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UISSION F

NO.

4.5' 104

to WN

24. MAR 1945 NO.

COpy

BEADQUAltTERS XXI BOUBER COWAND
AP0234

ThCTlCAL YlSSION R8P0RT
Field Order No. 48 Target
I

mallion Iii1 taublahl Aircraft . (90 ...20-,193)

Ho. 4IS

Engine Work8

24 lI&rob 1946 'fablo 01' Oontent. TactIcnl Narrative ••

••

• • • • • • ••••
•••••• •••••••••• and Scope ChaM: Charts •• • • • • ... • • • • •
0 •••••••

Annex A- operatIons •••••••• • Part I - NaVigatIon Ohart • • Part I I - Radar Approach Chart Part III .. FUght EngIneering Part IV .. Racial' Report •• • Part V - Air_Sea Rescue Chart

10

·•.
••

11 11
14-

16

17

Mn'sx B - Weather • • • • • "• • • • • •••••• Part I - Weather Summary •• •••••• Part II .. Chart .. Forecn!lt Weather VB. Observed '7eo.t.ber •••• ••• Part III - Prognostio Map • • • • • •. • • • • Part IV - Synoptic Map ••• • •• •••• Annex C - COl!IJnuniontlons • • • • • • • •
I Part I _Ro.d0."f

·.

18 19
21
22 23

C9untG~

Mell$J,1l'es
0 0 • •


••
0

Part II - Had!o '. • • •
1.nnex

D .. Intelligence

• ••• P art I - EnelllY.\:11' Opposl tion • • • • Part II .. Enelmy Antlo.ireraftand Alr·-to-Air BOlllbing •••••••••• Part III ..Bombing .Resul til o.nd D!lJ1I!:loge
• II • ..

. . . . .' . ·. . ... . ...
.. •

24
25 26 29 30


• 0

31

/.lIsellsmant

••••••••••••

Annex E - Consolidated

Statistical

Summary •• Order

l'Dp!;lXF ~ XXI Bon'lberColDIno.ndFlsld Annex G .. DhtributlQI1 •••
... ,lit

·.

"

. . ·. ·.
!It " •

4.2

53
58

• •••

••

Prepared

Bye

m

A..2 Sect10n

Bomber COIlllll!U\d

,.1.,.1'1.11111.1.111111
1

I-

_By

J I

zs/~/4S
Date

m

SECRI! 1 JAth. of tbe O. G•• BOIIIb.Z' Command

••

.Jl>6..
Ift1tlal.

1

1111"1111111110111111111

m

H~UARTERS BO loSER CClJUAND !PO 2M

27 April 19'5 SUBJECT. lleport of Operationa. TO. 3' Maroh 1~'5 'faah1npOll 26, D. O.

Comma.niling General,' Twentieth Air Force,

1.

IDENtlfICATION

OP MISSION'

'. Field Order No. 48, Headquarters XII Bomber Oommaad, dated 24. llarch 1945, directed the 73rd, 313th and 3Uth BOIIlbarclaent Wings to oommit a normal .f'oroe on 24 Maroh to attack th$ lI1t.ub1sb1 Airora~t Engine Worka in Nagoya. b. Targets Specified.

(1) Primary Target] The lUtaubish1. Aircraft Engine Works, lUI shown on m Bomrer Command Lltbo-Kosalc No. "90.20--193. and &s designated on the POlt-strike picture of Da.me.ge Aueument Report in Annex D, Part III, ot: this report.

(2)

No aeoondary or last

resort
I

targets

were 'pacltied

STRATEGY PLANOF OPEMT ION .AND

a. Reasons for Selection 01' Tanett Reoent operations _ indicated low-alti t'Ade. night radar bombing against priority airoraft plants could be carried out luccessfully and econom.1oa.lly betore the en~y cO'uld effectIvely cO'unter this new tactioal use of VHBaircraft. BeG~u!e of the good radar orf~et alming points and the plant'. proximity to t'he coaatl1n1'1 this tllrge-t WIlS aeleoted to help perfect this new technique. the weather forecast presented on. 23 Yarcb indioa.ted route and base condi tiO'na favorable for 8uch II. min ion aDd. firm deCiaion was made to attack. b. Importance. -9f TUgetl According to general intel1i~nc. souroea,the lHtlubisbi Aircra.ft EngIne Worka is one of. the two largest manufacturers of engi~1 for Japanese combat planes, 1. 4~rterent types bafn~ prodube4_ Moat of these are older types under 1500 bor ••• power, but some are new models of 1600 horsepower or more. ru. factory ~ellTered eng~nes to 9 different airframe assembly plant •• indicating the degree to' w~lQh the Japanese airplane industry was dependent on it. Engines were being shipped 9.B oVerseas replacement units lUl.~ aleo to Vo.rlOll8 Army and Navy a1r arsenals in Japan. A totlll of 20 different planes had some of their engines supplied. by this pla.nt, including several of the more important new types.

0,.

P2tPeils

of Plg.nninc··Ope ra;tbnRlI
I

(1)

Bomb1.ng .P1onB (a)

~rm1np.tion

of Bomb LoW'

1. The 31&tb Wing, assigned the task ot pin pointing and lighting the target with flares for 30 minutes, assigned lOairorllf't to ea.ch of these phue8. Their plana and loads .. re ... follows :
.. The 11 ..26 flares. best available tor lighting a target of' this type. were to be dropped by 10 plane. trom ana.ltltude of 8000 to 10,000 feet and fused to open at 3000 feet, II. setting which should give maximum illumination and maxlDltlll eff.ottve burning time. T.hls should Ught tM target clearly for a dlltallO. lip to 3 and 4. ml168 and permit the main.force aircraft to bomb ri.~ll,y until incendiaries had started eufficlent fires for contillue4 vi.u&1 'bombing. To supplament the flares e.n4 ark tba lOQation of the target so thD;t it could be BeeD from d1ata.ncee up to 15 miles. 10 plnnu were to carry M-17 inoendiary olllSters. Tht. Wo.lI to enab'l.e crews to kill eeur ae and rate and thus be set tor .. vi sual run when the!l.imingpoi.nt Wall seen. The incendiary oluater. were fllBed 1;:Q open at 3000 .feet and were seleoteeS for the probability of their setting numerous brilliant fires with.ln the target area,.

.s..

.!. Bombing aircraft of the ml!l.in force were te be loaded With 2 M ..76 lnoendiarYbombs CrUiSedinstantaneous nose aM non-d.elay tail) and as ~ SOO.pound general-purpose bombs (1/100 delay nose, non-delay tail) lUI fea:sible. The latte.r WUB considered the most effective high-explosive weapon because principe.! buUd.inga in the ta:rget area were of normtll epan nnd no.t .lSubject to spreading collnpse. The 1/100 dehy nose fuzing wa.s to a.ttain bomb burets 6 to 8 feet beneath the roof, there,bydamnging both maChines and strllO .. tLlJ"8S. The n.on-delny tail .f'udng wa.s selected to obto.in ltCilab blU"8t of nenr lIIis58&at grOWld lavel to obtain m!lXimWD. blast efrect on nearby buildings. Tha M.76 bomb W!;I.S chosep. beca.uae it lied. ballistic qualities dmllar to the 500-pound general-purpose bomb o.nd could be used in mixed loads.
load of M_l1 incendiaries

A.

Every twe1.fth al rcral't was to· carry for reasons listed in paragraph.1.

It.

a 1'1111

". Each drar aft equipped w1th II; 1-1911 camsre. to oarry 1 photoflash lI-46 bomb with drflg plate removod. and loadod to ('eleallG last. TiZlOfuting wa,5 !!amea& ac,tunl time of fall fOJ'hip eJlloo plolllive bombs 1n ordfl.r to o'btdn best .trike photography and to give maximum number of bo.mbbursts in each pioture.
W&S

give

gree:wst are'.a•.

1. Mintllltl1ll. ground spaoing wall to be usacl to pOlll1ible cOI1t:entrat1on of all 'bo.mhs within the toJ'yot
me.;ei:m,U:

tonna.se

§"... Airc.reJ''t weN' loaded to obtain of each type of tIIllnitJon on'the ta.rg9t.

Al£B.lI

each to 1 minute

make

1. The 10 p ..tbt 1rlders of the 31nh Wins .. re 3 run. over the t2rget trom different directions with. interval between each plane.

!. Two aiming pOints were .. d gned , 1 in the a west part of the faCtory and 1 in the eut part. All aircraf't l1ael1 a cammon initial point (34/36/301 • ~36/33/00m). A%.a of attack, altitudes of flight and attaok, and commitment of forcea foilowl

l'l1nc.
73rd 3l3th 3l4th and

Axil of Attaok frgm 0AP
27 degrees 32 degrees

Altitude on Rqyte Out4000

Altitude of Att,ek 8000 to 6800 1000 to 7800 7000 to 7Soo 7000 to 7800

Poroe A,,1W4 All All 50% 011
each

True True 27 Degree, True 32 Degree. Trl1e

to

~OO

5000 to 5500 7000 to 7800 1000 to 7800

·.ill Wing. were given the option of fly1ng 500 feet on top ot onrcut if' practioable and desirable. Grol1nd speeds vQJ'ied between 225 and 300 ml1u per hour for quick withdraw .... l after relea..4 or 'bomb. Il.l'Ji ch'1tts were between 5 to 7 degree. right.

l. The 3l4th Wing also dispa.tcbed 1 airoraft with a qualified commander who was to act as a ·master of ceremoDJ.,· in maki~ My important announoements concerning taotics. In addition. he was to relay from time to time cloud base to planes of the main torce. This plane was also to take photographs of the tar~t area at the conclusion of' the attack.

I

J. Attack '11&8 to be made by individual drcratt, with 1 minute interval between planes. A definite radar bombing run was to be made over a radar aiming point befpre visual correction waa made.
(2) Nav1gatloaal Plann1gga
RegnDs

RmIt4
Base

tOT

Cheio,

to
Iwo Jima

to 34/l6N - 136j45/30E to
34/36N - l36/33E

Iwo Jimat

A check polnt for radio and radar

ala ••

Landfall I A ~ood radar ldentification cheek, pe~mitting direct access to initial point. Inlthl point in Nagoya BaYI The route to the off.et aiming pOint.
lDOSt

to

dlrect

Target to
IVlo Jima

Immediate right turns to be made oft the target to get planes out of the heavily detended area as quickly as po.sible.
!WO

Jlma

to
Base

pOint.

l!I,~ain be uaed to

BIll

a ne,vlgati.onu "'heck'

II.2JJ1
(3)

'Ught
(a)

lii¥ipeorlQ1 PlWipCl Plan'

Flight

l. Speedll and altitudes, except tor bOlllbing rlUl or 250 mph oalibrated air IIpeed to ~et aircraft ~ from target as quiokly all pOllll1ble, were planned tor m&.X1111W1l fuel eoonomy and lIare•• Entire fli&nt was to be m~e by lndlTldual_plan8s.
(b) Loading.

1. Fuel reserTa data of prorlou.s lllisllioa IDcUcated that the avetage aircraft of the 73rd and 313th Wi~1I did. not require bomb ba.y tanks. Wing and center wing tanks were to be tilled to oapaoity for an average fuel load of eeoo gallons. Aircraft of the 314th Wing required an additional full bomb bay tank tor a tuel load of approximately 7300 gallons.
J. Bomb Load.
A. 10 maxirAum or DdnilllWll bollb load •• speoified. Average load for the 73rd and 313th Winge waa estimated at 16,000 pounds, while tor the 314th Wing it waa estimated at 10.000 pounds, the differenoe being due to tbe 314th Wing'e greater 41etance to the target.
of Wing Commander_s.

1.

Ammunition

load was left to disoretion

(4)

R~dar Planning.

(a) Tho raciar route .eleoted for this low-altitude strike was essentially the same as for the 2 preTioue incendiary atta.cks on Nagoya. (See Taotical Misslon Reports Boa. 41 and 44.) All runs were 1.nit10.t8d on radar. A new offset aiming pOint, tho northeast ~»ner of the inner harbor. waf used. The harbor showed up _11 on the soope. and there were many oheck pOints on it. (b) Route from initial point to ta.rget was altered on recomlllendation trom the lYings (a straight ccur-se from initial point through the dffsot aiming point to the aiming points' to simplify oftset bombi~ problems. (0) Initial point 'IRIS 0. distinct indentation of la.n4 southwest of the target on IS6 Dav. (For detailed ro.do.rIlpproa... see Soope Chart RS-19 and Radar hea Approaoh Chart RA-Ii! in Annex A. PQ,tt II.) (5) nals on frequencies (6) Radar gounter.Measurg!l (a.) Routine searoh was planned for enemy radar .igbetween 36 and 3000 mos by 8 radar observers. A1.r-Sea Rescue Planningl

(a) The Navy was furms bed wi th details of the ma. sion and waS requested to furnish available faoilities' for alr-sea. ~soue pu~oses. FaCilities furnished followl

lJ,SZlJiI 1. Three su.bmarine. udgned to 11t.'I.1.... du.ti81 were IItationed for the entire ahdon ... tollOWllI WOOI137/301. 32/ooN - 138/15E, and 30/001 - 139/00£ •
.&. '1'lIr .. Dwabe ail']llan .. were &Saltine. to position., 30/0ON _ 139/00E dlU'1a& t1lu .r retllm fl1ghtl 22,100N- 1U/30E froll 24.8000Z utll end of 11111.,. _4 .. l44/00E from 242100Z until end of mission.
this following

1'/_~

1. Surt_c. vas.els were ass1gne4 .. t41.. , 1 for the e.ntire lIIission at 18/001 • Utl30!, a, dostropl' at IS/ool .. l4.0/00E 1'1'011 2407001 until 250800Z, and a destroyer .soort at-1Sl/OOlt' • 1.4/00E during the entire mission. J. Three orub boat. were statloned durlni the or itical take-ott and landing times: 1 in lI.gioi.De 8q; 1 between Saipe.n and Tinian, and 1 southWest of North Field at Gilam.
(b) Thls Command assigned 2 Super Dumbo airplane. the tollowing poal tions. 32/00. - 138/151- from 24.15301 Imtil 241730Z. and 2't\5N - HO/lOB: from 2417301' IUlU1 2&193OZ. ODe B1apeJ' Dumbo _8 on ground alert from 240730ZWltll end of lIi .. 10o. Cae. Anne~ A, Part V, for details.) to orbit Ii. Details of PlonniD' .. IntelUPMe
I

(1) ipslIlY' Air Opposition: General intelligenoe 8ourC •• indioat3d there were nt maximum 180 single-engine fighter. nnd 64 twiaengine aircraft in B. SO-mile radius, o.nd 252 s ingle-engine f'lghter. and 64 twin-engina aircraft in n .00 mile radius. Past experience indioated there would be some night opposition from twin-eng1ne planes and possible daylight, single-engine plane - searohlight comblaation.. HOwever. these bad proved ineffective, and enemy aircraft cona14erat1ons did not enter into plann1ng for this miss10n.
I

(2)

Ant1niroraft

and Air-to-Air

Bombing:

(a) BM,vv.AlA GUM t Nagoy(lwas defended by 200 heavy guns, practlco.lly all of whi;;h were within range of our aircraft at some time. Heavy fire also was expected from sbipping in Nagoya and Ise Bays. Accurac¥ of Ure was expected to improve on thi. mission. the third simllo.r IltTike on Na,goya. (b) Automatip ',liupop" There were a.pproximatoly 110 automatic weapona in the area. Although they had not been a major defense ~apon on previoue miSsions, their fire was expected to be more effective if searchligh tracking improved. (c) SeBf9hl1ghtBI Approximately 54 .. archli~t. bad been reported in the area. and an additional SO had been reported ~. iilong the eWflrea <Of' lise B'ay.' SenrohHgh etteo'tivenesll on the .eoo04 Nagoya.mission had shown Blight impl'OVemen't> over th~, t1rst;. 1r geed 'lieatheF' oond!t~Otll!l ..xist&~.· bette~ SStU-obllght ~aoklng ·wa.a expeoted (d) BarrHa 8a1100nll Three or 4 '&arrage balloonll flying from 2000 110 5000 teet were reported on P\\st Nagoya nIght .aullcea, but 'I:'l00 "of',those were on t)le proposed fl.x1.8 ot attack f'rCfll Ii~ Ba,y
,to the tnl'ge'l;

(e)

§ttegt

PO flQnpipCI

.1. Since thh .tr 1ke Wall approximately on tile Same QXis of ~tt~ck as the other missions, aircraft were instruoted to bomb tram 6500 to 9500 feet and ind1 vidud drcntt were stagerecl in altitude between these optimum limits. Tbe,e instructioDS were based on the following r~8onSI
.A. An increa.sed percentage of a1rcratt damaged due to antiairoraft bad occured in the prior a mi.· 810DIU Nagoya It.12 March, 6.95 per cent, and NllgOya 18-19 Uaroh, 9.7 per cent.

lost ~d

.k. Antin1rohft increase on a repeated plan of attack.
impossible

ef'tect1vene.s was known

to

,£. Change frem proposed o,x18 ot attack was because ~ good radar run on the target was nece •• ary.

!. I~ was decided that aircraft break away to the east and southeast following bombs away to get out of the heav117 defended area. At land's end, defenses of Toyohash1 and were to be avoided.

Bame.ma""

3.

EIECUl'ION OF

THE

MISSIOH:

a. tpke-ofr: Take-otf was llCoompl1shed as planned. with the 314th Wing·. 20 pathf1nder and pin-pointing aircraft leaving prior to other aircraft. Actual take-off was as followsl

~
73rd 31 3th 314th

Ale M rbollnsa 122
79

First AlC 0736Z 0720Z
0652Z

Lost Ale
0647Z 0829Z

50 251·,

07411 OS"Z

m

Bomber Command Total

0652Z

• The ri~r. includes 2 Super DumboB for .the 73rd Wing and 1 observation photo misalon ·~ster at ceromonies· for the 314tb Wing. No take-off difficulties were encountered. b. Route Out I Nav1g(l.t1onon the ~oute out wall relatively ensy beCause of Loran ~nd good smooth celestial weather witb few cloud •• Some light rain -bower.' were enoountered, but landfall was easily identified. Radar was used tor pilotnge. The wInd was a& briefed. 310 degrees and 35 knots.
11.

0nr 'fauat:

(1) h1mVY Tar gat a D1fi'iculties encountered 0'1'81' the target were all follows I oloude _l!O 4./10 stratocumulus. base 3000 f_t. 'tops 7000 to 8000 teet; 8moke reduoed visibility from 15 to 2 mHuJ poor lighting by flare8 hindered bombardiers, and bombardiers made erroneoUIJ correct.lol'lJl In.cen.dio.ry omb, that had not been dropplSd Oil on b the target. In all, 126 aircraft bombed by radar and 96 made visual relea.ses, dropping 1507,6 tons of bombs on the target from lSOOZ to 16l7Z at altitudes ranging trom 5650 to 9600 feet.

(2) Lo,.t Rourt Tarat. Tbroe drcraft of the ?Sri _III (including 1 th:'lt aleo bombed th3 prima.ry) 'Dombell Toyotashi and Shiap -from l604Z to lUOZ at altitudes froID 6000 to 'JOOO teet. u-opplDC 17.8 tons of general-purpose bombs and 1 ton of incendiaries. (3) Target. of Opportupity. One nirple.ne of the 31:5th Wing bombed a.n unknown target at an IUllc:nown time. dropping 6.6 tOJUI ot gen.ero.l-purpo se bombs and one-hlllf ton 0.1' inc endiar ies. (4) Twenty-two aircraft wero non-efrectlve. see Consolidated Sto.tistioal Summary, Annex E. d. indiVidually Route BOckl In general, by the shortest route. all aircratt returned POl' deta1l., to base

e. Landingl Aircrll:rt ot the l118.inorce landed at baae Ilftder f good weo.ther condi tionl 1.1 follows.

IW
313th 514th

Firat
2046Z

Ale

lAst

AlC

73rd
Total

.mu 2046Z

2l11Z

.&U2Z
2340Z

2311Z 23l7Z

Four aircrnft

landed at Iwo Jlma in order to refuel.

t\. ~I Five aircraft were lost on this m18s10n as follows: ; as a reeult of unknown reasons. 1 en route to tQf'get when en eng~ne caughb fire (ditching) J and lover the target due to antiaircraft. ('!'he tonnages of 3 are included under ·Primary Target· and I under ''fu.rgets of Opportunity·.)

s-

Ope ration.

Sumll!!lry: See Annex A ror po.vigo.tiop track oharta.

(1)

Nn.viUtiOD1

(2) Bombing The dUficul tie s encountered over the tP."gft. t listed 10 pe.ro.grnph :3 e (1). brought forth the following commenta and con4i deratl ons 'for ru ture operet ions. (a) Bec~use of the li.itod field of v.ision ot the bombsigh~ tol~soope. ita use tor this type of night bombing wns h~pered. It 1s though.t tbat the use of the reflex optios, now en rOllte to this Command,may possibly have resulted in better bombing. needed. the target and better (b) Mora effective tnrget Some methods suggested follow: illuminntion methods wero

1. Flures should be released not direotly oyer but perpendicular to the axis bf attack for sUhollettll1g lighting of the target.

£. Teams of 4 pl~nea should be used. with 1 carrying incendlnries and flares to light up the target for the other :3 oarrying high.explosive bombs.
~iror~t ~. 1n order to light Flarss should be on the last stntion the target for sucoeeding ~l~ea •
ot'

eADh

... 1-

(0) A major 4isn4vanta,e or u.inc incendiary baab. for target me.rkin~ wa.stheir being employed as a.1m1ng points evea_eft they were not plaeed on the target. (d) It is possible that better bombins results would hc.w been obtained by putting a larger number rJt airoraft over the target In a. s.horter time in order to reduce the impairing of visibility by smoke. (3) Flight Enginaerip'l

(a) Ipitial OrQia.. Altitudes and sp.e48 tloWQ on the initial cruise were 0.8 planned--al1 aircraft climbing to designated alti tu.des between 4000 o.nd 6500 feet immediately atter take_ott. Thi. procedure proved to be comparable in fuel economy to previous l1is&1oaa haVing a very low altitude initial cruise. It also provided gronter orow ~omrort, better navigation, and increased sattey. lhis mi.sion plan was o.nother phue of the tests being conducted 'by this COIIdIIaD4 to determine best prooedure for maximum tuel econo~. Ho eleaeata or groupe were a8sembled during the m1s8iop. bombing altitude were used. (b) C11mbto bombing alt1tu411 T1merequired tor climb varied greatly since many type. of prooedure.

(c) Crube to Torget. Very 101t' power. were required to obtain maximum range air speed in the orulae prior to starting the bombing run, the apprOximate average pOller Betting bUng 2000 rpm and 30.6 inches mo.nifold pressure. A'terage power setting required to obtain 250 mph calibrated air speed on the bombing run waS approxim~tely 2350 rpm and 41 inches of manifold pressure. (d) Return tp BB''' III neurly 0.11 onael, returns to b~8e were m~e at 5000 to 10,000 feet until approximately 1 hour from the' base where let downs at approxlmately:'lOO feet per minute wsr.e JIltl.de. Fuel oOl'l8Ul11ption data indica.ted returns at 5000 teet gave best fuel economy. (e) Commentg on MissioDI

I

.1. The 73rd Win:; (Saipnn) ca.rrie-d the f5rentost C'.vero_gc bombloud to Jllpnn to dnte, 16,957 pounds. The 3Uth \flng, loented on Gu4m. loaded 4 of its betteJ' a.iror&f't with approxim:l.toly 17,000 pou.nds of bombs nnd 6750 gallons of fuel (other airorC'.rt carried 7400 gallons of fuel and approximately 9000 pounds of bombs.) Theae o.1roro.f't completed the mission and returned with en o.vernge of 846 gallons fuel reserve. only 141 gallons below the 3l4th Wing average. This proved fairly oonolusively tho.t bomb 10Ms should be varied with Ind1vidual o.ircr o.f't ~d crew capo.b1l1 tiu.
ll. For ruel oonsul)1ption nnd wlaght data, Beo COllsolldoted Statistic 01 Summary,Annex E:. For vertioo.l plot, fuel consumption. and. historical -records, see Annex A.
(4) ~~ (800 Annex A. Pnrt IV, for details) Poor to.rget illumination interfered greo.tly with bombing adjustmentll. (5) GUnnery: CFCequplment and .SO..oal1ber me.oh1negLlll.ll were each 99 per cent operathe .

.,a..

(6) Air_Sea !escuel Fi •• alrcratt were reporte. aie.iDl' one believed at 8ea. Becaus. of insufficient information the e.arch made by Super Dumbos and Dumboswa' unsuccessful.

11. Weather I (See Annex B. tor details.) Weather oon4i tloDJI were almost as predicted. Conditions were good tor take-ofr and landing, although the 31'tb Wing enoountered light rain on landing at GU~
1. Communicational I. tor coordin-

(1) Radar Counter MeUU"" (See Annex C. Part details.) Searoh result, indioated possible radar-controlled ation between ~ntiairoraft and searChlights and aD IDtrio~te ing net operating along Coast from O.$hlma to Oal0 Zakl.

e~lY"Are-

(2) Wl2a (See Annez O. Part II, for cleta11s.) A total of 21 str ike reports were tra.nami tted and reoel ved. 1J.1 15 "questa for bearings were obt~ined.
j.

Intel1hence

SU!!!!!!arv

(I) Enemy Air Opposition, (See Annex D. Part I. tor det~ils.) Air opposition was slight, only 3 attacks being made. BOweger, 1 of the misling 11-29ls mo.yhll.ve been lost to enemy airoraft.
(2) E e (See Annex 0, Part~I~IIII;, ~f~0W.rUl.lr.daet"Q~i"lU;81oi..-i'-L ...... u..:~~~~~~6L..lU~~'::='=~ lights were IDOreeffective than they had been on prevl0,ls this tQr~t. There, were many reports of rocket activity. Part

(3) Bombing ReSults and Dams,e Assessment I (See Annex for details.) New drunage to primary target totalled only 4.5 par cent of total root area. Other dumnge inflioted follows:
III,

D.

I

39 buildings

(a) Ta..rget 196 - Chi.gusa Factory, destroyed.

Nagoya Arsend

(b) Nagoya Pottery Works. reportedly oonnected to Ch1guso. Fo.otory, Nagoya Arsenal ~ 22 buildings (90 per oent of plo.nt) d.estroyed. Co••
502,000 square feet

(0)
(d)

Target 254 - Mltsubishi damaged.

Eleotric

Kanufa.cturlng Na.goyuhnenal •

5 buildings
Enti.re plant

destroyed.

Target 200 - Torilllo.tsu Factory,

.\

(e) Xureha. Textile 1.1.111 (reported of 10 buildings destroyed. (f)
Asa.sh1. Pottery

mlUlitionB plo..nt) plo.nt

I

IngB destroyod. tolled

"'orks • Entire section

or

16 bllUd-

I

(g) New do.ma~ 1n northeast 8.053,000 square feet,

of Nngoy_ to.

I
I

).1

f~rl/jlt~
GURTIS E,

LeIdAY

/

Mo..jorOe nero.l, U,S. A, Oommanding -9-

lilT

J

JJ,gJ.il

A

Part Part Part Part

I .. HIlV:1ga.tlon Chart II ... Radar Approa.ch Chart aM. Soope Chart

III .- Fl1ght

EftglD~er lag .'Cbarts

I

IV - Ra.do.rRo:eort

I
\

Part V - Air.Sea. Rescue Chart

I

-I

lIU§ion

No.

t5

24 Jlll1"oh 1945

5

!l!llJl

nUT

135·

Q

MISSION NO.• 4.L DATE 24 March'41

XXI BOMCOM.
K E '(

t.

I

~,25·-

I ---, -+_._", ---, 1 ..

!

'CHICHIJIMA

I I
I

73-2,41045Z 2412,07Z 313-241046 241:461 314- 241030241110 l'

Isf. ~

lasl

35TH I>H(lTO TECN VII"

A-a -301

SECTION

PARTlI

RADAR APPROA.CH CHART - JAPAN
SCALE 136·411'

CHART

NO. RA-2

XXI BOMBER' COMMAND

NAGOYA

1'260,000

AREA

RESTRICTED 137·00'

SE.CTION XXI BOMBER COMMAND

REPROOUCED

BY 949TH

ENGR AVN TOPO

C

(;)

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PATE

~

d..

ABI.Al9.-13

(Blind

l!R!Jlbi.ng)

(1) The be.·liG plo.n ror the IlUsaion called ror 0. rlldar D.pproMh to visual bombing or the p.rimo.ry target. The radar run W(:I.Splanned Wlth a:.P whioh could be employed for a ra.da.r relellSe 1£ ~tl.thercondl .. tiona were poor. Reports indioa.te that bomb runs begun by radar and then cho.nged to visuo.l WEIre.foroed to revert o.~aln to ro.do.r due to defiaien .. eies in th.e technique for l11umina.tlng the target. Confusion wns ctl.l.lsed in some CQ.ses by Illff'lculties 1n D..djusUng the bombing technique to suit pOor target conditionso.t the la.st minute. The plan Wa.,sto illuminate the tc.rget areo.wlth flores o.nd incendlo:.ry bombS for vi.su!;ll relens e. Only 98 out of 2240..1 rc ra.!'t made vi.sun1 releasos.

.ago wind

WIlS

(2) Of 41 radnr wind runs the nvere,ge de'11a:tlon from 12 degrees and 10 knots. (3) Ra.dar rang.e nt landfall
WEi.S

aver-

betw@en50 and 80 Geutl ..

cal miles. b. c.
sion peri.od.

SCR~718 (Radar Altimeter) S9R-69S 'IFF). Normol

.. N9rmal.

d. .iJilgN -4 (Loun) ..Tr:.;.nsml tte I" was on throughout the nUs~ Average mulmum runge was between 1000 and 1.200 DIlut1cal

miles. a.EquiPment

Perf°rmg.no9:
75rd

11." AHlAP9.-H I Operatlonal over hrget as follows: Wing, 93:C; 313th 'i!ing. 97%. and 314th "\flOg. 90.5%.

b. e, d.

SOB-7l6 I
SCR-696:

No malf"unctlons
1 failure

reported.

reported.

AJJI..\PH.f.

7 failures

reported.

-16 ..

1....-

A.JQll!l
...

__j.J_

_j

I

I

&

130'

-

Port :i.:: Air13S'

a Rose e

""
ll.

145'

1
I

t

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S

• I

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)

c

0

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Q~

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.,
~~

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MIS<:lIOi'l WOo ~ OAT E ?..:tMf!!!L~
XXI BorACOM.

..

AIR SEA RESGl)i:.

-

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~

~

o~
... -

8IJ.t.morlT.lIII

I-r-

35"1

Surfac. VII.lt
NAVY Ou .. ".

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SUPER Ou ....

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240700l ~

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30"1

t
~

Surface Vessel on Station From

I

,0 j508iOl

I

J
I

r.':AWA
.,-..5
0 ___

-- --:-- -

r--

I

-+: I
I
I
1

:
I

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1-- 1--

--

I--

--~-~+--JIMA
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\,

-~CHILJIJ

,

:

I

:
I : J

I

25.j

1

- l2

: I
I

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r: ~

1 I :
J

Surface Vessel on Stotlori.(_ Dur1n! Entire Mission

J._- ~l
\

. . \" -\1 .
\.• I
I.,.
~

L• I

20"

,..

.•

- 1-- 1--

-+1 1 I
I I Secret
'35'

Crosh Boots on Station Vicinity I- - SAl PAN, TINtAN and GUAM During Takeoff and Landing.

\+,~" ..
_l

<lffiflAN I-IS'

IDS

GUAM~i

_t
'40' REPRODUC£D
BY 35TH

."0.

''::.

eM,"T X., 10 •• 111 COlI

110' . -'~~~_--

Ils' --

PHOTO

TECH

YNI~

.ANNEX

B

Part

I - SWIIDU'1

P41"t II - Chart,,'oteoaat VI.. ObaoJ'vod Wsa.ther

Port III - Propcatlc

lIap

'Part IV - Synoptlo lla:p

Miu1QolA.M

M1ss1onNo.

45

Do. 24.-25 Marc h 1945 te

PLANNING FOREOAST
Foreoast Bases
I

0400Z 23 M4rch 1945
Guam:

olouds.

SCattered low clouds bases 1800 it; scattered Light to moderate showers between 0400Z to Scattered low Clouds.

12ooZ.

IlIiddle

Salpanz "Roa'he I

Ta.rget,

To 23~1 Same as So,lpan ,23°N to 270NI 51/10 cumulus. bo.sa 1800 ft, top.s 7000 ft; 10/10 altooumulus, base 10,000 ft, top 14,000 ft; 5/10 clrr~B, base 28,000 ft. ;nON to 300NI Solid overcast in layers to 28,000 ft. 300N to Coast: 10/10 cumulus, base 2000 ft, top 7000 tt; 6/10 altocumulus, base 12,000 ft, tops 14,000 ft; 6/10 cirrus, base 28,000 ft, reducing gradually to coast. Tokyo: 3/10 cumulus, base 2000 ft, tops 4000 ft, 1/10 middle. base 12.000 ft, top 14.000 ft, 5/10 cirrus, base 30.000 ft. MIddle a.nd high clearing after 1300Z,. Nagoya I 3/10 middle, base 7000 ft. to~ 10,090 ft; 2/10 c f.r-rusIn morning only. OsaJcll.-Kobe: 6/10 cumulus, base 4000 ft. tops 10.000 "ft. Forecast Weather Encountered

Operational

,

Base at Take-oft. Guam. 5/10 cumulus. base 1800 f"t, top 7-9000 ft I 4/10 a1 tocumulus, base 14,000 it, light showers. Sa.ipo.n-Tinianl 4/10 cumulus, base 1800 ft, top 6000 ft, visibility 15 miles. Route out. To UONI 4-6/10 cumulus. 'base 1800 ft, top 6000 f"t. Vi Ii bili ty 15 miles. MOW to 27O)J. e/lO o\llllulus, base 1500 tt. top 6000 rt, 8/10 altooat1ulua, base 10,000 ft. top 12,000 ft. Rain showers reduoing visibility from 10 to 2 miles. 270W to Target. s/io strato. cumulus, base 2000 ft, top 5.5000 ftJ 4/10 altocumulus, base 10,000 ft. tops 12,000 ft, to 300N. Visibility 10 miles.

Guamt s/rc CumulU8. base 1600 .t'ti 7/10 altostratus. base 12,000 ft, Visibility 12 miles, light showers. Sa.Ipan-Tinianz 4/10 cumulus, base 1800 f't; 4/10 altostratus, ba.se 12,000 ft. VIsIbility 15 miles.
To laoN,

Same conditions as Saipan. laoN to 210N: 8/10 cumulus, base 1000 ft, top 66000 tt; 10/10 altostratus, ba.se 10,000 ft. top 12.000 ft. Light rain showers lowering viaIbil1 ty from 12 miles to 2 ml1qs, 21 ON to 330N, 6 -8/1 0 cumulus £Uld stratocumulus. base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft. 3/~0 altostratus, b.a~ H..t_~OO"i't, tOps 16,000 ft b.tween ag.... and 3~N. x 330N.to Targat..Ar~J wnnvtJ-a. tocumulu8 t ba.se 2000 ft. top 5000ft Target I 4/10 stra.tocumulus, bUI) 4/10 8tra.too~lus, base 3000 ft, tpp 6000 tt, visibility 6-9 3000 tt. tops 7-6000 ft; viaIbl1- t miles. Wind a.t 7000 ttl 310° 34 knots. Ity 15 m~les beIng lowered to 2 m1lel in 8111Qke. Winds a.t 7000 ftl 3100 at 36 knots,

Route Same as route outgOing
BaBe on

Same

&8

route outgoing.

Return. Sg,ipsn-Tinio.nI V10 cumulUll, base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft, visibility 12 miles.
~: 6/10 oumullle, baae 1200 ft, top 8-9000 ft, 6/10 o.ltocumulus, base 12,000 ft. Visibility 15 miles ~owering to 1 mile in show~rs.

SaipRn-7inian. 4/10 cumulus, base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft, visibility 15 miles.
10/10 cumulus, base 1000 £t, o.ltocumulus, visibility 6 \ miles in light rain.

Guam

I

10.10

Winds Aloft hi; 20/20 10/17 aO/17 30/17 50/17 65/16 70/11

.. Forecast ~&oH- ~jOH
300/60 300/35 310/30 320/25 330/21 350/18 330/12 -17 -10 -6 -2 3 8 13

IS. 000
10,000 6000 6000 4000 3000
3nrfrQe

~3:
-3 8 10 14. 18 22
26

320B ..12 -3 2 4325/25 340/17 8 360/19 12 5/,?§ 17

~ioli-

300/48 300/30 310/27

290/65 300/40 310/34 320/27 330/22 340/18

Ii!:a!i

..22

-12

..a
-4 0

3201l?

5 11

I

Winds Aloft .. Observed lye !o 15,000 10,000
8000 6000 4000 2000 Sw:;l:g,cl 100/1S1 85/161

1~31

16°!: to 27°B
265/401
:500/261

2I~

t!il 340N

?S5/451
310/381

305/401
310/36I. 310/34.K

,~

0),
<,

t

,
I

,I

,
I

~/,..;?C.,......_;..-

-,-

-<I

{?

~-'

.\.

.'"

• CHICHI JIr.tA

-

I

.~IWO JIMA

(; N OS T I '4--00z

~TPALAU

a

Itt A ,.
~
"

,.


nWK ;(\' 'I!i,

19..,...5.

s:

\,.

\

C

t Part Part

I .. Radar COl,luter Measurea
II - R1l.dl0


",.i. Ips M
. 1& Ifuoob 1145

111'11

fART I 1. GeMrnll

.aAPiLR COUNTER MEASUBES

a, Eight RCMSenroh Alrornft part-iclpated in and oompleted this mi.sslon. All bands f:r:om 88 to 3000 me wert moMtored. 'Re6ults een:rch and enemy !lotion indicl1te possible Goo.rdination betwoen flak and searchlights, and signals Indioa.ting rndar ..controllad equipment.

of

b. J.. total of 73 Signals was intercepted, but a!ter the aniUysls for repetition. and ambiguity, this nU!l1.ber was tasolvol1- into. 36 different . signals. c. No offensive counter measures "Were e.mployed.

2.

.Rssuas
11.

of Se~rch: interest intercepted wore
ll.S

Sign.als '01' particular
(1)

1'ol1ow&;

3050/1500/ ..7·.9 (2)3125/12751..7 •• 9 Tb.ese 2 signals were intercepted en route tothEl tctrget ond. 1n the SQJIl6 general locality on the return trip. !ho point of intercept en route wo.s33/35'N • 137/10E, The point of intercept on the return trip was 33/28N • 138/20E. (3) 3090/2000/3.5; This signo.l woosintercepted. 136/50E off Do.1oZaki. This waS a dl.stlnctly o..udi le signn1 h vo.rying jagged poale pUlse.
(,) 76/ ••• /8 34/00N • 137/058 with

o.t 34/20Jl • a.

,

(5) (6)
with flak.

78/ ••• /Short 34/05N .. 136/55E 77.• 5/2400/6 34/50N. 137/20E These l&o.rk TAKodel 3' swere not directly

a.s.soc1o.ted

(1) (6) Hagoya. area. It. toll
01lIl I

77.5/910/6.5 79.5/g00/7. 5 These are proDctble ~rk fA Model 3'. lignals in the Flak wall !;en.,r~lly moderQ.te and ina.ccurate. dgno.ls intercepted Iptercept in the to.rget oreo. were Locationg Remarks 1I111'k CHI
0.11

Other

OhoUC1;griatio.
75.5/466/32

3';20N .. 136/458

196/900/5 115/2000/6.6 178/1500/4.4 The 3 toregoin,. accurate to accuro.te 220/500/25 201/100/1 186/750/3G 150/350/ ..... 102/470/16

34/45B .. 136/45E 36/10N .. 13~/4-5g 15/05N .. 137/058 s1gaO.1a lIGrG eon1oiden.t with flak. 35/15N ... 136/551 35/l5B .. 136/55E SS/15N .. 137/15E 34/ 4.51 .. 137/351 3';35N .. 137/558

searchlights liar" 1 Yodul 2 lIark 1 Kod.el 2 lIark: 1 l!ode 1 :5 Mark 1 Wodd 1

-25-

§.iSlRJI

o.

Signals interoepted

en route

to the t~rget were as follcwsl Rome.rks
Friendly,

ChV!l9teristi95
106/500/40

Intercept

Loc§Mion

92. 2/ ---/20

147/ ---/7.5 81/485/60 157/480/6-10 170/950/2. 2 108/475/26 82.5/480/32 73/480/28 112/295/4 80/445/26 100/810/11.5 98/350/24 157/465/14 243/300/8

26/30N - 140/45E 26/30N - 140/45E Nishi no Sh1 rna 32/20N • 13B/OOE 32/25N - 137/351': 32/40N .. 137/10E 33/35N - 136/35E 33/10N - 136/45E 33/15N .. 136/40E 33/:35N - l36/35E 33/35N - 136/35E 33/35N - 136/35E 33/35N - 136/35E 33/35N .. 136/35E 33/55N .. 136/25E

IwoJima

:Mark 1 .Model 3 Mark: CHI lIark 1 Model 3

l4o.rk 1 .Uod.el 1
Mork CHI Mfll'k CHI 1lie.rk ilark Mark Mark CHI B 1 Mod.el 1 1 Model :3

d.

Signals logged on return Interoept

from target Locatlon

were as follows
Rem r..rk s

1

ChgtD.C;teri gties
101.5/---/20 74/250/14.5 80/200/40 146/470/4

33/50N _ 138/00E 32/50N - 136/25E 31/30N .. 139/25E 31/25N .. 139/30E and Conolusion;:
wa.8

Mark 1 Model J Mark CHI Mark ;CHI Uork'l Model' :3

3.

hnalYllh
a.

No D/F'ing of ~y signal ~ble eqUipment. Looations given ~ro intercept.

employed due to Lack of suit .. airoraft position at point of

,

b. The 2 10.om Signals at 3050 nnd 3125 me are suspected to be friendly submar.lne equiplllilJlt due to close simila.rity of the oharaOteristics. e, The 3090.mo signnl was interoepted near Do.io Zakl and 111 suspeoted l:ia.rk 2 Model 2 Jo.pal1ese land or shipbo.rne surface searoh and fire control.
B.

de One searoh airoraft had the opportunity to fly along the Ooa.t from O-Shilbt\ to Ddo Zald for over an hour. The numero". Elf signal. logged indicate an intrioate EWnet in operation in this vioinity.

•••••
PART II - WIO 1. Strike Repqrt! t Twenty-one .trike reports were transmitted by aerial operators a.nd all were received by the Ground Station.. One a.erial operator of the 73rd Wing. unable to henr the Ground Station. had hh strike report relayed by o.nother o.iroro..ft. In one other inata.noe a relay 'W0.8 neoessary beoause the e.1roro..ft' 8 tran.mi tter signal WQ.S weak and the Ground Sto.t1on oould not reoei ve the mOlllll).ge.
2. Pox '1'rQPlliuioDa I ,The u.sual UCOP';'Cweo.ther and time s 1&00.1. were trans 1111 tted every hour and half hour by the Ground Sta.tions •

.. 6.. 2

11£.811

3. Freguenoi!!!s l lIo.jority of traffic du.r1ng this mission was ca.rried out on the 7 and 3 megacycle frequencies. The 11 megaoycle frequenCies Were regnrded as pro.ctiolllly useless over the target. Atmospheric interference was slight and ground etntion operators reported only a few incidonts of lamming during this mission. Following is a percentage breakdown of trnffio per frequenoy, 64 per cent on 3 megacyCles; 30 per oent on 7 mega.cyoloB. e..nd 6 per cent on 11 megacyoles. 4. Naylgationd Aids I Fifteen requests for SF/OF bearlngs were made and all were obtained. Six VHF/DF bea.rings were requested and ob .. tained. The 3l4th Wing reported 1 request f'or VRF/T1I from Iwo Jim&. with 8xoellent results. Homers and Ranges were used extensively with good results. KRHO Was also used. However, Some crews reported the OWl station was jammed over the taJ'get.

5. Net Disc mHne and Security, The 73rd and 314th Wings reported good discipline and security. Only 1 caS5 of an aircraft Interforlng wi th another's 'b'ansmlss ion was reported in the 73rd \Ving. The 31. 4th Wing reported that there were no br eachee of' security or diSCipline, HOwever. the 313th Wing r~ported tho.t airplane commanders complained about the continoU9 chattering on VHF over the target. Several casee of' o.ircraft talking to other a.ircraft giving 0.1 ti tude. course. location were cited with specific inc idents. There were no other reports at breaches of security or discipline.
6. EjMmy TrY8!!lisslon§; The foll owing jBll1lD.ing ere encountered du.ring this tnission: w ca.ses of interference

and

a.
mission

31405 kosI (1)

I oaused minor interf'er·ence during transBearing 298 degrees from Salpan.

of Bombs

Away

Japanese net reports.

bsarlng

(2) Unknown station 358 degrees •.
(3)

sent uni telligible was
partially

code at l540Z,
effective trom ll20Z

Unidentified
Unidentified

to 1130Z. (4)
oi'f'eet1ve.

BIT

OWat

1335Z and 1555Z was part1.a.l1y

(5) (6) Ground Station ,...
at

Steady tone
Steady

during

entire mission CV/, reported

was very

effective.
blocked

tOne plus

1335Z. Steady tone near

as deliberate,

(T) approached. b.

coast of' Japan got .tronrr

..

cout

6065 kesl (1) Bagpipe jamming at 14.l5Z la!SUng for 5 minute.
Japanese commeroial station waa

Dot TOry ei'f'ecU\,e. (2)

over

blooked out Ground Stat10a a.t 11lll

target. (3) aircraft

Station

ad to ~rk

sending letters a.nd prosigna but was una.ble to authentioate •

a.ttamyt-

• 2..,_

(4) CW jamming at 1540Z waS very effeotive.
pipe jamming completely

(5) At l400Z,OW jrurumin~ was experienced.
bloCked out station.

Later.

b&!~

Station

(5) Uodulll.ted CW' tone jammed frequency. When Ground would drift, station would return to frequency.
c. d. 11080 KOB I 3990 Ics
I

Heavy atmospMricli

during

entire

mission.

(1) (2)
(3)

Series
Steady

or

Vf S jllllJD.ed frequenoy

over

target

area.

tone

a.t lOlOZ waa pfl.l't1e..lly effective.
was ineffective.

Japanese voiCe trr,nsm1ssionB
Several

(4)

CW

transmissions

wore ineffective.

(I) (2)
f.

Jamming of time tick
Series

Qt 1400Z was reported.
effective.

ot V's

were partially

3410,7310,11160

and 1.0820 lcs

reported

a.nd interference. '.
by the

n.egligible jamm1ns;

DistQss I No distress or emergency Ground Stations during this mission.

tro.nsmissions 'were' recorded

B. Equip!"nt Malfunctions I ANIART-13: 1 fuse blown. BC-34S I 1 intermittent opera.tion. 3 inoperative. 4NfiARN-J, 12 compa.sssense antenna.s broken, 1 unable to'switch control box to radio opera.tor·s position. 3 :~aoperati.ve. SCR=.§22 I 1 i.nopsra.tlve, 1 intermittent opera.tion_ &cJ&. 13 inopero.t1ve, 2 sticking. ~I 3 s1l1tcbss in .. opero.t1ve, 1 amplifier inopera.tive, 1 short in toil gunner's pOSitIon,

-

o.nd 1 intermittent

aDd noBiy.

..28-

J!RllI.1

JI.1B.Jl

ANNEX

D

PQI"t 1 ... Enemy .lUr OppositIon Part Part II • Enemy Antlc.lro:rt'f't
BOlILbing

,
aad Jdr.to.;.ur

III

• Bombing

Re •. 111te 11DC1Dooange Aaae.l8l1!i11!1.t

PART I - ENEMYAnt OPPQSITION

1.

General I a. Enemyair opposition

reported was s11~ht. Howeyer, 3 or these at least 1 B-29 may have been lost to enemy aircraft. Ninety-s1x enemy &1rcraft were sighted; 3 made 3 attacks (See Accuracy of EnemyFlchters).

B-29's were lost due to unknownc~use!.

Four bombers were damaged. No E/A aro claimed destroyed or dam.aged.
c. One B-29 was paced tor approx1.mately 10 minutes by an enemy aircraft that met the A!e prior to la.ndfall. In the target area. searchlights illuminated many of the bombers. The enemy seemed reluctant to attack. 2. Type of Aircraft Attack}ng. Three enemy aircraft made the 3 attacks. Twoaircraft wre ~hOlly 1.U11dent1f'ied,· but 1" wo.s .identif ied single-engine.

b.

No B-29's were known to be lost due to enemy aircraft.

o.B

3. Enemy Aircraft Sighted But Not .Attackingl Ninety-tbree enemy aircraft that did not attack were sighted. Very few .... re positively e identU'i ed as to name--2 Tonys, 1 :Zake, 1 Irving, and I Nick. Several were partially identified--2 possible Betty", 1 twin-engine transport, and 1 twin-engine unident1.f'ied aircraft with a twin tail. Of the remainder, 12 were unidentified twin-engines. "ware single-engine ll'nidentified, and 68 were entirely unidentified.
Diregtion .and 1 from the left. 5.

4.

And

kgvel of Attackl

Two attacks- came at the tail

Accuracy or EnemyFighters:

" a. Four B-29' s

0.7% of the force) were damagedby enemy a1rcraft

No B-29 is knownto baYe been d.estroyed by enemy aircraft. and flak,

b, Twelve enemy aircrl.l.ft were observed to be aggressively attacking a B-29 while it was ca.ught in searchlights over the tar~et. No further data is obtainable. This B-29 m~ be 1 of the 3 aircraft ·reported lost due to unknown Oal1l1eB.

6. Types of Ptp j.otlle I Enemy fire was, tor the most part, unobserved. However, lome small caliber traoer ammunition and 20-mm fire were reported.

7. Ene~ Tactic.,

a. PaciD1r1 One B-29 .... paced for a.pproxi.ately 10 minutea as by an enemy aircraft .... hioh enoountered the bomber off the coast before landfall. The en~ aircraft continually blinked its runnin~ lights during thia time,
'b. TraUingl One B-29 was followed 100 miles from ths cowst of Honshu by an enemy aircraft whioh did not attack but which firsd traoer ammunition from time to time,

c.

-~~------_---,L_~

5 095 J, Z

- / 'j/_'__"'~I.J"

U'

.-~

f.).·n

a.3{.HSSV'l:):;J'O'.:o''---_ .......

t!1~1V

.... ---

o.

PUUS!

(1) An enemy airoraft which waS off 1t5 pursul olosed to within approximately 350 yards without tiring. downward.

t

curve away

(2) Another passed overhead at 11 o'olock breaking No fire was observed. (3)

o'cloCk. pressing

A twin-engine fighter made a pass between 5 and 6 to 500 yards and then fading aw~y.
n

(4) An unidentified fighter started from above. pressed to 500 yard~.

head-on attack

(5) Four other pa.flsesby enemy aircraft were reported, inoluding 2 unidentified enemy aircraft (near landfall en route to base) which made a coordinated pass but failed to fire when the B-29 increased its speed. d. continually Blinking Lights:

(1) Enemy aircraft which paced our aircraft for 10 minutes blinked lights. {See Pacing above.~

(2) Enemy aircraft cruising in ttll'getarea blinked their wing lights and flashed cockpit lights on and off in some instances. e. Searchlights, Although many B-29's were Caught in search. lights only 1 was attacked. (See Accuracy 21' Enemy Fighters.) 6. stances, action.

B-29

Tactics and Firepower yB Enemy Aircraft: In some intemporarily increased power settings were used as &vQ.sive HArking and Light,; Tony painted

9. Epemy Aircrptt

~. ],iIarklng8 only 2 aircraft were observed--l of silver and 1 twin-engine painted blaCk.

b. Many had lights b~rning. At least 8 were observed with blue lights in cockp1t, and 2 with dome lights burning. Ilany were reported to have running light' burning. 10. "suU,

IVA

of

Hit, pn

linmy

Aircraftl

Wone observed.

11.

C1aim'l Rone.

•••••
PA~t II
1.
t

JlTIAIRQRAFT

AND

AIR-TO-AIR

BQMBIRG

_my AlA.lir91
were more effeotive
by',

a. AlA defense and searchlights prev1o~, mulon,. b.

than on

1_ Primary Target 11'18attacked

(1) 106 Ale of the 73rd Wing. between 1503 and 1607Z trom 5800 to 7200 feet, along axes of attack from 200 to 43°;

.:51I! I

7200 to

(2) 8700 ft,

71 .A/C of the 313th on. an axis of Ilttack

Wlft~ botween 1505 and 1.55SZ .f'roDl oi'approxiDllI,toly 3.ra<'; and

(3)
5650 to

47

Ale

9800 ft. alon.g

of' the 314tb Wi.ng between 1500 and loI7Z from axes of'a:ttack f'ro·m2:.),O to 320.

c. Under-cast over the target was reportod by different crews vlU'ying from ·clea.r to broken cloudew to '_2,(10 ..5/10'. Tbe wind. Wall from 265° ..3650 at 18~sa mph.
QB

d. En route to target, both heavy and medium .flak: waS encoull.from. both shoree of the bay end from "hillS in the harbor. Most crews reported AlA fire all m.od.erat{l to intense- and generally .aCCur-ate. tered e. Over the ta.rget, both he·avy and medium flak were report.ed. It was moderate to intense and mostly accurate. Better coordination tban prevlou51y wa.s reporwdfor flak and searchlights. f. Three A/e of tbo73rd Wing were lost pt'Osumably ove.r the target. One Ale o.f the 313th flak.. (One. other ditched en r-oute to the target.)

(to unknown Clulllle), Wing was lost to

g. Twenty~six Ale of the 73rd Wing. 10 Ale of the 3l3tb. and 10 Ale of tho 3U.th were damaged by flak. Moe:tde.mage WaB by heavy flak fragments and was of !!I.inor nature.

h.The crews reported an in01'I:II).86 t.ivenes.1I of searehUghts over Nagoya and on About 30 S/Ls were reported on each side of 60 ~/Ls in Nagoya. Fifteen blue beams wo.re
used as

in the number and effeeboth sides of th.e bay. IsO' Bay, and as many as observed at 35/04N - 136/5511:.

I

1. A red flare f.rom a ship in Ise Bay seemed to have been a Signal for S/Ls.. This flare was observed at about 1600Z.

j. One barrage be.lloon was observed at 4.000-5000 ft. on the shore of Atsumi Rl~er near Tawara, apparently located over II. large constructl.on projeot. Four barrage balloons were reportad. a.t the nQrtheastern edge o.:f' the city near the target at 5000..6000 ft. Four others were aeen at approximately 5000 ft •.over Nagoya. Castle. One other ba.llool1 was reported at 3000 ft. at east edge of the city near &. large park.

north

It..

deooy fires east in the bay south

Smoke pots were Been burnihg nea.r the Atcbi Plant of the target area. Four barges W6.re reported the docks.

and .2
&fir8

or

1'1'0111 modera:te evas1ve act10n after bo.mba away to aha.rp turns to left and right before the bomb run and en.ngo8 1n course and al ti tudeatter bombs &w«7. A few crows prooeeded as far _north as Ich1nomi.ya to avoid BiLe and flak on wit.hdrawal trom the tartet. 3.
41r-tg-Air a. Bombing and RoCkettl bomb1.ng Wad reported.

2.

Our Tactios

"'11

AlAI

Evasive

aotion

by d1fferent

AlO 'ftrhd

No air-to-alr

b. A ye110wball ot fire!lbout 6 1n.obe. in dhmetorwall obu.rved oysr Hatoy&. moving upward at approz1mately 760• Ft.re burned out at 8000 ft. o. Oran,;e rockets. and red flashe. were

seen over Nilgoy a. pDssibly

In-

accurate

d.

Six white balls of fira were se~n to oome up from Nagoya. rookets were reported as follows by the crews rose to 6000 Oastle.

e. Ground-to-air of the 313th Wing:
(1)

ft. before burning

1 at Okada and 1 o.t Toyoh!l.shi. T~se out and had a rad flame.

(2) Over Nagoya. 2-6 were reported near Nagoya 3-4 in the southeast part of town, and 3 nenr the tllrgat.

f.

Crews of the 314th Wing reportedl
(1) (2)

Five possible

rockets over Nagoy!l.a.nd 1 near He.mematsu.., rockets !'ired i.1l Ursts of :3 b

Ale

44..09776 reported

directly target. burst.

B:boveBori

Canal.
5 rockets

(3) Ale 44-24833 Ea.ch volley contained
(4)

reported :5 volleys of rockets over the which rose to 9000 ft .. and

Ale

44-69677

rOCkets which resembled orange and far brighter

Sighted over Nagoya 2 or 3 posdble gas explOSions. The bursts were reddishthan AlA fire.

g. Alc 44-59695 observed 0. greyish ball of fire about the size of· a 80ecer ball passi.ng below the ;,je in the target area. h. Shortly phosphorus bombs or A/C, leaving a huge believed fired from after leaving the target area, 1 crew Sighted rockets bursting at 7000 ft. directly behind the white puff with streamGrs. This project1le was the ground.
I

i. Near land's end a red ball of fire waS seen coming up trom below by 1 crew.

•••••
PMT III Target Areal - !l.UU.GE MSESSMENT REPORT NO. 21
Da.te

Nagoya.

Flown;

25

I4arch 1945

'l'Ji,lIGETS I 193. 196. 000, 254; KURE8A TEXTlIE UlLL. ABASHI PO'l"l'ERY wcms AND NA.GOY.A CITY. Altitude
S4,OOO feet

SUINARY
This report auesses damage to the above Usted targets resulting from XII Bomber COIIIIII.o.nd Mission 45, 24-25 March 1945. New damage to Tllrget 193 totals about 113,500 sq. ft •• or 4.5% of the tota.1 roof area. Three numbered targets were damaged.'! industries without target numbers, along with Ilbout 6.000.000 sq. ft •• or 183 acres, of urban area in Nilgoya City were destroyed •

.iJQ.Bil

(All nwnbered and annotated to pioturoein this section •.)
ThRGET 19~ SW!§T (35/11N .. 136/S7E)

referen.ce,z,

in this

report

are k8'yod,

Mitllubiehi Alrorc.f't Engine Works
I

leAL st!l8!SAJ!.Y, IlA.M.MIE QF ROOF

SQ. FT. OF

MEA

FERCENT.ri.GEOF TOTA" ROOF .iJ!E.h

Destroyed Structural damage Superflc·lal damage Gutted Minor

67,200

9,aOO
62,500

~

-.!!

1.5%

Total" 173,500 4-.4% Total roofe.re a of plant 1a 3. e 11. 000 s ,. ft.. lUI given in (lIV Indu.str1al Report No. 2 .. 27 February 1945. (See Table on next page) TARGEt 196. (3S/13'N - 1M/SSE)
Oe§criptlsm

Chlgu.Ba Faotory,

Nagoya Arsenal

1

23 buildinge, in.cluding 2 reported shell rllHng. and 1
ballistics building. (Ref. a)

Destroyed

a

4 bulld.ingsl plUB 12 revetted reported 0.11 silorlng e,;plosives or live aI'!IIIIunltion. (Ref. a.)
bulldingll

Destroyed

22 buildings, 90% of' Nagoya Pottery Works, reportedlyoon ... va,rt(!lld to Ohl~sa Faotory,Nagoya Arsenal (Ref'. b) ReferClD081 a.
b.

Destroyed

e, Referenoe

Target Information Sbeet No. 90.20-196 ..I, Joint Target T Group, Washington, D.C,. 7 January 1945. Ma.p, Nagoya No.rthenst, JJ!S 340593, Jo.nl14ry 1945 ;.J.F Air ObJeotive Folder 90.20

PhotographYI
Pre -atr1ke
t

3PR511 96.31

M

Post .... trike'

3PR5M 9"-21

26,21; 3RI 34

'URGEr 264 (35/11N - 136/57E) Depcrlption Open storage
5

141tsub1lhl ElectriC lIi'g. Co. Damage area,

66,000 sq, ft.
buildln&

Destroyed

Probable storage 37,400 sq, ft.

6

Ya.ehin.e shop- 62,600 sq. ft. (Ref'. a.) Probable ma.ohine shop 62,600

Hiton SE !).OMlor, 8% damas-It

1

sq. ft. (Ret. a.)

B end ('l%) bulldil\g ~

or

- -/ 'y">"'''U ,'U . '"'"_);::Jy'

5095)L
CI

~ 0: ~

I~ s I~
l:;j

..
8I~ I~ I~ Ii; Ii
I~ ,..,

~
'114

: I~ t 13 I~ .~ I~ I~ t I~I~!~I~ 18IgI~I~1m I~IgI~ I~ I~ g I~ I~ IJ 'lo r~
e

..... -M ~ ~ 'r: "; ~ ~ 'M ~ ] ~ • ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'M .~ l'l i~.~ ~ C!l ~ 0) ~ I~ I~ I~ I _'~ I~ 0 I~I~ 'd 16 I~ 0 E I~ ] +> ~ en ~ ~ i~ 10 P ~ i~ b £. j§ b b ~

~~

§

l'tl od ~ 5 f I~ I!... i~ 11, i sI~ ~ ~ ~ ..... ..... .....
,0 't:

I~ I~

11,
Ii:

-g
~ ~

r. j
l'l

.s•
<D

1':-

1";- ,

I....

I~

I~ I'::' I~

1':-

1':-

M

0

r-I

I~

C\!1Il ~ ~ ~ ~ r!1I) l"- ~ {? .~ lro I,%! @

8

0 00 0 00

g .. g
0
I,....

0 0 00 00 0 o III 100 0<) ,CXl ~ -~.I"r~ t"l.qo

I:Q

..-I

I~ ~Itti
~

I~

0

gl~ Clill

!D !D. «J

CIl

.s

rs.

IJ 1~lil~
1'=
I~
r:

0 'f I... 18 G

i

s
I?
II)

8 o
"<1' rl

..

i]l~I~ Ij
I;
[

I~ I~
1

0

If;

Ig Ie I":

o
o
III

-s <0 8 10
01

g
oj

.~

IJ

,
'-t cd

,

i .- i~

I~ :~ 18 I~I')I~ I~ I~I~ I~ I~ I~I~I~I~I~ I~ I~ I~ 1£ J! Ig
Ir-

Ir-

,~ ,~
I~
..,j 1";-

I~
Ir-:

:~ :~.~ I~ !~ I~ I~ I')i~
,~

I~.t"i

~ ~

I~ I';;; I.- I...

Ir-:

It<:

~ a::

jQ

~~ ~1 I~I~~1~1:l[~ t!1~:~~:~I~~ ~1:18~~ I~·",gj
.... 4)

fk
::I=-:

~

Descrlpt10D
6 9 Proba.ble Machine shop 7e. 300

~
E end (38%) of building dlllllaged
eO%damaged

sq. ft, (Ref. a) Boiler house - 8 ,500eq. (Ref. 11)
MaChine shop ft,

10 11 12

(Rei'. 11;) ft,
Unidenti!'

.. 62,60.0 3q. ft.

E central
01 ract

put

135%damll.ged

hd. building building. sq" ft.

~34.. 000 $q.

!lornar assembly
67.000

hit on SE .. 36% da.m.age

Unident.ified
type.

47% of Wan.d of roof removed pr.ior to strike,
80% of roof

13 Referenoel

Unident1J;'led building,

31,000

Sq, f't.
11..

prior

removed to stri.ke

b.

Tlll'get Information SMatNo •. $la, .20 254..T1,. Washington D•.O., .. 3 January 1945. AJ;;F Air Object1 va Folder 90.20 .. July 1944.
I

Refe.re.nce photography Pra-strikel Post-lltrilce
TJ.RGE'l

I

3PRSlf 96 -3 : 34 3PR5M 99-2: 213, 27 ·-3RJ 33..35 136/58E) Torimatsu


Destroyed

200 (35/13N -

Factory,

Nagoya.;.rsena1.

,preg, Ng,

Das'<Eip;tJOD 2 building$. 290'x 210' !UlIi 2201 x 120' - 90,000 sq. ft. total

30

31

Open storflge area. 134.000 sq. ft., containing 2 storage buU.dings, 38,OOO"sq. ft. total Destroyed

32

sq. ft.

PossIble

machine shop - 87,900

1000 sq. ft. of NWoorner dam~d

Total root area. 1,102,000 Sq. i't. Total roof area damc.gedor destroyed I 129,000 sq. ft. Percent ot total roof area dDJIIAgad destroyed. or 11% .Reference.
a..

AAF Air Objective Folder

90.20

·oo

July

1944

Ref~reno'e :Photography: Pre-strike Post-Btl'ilee
I I

3P.R5N liJ6-31 39 ZaP.R5Jl 99-21 29. 30 .. 3LI 39

KUREH4
14

!1'E>tULEMILl',c(.35/10/IXIN .. 136/56/04E)

Rbported

11111111 plant. tiolUl

Entire plant.
about a. b. J&ap..,Nagoya
AbE

10 bUlldin.gs)

350, 000 sq. ft. N,orthell.st,

Iostroyed

Reference:

I..ir Objective Folder 90,20
I

AMS340593, Jll.nuo.ry 1945 16.-4.) 6 July 1944

Refe renee

photography
I

Pre.strike Post-strlk.e .AMSHI POTTERY

SPRSM96-31
3PR5U 99-2, (35/12/06.N

I

34 26,

27.

3RI 34,

35

w:lRJs'

.. IS6/SIS/lOE)

De 9 crlpti2D

15

Entire

,
Reference: Pre -str.lke Post.strike Prints
I I

about 224.QOO sq. ft. Destroyed Additional buildinga not o.tto.cbed to pi ant - 250,000 sq. ft, Destroyed a. Ma:p, Nagoya North.eo.st, J.MS 340593, Januo.ry 1945 b. _;.j,p J•.ir ·Objecti va Folder 90.20 M.. 4. 6 July 1944

plant,

16 buildings.

Reference photogrl>.phy: SPR5M96-3: 3PR5M99-2: 34 26,27

,

annotated nnd a.ttl>.clledl

HA~
"":eA

CITY .. new d~age

W!l.8 concentrated

in the NS section Sa.tt. Affected, 144.000 577,600
276,000 4.6,200 ;521,700

df the City.

16 17
18 11J
20

110·

92,500

21 22 23
M 25 26 27

146.000 2,800,000
516.000

a. 297,000

168,600

2B
99

17",000 434,000
ip,QQQ

Ref'erenO,1

DIU Damage ~!lseS8mont

Report No., 25

1

MISSION

CON FIDENTIAL

NO.46

Ij£AJ.t

ANNEX

E

CONSOLIQ4'lED STf4::JST104L

SUJ@4.'JU'

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MISSION_----=45::.... FLIGHT DATA & FIJEL CONSUMPTION DATE 24 March 1945 .

-

21 B.C.

Ale

COMPLETING MISSION

*

103

69 7:.08

46

218

FLIGHT DATA

Avg. TiJne At Low Altitude Avg. Time Of Climb To Bombing Altitude Avg. Tinte At Bombing Altitude Avg. Flying Time Avg. Distance flown (Nautieal Air Miles)
FIJEL eONSUlfPTION

:25 7:04 13,57 2748

:06 :2,3
lA:2S 2662

:.26

:19
4:25

15t26
2.791

11.:25

::7.30

Consumed To Target; Average
Uaxlll11lm Minil1lUlll

3432 4018
.3l04

,3.493 ,3800 3075

3935 4326 34bO

3557 4326

3075

Consumed From T'arget To Base: (A/c Without Jlalfunction) No. Of Aircraft

98
2294 2662

Average
Maximum lfinimum

67 2231 2670 IF93

44

2,381
2675

209 2292 2675 1£9.3

1920

~046

To Base: (AiC With lIIalfunctlon) No. Of Aircraft Consumed Fro.mTarget

5 2486

2

:2

9
;:398
28,37

Average
Maxil1l1lll

22;4
2369 2139 57';8
61.82 5280

2322 25.32 2lll

2837
2285

Minimum Total Fuel Used:

;'111

Average
.Ma:xilllUlll M:i..'nimuJa

5734
6363
5422

6.367 6764
,772 987 1628 560 412.6

5869 6764 52;::;0

Total

Fuel Remaining:

A.verage
Maximum MiniIll.Ull

1038

1018 1505

loa
1028 478

146.3
478

603
396.5
2.16 4,36294
(Excludef:l

Avg. Gals. Consumed Per Hour
Avg. Gala. Consumed Pel" !lile rOTAL FUEL USED ON AIRBORNE

411 2.09

406.7
2.15

Ale 64la32

310374

1388500
Iwo JIJlV».

* Ale

tar whieb .fuel data are available.
on

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1 .Il/C- Oat.[;vdlrbl.e •.

996, 1460., &: l,871 aiils.

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.BCII!ER ca.DWD , "'IE LDOBI)ER
Fll!:lp ORpER NO. M

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FMM:

COM GEN XX! BOM COM

TO:

COM GEN3l3TH BOM WING COM GEN3l4TH BOM WING INFO:

cm\ GEN73RD BOM WING
By Auth of CGXXI BO

em

9i. •.3.1

j('

Initials

to'

16 1JJa&ei. 1fJ.Date

XXI BOMBERm~ c GUAM 0800 26 March 1945 FIELD ORDER NUlffiER 48 ERADICATE UMBER N 5.

MAPSFOR PLOTTING: JAPANAVIATION CHART 1:218,880 AIMINGPOIN'l'REFERENCE: XXI BOM COM LITHO-MOSIA.C 90.20-193. OFFSETAIMINGPOINT REFERENCE:XXI BOM COM LITHO-MOSIAe NAGOYAITY C
1.

Recent operations of this v;l.sual precision bombing carried out economically effectively counter this priority target" t'rget SUccess while perfecting The XXI BornComwill with normal effort.
B..

command indicate thai;. low altitude night against priority aircrnft plants can be with precise results before the enemy can new tactical use of VLRaircraft. Of the 193 offers the best chance of initial our technique. ERADICATE O. 5 (Target N 90.20-193)

2.

attack

3.

73rd Wing:

(1) Attack Target:
(2) MP! OAP

From T-Hout to T-Hour plus 45 minutes.
o

AXIS OF ArTACKFROM OAP FORCEREQUIRED27 Degrees True 4,000 to 4,500 feet. or 500 feet on top
All A/e

086064
(3) (4) Altitude

077032
on Route out:

AltitUde of attac~: 6,000 to 6,800 feet of overcast if practicable and desirable.

(5) Bomb Load:

except every 12th A/C, will carry two bombs loaded to be in center of train of bombs. Balance of load will be ;00 lb. GP's. (RDXCompo B filler to the extent of their availillbility). Every 12th A/e will carry full Load M-17 Incendiary Clusters.'

M-76 Incendiary

All

A/e,

b.

.313th Wing: (1) (2) (.3) 12.3069 0770.32 Altitude of Attack: Attack Target: From T-Hour to T-Hour plus 45 minutes. to ;,500 feet or 500 feet and deairenb1e. on

Altitude on Route Out: ;,000 top of overcast if practicable

AXIS OF' ATTACK FROM OAP FORCEREQUIRED 32 Degrees True 7,000 to 7,800 feet. All A/C

A11 A/C except every 12th A/C, will carry two Bombs, balance of load 500 Ib GP's. (RDS Com,). B. Filler to the extent of availability). Every 12th A/C' will carry full load of 1A-17 Incendiary Clusters.

14-76Incendiary

BombLoad:

c.

.314tb Wing: (I} Attack Target:

.§.J1l£lUll
(a)
(b)

Pathfinder A/C carrying flares:
10 minu~es.

:'ltarting T-Hour minus Starting
T~Hour

Pathfindor A/e carrying incendiaries: millus 5 mi.nute.s , Balance of Force: on Route Out: Starting T-Hour.

(c)
(2)

Altitude (a) (b)

Pathfinder A/C carrying flares desired by wing commander.

and incendiaries:

As

Balance of Force: 6,000 to 6,500 feet or 500 feet on top of overcast if practicable nnd desireable.

(3) AmINO POINT
086064 123069
(1.)

OAF
077032

AXIS

OF ATTACK FRQM OAP 27 Degrees True

0770)2

32 Degrees True

Altitude (a) (bl

of Attack: end incenderies; lis

Pa thf'Lnder A/e cEl.rryingflares desired by wing commander • Balance of Force:

7,000 to 7,800 feet.

(5) BombLoad:
(a)

Pathfinder A/e carrying .flares: sired by l1i:)g cOr.JllIIIDder.

Type and load as de-

(b) (c) (6)

Pathfinder Ale carrying incendiaries:

~f-17 in.cendiaries.

Balance of Force: Each A/e two M-76 incendiary bombs end ba Lanee of load wi th 500 1 b GP' s.

The J14th Wing will dispatch Ale to drop flares sufficient to light the target for a period of 30 minutes. Also dispa tch 1I1c carrying incendiarie s sufficient to pin-point the target for visual bombing. Balance of force, if any. I\'ill bombaiming point 12.3069
The 314th r.ing

(7)

route to target. aircraft

will avo i.d the 11Jlandof Rota by 15 miles encrews will be assigned positions scheduled over the target. in the

(8)

The best qualified

first

(9)

The )14th Wing will dispatch one A/e to the target area for the purpose of observing the bombing a t tack , A qualified communder cting as a master of cerenonies will make any ima portant announcement concerning tactics as he deems necessary over the VHF, Channel B. Uponarriving at the target area the lead pathfinder flare aircraft will notify the uaster of ceremonies the base of cloud formation using ~,OOO feet as base altitude. Example of notification: "Base of clouds is Base Altitude plus 4.000 feet". This will be 6,000 feet as actual base of the clouds. After receiving this transmission from the flare A/e the mastor of ceremonies will from time to time relay cloud base to llWinforce. By individual aircraft vttacldng witil minimum interval between eircrvft. A definite radar bombing run will be made over a radar aiming point before making a visual correcti.nn.

(10)

x.

(1) ~Ietbod of Attack:

(2)

Route: Iwo Ji!llfl J~cl6N - 13645E 3436)ON - 13633E (IP) Target: Right turn lwo Jima On ~ithdrawal deviate to left sary to £..void enemy defense~.
Base

Base

of prescribed

course if neces-

3436)ON - 1363311: Vllll be used as e mean I.P. "irect courses through MPI and OAP will det·~rmine actual 1. P. Mean I.P. will be USCld as reful'ence point for turning onto axis of attack.
(3)

It is inperative that A/C be over target at times designated to insure lighting a t proper time. Delay at landfall l'Iill be resorted to where nec~ssltry. Full coordination is necessary to make the mission a succoss. Fuse Setting:
(a)

(4)

500 1b GP. 1/100 nose and non-delay tail.
M-17 Incendiary

(b) (0) (d)

taU.

Bombs- instantanE!OUSnose 1 non-delay fused to open 3,000 feet above

M-17 Incendia.ry Clusters the target.

M-46 photo flash bombs - A/c loaded with Gp's fused setting wi~1 be. same as time of fall of 500 Ib Gpls. A/c loaded with ~l-l7 IB's will use fuse setting from borabdng taLle for altitude that is being flown. on bomhing run - .250 mph. Minimum to check posi-

(5)

Calibrll't.ed airspeed

(6) Interva.lometer setting:
( 7) (8)

Bombing Instructions: Crews will be cautioned tion CE refully before releasing bombs',

A mmdmum number up to 50 percent of the aircraft, will curry 1 each ,,-/+6 photo flash bomb and K-19B camera, Number of aircraft will be based on number of K-19B cameras that are llvtJ,ilable for use. The photo I'Lnah bomb will be dr-opped last with drag plates removed. For thiB mission pins and car-o-seal tel'S ~ly be removed from fuses prior wire of incendiary to take off. cl us-

(9) (10)

In the event the cloud base is lower than '8,000 feet, all aircraft except !;he pr. thfinder flare find incendiary A/c will stand by for traNsmission of the cloud base altitude, from the mE.!sterof ceremonies. The cloU(l. base will be given as base c.ltitude plus so :nany thousand feet. Th., base altitude is designet~d us .2,000 feet. Tho altitude for attack for 7Jrd and 314th v:'ings will be 1500 fGet below the cloud base and 500 feet below cloud base for 313t.'1 Wing. Amm<mitionLoa.ding: The arnmuni tion lou ding Ivill be left tho dt.ere~ion of thcl wing commander. to

(11)

{l2} GlU1ll~ry Instruc tiona:

The bomb'jroior will not be parmi t ted to fire guns. Instructions will be givon that gunnors will not fire their guns at Herial ta.rgets urUess fired upon. Qunno:ra of lowoJ:' tUl'X'Gta of 73J:'d Wine: nnly fire author-Laed to fire upon ground targets.

§'Ji!Q.R!!1
I

(13)

Radar sets will be turnJd off for 45 minutes emmodiately nfter leaving the target so interfeNllce wil1 not be made on other aircraft on bombing run. Allorting aircraft on route out will turn 900 from prescribed route het\ding and fly 5 minutes before turning on return heading. 250110K

(14)

(15) T-Hour and D-Dey:
4. n. b. 5. No ohfuag~. This is Tactical

Mission Number 45.

Communications: a. (1)
(2)

Radio silence will prevail enroute of extreme emergency.

to target except

in cases

No contact reports will be sent enroute to torget. Contact reports will be sent on return route m11y when north of 28° north. Wings will designate one J)l~ne per squadron to transmit a strike report. Strike reports references: as the only pl.ane

(3)

(4) (5)

(Reg. 100-20 S.O.I.)

All a.lrcraft will monitor ChlllUlel B in the target area for the purpose of receiving instructions from the TOr:'_ster of ceremonies. The following code will be used by the master of ceremonies for authentd.cataom
ZEBRA OSCAR 1

(6)

ROGER

3

2

4 6
5

7 8
9

10 II
12

Before giving instructions the master of oeremonies will give the code word followed by one of the corresponding numbers as above , F.xample: Master of ceremonies, OSCAR 8, Cloud p;"se, Base altitude plus 5,000 feet.
LEMAY CG COM GEN XX!

D/OPNS

:l61iT'&raiY

/.VA for.
2 En ~ing

BOM COM

DISTRIBUTION:

a

DISmmVTIOB

Jb "ian Ie

.I.1AA.ll

DISTRIBUTION TACTICAL MISSION REPORT§
Oopy No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S
9

10 II 12 14 15 lq. 17

13

1s
19

Commandin~ General, Twentieth Air Force Commwnding General, XX! Bomber Cpmmand Depu~ Comm~nder, Twentieth Air Force Chief of Starr, Twentieth Air F~rce Chief of Staff, XXI Bomber CO~d Deputy CIS, Opns. XXI Bomber Command Deputy -CIS, Sup &: Maiott D,:I Bomber Command AG o.f S, A·2, XXI Bontber COllll!land COlllllanding Generd, Army Air Forces. ATl;fll AG/ AS Intelligemce Commander in Chlei', Po..citl0 Ooean Azl'ee.s (Adv Hq) Oommander in Chief, Pacific Oc~en Areas (Reel' Hq) Chief of Navnl Operations, OP-lS-V Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Onean Areas CommandBr Air Force, Pacific Fleet Commander, Fifth Fleet COIlllll.a.nder, First Carrier Task Fo.rce Commander, Forward Area Commanding General, U. S. Army Forc66 in Far East Commanding Generlll, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean
Arells

21

Paoifio

Commanding

General,

Allied

Air

Forces,

Southwest

Commanding Gener~.
Genllral.

Areas

SWPA,' ATTN:

G.2, (For Section
Forces Air

M 26

as

27-f.8 29

30 - Sl
32
33 34 35 36 37 38

Commanding G.ne!'~. Commanding Gtneral, COlIIIDandi!'lg GanerQJ. ao~and1ng General, Oo_anding General, COllllll&l1cUngGeurlll, C.. fUI4ing General, OommaD41nC Oellerd, Com.an41n& Gen,ral, 00-.a41n& General,

Europe

22.RClM) Commanding Commanding

General. Far East Air

U.S. Strategio

Forees in
Air

Mediterranean Allie¢ Fifteenth Air Force Seventh Air Force VII BOIIIber Comand

Eisht Air Force

Forcee

Elennth Air rorce XX Bomb'er 0011IIII&11.11 38th rlyillS Tra!l11ng 'ling 58th BO$bt\l'c1IIIont Wing

VII Fighter Ooamand

Comm,.ncl1~

CoJllllD,Jlding GeM!'.l, 313th
COlDlllan41Q1 General. Commaacl1ng Oeb.eral, COllll1US41ng otUeer. 3U~

Gemra.l,

731'4 BOII1ba.rdment '1111& Bombardment Winc

39
40

'1
42
4S

"
46

3rd Photo RecoD Squadron Stat1stlod Control Unit Clhell10d Warfare Oftlcer. XXI Bomber OOmDlllnd Tacticss & Training Seotion. Ad, XXI Bomber OODIIJIILnd
33rd Officer. XXI Bomber XXI COlIID.nd
COGIIlIllnd.

Coamanding Offioer,

315th Bombardment Wing

BOIIIbardmen~1fl.11&

OrdDaJioe

46 - • .,

Hi.torlCal Officer,

Oomanding Genera.l. XXI Bomber

Bomber

Detaohment •A'

Command

48 - 77 'F8 79

Comm.al'ldln!; enerd • .Army Air FO'rQos. ATTi: G Intell1,ence, Co11ectioA D1vision .
AAF Enluation Board, c/o Headquarters

KJ/AS

AAFPOA

80 81

a7
sa

82 83 84 85 86

Commnndll'l!;Officer. Commanding Offic~. Commanding Officer, Command1ng Officer, Commanding OffiCer,
COl!llD.llndlng Officer, COllllllllnding Officer, CommandlQg Officer. Commanding Officer, COQa.nding orrlc.er,

6th Bomb Group 9th Bomb Group 16th Bomb Group 19th Bomb Group 29th Bomb Group

(VB) (VB) (VB) (VB) (VH)
(VB)

89 90 91 92 p3 95
96 98 99 9"'-

CommandlRg

Officer,

97 100
10;'

50 2nd !tomb Group (VB) S04th Bomb. Group (VB) Commandi~ Officer, 505th Bomb GroQp (VH) Commanding orfil3er. 655til Bomb Sq (H)(~VR) COlDII!andillg Officer, 'l"trt;.ntieth Air FQl'oe Lead. (!h':6. CCIIIIII.:mding otr~eer. 15th Ft~ter Group Oolllllul.ncUng Off1Oc",r .a16t"Pig,h.ter Group • Cammanding Officer, S06th Fi~hter Qroup A-2. Rep4rtin!; Unit. XXI BombGJ' Oommand (1I'11a Copy) 4-~ Rel?ort1ilg ~n1tl XXIBo.iI1b~ Oommand

Officer. Officer, Command1D~Ofricer. Commalldinr; Orfi<Cer, C0l!lll..CU1d1ng OfUcer.
Comm~din,;

COlnll).andll't'q;Offleer. CplIIII\o.nd1ng, Oft1cer, Commo.ndinl OffIcer.

Command1ng

39th Bomb Group 40th Bomb Group ~30th Bomb Group 331st Boab GrouB 444th Bomb ~roup 402nd Bomb Group 46eth Bomp Group 497th Bomb Group 4S8th Bo~ Group 499th ~omb 'Group SOOth Bomb Group

(VB)
(VH) (VR) (VR)

L

(VH)
(Vii)

(VB) (VB)
(VH) (VH)

501st Bo~b Group

(VB)

Sohool

102
i03

104

lOS - US

•l

. :!.

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