~ Inlthl po.int-Were cloud up on several. ro.dar 'oope, a.nd ma..ny nQ.viga.tQr. and radnor· opero.tor. confused the southern paint of the il,land witb the (iobe Mming poInt. Despltetu.rbulences nnd light .bower., W6o.thl!lr on the ;routl!l 9ut 'lfM generally good.

(1) 'rimy 'l'flJ'g.!t1 "11th 5/10 oumulus 0101141, baae :3000 feet and top 6000 feet. 250 or the 306 o.ircpoJ't over tbe primary tlll'get bombed by radar. Bombing 1Ins c.t o.ltitu.des tram 4660 to 9000 .feet o.nd from 1738Zto 1946Z, with 2328.1 tons of bomb. being dropped. (See Conaol1do.ted Statistical Summary, Annex E, tor detailS). (2) dropped i;l
tOM

Lilt Resort 'f.arget' One o.1reroJ't 0.1' tM73rd of bO"" on Sldngll at 1900& fron o.n .. ltiUd.. ... 11l9

feet.

or

1fl~ 7900

(3) Junta oCQRportunUX1 On,e alror.att of the T3J'11 Wing dropped. 9.1 tons o.nd 1 .o.ircratt 0.1' the 313th '.'ing dropped 8.5 tons of bombs. both being on Ilnkno1fn targets from ~kDOwn o:lt1t~de. and o.t unknown times. (4.) Twenty ... ne nlroraft o were non-effecti'T8. nex E, CODaol1do.ted Sta;tiatle:o.l Summnry) (See Aft-

d. RouWBg,glp Arter bom.bint. Q. maJority at a.ircraft flow ba..cko.s briefed. Two flew dIrectly fl:'om to.r get to bue, going "..t to Iwo Jlma.,wh:ile 15 lo.nded ~t thc.t ish-.nd., Href'uel1ng c.nd one flor minor mn.lnteno.nce. ':'leather for the return tripwa. lim11ar to that en route to tQ.rget. e. Lp.ndlnp Alrcr!l.ft 0.1: t;he m0.1.D forc elan-dad. o.t ba.se. under good we 0. the l' conditions e,s follow •• Firat LOAdipg 73rd 16234.0Z 170001& 313th 17 Q0313 314th 1623"o2 TOTAL Landings QXlllude a;l.roro1't tha.t

.nn&

I

taat

LaMing 110256'Z

1702S0Z

1702S62 landed. at lwo Jlma and returnedlatllr.

l1QUU.

t , Lgln.. Three B~29tl were lott dlle to unknown rOlLaona. (The tOM'<gG of' • are included. under 'Targets 01' Opportunity· t.hnt of the third u.nder 'Prima.ry Target.·)

-7.

JJ2.111
Opltrations Summ,WI

g.

(1) Navigationl(Se. Annex A, Part I, for detaill)' Celeatia.l work wns hampered by 010u4 cover and navigators ha.d to 4.pend on Loran u an a.id to their dond reckon1ng.
(2) BOllbinc::(SooAnnex A. Part II, for deta.1le). From the bombing .tandpoint the mission wa. luco08.ful. Few meohAnioal failures were reported, with most bombs being dropped in the briafed llreaa. (3) Flight EQdneeriDs,.:.uee Annex A, Pa.rt III, tor d,eto.lls)I The times required for o11mb to bombi.ng altitude var1Ctd beoause different types of prooedures were used. Fuel oon.umptlon. were .lightly more than predicted due to slight hea.d wind. encountered, The 73rd lITingcarrhd the gret\.te.taverage bomb 10114 tbo.t hs•• been carried to date -- 16,637 pounds. (4.) ~:('See AnnexA, Part IV, for dfttall.)· Approz1mately 82 per cent radar bl)mb relaa.8es were ma.de. IOl'llldl80 WQa U mnde of SCR-718 rada.r altimeter and SCR-695 IFF equipment. IlIlzllllwa ra.nge of Loran fixes wa.s between 700 a.nd 1600 nautioal milo ••

(5) Gunnary:(See Annex A, Pa.rt V, for detail.), Yore enemy fighters o.ttacked than on previous night miasio08. Equipment operated 8~tlsf~ctorl1y.
(6) Air.Sea Reacu!, Three 8-29'8 were mi.sing ~ue to unknown Caulles. Sincs no posItions were given. no aen.rches oould be instituted.
g. Weather t(See Annex B, for detaUs); Weather oondition. for the miuion "ere genero.lly as predicted. Winds on the ret\1J"l\ were from the south inlltead of rrom the north, all predicted. '~aother oondi tiona at ba.ses "ere good for take-ofr ond landing.

h.

Cpmmunication.;

(1) RQdo.r Counter &eq§ures;(See Annex Ot P~rt It for details). No offensive counter meo.suras W6r~ employed. Signal. interoepted in the ttu'e;etQ..reo. fo.iled to indlco.te extensive :,,". ~-lq -0( Lng activities.. Suspected AI lIignnh were intercepted, but oould not be defin1 tely o.uoch.tad with ooord1 nated fighter o.ttt;lck ••
(2) Cgmmunicntion.:(See Annex A tott\l of 39 bea.rings wo.s requested and all

a, P~rt

diSCipline

WOOS

good.

II, tor detall.~: were obtnillec!. iJet

1.

InhlllgeMo

Summqry,

(1) Enemy Fighter ReaotioQI(See Annex Dt Pnrt It tor deto.lls)· Although .:?J30·JnpanesGightera were aighted, only 06 or f them ~ttacked with l04 o.tto.ck.in toto.l. QIlal1 and qu~i ty of opty pastioD indlco.ted the en-emy'IJoontinu.ed inability to ~nt"rcept 0111" forces with other than negligible oppOSition. Howe .. r, proportion of aircraft Sighted to those attacking wa.s the higheat yet eXp&l"i~ad on n1ght miSSions. (2) Enemy Ant1Q~rXl'a.ftQnd Air-to-Air :BombinC (See Anne,x .0, Part II, for details Enemy antialrorCl.1'tas mengel" IUld w ina.cou.ro.te.Som.e air-to-a.ir bombing and rockets were observed.

(3) DOMineBesun, ana Dyu. ,Atun.nt Po.rt III. ror dete.Il1) j' Two POlt ..mission reoonnnill8.noo made and from photogro.phs o.nd subsequent interpretB.tlon ingresulte were indIcated I, .
(.Ill,' peroent) destroyed. (a) o,r lobe'll were d,e,stroyed. (b)
wo,&

leSe,

ADDex D. fllt;bt. wezoe the follow-

a-I,qu.are
per

m11e

0l'0II..

3,0 miles Zone No. 1

Forty-ai,x

cent of Incendiary

(0) Target 169 (M1tsub1shl Heavy Industry) wa. 8 per oent dostroyed, Tn.rget 171 (Kawasaki Heavy Indu.try) was 13 per cent destroyedl o.nd the Al"o.to. Sh1pyo.rd 'WIll 21 per oent deltroyed. (d) destroyed. Target 34 (Kobe Harbor DlIItrlct No.2) was

CURTIS E. LelW' I 1!a.jor General. U. S. A. Commanding

£~ r. C41.1~.

A-2 XXI

SECTIQN BOMBER COM

RADAR

APPROACH
SCALE

'3o

D

oo

1;;;;Ff""~
II
1

KOBE.- OSAKA

1'250000

AREA

CHART-JAPAN

';1-l.!' ..... T

NO. RA-

r.ESTRICTE

6=

INITIAL 1 "

POINT

Aiming Po_intNo. Assigned.A/G

a
3

eo.Wing

2

1/2 of 73rd. on eo.A.P Allof 3'13th.

I
~~

14,g 135"00'

-,_.--_ ~"'""'~;~.._~:_-~6LL- ._=-135" 15'

4

AU of

314th.

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=

APPROACHES TO KOBE

CONFIDENTIAL

KOBE

SWEEP

AYAMA

XXI BOMBER COMMAND
MARCH,1945

REPRODUCED

BY 949TH

.§J,g.B.ll

ANNEX
A

ClIRAUOJ§

Exhlbl t .. Traok Obo.rts

Po.rt I .. No.vigo.tlon
Po.rt Put
Pl1rt

n ..'Bo;Dblng
III .. Flight Engineering lV .. Ra.dar V .. tlunnery VI .. Ai r.. Sea R.esuoa
Kap

Put Part

E:xhl.bi.t - .Ur-SeaReaoue

MiSsion

No.. 43

16 Maroh 1945

FE8flU.RY

15I4!

130·

13!1·

sffmonO$8ki
I)

+-.SIroil

MISSIO DATE ..I2.JIIIIWId.L..I&:r.Ij XXI BCiII.1c('M. __ ~

-Briefed ---313th. "--'3 14th.
-----73rd.

~

'.

. l
t

I

I I
~INAWA 25'-

I

---+-------

I I

\,~ '. ~

'1~ ~

1619!12Z 73·161700 162000l 313·161723 16192!1l 314.161744

~

...!!!:.

-

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\\

--- --

-

--

-\

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I

IPAN ~~INIAV-'5·1

GUAMJ,
TA 73 • 161010Z 313 • 161010! 314 • 160950l
130·
TRACK CHART X XI 80" SER 00100

.l!1

FF

.I.Ul "

.lIL... LAN 1.J.II1
1702422 '7028011 170241.

16120:!! 182340! 161151! 170020. 161001l! 170031.
14~.--=:J

I

I

135' CONFIOtNTIAL

140· ,-~~~REPRODUCED

-B-'-3-'-TH____;'P'-HO-T-O-T-E-CH UNIT

PART I - NAYIGAT WI 1. The navigational problems encou.ntered on thill mll1l11onwere nearly identical to those encountered on the Osaka millsion of 13 . Maroh. Oelestial work was hampered by cloud cover above flight altitude, and navigators were required to depend upon Loran 11.8 an aid to their dead reCkoning. Loran range was effective to the ooast of Honshu, with the average landfall error 10 miles east of the brieted point. 2, Orews failed to make Mufficient effort to follow the briefed axis of attack. Oases of la..ndfa.llrror were not great enough to e justify direct routes to the target with no attempt being made to fly the briefed axis of attack or to pass over the initial poInt. 3. Awajl-Sh1ma Island and the point at the IP were closed up on several rndar scopes, and a large number of n~vlgators and radar operators confused the southarn point at the island with the lobe aiming point. Winds were briefed at 320 degrees at :as knots and computed at 340 degrees at 25 knots. 4. On return. two aircraft flew directly from target to base, flying west of Iwo Jima. Aircraft in diffic~lty flew directly over Iwo Jima; other. flew Q$ briefed •

•••••
PJ.RT II - BOMBUIG

1. A 3/10 to 5/10 undercast waS reported on this miSSion, with the target being obscured because of smoke. il. great deal of turbulence W!LS also enc ounber-ed, The major1 ty of the releases were by radar, with a number of aircraft reporting deflection correotions being made visua.lly just prior to bomb release.
JJP when these points

2.

All Wings reported little diff1culty were not smoke covered.

in loca.ting IP and

3. The 314th Wing had s.eme difficulty, due to searchlights blinding bombardiers. Searchlights, however, were used only during part of the mission. 4. Flak was reported by a.ll Wings but it did not dis1lract the bombardiers on the bomb run. 5. Few meChanical failures were reported. with the majority of th~ bombs being dropped in the deSignated tar~t areaa. 6. Several large fires and numerous on strike photographs. small fires were visible

7, Both the ~13th and 314th Wings' bQnbs were short and some bombs were west of the axis of attack. The 73rd Wing' a a.im1ng point was completely destroyed.

1J.2111
PART III 1. Narratiye .. FUGRT ENGIN§!iBlRq

of Milsion as Flownl

a. Low altitude crijiool The initial cruise was flown's individual aircraft by all Wings, with altitudeo and speeds flown being as planned. No attempt was made to assemble elemonts or groap. during the entire mission.

to bombing altitude varied greatly 8inoe
dure wa.s used.

b.

Climb to Bombing Altitudl'

many

The time required tor olimb types of olimb.proo.-

e , Cruiae to targetl Very low poweres were required to obtain maximum range airspeed in the oruise prior to starting the bombing run, the approximate average power setting being only 2000 rpm and 30.6. inohes manifold pressure. The average pcnre[ Betting required to obtain 250 mph calibrated air speed on the bombing run was approximately 2350 rpm and U. inohes manifold preS8lll"e. In a few instances I high powet'a were used for a oonsiderable length or ti~ to elude enemy fighter planes. d. Return to base: In nearly all Oales the returDs to base were made at 7000 to 10,000 feet until approximately one hour frollL the base; where letdowns at apprOximately 100 teet per minute were made. Fuel oonsumptions were qprQxlmately 200 gallons more than pred.icted due to slight bead winds encountered.
2.

Comments

on Results of Missioni

a. The 73rd Wing carried tha greatest average bom.b load that has been oarried to Japart to date ~ 16.637 pounds. All alrcraft in the 73rd Wing Carried a bomb load specified by the Wing. In the 3l3th Wing. loads ''iEU'S limited bv the type of incendiary bombs avo.llable. The 314th Wing speoified 22 )(-46' s or 24 &.46' s for bomb loads averaging 10.202 pounds. as predioted.
b.

Average fuel consumptions

to target for all Wings were

c. Average fuel reserves for all Wings were slightly lee. than predicted beco.useof head winds. d. For fuel consumption Statistical Summary.
3. Exhibits
I

and weight data, see Oonsolidated

a, For vertioal p~ot. fuel oonsumptloft, and bomb load seo Chart IA·. Cross hatohed areas represent allowanoes for reduced potential bomb load and additional fuel requirement to target for 31'th Wing. b. For historioal relDord of Pllst 9 missions
llee

Chart "131•

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~

P.ART IV - RADAR 1. hdq,r Employment:

a. AN/.A.PQ-13 (Blind BGlllbin~) Ro.do.rwus u.ed tor target I n~vigation ~ bombing. It ho.d been antioipated that the speoifiO offset aiming point might 1\ot be visible beouo.se the oity's southarn COo.st wac used for timing o.nd course correc~on8 were made with .reference to coo.sto.lfeatures. Reports indioo.ted some orews '-.re able to distinguish specific aiming pOints wbJle otbere estimAted their position. Approximo.tely 82 per oent mo.de oomplete radar re. leo.se of bombs. b. c. SCR-71B SCR-695

-

(Ro.do.r Altimeter) (IFF), Employment

I

Employment
WIlB

wus normal.

normal. m188ion to a14

d. APN-40 (Loran) I Transmission in navigation to and from target. 2. Equipment Performance:

throughout

0., AN/ APQ-13: Or 306 AlO bombing the target, 250 bombed by radar nnd 56 made radar approaches and bombed viSUally. Operation of APQ-13 over the targst was 94 per cerrt Avere,ge maximum , landfall range was between 65 and 70 miles. Extending of radardomes did not increase the r ange of the equfpmenb ,

b. AN/ APN-41 Loro.n fixes nnd line of pod tion were to.k:an at maximum ranges of between 700 and 1500 nnutical miles. 3. Miscepaneous: One radar operated wi th Interf'er:enoe on its scepe , By it directive chetrO)cteristics, this interfenerce seem .. ed to emanate from an· enemy night. f'ighter. Approximately baIt of the scope was covered with interference, dense along radii at the oenter, less dense at the sidesi the center of the l1I9.ss interof ference rollowed enemy night fighters wh1·ch were observed visually •

•••••
PART V - GUNNERY 1. This mission was the first night mission inwh1ch strong enemy foroes were encountered. .1,.11 a re suI t. it was felt that more ammunition should be carried on future missions. Therefore, the lower eft. upper aft, and tail mounts will henceforoe carry ammunition instead of just the tail mount, 2. C.F.C. equipment for ~ll 3 Wings was 98.7 per oent operative and 50-cal. guns were 97 pe~ cent operative •

•••••
PART VI .. AIR-8M RESroE

There were no known ditchinga on thiS m1saion. Three airorc1't are missing due to unknown reasons. Sinoe no pos1t1ona were ~veDt no searches could be instituted.

-16-

SECMT FEIIIUARY 1'4 ~ r--"""'"T--·-1~-,).":""_1----'---'--'--1-35-·~-....--..-__,.~".0!I--·',--...,.--.---r----r--;--

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DATE 18 March

MISSION NO.

1~45
35"

XXI BOMCOM. AIR SEA RESCUE ~

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1~5' SECRET

140" REPRODUCED"
Y

lis.
3.5TH PHOTO TECH UNIT

iJ~Jll

B

Put Part

.1 .. Weather Summary II .. Chart .. Forecast vs, Observed Weather

P~~t III ..Prognostio Map Part

IV ..Synopt1olla:v

Minion

No. 43

16 llarch 1945

PART I _ 1IEAIllER PLANNING mtEQAST
~ OUaJn.I 4/10 oumulus, base 1800 ttl top 7000 ft, lnereuing to 6/10 with show(l.rs at'ter 0600Z. Saiplln: 41'10 cumulus, bo.se laCO ft., top 6-'7000 tt, 3/10 Uto .. 9Ul11U1ulI,\>a.s~ 14,000 ft. ,tOll 15.000 ft • To MONI 4./10 cumulus, base 1aOO tt, top 6-7000 tt J 3/10 a.l tocumulus, b!l.Se 14.000 ft, top 15,000 ft, 240N to 26QNI 6/10oUll'lu1us, base 1800 ft, top 7000 tt, e/10 a.1to-oumulus, base 13,000 ft, top 15,000 ft. ,oo0N to eaoN: 10/10 clouds. base 1200 ft, top 20,000 tt,· with showers. Light to moderate turbulenoe. light loing above 10.000 ft. Ceiling dbwn to 500 ft .• in rD.1n. OOoNto COIlBt I 9/10 str'1.toCW1!UlUB bas", 1500 ft, top e.. I 10,000 ft. 8/10 mid.dla olouds, ba.se 11, OOQ tQP 18,000 ft, in layers decrea.slf\g to coo.st.

.~I

rt,

Ta.rget:

lobe high

I

altostratus
Qperg.tional Base at Tnke

GilO strlltooumulus, ,bnse 6000 ft, st.rntoGumulus ",j'ter

aoCE.•

base 2000 tt, top 4000 ftJ 10/10 top 11. 000 ft. changing to 6/10

FOreoast

'Hea.the:J' Encountered

4/10 cumulus. brUle 2000 ft, top 5/10 oumulus, b~se 1500 ft, 6000 ft; 2/10 altostratus, bue top 8000 £tIS/lO middle cloud, bo.se 12,000 ft, top 13.000 .ft, 13,000 ft, top 14,000 .ftl e/ro cirrus bnse 28,000 ft. V.hi._ 6/10 cirrus,. baGe30,OOO ft. Visibility 15 miles. bili ty 13 miles. lowering to 1 mile in !Showers.

Ocr

I

Route lSoN to 23oN: 4/10 cumulus, ~ base 2000 ft, top 5000 ft, visibility 15 miles. 250N to 270Nz 6-8/10 cumulus. baae 1500 ft, tops 6-8000 ft; 5/10 altocumulus becoming 10/10, bas~ 10,000 ft. top 14,000. Visibility 10 miles, lowering to 1 mile in moderate showers. 270N to 340Nz 8/10 oumulus .• bale 2000 ft, top 5-6000 ft, vi.sibiHty 20· miles. 340N to Torgetl 5/10 cumulus. base :!OOO.ft. tops 6000 ft. Visibility 15 mileG.

l50N to 25oN: balHl 2000 ft,. top bUity 15 .miles. tUB sta.rting aeoN, top 10,000 ft. asoN to .27°W I base 1200 ft, top

5/10 oUllulus, 5000 ft. Vis!3/10o.1tostre.. .. base 8000 ft,

9/10 oumulU..II, 8000 ft, 5/10 0.1 tostrutuB, base 10,000 ft. top 13,000 ft. VisibUity 15 mlleB, dropping to 5 mUes in

3/10 stroto .. oumulus, base 2500 ft, top 5000 ft I 3/10 0.1 toatro.tus, bo.se 10,OOC) ft. top 12.000 ft. 290N to 330NI 10/10 strato. oumulus, base 1500 ft, top 7000 ft.! lalla nltostl'ntulS 1n It\yerebotween 9000 ft. nod 16,000 ft. Vhibi11ty 10 miles. 330N to To.l'!;otl 4/10 strl1.t.oCUIJ),uI.us,bllse 3000 ft, top 6000 ft J3/10 al tostrntus, bo.se9000 tt, top 12,000 £1;, v.is.1bll1.ty 15 inUlts.

Hghtshowers. 270N to eg°N'1

________

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5/10 oumu1us, bu. 3000 tt, top 6000 ft, 'Visibility 15 m.11e(ll.

4/10 stra1loQWllulul, bu. 3000 tt. top 6000 ftl 3/10 altoatratu., base 10, 000 f~, top. 12,000 tt. Vi.ibility 12 milea. Similar to Route Outgoing.

Bepta Betntn1 PC:

Similar
ing.

to Route Outgo-

~:

BM"

4/10 cumulus. l)ase 1500 ttl top 70QO ft; 3/10 middle clouds, base 1,3,000 ('t, 'op 14,,000 ft. Visibility 15 mile., lowering to 1 mile in ~how~rB.
pn

5/1Q cumu1u., bale 1600 ft, top 6000 ftj 5/10 middle cloud., ba,1I1! 12.000 ft. Viaibllity 15
miles.

Wlnd& Aloft lSON.
15,000 10,OOQ 8,000 6,00Q 4,000 2,000 Surf'aoe 65/12 'l0/15 ';'0/15 70/15 70/15 70/17 70/11 200N 0 8 12 16 20 24

... Fore~aBt 2SoN ... 330N Target 260/65 290/40 300/35 320/30 350/25 20/20 360/13

200W _ aeON

~10J35
320/27 340/25 10/22 40/22 75/21 50/14

-41
4 7 10 13 16 18

390/55
290/35 3~0/30 330/25 360720 30/20

·9
-2

-19

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... 9 -7 -5 -3 -1

1
4 6 6 10

2'7

10/14

Wihde Aloft

... Obller'Vsd

10,000 8.000 5,000 4,000 2.000

90/~

270/40

~0/35

300/30

6.0/25

60/25

'300/35

Surface
Remark;
I

This foreoast

~

oonlJ1dered

good except

were off on dll"sotlon. IIhifting throl.lgh the north.

that wind. on return through the south instead of

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Part Part

I ,. Radar Counter lIeaau.N1I II - Radio

.. 62

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PAl\TI - BADAl 1. Gen&rall

cowqm M!jAStlBES

a. Four R9U SearBh aircraft participated in and completed. this m1es10n. Search was performed for enemf transmissions in the freqllency bands of 4.10 mc, 25-100.0, and IM-300 Il10. While over tba target, the soarchwae concentrnted on logging radar signals w1th hlth PRF and short pulse length characteri8tic ••
b. A total or 54 a1gn~ls was 10gs-d, but atter analysis tor repet1t10n and amb1guity. ~h18 numbeTwaa resolved into 15 ditterent signals. Analysis inCluded c01n01deoo. ot the signala with ene., .0tion, their po.aible transmission from partioular ene., equipments, and previous InterceFts.

c.
2.

No offensive

counter measures were employed.

R"lJlts
a.

or

Search I 1ntnceptod which were of particular intereat

The signals

fOlloWl (1) \95/2000/31 This sigDAl was intercepted about 10 miles from Kobe over Osa.kaWanand 1s believed to be the Mark 21 A A Fire Control type rada.r eqUipment. It was coincident with intenae to meager but inaccurate flak through ~lO to 9/10 clouds. The few searchlights at the target area were inerfective except 1n a few oases in which aircraft were Coned by 8evera! searChlights and '1isual lighting of A A was useg.. This sfgna.l 19'8.8 traCking. (a) 79/2000.2500(5.71 This Mark TA Model 3 a1gnal wtl.S very strong' in the tnrgst areu nnd cnn be compared with the incidence (If flak stated nbove in po.ragrnph (1). This signal _B tra.c.king.
(3) l50/1200/-.~1 This I!I1gno.l.interoepted 50 miles oft Sh,lono-M1Bnki.V(Q.s lobe lWitGhing and tncldng. A few minutes later 4 or 6 tw1n-ent;ine Eli were following the a.ircro..ft. No o.tto.okllwere
made ,

(4) 1300/---/2: A a1mlle.r 8igna1wo.s picked up in the Osaka area on a previous mission. No definite coordination with fighters was made on either mission to associate the signal with AI. Fighters were known IItill to 'be trailing the aircraft after eve.J1ve aotion through clol.lds was employed. No algnal. however, lI!l' Int&roepted a.t this time. b. Other dgna.1s intercepted Qhlltac3$r1stio.
100/750/7.10

to nnd from target

nreD.1

Intercept LegAtiop
3.:?!55.N• l3S/50E

Remark, Strong ligno1. lobe switChing D.ndtrD.cking.

94/eOO/20 97/600/20

110/eOO/20

The foregoing three li,nal. (on the preceding po.ge) were intercepted ~t 33/20N • 134/40E, and are believed to be Mark II Fixed Air Search based near Yuroto Zaki. 156/350/7.5 104/600/18 78/400/40 107/750/7-10 123/700F/10 146/450/5 310/600/10 Possible Mark 3,,35 Nisbino Sh1Jna, TrtlCldng 28/l0N - l41/00E Tr~Cking 31/l0N - l38/30E West of 8m th ts, 100 m1 from Smith Lobe Sw1toh1Dt Is. 100 m1 SW Smith la.
Nish1no Sh111l1l. 1 !'pm

The foregoing seven signals were intercepted en route to Japan, an4 indiCate ~equate Jap~ese early warning equipment from Nishino Sb1mn to Smith Island with a range exceeding 100 mile •• 3, Ana!v,lg qpd Copclu8ioDl' a. No D/F'ing of any I!Iigna1was poae1ble dlle to the 111.011; eqUipment. The looations listed ~re suapected locations,

.,

or

suitable

b. The B1gno.la i~tercep*ed in the tnrget area failed to indicate any extensive lise of gun-le.yin~ activities. Raao.r searchlight oontrol was notlceaoly 1aoking except 1n a few iaolated CasOs 1n which the aircraft was coned effectively by lights. Visua.l aight1ng II presumed for A A. Heavy A A-was reported only by lllumip.ated aircraft. Three types of fire were encountered through 0/10 to 10/~0 clouds. The ;iuspeoted AI signals are stU1 being intercepted, but associated with coordinated fighter attaCks, Furtb3r search is Wing maintained for more evidence pf these signals.
as yet cannot be deflnately

c.

PAB·T II

- RADIQ

1.' Strike Reports I Aircra1"t rad10 Gpere.tors transml tted 26 strike reports, all belng received by the Ground Stations. Three reports were trnnsmi tted on 11080 Ito 'but were not received. Tbe'e l"eports were then retransmitted on 6055 Xo and were received ~ the OrOlU1d tation. S 2, Fox TransmifaioM I Ground Stilt! ODS tr~1Il1 tted. OOOPAC weatMr" ' and time ticks simultaneously on all strire frequencies on the half hour and hour reapeethely. GuM! _ather was held in reserve by Saipan o.nd Tinlan in Case of 11 diversion of a.ircrB1't to other than their hoQltl bases.

3. Fteguenci&BJ .Air-sse. rescue f.requenc1es were monitored ~urlng the entire mission. The tollowing information was interoepted. An aircraft of the 313th Wing :f,ntorllleda atllt10n guarding 4476 lca that he Was low on fue;!. !lnd mir;ht 119t mo,ke base. Lnter interception indioated that this plans was in sight of the field and 1I'Ould o.ble to be lo..ndso.!'ely. Tbts o.irero.ft landed nt Saipu.n. The I1boveinformo.t1on W0.8 relo.yed to the o.ircrti£t' Ii headqunrtera ~Oll receipt 'by the Ground Sta.t1on. RadIo oper~tor8 reported t.bo.t frequenoy 11080 los not received neo.r the target. Bowever. 6055 Iqs and 3145 Ics (the other fro-

.0..

-28-

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Al&~
...... "--_~ ...I

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C~fln.A_Dat'.:>~z..

S6a >

J.i.2AJl

quenoh. used by the 73rd Wing) were reoeive4 with an excellent 81Cnnl. Aerio.l operntors stated tllat j8lllll1nc wal reoeived on 0.11 Itrlke frequenoies o.t one t1me or an other du.rlD&the IIluioD" Atmospherl0 interferenoe was slight to moderate on all frequ.enoles. 'ollowing 1. a. peroento.ge bret\kdown of tra.tfio I percent on ,. mer; oyole trequ.on.. oy; 37 peroent on 3 megaoycle frequonoy; and 21 peroent on 11 "caoyole frequ.enoy.

'2

4. Hayigg.tiond Aid.. Thirty-nine IP/DF bearinsl were requ.ted and. 0.11 obtained. Eight requests were mad. for VBF/TI! bear1Dgs. 0.11 -were obi;a.ined. One BF/11! bearing was not requested but the all'. oraft tranalil1tted an emergenoy (XXX)messAge. The Ground Stat10n 1mmt?dio.tely shot a. bearing on the aircraft and sent 1t to the aircraft. Ranges a.nd bo~ers were utiliaed extensively with SOodresults. On. Gro~ attempted Q.ir-to-o.lr homing with only latisfaotory result •• Most Groups reported too muoh interferenoe for air-to-air boa1ns pur. poses. Althou.gh the O.W.I. Broaclcastlng Station ~ Intermittentl, jammed, 2 orews reported homing on tbll .tation all the WlI¥ fro. 1lbe C00.8t of J o.po.n. 5. Het D1.seipl1M !ll!d Securityr Het dhcipline ftl 1004. Aircrn1't operators were carrying 2 asp 1270 c04e book. Binoe one went out of effect during the mll.ion. Seven mdio operator. used tbD OQapromised eode after it became effecti".. StePI are ~iDg taken to rectify this situation. S. ~emy Trallsm1§§ iong: The fGllcw1ng inoidents interference were noticed during this miSSion.
a.

of jllllllDlngaDd

3145 Kes: (I) Intentional

over ta.rget. hours after a.t 1930Z.
b.

c:w

jamming was partioularly

effeotive

(2) Steady tone was effeotive leavlng target aren. (3)

at 1100Z. 13201 and for :5

mv

jMlIlling.

narrow ba.nd width. wo.. very effeotive

6056 ~9S I (1)

Jap music at l510Z,

0.180. t 1559Z. sourx1ed like Jo.p a

broadoast. (2) t1ve.
0.

Short period of bagpipe jo.mm1ng at 1725Z; il¥'tfeQ-

UOBQ XO.I

tiv9J

(1) OW jD.llllnlng 2QOOZi w1dl!! o.!1dspread mOode .f1'eont b it some at 1130Z. (2)
Unidentified

0'1'1 at 1545ZJ was partlo.1ly effective.

d. Fr~q~enoie. 34le~ $a9D, 7e&Oi 1415, lee89·~. 11160 kGs te,pGrted no ol1tAtandj.ng lnQldenils Qf jamm1nt .. aitbaugh atJll04phei'1.III ~nterferenoa. ,trail p~asem:t CD all fl"(!Iquona-ies.

-29-

112.111

7. Distress I Ground Stations received. 5 dhtreu mes ... s• Bearings were obtained on all aircraft. Four planes landed ..10lwo Jima, while the fifth stated 1t might ditch 100 miles frcDi b . D/F st ..tion Wall immediately n.otiti'8d and obtained 'bearInr;a lon, 1.8 ditching W1LB immInent. Position, bearIng, aDd altItude were obtained from the radio operator and this information wall forwarded to ADCO (Air Defense Control Center) whioh immediately pIaiced 110lip 011 the radar aoope, 'l'h1a aircraft cUd. not ditch and was able to 1aD4 Barely. 8. Equipment Malfupptiono I ANI ART ; 1 dynamotor caused RatiO -13 in BC-384; 1 dynamotor inoperative. BC-348ReceiveI'I 1 ott oalibration; 1 with no aidetone. WARN ..7 Radio COmpUSI 1 iocl1o..t01' hl1llting; 1 inoperative completely. 1 inoperative on 'Compaas' positIon. SOR-saa Oomand: 2 inoperative. RC-36I 1 dJll1fier and 1 miorophone Switch inoperative, Antennae.: 31 RL-42 reelo inopep..tive; , RL-'2 r •• 1s stioking; 6 compass aense antennae.· broken.

se

•• • • • •

-30-

Afd~~'~'-"~5 5: 60
'--__ .... C~I\Rt~ ~al·~~~~~ __ ~

.....,jaJ

S --~,.._. ....EORIT

D

PtIl'tI" ...nemy .Air ()ppoait1.on E Part II ... nemy Antlo.1rcruf't and A!r ..o-.A1r BotIIbDg E t 1 Part III _ Bombing Results
Exhibit Exbiblt .. Photo ... Photo

and Damage Aassaament

Million

110 43.

PART I .. liM 1. Gonenl

An

gPPOSltIOI

t

~. Enemy air opposition was weak on this mission. Two bQndred eight,y Jap fighters were sighted; 96 made 104 attack.. Previous experience ~t the target together with intelligenoe on tighter aircraft based in the aren lend to the belie! thnt the reported nwmber of sightings is excesSive. No B-29 was known lost due to enemy a1rcra.f't CLOtion. Two B-29'a (.6% of our i'orce) were damaged clue to enemy airoraft and three B-29' s (1% of our force) were damaged by enemy a1rora.f't B.Dd anti .. aircraft fire. Claims are 1 unldent1rled single-engine aircraft destroyed and 1 unidentii'ied fighter damaged. b. The m~jority (62 oi' the 104 attaCks) ot o.ttack8 wu lIo.d. the tail, as was the Cnse on the 3 previous night missions. c. Ene~ fighters used the glow of fires to .ilbouette the B-291 B. One fighter pressed hie attaok with the o.ld of lo.nd1.ngUghts. Two B-29'e were followed 200-300 miles out to sea by the enemy. d. Ene~ fIghter reaction on this mission indiCate, tbB continued inability of the enemy to intercept with other than negligible opposition. It Ie to be obeerved, however. that the number of enelllY aircraft sighted and attaCking on this mission ie the highest yet experienced on night missions. 2. Type of Enemy bircrnft Att\\cking:

a. It is estUnated thnt 96 tighters made 104 attacks. Seventythree of the 104 attncks were made by ~ircrnft unidentified as to ~; 38 ntt\\cks by wholly unidentified aircraft; 24. by single-engine; nnd 11 by twin-eng1ne aircro.f't.

Enemy .4irerllf't Unidontifled a/E U/I lrvlng T/m U/I
Tony

No. ¢' Atto,Ckl 38 24.

11 11

oSCI!.!'

Zeke TOjo Zeke 32 Nick TOTAL

e

.,

.2 1

1 _..,1 104

3. Enemy Aircra.rt Sigh\;eO But liot,Attopkingr One hundred, e1gh~ tour enemy D.ircra.{'t e..t did not f).ttnck1II6res:J.gbtedas follows I 86 ~ unid.entifiad, 00 single-engine unidentified, 16 twin-engine unidentified. 6 iekes, 6 Ton7fs, 6 Oscars • .2 rojos. 1 Nick, and 1 Dinah III.

4.

Dire9t! pn and. level of At1ip9!c ,
0.. A total

pared to,39. speoti ve1y.

at 104 attacks was mild., by enemy t1~ter. 8.1 com47, and 40 made on the three previous ni~t miaaians. re-

b. Tail attacks again were most numerous, 62 of the 104 attacks being made from the rear quarter. On this mission the greater number ot these attacks. :n. were made from high tail. 24 baving been made at level. ./ c. Of the remainder of atto.clca, right quarter attl1cks were 811~t. ly favored over nose and left, having sustained 16,10. and 14 respective1y.

I

d. Diltribution the following ohart.

of Attacks on direotion

Glld level

basis o.pPOIll'S

on

Direotion I1ndLevel of Approa.ch of' Enemy.Ai TC r Ilf' t Total Number of' Attacks 104

7

8

P'RCI( ABOVE

1 43

FROM LEVEL

_______

-' C~,I~I~a_s~0,

A!d~

'ifS 6as:

5. Acour!l9y of Ep,'IW Fighters I As far as b known, DO B.29 wu destroyed by eneMf airoraft. Five Ale (l.~%) were 4ama~.4 bf Jap f'lghttrB as oom.parodto 0% •• 7%. 0%, 0%, 0%, 16.5%, 4.7%. 22.8%, 13.]$. and 53.9%. respectively. of B-29's 4emag.d a.nd/or d!8troyed by en!1IW' aircraft on the 10 previous missions. 6.
7.7-mm

twes of Pro1ectile
and 20-mm.

I l4ach1ne-gun tire was observed !I.II were Some enemyfi~ters 'Were reported using tracer am·

munition.
7.

EnemyTactics

I

a. Sometendenoy waS observed toward oloser approaohe. on attaoks than experienced on previous night missions. Irvings and Tony. were observed to be mElking more aggressive attacks. b. In one instance, an eneuw airoraft attacked with the aid of his lo.nd.lng lights. Althou&h landing lights picked up the B-~. short range of the beams and rapid rate of closure resulted 1.n ineffeotive Il.ttack.

e, One unidentified twin-engine aircraft fired trom its top turret a.t approximately 300 yards at 3 o'clOCk low while on a courae parallel but opposite to a B-29.
d. Twocoordinated attacks were ob!lerved. On one of the88 atta.cks. the a.ircraft Came in from 11 and 1 o'clock. On the other, 2 twin-engine a1rcrn.ft were observed flying individually 1000 teet above aircraft over the target area. WhenB-29' s becnme fully illuminated by the fires, the enemy aircroft attacked from high at 5 and 7 o'clock. pressing to within 300 yards. Brenkll.W8.ys were unobserved.

e. Someenemy aircraft bElYarea after In1t1o.l Point.

were observed in pairs,

especially

over·

f. Over the tc.rget, 1 unidentified enemy o.lrcrn.ft Ml.S observ. ed flying above o.nd 900 to the course of observing o.1rcrn.ft while dra.gging a co.b1e with several cy.l1nders atto.ched. The cable Wl).S o.pprox1mntely 500 reet long o.nd its vertico.l appearo.noe 1ndico.ted weights to be heavy. g. Yany of the ene~ airoraft blinked wing and/or oockpit lights. Some o.ttacklng pInnas out out tbe1'!' wing lights as they broke on tbe approach. feet h. One !!VA dropped a flare over the target area.. from between 15,000 teet to 10,000

L, Fitteen f'lghterl'J tro.11ed a. B·29 tor 30Q miles on the wi thdro.wCll. Seven flgh1;ers trailed one B-2SI for 200 lliles. j. No radar ta.otlos \1Dreobaer·VEl4. Seerohl1ghts were negUr gible in effectiveness. Ho'IfQver, he glow fran. 1'ires, reflected ~nt at scattered clou.ds, rendered 0. grent denl of illumination to the ttu'get nre~. Someenemf aircraft appeared to use light of fires bela. to silhouette the bombers. k. Ene~ aircrntt fl as h.ed 1 and.i.ne; igbtl!!. l

werG observed apparently po.cing.

Theae

410

8. B-2? TII,ct.1ca o.nd P'irepp!!!!r n. Enpmy Airorpttl Ev'o.lI1ye o.ctiOIl wo.s !l.coompliahed by some B.1roro.£t, by making right OJld lett turns 0Jl4 changing ~ltitude. One B-29 Ohanged oourse. o.ltitude OJld o.irapee4 to sho.ke oft enemy o.iror~ft. One B-29 dived, picked up !l.lrspeed, QDd turned. Someaircro.£t took evo.sive aotion by molting IIha.rp turns to thwart o.ttncks. A few o.ircraft took advo.nto.ge of cloudll to lose enemy fltbters while ~ther 5-29 successfully evaded an attack by entering he~vy smoke rising from the target.
9. Enemy Aircraft

Mnrkingil

a. Mnrkings were, for the most part. unollssrved exoept for wing lights. HOwever, 1 Irving wo.s reported o.s s11ver-oolored, IUld 1 Tony a. olive drab. b. Enemy o.1rcraft were reported with wing lights, some red and green, others merely red. Some ho.d wing lights reversed to those of B.29's. Somehad 2 lights on I wing; I was seen with 2 orange-colored Ughts on wings; Qllother ha.d bluo lights. 10. Results of' Hits on !!lpemy Airorp.1'tz One unidentified dogleengine enemy o.lrcro.£t exploded when hit by tail gunner. O~ unidentified airoro.tt, nfter being hit by 0. tail gunner, went Into 0. dive. throwing out 0. cloud of smoke. 11. Cla1ms by Type EnemyAlroro.tt pgmnged. 1 U/I. and,
Qyn

Po81t1.oD.1
Gun PoBitiOD

Dellwoyed I S/B 0-/1
NOTE;

To. 11 intormuti on thlUl that Summary •

The foregoing analysis is bused on Inter presented in the Oonsolido.ted Statistical

•••••
URT 1. II .. ANTIAlRCRAfT A@ AIR -TO-AIR BOMBING EnemyAnthirgraf'j;: a.
landfall

En route to target

flak was reported

.s follows

I

(1) Aircraft of the 73rd Wing !lIet meager flak between IIJldIP. It was mostly heavy. continol1s1y pointd. and barra~e and fairly accurate.

(2) SCattered burets from automatio weaponl and 3 ~s on the peninsula south of Iushimoto, neat Stuon-llisakl Seaplane BtLlI8, were. first met by the airoraft o~ the 313th Win~. Looation ot the &uns ~as estimated at 33/~7N - 134/45E. :rhree DIore ~s wore apotted at ShimaSilto. SCattered flu from lI.utomat~c weapons waS loen from Susam! and Tanabe just south of WakaYamA. where both gu~ and A/W were encounter~. A/W fire was also met at the IP and tram craft in the bq.
(3) The 314th \nng arierart mitt .meager aDd inaccurate flak in the Vioinity of l.'To.Jcaye.mo. and Sana, the tire beln~ described 'spore..dic and poorly controlled.'

III

b.

Onr the Tvat.

(1) Aircraft of the 73rd WinEattacked the tar~t thrOQSh underc .. t TIll'y1~ froID 1/10 to e/10 usi~ &xes from S~ to 36 4eve •• ; planes of the 3l3th dropped their bombs through 2/10 to 9/10 un4eroast on an axis or approximately 10 degrees, tM 314th Wins encountered U.Ddercast tram 0/10 to 10/10 and uaed ~S from 356 to 3 de~e.. The win! 1flUI from UO to 320 degree8 at S3 to 46 miles per hour. (2) AlA fire was described aI 'sporadio and erratic,' lDD.1nlyarrage, with 80mepredicted oonoentrationa and oontinollaly pointb ed fire. Both heavy and med1W1l flak were reported. It wu 118a&8r o t intense and generally inaccurate. Two aircraft of the 313th Wint;1I9re 108t to Qnkncnm oauses· of the 7lrd Will!ruled to return. At leaat a part of this 10s8 due to flak. 8inoe, on interrogation crews reported seei~ 1 B-29 IInder intense AlA fire gol~ down in a flat spin over the target. o.
and one aircratt

_8

d. Four airoraft of the 73rd, :5 of the 31:5th, and 314th Wing 'Were dam~d by flak.
2.

a

of the

course aary. 3. craft

B-29 TactiC' Acainot MAl
~nd

altitude

to evade flak.

Some aircraft eql10yed cha.nt;es 1n ~r8 found no evasive action neoes-

Air-to-Air

BombingAnd Rockets c

a. The 73rd Wing reported no rocket attacks. A few enelV airdropped flares. One aircraft observed rockets in the target area.
b. The 3l3th Wing reported
I

results.

(1)
(2)

At least

3 o.1r-to-air

projectiles

launched with negative ta11s of tllllll2 fighter.

(

,

orossing iofront (3)

A pair of projeotiles wi til trailing of a B_29 1n the target area. A rocket fired from a single-engIne

(.) A rooket battery of 6 to 10 launchers firing from near the o.1mlng point. The prOjectiles relt.ahe~ an altitude of 9000 feet, gi ving the appearence o,f' Ro.man oandles •

......

.I'AR'l' III Yiselon No.: Altitude, 3PR5M 88

_ DAMAGE ASSESSMM •
l)ats Flownl

17..1& March 194P

34.000 fee~.

This report a8leSlllSI damage to Kobe City re.u1t!l.~ frolll XXI Bomber CommandiosioQ 43 of 16.17 Maroh 1945. Area destroyed totaled about M 79.630.000 square feet (2.86 aqua.re 1111188 .. 1.850 acres).

tODe City oovers an area. of about U. 8,Uars l1111ea. About 20.5 peroent of the city Wo.l destroyed. Forty-six per cent of Incendiary Zone No. 1 was destroyed. Industries damaged inolude Tar~et8 34. 169, and 171.

Xbtal damage to Kobe 01 ty from XXI Bomber COllllland lisB10nl 26 and J 43 is 82.281.000 square feet or 2.95 square miles. representing about .. 21.1 per cent of the entire city. Photo qu~lity is gpod except for cloud cover whioh may conceal damaged portions of dock area.

STATISTICAL SVYMARY OF
Total Area of Kobe Total Area destroyed Per cont destroyed -

DAMAGE
14 square lII11e8 2.66 square lIIiles 20.5 per oent

Area of Incendiary Zone No. 1 3.66 square 1II110s Area of Incendiary Zone No. 1 destroyed 1.60 square 1II11el Per cent of Incendiary Zone No. 1 destroyed--46.4 per oent
SUMMARY OF DAMAGE AnnotatiOns

BguMe

Feet

Residential area destroyed Two residential areas destroyed 3. Residential area. - RR Yard buildings destroyed - Target 171, Kawa.salei Heavy Industry damnged. 4. Ros1dentio.l, light industry and business area destroyed. RR Station in center of I'rea not destroyed.
2.

1.

1.350,000 6.110.000
·8.,310,000

Target 34. Kobe H-orbor Distr let No.2., warehouses d.estroyed. 6. Target 169. Mitsubiahi Heavy Industry ground aren around 6Hpways and industrb.l bu:tldings destroyed. 7. Three residential areaS destroyed 8, Resident1o.1 area destroyed 9. Three reSidential areaS destroyed 10. Two residentia.l area.l. l3.estroyed II, Five res1deptla1 areas ~nd light industry destroyed. 12. Two re8idetitial steHl5 destroyed 13. Two residential areas and light insudtry destroyed.
5.

630,000 - 360,000 5.710.000 ',830,000 570,000 1,040.000 2,030,000 1.750.00:0

Refernece photogrophyl

Pre-strike. Post-strike

3E'R5K 36 .. IV. 11. 12 3PR5Y 6'~ 6S. 86. 87, 68-1V.

Referenoel AAF Air Objeotive Folder 90 • .2S )(-9. All referenoes to numb-ered damaged areas are keyed to the m.oso.iothat followsth1a page •

• OIU,

m B C, DA REPORT 23

I

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IW4GE
Mission No.1 ~Bsion No.1 3PR5U

ASSESSMENt· Date Flown. Date flown.
SID4WARY

ae

18 March 1945
24 March 1945

3PR5U 95

This report Bupplemets OIU D~~ge Assessment Report No. 23, assessing additional damnge to Kobe Ci~ and ~iving a more detailed assessment of 1ndustrl&1 damage resulting from XXI Bomber Command Mission No. 43, 16 March 1945. Recent coverage showed aIProximately 3,177,000 s~uare teet ot additional destruotion to residential areas and revealed Target 1~9 to be 8 per cent destroyed. Target 171 was 13 per oent destroyed. and the Arata Shipyard was 21 per oent destroyed. Total damage to Kobe City resulting from m Bomber COIrm"lnd ll1ssionl and 43 amounted to Q.bout 1;15,458.000 square feet, 3.0 square miles, 1,920 acres or 21.4 per cent of the city destroyed.
26

Interpretatien

of the dock area is limited because of cloud coverage.
SUMltlaRY OF !WlAqE

STATISTICAL

SQ. PI· Additional damage Previously reporte. damage Total damage observed INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE
TOTAL AREA-S9·

§Q"

MILES

3,rn,oao
62.281,000 85,458,000

32
1.868

1.920
AREA

FT

pm

CENT

DESTBOYED-SQ.FT. 429,000 510,000 140,000

DiSSTRQYED 8.0 13.0 20.0

169
171

Arata Shipyard

5,300,000 4,050,000 700,000

sm!JABY OF DAMAGE-RESIPENT IAL (See Print 34 . follow.!ng this report for annob.tioD..1 hted below) Amlotatlon 1 Annotation 2 Annota.tion S (See Print 90 TARGET pI following 1,147,000 sq. ft. destroyed 700,000 sq. ft. destroyed 1.~30,OOO sq. ft. destroyed

ITEMIZATION OF DAliiGE-1NDUSTRIAL

this report for annotations

l1sted below'

(34/4oN. 135/llE)

ltllwasBkiHeavy Industries. Ltd •• oooupy1ng reotAngular area of about 4,050,000 sq. rt~· 60,000 eq.

./;.nnotution 1. Annotation Annotation 2. 3.

2 la.rge and severlll BlI'ID.ll bulld1Jll;1!I destroyed. ft. of roof area deBtroy~d. 2 buildings occupying

17,000 Sq. ft. - d~8troy8d.

Casting shop 30 per cent destroyed - 6 smaller building. destroyed - totd destruction of about UX),OOO sq' .ft. • • XXI B.C. O.I.U. D/l;. Report #26

Annotation Annotation Annotation Annotation Annotation

4.

3 buildings

totalling

about 80.000

sq. ft. de.~royed. gutted -

5.

11 small buildin~s destroyed .. 1 lar~e buildi~ total destruction of about 40.000 sq. ft.

6. 5 slIIall buildings
7. 8. 7 small buildings 6 small bUildings

destroyed destroyed destreyed

- about 31,000 sq. ft. ..about 68,000 sq. ft. .. about 44,000 sq. ft.

~It.

~IPI,ag!2 AH)2 E:liG~m; 1!Q1!ii§(34/40N
9, 1 building
65,000 10.

- 135/11E)

Annotation Annotation Annotation WOET 169 Annotation Annotation

sq. ft. of destruction.
destroyed

destroyed

- 3 buildings

gutted .. about

6 buildings

..about 64,000 sq. ft. .. 9,000 sq. ft. Heavy Industries, Ltd.

11.

1 bulldingdestroyed

(34/39N - 135/11E)

W.tsubishi

1

Fitting shop and area adjacent to slipways destroyed, totals approximately 35,000 sq. ft. Sheds and smnll dock totals approximately sq. ft.

2 1 building destroyed, 1 gutted. building destroyed - destruction 113,000 sq, ft.
20 buildings

Annotation:3

destrO"'jed- Qbout 281,000

Reference Photography: Pre-strike: Post-strike: Reference unterlal: 3PR5M 19-4R I 106 and 4L: 108 3PR5}d66-:3L: 29 and 3RJ 28 3PR5M 96 .. 2: 34 No. 23

OIU Damage AsseSSlllent Report OIU Harbor Report No. 1

.. 04

1.J.!ZII%

I


CONSOLIDATED STATISTICAL SUlAlARY

16 Karoh. 1945

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_________ ....1

C~ARA'

71:; 6(} <
Dal';~':-

MISSIOH___:_:!+:::.3 FLIGHT DATA & FUEL CONSUMPTION DATE

_ 19.45

16 March 500 Gp. 38 !!c

497 Gp.

.498 Gp.

.499 Gp.

73 Wing 135

Alc

COMPLETING MISSION
DATA

*

30

39

28

nIGHT
Avg. Avg.

Avg. Time At Low Altitude Time Of Climb To Bombing Altitude Time At Bombing Altitude Flown (Nautical Air Miles)

7:30 :05 :25 14:33 2810

7:15 :20

7:03 :13
:38

6:38 :18 :57
14:4"1

7:05 :15

:31
15:14 2912

:39
14:50
2£04

Avg. Flying Time Avg. Distance

14:39 2754

2725

FUEL

CONSUMPTION

Consumed To Target; Average
Maximum

)659 3953
3351

3635 3860 3372

3535
3910

3534 3820

3591
3953 3273

MiniIllUJll Consumed From Target To Base:

3273

3305

(A/c Without Malfunction)
Average
Maximum Minimum

Bo. Of .Aircraft

)0

2338
:271B

37 2332. '2.472 2113

27 2349 2536 2010

36
23/+7

130
2341.

2552 1901

2718 1901

1920

Con~ Ho.

From Target To Base: (A/C With Malfunction)

or

Aircraft Average Ma:ximull JIinimum

None

2

1

2

5 2507 2797

2326 2360 2313

2797 2797 2797

2543 2690

2396
5881 6255 5491

2313
5941

Total FUel

Used:

Average MaxiIlUBl lfinilmll

6020 61~85 5637

'5969 6218 5700

5900 6381 5344

6485

5;44
1514 11.56 285 4.00.6 2.12

Total JUel Re_ining:
Average 750 1133 ':::85 413.7 2.14 222901

749
1100 507 391.9 2.05 242166

899
1456 419 402.7 2.1 181708

869 1279 514 397.9

~
Mini.llI!1

ivg.

Gala. CorulumedPer Hour

Avg. a.l•• Con6Ulled Per tile TOTAL FUEL USED ON AIRBORNE Aje

235572

882347

* Ale

whicb fuel data are available. !l Includes 1 drcrE'ft lending I:"t Iwo Jimo. far refueling.

tar

MISSION DATE FLIGHT DATA & FUEL CONSIJMPTIO N 6 Gp. 9 Gp. 501+ Gp.

--,1:-:;6,.......,..,M-arc--:-h~·

43

CO-19CO-4~' 5--

505
.,}

Gp.

313 Ihng
,~

Alc

COMPLETING

MISSION

*

.Gf

~4

"-'"

...

FLIGHT DATA Avg. Time At Low Altitude Avg. Time Of Climb To Bombi.ng Al t i tude Avg. Time At Bombing Altitude Avg. Flying Time Avg. Distance Flown (Nautical Air Miles)

7:00 :10 1:10

Date. 1'1 t

7:05

7:03 :15 :49
14:53

:20 :30 14:52 2700 11,:31 2801

Available 15:08 2750

15:18
2787

2755

FUEL CONSUMPTION
Coasumed To Target: Average
llaxillllllll Minimum

3.5n
3647 3/+94

3617 3896 3452

3474 4014 3257

3674

L.325
3;':01

3592 4]25 3201

~

~

Consumed From Target To Base: (Aje 1f1thout Malfunotion) No.

or

Airoraft Average
'Ifaximum Ilin.imWll

27
2L.l6

24 3168 3333 2889

:::2

2287 2562 2014

30 2158 2335 1545

103 2489 3333 1545

2675 2285

(Ale No. or

Consumed

From Target To Base: With Malfunotion)

Aircraft Average
Maximul II:1..nimWIl

None

None

None
-

1 1542 154.4

1

~
Total

5968
6322 5779

-

-

-

-

1542 15421542

-

-

1542
5832
6227 5510

FUel Deeda Average
liaxiMUll

5720 6096 5228

5761

5826 6322 5~28

6094 5445
1024 1340 691 396.8 2.0t
~jO~U4

llinillwl 'rotal
Fuel RellalDing:

Average
IIaximWIl Mini.l1m

812 1001

1065 1557

883 1265 273 39~;.2 2.1e
~"b

936 1557 273 389.2 ;~.1l
T§z;s7'1

458
Per Hour Pal" Mile

639
378.1 2.0e
~(Uj';1

Avg.

Cals.

Consumed

390.1

Avg. 008. Consumed
!OTAL

2.14
(!. ••

rmn.

USED ON AIRBCME

Alc

i'a"5IT

* Ale ter

wbicb fuel data are available (Exclud.es E'.lrcr~ft lfl.l1.clJ.nr; ~t Iwo Jim~) Fuel Remaining 6th Group - 6 Ale - iU9, 12E9, 15Eil, 1608, 1619, 1762 {(;aIs. At Iwo Jima: 9th Grour - 5 Ale - 153.<\., 551, 1672, 1879, 2044 (ala. 1 504th Gt-oup - 1 Ale - 1[.00 gals. S05th GraUl' - 1 Ale - 1342 l';a1B.

MISSION __ FLIGHT DATA & FOEL CONSUMPTION DATE 16

---4~---':Iarch

1 Q~ 5

19 Gp.
A/C COMPLETING .MISSION FLIGHT DATA

29 Gp.
22 a

314 Wg. 45
6:1.2

21st B.C. 284 7:00 :15 :44 15:00 2797

*

23 6:20 .;19
:54

.
I

Avg.Time

At Low Altitude

7:04 :10
Not .AvP.i

Avg. Time Of Climb To Bombing Altitude Avg. Time At Bombing Altitude Avg. Flying Time Avg. Distance Flown (Nautical Air Miles)

:15
:54.

15:.36
;~IG73

15:39
2871

15:37
2872

FDEL CONSUMPTION
Consum.ed To Target
I

Average
MaxilllUlD

3994
J;:72

36'88
3877 ,366$

3844
/.,2.72

3631 4325 ]201

«~

Minimum

37E:C

3668

Consumed From Target To Base I (AlC· Without UalfWlction) Of Aircraft Average Ifaximum llinimWl

Ko.

23 2433 2700 2183

22

145

na
2414 3333 1545

2476 3050
2004

21.54 3050 ::004

Consumed Frail Target To Base: (i/c With Malfunction)
Ifo.

or

Aircraft Average
llaximull

tJon6

No.w

None

6

-

-

II:I..n11IWI
Total FIlel

-

-

-

6344 7216 6117 986 1275
114

2346 2797 1542 5958 6485
5;:"28

Used

I

Average
IfaxiJIum

6286 6780
58/... 0

llinimwa Total Fu.e1 Rellabing:
Average

6314 7216 5840 1004. 1460 114 404.2 2.20 318505

10~1 1460 5eO 402.9 2.19 157618

889

llaxinnm
Mini.l1m

1557 114 397.2 2.13 1935731

Avg. Gals. Consumed Per Hour lvg.

a.l.. Consu.ed

405.4
2.21

Pel" tile

TOTAL FUEL USED OK AIRBORHE

Ale

160887

Ale ter whicb fuel data are available • .!. Does not incluc..te 1 ai.rcnft lr.ndinll. :'It Iwo

*

Jj 'lll'l.

,

...... ~

ANNEX

11'

BOMBER COllWiD PIELl) ORDER

IM_.·

.M

FROM:
TO :

BOMCOM XXI
BOM'WG BOMV!G 313 BOM',IG 314

'1"

SEC RET --,...---

By Auth of CG XXI BC , Initials

.e;p

1'3 fJAC(/?d 1/);-Date

XXI BOMBER COMMAND GUAM 0800 13 Uarch 194.5 FIELD ORDERNO. 46 MIDDLEL:AN NO.2.

Kobe Urban.
1. 2.

Maps for plotting: Japan Aviation Chart Aiming point reference .x:;·~IBam Com Litho

1,,1osiac 90.2, No.

1:218,880

Omitted.
The XXI Bam Com will at ta ck urban imum. effort on "0" Day •

area of Kobe with max-

.3.

a.

73rd Wing: (1) Take off time:
(0)

First A/e of pathfinders: 10 minutes. First A/C of main force: enroute: of attack:

Zero houl,' minus Zero hour.

(b)
(2 )

Altitude

4,000 to 4,,00 feet. 6,000 to 6,800 feet. Force ReguiIed
1/2 force

(3) Altitude
(4)

Aiming Point
(8)

Axis of Attlli 08 degrees true

074139 0,6123

(b)

08 degrees true

1/2 force

(5): Bomb load:
(6)

Pothfinder: Six.alrornft deaignt'ltedas pathfinder A/e will lOAd M-76 500 lb. inoendiary bombs. Main 1'oroj!l:Viill load incendiary olusters conteining M-69 bombs to the extent of available supply. RemD1nde~ will load l·i-l ?Al Incendiill,"Y clusters. InCluded in every 3rd A/e will be one 500 lb. Frog cluster fused to open ,,000 ft. below A/O.
oft t; im.e :

(b)

b.

313th Wing:
(1 ) Teke

(al

First A/e of l'8thfiJ1ders: 10 minutes.

Zero hour minus Zero hour.

(b) First A/e of main force:
(2) Altitude enroute: (3) Altitude of attaok:

5,000 to 5,500 feet. 7,000 to 7,800 teet.

S 1!l C .... ---- RET -

§'!QE.!!
FIELD ORDER NO. 46 (CONTINUED)

(4) Aiming point: 09:5140 (5) Bomb load:

Axis of Attack
10 degrees

Foroe Required All A/e

true

(a) Pathfinders: Six A/e designated as pathfinder A/e will load M-76 500 lb. Incendil'+_:'
ary bombs. (b) Main force: \"dll load incendiary clusters oonteining iA'-69 bombs to the extent of available supply. Reroninder of force wi 11 load ~d-l7Al incend:Lary 01usuars , Incl uded in prescribed bomb load in every 3rd A/e will be one 500 lb. Frag cluster fused to open 3.000 ft. below A/C.

c.

314th Wing: First A/e of pathfinders: minutes. First A/e of m8in force: minutes. enroute: of rttaok:

(1)Take off time:
(a)

Zero hour minus 40 Zero hour minus 30

(b)

(2) Altitude

3,000 to 3,;00 feet. ;.000 to ;.~OO feet.
Force required

(3) Altitude
(4) Aiming

paint

Axis of att~ck

04;13;
(5)

06 degrees true
Load :

All A/e

Bombing

Pathfinders: Six aircraft design~ted os pathfinder A/e will load with M-76 500 lb, incendiFlry bombs.

Main foroe: Will load incendhry 01usters oonteioing M-6~ bombs. Inoluded 1n prescribed bomb load in every 3rd A/e will be one ,00 lb. Frag cluster fused to open 3,000 ft. below A/C.
(6)~he

target. Tuke off time, altitude for observDtion and plane for observation JIi./e will be left to the dis~ oretion ot the 314 Wing.

ot conduoting ':\n bservation of the bombing ot the o

314 Wing will dispetoh one B-29

Ale

tor purpose

x.

(1) lJethod of ott"'ck: By indlvidu'll airoraft at-

tacking with minimum interval between aircraft. A definite rad~r bombing run will be mnde over a radar aiming point before milking a viau'!!1 correction. BAse

(2)

Routes: 27l5N - l40.53E '353N - 1350330E 3419N - 1350630E (IP) Terget
2500N ;t4}OOE

§.;m.Q.E!1
FIELD ORDER NO. 46 (CONTnroED) 3444N 134.5.5E :nOON - 1344.5E
{a} In turn off from the target Ale will fly West of the line between point 3444N 13455E and 3300N - 13445E to avoid possible cb11ision with inco~ing aircraft.

Base

(b) A front is forecasted to be in path of prescribed route. All "lings will pene=r: " trote front ~t 1,000 ft. The ;14th Wing will fly a~proximately 20 miles West of the prescribed course. The 313th Wing will fly the -prescribed course and the 73rd. Wing will fly apnroxi.mately 20 East of' the ~rescribed course. {o}

Ale

will avoid flying over Jupanese is~ lands enroute to avoid possible flak damfl.ge.

(3 )

Fuse setting: (o ) (b)

M-76 IB, Instontllneous nose, non de 1,'" y
toil.

E.-28 and E-36 clusters fused to open 2,000 ft. above tllrget. M-17 cluster, fused to open 3,000 ft. above
target.

(c) E-46 fused. to open 2500 ft, above target. (d) (4)
(.5)

Calibrated

airspeed on bombing run - 2,0 1{PH. setting: Minimum train. 50 teet.

Intervalometar (a~ (b)

M-76 bombs:
All olusters;

(6) Bombing inst~uotlons: Crews will be cautioned to check position oarefully before releasing bombs. In previous ~lss~ons bombs were dropped in tire et~rted outside of t~rget oren. A ooncentration of tires within assigned zones is definitely desired. . (7) ~or tbls misaion pine Rnd Car-o-se~l wire may be removed from fuses prior to t!:1ke off. (8) All ai~or9rt will s3lvo 1.~ediatelY tennlo.meter bas been run through. ing bomb boy tnnk!! will ml1ke use ot bars on A-2 end A-4 releases unless
modified.
(9)

A/e o~rryspreader

otter in-

otherwise

Ammunition 10ad1ng: Tail turret· only will be looqed in 7~rd 'lnd 313th Wings. Lower forward and aft turrets will be landed in the 314th Vling. Maximum. load of 200 rounds per authorized turret will be loaded.

§'~2.R!!
FIELD

ORDER NO. 46 (CONTINUED) (10) GunnGry instructions: Tail gunner will be instructed to fire at aeriol targets only and only when fired upon. Only side gunner-s in the 314th Wing will be pcrm.itted to fire Lowe r turrets nnd ground objects will be the only targets. Bombardier definitely will not control lower forward turret. enoe will not be made in other aircrftft on bombing run.

(11) Radar sets will be turned off for 45 minutes immediat31y after leaving tf!rget so interfer-

(12) ,

Aborting '1ircr!:1ft route out will turn 90 on degrees from "')rescribed route heading and flY' .5 minutes beforo turning on return heading.
liD" Doy nnd

( 13)

Zero Hour:

162020K.

4.

e. b. n.

No change. This is XXI Bom Com Tactical Mission No. 43. (1) Redia silence will ~revail enroute to target except in cases of extreme emergency. (2) Radio homing plnnas will carry one spare radio homing transmitter and one sp~re liaison Dynamotor. (Heference XXI Bom Com Regulation 10037) Altitudes, fre~uencies, and identifioation signRls for homing Ale ere deSignated as follows:
LLTITUDE FRE'7UENCY

5. Communications:

IDENTIFICATION
J K

25,000 26,000 27,000

362 KCS 40.5 KCS 486 KGS

P

(3) J'''1;;urdng tactios may be employed

by onemy but at least one of three rreq~enoies should be open.

(4) No oontaot reports will be sent enroute to target. Oont~ot reports will be sent on return route only when north of 28 degrees north.

(5) Wings will deSignate one plene per squadron as
the only plone to trcnsmit"Q strii(e report.
(e)

Speoial strike report will consist of time 6ver tnrgat (GMT), target bombed, method at bombing, oloud cover~ge, resUlts obta1nei. t1ghter opposition and tl~k opposition. - Over target (GMT)
.. p ~

!!!!!!.
Target bombed ~~ethod of Bombing Cloud coverage
-V

Primary
Visual

- R - Radar - N - Nflvlgation - 1 to ~ for tenths, X for 10/10

§.lQ.:B.!I
FIELD ORDER NO. 46 (CONTINUED)

Bombing rasults

_ I\. ...

GeneralconflaSeverAl large tires
Many fire.s

... B
... C

gratlon

... D

... E Fighter op1)ositlon

Fewscatterad

Unobserved
Heavy

tires

... A ... B

... 0
... D

Mod.srote

Meager None

Flak op1)osltlon

... B ... Moder8to ... ..Meager C

... A .. Heovy

... ...one DN

MON'l'OOMERY

.£R~

FG~

D/OPNS

DISTRlBUtIO~

:

2

to en wing

SECRET

DI3'l'1lIBIJ'l'IOH LIST

.J.llil

DISTRmUTIoN taCTICAL HISSIONREfQRTS

Copy

NS.
Oener~l. Twebtieth ~ir Poree Gene rDl, DCI B amber Command Brigadier General La Vern~ Saunders Deputy Commander, Twentioth ~ir Faroe Ch1.ef of Staff. ~entieth Air Foroe Chief of Staff, XXI Bomber CO!lllllQ.nd Deputy cIs. Opns, XXI Bomber Commf:l.nd
Commanding Command ing Deputy AC of

1

2 2A.

3 4-

IS

6 T 8 9

S, k.2,

CIS,

Sup

10 13 14

11 12

Commanding Attn: AC/AS, Intelligenoe Commander in Chief, Pacific Ooean Arens

Bomber Command Geneml. Army A.ir Forces,

XXl

& Malnt,

XXI Bomber

Command

(AdvHq)

15

16 18 20

l7
19 21

22 23
U

25
26

27-28 29 30-31

32
31

COlJIID8.ntilng General,

Commander in Chief, Po.oi£'10 OOonn Arens (Renr Hq) Chief of Nn~l Operntions. OP-16-V Joint Inta11i~nce Center, Po.oifio Ooean Areas Commander J..ir Force. Paoific Floet Commander, Fifth Fleet Commander. First Carrier Tnsk Forco Commnnder, Forward !roo. CommandIng General, U.S. Army Foroes in Far East Commnnding General, U.S. Army Forces; Pe.cifI0 Ooea.n AreaS COllllllanding General, Allied Air Forces, SouthYl'llst PaoU'ic Arens CommD.nding Genera.l, SWl'A, Attn: a.2, (For Section 22, ROll) Comma.nding Genero.l, FQr East 1..ir Foroes Commanding Gener~l, U.S. Strategio Air Forces in Europe Commanding General, Eighth Air Forca COllllllo.ndlng 'Gene rD.l, lIedi terro.neo.n ..i.llied ForCe8 Air OOJlllDarding General. Fitteonth Air For08 tlollllUa.Ddlng General. Seventh 1.11" Force 00lllllla.J¥11ng Generd, VII Bomber Comma.nd

~

sa
36

Fighter CollUDCU\Cl ~Ir Force CQlllllla.Dding OaMral, XX Bomber COllllllB.nd Command1ng General, 38th Flying Train1ng Wing OODllllnnd:ing Oenero.l, 68th BOl$a.rdment Wing

VII

Command1ng

General,

Eleventh

CommDCllng

5'7 38 59 60 41

COIIIIIIaD41ng General, OOllll1o.ndlng Oenernl, OCIIDIID.nd1ng enero.l, G OOllllll4ncl1ng Off1oer,

Oenera.l,

73rd

Bomba.rdment

Wlag

'2 .q
46

Oommanding
Obllll1oiLl

4e-&'7

"

1fnI'fe.:re 01'1'1081', XII BOlllber OolllllllUld Ta.ctios • Trll1ning Sedtlon. J,. .. 3. XlI Bomber COllllllanci Ordn&noe Ottl~.r,XJl Domper Oomman4 Oommamlng General, XXI Bomber COlllJland, o,taohment lAHbtorical Officer, .lXI Bomber Oommand

Otricor.

33rd Statl.tlca1

S13th Bombo.rdmOnt Wlft~ 314th Bombardment Wing 31Sth ~ompardlllent Wing 3rd Pho1!o Recon ~qudron
dontTol

Unit

78 79 80 81 62 83 84 65 86 87 86 89

92
9:5

91

90

94 95
96 97

00

100
l~ 102 103 104 105

911

-

115

Comme.ndingGe ner e.l, Army Air F proe B. ATTJi: AC/ AS Intelligen.ce, Colleytion Division AM' Evaluation BOl)l'd, c/o Headquarters AAFPOA CQmmanding Offlcor, 6th Bomb Group (VR) Commanding orr 1c er, 9th Bomb Gr oup (VII) Commanding Orrico:!', 16th Bomb Group (VB) Commanding orrioe.r, 19th Bomb Group (VB) Commanding Of,fioer, 2~th Bomb Group (VB) Commandl.ng Of'f'lcerI39t!~ Bomb Grqup (VB) Comm.ll.lldlng 10 er , 40th Bonb G.ro up (VB:) Comman~llfg Off.l0~I',.~30t:h Bomb Group (VH) O,gmmandlng Officer, 3315t Bomb Group (vn) COllllllanq,ing Offioer. 444th Bo~h Group (VB) Comm"ll.~iing Officer. ~62nd Bomb Grol1P ('lH) Command! rlg Offi eel', 456 th Bomb Group (VlI) Co~a.ndlng Offioer, '97th Bomb Group (v:e:)' COfllm!1l'1ding Ofrt~r, 498th Boll'lliC!t'oup (VB) Oommanding Ofrloe~, 499th Bo~b Group (VR) Gomm.anding Officer, SOOth Bdtnb Group (VB) Command in,! ClIff' iO'sr. 501 s t Bomb Group (VB) Comlll.llnding Offioer, 502nd ltomb G1"'OUp (VB) COInmMding Of'fieel', 504th Bomb Group (VB) Comma.n.ding Officer, S05t.h Bomb Group (VH) Commanding Officer, 655thBonib Sll (H) (WR) Commanding Officer, Twentieth Air Fo.roe Lell;d (Jre" S~hool CODUtio.rul ing lee r , lSthF Lgh tel' Gro upCommanding Otricr;;cr. 21st "Fj,ghter GTou.p Commanding Officer, SOOth Ftghter Group A-a, RaportingUnit. JCXI Bomber O'omm.and (FUe Copy) A-a; Reporti.ng Un1 XXIB.omber Command t,

orr

orr