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MISSION FLOWN COpy NO. ... 5 NO.

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131

HFADQ.UART:ERS
XXI BOMBllR 00 MMAND

APO 234
TACTICll.L MISSION REPORT

Field

Order

N0.

79
Target: Tokyo tk'ban Area

Mission

No. 183

25
Table

May

1945

of Contents

Tactical

Narrativo

••••

......
.. •

III

Annex

A - Opera ti<ell'ls Fart I ~ Navigation

Track; Chart • Part II - MeaD Point s of Impact • • Part III Flight Engineering Charts. • part IV .. Radar Report and dpproach Ohart Part V - Gunnery Report • • ." .. .. • part VI .. i.ir-8ea Rescue Chart. • ..

.•

..

.• •
..

page No.

•••

••••

1
11

• • .. .. .. •

-

.. .. .. ..

· •.. .. • · 10 · .. .. .. .. 12 · • · • 13 ·· •• • 15 · • .. 17 .. .. .. • .. •

Annex B - Weath"r • .. .. .. • , .. • • Part I - Wezther Summary. Rlrt II - Chart - Forecast Observed Part III - Prognostic Map Part IV - Synoptic Map. ..
Annex C - C onmunicat ions

.. • .. • • •••• .. .. .. .. • .. • • Vlcatbc:r vs , Heather. .. • ..
.. • • • • .. • .. • ....

. ..

18

19
20
22

· .... .. .. .. .. . 24
25 26

23

Part Part

....... • .. • • .. • .. • • .. ... I - Radar Counter Measures • .. .. • .. .. .. .. II - Radio .. .. • .. .. • .. • • .. • .. .. ..

26

Anne':lr D .,. Intelligence part I - Enemy Air Oppoai t i on • .. • .. • .. .. • .. part II - Enemy Antiairoraft.. • .. • .. .. ... Part lIT - Danege Assessment.. • • .. .. .. .. • .. •
Annex E - Consolidated Anno:x: F - XXI Bomber

31
32

35 41 46

Statistical
COln!W.nd Fi aId

SUIII7lary. • .. • • • •• Order. •

· . 57
61

Annex G - Distribution.......................

• • • • .. • ...

Prepared By:
A-2 Scction

XXI

Bomber

Conmand

1:::::: S:::::: : By Auth.

1::::: IIII

of the C.Q. : XXI Bomber COlmIalld.

SECRET

~14Jul

45

JT(~
Initials

..., "~ ,
'

:

Date

~... . . ..... ~.. . .• .. . . ..

. , . .. .~ .

HEA.DQ.U.ARTERS XXI BOMB:l'R COMMA.m

APO 2.3k

14
SUBJK::T: TO: 1. Report of Oporations
I

July

1945

25 M:l.y 1945
.Ll.ir Force,

Commandip..g General,

Twentieth

Vlashington 25.

D.C.

mmr IFICATION

OF MISS ION:

a. Field order Number 79. Headquarters XXI Bomber Cotm:Ja.nd. dated 25 May 194.5•. directed the 58th. 73rd. 313th. and 314th Bombardment Wings to take part in a maximum-effort incendiary attack on the Tokyo urban Area in XXI Bomber CommandMission Number 183 .. b. targets (1) radar Specified: visual and

The Tokyo n-bnn Area was the primary

target.
(2)
2.

No secondary

or last

resort

targets

uere

specified.

S'IRATEGY AND PLAN OF 01'ERATION:

a. Strategy and Selection of D-Day: This attack was planned in conjunction nith MisSi,on No. 18;t since it WAS believed that greater potential damage would be caused by executing 2 night incendiary attacks within a minimum til!:t!;l interval. The ar-ea selected for attack was 11 band approximately 16,000 fect wide and 24,000 feet lone to the west of the watierfront immediat ely south of the Il:.'1pe.rin1pnlae e , (Sec; XXI Bomber Command ToctiCD.l. Mission Reports for details of Missions No. 37. 38. 40, 69 and 181.) on the boais of a fovornble weather forecast far the night of 25-2~ May. firm decision \1o.s rode to ottacl<:. b. lIIl.portance of the TarBet: Th~ target to be attacked included industrial and residential districts, as "ell as part of the financial. governmental. and COlllP.lerCi£l1 sections of Tokyo. It also included the ShiD.ugauc Railroad yards, the largest m3rsballina yards in Japan. nnd the warehousing ess€ntia~ far tbe storage of supplies us ed in e onnec t i on wi th that act i v ity • Many machine -tool aDd. el ectronic factories and scattered industr ial piants \lare also in the target area.
'h

Details

of Pla.nnipg

(1) Bombing:
(a ) Determina.tion 0'M Bortb Load: wer e to corry inoendi.o.ry

1:.
bombs and

1~11 aircra.fit

clusters.
-1-

g. Twelve path1'inder aircraft fran each Wing were to cQrry 500-pound AN-Wfl6 bombs, fuzed inst(;\ntaneous nose o.nd non-delay tail. These bombs were se Lect ed as a pathfinder munit ion s~nce they were ~pectod to start immediate large-scale appliance f'lres in the tnrget ares. a~d thus mark 2 mean paints of impact. The exe aUent 001li sUe propert i es of this b~b were expected to enable the pnthfinder crews to obtain nnxilllumaccuracy. Construction with~n the oreo of 2 menn points of impact aSSigned the pathfinder force 1nc1uded 10- ond l2-story fire-resistant concrete and brick buildings. Single and double-story wooden duellings, nercantl1e centers, and tyPiccl industrial installations. The AN-W6 bomb was belioved to have sufficient weight and strikine velocity to penetratE each type Qf structure in the area. The instantaneous nose and non-delay tail fuzings were selected to allou the bombs to burst several feLt beneath roofs, thereby aseur mg maximura fire setting effect. Pnthi'inder bombs were to be released a.t 25-foot intervD.ls in order to obtain maxinuo cone entir-a t ion.
3. The fir at third of the main force. Ilssigned the same 2 mean 'points of impact as the pathfinder force, oms to carry 500-pound Ml. 7 aimable incendiary clusters fuzed to open 5000 .feet above the torget. The I1GO magnesium bomb in this cluster nos considered the best available incendiary with whieh to strike the wooden industrial. and .fire-resistant structures il'l the area. The desit;nnted 5000-foot opening uns expected to obtain I!la:x;imUl:!J efficiency in the functioning of both e lust er s snd indi vid ual bombs.

11. The rEiJJJB.ining tao-thirds of the cain force .. ether mean points of il!lp8Ct. were to curry approxiDntely M-47 incendiary bombs .fuzed instnntoneous nose and one-bnlf' c.lusters of M-69 bombs fuzed to open 5000 fe ..t above the target. (There were to be no mixed loods in .:my nircrnft.) The 2 different types of bcmbs select ed bad be en most effective in previous missions against S inilm- targets.
assigned one-h~lf the

4

The M-47 incendiary bombs cnrried by the main force were to be released at laO-foot intervals bet.. een groups of (; boobs. All c lust er s were to be r clea.sed at 50-root intt.I"vals. These s et t ings had been effect iva on p.revious similar missions. (b) Boobina Datu:

5.

s ion in ordeJ!' to obte i n a ground density
diary for

\'roS specified far this nisof 225 to 250 tons o£ incenbomba per square I~Jile o.f the tor.aet area.

1.

MlxiP.lUJ:1 effCDrl

the pathfinder

g. Six nann poi.nts of irnpnct 'Rere selected and moin rardes (Sea Annex:AI FDrt II).

1- Because of Inntioircrnft considcratiol'..9. the best radar eppr'oacb , an axis of ap:Jlro.ximotely 315 de,jl't.os across Tokyo B9.y. was eliminated Tor tl?-e main. force. (see Mission Report No. 181 for further dot ails .) Intcrro~e.tian at: cr ews who had :part' 'pated in MiSSion No. 181 indicated thtlt an initial point locoted a~c~achioji 0535N-13916E) was sotisfQ ~tory for 8 radar turn to the t rget. Fran this point an axi s of approximately 80 degrees could be u:ed to the tarest. a down-wind run C ou..:ld be made, and anti::droroft
defenses were weaker on this than -2on a~ other npproaoh.

It. Following the Command's policy of sending pathf'inder aircraft to light up selected mean points of impact. eaeh Wing was to assign 12 aircraft to l1gl1t up the 2 easter:tll:l.CJ3t p~s. It was dec ided that the others would not be attncked by pathfinders because of the confUsion that I!1ight result trem bavinG mare than 2 pOints illumincted. po.thfind€rs wero to precede the l!lain-farce nircraft to the target area by approximately 10 minutes and were to use a 3.l5-deBree axis of attack from their initial point. 3532N-14004E. Th~s ~as considered the best possibl~ radar run.
ity of the force, number of aircraft

j. Emphasis was again placed on cacpressibl1with all \iings being instructed to get the oaxirnum over the target in the shortest possiblo time.

~. All bombing ~as to be done fr~ altitudes of ,000 to 11 ,800 f'eet. It was estirD.ted that drift would be 2 degrees .right. Bombing was to be done at on indicated ground speed of 307 to 309 miles per hour and the axes of attack far tb£ nain force were to. be from 78 to 81 degrees. (2) ~vil)atio.n:
(8)

(SeeAnnexA.

Parts

I and IV.)
'1'.'85

The r-out e for

the tathfindcrs

as f'011003:

Reaso.ns for Choice Bases

to.

to IW0 Jiron

Tactical

Doctrine.

34#°N.140QOE to

351813N-14025E
to Target to

3.532N~14004E (IF)

to

This check point was to keep navicators to. the left of course en route to. target. I;:\ndfall was on easily identif'ied radar point for D. turn to initial peint. Initial peint was an easily identified point on the coast across the bay frOD Tekyo. A point used to. avoid flak defenses.

3.5.55N-13940E

to J55~·14100E to Iwo. Jima to. Bnsas

This point was selected to. /lvo.id nntialTcrru't co.ncentratio.ns at Chosi Point. TOcticru Doctrine. (b) The ro.ute for the nsiD farco f'or Choice esas as. fellous!

Eases

---Route

Reasons
11'10 Jill1£l

to.

Taotieal

Doctrine.

34a6N•1,3814E

to

3535N.1391bE
to Target to.

to

(IF)

Depl rturo and lnndfc:ll point 170.9 an rosily identifiGd peninsulll. on thG edge at Suruga linn. Initial point wos eaeily identified 5 niles fram Ha ctlioji to 03.kC'1 turn to the target. 0. After leaving tbe t:l1"GElt a It::ft turn nas to be t, nade to t\void f:lak concentrations and thernnle
\7i th the exit
to

btl made north

of Choai

Point.

1W'O JlzP. to :eases.

Tactical

Doetri~a.

(3)
f

FliBbt

Engineering:

(a) Flirp.t Plan: Altitudes and speeds were planned or ma.xmUl:J. fuel ec onomy and S'cfety. Assemblies were to be made only to compress striking forces. Larg\:l fuel reserves were recO!:IDended because of expected poor weoth~ at Iwo Jima and home bases. (bJ Loading:

1. Fuel reserve data indicated that none of the Wings 'Would r~g_uire bomb bay tonks. Fuel load of approxmately 6700 gallons was to be ccrried.
2. No l!la.Xinumor marnmum bomb loads -r.iere specified. The 58th, 73rd",-and 313th ,iines were expected to carry potent ia I bomb load s of 15, OOOpound.s IEr a ircraft and the 314th \"iing was expect ed to carry 11.000 pounds. The amnuni t ion load nas est mated at 300 pounds-. (4) ~: (See Annex A t Part IV.)

(a) As on Mission. No. 181. departure point was to be the distinctive peninsula at 3436N-13814E. The initial pOint. also· oosiJ,y identified by r-adcr , Vlas 5 nautical miles southl7est of Hachioji. :n- om the as sem,oly p0int t o the ini t ial point I accurate radnr navigation could be per:f0rmed by using Surugl'! BaY_'$ :okosuka Peninsula. M01lllt Fuji. and the western malf of the Tokyo Peninsula as ehec x points. (b)' The mean po i.nt s of :impact were projected along the nor ther-n ToIt;yo deck line. The coastline definition of Tokyo Bay was expected to reduce rate errors und those errors that pould oc«ur were expected to result in bonbs falling on mean points of impact of other \"i'ings. To ~nkc advantage of this course, the ::\Xis of attack was made as much to the east as possible. (0 ~ R'llf'-WIlY frCl!l the departure point to the init~l point. both tlit: initial point and the entire tnrget area would be v.rithin range of radnr. After the turn at the initial point. the Dat"'thwestcrn ecsner of TokyIDBay end the northern Tokyo dock line uould be available for reft.rence points. (d) It was expect od thtrt the 2 northuostcrn c.inins would b~ the most difficult to baob accurately by radnr.

points

(0) Pathfinders were to go into the t~get over Tokyo Bay from the east t a insure hit t ina the nean points of inP"'ct. which were easily id60tified froo that direction. This reduced th :P oa s i bili t y of der 1ec t ion Err or s • It "IfQS es se.nti01 that th 0 pathf inders hit, the exact points in order to prevE)nt r.oin force boobs follin'" on areas burned out by pr evious oissions.
frOI:! '"

(5) Radar Count",r Mensur 0S1 It rra s planned to have 13 RCM Observers senr-eb for early-warniJlB ond gun-laying rndors am to duct .:1 Gen",ral search in the region 01' 40-.3000 Megacycles. divid~on it into the follooine ba nds , 40-100, 100-140, 140-300., 300-1000. ~: 1000-3000 r.legD.cyc1es. Search rece ivas, pulse onalY'}m"~. and d irect ion-f~nding. a nt e~as w.. r-e to be employed and ObS6t:W'lt loons TlCl'o

SECRET ------

to be made throughout the islands en route, to the tcrget as well as in th~ tarset area. It was planned to have each a~ ~-rQPEl" (~l.ndow, for use as protection against sea.rchlights and antialrcrb.J.Io
fll'e.

(6)
AI Pa.rt VI.

Air~ea

Rescue:

were to provide rescue facilities
d. Details of Flannins

The Navy and XXI Bomber COllll'land as indicated on the chart in Annex .~ Intelligence:

(1) Enemy Fi6hter Reaetion: Mnxim\Jl!l fighter strength in the Tokyq urea was estil1e ted at 378 operational aircraft, but the night fighter strensth was estimated at apprOXimately 56 twin-engine Nicks and 27 single-engine planes. Day fi6hter~searchlight ccnbination t echrri.que had shown an improvement in the Tokyo area. (2) Enemy Antin ircroft :

(a.),
of ."hieh

Derenses:

J,. In Tokye proper there rrer e 480 heavy guns, approxirPtely 345 would be within effective range of the B-29's on the planned route and axis of attack. In addition to the ~reQter Tokyo defenses, there ware 24 heavy guns at Tachikaua. 18 at Za.ma. and 10 at Chi.ba. nerossTokyo Bay. It was est ireted there would be moderate fire frCl!l Tachikawa and meager frcn Cbibn, and that the Zam de.fenses would be within l'ange for every lioited period.

l.
feet, it uas effectiveness. est~ted that

At the r ec cmnend ed base al ti tude of 9000 automatic \.capons wuuld have only sliGht

#.-pproxioc.tely 1..50 to 200 searchlights had been reported in th~ Tokyo area and their tactics hod ~oved on recent missions. Snoke and cloud cover that might be encountered was expec t ed to reduce s6archliBht effectiveness.

J.

It..
the proposed altitude ported

No oor1'8£:e

balloons

had been reported

at

of attock.

5..
(b)

Some uound-to..nir

rockets

hod been re-

in the oreQ, but these bod been in~ccurntc end ineff0ctive.
Re:comnendotions:

],. Due to the increased searchlight actiVity on Ghibn peninsula ana. sinoe the axis of attack frQl:l the oost acrose Tokyo Bay hod boen used on sev~Ql previous night ~issions, it wns recommended that Tokyo bo approacbed froo the west. A sim~lnr route ond axis (Jf· ottack had b,-sn used on Mias i on No. 181; h0ii9v"r. no chonges were belidved to hove b... n l:1.ode e in the Tokyo defenses to strengthen th~ QGainst u repeat attack. Fol1onina ba~bs Q~y. 2 breakownys had b<;len recommended, nQrtheast through a gap in t",!e Tokyo d erens ss ond. north toe has i Poin t to land ~ . end, or southeast s across Chibo peninsula ~f smoke nnd thLircal act~v~ty nere not too intense.

-5-

. 2. A base al ti tude or 9000 feet was recO.I!IIIlended Vl.ew of the o.ccurate-automRtic weapons fire that had been eneountcred at lower nltitudes. in recOmmended that

1. '1'0 saturate antiaircraft .t eoc h "'. "l.ng compress 1. s attock into

defenses. it was a 70-minute period.

~.. Since most flak on night missions had been encountered by aircraft coned by s&archligpts, it was recommended that aircraft dispense "rope" (windc;w) and desynchronize engines as defensi.ve tactics ..

3.

:EXEUUl'ION OF THE MISSIONI

a..

Take-off:

Take-off ldrcrnft

uns accomplished Airborne Pathfinder 12 12 11

as follous~
La.st

Wing 58th 73rd 313th 314th
JiXI
oJ<

Main Force 120 130 75 127

First inke-off 250712Z

Take-off 250848Z 25085& 250B57Z 250§j.Q-z' 25085SZ

250740l.
25073lZ 250654Z 2506S4Z

11.

B.C., total does not include

This

4 Super-Dunbo Aircraft.

RQute Out: Aircraft proceeded to the target individually at briefed nltitudes and air speeds. with celestial. Loran, and radar be i.ng u;sed us navigational aids. Compressibility of the Wing forces on this mission :was superior to that of any other previous mission due to g000 execution of tiI!ling by tbe navigators. b~ c. Ov<.rTar Bet:

(1 ) ;pr imary Tnr Bet: Tar get oxeo. navicat i on wo s ac C CI:lpliShed by radar, with a few visual corr~ctions being node on the bombing run. Farty-four puthf inder and 420 main-force ci rer.a.ft dropped 1:1 total of 3262 tons of bombs on the prinary tarGot.. T.he pat h-, finders bombed between 25~38Z and 25152lZ at altitudes ranaing frcc 7915 to 22,000 feet, and the main force banbed between 251410Z and 251613Z at al titudes rnnging frDr.l 8950 to 20,000 rest. Visual bonb-, ing was done by 9 jlathfinders and 155 min force B-29'5, and r3Q.:lr banbing waS done by 35 p3th:finders and 265 r.Nlin force aircraft.
(2) TarBet s of OpportUI,lity: Six B-29 's d.ropJC d

39.tI
.frCG

tons 9195

of' bonbs between 251415Z and 25151% at a1 t i tudes renginG to 12,300 feEt on 4 different targets of opportunity.
(3) TWenty-six main-force and 2 pathfinder chiefly due to mechanical difficulties.

aircr~1't

ective, were n on- eff
d.

Route

without

incident.

Back: Navigation to home ba.see One B-29 landed at 1'1'10 JimO.·

\'7aS

accOl!lplished

-6-

landed

,

e. Landingl Aircraft of the pathfinder and main forces ot bases under good weather conditions as follows, \7in8 First Landins

I!st Landing

58th
73rd

25211,5Z 25202?Z 25210.52. 252127Z
252G27Z

252354Z
252347'l. 26003% 26005% 26005.5Z
due to the fo110'17-

313th ~
XXI B.C.

ins reasons:

f.

losses't

'l'wenty-six

B-29 's were lost

(1)' (2)

Enepy Antiaircraft:

3 1

Enemy aircraft

and antiaircraft:

inability

(3) other: 2 (cr ews bailed out over Iwo J'i.r:.m due to to land their planes because of bad neather.) (4)
Unknown: 20

g.

Op~rat ions Summary;'
(1) NaviBation: See...Annex':"~ part I, for track chw.rt.

(a) Th~ sreatest difficulty encountered on this Dission was the smoke and fire over the target. This made it difficult to identify mean points of impact far aircrof't aa.king visual runs or having ro.dar malfunctions.
(b) The 314th Wing had 10 aircraft report bco.b release molfunctiona. Four additional aircraft had difficulty trith the pn(:)umatie bomb door system. The other \fings reported fewoa.1funetions.
satisfactory.

(oj All Wings reparted that the axis of D.ttD.c.k naB Average drift reported was 2 degrc,-s left. 'Iho tining was good with the entire force beiIl8 over the target rrithin a. 9.5-minute
period.

(3)'

and Annex E. Consolidated

Flipllt Ene;int.ering: (See Anm.x .\. P.:l.I't III, for charts Statistioal Sun:lIlrY.for fuel co!)'suopt ion Narrative of Mission as Flo~1

otd weight data.),
(0.)

1. Climb end Initiol Cruise: Clicbs to cruisill8 o.ltitude were accanplished immediately of1;er t~ke-of'f. CompreasiDn of the bcmbinB forces wllsobtained by hovine the first airp13nes to take-orr fly at altituqes as low as 2000 feet and at a calibrated ail' speed of 195 miles per hour and the last airplanes to ta!re-01'f £1 at altitudes as high as 10,000 f6Qt nnd at a calibrated air "1 ap y "ed of 200 m1 es per ha ur •

2. Return to Base: Return altitudes varied from ~OOO to 20,000 feet. The best return was made at 10,700 feet at a cal~brat ed airspeed of 18.5miles per hour until a 140 foot per minute et-down was ;made into the traffic pattern.. By this procedure the ~eraft used 1961 gallons frern the target to Guam. (b) Comments on the Mission:

,1:.

compression

of forces

wor ked vell.

_g. Seme of the 58th and 313th Wing airplanes carried M47A2 bombs which could not be loaded to afeatest capaCity on the B-29Io5. acc.ounting for the low bcmb load average for the 2 Wings • .2. Just before airplanes took oN on this nissian, prediction of poor weather VIas ~de for 1'110 Jima on the return route. One grou~ of the 58th wing off1caded 2 boobs tram each plane and added an equ.ivalant weight in fuel. The 73rd Wing added 200 gallons of gasoline per O:i. rcraft. The 3l4th \ring r-emoved bcmbs to oake rqom for an estimated 900-gallon reserve for its planes.
(4) ~: Gunnery: See Annex A. Part IV, for radar report. report.

(5)

See Annex A, P<lrt V, for

gunnery

(6) /I.:i,,r-SeaRescue: (S ee Annex A, Pnrt VI. for sd tes of ditchings.) Four B-29 1 s 'l<ere lost off 1wo Jima, ni th crews bailing out of 3 3ircraft and the fourth ditching in 1... Karbar. 0 all cr'eW membe,rs except 1 man were rescued. (Figures are based on later inforDation and were not available for inclusion in the Consolidated Statistical SUIllr.lary.) One B-29 ditched at 3148N-14113E due to danage sustained over the target. Nine of the 11 cre9 meobers ..ere rescued. although I of the rescued men Inter died. .i.notber di telling had been reported at 33l0N-llj.130E, but negative searches ..ere oade on 27 aad 28 May. h. Vieatber: (See Annex B for details.) ered on this ml.SSl.on was a Iraoat as briefed. i. Communications: (1) Radar Counter Measures~ (See ·mnex C. port f.-sather encount-

r.
..ere

for detailS.) Thirteen observers partici~;ted Bnd 95 intercepts obtai1'lsd. Hope VlElS dispensed when it was considered neeessery. (2) Rodio~ (See i.noax C. Port II, for detru.l s.) of 33 strike reports wos received by Ground Stntions.
j.

A

total

IIltelligencel

details.) attacks.

(1) EnemyAir Opposition~ (See .\nnex D, Part I. for Sbcty Gn81:lY fighters intercepted thO!B-29's and t:Pde 94 Cl3l. ms were 17 destroyed and 4. dar.nged.

(2) AntiOlircraft and .... ir-to...Air Bambi 0: (see i.nllLelC'. 0 _,,"1 for details.) Flok encounf ered in the t!"lraet a r-oa oos D. pa ...~ .... • t he most in tens e to dat e.

tails.)

(,3)

DamageAssessment

I

(See Annex P. Part

III.

far

de-

(n) Damage resulting frornMissions No. 181 and 183 totalled 22.1 square miles. or the equi w.l.aDt of 20 p... cent of the r total city area. (b) This damage, together with drunage caused by the COI!l!M.Ild's 5 other missi<r>ns against Tokyo (Nos. 31. 38. 40, 67 md 69),. raised the total city urban area destroyed and damaged to 56.3

square miles,

or 50.8 per cent ot the city area.

.

~1I._'r:;,

~

.£, IJ ~

CURI'IS E. LeMAY Mljor General. U.S.A. C OI!lI!land ing

OPERATION:)
Part I - NavigEltion Track - Mean Points Chart

Pe.l"t II

9f lm,paet

Part III - Flight Engineering Cbarts
Part IV - Raaar Report and Approach Chart

Part V - Gunnery
Part VI - Air~ea Rescue Chart

Mission No•. 183

25

May

191iS .

-10-

APRil 1945

PART ....L NDVIGATION CHART

SECR£T

MISSION NO~I~83=-_1 DATE 25 MAY' 45 XXI BOMCOM.---I

-.-------------

K EY--

--35·

-11-~-

58th 73rd 313rl'l 31411'1

'CHICHI OKINAWA

J ~,~

r\'JQ

PATHFIflOERS ALL ~INGS

20·


TARI:3:E:T_
lsi. Lost 1st Lo~r

J... p-ND'S END
lsI 251400~ 2514052 2514032 2513552,

5611'1 251327Z .• 73rd. ~ 2513362 31311'1 251305'i! .• 314 th.· 2513042

2514552 251515i: 251517r 2514592

251338i! 2513522 2513472 2513432

2516132 2515602 25l420i! 25153e~

I

Losr 2:5162822516232' 2515562 251534~

S8t~~ 250712Z 73rd· 2507402 3131h· 250,312 .314rh·250654?140· TRII-CK CHART lOU SOMBER COMMANO SECRET

A lSI

OK
250846c 250~58l 25085E1~ 25084 0~
Los

i

1 ' 1' ' ' ' '
~'

~
'-<!

~ ~

Ctl

"J>
~,

\~ Q :z
~

I

r~~
d
l"l

0
'"

o t'" >

~~

(f)

rn

~"
\.)
~

~

x; ~
~ ~

d

,

""""

~fYll1 /"'O/lp

V"'i

f,coo

1Ja I"? B
lli71TtJ.Pf-

(ri£-Y

fO~t
1(IiS&RYt"

~/I~;;

%GJ.
f~Jlf)

~/!t)

PART IV ~ RADAR REPORT

1.

Bruipment Perf armanc e:

a. AN/iU'Q.-13 was operat ive as follows: Over the target I and 421 on return.

485 on take-off.

428

aircraft.
miles at

b. c.

Azimuth sta.biliz8.tion

was used on the bombing run by 308 uas 59.5 nautical

a

The average maximum range of A.WAPQ.-13 10,000-:100 t altitude. The average maximum range of radar miles at 7000 feet and 133 nautical maximumrange

d.

116 nautical
was

beacon reception r.as miles at 13,000 feet. point aircraft.

48

e. 'The average nautic~l miles. f. g.

of AIo/AFQ-13 on landSall reported
by lead

There were no AW/AIQ-l3 fi3Uures Failures reported

t:l t=l

SCR-718.
ical

were 12 ArVAPN-4. 1 SCR-695.

and none

o
'"

~
~

;;

U> r;n

2. Loran: The average maximumrange of equipment was 521 nautmile~ ground waves and 1091 nautical miles far sky waves.

>.3

,
~

t<l

,

.

o

3. Comments:
a• Ther ewer
€I

299 ind i vid ua 1 radar

reI ea ses r aport ed •

by radar

b. The identification of landfall, ini t iEll. and aiming pOints was report ed as fran good to very good. and off-set radnr bombing methcxis were used

c. Both direct on the mission.

-15-

B

WE.I!.TIDR part part I _. weather II

surrmary

_ Chart - Forecast iieather vs. Observed \)"eather - prognostic Map

part part

III

IV - Synoptic Map

Mission No. 163

25

)"Jly

1945

-19-

Q.Q.I!!.!.Qlil.Ii2tl!Ll&

ANNEX

B

WEA.THlR
part

I -. Weather

SUllIIlBrY

part

II - Chart - .Forecast weather vs , Observea Weather - Prognostic Map

Pa.!'t III

part IV - Synoptic

Map

Mission No. 1153

25

May

1945·

-19-

Q.Q.HE1~E.tiltl~l:

PART I - \i'EATHl!R SWMARY

Planning Forecast Bases: 4".6/10 low cloud, base 1400 t't. top 8-20,000 1't; 5/10 middle. cloud, thin at 11,000 t'tand 4/10 high cloud at 30.000 t't w1th showers in morning slowly decreasing during day.
.'1'0 28ON:

Route:

To 2u'1.1: As bases • 10/10 low and middle cloud, base 1000 1't. tops 18,000 ft with 8/10 high cloud from 22-26,000 ft. extending to coast in areas west of 136"1:. "'£. ) To CoaBt: 7/10 low cloud, base 1800, tops 6000 tt (E of l~E • Tal"gets: Tokyo and Nagoya: 3/10 100 cloud in morning increasing to 8/10 by l200K with middle and high cloud increasing slowly tbrougnout the day to 16/10 in many layers from 11-)0,000 ft. Qpe:t"ationa1Forecast I"(eather :Encountered sa ipa.n; Tinian: 10/10 low cloud. bnse 2000 ftj 1/10 middle cloud. tase 14 ,000 ft. Guam: 6-8/10 low cloud, be se 1600 ~top 7000 ft. widely scattered ligpt saoeer s in the ftree. To 24"N, 4/10 10'1'1 cloud. base 1800 ft, top 8-10,000 it; 2/10 middle cloud, bese 14.000 ft. top unknown; becoming 5/10 at the end or the zone. 24~ to 26CN: 5/10 low cloud becaning 9/10 ~ith tops at 9000 ft; 3/10 middle cloud, base 12,000 becaning 9/10. 26% to 10~1: 10/10 lCR cloud, base unknoun, top 8-10,000 ft. with a few tops to 20.000 ft; 10/10 oiddle cloud. base 12000 with top at 2 ,000 ft; 8/10 hi~ cloud at 24.000 ft. visibility 10 Cliles lorering to 0-1 mile in rain, modcr-at rim icing c 8 bove 14 ,000 ft. 30~ to target: 9/10 low cloud. base 2500, top 80qO it bco<rU.ng 1/10 at coast; 8/10 middle cloud, base 12,000 i't becCl!ling 14.000 t't: 8/10 high oloud ~t 2 .000 ft; sev~e rine icing ut 15,000 rt. light at 20,000 ft.

,

Base at 4/10 low cloud. base 2000 Take Off: ft. top 6-12.000 ftj 5/10 middle clou4. base 12,000 ft, top 13.000 ft: 8/10 hign cloud at ]0,000; visibility 20 miles, lowering to 2 miles in showers. Route To 20?N: Same D.S bases. out: 205'I to 22"N: 4/10 100' cloud, base 1800 ft, top 8-15.000 ft; 2/10 middle cloud, base 12,000, tGp 13,000 ft; visibility 15 miles, lowering to 2 miles in showers. 220N to 24~:N: 4/10 1011 cloud, base 2000 ft, top ~QOO ft; 2/10 middle cloud, ba~e 12,000, top 13.000 ft; 6/10 high cloud at 28,000 ft. 24~ to.21~: 8/10 10& cloud. base 1500 ft. top 10-15,000 ft; 10/10 middle cloud in layers betwe~n 18,000 and 18,000 it; 8/10 ~1gh. oloud at 28.000 ft; light ~~me ~ce; visibility 10 miles, lowerl.rlg 1 to 'le in showers. ~~oN to30"N: 6/10 low c~oud I bose 000 ft; 4/10 l!lJoddle cloud. 2000, t op 5 1:/1 0 bose 12 •000 , top 13,000 it;.;) . loud at 27.000 ft. hl.~ ~o 34~: 5/10 low cloud, bas ]0 4000 it, 3/10 high cloud 2000. tooPft- visibility 8-10 miles at 28,00 , in haze.
Target: haze.
Route Fieturning:

3/10 loW

top 4000 . "sibility 8-10 miles in 28.000 it. Vl.

ft- 3/10 higp cloud at

cloud.

base 2000~

cloud. base unk:oown, to!, 8/10 middl cloud. base 14.000 ft, top unknown , 9/10 hj.g,h cloud at 2).000 it; visibility 15 miles. Same as Route Outgoinc.

1/10 low 5000 ft;

Some as

Route Outgoing.
-20-

:a

Qperational

Forecast

Weather Encountered 7/10 loVl cloud. base 1500 ft. top 6000 tt; 4/10 middle cloud. base 10,;000 ft.

se on c~turn:

3/10 low cloud, base 2000, top 5000 ft; 3/10 middle OUds, base 13.000. top 14.000 ft.

Winds Aloft
B':I se to 20'1-T

- Forecast 2S o

20~

to 25~ ;.20 -09 01 10

N to 35°N
-22 -12 -02 07

Target
260/65 260/55 260/30 -24-05 03 08 12

25.000 20,000 15.000 10,000 5.000 21000 Surface

210/15 170/15

-20

190/~5 160/15
120/15

-09

150/15

01 11

19

26

090/13

260/27 260/25 270/25 270/20 280/15 290,ll"2

31

300/06

19 26

30

255/50 255/43 260/35 260/28 255/18 280/11 140/08

"260/45

-14

12 16 21

260/20
250/12 2/J.0/05

16

Winds l~loft - Observed
Base

to 20CN

2G~ to

2..s,CN

25~

to

'35~

Target
250/40

12.000
10,000 2.000

030/20 130/25

240/30

240/3.5

220/25

240/35 260/35 210/25

240/33

-21-

Cl'I
<,

.....

~ ~

.$
~ ~ ~

).._

I~

....
'Vj

III '<

» ~
~ :1.
Q 0 t<l

\~
~
;>:l

.~ 0
~ ~

• = all;) ...
~~

.•. •

t,

\

....

n
t"'

0 '"

»
tn. t;)

•~ 2
"~

~

~~
I..fI

I. I

0
a
0
<0

0 0 0
N

0
0 0

0
0 0
pJ)-

0
<:)

0

0

::5

0

0

t<>

0

..r>

~

0-

0 0I<)

~')'

.,

TRUI~

,~

C'

I'

c

part part

! ..Radlll" Counter Measures
Il. - Rad:iG

W-sa1on NO.

183

,

PART I - ru..DAR QOUNl'l!R MFAStJRl!S 1. PUr:eose:

a. To D/F early-warnine
b. To continue radar

and gun-laying

radars.

search

in 38-3000 me region.
of rope.

c. To confuse enemy radar by the use
2. Method:

Q. Thirteen observers participated and used the following equipment to a«comp1ish the search: 13 - ...IR-4. 12 .. APlL.ll. 3 ' APA-24. 2 .. l.:PR-.5. and 1 - 1.PA.-6.

b. Rope was dispensed onds when considered necessary.

at the rate

of 3 bundles per 10 sec-

3.

Reaul tSl

a. Many crews reported trot rope ws effective and in !!lUI)" cases the searchlights were observed trackifl8 the rope aftEr it ~s di.spensed.
oj

~t.
z~
>

»

b. Radar search resulted
Characteristics
00068 00068

in the following

95 intarceptsl

Coerdinates

~

Til!l.e a* 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

oM c* Usc
121 121 121 121 121 121 121 122 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 122 122 122 122 122 121 121 121
122 S S 1#1 E\i Eri

_5
S S

:n::a
CHI

~

0600 2.5 3540N 13930E 052645 0143 0252 0490 40 3107N 1400_5E 052645 00069 0500 50 3505N 14025E 0130 052645 00070 14030E 052645 0143 0495 30 340m 00070 0450 35 3522N 14024E 052645 1315 OG071 0li.00 20 3427N 13828E 1225 052545 0209 0500 34 3307N 1403.5E 052645 00073 0502 1.0 354 ON 13933E 052645 0052 00073 06 3545N 13937E 052645 0107 1900 00075 0180 20 3340N 13930E 00075 1139 052545 00a'78 9:550 . 20 .3500N 13830E 052645 0035 00079 0006 0450 25 3435N 13810E 052645 2000 05 3545N 13945E 0526~5 0146 00079 oooSo 0450 40 3310N 1381SE 052545 2345 00080 1320 0450 35 3458N 14.049E 052545 00080 1900 05 3529N 13940E 052645 0112 00080 0011 0497 42 3307N 13947E 052645 00080 0024 0473 34 3433N 13655E 052645 00080 0490 42 3307N 13947E 052645 0021 00086 0370 44 27D.5N 14212E 052645 0405 00093 0366 30 3512N 13652E 052645 1040 00095 0690 20 3450N 14035E 052645 1140 00100 0501 24 323 ON 14045E 052645 0118 00101 0495 12 354.5N 13937E 052645 0107 00102 0364 30 3529N 13940E 052645 0107 00103 0786 13 3240N 14050E 052645 0058 00103 1055 12 340.5N 14110E 052645 0145 00105 0307 08 3435N 14100E 052545 0152 00105 0907 12 3228N 14045E 052545 1230 0010.5 0520 30 3410N 14037E 052.545 1157 c· :neli£lbility b~' Method. . Orig1n S'" .. 26.

CHI
CHI

CHI CHI 5 Eli CHI
:Eli
E\1

5

D7
GL

s
S
S

P

E; CHI CRI

CHI

ar~DJ

5
S S S S

El' CHI Eli CRI GL 01''';'°3 ~i CHI ]All· CHI
GL Dr" El,·

B1

01'1.03

P
P

CHI

Ell

121 121 121 122 P 121 S

F Ell F Ell S Ell' S El. S EI.. l' E. S El, S D. S D1
EH
Dj'

P

0010)102a:l 0010.l02CX2 00101"'202 001010202 001010202 0010100~ 001010002 001010202 001010002 001010202

CH;

em

CHI

§!QR.E:t

~.EQ.B..s;~
Charaeta-istics 00105 00106 00107 00Hl8 00108 00105 00110 00110 00112 00113 00130 00135 00138 00146 00147 00147 00148 00149 00149 00150 00150 00151 00152. 00153 00151 00155 M155 00156 00;157 00157 00158 00160 00160 Coordinatf;lls 14040E 13750E 13750E 14040E 14035E 13832E 1403OE 1j830E 14052E I4105E 13832E 14025E 13915E 13900E 14100E 13947E 13840E 13932E 13720E 14120E 13952E 14057E 14128E

Date 052545 052545 052545 052545 052645

~

~

.!!!£.!
S S
p

Y!.!

~

Ol '<

:t>-

\~ .:;: z~

.::

..
;d
;>

0
t;::I

o
r-

0

'"

> U>
Gtl

~

,

'"

~

"0

0590 10 3500N 0353 44- 3305N 0490 24 3300N 0350 32 353 ON 0506 18 3315N 0365 28 3325N 0240 46 335 ON 0550 20 3400N 0350 50 3545N 0572 36 3425N 0430 25 3345N 0000 08 3420N 0340 10 3430N 1000 09 323 ON 0492 04 2.729N 0492 08 3307N 0450 0.5 352 ON 0502 08 3406N 0485 05 3410N Oif)_5 05 JljlON 0545 40 3533N 0497 08 J415N 10(')0 06 3.535N 0490 07 330lN 0920 06 3345N 0387 oEl 353 ON 1000 09 3320N 0481 07 3402N 0492 06 3307N 0578 07 3100N 1100 08 3055N 1000 08 333 ON 0490 05 353 ON 00180 0490 05 3530N 00185 1025 03 3530N 00187 0000 09 3400N 00190 0450 05 3540N 00190 0450 05 3410N 00180 0180 20 3355N 00190 0240 05 2640N 00193 1000 16 3240N 00194 0800 ,14 3400N 00195 0318 20 342 ON 00195 0956 06 344lN 00195 1650 06 J430N 00'195 1460 06 3535N 00l?5 0000 04 3340N 00196 1950 06 353ON 00196 0960 10 353 ON 00196 1020 04- 3540N 00197 0335 08 '3516N 00198 0370 05 3542N 00200 0490 05 3530N 00200 0310 05 3400N 00200 0900 10 3605N 00201 0000 08 353 ON
u*
Origin bi!<

Method

21 121 21 121 21 122 21 121 21 121 21 121 21 121 21 121 052545 1124 21 122 052645 0140 21 121 052645 1215 21 121 052645 0135 21 121 052545 1154 21 121 052545 2350 21 121 052545 2125 21; '121 052545 2229 21 122 052545 1240 21 121 052545 2310 21 122 052545 1030 21 121 052645 0030 21 121 052545 1300 21 121 0526,45 0.0.54 21 :122 052645 0012 21 121 14015tt 05254.5 2357 21 121 1]845E 052645 OOlS 21 121 14030E 05264.5 024-3 21 121 141]OE 0.52645 0215 21 121 13720E 052645 1025 21 121 13947E 052645 OCf27 21 122 13930E 052545 2310 21 121 13940E 052545 2335 21 121 13835E 052545 0016 2l 121 13930E 052545 1230 21 121 13930E 052545 1231 21 121 13930E 052645 0115 21 121 1]815E 052545 1235 21 121 13555E 052545 1242 21 121 14015E 052545 1330 21 121 13940E 052545 1144 21 121 14105E 052545 2106 21 121 14130E 052645 0225 21 121 14120E 052645 0207 21 121 13810E 05264.5 0345 21 121 14030E 052645 0423 21 121 13805E 052645 0319 21 121 1393lE 052645 0344 21 121 14110E 05264.5 0152 21 121 1403QE 05264..5 0405 21 121 140]OE 052645 0359 21 121 13950E 05264.5 0120 21 121 13821E;- 05264$ 0335 21 121 1.9952E 052545 1245 21 121 13930E 05254.5 1232 21 121 13815E 052545 1235 21 121 14100E 05264.5 0125 21 121 14030E 052645 0400 21 121 1135 1009 100(J 1128 0122 052645 0301 052645 0130 052545 1220
Colo

S S S S S
p

S S
S S

S
S

P S P
S

S
S p

S S S
S S S

:m; 001010202 g 001010202 B1 001010202 :Eli 001010202 ili 001010202 III 001010202 Hi 001010202 El. 001010202 3i 001010202 Er~ 001010202 E\; 001010002 El, 001010202 Eli 001010002 Eli 006040002. :El. 001030003 EI, OC10)0003 Eli 001030003 BI OCIO] 0003 :Ell 001030003 Eli 001030003 Eli 001030003 Hi OCIO]OCC.3 ai' oeb04 003 BI 001 30003 Eli 0c60400 03
El, Ill"
0010]OOC]

P
S S S

1m OCl 30003
ilo'

006040003

S
S S S S S S 5 S S 5 S S S 5 S 5 S S 5 S S S S

!W EX; E\,'
E\i

B.

GL

O010]C003 CCIC30003 ccs 40 03 OciJ040003 001030003 001020002 CT•• c3

OC'l0200C2 001 20002 01030003 Do 001020CC2 B'" 00604('(103 Eli 00102 002 Eli 001020002
EI~' El, E\i

B;

o

1020002

00402 GL 00402 B; 006040002 GL 00402 GL 00402 GL 00402 :Eli 001020002 Ell' 001020002 El7 001020002 001020002 J1li' Eli 001020002 001020002 Ell

Gt GL

0('402

:;tel'ie.bility

-272Jl;Q!3.EI,

Characteristics 00201 00202 00204 00204 00206 00208 00208 00215 00469 0995 1088 0735 1070 1500 0900 1212 0870 0475 04 05 31 07 04 05 10 22 15

Coordinates 3540N 323 ON 3540N 3540N 3535N 3459N 3555N 3420N 3505N 13950E 13915E 13950E

~
052645 052545 052645 052645 052645 052545

~
0130 2345 01.40 0150 0357 1238 0108 0027 0045

a· ~
21 121

C. Y!!
S GL GL 117 GL

:!n!
00402 00401 001020002 00402 OO¥2

21 121 s
21 21 21 21 21 21 2l 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
S S

13950E

13931E 13832E 14015E 13815E 14015E

S
S

052645 052645

052645

S S
S

A Signal 'IIi th the cherncteoristics 4. Remarks: 469/475/15 was intercepted on this mission. 1.. sim.ilar signal, probably the same one. was heard on missioR No. 181 in the same approximate location. No DIP cuts were obtained. ~ART II RADIO

en.
GL Ei

00402

001020002 001020002

::0

1. S;trike Reports: 1 total of 33 strike report messages was ... received by the 1;ing 'Ground Stations. Ten reports 'il'er6 received by the 58th Wing; 8 by the 73rd i 7 by the 314th i and 8 by the J13th. 2. FOx Transmissir:lns: The only diversion i'rcm the usual Ucopao ,.eather and Time Signals transmitted from the Ground Stations to th.e airclu.\ft during this mission was the transmissi on of the r.eather at IV/O Jirno. on the hour and hnl£-hour for 2 hours ai"t...r Bombs .... 'il'sy.

3. Frequencies: il.erial radio operators reported that atI:i05pheric interference was heavy on all strike frequencies during this tUssian. The 11 megacyc Le frequencies in all \lings proved the nost effective. There .. ere several enexny atte.npts at jamming on nearly all frequencies. Followin6 is a per-c errsoge breakdown of traffic per frequency: 15 per cent on .3 megacycles; 35 per cent on 7 megocycles; and 50 per cent an 11 megacycles. 4. Navi,Q(ational Aids, Tl7enty-four requests for RF/DF bearings were mode of the Ground Stations. ,.11 but 2 'l':'cre obtained. In 1 case. the M_OSO/F atation Q:) uld not pick up the Direr ft si6nal and in the other interference from another oircrrlrt blocked the airorll1'tts second attempt. Three VHF/DF bearinas 110I'€r quested and r.er obtoincti from Condar BJ. S9. SaiJlO,n6 Renaer S i h omers , ond bro!ldcost stations r.are usaCl. effectively. 5. Net Discipline and Security: Only 1 violll.tion of sccurit: ~s reported during this nissloD.. The 313th loing r ported that an .:l.er:lal operator used a wronB esp. Net discipline inproved OD the uhole. The 58th Wing reported that some operators continu&d to break in on other tron6I!'lissions • failed to cleor the ai:r for Ilraent tr"f:f io. used m'oll8. authentication. o.nd asked tor wer:thcr just before or right Qf'tor a scheduled weather broadcast. Th9 73r d lYing had only 1 breaoh or net discipline; tho emergency transru.ssio:n of 1 aircrlli't ons broken by another airorttft. Correcti ve notion 'W6G tllken in oocn i.nstl'1noe listed abovsto prevent recurrence.

-28-

6. EnemyTral'lsmissions: The following incidents at janming aad eneI!\Ytransmissions were encountered during this mission,
a, 3145 kea: (1) (2)
Jnp OW between 1500Z and 1900Z was partially

effeetive.

Jap 0'11 between 1300Z and 1330Z was very effective.

fective

(3) 011' siBIla1 to effective. b. 6055 kes: (1) (2)
Enemy

AA:P from 130az. to 1335Z was partinlly

ef-

voice at l057Z and 1600z was ineff ... tive. c was partially

Jap CW at 1320Z, 153OZ. and 1605Z

et-

fectl,ve.

(3) steady
(4) (5) blocked
out the

tone

near

1170

1ima

lroS

partially

effective.

ow

betWeen

Iwo and So.ipan
tone

VIas

vo;ry effective. vo;ry effective and

eli a:nd steady ground station.
Oil' and d;ashes

at

133ce. nere

(6) (7) c.
partially

at

1609Z and. 17042 uere C\7 at

·cffect ive.

Heavy unidentified Intentional

12582 was very effective.
1530Z and

11080 kes:

0\, betucen

16c7Z

;.as

effective.

d.

9020 kes: (1)
(2)

Gli fran 1650Z to 1730Z was vary effective. B!l gpipe frcm 1415Z to 1500Z was part ially Negligiblo. Unidentified Intermittent
spQl'k

ef'fect ive.

e.
f.

10305 kes:

1990 kcs:
7415 kes:

cv

nt

0925Z nils very effective.

g. very effective.
h. v,-ry effective

C'.. bet\7cen

lo57Z and 1145Z

;m.'3

10820 kcs: .•

coil

jrumlin£; frae

114.52.to 120520 "as

a,
uare received

"I410! ?,UO. and 11160 }cos: Ne.B,ligible.
The 73rd "'ing reported by the Wing Ground St.o.tion.

7. Distress,:

that 2 e!:'lergencyIlGSS!la
The first
'R"8S

i3S

ines an aircraft indicating a possible ditohiDG due to the 10$s of 2 ons • Before atiternpting contact with the \,'i'ng GrOundstation. the niroraf't sent his (Dergency mes sage to 1'1"0Air '-Sen Rescue on 37.5.5 kes. ..l .Qu.:r.
(true course to steer) !;laS requested by thiS £lircrr:ft trOll ;.ir-See. rte~cue at Iowa. The. bcorins was not 0 btain ..d. The airerni"t ' OpCl'ot r o then switched to 11080 kes and transm.itted the obove mentioned message

received

1'r0!!l

-29§.!HLE..i!

to the Wing Radio Station. Supred was alerted in order to obtain 0. fix in the event of ditching. Position reports were: received from this aircraft plus 3 fixes obtained by Suprad. Commmiea.tions were maintained with tho Olircraft until it landed safely at this base. Th~ second emergency message was received in clear text fram an aircraft stating that ditching \vas possi. ble due to lack of fuel. This message was received in cleor text due to the aircraft's proximity to the field. Suprad. Vias notified, JJ.CS D/F UIlS also notified and true courses to steer were given to the aircraft. Course and altitude of the airCTnft were forwarded to the ADCC for the purpose of obtainill8 a radar fix in the event that the ai rcraft should ditch. Commu:nicationa were maintained until the aircraft landed safely at Saipan. The 58th Wing logg~d the follooill6 messaBcs: TIME

~

lO!;5Z

llobz

165O'2 1620Z 1 Bl5Z 1715Z 2015Z
2035Z

6V754 6V7.54 16V752 36V75l 50V752 l5V752 54V752 4V70/t 24V753

n

2220Z

end posi tion.course.' "Ship ditched. emergency IFF ON.' "No.1 feathered and position.~ nNo ~ 2 featheroo, pos ition, ]![' L Tinian. ~(Received 3 additional position reports frCD tbis ai rerlilf't.) n~29 in water, burning. position.' nPosition (2 additional positions reported by this aircraft)." nPosition of survivors." "Possible ditching and position.-

Engine trouble

"Engine out. continuing

8. ID:l ui pment Me. lfunct ions I .w/mN-7 = 5 sense llnt enna5 broken j 1 control cable broken. SCR-269G: 1 loop ont enna broken, 2 sense ans ennas broken. SCR-522; 2 inoperative. RO-43: 1 antenn:l broken; 2 indicators flashing continuous. RC-,6: 1 il1Gpcrative; 3 :microphone switches inop(.rntive. .IBT-13: 2 inoperative; 1 no sidetcnc. BC-348: 1 inpp",rative. RL-42: ·22 inopu-utive.

-,30-

D

INTJ!LL1GENCE

part I ...n~Air E

qpp05ition
.'

part II ...En.eIl)y,.ntiaircratt l
pal!'t

III ...DariQ,ge

A~ sessment

Mission No. la8J

25

May

1945

,Pl.RT I - ENEM'f

AlR OPPCSIT!.ON

(Based on 6valu.l3ted data which rraa not available for inclusion Consolideted Statistical Summory)

in the

1. ~U; It is estimated that 60 Japanese fighters intercepted nith 94 at tacke being m:lde. Eneny air opposition contributed to the 10S6 of 1 B-29 and resulted in damage to 21 others. Claims were 17 destroyed and 4 dQmflged. :m:u.'Ily Warning: The Tokyo area WQS alerted almost 2 hours beB-29' amad e londf all. _',pprox:imn e ly one-ha l:t' hour t before pathfinders mode landfall, Tokyo apparently had surmised that an incendiary ntto'ck was imninent and broo.dco.st a st3tement that .the enemy seens to be carrying out a wave of attD.C.ks with sinale planes which w ill last for several hours".
f or-e t he pathfinder
t Overcast was at 14,000 f(;et. B-29' s banbed. frat! 22.000 feet, v.r.i th a.majority dropping their incendiaries frCl!l 9000 to 14,000 f'<6.et. lieather over the tarGet and the bombing nltitude of Bw291s were probably no hindcDnoce to'"'the-J'~p fighterG-.

2.

3. Weather

BODO to

4.
94
attacks

Deployment a.

of Enemy :drcraft: control, only

Due perhaps to inadequate fignter made oc~urred prior to the IF.

4

of the

b. Frcm the IF to the target .. 25 ];lor cent of the intercep .. tiona lVa' e made. t-·"Th,e.inajor.a ty of the -a.tta~lcs were .made by ~c!~ntified fighters. c. Between the target a nd land IS end. 57 per cent of the attacks occur ed , probably made by units other than those intercepting £rem IP to tnrget. Most of the reported "B:lk:l" ~tt.:lck.s occ.urred frm the torget. ar en cut to sea. d. It W<"IS believed toot 25 to 30 of the 60 interceptors 'lVere TIE fiGhters. of which 10 to 15 covered the area fr~ IF to tar.;;et and 15 to 20 the area between the t.:lraet and lo.nd·s end. ~·.pprox~tel y 20 to 25 SIE fight erB at to.cked in the torSet area in coordinat ion l1ith searchlights. Another 10 to 15 SIE interceptors nppear.x1 to operate n ear land's end. e. There WQS apparently no vectoring of enemy fiGhters to the bombcr-a Instead the cnOlllY s<-anoo to have been instruct eel to , cover a deSignated oxen. Single-el1Gil18 ;fiGhters G3de most use of the searchlights, and coordination seumed to be improvint;.

5..

,};acticsl

a. The mnin force of B-29's bombed the tarGet 1'rm 14HZ to lb13Z. Betwoen 1400Z and 1500Z the e~emy Ill£Ide appr oxirlEttely 66 per cent of their attacks. Last units oi'B-29 •s to roach tho target received nil to weak interception.
b.

the tail.

Favorite

Fifty-eight per cent of the enEmY attacks "era ~de approuchcc "era ~ n.c:J,otr t'i~1 lOTel.

at

-32-

§'£:QR.E1

approllch:.

c.

Following is a chtlrt showing direction

and

level t:4

Direction ~nd Level of Approach of Enemy Aircraft
,ot Attacks

Total Nwnber

16%

1%

F.ROM LEVEL FRO!! BElLOW

40% 40

6. Details of sightings of, and encounters aith, :flares, rockets, and midget aircraft on Mission ISl ond 183 ~olloos (E.aluation
of these reports a. target, is indicated by the title); Flare.!'h (1) wTrientyorane;e light s were 801m bnnaiDs in midair the light cont iDuiDg for about 30 seconds.'

OiVeI'

(2) "Between IP ond tara:et, 0 steady red liGht lasted for 2 minutes, trailiIl6 apar-ks fl'= 14-.000 feet to the ground.' (3) -The 'balls of fire' did not oamecloser than 300 yards and app~ared as u reddish-orange, glop about the size of a
basket ba 11.. n

(4.) "There were due to no apparent cause."

5

'balls

of tire'

seen to disinteBl"ate

(5) "In most all in~tances in which 'balla of tire' bUI'ned out. there was a distinct brightening effect just prior to the disappearance of the missile~. instances illuminated (6) "The 'balls of tire' rema:i. ned stationary and in 5 were seen to swing 25 to 50 feet frcan a parachute.(7) nProjectiles appeared to be tired in pairs. Two the air for sbuut 1000 yards. then d1BappeQred~. were apparently suspended by par_ put forth a briSht white light after 4 to 5 minutes they bUI'st [e,11 to the ground.-

(8) "'Bllls of fire' achutes. ~ben first observed they which ch::mged to a dark red. Then into 3 separate ba'Ll.a of flame ond
2000 feet

(9) "Three white 'bolls of fire' descended fran about above the pb.thi'i1lder and b\Jrnoo out in tbe air.instances reported substca-

tially

(10) There were llPny other similor to the above. b., Rocket s: (1)

"O'e lock level.

II,A 'bull of fire' at land's end came in at cl. osed to 1000 yards and burned out.1

6

(2) nA tball of fire' wns siehted about 15 miles off in the distance from an aircraft approximately 30 ~es off HonShu. Itwaa traveling horizontally at a high rate of speed, first Iclwa:rd this airCX'aft and then it turne~ left.1

(3) ~A f:l8ir of bright red flares similar to r(:lOe.n candles were seen Qver Chiba Peninsula. They seemed to criss-cross in the air and then dis.s:olved." (4) "11. rocket passed over the B-29's tail before goil1B out t leavin,g 0. red traH.' ani went for

about li~iles

(5) IIfBalls of fire' were seen launched frCD the ground Chosi Foint. The launching wa.s a.ceompe.nied by a blue flash of f'lame. They came up to 10.000 feet very quickly and cut inside the turn of the B-291s off landfall."
ROOT

(6 ) .. }!Si!lmsbal:.ls. at' t1J:"~ ••

were seen to f'ollow.e1'tc

the

aightings

(7) In addition to the :foregoing, there were manymore which were believed to be properly ol.:\ssified as rocketS.
e• MidRet Air craft
l

(1) "An unident ified en.amyaircr£ltt launched ~ BnlcBa. a t our plan ell of these came to wi til :in 500 ynrds ~ it was hl.t and 1t exploded. \lings and fuselage were se~n.·

-34-

§_!;QE.i.l

(2) -There was 1 instance in which a Bake came close enough to a 13-29 almost to ram it. The pilot of the B.29 succeeded in llUIUng up and. the Blka slid underneath the 13-29.11
(3) In additiOn
of Attacks: Number

of what could be mi.dget aircraft

to the above, there were other reports of the Bake or some other type.

7. Breakdown

Enemy Aircr(?:ft (including same possible Midget A/e and same prob. able flares) T/E Unidentified S/E Un:identified

Per cant

Uniaentified

50
24
6

54

11

25

12

Nick
Irving

1 Total

6 1
1 _J:

Oscar
TOjo

firing

a. Two :rap fighters at each other.

on reciprocal

..

94

1 1

100

beadings

were seen

b. ApprOX,im::ltely 1/3 of all yard!! or less. c. One of these attacks. 8.

attacks broke off at 200 followed B-29's to sea. land's end. making no

Several twin-engine fighters paced a B-29 200 m:i.les past

elaims;

a~ Destroyed:,'_l"r -1 u/r by Nose, .3 U/I by RB. 5 0/1 by RSG. 1 Nick by RSG. 6 oJ/I by 'lJail. and 1 u/r by Nose and RBI
b. prOb~lblY Destroye.d: 0 by LB.. 1 U/l by RB. 1 0/1

by MG,

e. DamasedI 4 and 1 U/I by Tail. PART II

1 Irving

- ENEMYANTIAIRCRAFT·

1.

Sunmtary of At tack: a. The primDry target was attaoked
by airdraft

of 4

Wi.I1gs as f'ollcms: MAIN FORCE Wing

58
113

73
120 144,OZ-lb ODZ

313

Ale

71
141al-154SZ
141SZ-153BZ

Time over Target 151%-16132 .. !need

on Wing Flak Of:fl.icers· reports.

§.J£a!:l
58 9100-12.500 10,000 65°-92° 73 895°-14.200 10,000 80°
£:ATHFINDiRS Wing Total

Wing
Al titude Bracket Average Altitude
AXes of

313
95°0-20.000 10,700 74°_88°

314
9100-15,100 10..500

Attack

Tf-86°

58
A/e
12

73

313

314 9
l343Z-1447Z 7915-8700

12
1352Z-152lZ

11
l348Z-J.42oz 8700-9000 300°

Time gver 'l'.arget Altitude Bl:'acket Axes of Attack b.

1338Z-l410Z 8000-9000 290°-300°

84°0-22,000 290°

284°-32SO

0/10-2/10

and winds at

Oloud undercast in the target area was reported at bombing altitude were 28-35 knots at 240°_260°. Six aircraft attacked variouS targets of opportunity. is a tebulation ~

c.

2. Flak Dl Route, to Target: The following the flak encountered en route to target areal Loeatiion Shizu.oka Nume.:z.u Coordinates

Remarks

.3458N3609N
35421'1

1382f!E

Mae.gar to modere.te t ine.ceurS te •
heavy and medium.

1,3852E

Meager to moderate. inaccurate
henvy Meager. medium. oDd medium. inacour ... e , he:lVY and t

TachikEl.wa Hoehioji
Mt. Ridger 10 mi.

13925E
139:fOE 13910E 13820E

3540N

AW-Gun flashes

w.

of IF

3540N 3452N
3fjOON

Ye.izll

Meager. ilIAC curat e. heavy and m.edium.
Meager.

Shimizu

13830E 13856E

inacourate. inaccurate.

heavy and

medium.
Meager. medium.

Gotanba

3518N

-:36-

~'!QB.!I

Location Route priOE' to IP

CoordiMtes

RelllBl'D

Meager, inacc.urate, beavy aDd medium, continuously pointed tire, black bursts.

~~outh of Fujigawa River Hammtsu Omaesaki Mt. Fuji

3506N 3442N

1383BE Meager to moderate,
medium and heavy.
WIry

inaccurate.

13744E Meager QM

iun and heavy.

inaccurate.

ae4_

3435N 138l3E 3528N ·13842E

Meager and inaccurate,

barrase

medium end light,

white bursts.

Meager and inaccurate,

bee"..
!!Ied-

s.

at IF

of He chioji

Ver.y Beager and inaccurate. i urn and/or heavy. Area
Heavy and medium.

IP into Target Chiba peninsula

3532N

14005E Moderate, accurate, beavy end medium, continuously pointed. (Pathfinder aircraft) Medium, inaccurate e. ircro.ft). (P.?th!'iDder

picket

B;:)at

5 miles

off

Chosi Point

3. Flak at TarBet: Flak in the target area mlS reported as the most in.tense encountered to date. In general it was intense IlZldaccurate. meaium end heavy tlrougbout the entire attsok. Searchlight nnd gun de:fenses were apparently well coordinated. ~ircraft ill\Elinated re:po:rted intense to moderate, accurate. medium ond heavy tire. While those oot illvminated reported nil to me:::BElI'fire. In 9:I,ce cases the possibility ·of visual trllcking of aircraft was presented by the reflection of searchlight beams and fires against the overCBS'i. Most of the fire appeared to be continuously pointed. Hor.ever, acme predicted conoentrations and barrages were re"parted. particularly at the time of bomb release and at times Tlllen aircraft emerged frem smoke e.l cuda , Most tracers reached the 3ltitude of the att<::cJciIl8 aircra;f't, Some AWfire was t im~ :ruzed. 4.
Location
Half
way

encountered

Flak on Withdrawal: The :following ofter leavinB th", tnrget eras:

is a tabulation

of flak

Coard1nnte.s heavy. cCIltinu.ously

target

between the 3545N 14020E llcourate. end 1(\no'$ end (spprox) pointed.

North of Choehi Point
at land's end

Accurote, hooV)' (rodar-c.ozltrolled" 5 inoe no s&lll'chlishts were IiIIIIployild). Intense, heavy and medium. Gontin-

Noval vessels near Yokohama Chibo and Kizaro.zu AirfieldS

uously pointed.
Gun flashes only.

Location
Qoi

Coordinates

Remarks Meager to intense, fairly accurate, heavy and medium. Twentyburst ~rrage reported here. Meager and inaccurate, medium.
medi\IID.

35300

l400bE

Mohara Naval Vessels Naval Vessels (S out h of Ohara)

3522N l40l9E

3522N 14033E Intense,

35l4N l4023E Medium and heavy. and heavy. 351!jN 14Q35E Medi\.DJI
3500N

TateyalD9. Airfield

l3950E

Moderate, heavy, fairly accurate, continuously pointed fire. . Ale bombed the airfield 8S a target Of opportunity. Medium.

Surface Picltet

Craft

3535N l4020E (approx.)

boat

3432N 13800E Medium.
:3445N 14005E Moderate and inaccurate,
Mee.ger and inaccurate. h68~.

Surface Craft (4 blips on radar)
South o.:f Chiba

Near Ohara
Chiba
nocm Target to Chiba

35lON l402JE

Several ported.

DEm

flak

botteries

re-

353bN 14008E Moderate.
t

accurate.
pointed

hezvy. CC'nc-

inuously

Intense. continuous, medil..l:il. curacy not evaluated. 3544N 14050E Intense.
medium.

Chashi

Vessels in Tokyo Bay and. 12 to 160 miles S E of Choshi

Intense. medium, trac era up to 11 ,600 feet.

5. S1lllJl1lary LOeB and Damage to Flak: F\?ur ai rcre! t were lost of to flak on this mission, a figure which pas slightly disproportionate to the quantity and accuracy of flak encountered over the target. However. 20 aircraft were lost to unIffiOt'D CBuses and flak probablY occo\Ulted. for a sioz.able number of these. ~t oi' 470 aircraft aver the target. 100, or 21.28%, sustnined flak dNllf\ge.
6.
imote

See.rchlie,hts
a, The

I

fo11ooi06

tabulntion

shOWS the

location

and app:N1il'C-

number

of searchlights
NO.

encountered,
(i>.pprox)
ReI]]!lro

Locotion Numaoz.U Fujikawa
Goi

6-8
12

:Ineffective

th.roug!l underonst.

3

Amotsu

6

lPoaUon

No. (A.p!!"ad 6 10-12 2

Chofu
YBch1mata KDsumigara 'nlteyaue Hojo N. end Tokyo Bay (Chiba to FWlIlOO,shi) Omaeeaki Target Area Choai Point IF Area Haohioji Sutaga Cbiba Muaashino Ar ea

20-25

6-8 3

Very effactive. Very effective circle defense.

150

cOllCentr1o

25 100 plus

5
5

,

Most AI C ill'Ulllinated here. Blue 1ights--very effective. Scattered Inf)eose e;t'een master lights.

10-20

b. A large number' of aircrnft reported "Zero pickups-. i.e •• ~enrchlight contact after searching from 0-3 or 4 seconds. Tracking an most cases was reported as very effective. It appeers that the use of -rope" (window). desynchrooizntion of engine:s, aDd evasive action "as not as effective on this mission as on previous missions. Crewe reported rope as being fran nil to partially effective. c. The conventional concentric circle defense of Tokyo was well balanced and very effective. Aircraft were repeatedly picked up by outer rine lights and passed fl'om light to light across the target. One aircraft reported it wos passed fran light to light fran IP to land's end.
d. Ooordination between lights and guns was reported 8S ea::eellent. The enemy was apparently trying to reduce the nUl!lberat li~ts on each aircraft and consequently illuminated more aircraft with fewer lights. Several ai.rcra:rt reported 3-6 lights used canparsd to 15-30 previously. In practically all cases, only aircratt illuminated were fired upon. Many of those not illuminated were not fired on at all.

e. There were numerous report s of eolored. glowing lights or flnshes in tbe Tokyo defenses, particularly nlong the lxmb run. The color of these flashes varied in the reports fran bluish green to ht'ight green. The f lashes were intensely bright· and hurt the eyes. Seme pilots reported that these liGhts flooded the skY ';"TUb light at on altitude of 10.000 feet. n lumination was adeque.te enougb so that other ai rcraft in the area could be seen. 'The intense gla:J lasted 10 to 15 seconds. then died out. fihile the glaw was at its maximum intensity, normal searchlight beams picked up the aircraft. This indicated the possibility of eenrchlights makil!lg visual contacts with the aid of this I!lYsterious green glow. Verifying reports stated that ssorchlight contacts were alde almOst ilIIne:diately follOWing aach of these gl"t:eJl glows or flashes. 7. Blaekout: Blackout in the torget and surroundill8 arase was good to excellent. Lidlts were reported at a reservoir north of Tachilalwa. D. rotating beacon 10 miles west of Tokyo, and a tf1ff aCElthred lights at Hachioji. FathfilldEll's reported H!lnedaAir1'ield fully ligbted; ho\,t;ver, these lights bad been extill&u1shec1 prior ~o the arrival of the main force.

r:

B.

Miscellaneous

A/A Observational

e , One round (20-foot diameter). gray balloon over Tokyo at 9000 feet was observed by an aircraft at 10.800 fee.t. The crew thought that the balloon was of the ..:tree~ type. the b. Phosphorus flak wae reported sane as otl:!er heevy flak.
Olff!r

Tokyo.

Accuracy was

c. Pnrachl:1te flares were reported half way bet'l'lsen the IP and the target at 10,000 feet. They had a yellooish 'i1hi e glow lightt ing up the sky for It minutes. d. One crew reported flashes spnrklB<i like pin wheels as they fell. of fire over the target over target which were

e. One crew reported that large red bursts immediately followed by numerous small bursts.

f. Five" balls of fire" were observed in the targ8't area. were level but trailing the aircraft. Crews reported that what appeared as tracers were emanating from these ·bolls of fire". (See part I, of this Annex. for additional "balls of fire' details.) They

g. One crew reported ground-to-air rockets in the target area. Also reported were 3 battleries of rocket lauDcha-s on the shore of T0l\:YO Bay from Soutl:l.Tokyo to YokohE>.ma. ne battery releasO ed 13 and the other 2 eatterie.s each released 20 rockets which reached altitudeg from 8000 to 1.5.000 feet. Those reaching the higher altitutles appeared to exert Q new burst of speed after the initial velQcity started decreasing. None of these rockets was effective. h. Ground-to-air (1) rockets were observed rising from: red-cr-

7'

a·nge glow with trailing

K~H;3saki (15 at 8 time. very inaccurate. streamer's).

(2)
(3)

Tachikawa. Tokyo Dock Area.
E!;\ st

(4)
i.

a ide of B::1y (50uth of city

of Chi be).

equipped uith
for

Ground-to4r rocket s were reported launched 4 at a time time fuzes from location not given.

j. One cre'~ reported ftb3l1s of fire" "hich bung in til. e 8 ir 2 to 3 seconds bofore exploding in a yellOl7-red flash. They.wU'6 fairly accurate in altitude; otherwise they were inaccurate and a.neffective.

9.
ID,E!.de.

Vo reports

of E~ir-to-air bombing or air-to-air

rockets

ue.r~

-4U-

PJIlRT III

• DAMAGEASSl5SMENl'* TOKYO CITY

1.

Summary:

a , This report assesses darmge to Tokyo r~sultina fran BI Bomber Conrnand Missions 181 and 183, 24 and 25-26 May 1945. Adequate reconnaissance photography was not available during the period between the 2 strikes; therefore, the resultant damnge could not be separated acc~ding to each individual strike. b. this report. available.

XXI Bomber CommandNissien

Damage in North Tolzyo (b.rsenal .Area) resulting fran 67. 13 J.pril 1945. is also assessed in a suitable :photo cov6I"~ge not haviOG been previously

c. Reported damage to the city of Tokyo ira!! all other ra ids has bee n remeasl:1Ted and replotted on a rasH tllted Mascic. thu'B account Lag for any discrepancies betueen figures far ·old darnage" listed in this report and those J;lublished in previous reper t s , di. Area damaged totaled 22.1 sq. mi. as a result at missions 181 and 183. and 11.4 sq. mi. for mission 67. Total d8l:lese to Tokyo is 00\1 56.3 sq. mi •• or aboub 50.8% of the built-up port ion of the City. e• included truction.
2.

57 numbered tare€ts
capitulation

Ind ustr io 1 df'JrJuger esui t ina fran t h3 above mis sions which shalt -roryi.ns desreo,s of desof Damage by Missions:
Area Destroyed

XXI Be Mission No. 19.

Per cent of •• totnl Cityi.rea

9

25 February and March 19l1,!i

16.8 sq. oi.

13 April 1945 15 ~;'pr 1945 il 181. 183

6.0

sq. mi.
SQ. l:Ii. Sq. mi.

24 ,. 25-26

~y

TOTAL

1945

56 •.3

22.1

50.8

20.0

"" XXI Be C.l.U. DIll. Report No. 8l
."" The built-up ar-ea of the cit y of Tokyo is fisured ."It 110.8 sq. mi. (the ar-ea uithin the srbitre.:ry oity tlOundnrics used in this r~part is 117.8 sq. mi., of 17hioh 7 sq. mi. are: pllrks or sparsely bull tup areas).

PST

III

• DAMAGEASSF.SSJlI!Nl'.
TOKYO CITY

l, •

SUJlIlIery:

a. This report asaeeees darmge to Tokyo resul t1ng fran XlI Bomber COl!rnand Missions 181 and 183, 24 and 25-26 Miy 1945. Adequate reconnaissance photography was not available during the period between the 2 strikes; therefore, the rasultal'lt damng€: could not be separated 8ccording to each individual strike.

XXI

b. Damage in North To~o (&.rsenal Area) resulting frc:c Bomber CommandMission 67. 13 April 1945. is also assessed in this report, a suitable photo ccvsrcge not having bsen previously
avuilable.

damage to the city of Tokyo f'rCl[!] all other and replotted on a restituted moseic, thus accounting for any discrepancies between figures for lold damagen listed in this report and those published in previous re· ports.

c.

Reported

raids has babn remeosured

11. Area damaged totaled 22.1 sq. mi. as a. result of ei811.4 sq. mi. for mission 67. Total dru:JJ.ga to To~o is non 56.3 eq , mi •• or about; 50.8% of the built-up portion of the city.

sions 181 and 183, and

included truction.
2.

57 numbered tnrBEts

e.

Industrial

damage resulting fran t re sbove missions which shorl varying degt"e... of" dess

Co? pit ulat ion of D .. -'lJl18g6 by 1111 ions : ss

XlC1 Be Mission No.

Date 19. 25 Februnry and 9 Maroh 194.5 13 ~lpril 1945

Areo Destroyed 16.8 sq. ei. 11.4 sq. mi.

Per cent of •• totcl City ..:.rea

31. 38• 40 67 69
181. 183
;;0

15·1 10.3

15

,,_.pr 1 1

1945
:May 'l'OTLI!.

6.0 1945

SQ..

mi.

5.4
50•a
20.0

24 ,.25-26
D/A Report

56.3

22.1 5g.mi. sq. mi.

XXI Be C.I.U.

NO. 81

"'II<

The built-up nrsa of the City of Tokyo is figUr ;d nt 110.8 sq. mi. (the ores within the Ilrbitra:ry citl' ooundm-ies used in this report is 117.8 sq. mi.. of' 'Chich 7 sq. mi. ore pm-ks or spnrsel)' built-

up areas).

-41-

~Qlilllt.E1:!:r..!*~

CONFIDENTIAL

SUo/!l.al"Y of

Tote~ Damage:

Area of City Area of City destroyed Area of Inc endiary Area of Incendiary Area of Incendiary Area of Incendiary Zone I Zone I destroyed Zone II Zone II destroyed

Sq_ Miles

110.0 56.3

Percent

50.0

il.oa
0.9
57.3

Target Area 90.17-3600 Target Area destroyed Target

Target Area 90.17-3601
Area destroyed Area Target

14.135 7.10 6.7 2.79 '.26 2.29
ITm.aZATION_ OF INDUSTRLi,L DAHAGE

47.6

TarBet Area destroyed

90.17-3602

Targ~t Area 90.17-3603 Target Area destroyed

TAWEr NO. 201

202

Ordnance storehouse a.mmunition
Arsenal Arsenal Jap~. Artificial Fert Uizer-Chemicals

TAIDE'!'

NM.{:E

4 sr:Ja1l buildings

EKTM

OF D1!STBIlCTION - r.rl.nor damage to plant

15 large, 6 lilediWll, 17 soall buildings eicstroyed. Plant 75% destroyed. 7 large warehouse buildin&s gutted - 15%
of plant destroyed. 2 mSdiUCl, 10 sm:lll buildings destroyed. building, roof darJa.ge - 5% of target destroyed 4 warehouse type buildings destroyed, 6 medium buildings destroyed, 2 warehouse type bui1<1ings 50% destroyed 10% of target destroyed.

1 large

205

Army AT'senal

20~ 207 200 209

:.rrr:ryArsenal Military Gun \\brks

13 J.?,rge,6 medium, 10 small buildiJigs 14 small 'Quildings destroyed.
destroyed - 2.0% of plant

destroyed. l~ of plant

Arm:! Branch Powder

Factory

Military

V.orks

211
214

InawashillO Transform;;. ing Station Armory Powder factory Tabata - Nippori RR yards Government Steam Power Station Nippon Electric Co. Fact-ory No. :2

Zl7
224 220

326

destroyed. 11 medium and s.li.lB.llt-uUdings destroyed. - 2 I.ledi1llll buildings gutted - 2 mediunl builciings damaged. Tarbet20~ destroyed. 2 larGe buildings destroyed. 25% of target destroyed. 2 warehouse type buildi.ni;s destroyed, 2 buildings gutted - Target 20~ destroyed. 7 medium, 6 S1l1illl structures destroyed. Tazget 15% destroyed. 2 sma.ll buildingS destroyed. )linor daI:lage to plant. All bulldin{,'EI on traek-bound islands destroyed or fire &snaged - Yards and roundhouse appear operative. 5 large I 2 1!ledium, 12 smEUl buildings d~stroyed - 2 large, one medium building severe roof dar(lIl.(;0 - 1 J;lediw:lbuildi.nt; partially destroyed. 30% of plt'.Ilt destroyed. 1 smnll buildi.nf; destroyed. Plant is in tire $W~pt area and probably is damage~. OONFIDENTLU,

CONFIDENTIAL

Target

332 336 327

No.

Mitsubishi Airc:raft Co., Arrrw Arson.:li and Engineering School Rc.dio St.:lhon JOAK Station Shibaura Plant

Target Name NakajiL13. Seaplane Works J~1an Special Steel Co.'

352 363 ')67

Tokyo Ce~tral

370 551 799 G02

369

Ueno RR StD.tion Oi rut V,brks

ktent of Destruction small buildings destroyed :3 small build.i.n.gs destroyed 12 small, 1 mediumbuildings destroyed. 60% of target destroyed. 20 small buildings destroyed. Target 20% destroyed. Possible firc damage - large adjoining building destroyed. Stution building [;utted. lli..nor roof damage to station platform roof. Minor roof ~.ge J large buildings destroyed - 5~

6

l\!edensha EJ..ectdc Equipmc;.nt Co., (factory No.1) Mitsu~ishi .\/C Co. OUachi Plant Ikegai ~chine FounQ.ry"

Ikegai wtor

Pla:n.t

oea

Konishi

C05

Photo }\brks Takeshiba Pier

Hinode - Cho Pier

C07

Shibe.uro. 'Iiliarf

3 large, 14 ~eCiUD., 10 sr.all buildings destroyed - target 40% destroyed. 7 large, 2' mediur!1, G smll bull dings destroyed, 1 large building seriously damaged - 25% of ta.rget destroyed. No apparent damage, but plant is in fire swept ar~.· 1 large, 2 medium, 10 small buildingS destroyed - 80% o! target destroyed. 3 small buildings destroyed • 2 medium builcli.nGs destroyed, 1 small building destroyed, 1 mediumbuilding 60% destroyed - 10% of plant destroyed. 3 large, 7 medium, 7 S1il!!lJ. bulldiilgs destroyed - target 20% destroyed. 25 warehouse buildings, 12 s!:lB.il buildings dcat.royed - 25% of target destroy~o apparent damage but plant swept area. 4 mediUlil buildings destroyed, 50% destroyed. 6 small buildings destroyed, de.mage to plant.

destrotcd.

-

ceo
M9

ed.

Oi Electric

Co. Plant No.1

is in fire target slight

Nippon Electric Co. (factory

1331 1335
1347

Kayaba Engineering CPo Naval Gunpowder Works
(not confirmed) Jupan Service Co.

No.3)

90%, dostroyed

1374
1340 1345 1355 1361

Shinjuku.

Station and 1m Junction H~rley-Davidson Motorcycle
Co. Tokyo Municipality

both 50:( gutted and nW:tor roof damage. 1 medium. building 50% gutted. 1 medium. building 50% dcst.royod, 7 slMll" buildi.n(;s destroyed. Plant 40% dostroyed. 1 warehouse gutted Target 90% dest royed. 1 gasometer severly da.ml::.ged. 1 ~asometer decaged by near mdss " 7 mediUJil., G sr.nll buildings dl3stroyed. 20% of pl.:uTt destroyed. All buildin~9 destroyed except one Tlhich is pr6bebly damaGed. Target 95~ destroyed." ' 9 lllrgo, G ('lcdiw;J., 35 Sf_l3.l..l buildings destroyed - 2 large, 2 m~dium buildingS gutted. Target .50$ destroyed. 1 larGe, 2 mediwn, 1 ar.W.J. building dest:i"'Oyed. Radio towers appear undambuildings Destroyod
-"-gad. Top floorS

':l"I1O large buildings

~\l1 buildings except one - destroyed

Plant Japan Steel BearinG Co.
Koh.-uso.n Hachinery Physico-ChcmicaJ. Co. Ind.

Steam

1364
1419

Navy Dept. RAdio To\V"€rs

gutted.

of two wings

of Navy

Central Meteoroloaical Observatory

00 NFIDEtJTL\L

C01~FIDENTIAL

Tar/SetNo. 2105 2109 2110

Target

l'lame

Extent of Destruction
4 small and 10 med.iwn buildings 4... troyed. 60% destroyed. 3 buildings minor root damage. S11sht da.'!;Io(;o plant to All buildings destroyed except two "'lhion llAvo tire damage. Plant ~ destroyed. 4 large, 12 medi~ 14 mnall buildings destroyed. Target 7~ destroyed. 3 large, 6 ncd!um, 4 ama1l buildings dostroyed. 1 l~rgo, 1 medium building roof dwmage. Plant 3~ destroyed. 1 l~rgc building gutted. 4 medium buildings gutted, 1 large building roof d~age. 6 small buildings dostroyed. 15% of plant destroyed. 1 large, 2 smnll buildincs destroyed. 25% of Target destroyed. 11 lorge, 20 ~edium. 18 sanll buildings destroyed. RemAining buildings have minor damage. T&rget aQf. destroyed. 26 Dcdium. 10 smull buildings destroyed. 4 modium. buildinGS d!lllB.ged. Target 8~ destroyed. 10 large. 29 smull buildings dastroyed. 15% of Plc:nt destroyed. 1 lorgo, 9 medium, 3 small buildings destroyed. 60% of plnnt destroyed. 1 -975' long structure gutted. 4 lo.rge, 3 medium, 8 SlIlllll uildings b destroyed. 15% of p1Qnt destroyed • 7 1l'.rge buildln!;s. 11 medilm, a small buildings destroyed. 1 large building 50% destroyed. 2 lcrgo build ings damaged. Torget 70% destroyod.

Kokusan Elect. Co.,

Toshir.1ll. Plant Shine~awa t~g. Co •• Tokyo Plant Ta.n9.k:p, I ,)a t. Mfg. Co. Unidontified

XXI 3004 XXI ~OOO
XXI 3058

Indus~ry

Unidontif'i Industry ed
Unid,')ntifiod Industry

XX!

3062
306CJ

Unidentified Unidentified

Industry

XXI

Industry

'l!!!'

XXI

3070 3109

Unidentified

Industry

xxr
'<
o;l

Frob Powder Plant
Ebisu Beer Co.

»
~ ~.

XXI XXI

3112
3113 4011

\~ -< z
...
~

Lab Navy Tech nc·ser.rch
Electrical Industry PltUlt

Re"ferenc

0St

A.

B. C.
D.

AOF 90.17

City Plan of Tokyo. No. 5279...&1 A, OSS R CIU D~~ge Assessment Roport 20 - 20 tinroh 1945

Soptem.ber

1915

om

Domnge Assessm.cnt

Report

47 • 29 April

1945

Inolosuros:

1.

Semi.oontrollod mosaio of Tokyo ~no~tod

to show d~Qgo

CONFIDENTIJ\L

Mission No.

:1.83

25 May 1945

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UNIT CONSIDERED

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1 I

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5947 6570

58646325 .5121 901 1579

5927 7112 5210 803 1841 200 396.5 2.11 700057

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I

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1.verage M9.ximwn .Minimum
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XXI BOMBm !XlMMllND FIELD

CRplR

¥Lsston No.

un

25

Me,.

194,5

-:)1-

FROM:

COM GEN XXI roM GOM

TO

58TH BaM WING COM GEN 73RD BOM ~NG ces GEN J13TH nOM WINe COM GEN 314TJI BOM WING
COM r;Et-T

§.iQ!!!
By Auth

or

CG XXI 00

INFO:

C03RD FHOTO

f.;tL 7 Initials.-2£/,,?,i z Da to
XXI BOMBER COHMAND

~-

GUAM

('30OK

25 May 1945

FIELD ORDERNUMBEB. 79

TOKYO URBAN
Chart

~~PS FOR PLOTTING: Japan Aviation
MPI REFEFcENCE:

1:218,880
Palace
Area"

XXI BOmCom tho-Mosa:i.c "Tokyo Li

1. 2.

OmitteCi. The X1J Bomber Command attacks on D-Day, Tokyo Urban Area with maximum effort

3.

a.

5BLh Wing:
(1) Target:
.MEl

Tokyo

Urh&l

Area
FORCE P.EQUIBED 12 Fa thfinder

069040

069040 041.046 01401,.9 (.2)

1st &: 2nd Groups Scheduled Jrd Group Scheduled
4 t.h G-roup Scheduled

Ale

Altitude of attack:
1st. and 2nd Groups:

Main force 9,000 - 9,800 feet.

3rd Group: 4th Group:
(3)

10,000 - 10,BOO feet. 11,000 - 11,800 feet.

Altitude enroute to t~rget:
4,000 - 1.,800 reetand

Main force-

9,000 - 9~800 feet.

(4) Bomb Load: ~~in Foree(a) Ls t and 2nd Groups: M-17 Incendiary

lusters 30mbs

(b) (5)
b.

2nd and 3rd Groups:

M-47A2 Incendiary

Pnthfinders

take off at zero hour plus 12 I~inutes.

73rd Wing: (1) Target: Tokyo Urban area.
FORCE REQtJIRED 08':1058 087058 05'706/. O}00'70
(2)

12 Pa thfindeT' }. Ie lIst Grouo Scheduled 2nd and 3rd Gr~up Sch~ 'uled

t. i..h Group Scheduled

A1titud~
1st

of attack:

Main

Force·

GrOll]):

211d and J.rd Group:
J~U.

9,000,- 9,800 fee!. -11,.800

Group: 11,000

1o,o00 - 10,aOO feet

feet

FIBLD

onDER NUMP..ER ?9 CONTINUED
(J)

Altitude

enr-oute to target:

Main Force-

2,000 - 2,800 feet (L.-)
Bomb Load: Main

and 7,000 - 7,800 feet.

FOI"C6-

(a) (1:::) (5) c.

1st C'.roup: M-17 Incendiary
111-69 Bombs.

Clusters Incendiary Glusters containing

2nd,

.3rd, and 4tJh Groups:

Pathfinders

take off at zero hcur plus 24 mL~utes.

Jl,3-th Wing:

(1) Target:

Tokyo Urban Area. FORCE REOUlfu..jJ

ow/'o 58

08'1058 05706/. 030070 (2) A1Lit-ude of attack:

IsL

12 PathfinqeT A/e and 2nd Groups Scheduled 4 tl". Scheduled
Jrd Group Scheduled

Main Force-

1st and 2nd Groups; 9,000 - 9,800 feet. 3.d Group: 10,000 - 10,800 feet. 4th Group: 11,000 - 11,800 feet. (3) AI ti hds enrou te to tllrge t:
),.000 - ),800

Main Forcefeet.

feet

and 8,000 - 8,800

(4)

Bomb Load:
(A) (H)

Main ForceM-17 Incendiary ClusterS M-I.7A2 Incend iarv Bombs.

1st and 2nd Groups: 3rd and 4t.h Groups:

(5)

Fathfinders

take off e. t zero hour plus 18 minutes.

d. 314th i'ling: (1) Target: Tokyo Url~ Area. MPI
06901.0 . O()9040 0'41,.046

FORCE PEOUIRED
12 futhfinder Ale ls~ Group Scheduled 2nd and Jrd Groups Scheduled 4th Group Scheduled of e.t.tuGk: Main Force-

014049

(2)

Altitude

1st Group: 9,000 - 9,800 feet. 2nd and Jrd Gr QUPS : 10, 000 - 10,800 fee t.
I,th Group; (3) Altitude 11,000 - 11,800 feet. enroute

to bar-get:

MClin

Force-

5,000 - 5,800 feet and 10.000 - 10,800 fee~
(1,) Bomb Load: Ma.:in Force-

(a)
~b)

1st Group: 2nd, Jrd,
M-6,9 Bomon.

M-1'7Incendiary Clusters and 4th Group:
Incendiary

Glustars

containing

FlElD

ORDER NUMBER79 CONTINUED (5) 'Pathfinders take off at
ZErO

hour.

x , (1)

Each wiRe; will assign 12 lead crews as pathfinders for the purpose of preceding the main force to pin point designated M'PI' B. Pathfinders will take off at time im icated cruising at 200 BPI eIAS enroute to target. Ten minutes after take off off last pathfi nd er the main force will start take off, the first of the force cru.ising at 195 HFH CrAS. Flight plans for the rest of the f Clt" ce will be mafle to compress the attack into 70 minul:. es , '. Routes: MAIN FORCE Base Iwo Jima 3436tl - Ij81l.E 3535N - 13916E (IF) Target 13reakaway - A/c on Northern MFI' 5 make le ft turn eyj_t nor-th of Choshi Point. Ale on southern MPI's make r:tght turn exit south of Choshi Faint. lwo J1ma
Base

(2)

(3)

PA THF INDSRS Base Iwo Jins. 3440N - 1400uE 3518)ON - l402SE 3532.'.1 - 14~ (IP) Target 3555N - 13940E 3555N - 14100E IV/oJilra Base

(4)

Pathfinders,: (a) (b) (c) Altitude Altitude

All wings enroute to target: of attack:

5,000 - 5,000
ft.
bombs.

ft.

3,000 - n,800

BombLoad:

Sob lb M-76 incendiary

(a)

U-76:

Instantaneous

nos e and non-dels,y tail. nose.

(b~ M-47A2: Instantaneous (c) (6) All clusters

to open 5,000 ft above the target.

Intarvalometer (a)

Setting:

M-76 - 25 feet 1<1-47 - 100 feet All clus ters - 50 feat 251700 Kirg

(7) 4. a. 0. 5.

D-D.ay a nd Zero Hour:

No change. Tactical Mission
Number

lS3.

/~n/OPN8

.L';t f
,~ ;rv

Communications: 'OCIBomCom501 and SOP far strilre contact reports and IFF procedures.

reports.

.

C. .... "'/G'rO ......

'/.,----

I.El-AY COH G!:N XXI

B)'{

COM

l./lONTGQh'·Y

DIST'lI13 'IT ION :2 ea '~ring

G

PISTR1mrIDN

Mission

25

,

NOe

18,

M!ly
I

191iS

DISTRIBUTION
TACTIC.4,L MISSION REPOl1TS .

Copv No. 1
2 3
4

Commanding
Chiof Chief

GGnbrc~,

C0mmCl.nding Genero.l,

Twentieth 41r Faroe XXI Bomber COIlll!\a.ll.d Air Force

00p~ty Commnndor,
of Stc.!'f, of Staff.

Twentioth Air Forco
Twentioth

5 6 '7 8 9

11
12
12.

10

ATTN: AC/AS. Intel! igence Comma.nder in Chief, Pacific Ocean .A.re:aB Commander in Chief. Pa.cific Ocean Areas Chief of Navl!tl O:pe.rations. OP.IS.V

XXI Bomber. COllllllo.nd Deputy CIS. Opos, XXl Bomber Comm~d Daputy Cis, SlqI & ltI:l.1nt. Bomber COIIIIM.nd XXI AC of S, A-2. XXI Bomb0r Command Commandin~ General, Army Air Forces
(Adv Hq) (Rear Bq)

14
15 16
1'7 It)

.COIDIDang.er, Third Fleet
Commander, Co~andor, Oommab.der. Commander Commanding
Marla~s

Joint Intelligonc~ Contor, Pacific Commander J,1F Forco, Pacific Fleet Fifth Fleet First Carrier Taskforce

Ocean Areas

oJ

";>

~~.
z

.. -<
~

0
t=l

o r" > CIl ~

"'<!

i_;j

1::1

in Chj~t. U.S. ATmy Forces, PaCifio 20 General. U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Oce" Areas 21 Commapding Ganeral. Allied Air ForcGs, Southwest Pa¢ific Areas 22 Commanding General, South\lIj'(3:st PQc.itlc AreaS • .ATTN: 0-2 (Fot Section 22, ReM) 23 Commanding General. Far East Air Forces 24 Commafiding GGner.al. U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe 25 Commandi.ng General, Eighth Air Fo rca 26 Commanding General. Mediterranean Allied Air Porces 2'7 CO!llll1anding eneral. Fifteenth Air Force G 28 • 29 Commahdihg Geheral. S~venth Air Force 30 Comm~nding GOI'le.ral. ViI Bomber Comma.nd Corrunand, 51 ,_ 32 Commanding Gonel''tJ,l, VII Fightar 33 Commrending General, Ele-ronth Air Force

19

34 35' 36 5"'1'.

G.oll1lD-o.nding Ge·nero.l, Bomber Commll:nd qom.mtmding G&nera.l. 35th Flylng Tro.ining Commo.nd Hq. Allied Air ForceB. SOllthwest

xx.

Wing

ATTN:

ZB 39
40

41

COD'lOlllndlng ~mnndihg Commanding Commanding Comm£ll1dillg

Senior Inhlli,g,onoe Officer R••1..A.F. Clenerlll, Seth Bom,bo,rdm.mt Wing General. 73rd Bombardment lang Gonero.l, 315th Bombardment Wing
Geno1"o.l, Genoro.l, 314th
3rd

Pacific Arso..,

42 4:3 44 45
46

O~mmnndlug Officar" COlllID.a.'fl.d.1ng Off' i~rt

Command in,; Officer,

Photo l{econ Sql\o.dron 41st Photo- R.llloon Squc.drotl 33rd Statistioa.l Oontlrol Unit

:usth Bombe.rdmont 1,1ng

Bomba.rdment

'Win&:

48

47

49 51 - 80 COllUllo.ndin!; Genero.l. Army Air Forces, ATTN; AC/1..S llltelligenoe, Go,uec"l;ion
M

Tact1 ell o.nd TrD.1 ning SG:OtiCl'IlS-, A-S. XXI BaIII)e r COllllland 0rdnan.oo O.ti'ioer • .lJ[I Bomber CO_Q.lId Commanding Orricer, XXI Bomber Oommund, CQ~t Stagln& C~nter (P rovi 81 ana 1) 50 Historical Orfioer, XXlBombar CODlDland DiTis10n

Qbemical

Warfare

Offioer. XXI Bombor Coma~

Copy No. Commanding Genera.l. Army .Air Forces PacUic Ocean Areaa, ATTN: AAF Evaluation Board 82 Commanding GoneI'd. JLrmy Air Forces Po,cific Ocean Area.s, 4~TNI Director of Communications For: Counter Measures Air ~nalysis Center 83 Commanding Officer. 6th Bomb Croup (VB) 84 Comm~nding Officer, 9th Bomb Group (va) 85 Commanding Officer. 16th Bomb Group (va) 86 Commanding Officer. 19th Bomb Group (va) 87 Commanding Officer. 29th Bomb Croup (va) 88 Oommo.nding Officer, 39th Bomb Group (va) 89 Commanding Officer, 40th Bomb Group (VH) 90 Commanding Officer, 330th Bomb Group (VB) 9L Commu.nding Officer, 3:31st Bomb Grou:p (VH) 92 COnlmo.nd ingOff leer, 444th Bomb Group (VB) 93 Commanding 0rficer. 462nd Bomb Group (VR) 94 Commanding Orfioer, 468th Bomb Group (VB) 95 Commanding Officer, 497th Bomb Group (VB) 96 Commanding Officer, 498th Bomb Group (va) 97 Commanding Officer. 499th Bomb Group (va) 98 cemmQndin~ Officer. SOOth Bomb Group (VB) 99 Cem~lUl.ding Officer, SOlst Bomb Group (VB) 100 Commanding Officer. S02nd Bomb Group (VE) 101 Commanding Ofr ioer, 504th Bomb Group (VH) 102 Goramt1.ndingOfficer, 5C'5th Bomb Group- (VB) 10z> C~,mand'ing Officer, S09th Cemposi te Group 104 Comma.nding Officer, 655th Bomb Squo.dron (H) (VIR) 105 Commanding Offioer, Twentieth .hir Por ee Le.lld Ore. SehODl 106 Commanding Officer. 15th Fighter Group 107 Commnnding Officer, 21st Fighter Gro~p lOSCorttmo.nding 0ffioer, SOOth Fighter Group 109 Reporting Unit • .A.-2. XXI Bomber COIi!mo.nd(File Copy) .nO - 11~R~porting Unit, ~-2. XXI Bomber Comm~d 81

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