ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDTES (IPSS)

AN ANLYSES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ETHIOPIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE CONCEPT OF “PEACE”
(The case of Ethiopia’s relation with Eritrea and Somalia)

SUBMITTED BY: - AMARE KENAW

GRS/1616/03

SUBMITTED TO: - PRO. BJORN MOLLER

November 2010
ADDIS ABABA
 Table of content

Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................ii

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................ iii

Conceptual and Theoretical frame work ............................................................................................. 1

1. The Liberal Peace Theory: Peace defined (introduction) ........................................................... 1

2. The Democratic peace theory ....................................................................................................... 2

3. The security complex theory ........................................................................................................ 2

4. Geographical delineation .............................................................................................................. 3

5. What makes the horn of Africa prone to civil and transnational war? ...................................... 3

5.1The colonial legacy...................................................................................................................... 4

5.1.1 Secession and Border skirmish (the case of Ethio- Eritrea).............................................. 4

5.1.2 Irredentism and the quest for nationhood (the case of Ethio- Somalia) ........................... 8

Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................11

References ...........................................................................................................................................12

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 Abstract

This paper tries to analyze whether the relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbors
characterized as “peace” or not by giving a particular emphasis on Ethiopia’s relationship with
Eritrea and Somalia. The paper begins by discussing the conceptual and theoretical frame work
toward the concept of peace, defining the geographical delineation of the region in which
Ethiopia and its neighbors is found, assessing the main factors that make Ethiopia and its
neighbor prone to civil and interstate war by referring the historic-political interaction as a
background and end up with characterizing the region as not peace.

ii
Acronyms

AU African Union
BCEE Border Commission for Ethiopia and Eritrea
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front

EPDM Ethiopian People Democratic Movement

EPLF Eritrean people Liberation Front

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

IDPS Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority for Development

OAU Organization for African Union
OLF Oromo People Liberation Front

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

PDRE Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council
SYL Somali Youth League

TPLF Tigray People Liberation Front

UIC Union of Islamic Courts

UN United Nation
UNDP United Nation Development Program

USA United States of America

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic

WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front

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Conceptual and Theoretical frame work
1. The Liberal Peace Theory: Peace defined (introduction)
The concept of peace for several years has been defined and redefined by several authorities at different
times differently. For this very reason its main concept for years has been misunderstood and
misinterpreted. Various scholars, professionals, leading politicians and people tried to refer the concept
traditionally as the absence of at least direct violence (Galtung, 1990: 294). For them in accordance to the
contemporary concept of peace, they were trying to define the concept with a single sided view. They just
see one sort of peace in which now a days we call negative peace. They did not recognize the most
significant and decisive part of peace which is called positive peace, that advocates the creation of peace
full ties between and among different neighboring states, with a free movement of people, establishment
of trade and economic interdependencies’, the foundation of security communities, the prevalence of
domestic securities in particular and regional security in general with the absence of the most protracted
structural violence (Galtung, 1990: 294). To those of the traditional subscribers of peace, the most
sounding description of peace has been kicked out of the scope of peace concept. Though this is true the
significant and decisive concept of peace remained untouched to the final days of the end of the cold war.

Peace societies emerged in the nineteenth century, but it was only in the twentieth century that peace
movements as we presently understand them came into existence. Large-scale mobilizations against war
took place in the years before and after World War I, during the 1930s, and especially in response to the
Vietnam and Iraq wars. These movements challenged government policy, particularly that of the United
States, and were generally anti-imperialist in outlook. Mobilizations for disarmament occurred during the
interwar years and re-emerged in the cold war as a response to the threat of nuclear war. Disarmament
activism reached a peak with the massive nuclear freeze and disarmament campaigns of the 1980s. Some
of those organizing antiwar and disarmament campaigns were absolute pacifists, rejecting the use of force
for any purpose, but most were more pragmatic and conditional in their rejection of war. They opposed
dangerous weapons policies and unjust wars, but not all uses of force. Still the purist position often
predominated, conveying an impression of implicit pacifism that limited the peace movement’s public
appeal.

On the other hand the concept in the period of the cold war has been also used to refer as ‘the extended
period of peace’ by some scholars coined as ‘detent’ which literally means ‘peaceful coexistence’ to
Europe and elsewhere in the world, but still some parts of the world were also engaging in ‘proxy wars’ in
and outside of Europe in the name the two super power blocks, i.e. the USA and USSR (Nehma & Zelza,
2008: 4). Therefore, if the avoidance of direct violence conflicts and enactment of a cease fire has been
conceived as peace, to them, still war was going on in the forms of ‘proxy’ in Africa and Asia (Nehma &
Zelza, 2008: 4). Hence it is very difficult to conceive the cold war as an extended period of peace like the
traditional subscribers of peace. The description of peace then shall be an all inclusive both in the sense
of negative and positive aspects. According to David Adams (global movement for a culture of peace
2005), A culture of peace is an integral approach to preventing violence and violent conflicts, and an
alternative to the culture of war and violence based on education for peace, the promotion of sustainable
economic and social development, respect for human rights, equality between women and men,
democratic participation, tolerance, the free flow of information and disarmament.

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 2. The Democratic peace theory
The idea that democracies do not fight each other can be traced back to the writings of Immanuel Kant
over two hundred years ago in The Perpetual Peace; however, it was not until the early 1980s and the
writings of Michael Doyle that the idea received its first contemporary articulation. According to Doyle
and other adherents of the democratic peace, Grayson (2003 2), liberal democratic states have been able
to maintain peaceful relations amongst themselves, but are prone to wage war against non-
liberal/democratic states. Referring the argument given by Doyle and his adherents above again, Grayson
(2003, 2) the horn of Africa in which Ethiopia and its neighbors is found characterized by a number of
frequent violence and bloody civil and interstate war. Applying this theory we can understand that the
neighboring states of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia are non democratic and are warmongers. Hence the
relationship is characterized by not peace. But it doesn’t necessarily mean all democratic states are
peaceful and non democratic are warmongers, rather it is to mean, regardless of the theory, democratic
states are relatively peaceful than non democratic and did not wage war against another democratic state.
According Grayson (2003: 3), therefore, democratic peace theory transformed in such manner
 democracies are inherently peaceful unless unjustly attacked (or threatened) by
authoritarian regimes,
 uses of force by democracies are justified because they are directed against real threats
 launched by rogue actors intent on undermining the ‘democratic way of life’,
 democracies by definition cannot go to war with one another (as a result of assertion )
 the best way to ensure global stability and peace is to promote the spread of democracy

3. The security complex theory

The security complex theory first published in 1983 and republished in 1991, in Berry Buzan’s pioneering
study people state and fear was the first and sustained attempt to put forward guiding ideas pertaining to
the concept of regional peace and security. One of the very significant and viable benefit of Buzan’s
theory is, it enables analysts’ to challenge prevalent concepts and talks about regional peace and security
in terms of the pattern of relations among members of the security.(Ayoob,1995;58) the following is a
very brief consideration of Buzan’s most significant description of region and regional security complex.
In the first place and in peace and security terms Buzan argued that ;region means that ‘a distinct and
significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been
locked in to geographical proximity with each other’ (Buzan, 1998:188). Moreover military and political
threats are more significant, potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range. Buzan
then stressed that regional security system such as south Asia with, for instance, the military standoff
between India and Pakistan can be seen interns of balance of power as well as patterns of amity which are
relationships involving genuine friendship as well as expectations of protection or support, and enmity
which are relationships set by suspicion and fear arising from border disputes, interests in ethnically
related populations, to long standing historical links, no matter whether positive or negative (Buzan,
1991:190).
These patterns are, according to Buzan, confined in a particular geographical area. He used and
popularized the term security complex to designate the ensuing formation. Security complex according to
Buzan, therefore is, ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely
that, their national peace and security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan,
1991:190). Such complexes held together not by the positive influence of shared interests, but by the
shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum
of sectors, which is military, political, economics, societal and environmental.

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 4. Geographical delineation
In this paper, by taking in to account the meaning and description of peace given by several present day
scholars and peace researchers above, try to explore whether the relationship between Ethiopia and
one or various of its neighbors in the horn of Africa region characterized as “peace” or not by
giving emphasis Ethiopia’s relation with Eritrea and Somalia. In a narrow geographic sense,
according to Bruke Mesfin (horn of Africa Security complex: 2) the horn of Africa, in which Ethiopia and
its nearby adjust sovereign authorities are members found in the north eastern part of Africa which faces
in the east the red sea, in the south the Indian ocean and in the west the Nile basin. The horn of Africa
within the sited territorial limits comprises of four sovereign states. These are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti
and Somalia, with geographically adjoining states of Sudan and Kenya. the peace and security of these
states in one way or another can be affected not only by nearby adjust areas but can also be and indeed
has been affected by Uganda one of the member of east African security community, IGAD
(intergovernmental authority for development), in which almost all horn of African states with the notable
exception of Eritrea are members, Yemen, Libya and Egypt are not les involved in the issues and
processes of the region certainly having an impact in power balances and developments.

These states all together share various societal set up because of having near geographical proximities.
They have a similar climatic condition, their people have along lived shared history in terms of politics,
economic activities, religious beliefs, cultural and normative practices, ethnic backgrounds and even there
has been a shared identity between and among these region and people in the dialects they speak. The
region is also characterized by frequent conflicts between two or more states within a time (part of inter-
state & transnational war) and between and among different localities and partisan group within the state
(part of intra-state wars) on the other time. Furthermore the political fate of each state in the region has
always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states Berouk (horn of Africa Security
complex: 2). Indeed no state in the horn of Africa has been insulted from the problems of the other states
no matter how distant and no matter how strong or weak. The region also characterized by a rapid
population growth and dissertation that bring those states to be engaged in pastoralist conflicts
overgrazing lands, water and other economic resources.

5. What makes the horn of Africa prone to civil and transnational war?
The horn of Africa has been for the long past and still indeed is the most conflict ridden region in the
world characterized by frequent bloody conflicts. According to Ali A. Mazuri (Nehma & Zelza, 2008:
38), most of the wars fought in the region are hard to determine as pure intra-state wars, because though
the main causes of the frequent conflicts in the region were domestic within the state, they soon get an
international attention and external involvement accompanied by widespread violation of human rights
raging sometimes simultaneously within and between states. In fact the African continent’s longest
running intrastate conflicts, the Eritrean conflict and the south Sudanese conflict within a great estimated
death toll took place in and the immediate adjust lands of horn of Africa.

The region is also characterized as the most deprived and the poorest region in Africa. In the region the
most basic or necessity needs of life such as clean water, food, health care needs and education are not
available to the majority of the population. According to various reports of UNDP(2006), on the other
hand the precipitate income, life expectancy and literacy rates are among the lowest in the world where as
adult and infant mortality are among the highest UDI(2006). The region is prone to deadly droughts
which hamper crop and live stock production. These droughts result in food deficits each year making the

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horn of Africa one of the food insecure regions of the world. from this we understand that, due to the
above stated natural and human made factors, the horn of Africa has the highest percentage of refugees
(people displaced from their home areas in (IDPS) and out of their state because of civil wars), which
further reinforce the cycle of future conflicts in the region. Therefore the existing relationship between
Ethiopia and one or the other of its neighbors cannot surely be characterized as peace, though there has
been and still there is a peaceful tie and warm relationship between some of the countries of the region in
particular and eastern Africa in general, taking in to account the relationship with Djibouti and Kenya
respectively. But this relationship for long time has been and still is affected by the outbreak of civil or
transnational war caused by one or more of the neighboring states.

These problems came in to existence in the horn of Africa, and the peace full relationship becomes worse
not because of Ethiopia has got a notorious external policy towards its neighbors in the region but because
of those of the states in the horn of Africa probably with the notable exception of Djibouti are war like
people having a military dictator in Eritrea and a state without a recognized government in Somalia after
1991 and the long existing civil war in the Sudan in which Ethiopia share the longest boundary
demarcation compared to the other neighbors. Even though there were various disputes that usher the
relationship of Ethiopia with its neighbors in the horn of Africa, the following are the major once among
the other.

5.1The colonial legacy

5.1.1 Secession and Border skirmish (the case of Ethio- Eritrea)

Most of the conflicts in many part of the continent of Africa deeply rooted on border skirmish, and their
history goes back to the time of European colonialism. The boundaries created between and among
African state are deliberately created by the Europeans not for the sake of Africans but it is for the
administrative conveniences’ of Europe over Africa. Therefore those boundaries that has been created in
Berlin conference in 1884/85, designed to solve and avoid bloody conflicts between and among the
European powers themselves in the times of creation of sphere of influences in the continent of Africa
and later strengthened by Europeans to suppress African resistance movements. Those artificially created
boundaries in the later years of independence and in the process of decolonization brought immense
problems on the African states. Because when it has been artificially designed by Europeans it doesn’t
recognize the societal sett ups of African people. According to Ali A. Mazrui (Nehma & Zelza, 2008: 36)
the most lethal of all wars in Africa those of fought between blacks, the root of those wars lies in the
white legacy. On the one hand bloody as they were, the anti colonial wars were less bloody than the wars
in the post colonial era. But according to Ali A. Mazuri (Nehma & Zelza, 2008: 38), it is obsessive to
explain the root causes of African conflicts are really boundary issues, the case of Ethio- Eritrean conflict
is the significant exception in this case which is fully territorial matters compared to the other civil and
interstate wars in the continent.

The establishment of new states, according to Bruoke (horn security complex: 6),when the members of
the region got their independence (Sudan in 1956, the Somali lands in 1960, Kenya in 1963, and Djibouti
in 1977 while Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 institutionalized in 1955 and forcefully got its
independence in 1993, leaving Ethiopia landlocked) was thus miss drawn borders which were agreed up
on the good will’s of the colonial powers basically ignored ethnic, cultural, historical and religious groups
natural lines in which Africans used in the pre-colonial times. one might possibly conclude then, this
resulted in intra-state conflict protracted demand for autonomy for a specified ethnic group to secede as
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well as in the regimes of the newly independent states lodging territorial claims in turn leading to conflict
with other states or interstate wars. Following this let us see the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea
(as a civil war 1974 to independence, and as part of interstate war after independence since 1993)

Immediately after Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown; in September 1974, a Military Committee, the
Dergue (PMAC) was established from several divisions of the Ethiopian Armed forces. General Aman
Amdon who was Eritrean by birth, according to Kinfe Abraham (2004: 49), elected as spokesperson for
the Dergue and implemented policies for the country, which included land distribution to peasants,
nationalizing industries and services under public ownership and led Ethiopia into the principle of
‘Eastern form of Socialism.’ The Dergue was credited for these policies which at first gained mass
support across the country. However, the popularity of the Dergue did not live long. The Eritrean conflict,
Somalis invasion of Ogaden and other issues surfaced. In particular, General Aman disagreed, apart from
the committee members with the policy on how to deal with the Eritrean crisis, as he wanted to solve the
Eritrean conflict peacefully Kinfe Abraham (2004: 49),. He was put under house arrest by the Dergue and
executed two months later along with other high ranking former imperial officers and civil servants.

Initially the Dergue was popular following the coup against Haile Selassie. According to Teum (200),
they came to power under the slogan of "Ethiopia First", "Land to the Tiller", and "Democracy and
Equality to all". The Dergue then became deeply unpopular due to ill sought out policies and mass
executions, which sent a shock wave across the country. Many Ethiopians joined opposition groups such
as Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP), Eritrean
Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF), Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF). These groups made up of many ordinary Ethiopians became the victims of the Dergue; thousands
of Ethiopians fled the country to neighboring countries, Europe and North America.

On the other hand an internal struggle for power took place within the Dergue; according to Teum (2000),
then the unknown figure, Mengistu Hailemariam, eventually emerged as an undisputed and ruthless
leader. He executed General Tefari and other high ranking officers and became the leader of the Dergue.
Mengistu adopted a Stalinist policy and declared the "Red Terror" (mass execution) in 1977. Ethiopia
entered a new phase of chaos and a state of civil war in Eritrea and Tigray. The rebel movements
discussed above, opposed and engaged in armed struggle to overthrow the Dergue. According to Kinfe
(2000: 6) Mengistu gave a free hand to his political cadres to use every measure they sought necessary to
carry out his policy. Thousands of students, teachers, workers and ordinary Ethiopians who were
suspected of supporting opposition groups were imprisoned without charge, tortured and executed. This
made the regime of Mengistu to be unpopular followed by mass resentments.

In 1978 a civil war broke out between the EPRP and TPLF in Eastern Tigray. According to Teum (2000),
The TPLF drove the EPRP out of Tigray. The TPLF also drove the EDU out of the Western part of
Tigray. The TPLF popularity grew and they became a major threat to the Mengistu’s regime. Mengistu
retaliated by putting many Tigrayans in prison without charge. Many were tortured and executed in a cold
blood. On the other hand, though the civil war is going on, between the reble groups and the regiem of
Mengistu the ‘worst living memory’ in the history of Ethiopia; Famine, broke out in 1984/5, in which the
rebel groups suspected that, the regieme of Mengistu deliberately ignored the tigray, Wallo and Gondar
areas that has been immensely affected by the famine not to get aids and rehabilitation by getting in to
account, these areas are hosts of the rebel movements. Hundreds of thousands of people died of starvation
and this further escalated the civil war.
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Instead, the Mengistu regime devised and implemented a policy of resettlement in the famine affected
regions as a cover, according to the US library of congress (1991), used as the political imperatives than
perceived economic objectives, to prevent people from supporting the rebels' causes. The government
thought this might weaken the rebels and stop them getting the support of the people who live in the areas
controlled by the rebels. The Mengistu regime carried out the resettlement program by taking people by
force from markets and their home and loading them to buses and Lorries and transporting them to
swampy areas ridden with malaria in the south and west of the country. As a result of the resettlement
program, many people died on their journey and on arrival because of the inadequate help from the
government. Many families were separated from their loved ones and many people returned back home
illegally. The resettlement program (like the Tanzanian Ujjamah) was a disaster; nobody volunteered to
go but people were forced to resettle in unknown and inhospitable areas. The TPLF used the plight of the
people and the resettlement policy to help its cause, and the TPLF popularity grew immensely. Many
people chose to join the TPLF cause rather than being forced to resettle in an area they were not familiar
with.

In September 1987, The Mengistu regime proclaimed Ethiopia as the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic
Republic and the Dergue became the Ethiopian Workers party (EWP), an actual declaration of their
power through neither democratic election nor a protracted referendum. In the same year the Amhara
opposition group the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Movement (EPRDM) was formed and they
became a key ally of the TPLF. Large parts of Tigray, Wollo and Gonder fell to the TPLF and EPRDM. It
then became clear that the Ethiopian army was not capable of defeating the rebels and Russian and Cuban
help was needed in military planning and to fight against the rebels. The TPLF and EPRDM were
victorious and took control of the whole Tigray, Wollo, and Gonder Regions and they then advanced on
Addis Ababa. Meanwhile the EPLF in Eritrea took control of the major cities and began to advance to
Asmara and Assab.

According to some historical analyses, Eritrean separatism had its roots in World War II. In 1941, in the
Battle of Keren, when the Allies drove Italian forces out of Eritrea, which had been under Italy's rule
since the end of the nineteenth century. Administration of the region was then entrusted to the British
military until its fate could be determined by the Allies. Britain, however, sought to divide Eritrea along
religious lines, giving the coast and highland areas to Ethiopia and the Muslim-inhabited northern and
western lowlands to British-ruled Sudan. In 1952 the United Nations (UN) tried to satisfy the demand for
self-determination by creating an Eritrean Ethiopian federation. In 1962, however, Haile Selassie
unilaterally abolished the federation and imposed imperial rule throughout Eritrea. In January 1974, the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) handed Haile Selassie's forces a crushing defeat at Asmara,
severely affecting the army's morale and exposing the crown's ever-weakening position. Beginning from
this event onwards, as discussed earlier above the Eritrean People Liberation Front fought bitter battles to
the regime of Hiale Sillassie and the Dergue for independence.

Four years later after independence in 1998 the border conflict become imminent, this consumed
thousands of life from both sides. Various analyses have been given towards the causes and the
pretexts of Ethio- Eritrean war. According to Van Hans Springer (1998), it is because of the
invasion of the government of Ethiopia that forcefully subjugates the territory of Eritrea in the
pretext of pursuing terrorists that the interstate war continued when Eritrea tried to protect its
national security. He further explains the situation

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 “After 1991 (victory of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) on regime of
Mengistu Haile Marian) many former Ethiopian guerrillas have moved into the Badme
region to farm small plots of land, displacing many Eritrean farmers who were already
there. This process slowly resulted in Ethiopian domination over these Eritrean
territories, forceful eviction of Eritrean farmers from their properties and looting of their
animals. In August 1997, Ethiopian troops occupied the Eritrean village of Adi Murug
under the pretext of pursuing "terrorists". In the same month Ethiopia expelled Eritrean
citizens from their homes around Badme. These expulsions and the destruction of crops
and other property continued throughout the next year. Two rounds of fighting followed in
1998 and 1999.”
On the other hand contrary to the above statement, according to the ruling by an international convention
held at Hague paper submitted by BCEE (2000), it is Eritrea who broke the international convention and
invaded the territories formerly seized under the Ethiopian government. According to the Rule by the
international convention;
“Border dispute brings Ethiopia and Eritrea to the brink of all-out war: An incipient
border dispute flared up into a major armed clash between Ethiopia and Eritrea
during the early part of May. The initial focus of friction between the two countries
was an area between the Tekezze and Mereb/Gash rivers known as the "Yirga
Triangle". According to various reports, following a minor and probably unplanned
skirmish on May 6, the Eritrean army moved to forcefully occupy an area around the
border village of Badme on May 12….”
In addition to these described above the United Nation and African Union, investigative teams who work
independently at different times to find empirical evidences on ongoing Ethio- Eritrean conflict and to
independently offer resolution mechanisms for this bloody conflict, identified that, it is Eritrean troops
who first launched attack on Ethiopia claiming that the territory primarily belongs to Eritrea.
“In May 1998, fighting broke out between Eritrean armed forces and Ethiopian militia
along the border. In response to the movement of Eritrean forces into the territory
previously administered by Ethiopia. Eritrea responded to an escalating military conflict
by calling up its military reserves. Eritrea and Ethiopia exchanged artillery fire and
engaged in air attacks leading to numerous civilian casualties…..”
Whether it could be in the first, second and third argument given above, it is necessary to conclude that
the interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was absolutely triggered by the existing boundary claims
no matter whether Ethiopia or Eritrea started the war against the interest of the other. Various regional
and international communities such as the UN, AU, USA and Rwanda had tried to resolve the border
from the outset through mediation but none of them were fruitful still both claims the strategic area of
Badme, though it has been given to the government of Eritrea by the peace resolving committee in the
Algiers convention. the issue now looks like calm but still, there is no any peaceful relationship between
Ethiopia and Eritrea and even according to some official reports of the government of Ethiopia and other
neutral medias, the government of Eritrea is giving a favorable training ground and equipping with up to
date mode weapons for different rebel movements of the Ethiopian government such as The Oromo
Liberation Front, OLF, The Ogaden People Liberation Front and the like to instigate and escalate
insurgencies and civil wars in Ethiopia.

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Here we have to analyze what makes the situation even more distressing is that there is ‘no apparent light
at the end of the tunnel.’ Because neither the Algiers accord nor the boundary ruling that came subsequent
to it (BCEE) has put to rest the hostility and venom that had characterized the 1998-2000 war. Relations
between the two countries are still what we call the period of “No Peace no War”. In addition to this the
government of Eritrea is a military dictator and probably believe on the principle of being notorious
towards its neighbors and enhancing its national pride only by force, then this will insist in the future the
same offensive launch towards Ethiopia and its other immediate neighbors. Therefore, this also made the
establishments of peaceful relation difficult on the behalf of the Ethiopian government. This leads to be in
doubt whether the conflict will might recycle for the future. Here we can cite the Democratic peace theory
of Grayson and Michael Doyle (Grayson, 2003:2), which argues “two Democratic states never wage war
against each other.” In this context therefore, Eritrea is not a democratic state where as Ethiopia is
democratic and then Eritrea will never stop waging war against Ethiopia. The theory further (Grayson,
2003:2) argues, democratic states can maintain peaceful relations among themselves but are prone to
wage war against non democratic regimes if they thought it is necessary to use force to respect their
national security and to secure peace and order in the region.

5.1.2 Irredentism and the quest for nationhood (the case of Ethio- Somalia)
The relationship between Ethiopia and the state of Somalia, unlike the relationship between Ethiopia and
Eritrea discussed above, can be divided in to two sub divisions. According to Kinfe Abraham (2008: 13)
that is the relation between these states before 1960s and after the 1960s. before the 1960s, beginning
from the state antiquity, particularly referring to the historical development of Punt in the eastern part of
Africa the relationship between the people of the Horn though tribal is somehow a peaceful relation in
which trade, as the main economic activity of the region towards the eastern world across the Gulf of
Aden and westward towards the present day Ethiopia with the Oromo inhabitants of the region. but later
after 1855, when the emperors of Ethiopia begun to create a strong unified and centralized state in the
horn of Africa, they, particularly emperor Menelik II, designed forceful subjugation and peaceful
persuasion of different people in the region to be part of the Ethiopian imperial state. Therefore by
holding this as the main agenda of the Ethiopian empire, the king’s war lords tried to expand the territory
of the state using every means towards east, south, south west and west.

Ethiopia's entry into the Somali region in modern times dated from Menelik's conquest of Harar in the late
1890s, the emperor basing his actions on old claims of Ethiopian sovereignty. According to Abdul (1998)
In 1945 Haile Selassie, fearing the possibility of British support for a separate Somali state that would
include the Ogaden, claimed Italian Somaliland as a "lost province." In Italian Somaliland, the Somali
Youth League (SYL) resisted this claim and in its turn demanded unification of all Somali areas,
including those in Ethiopia. After the British evacuated the Ogaden in 1948, Ethiopian officers took over
administration in the city of Jijiga, at one point suppressing a demonstration led by the SYL, which the
government subsequently outlawed. At the same time, Ethiopia renounced its claim to Italian Somaliland
in deference to UN calls for self-determination. The Ethiopians, however, maintained that self-
determination was not incompatible with eventual union.

Immediately upon the birth of the Republic of Somalia in 1960, which followed the merger of British
Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, the new country proclaimed an irredentist policy. According to
Emerson (Schraeder: 107), in a continent that Somalia was “rich in nationalism but poor in nations”,
stood out during the 1960 as 0ne of the three largely homogeneous states of Africa (making Lesotho and
Botswana the other two). For this reason that Somalia had often heralded as having a dramatic head start
8|Pa ge
compared to the vast majority of other more multi-ethnic countries on the nation building goal pursued by
the first generation of African nationalists. According to Schreader (107), Somalia also served as a
lightning rod for regional and international condemnation due to the irredentist dimension of Somali
nationalism that sought to incorporate the Somali inhabited portions of neighboring countries in to a
larger pan Somali inhabited nation. By getting in to account the nation hood of the greater Somalia nation
state in the horn, Somalia laid claim to Somali-populated regions of French Somaliland (later called the
French Territory of the Afars and Issas, and Djibouti after independence in 1977), the northeastern corner
of Kenya, and the Ogaden, a vast, ill-defined region occupied by Somali nomads extending southeast
from Ethiopia's southern highlands that includes a separate region east of Harar known as the Haud. The
uncertainty over the precise location of the frontier between Ethiopia and the former Italian possessions in
Somalia further complicated these claims. Despite UN efforts to promote an agreement, none was made
in the colonial or the Italian trusteeship period.

In the northeast, an Anglo-Ethiopian treaty determined the frontier's official location. However, Somalia
contended that it was unfairly placed so as to exclude the herders’ resident in Somalia from vital seasonal
grazing lands in the Haud. According to Abdul (1998) The British had administered the Haud as an
integral part of British Somaliland, although Ethiopian sovereignty had been recognized there. After it
was disbanded in the rest of Ethiopia, the British military administration continued to supervise the area
from Harar eastward and did not withdraw from the Haud until 1955. Even then, the British stressed the
region's importance to Somalia by requiring the Ethiopians to guarantee the Somali free access to grazing
lands. From this we can understand that before the 1960 the Ethio-Somalia relation is somehow cool and
less unstable with minor or local skirmish over grazing lands where as these peaceful relation begun to be
changed as the main arena of engagement between the two immediately neighboring states after Somalia
became independent, especially after colonel Said Bare sized power.

Regarding the boundary demarcation, Somalia refused to recognize any pre-1960 treaties defining the
Somali-Ethiopian borders because colonial governments had concluded the agreements. Despite the need
for access to pasturage for local herds, the Somali government even refused to acknowledge the British
treaty guaranteeing Somali grazing rights in the Haud because it would have indirectly recognized
Ethiopian sovereignty over the area. Here referring Schreader (107), within six months after Somali
independence, military incidents occurred between Ethiopian and Somali forces along their mutual
border. Confrontations escalated again in 1964, when the Ethiopian air force raided Somali villages and
encampments inside the Somali border. Hostilities were ended through mediation by the OAU and Sudan.

The Somali civilian governments, after independence were failed to maintain national cohesion and peace
and security within the state and this according to Kinfe Abraham (Somalia calling, 2002: 16) lead the
state of Somalia to experience the rise of military dictator in a decade after independence. By using the
situation in Somalia colonel Mohammed Said Bere came to power with a great zeal of forming a more
extended greater Somalia in the horn of Africa by unifying the five lost clans of Somalia. Actually this is
the calculation of Somalis during (in the time of colonialism Somali clans were living separately in five
administrative areas, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland, the northern Kenyans
and the Ethiopia Ogadens). According to Kacie Lake (2008), Said Bare and his followers believe that still
Somalia unification is incomplete, because still their fellow national are living in Ethiopia and Kenya and
then they must be united and part of the greater Somalia. Beside the mediation by the UN and OAU
However, Somalia continued to promote irredentism by supporting the Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF), which was active in the Ogaden.
9|Pa ge
The year 1977 saw the emergence of the most serious external challenge to the revolutionary regime that
had yet materialized. The roots of the conflict lay with Somali irredentism and the desire of the Somali
government of Mahammad Siad Barre to annex the Ogaden area of Ethiopia. Somalia's instrument in this
process was the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali guerrilla organization, which by
February 1977 had begun to take advantage of the Derg's political problems as well as its troubles in
Eritrea to attack government positions throughout the Ogaden. The Somali government provided supplies
and logistics support to the WSLF. Through the first half of the year, the WSLF made steady gains,
penetrating and capturing large parts of the Ogaden from the Dire Dawa area southward to the Kenya
border. According to Lake (2008)
“In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and occupied Ogaden and its forces advanced to
Harar. Western governments' politics played into and contributed towards the Somalia
and Ethiopia conflict. The USA had abandoned Ethiopia when it adopted Marxist and
Leninist ideology and switched its support to Somalia. Mengistu was desperate at the
time; the Soviet Union once a partner of the Somalis changed their support from Somalia
to Ethiopia. Mengistu received military and logistic support from the Soviet Union and
Cuba. Thousands of Cuban and Russian personnel and armed forces came to the aid of
the Mengistu regime and were involved in military planning and fighting against Somalia.
Later they were involved in planning and fighting against the TPLF and EPLF in the
north of the country”

The increasingly intense fighting culminated in a series of actions around Jijiga in September, at which
time Ethiopia claimed that Somalia's regular troops, the Somali National Army (SNA), were supporting
the WSLF. In response, the Somali government admitted giving "moral, material, and other support" to
the WSLF. According to Abdul (1998), following a mutiny of the Ethiopian garrison at Jijiga, the town
fell to the WSLF. The Mengistu regime, desperate for help, according to Kacie Lake (2008), turned to the
Soviet Union, its ties to its former military supplier, the United States, having foundered in the spring
over the Derg's poor human rights record. The Soviet Union had been supplying equipment and some
advisers for months. When the Soviet Union continued to aid Ethiopia as a way of gaining influence in
the country, Somalia, which until then had been a Soviet client, responded by abrogating its Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow and by expelling all Soviet advisers.

The Soviet turnaround immediately affected the course of the war. Starting in late November, massive
Soviet military assistance began to pour into Ethiopia, with Cuban troops deploying from Angola to assist
the Ethiopian units. By the end of the year, according to Lake (2008), 17,000 Cubans had arrived and,
with Ethiopian army units, halted the WSLF momentum. On February 13, 1978, Mogadishu dispatched
the SNA to assist the WSLF, but the Somali forces were driven back toward the border. After the
Ethiopian army recapture of Jijiga in early March, the Somali government decided to withdraw its forces
from the Ogaden, leaving the Ethiopian army in control of the region. However, in the process of
eliminating the WSLF threat, Addis Ababa had become a military client of Moscow and Havana, a
situation that had significant international repercussions and that resulted in a major realignment of power
in the Horn of Africa.

According to various analysts, on the other hand, it is the involvement of the USSR and USA in the
region that worsened the situation of the 1970 conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. They argue that it
is not the question of irredentism and the idea of the nation hood in Somalia, though used as a cover cause
like the many conflicts of Africa; rather it is the strategic importance of the area as the main foothold of
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the cold war. The two regimes (Ethiopia & the newly independent Somalia), fallen under the hegemonic
competition of the USSR & USA and this intensified the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Because
whether the USSR or USA Want to spread their ideologies in the different part of the world and the 1970
is the most exaggerated period of ideological competition between the two camps (the socialist at one
hand and the capitalist on the other). Hence both of them were looking satellite states out of Europe and
Asia for their ideological support. Though violent and direct military attack had been avoided between the
main antagonistic powers in the cold war, where as war is going on in the form of ‘proxy’ outside of
Europe between the satellite states of the main camps. That is why the conflict between Ethiopia and
Somalia has occurred which ushered the two neighboring countries relation from the 1960 onwards.

As the paper tried to correlate the state of Somalia as the main lightning rod for regional and international
condemnation in its irredentist claim and it is still the home of nationalistic chaos and being the host of
different terrorist organizations especial after the death of general Farah Hussein Aided IN 1990S,
Somalia become a failed state which unable to create a recognized government. Therefore according to
some liberal peace theorists’ collier ethal (2003: 47), the final destiny of a failed state would be end up
with being the host and cradle of terrorist groups and pirates. Here we can refer the case of former
Afghanistan one of the failed state in building a recognized government, in which it become probably the
first home of the terrorist organization in the world. Therefore it seems to be logical to the Ethiopian
government to be shrewd enough not to establish a peaceful ties and relationships with the ‘failed’ state of
Somalia. Furthermore the Ethiopian government, following the chaos in Somalia in the late 1990s,
according to Karin Dokken (2008: 3) directly launched a direct military interference in the internal
matters of the failed state of Somalia at one hand to help the Somali to be able to institute a popular
government through popular election before the state fallen to the hands of Islamic fundamentalists (UIC)
and to protect the region’s peace and security, because of fear of the state might fall to the hands of
terrorists and those of international and regional pirates who going to be the major threats of the region on
the other. The use of force by the Ethiopian government has been justified as right applying the
democratic peace theory developed by Michael Doyle and Grayson (Grayson, 2003: 2). From these
analyses we can understand that whether based on the ‘Liberal and democratic peace theory concept’ or in
the “security complex theory” formulation there is no visible peaceful relationship between Ethiopia and
the ‘so called state of Somalia’

Conclusion
Based on the document and content analyses of various scholars and peace researchers’ investigations,
and by getting in to account the conceptual and theoretical frame work towards the ingredients of the
concept of peace described above, we can conclude that there is no significant and visible peaceful
relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbors. The basic factors and issues that lead us to come in to
such conclusion is by tracing the historic-political relation of those states in the Horn of Africa. The
relation of these states as the paper tried to mention is full of conflicts, partly because of the legacy of
colonialism in the form of secessionist and border skirmish and, partly the development of the idea of
irredentism and the concept of nation hood as the case of Ethiopia’s relation with Eritrea and Somalia
respectively. On the other hand Ethiopia is also the only democratic, though infant state compared to its
neighbors such as Eritrea and Somalia, has the responsibility to secure peace and order in the region. That
is why Ethiopia interfered in the internal matters of the so called state of Somali in 2006. Hence the
relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbors is characterized as “not peace.”

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