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report no.

4/10

Performance of European crosscountry oil pipelines
Statistical summary of reported spillages in 2008 and since 1971
Prepared by the CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group’s Special Task Force on oil pipeline spillages (OP/STF-1) P.M. Davis J. Dubois F. Gambardella F. Uhlig K. den Haan (Technical Coordinator) J-F. Larivé (Consultant)

Reproduction permitted with due acknowledgement  CONCAWE Brussels June 2010 I

report no. 4/10

ABSTRACT
CONCAWE has collected 38 years of spillage data on European cross-country oil pipelines. At over 35,000 km the inventory covered currently includes the vast 3 majority of such pipelines in Europe, transporting around 780 million m per year of crude oil and oil products. This report covers the performance of these pipelines in 2008 and a full historical perspective since 1971. The performance over the whole 38 years is analysed in various ways including gross and net spillage volumes and spillage causes grouped into five main categories: mechanical failure, operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third party. The rate of inspections by in line tools (intelligence pigs) is also reported. 12 spillage incidents were reported in 2008, corresponding to 0.34 spillages per 1000 km of line, somewhat above the 5-year average of 0.28 but well below the long-term running average of 0.54, which has been steadily decreasing over the years from a value of 1.2 in the mid 70s. There were no fires, fatalities or injuries connected with these spills. 7 incidents were due to mechanical failure, 1 incident to corrosion and 4 were connected to third party activities. Over the long term, third party activities remain the main cause of spillage incidents although mechanical failures have increased in recent years, a trend that needs to be scrutinised in years to come.

KEYWORDS
CONCAWE, intelligence pig, oil spill, performance, pipeline, safety, soil pollution, spillage, statistics, trends, water pollution

INTERNET
This report is available as an Adobe pdf file on the CONCAWE website (www.concawe.org).

NOTE Considerable efforts have been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in this publication. However, neither CONCAWE nor any company participating in CONCAWE can accept liability for any loss, damage or injury whatsoever resulting from the use of this information. This report does not necessarily represent the views of any company participating in CONCAWE. II

report no. 4/10

CONTENTS
SUMMARY 1. 2. INTRODUCTION PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY 2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES 2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2008 2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter 2.3.2. Age distribution 2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC PIPELINE SAFETY 3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES 3.2. FIRES SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS (2004-08) 4.1. 2008 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS 4.1.1. Mechanical Failure 4.1.1.1. Construction 4.1.1.2. Design & Materials 4.1.2. Operational 4.1.3. Corrosion 4.1.4. Natural causes 4.1.5. Third party activity 4.2. 2004-2008 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2008 5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY 5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUMES 5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volumes 5.2.2. Spillage volume per event 5.3. HOLE SIZE 5.4. PART OF FACILITY WHERE SPILLAGE OCCURRED 5.5. SPILLAGES PER DIAMETER CLASS 5.6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 5.6.1. Land use where spillage occurred 5.6.2. Ground area affected 5.6.3. Impact on water bodies 5.7. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES 6.1. MECHANICAL 6.2. OPERATIONAL 6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING 6.4. NATURAL HAZARDS 6.5. THIRD PARTY 6.5.1. Accidental damage 6.5.2. Intentional damage 6.5.3. Incidental damage

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INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS GLOSSARY REFERENCES DEFINITIONS SPILLAGE SUMMARY

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APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX 2

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report no. 4/10

SUMMARY
CONCAWE has collected 38 years of spillage data on European cross-country oil pipelines with particular regard to spillages volume, clean-up and recovery, environmental consequences and causes of the incidents. The results have been published in annual reports since 1971. This report covers the performance of these pipelines in 2008 and a full historical perspective since 1971. The performance over the whole 38 years is analysed in various ways including gross and net spillage volumes and spillage causes grouped into five main categories: mechanical failure, operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third party. The rate of inspections by in line tools (intelligence pigs) is also reported. Over seventy companies and agencies operating oil pipelines in Europe currently provide data for the CONCAWE annual survey. For 2008 data was received from 70 operators representing over 160 pipeline systems and a combined length of 35,486 km, slightly more than the 2007 inventory. The difference is partly due to corrections to the reported data while 5 companies did not report and were therefore not included in the statistics. The reported volume transported in 2008 was around 3 780 Mm of crude oil and refined products although there was some missing data so that the actual volumes must be slightly higher. This figure has been stable in recent 9 3 years. Total traffic volume in 2008 was estimated at 130x10 m per km. 12 spillage incidents were reported in 2008, corresponding to 0.34 spillages per 1000 km of line, somewhat above the 5-year average but well below the long-term running average of 0.54, which has been steadily decreasing over the years from a value of 1.2 in the mid 70s. There were no reported fires, fatalities or injuries 3 3 connected with these spills. The gross spillage volume was 968 m , 27 m per 3 1000 km of pipeline compared to the long-term average of 89 m per 1000 km of pipeline. 83% of the spilled volume was recovered or safely disposed of. Most pipeline spillages were small and 20% of the spillages were responsible for about 80% of the gross volume spilled, a figure that has remained fairly stable over the years. Pipelines carrying hot oils such as fuel oil have in the past suffered from external corrosion due to design and construction problems. Most have been shut down or switched to cold service so that the great majority of pipelines now carry unheated petroleum products and crude oil. Only 159 km of hot oil pipelines are still in service today. The last reported spill from a hot oil pipeline was in 2002. Of the 12 reported incidents in 2008, 7 were related to mechanical failures, 1 was related to external corrosion and 4 were connected to accidental (i.e. non-intentional) third party activities. Over the long term, third party activities remain the main cause of spillage incidents although the number of events has progressively decreased over the years. Mechanical failure is the second largest cause of spillage. After great progress during the first 20 years, the frequency of mechanical failures has been on an upward trend over the last decade. In 2008 a total of 70 sections covering a total of 8446 km were inspected by at least one type of intelligence pig. Most inspection programmes involved the running of more than one type of pig in the same section so that the total actual length inspected was less at 5018 km (14% of the inventory). Most pipeline systems were built in the 60s and 70s. Whereas, in 1971, 70% of the inventory was 10 years old or less, by 2008 only 5% was 10 years old or less and 47% was over 40 years old. However, this has not led to an increase in spillages.

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4/10 Overall there is no evidence that the ageing of the pipeline system poses any greater level of spillage risk. hold out the prospect that pipelines can continue reliable operations for the foreseeable future. in particular those covering the mechanical and corrosion incidents. CONCAWE pipeline statistics. such as internal inspection with intelligence pigs. will continue to be used to monitor performance.report no. VI . The development and use of new techniques.

2] and in two summary reports [3. Section 3 focuses on safety performance i. Information on annual throughput and traffic. 1 .report no.e. The results have been analysed and published annually in a series of annual reports [1. but also a full historical analysis since 1971.org. These seminars have included reviews of spillage and clean-up performance to cross communicate experiences so that all can learn from each other’s incidents. From the 2005 reporting year the format and content of the report was changed to include not only the yearly performance. reliability and integrity of their operations. Section 2 provides details of the pipeline inventory covered by the survey (length. The last COPEX was held in Brussels in March 2010. The map of the oil pipeline inventory covered by CONCAWE as per 2008 has been updated and is now available in digital and interactive form at www. the number of fatalities and injuries associated with pipeline spillage incidents. diameter. 4/10 1. INTRODUCTION The CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group (OPMG) has collected data on the safety and environmental performance of oil pipelines in Europe since 1971.concawe. Finally Section 7 gives an account of intelligence pig inspections.4] covering the years 1971 to 1995 and 1971 to 2000 respectively. Section 4 gives a detailed analysis of the spillage incidents in 2008 and of all incidents over the last 5 years. Section 5 analyses spillage incidents for the whole reporting period since 1971 while Section 6 provides a more detailed analysis of the causes of spillage. Throughput and traffic data is also included. type of product transported) and how this has developed over the years. In addition to this activity CONCAWE also holds a so-called “COPEX” seminar (CONCAWE Oil Pipeline Operators Experience exchange) every four years to disseminate information throughout the oil pipeline industry on developments in techniques available to pipeline companies to help improve the safety. spillage incidents and intelligent pig inspection activities are gathered yearly by CONCAWE via questionnaires sent out to oil pipeline operating companies early in the year following the reporting year. Aggregation and statistical analysis of the performance data provides objective evidence of the trends and focuses attention on existing or potential problem areas which helps operators to set priorities for future efforts. This report uses the same format and therefore supersedes the 2007 data report 10/09.

These are pipelines • • • Used for transporting crude oil or petroleum products. Following the reunification of Germany. OECD Western Europe.1. out of the 75 operating companies with which CONCAWE maintains contact. year on year performance comparisons must be approached with caution and frequencies (i. although Turkey was never covered. This number has remained essentially constant over the years. In particular. as the impact of new operators joining in was compensated by various mergers. it is believed that most such lines operated in the reporting countries are included. 70 companies completed the survey. Norway and Portugal as well as all crude and product pipelines in Poland. Although CONCAWE cannot guarantee that every single pipeline meeting the above criteria is actually covered. the pipelines in the former East Germany (DDR) were added to the database from 1991. From 1971 to 1987. as different criteria can significantly affect the results. Pump station and intermediate storage facilities are included but origin and destination terminal facilities and tank farms are excluded. including short estuary or river crossings but excluding under-sea pipeline systems. only pipelines owned by oil industry companies were included but from 1988. lines serving offshore crude oil production facilities and offshore tanker loading/discharge facilities are excluded. 3 • The minimum reportable spillage size has been set at 1 m (unless there are 3 exceptional safety or environmental consequences to be reported for a < 1 m spill).report no.e. It should be noted that all data recorded in this report and used for comparisons or statistical analysis relate to the inventory reported on in each particular year and not to the actual total inventory in operation at the time. The geographical region covered was originally consistent with CONCAWE’s original terms of reference i. which then included 19 member countries. 2. Running cross-country. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY The definition of pipelines to be included in the CONCAWE inventory has remained unchanged since 1971. 2 . This total includes affiliates and joint ventures of large oil companies. All the above criteria are critical parameters to consider when comparing different spillage data sets. Thus. non-commercially owned pipeline systems (essentially NATO) were brought into the inventory. 4/10 2. This was followed by Czech and Hungarian crude and product lines. With a length of 2 km or more in the public domain. Greece. Slovakian crude and product lines in 2001 and 2003 respectively and Croatian crude lines in 2007.e. figures normalised per 1000 km of line) are more meaningful than absolute ones. Notable exceptions are NATO lines in Italy. REPORTING COMPANIES For the 2008 reporting year. 2. PIPELINE INVENTORY.2.

The sections are further classified according to their service i. 24 (1147 km) were in the “hot” category. the type of product transported. Most of the major pipelines were indeed built in the 60s and 70s and a large number of them had already been in service for some time when they were first reported on in the CONCAWE survey. A few pipelines transport both crude oil and products. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2008 Pipeline service. for which we distinguish crude oil. The smallest diameter product pipelines are typically 6” (150 mm) although a very small number are as small as 3” (75 mm). Figure 1 shows that the first two categories represent the bulk of the total inventory. the crude pipelines are significantly larger than the other two categories. 4/10 2. Over the years a total of 210 sections were permanently taken out of service. heated black products (hot oil) transported and other products. Figure 1 shows the evolution of this "CONCAWE inventory” over the years since 1971. In general. 3 . Although these are categorised separately in the database they are considered to be in the crude oil category for aggregation purposes. there are over 160 pipeline systems recorded in the CONCAWE database. 2. Figure 2 shows the diameter distribution in 2008 for each service category. Out of the 198 sections that have been retired since 1971. Some 88% of the crude pipelines are 16” (400 mm) or greater up to a maximum of 48” (1200 mm) whereas around 86% of the product and some 98% of the hot pipelines are less than 16”.3. white products. length and diameter Currently.e.1). It is important to note that Figure 1 represents the pipeline length reported to CONCAWE in each year and does not therefore give an account of when these pipelines were put into service.1.486 km. This reflects the decline in the heavy fuel oil business since the mid 1970s but also specific action taken by operating companies because of the corrosion problems and generally poor reliability experienced with several of these pipelines (see Section 5.report no. This aspect is covered in the discussion of pipeline age distribution in the next section.3. The three main populations are referred to as crude. reported in terms of some 702 active sections covering a total of 35. the main addition in the crude oil category being the Friendship or "Druzba" system that feeds Russian crude into Eastern European refineries. reducing the inventory by about 9200 km. The increase was mostly in the "products" category. 7 sections accounting for 103 km were permanently taken out of service in 2008 while 2 sections totalling 99 km were brought into operation. product and "hot" in this report. In the late 80s the majority of the NATO pipelines were included and in the early part of this decade a number of former Eastern bloc systems joined the survey. The 5 companies that did not report operate a total of 294 km in 22 sections. This represents two thirds of the original “hot” inventory of which only 270 km distributed amongst a dozen sections remain in operation. The two historical step increases occurred when systems previously not accounted for in the survey were added. A small number of lines may be reported as out of service in a certain year without being permanently retired.

<24 12 .<16 8 .<30 16 . 4/10 Figure 1 CONCAWE oil pipeline inventory and main service categories 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Total Crude White products HOT 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Cold and total pipelines inventory ('000 km) Figure 2 100% European oil pipeline diameter distribution and service in 2008 80% 60% 40% >=30 24 .report no.<12 <8 20% 0% Crude White products HOT 4 Hot pipelines inventory (km) .

i. Large volumes of both crude and products pass through more than one pipeline. and whilst every effort is made to only count the flow once. Figure 3 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+ European Oil pipeline age distribution in 2008 40 35 30 Total length surveyed 25 20 15 10 20% 10% 0% 5 0 2.2. a number of new pipelines have been commissioned while older ones were taken out of service. the oldest pipelines in the 26-30 year age bracket represented only a tiny fraction of the inventory. 5% of the total. there has been no large scale replacement of existing lines. Over the years. Although some short sections may have been renewed.3. The impact of age on spillage performance is discussed in Section 6. contributing their specific age profile. It should be realised however. The crude oil transported represents about 70% of the combined throughput of European refineries. 4/10 2.820 km (47%) was over 40 years old. The system has clearly been progressively ageing. Although the age distribution was quite wide. As mentioned above existing lines were also added to the inventory at various stages. the complexity of some pipeline systems is such that it is 3 3 '000 km 5 . Age distribution When the CONCAWE survey was first performed in 1971. was 10 years old or less while 16.report no. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC A reported total of around 530 Mm of crude oil and 250 Mm of refined products were transported in the surveyed pipelines in 2008. The development of the overall age profile is shown in Figure 3. the pipeline system was comparatively new with some 70% being 10 years old or less.3. only some 1890 km. a figure that is fairly stable from year to year (when considering the same inventory).e. that this figure is only indicative.4. By 2008.

Although higher flow rates may lead to higher pressure. however. line deterioration through metal fatigue is more directly related to pressure cycles than to the absolute pressure level (as long as it remains within design limits). In 2008. more or less the same as in 2007 and split between 95x10 m . These figures are. 4/10 often difficult to estimate what went where. They are not.km for products (with an insignificant number for hot lines). A more meaningful figure is the traffic volume which is the flow-rate times the distance travelled.km.km 9 3 for crude and 35x10 m . see Section 4). useful as a divider to express spillage volumes in relative terms (e. as a fraction of throughput. however. 6 .report no. the total reported traffic volume was about 9 3 9 3 130x10 m . providing figures that can be compared with the performance of other modes of oil transportation.g. considered to be significant factors for pipeline spillage incidents. there are a few pipelines where the flow can be in either direction. This is not affected by how many different pipelines each parcel of oil is pumped through. Throughput and traffic are reported here to give a sense of the size of the oil pipeline industry in Europe. Indeed.

96 and 99.report no. A total of 3 injuries have been reported over the years. In just one case. 3. none of whom escaped. All but one of these fatalities occurred when people were caught in a fire following a spillage. fire ensued almost immediately when a bulldozer doing construction work hit and ruptured a gasoline pipeline. It appears that the spillages themselves did not cause the fatalities. five other fires are on record: • A large crude oil spill near a motorway probably ignited by the traffic. There was one injury to a third party in 2006. both resulting from inhalation / ingestion of oil spray/aerosol. during the subsequent incident management and reinstatement period. 7 . These fatalities all occurred after the spillage flows had been stemmed. 89. 79.e. PIPELINE SAFETY The CONCAWE pipeline database includes records of fatalities. In another incident ignition of spilled crude oil occurred during attempts to repair the damaged pipeline. A truck driver engaged in the works received fatal injuries.1. In one incident involving a spillage of chemical feedstock naphtha 3 bystanders were engulfed in fire. FIRES There was no spillage-related fire reported in 2008. injuries and fires related to spillages. having themselves probably been the cause of ignition. Stronger management of spillage area security and working procedures might well have prevented the fires and fatalities. In three of the four fire-related incidents the ignition was a delayed event that occurred hours or days after the detection and demarcation of the spillage area had taken place. The repairers escaped but the spread of the fire caught 4 people who had entered inside the marked spillage boundary some distance away. Thus these occurrences should not be used out of context for any assessment of societal risk inherent to oil pipeline operations. Single non-fatal injuries were recorded in both 1988 and 1989. 4/10 3. Over the 38 reporting years there have been a total of 14 fatalities in five separate incidents in 1975.2. The single non-fire fatality was a person engaged in a theft attempt who was unable to escape from a pit which he had dug to expose and drill into the pipeline. The third incident also involved a maintenance crew (5 people) carrying out repair activities following a crude oil spill. FATALITIES AND INJURIES No spillage-related fatalities or injuries were reported in 2008. It is apparent that the casualties were not members of the general public going about their normal activities in locations where they should have been allowed to be at the time. Apart from those mentioned above. i. This caused a leak that filled the pit with product in which the person drowned. 3.

which also damaged a house and a railway line.report no. 4/10 • • A gasoline theft attempt in an untypical section of pipeline located on a pipe bridge. A mechanical digger damaged a gasoline pipeline and also an electricity cable. It could have been ignited purposely to limit the pollution. A slow leak in a crude production line in a remote country area found to be burning when discovered. The thieves may have deliberately ignited it. 8 . • • There were no casualties reported in any of these incidents. A tractor and plough that had caused a gasoline spill caught fire. which ignited the spill.

1.1.0 25 0 0 40 50 90000 3600 18 Crude - - 1.0 30.0 0. 2 were related to construction defects and 5 to design or materials faults. F = Fatality S = Surface water.75 10.0 294.1 12. 4. Contaminated soil was removed. For definition of categories of causes and gross/net spilled volume. Piezometers were installed to monitor the migration of hydrocarbons. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS (2004-08) 2008 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS A total of 12 spillage incidents were recorded in 2008.0 0.report no. Table 1 Event (1) Summary of causes and spilled volumes for 2008 incidents Facility Line size (") Product spilled Injury Fatality (2) Fire Spilled volume Contamination Gross Net loss Ground area Water (m3) (m2) (3) Mechanical Construction Underground pipe 458 Above ground pipe 462 Design & Materials Above ground pipe 459 Pump Station 460 Underground pipe 461 Underground pipe 463 Underground pipe 468 Corrosion External Underground pipe 469 Third party activity Accidental Underground pipe 464 Underground pipe 465 Underground pipe 466 Underground pipe 467 (1) (2) (3) 16 11 40 10.0 0. 4/10 4.4 0.3 0. Table 1 gives a summary of the main causes and spilled volumes and environmental impact.0 0. 4. see Appendix 1.1.0 17.75 16 Diesel or heating oil Gasoline Crude Jet fuel Jet fuel Jet fuel Crude - - 4.6 0. 9 .0 6. Mechanical Failure There were 7 incidents resulting from mechanical failure in 2008.8 108. Construction Event 458: An acoustic internal inspection gave an indication of a leak. P = Potable water The circumstances of each spill including information on consequences remediation and cost are described in the next section according to cause.0 52. G = Groundwater.1 1.1.0 28.7 40.4 328.0 3.0 3600 5000 250 11000 Spillage events are numbered from the beginning of the survey in 1971 I = Injury.0 129. 4.0 36.75 10. Further details are available in Appendix 2 which covers all spillage events recorded since 1971.1 0 S 9 6 4 16 Diesel or heating oil Jet fuel Jet fuel Crude - - 43. Excavation confirmed a small intermittent leak at a girth weld.1.1.

4. Following heavy rainfall. The cause of the failure was determined to be a delamination within the pipe material. The gasket. 4/10 Event 462: The spillage occurred during the launch of an inspection pig (Intelligence pig). Some product was removed through draining ditches and piezometers were installed to monitor the migration of hydrocarbons. pumping was stopped and the pipeline valves closed. Containment barriers were installed in local ditches using bundles of straw while the risk of fire and explosion in the area was monitored by the fire brigade and pipeline operating staff.1. but no product reached the water. The pump was immediately switched off. Event 460: A leak occurred at the mechanical seal of a pump. The pits are linked to a separator tank via an underground line and a further small concrete pit. The spilled product was confined in the concreted area of the pipeline facility and was recovered in drainage pits from where it was routed to the contaminated water tank. Pumping was stopped and the section was isolated. which had not been correctly installed was partially removed and dragged by the pig.report no. Piezometers were installed to monitor the migration of hydrocarbons. the leaked oil followed the underground water draining path and reappeared outside the premises. The emergency response team had to track the route of the pipe line to find the exact location of the leak. this pit was found to be leaking. Design & Materials Event 459: 2 An oil contaminated area of about 50 m was detected by the local fire brigade outside a pipeline pig trap station on a crude oil pipeline. Concrete drainage pits that are located underneath the pig traps collect the small amount of oil released when retrieving a pig. The pipeline was stopped and depressurised. The damaged gasket was replaced and pumping was resumed. Field operators alerted the dispatching centre immediately and pumping was stopped.1.000 m . The product spilled was confined to the valve pit and it was pumped into road tankers and returned to the company's facilities. Some 130 tonnes of product were spilled which contaminated a ground area of about 2 90. Some oil contaminated an adjacent gravel area (with a polythene underlay) affecting about 2 40 m . Liquid oil was retrieved and 300 tonnes of contaminated soil was removed for biological clean up.2. There was a water channel near the valve. The pipeline section damaged by third party action was repaired. Oil collected in the concreted area around the pumps and from there most of it could be routed to the contaminated water tank via drainage pits. An alarm was raised by the leak detection system. There was no further contamination. Event 468: This incident occurred in the aftermath of event 467 (below). backfilled and prepared for operational 10 . Event 463: A leak in the main pipeline was detected by the automatic leak detection system. Event 461: The gasket of a flanged pipeline block valve failed allowing a leak.

4. There were no water courses in the vicinity.6 bar pressure (MAOP=49 bar).5 months. The pipeline operator was not aware of these activities and the contractor was not aware of the presence of the pipeline. 4. 4. A small leak occurred at that point. Contaminated soil was removed for treatment. downstream of the pipeline in order to stop the oil moving further. 3600 m of ground were contaminated and the soil was removed for clean up. Third party activity There were 4 incidents resulting from third party activity. all in the accidental damage category. The pipeline operator had not been notified of these activities and there was a lack of communication between the owner of the field (who was aware of the existence of the pipeline) and the operator of the digger.3. The failure was attributed to metal fatigue.2. the line failed about 20 m from the previous place of damage with a ca. The leak was detected by 3 the panel operator and pumping was stopped immediately. The oil was removed by vacuum tankers.5. A containment barrier was deployed on the stream. Ditches were excavated to recover the spilled material. 4.report no. Corrosion There was 1 spillage resulting from external pipeline corrosion.1. Operational There were no spillages in this category in 2008. The leak was detected by the leak detection system. Investigation revealed that within this section the main crude oil pipeline was in direct contact with the protective sleeve (outer protection pipeline) and thus providing a location for external pipeline corrosion. About 40 m of product 2 were spilled affecting and area of about 5000 m .1. crossing an approximately 6-7 m wide stream. Three wells were build in which the oil is regularly removed by a vacuum truck. 4/10 pressure testing. 60 cm longitudinal split in the 12 o'clock position. pumping was stopped and the section isolated. Event 469: The crude oil pipeline between the tank farm and the refinery runs mostly underground. 2 4. 11 . The water in the wells is analysed about every 1. at 43. Natural causes There were no spillages in this category in 2008. During the pressure test. Event 465: A third party hit and ruptured the pipeline while bulldozing. Impacted soil was removed and disposed of safely.1. the digging machine hit and ruptured the pipeline.1. Event 464: During construction of a track in an agricultural area.

000 m of land were contaminated. Event 467: The incident occurred in an industrial area under development. The pipeline operator was not informed of these activities whereas the third party was aware of the presence of the pipeline. 40 caused some temporary environmental pollution. Of the 44 spillages recorded for the period. good with a net loss to the 3 environment of only 167 m . Despite these facts the groundwork was started without any permission and the bulldozer which was levelling the ground hit the pipeline and carved with his blade a 15x12x10 cm large triangular gouge. With 12 reported spillages. the owner's contractor was aware of the presence of the pipeline and knew that were restrictions on excavations in the area. The net loss was under 3 3 5 m per 1000 km (against a long term average of 38 m per 1000 km). 12 . The landowner knew of the pipeline right of way across his land and the need to apply for permission before carrying out groundwork.2. The pipeline was shown by permanent markers. 6 spillages affected surface waters and 12 affected groundwater but none had any impact on potable water supplies. 2008 was above the average for 2004 to 2008 with a 3 total gross spillage of 968 m . In terms of spillage volumes. The leak was immediately reported. but the hilly nature of the terrain provided enough hydrostatic head to cause a large spill of 3 2 about 300 m of crude oil. 3 Unfortunately the damage was located at a low point so that 28 m of product were 2 spilled under gravity flow. close to the 5-year average.4 per year since CONCAWE records began in 1971. however. pressure was relieved and manual section valves were closed. 4/10 Approximately 12000 m of contaminated soil were removed for clean up. Some 11. affecting an area of about 250 m . 3 4.report no. Contaminated soil was removed for clean up and replaced. Recovery was. 2008 was higher than the average of the last five years and just below the average of 12. 2004-2008 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW Table 2 shows the spillage performance for the 2004-2008 5-year period. The event was detected immediately by the automatic spillage detection system. Event 466: A farmer hit and ruptured the pipeline in agricultural area.

1 797 132 Spillage incidents 5 2 1 11 2 3 2 12 2 4 9 12 2 5 44 8 8 2 0 MECHANICAL FAILURE Construction Material OPERATIONAL System Human CORROSION External Internal Stress corrosion cracking NATURAL HAZARD Subsidence Flooding Other THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY Accidental Malicious Incidental Gross spillage Net loss 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 * 554 105 55 10 16 3 0.7 847 142 2005 34. volume and impact: 2004 – 2008 km x 103 6 3 m x 10 9 3 m x km x 10 Combined Length Combined Throughput Combined traffic volume 2004 34.3 0 0 195 0 793 4 Volume spilled m3 * 138 0 34 0 4 0 13 4 2 Average 659 149 67 15 29 11 1 234 9 55 0 362 Average gross loss / incident Average net loss / incident Average gross loss/1000 km Average net loss/1000 km Gross spillage/ throughput 651 9 54 1 18 0 0.1000 > 1000 m3 NONE SOIL < 1000 m2 > 1000 m2 WATER BODIES Surface Water Groundwater POTABLE WATER 3 1 2 7 1 13 4 3 2 9 2 1 31 13 4 0 4 29 17 6 12 0 Environmental impact 1 4 1 5 5 3 6 13 6 3 2 1 3 4 5 1 1 4 13 .report no.7 427 45 67 0 15 2 2 4 2 1 984 466 109 52 28 13 1.8 132 0 12 0 507 968 167 81 14 27 5 1.3 805 130 2007 35. 4/10 Table 2 Five-year comparison by cause.5 780 130 2004‑ 2008 35.2 48 0 0 0 90 Gross spillage per cause Mechanical failure Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party activity (No of incidents) Net loss distribution < 10 11 -100 101.6 789 127 2006 35.2 562 0 1 0 406 ppm 0.5 763 129 2008 35.

1.e.3 spills per year and per 1000 km of pipeline today. Figure 5 shows the same data as Figure 4. now expressed in spillages per 1000 km of pipeline (as per the reporting inventory in the each year) and the steady downward trend appears much more clearly. a disproportionately large proportion in regard of the share of such pipelines in the total inventory. 4/10 5. The moving average increases in the late ‘80s to early ‘90s and again in the early 2000 are partly linked to the additions to the pipeline inventory monitored. The 5-year frequency moving average has been reduced from around 1. moving average and 5-year average trends over the 38 years since 1971 and for all pipelines. 14 .1 in the mid 70s to around 0. Figure 4 25 38-year trend of the annual number of spillages (all pipelines) Yearly Running average 5-year moving average 20 Spillages per year 15 10 5 0 Several step changes in the inventory surveyed by CONCAWE over the years clearly make the absolute numbers difficult to interpret. The spillage frequency i.report no. number of spills per unit length of pipeline is therefore a better metric. 67 of these spillages occurred in "hot" pipelines. The largest number of spillages recorded in any one year was 21 in 1972 and the smallest number was 5 in 2004. There is a clear long-term downward trend which bears witness to the industry improved control of pipeline integrity. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2008 NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY Over the 38-year survey period there have been 469 spillage incidents.8 by 2008. Figure 4 shows the number of spillages per year. The overall 5-year moving average has reduced from about 18 spillages per year in the early 1970s to 9. 5.

see Section 5. hence the low frequency in recent years.1). Figure 6 0.2 0.0 4.6 0.4 0.0 2. This is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the spillage frequency for hot oil pipelines to be almost an order of magnitude higher than for cold pipelines.6 0.8 0. Hot oil pipelines have now been almost completely phased out.2 1.0 3.0 Spillages per year per '000 km 0.4 0.6 38-year trend of the spillage frequency (all pipelines) Yearly 1.0 0.3 0.0 6.0 15 .0 0.0 These overall figures mask the poorer performance of hot pipelines (related to corrosion issues. particularly in the early part of the period.4 Running average 5-year moving average Spillages per year per '000 km 1.report no.5 0. 4/10 Figure 5 1.7 Cold HOT 5-year moving average of spillage frequency (hot and cold pipelines) 8.0 5.0 Spillages per year per '000 km 7.0 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.

There were no hot corrosion spillages since 2002.0 80% 8. Figures 7 & 8 show the evolution over 5-year periods of the spillage frequency for hot and cold pipelines respectively.0 60% 6.0 16 . The recent spillage frequency from the remaining hot pipelines is still about on a par with what the total product pipeline inventory achieved back in 1971-75.report no. They were gradually shutdown or switched to clean (cold) product service. A more complete analysis of causes is given in Section 6. In the 1970s and early ‘80s several hot pipelines suffered repeated external corrosion failures due to design and construction deficiencies. The hot pipeline spillage frequency starts from a much higher base than is the case for the cold pipelines.0 20% 2. now broken down into main cause. the cold and the hot oil pipelines have demonstrated entirely different behaviours. with a very large proportion of spillage incidents due to corrosion.0 0% 1971 1975 1976 1980 1981 1985 1986 1990 1991 1995 1996 2000 2001 2005 2004 2008 0. When the hot pipeline data are excluded. 4/10 Clearly.0 Spills per year per '000 km 3rd party Natural Corrosion Operational Mechanical All causes 40% 4. This statistic best represents the performance improvement achieved by the operators of the bulk of the pipeline system. greatly contributing to the performance improvement which has been remarkable. Still the incidence of spillages has been reduced by two thirds over the last 38 years. Figure 7 Hot pipelines spillage frequencies by cause 100% 10. the cold pipelines show a somewhat slower improvement trend than for the total data set. the analysis by cause shows that corrosion is a much less prevalent cause of failure for cold pipelines. Albeit with fluctuations. There is a slight relative decrease of all causes except third party activities which has been somewhat increasing and is the most important cause of spillage.

0 5. i.4 20% 0.8 parts per million (ppm). In practice this is not a very sound proposition. Although there are fairly large year-to-year variations mostly due to a few very large spills that have occurred randomly over the years. The apparent improvement over the past few years is probably not yet statistically significant.e.2.1. would indicate the degree of success in improving clean-up performance. For one thing. SPILLAGE VOLUMES Aggregated annual spilled volumes Figure 9 shows the total gross spillage volume over the complete period. of the oil transported.report no. 4/10 Figure 8 Cold pipelines spillage frequencies by cause 100% 1.0 Spills per year per '000 km 80% 0. 5.2. The same data is shown per 1000 km of pipeline in Figure 10 and as a proportion of throughput in Figure 11. or 0.6 3rd party Natural Corrosion Operational Mechanical All causes 40% 0. the recovered spillage. the long-term trend is clearly downwards. The development of annual recovery percentages (gross-minus-net / gross) shown in Figure 12 indicates no strong trend.8 60% 0. Over the whole period. maximum removal by excavation of contaminated soil is not necessarily the correct response to minimise environmental damage and this is now better understood than it once was. Another compounding factor is that the growth in the pipeline inventory has been predominantly for refined product pipelines and it can be assumed that less invasive recovery techniques are justified for white oil products than for fuel oil or crude oil to achieve a given visual and environmental standard of clean-up. Over the last 5 years. the gross pipeline spillage has averaged 0.2 0% 1971 1975 1976 1980 1981 1985 1986 1990 1991 1995 1996 2000 2001 2005 2004 2008 0. 17 . the average recovery of the spilled oil is 57% 3 leaving an average net loss of oil to the environment of 70 m per spill. year by year and in terms of running and 5-year moving average. It might be expected that the trend in the differences between the annual gross volume spillage and the net volume spillage.00008%.

report no. 4/10 Figure 9 Gross spillage volume 7000 Yearly 6000 5000 4000 Running average 5-year moving average m3 3000 2000 1000 0 Figure 10 350 300 250 200 Gross spillage volume per 1000 km Yearly Running average 5-year moving average m3/'000 km 150 100 50 0 18 .

report no. 4/10 Figure 11 13 Gross yearly spillage volume as a proportion of throughput Throughput Yearly total 10 8 ppm 5 3 0 Figure 12 Spilled oil recovery (5-year moving average) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 19 .

As a rule of thumb. third party activities and natural hazards whereas operational problems and corrosion have caused smaller spills.report no. the gradual reduction of the annual total spilled volume appears to be more related to the reduction of the number of spillage incidents than to their severity.2. In other words. Figure 13 shows that. Spillage volume per event The gross volume released is a measure of the severity of a spillage incident. This is partly due to the mix of spillage causes changing over the years. have decreased relative to third party spillages which are among the largest (see Figure 14). 3 Figure 13 Yearly gross spillage volume per event (5-year moving average) 350 300 250 200 m3 per spill 150 100 50 0 Figure 14 shows the average spill size for each cause category.g. 4/10 5. which on average are smaller ones. on average the three “largest spills” categories result in spillages that are twice the size of the two “smallest spills” categories. the 5-year moving average over the last 8 years or so has 3 consistently been lower than the long term average of 160 m per spill. there has been a slow reduction trend in the average spill size per incident since the early 80s. beyond the large year-by-year variations. At around 100 m per spill.2. the proportion of corrosion spillages. There is insufficient data on record to establish any trend in the speed of detection or the response time to stem leakages. 20 . It remains to be seen whether this improvement will continue but it can be expected that improved monitoring of pipelines and the generalised use of automated leak detection systems should lead to a reduction in spill sizes. e. The largest spillages on average have resulted from mechanical failure.

4/10 Figure 14 38-year average gross spillage volume per event by cause 250 Average gross volume spilled (m3) 200 150 100 50 0 Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party Figure 15 shows the distribution of spillage sizes. This also highlights the importance of considering the cut-off spillage size before comparing data sets taken from different sources. 21 .report no. with little change over the years. Clearly a majority of the spillages recorded in the CONCAWE database were so small that they have only had a very limited and localised impact. demonstrating that less than 20% of all spillages account for 80% of the cumulative gross volume spilled and over 90% of the net spillages.

= less than 2 mm x 2 mm.3. or a mechanical breakage. = 75 to 1000 mm long x 10% max wide. hole size data are only available for 260 (55%). 22 . = >75 mm long x 10% min wide. Out of the 469 spillages. = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% max wide. The corresponding statistics are shown in Table 3. = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% min wide. HOLE SIZE The following definitions have been adopted for classifying hole size in this report: • • • • • • No hole Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture = failure of a gasket or seal.report no. 4/10 Figure 15 Distribution of Gross and net spillage sizes (over 38 years) 100% % of cumulative volume spilled/lost 80% Gross spillage volume 60% Net loss Gross spillage volume 1995+ 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% % of spillage events 5.

the larger on average the spillage would be. pinholes result in the smallest spillages and ruptures in the largest. the pipeline shut in. Note that early figures (say before 1980) are not very reliable as hole type was not commonly reported at the time. there are many other factors involved including the pressure in the pipeline. under the assumption that material was actually being pumped through the pipeline at the time of the incident. 23 . other factors are clearly more important as determinants of the spillage outcome. Otherwise hole types follow similar patterns to the cause incidences. For the other three categories. It would be expected that the larger the hole. operational and natural hazard incidents cause the largest two types of hole whereas third party is equally divided and the corrosion preponderance is with the smaller hole types. The table above shows that there is indeed a weak relationship between the average gross spillage size and the hole size. Pinholes are mostly caused by corrosion. However. The two rather obvious reasons for this are that higher leakage rates come out of larger holes and the hole sizes are to an extent related to the pipeline diameter which in turn tends to set the potential flow rate available for leakage. and the volume of pipe available to leak after shut in. 4/10 Table 3 Hole type Distribution of spillages by hole size No hole 8 3% 45 Pinhole 26 10% 62 Fissure 40 15% 274 Hole 83 32% 91 Split 49 19% 245 Rupture 54 21% 667 Overall 260 100% 289 Number of events % Gross average m3 spillage per event Hole caused by % Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party Sizes of hole by % Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural hazard Third party 63% 0% 0% 0% 38% 9% 0% 0% 0% 3% 12% 0% 73% 4% 12% 5% 0% 25% 14% 3% 33% 3% 28% 5% 33% 24% 13% 15% 29% 11% 14% 1% 28% 0% 57% 22% 13% 31% 0% 41% 33% 6% 35% 4% 22% 29% 38% 23% 29% 10% 11% 6% 9% 4% 70% 11% 38% 7% 29% 33% 21% 3% 29% 3% 44% As expected. Table 4 shows the frequencies by hole type. A majority of mechanical.report no. the leak being detected. the length of time between the start of leakage. Mechanical incidents often result in ruptures whilst operational and natural hazard incidents tend to cause more than their share of splits.

However.33 1. PART OF FACILITY WHERE SPILLAGE OCCURRED By far the greatest part of the material in place in a pipeline system is the underground pipe itself.17 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.46 0.29 0. these more vulnerable features should be designed out of the pipeline system.70 1991-95 0.report no. 1988 to 2000 and 2001 to 2008.00 0.54 0.00 0.24 0.10 0. instrument connections.47 2006-08 0.26 1. Table 5 Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party All Part of facility where spillage occurred.08 0.03 0.67 1981-85 0.4. by main cause Total 31 6 28 1 62 128 Bend 3% 0% 1% 0% 1% 6 Joint 3% 0% 2% 0% 1% 7 Pipe run 6% 10% 17% 0% 30% 85 Valve 6% 3% 0% 0% 1% 10 Pump 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2 Pig trap Small bore Unknown 0% 3% 3% 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 2% 0% 7% 0% 0% 1% 2% 1 6 11 5.08 0.20 0. joints and small bore connection failures indicating that valves.16 0.11 0.64 0.00 0.10 0.93 5.11 2001-05 0.00 0.63 0.17 1. Adding seemingly useful features such as more section block valves. Wherever possible.27 0. These periods have been chosen because of the major change in the reported pipeline inventory between 1987 and 1988 following the inclusion of the noncommercially owned pipelines and from the beginning of the current decade when a number of Eastern European pipelines operators joined the survey. Small bore lines are also a relatively common subject of leaks as they are mechanically vulnerable and often subject to corrosion.21 0.27 1.31 1. a sizeable proportion of incidents are related to valves.20 0.37 19960. flanges and other fittings are vulnerable items. It comes therefore as no surprise that most leaks occur in the main pipeline runs (Table 5).25 0.43 1. 24 . sampling systems can therefore potentially have a negative impact on spillage frequency.41 0.07 0.32 0. SPILLAGES PER DIAMETER CLASS In Figure 16 the frequencies of spillages have been calculated for the average length of each group of diameters for the periods 1971 to 1987.54 0. 4/10 Table 4 Event/1000 km No hole Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture All events Spill frequency by hole size 1976-80 0.45 1986-90 0.00 0.20 0.41 0.5.13 0.37 0.

Neither is there sufficient data on depth below surface to indicate how much the risk is reduced by deeper coverage.6. most incidents (78%) occur in the cross country pipeline themselves. 5. Not surprisingly. 5.0 < 8" 8 to 12" 12 to 16" 16 to 24" 24 to 30" > 30" Clearly smaller pipelines are more liable to develop leaks than larger ones. 25 . A number of possible reasons for this could be postulated but there is no way of determining from the available data what each risk-increasing factor might contribute. The type of location has been reported for a total of 398 spillages. It is not recorded if larger pipelines have greater coverage than small ones.8 0. 4/10 Figure 16 Spillage frequencies per diameter class 2. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 6.1.6 1.6.4 0.2 0.0 1971-1987 1988-2000 2001-2008 Spillages per year per '000 km 1. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Land use where spillage occurred We differentiate between spillages occurring either in the pipeline itself or in pumping stations and also record the type of land use in the area.report no.

The bulk of the spillages from pump stations occur in industrial areas simply because their location is mostly classified as such.000 m . Before that date. If we exclude the one spillage that affected more than 100. Out of the 469 recorded spillages. Ground area affected The current CONCAWE performance questionnaire. This factor tends to be more prevalent in the smaller area ranges. in use with minor changes since 2 1983. This is the main mechanism by which relatively small spillages can affect very large areas. to some extent fortuitous. requests reporting of the area of ground (m ) affected by the spillage. however. particularly those that occur over extended periods of time and in the lower quadrants of the pipeline circumference. For these events.report no. there appears to be a direct relationship between spill size and area affected. There are two ways in which small spillage volumes can affect larger areas of ground. Conversely. 5. area data were reported infrequently. Porous ground and hot arid conditions can also lead to the surface consequences being limited. Other smaller spillages can be spread over larger areas by the influence of groundwater or surface water flows.2. Bigger spillage volumes affect larger areas. can have their main effect underground with relatively little impact on the surface. Evidently.6. Fine sprays directed upwards can be spread around by winds. 2 26 . the vulnerability of the pipelines is significantly increased in such areas by a factor of possibly as much as ten compared to other areas. and for which the gross spillage was relatively modest. 4/10 Table 6 Location of spillage incidents Underground pipe Number Crude/Product % 16 3/13 5% 194 55/139 62% 17 0/17 5% 76 18/58 24% 7 2/5 2% 1 0/1 0% 0 0/0 0% 311 Above ground pipe 2 11 3 15 0 0 1 32 71 6% 34% 9% 47% 0% 0% 3% Pump Station Number % 0 0% 8 15% 2 4% 45 82% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 55 Residential high density Residential low density Agricultural Industrial or commercial Forest Hills Barren Water body Total Unspecified Whereas we do not have statistics of the length of pipeline installed for each land use type it is clear that the number of spillages in commercial and industrial areas is higher than would be expected from consideration of installed length alone. comparatively large spills. area data is available for 255 (54%). This relationship is. the percentages that fall within the area ranges are shown in Figure 17 together with the average spill size for each category.

6.report no. representing 3% of the total.7. 5.3.000-99. Since 2001 impacts on other types of water have been reported.999 >=100. have had some effect.000 0 Area affected (m2) 5. Within the last 5 years the proportion of spills discovered via leak detection systems increases to 27%. Impact on water bodies The spillage reports record those incidents where oil pollution of the water table and underground aquifers and surface watercourses has had consequences for the abstraction of potable water. the spills have tended on Aevrage gross spilled volume per event (m3) % of 255 events where reported 27 . one has to realise that third parties are often on the scene when the leak occurs and detection systems are relatively new additions. Although this may seem a rather small proportion. The most common means of detection of underground pipeline spillages was by a third party (52%) while automatic detection systems were involved in detecting only 11% of those spillages. 10 have affected surface water. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY The way in which the occurrence of a spillage was detected is reported in 7 categories (Table 7) and for three types of facility. 17% of the total. The pattern for spillages from pump stations differs from that from pipelines. It is believed that all of these effects have been temporary. Of the 90 reported spillages since then. 10 have affected ground water but only 2 have impacted potable water supplies. When third party have detected spillages. 4/10 Figure 17 Ground area (m ) affected by spillages (% of number reporting) 2 40% 800 30% 600 20% 400 10% 200 0% <10 10-99 100-999 1000-9999 10. Pipeline company resources detected some 83% of the pump station spillages. Some 14 spillages.

report no. presumably those that are below the warning capabilities of the instrumentation. 4/10 average to be the smaller ones. Table 7 Discovery of spillages Underground pipe Above ground pipe Pump Station Number % Average Number % Average Number % Average gross spillage gross spillage gross spillage R/W surveillance by pipeline staff Routine monitoring P/L operator Automatic detection system Pressure testing Outside party Internal Inspection Total 31 82 42 20 196 4 375 8% 22% 11% 5% 52% 1% m3 234 312 158 145 131 6 182 4 14 2 1 15 0 36 11% 39% 6% 3% 42% 0% m3 43 97 43 30 92 0 84 0 35 10 3 10 0 58 0% 60% 17% 5% 17% 0% m3 0 85 52 18 37 0 52 28 .

4/10 6. natural hazard and third party.report no. the main causes of incidents are very different for hot and cold pipelines and this is further illustrated in Figure 18. The survey returns provide more detailed information on the actual cause and circumstances of spillage incidents and these are analysed in this section. Out of the 5 incident categories. illustrating again the prominent impact of corrosion for hot pipelines. Specific attention is being paid to this as will be seen in the detailed discussion below. Figure 18 Distribution of major spillage causes Hot pipelines 67 incidents Cold pipelines 402 incidents 29% Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party 4% 7% 6% 2% 42% Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party 7% 81% 3% 19% Figure 19 and 20 further show the distribution of primary and secondary causes. Mechanical and Corrosion would be the most likely to be related to such phenomena. respectively for all pipelines and cold pipelines. the figure is only 19% for cold pipelines for which mechanical failure and mostly third party-related incidents are the most prevalent. There is a general debate regarding the increasing age of the pipeline inventory and the potential integrity issues that could be related to such ageing infrastructure. As already discussed in Section 5. 29 . themselves divided into subcategories. Whereas 82% of hot oil pipeline spillages are related to corrosion. corrosion. Secondary causes are unremarkably distributed except perhaps for the large proportion of accidental causes within third party-related incidents. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure. operational. Definitions are given in Appendix 1.

report no. 4/10 Figure 19 Distribution of major and secondary spillage causes – All pipelines 200 180 a: construction b: design & materials a: system b: human a: external b: internal c: stress corrosion a: ground movement b: other a: accidental b: malicious c: incidental Number of spills 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Mechanical Operational Corrosion a b c Natural 3rd party Figure 20 Distribution of major and secondary spillage causes – Cold pipelines 200 180 a: construction b: design & materials a: system b: human a: external b: internal c: stress corrosion a: ground movement b: other a: accidental b: malicious c: incidental Number of spills 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Mechanical Operational Corrosion a b c Natural 3rd party 30 .

MECHANICAL There have been 119 cases of mechanical failure.report no. 25% of the total of 469 spillage events. the most common reasons for mechanical failures are illustrated in Table 8. Whenever it is clear that such damage was caused after the pipeline was installed it is classified as “third party / incidental”. This is an average of 3. Note: It is not always straightforward to classify certain types of failures. Within each of the sub-categories. 44 failures were due to construction faults and 75 to design or materials faults.15 0. Table 8 Reasons for mechanical failures Construction damage 6 Faulty material 30 Incorrect installation 11 Incorrect material specification 0 NA 16 NA 30 Number of spills due to Construction Faulty weld 11 Incorrect design 7 Design & Materials Age or fatigue 8 31 .1. 4/10 6.1 spillages per year. The 5-year moving average frequency of mechanical failures is shown in Figure 21.25 Spillages per year per '000 km 5-year moving average 0. For instance a number of leaks can be traced back to some damage to a pipeline such as a dent.10 0. Figure 21 Frequency of mechanical failures for cold pipelines 0.20 0.05 0.00 The historical trend is downward but this seems to have reversed since the beginning of the decade. If no such evidence is available it is classified as “mechanical / construction”.

2. The number of spillages in each sub-category is shown in Table 10. For cold pipelines the number of failures is 76. This is an average of 3. As noted earlier though. 4/10 The total number of age or fatigue-related failures remains low. CONCAWE is giving particular attention to this point.4 spillages per year. 7% of the total of 469 spillage events. Only one of the pipelines suffering a spill reported that inhibitor was used. 54 of these occurred in the more vulnerable hot pipelines and in the early years. 6. 28% of the total of 469 spillage events. 18 out of the 24 cold pipeline internal corrosion incidents occurred in crude oil service although crude pipelines only account for less than a third of the cold pipeline inventory. one did not report and the others did not use inhibitors. 32 . stress corrosion cracking (SCC) was introduced as an extra category. This may only be an early indication and more data will need to be collected to obtain a statistically significant trend. 16% of the total and an average of 2. This is an average of 0. Thus crude pipelines appear to be much more vulnerable to internal corrosion than product pipelines. The events have been subdivided into external and internal corrosion and.8 spillages per year. OPERATIONAL There have been 31 spillage incidents related to operation. Table 9 Reasons for operational incidents Instrument & control systems 3 Incorrect operation NA 5 NA Number of spills due to System Equipment 2 Not depressurised or drained 3 Human Incorrect maintenance or construction 4 Incorrect procedure 13 0 1 6. 21 incidents were due to human errors and 10 to system faults. The most common reasons for operational incidents are illustrated in Table 9. 4 of the 8 registered events occurred in the last 4 years of the survey (2 in 2008). Table 10 Corrosion-related spillages Cold 48 24 4 All 101 25 4 Number of spills due to Hot External corrosion 53 Internal corrosion 1 Stress corrosion 0 Internal corrosion is much less prevalent than external corrosion.0 spillages per year. 10 years ago. The seemingly increasing occurrence of mechanical failures combined with the appearance of an increase in fatigue-related failures may be an indication of the ageing process. However.report no.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING There have been 130 failures related to corrosion.

the rate has decreased. has fallen dramatically over the years. increased occurrence of corrosion is a concern which is addressed by pipeline operators through the use of increasingly sophisticated inspections techniques. 4/10 Although there have only been four SCC-related spillages so far (including one recategorised from external corrosion). Figure 22 shows no sign of any increasing trend in corrosion failures of cold pipelines. sleeves. 25 were related to special features such as road crossings. Out of the 76 corrosion-related failures in cold pipelines. As already mentioned in Section 5. There is.20 0. In a gradually ageing pipeline inventory. If anything. etc. mostly related to corrosion. There is therefore no evidence as yet to suggest that generalised corrosion is becoming a problem.10 0. These techniques together with the general adoption of integrity management systems by all EU pipeline companies should ensure that any upturn in age-related spillages is prevented or delayed for many years. these have been relatively large spillages.report no.05 0. anchor points. possibly as a result of the more severe failures resulting from this type of corrosion.00 33 . of course no guarantee that this will not start to happen at some point and thus there is a need for continued monitoring of performance on this basis. Inspection methods involving intelligence pigs are now available to monitor pipeline condition and early identification of the onset of corrosion. Figure 22 Corrosion-related spillage frequency (all types) for cold pipelines 0.25 Spillages per year per '000 km 5-year moving average 0. which therefore appear particularly vulnerable.15 0.1 the frequency of incidents associated with hot pipelines.

were caused by direct damage from some form of digging or earth moving machinery. In one case an electrical earthing fault had arisen on a pipeline with no previous problem as a consequence of the electrification of an adjacent electric railway line. This is an average of 0. In the other. however. As discussed in Section 5 third party activities also result in relatively large spills and account for the largest total volume spilled of all causes. This appears to be a direct consequence of the difficult terrain and hydrological conditions that apply to a significant part of that country’s pipeline network. THIRD PARTY Third parties have caused the largest number of spillages with 174 events.e.4. 23 were intentional (mostly theft attempts) and 27 were incidental i. Pipeline operators are not always made aware of impending ground working jobs and cannot therefore supply appropriate advice on exact pipeline location and working procedures and exercise adequate supervision of the work. an electricity pylon fell over and one of the arms punctured a pipeline. 34 . Even when good communication has been established between the pipeline operator and the third party company. Accidental damage The most common causes of accidental third party spills are shown in Figure 23. resulted from prior damage inflicted to the pipeline by a third party at some point in the past. 3% of the total of 469 spillage events. 10 spillages were due to some form of ground movement and 4 to other hazards.5. 4/10 6.report no. 6. No less than 10 of the natural hazards spills have occurred in the same country. The vast majority of events. 124 events were accidental. an average of 4. the actual machinery operator may be left partially or completely unaware of a pipeline's existence or fail to apply the requisite care or skill. Damage by machinery occurs as a combination of lack of communication and awareness and lack of care or skill.6 per year and 37% of the total. Table 11 Details of natural causes due to ground movement Subsidence 3 Earthquake 1 Flooding 3 NA 1 Number of spills due to Ground movement Landslide 5 6.5.4 spillages per year.1. NATURAL HAZARDS There have been 15 spillage incidents related to natural hazards.

4/10 Figure 23 Causes of accidental third party spills 60 Other Drilling/Blasting 50 Bulldozing Digging/trenching Number of spills 40 30 20 10 0 Construction Agricultural Underground infrastructure Figure 24 shows the awareness data (reported for about 80% of the third partyrelated spillages) as the percentage of cases where each party was aware of either the impending activity (pipeline operator) or the presence of a pipeline (machinery operator). In the remaining 34% of the cases the pipeline was hit in spite of the fact that the pipeline operator know about the work and the third party was aware of the presence of the pipeline. third party undertook some form of excavation activities in the full knowledge that a pipeline was present in the vicinity but without the pipeline operating company being aware of these activities. In some 50% of the cases. 35 .report no. only one case was reported where the pipeline company was aware of the impending work but the third party was not informed of the presence of the pipeline. In about 14% of the cases neither party was aware of “each other”. In contrast. These cases often denote a lack of communication at the working level or a lack of proper care or skill by the third party.

4/10 Figure 24 100% Awareness of impending works and of pipeline location 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Drilling/Blasting Bulldozing Digging/trenching Third party only Both Other Neither All Pipeline co only The strong relationship between spillage frequency and diameter noted in Section 5. improving communication and awareness and comparing operating and work control practices between pipeline operators from different companies and countries. 36 . It is also the most amenable to improvement by sharing experiences.5 is also apparent for accidental damage (Figure 25).report no. The prevention of third party accidental spillages is of the highest priority due to its place in the spillage cause league.

Incidental damage This category captures those incidents where damage was done at some unknown point in a pipeline’s lifetime. 5 from vandalism but the majority (16) from attempted or successful product theft. Thus they share the characteristic that they might be detectable by intelligence pig inspections.2 0. Intentional damage There have been 23 spillages caused by intentional damage by third parties: 2 as a result of terrorist activities.4 0. 6.report no. a number of theft attempts have been discovered which fortunately did not lead to spillages. which subsequently suffers deterioration over time resulting eventually in a spill. Since 1999. scrapes and such like. all the rest were at valves or other fittings at pump stations or road / river crossings. In general they result from unreported damage done after the original construction when a pipeline has been knowingly or unknowingly hit during some or other third party groundwork activities.5. These all started off from dents.3.2. etc. In addition. 37 .6 1971-1987 1988-2000 2001-2008 Spillages per year per '000 km 0.0 < 8" 8 to 12" 12 to 16" 16 to 24" 24 to 30" > 30" 6. theft attempts by drilling into pipes have become a regular feature of the spillage statistics including 2 such incidents in both 2006 and 2008.5. 4/10 Figure 25 Third party accidental spillage frequencies per diameter class 0. There have been 27 incidental damage incidents. None of the terrorist or vandalism incidents was in underground piping. one was from an aboveground section of pipeline.

After a stabilisation and slight decrease of activity around the turn of the millennium. including a one-off exercise to collect back data from the time intelligence pigs were first used around 1977.report no. intelligence pig use for internal inspection of pipelines grew steadily up to 1994. a period considered as a reasonable cycle for this type of intensive activity. Also a number of pipeline companies in Eastern Europe have joined the survey in recent years and previous pigging records have not on the whole been provided. 4/10 7. 2192 km. In 2008 a total of 70 sections where inspected by at least one type of intelligence pig. Separate records are kept for metal loss pig. covering a total of 7842 km. . 443 out of a total of 702 active sections (63%) have been inspected at least once by at least one type of pig representing 76% of the total length of the network. The length of un-inspected pipelines is therefore certainly less than the above figure and should continue to decrease in future years. 38 . Within the last ten years. There are certainly some pipeline sections (mainly older ones) which were not designed to be pigged and which. Leak detection pigs are also sometimes used but their function is quite different. . 69 sections 31 sections 41 sections As shown in Figures 26 and 27. Inspections were split as follows amongst the individual types of pig: • • • Metal loss pig Crack detection pig Geometry pig 3451 km. Each inspection may entail one or more passes of a pig along a piggable pipe section. with an average total of nearly 8000 km covered by any pig run and 4890 km actually inspected over the last 5 years. INTELLIGENCE PIG INSPECTIONS CONCAWE has been collecting data on intelligent pig inspection activities for the past 18 years. It must also be noted that we do not have historical inspection records for a number of sections added to the inventory in the last two years of this survey. This suggests that the inspected sections are longer than average. because of small size or tight bends or lack of suitable pig launchers or receivers. crack detection pig and for geometry (calliper) pig inspections. the upward trend resumed. 2199 km. They can reduce the consequences from a leak that has already started by making it possible to detect it earlier. Most inspection programmes involved the running of more than one type of pig in the same section so that the total actual length inspected was less at 5018 km (14% of the inventory). They do nothing to help prevent the leak occurring in the first place. cannot be intelligence pigged.

report no. 4/10 Figure 26 Annual inspections by type of intelligence pigs 10000 Geometry Cracks 8000 Metal loss Total length inspected (km) 6000 4000 2000 0 Figure 27 Total annual portion of the inventory inspected by intelligence pigs 6000 Total length inspected 18% 15% 12% 9% 6% 3% 0% 5000 Total length inspected (km) % of total 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 % of total inventory 39 .

have been detected by intelligence pigs. For the last 10 years these numbers are reduced to 16 and 6 events related to external and internal corrosion respectively. Figure 28 120 Repeat Inspections in the last 10 years 100 Metal loss Crack Geometry Number of sections 80 60 40 20 0 2 3 4 5 Number of repeat inspections The intelligence pig inspection technique only finds flaws. 40 . 4/10 As shown in Figure 28. There are also 101 spillages related to external corrosion and 25 to internal corrosion at least some of which could have been detected. Indeed. a number of sections have been inspected more than once during the last 10 years. regular intelligence pig inspections are required by the authorities. Over the past 38 years. most of which have now been retired. Note that nearly two thirds of the 101 spillages related to external corrosion occurred in hot pipelines. There were 7 such spills in the last 10 years. corrosion and other sorts of damage in or on the pipe inner or outer walls. for some pipelines.report no. 18 spills have been caused by mechanical damage of faulty welds that could. in principle.

GLOSSARY COPEX DDR MAOP NATO OECD OPMG R/W SCC CONCAWE Oil Pipeline Operators Experience exchange Deutsche Demokratische Republik Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Oil Pipelines Management Group Right of way Stress Corrosion Cracking 41 .report no. 4/10 8.

4/95. 5/74. 4. 4/92. 4/01. 3/00. 3/05. 7/04. 6/79. 8/88. 2/73. 2/82. 7/76. 2/98. Reports No. 11/82. 10/80. 42 . 9/85. 7/75. 5/94. 4/96. 4/10 9. 9/89. 3. 9/77. 7/97. 2/93.report no. 7/86. 3/78. 1. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE Performance of oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western Europe. REFERENCES CONCAWE (1972) Spillages from oil industry cross-country pipelines in Western Europe. 3/06. Report No. 8/87. Statistical summary of reported spillages. 1/03. 6/98. 9/83. 2/72. 3/99. 6/90. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE (1998) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 25-year performance statistics. 4/91. Report No. Brussels: CONCAWE 2. 12/84.1970. Brussels: CONCAWE CONCAWE (2002) Western European cross-country oil pipelines – 30-year performance statistics. 1/02. 1/74. Report No. Statistical summary of reported incidents 1966 .

g. instrumentation. corrosion.g. malfunction or inadequacy of safeguarding systems (e. operational. inappropriate material specification) or a construction fault (e. This also includes failure of sealing devices (gasket.report no. inadequate support etc). This also includes "incidental" third party damage. Natural hazard: a failure resulting from a natural occurrence such as land movement. metallurgical defect. of hydrocarbons released from the pipeline system as a result of the incident Recovered oil: the estimated quantity. Operational: a failure resulting from operational upsets. mechanical pressure relief system) or from operator errors. within each category a primary cause. recovered during the clean-up operation. 3 3 Categories of spillage causes CONCAWE classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure. defective weld. expressed in m . lightning strike etc. natural hazard and third party.1. either as oil or as part of the contaminated soil removed Net loss: the difference between gross spilled volume and recovered oil. undetected when it originally occurred but which resulted in a failure at some later point in time. flooding. Table 1. Corrosion: a failure resulting from corrosion either internal or external of either a pipeline or a fitting.1 Main A B C D E Mechanical Failure Operational Corrosion Natural Hazard Third Party Activity a Design & Materials System External Ground movement Accidental Categories of spillage causes Secondary b Construction Human Internal Other Intentional c Stress Corrosion Incidental Detailed reporting in Appendix 2 further identifies. 4/10 APPENDIX 1 Spillage volume DEFINITIONS Gross spilled volume: the estimated total quantity. These main categories are subdivided to give a total of 12 subsets shown in Table 1. expressed in m . pump seal etc). Mechanical: a failure resulting from either a design or material fault (e.g. A separate category is foreseen for stress corrosion cracking. 43 . Third party: a failure resulting from an action by a third party either accidental or intentional.

report no. attempted) 44 . 4/10 APPENDIX 2 Key to table Service 1 2 3 4 5 SPILLAGE SUMMARY Crude oil White product Fuel oil (hot) Crude oil or product Lubes (hot) Facility 1 2 3 Underground pipe Above ground pipe Pump station Leak first detected by 1 R/W surveillance by pipeline staff 2 Routine monitoring P/L operator 3 Automatic detection system 4 Pressure testing 5 Outside party 6 Internal Inspection Land use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Facility part 1 Bend 2 Joint 3 Pipe run 4 Valve 5 Pump 6 Pig trap 7 Small bore 8 unknown Reason 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Residential high density Residential low density Agricultural Industrial or commercial Forest Hills Barren Water body Incorrect design Faulty material Incorrect material specification Age or fatigue Faulty weld Construction damage Incorrect installation Equipment Instrument & control systems Not depressurised or drained Incorrect operation Incorrect maintenance or construction Incorrect procedure Coating failure Cathodic protection failure Inhibitor failure Construction Agricultural Underground infrastructure Landslide Subsidence Earthquake Flooding Terrorist activity Vandalism Theft (incl.

000 1 55 6 20 5 1 1 15 Aa 4 1 56 9 10 1 1 3 33 Ca 2 57 2 2 2 2 7 6 Ca 3 58 10 1 2 1 3 9 4 Ca 14 3 59 12 5 5 1 3 8 Ca 14 3 60 13 5 5 1 3 8 Ca 14 3 61 4 1 5 1 3 17 4 Ca 14 3 62 6 0 5 1 3 16 Ca 14 3 63 16 1 5 1 3 9 2 Cb P 1 64 7 1 5 1 3 8 2 Cb 1 65 16 500 5 1 3 10 Ea 17 2 66 5 1 0 5 1 3 21 Ea 19 2 67 8 30 4 2 1 3 22 Ea 19 2 68 8 200 2 5 1 3 22 Ea 17 2 69 10 668 668 2 1 3 18 Ea 18 2 70 10 489 405 2 1 3 18 2 Ea 17 45 .000 1 48 28 100 40 5 1 3 16 Da 3 49 10 8 5 1 3 9 2 Ea 18 3 50 12 0 5 1 3 6 Ec 3 51 12 1 5 1 3 6 Ec 3 52 12 0 1 1 3 6 Ec 1 53 1974 1 0 2 3 7 4 4 Aa 7 1 54 3 2 2 3 7 5 4 Aa 4 1. 4/10 Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact (") detected by part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 2 1 1971 11 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 Aa 7 1 2 4 2 3 2 Aa 2 3 11 0 5 1 3 6 Aa 5 1 4 20 40 5 3 3 2 5 Ab 60.000 1 10 34 2000 5 1 3 9 Ea 19 2 11 8 2 2 5 1 3 20 Eb 25 2 12 1972 16 5 2 1 4 4 Ab 12 1 13 28 800 150 2 3 1 12 4 Ab 5 2 14 12 70 39 5 1 2 5 2 Ab 1 15 9 10 5 5 1 3 29 Ca 1 16 9 40 35 5 1 3 29 Ca 1 17 10 1 1 2 2 3 39 4 Ca 1 18 10 1 1 2 2 3 39 4 Ca 3 19 12 500 5 1 3 12 4 Ca 3 20 12 5 1 5 1 3 12 4 Ca 2 21 10 150 50 2 1 3 7 Ca 3 22 4 0 5 1 3 15 4 Ca 3 23 6 1 0 5 1 3 15 Ca 1 24 20 200 60 2 1 3 8 4 Ea 17 1 25 20 250 100 2 1 3 8 Ea 17 1 26 28 60 12 5 1 3 16 Ea 17 1 27 10 90 5 1 3 6 Ea 1 28 8 7 5 1 3 8 2 Ea 17 2 29 10 30 5 1 3 9 Ea 17 2 30 8 400 350 2 1 3 2 2 Ea 18 2 31 10 99 96 5 1 3 6 2 Ea 3 32 12 0 5 1 3 5 Ec 3 33 1973 5 4 1 1 3 8 Aa 4 1 34 20 25 3 5 3 2 1 4 Aa 1 35 16 0 2 3 4 3 4 Ab 1 36 4 2 3 7 11 4 Ab 4 2 37 24 25 2 3 2 2 4 Ab 1 38 18 11 1 2 3 5 13 4 Ab 4 2 39 6 12 6 5 1 2 1 4 Ab 1 40 9 12 12 1 1 3 32 Ca 3 41 5 15 1 1 3 8 Ca 3 42 5 15 1 1 3 8 Ca 3 43 12 200 2 5 1 3 13 Ca 3 44 12 12 2 2 2 3 13 Ca 3 45 12 250 5 5 2 3 13 Ca 3 46 12 150 2 1 2 3 13 Ca 14 3 47 12 310 10 5 1 3 13 4 Ca 30.report no.000 1 5 350 2 3 8 9 4 Ba 9 1 6 25 2 3 7 Bb 11 3 7 5 3 5 1 3 8 Ca 2 8 8 6 6 2 1 3 20 Ca 1 9 20 300 50 5 1 3 5 Ea 19 1.

000 1 140 24 100 1 5 1 3 5 Aa 6 2.865 1 139 1979 22 100 40 4 1 3 8 2 Aa 6 16.500 2 146 12 90 50 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18 1 147 8 245 150 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18 2 148 11 950 380 2 2 3 15 4 Eb 26 P 6.400 46 .report no.500 1 118 18 80 2 1 3 5 2 Ea 18 400 2 119 8 3 3 2 1 3 25 2 Ea 18 2 120 8 3 1 2 1 3 13 2 Ea 17 2 121 12 191 2 1 3 19 2 Ea 17 2 122 8 269 5 1 3 19 2 Ea 17 2 123 20 2530 2500 2 1 2 9 2 Ec 1 124 1978 34 2000 300 5 1 2 16 2 Ab 2 2 125 8 235 205 2 1 4 16 2 Ab 2 1 126 22 19 5 1 3 7 2 Ab 2 1.800 2 127 6 12 6 5 1 3 18 4 Ca 15 2 128 10 100 10 2 1 3 14 2 Ca 15 3 129 12 2 5 1 3 14 2 Ca 15 3 130 8 120 60 4 1 2 7 2 Ca 15 3 131 8 80 40 4 1 3 7 2 Ca 15 3 132 12 2 1 1 3 12 4 Ca 3 133 18 4 1 5 1 3 6 4 Ca 15 4 134 16 400 250 2 1 3 14 2 Da 23 2 135 11 3 0 5 1 3 10 2 Ea 17 2 136 12 58 40 4 1 8 10 2 Ea 19 1 137 24 1 5 1 7 4 Ea 19 1 138 16 255 245 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18 5. 4/10 Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact (") detected by part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 2 71 1975 20 30 10 4 2 7 11 2 Ab 5 1 4 72 34 30 2 5 1 2 12 Ab 5 3 73 10 3 2 2 2 5 1 Ab 1 74 10 2 2 3 8 4 Ba 11 2 75 4 3 3 7 4 Ba 9 2 76 8 20 10 2 3 7 4 4 Bb 11 1 77 5 2 3 7 4 Bb 11 3 78 10 50 2 1 3 11 Ca 15 3 79 12 3 5 1 3 9 Ca 14 3 80 6 25 1 1 3 9 Ca 14 3 81 10 1 0 2 3 6 6 4 Ca 3 82 4 1 5 1 3 18 Ca 3 83 8 0 6 1 3 6 Ca 3 84 8 0 1 1 3 6 2 Ca 3 85 12 0 2 3 3 6 4 Ca 1 86 6 15 0 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18 1 87 18 5 0 2 1 3 12 Ea 19 1 88 8 120 3 2 1 3 9 Ea 17 2 89 8 60 60 2 1 3 23 Ea 19 1 90 6 15 6 5 1 3 2 Ea 18 2 91 1976 8 5 1 7 9 Aa 5 3 92 8 5 1 4 13 2 Aa 2 1 93 9 2 1 4 13 4 Ab 2 2 94 24 17 1 5 2 2 17 4 Ab 1 1 95 16 1322 433 2 1 2 13 Ab 1 3 96 10 80 2 1 3 11 Ca 14 2 97 4 90 90 5 1 3 16 Ca 15 1 98 24 200 2 1 3 10 Da 21 3 99 10 50 25 2 1 3 Da 21 1 100 10 40 2 5 1 3 13 2 Ea 18 2 101 8 44 14 2 1 3 24 2 Ea 18 1 102 18 802 606 5 1 3 7 2 Ea 18 2 103 8 153 153 2 1 3 2 Ea 18 2 104 14 358 358 5 1 3 23 2 Ec 2 105 1977 32 2 3 4 9 4 Ab 150 2 106 28 2 3 2 9 4 Ab 140 2 107 20 2 5 1 2 8 2 Ab 2 1 108 36 2 1 4 3 4 Ab 1 1 109 50 2 3 4 19 4 Bb 11 1 110 1 2 3 4 7 4 Bb 11 2 111 12 350 220 4 1 3 10 2 Ca 15 3 112 10 315 90 2 1 3 8 1 Ca 1 113 6 2 3 7 9 4 Cb 2 114 12 103 5 1 3 19 Da 20 1 115 20 550 500 1 1 3 13 2 Da 23 1 116 24 600 25 3 1 3 11 2 Db 1 117 10 160 2 1 3 12 2 Ea 17 1.700 2 141 9 50 5 1 3 17 2 Ca 14 350 2 142 12 300 200 1 1 3 23 2 Ca 15 3 143 18 20 1 1 3 12 4 Ca 15 500 3 144 18 5 1 1 3 12 4 Ca 15 100 1 5 145 18 50 1 5 1 3 16 2 Ea 17 2.

600 1 190 7 182 120 2 1 3 17 2 Cb 20.000 1 200 16 10 2 3 6 18 2 Ba 8 50 1 201 10 10 2 1 3 21 2 Bb 10 50 3 202 12 2 1 1 3 17 4 Ca 1 203 6 20 16 5 1 3 24 4 Ca 15 250 2 204 16 5 1 5 3 3 11 4 Ca 14 10 2 205 9 236 236 5 1 3 11 2 Cb 200 1 206 10 150 1 5 1 3 23 5 Ea 17 100 2 207 11 244 240 3 1 4 21 Eb 24 1 208 1985 24 1 1 1 1 8 14 2 Aa 7 18 1 209 20 25 4 5 3 5 9 4 Ba 2 210 10 16 3 3 4 17 4 Ba 2 211 10 7 3 3 2 17 4 Ba 2 212 6 4 3 3 4 17 4 Ba 1 213 16 1100 756 2 1 3 9 2 Cc 13.000 2 217 24 292 4 2 1 2 26 2 Ab 7 3.000 2 192 10 213 171 5 1 3 29 2 Ea 17 2 193 14 675 470 5 1 4 3 2 Eb 24 1 194 12 1 0 5 1 3 20 4 Ec 15 1 195 1984 28 4363 3928 1 1 3 10 2 Aa 6 6.000 2 215 1986 16 160 6 3 3 2 17 2 Ab 200 1 216 20 53 6 2 1 3 12 2 Ab 2 3.500 2 224 14 280 56 3 1 3 18 2 Ea 17 100 2 225 6 52 41 3 1 3 13 2 Ea 17 10 2 226 8 11 6 3 1 2 19 2 Eb 25 3 47 .000 1 182 22 15 5 5 1 3 18 1 Cb 1 183 6 31 5 1 3 20 2 Ea 18 2 184 8 7 1 2 1 3 30 4 Ec 5 185 1983 4 10 2 1 2 22 2 Aa 1 100 5 186 4 1 3 1 2 22 2 Aa 1 9 5 187 4 4 5 1 2 22 2 Ab 1 80 4 188 16 442 111 4 1 3 18 2 Bb 11 2 189 6 12 4 1 3 15 4 Ca 15 3.000 3 218 16 20 5 5 1 3 38 1 Ca 14 2 219 20 2 2 5 1 3 22 1 Ca 15 3 220 8 10 4 1 3 25 2 Ca 20 1 221 9 10 10 5 1 3 45 2 Cb 180 1 222 34 7 7 1 1 2 14 4 Cb 84 2 223 8 192 95 5 1 3 15 2 Ea 19 1.000 2 214 8 211 195 2 1 3 33 2 Ec 18 1. 4/10 Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact (") detected by part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 2 149 1980 13 8 1 2 3 2 12 4 Ab 7 1 150 40 4800 400 5 1 3 9 2 Ab 2 10.000 4 155 10 762 135 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18 10.500 1 196 24 141 5 1 1 18 2 Aa 6 4.000 3 151 10 80 5 1 3 10 2 Ca 14 3 152 10 10 1 1 3 10 2 Ca 14 3 153 7 1 1 1 3 15 2 Ca 15 10 3 154 12 111 12 5 1 3 15 2 Da 21 P 10.000 2 156 12 270 5 1 3 Ea 19 2 157 8 313 2 1 3 Ea 17 1 158 30 5 3 4 4 Eb 25 4 159 1981 34 10 2 5 1 4 6 Ab 1 160 40 10 5 2 2 5 4 Ab 80 2 161 10 600 150 2 1 3 Ab 2 1 162 20 19 1 5 1 3 17 2 Ca 14 3 163 8 5 4 3 2 12 2 Ca 14 3 164 8 19 4 3 2 12 2 Ca 14 3 165 12 5 2 5 1 3 15 4 Ca 14 50 2 166 10 92 58 2 1 3 25 2 Ca 15 1 167 20 5 3 5 1 7 15 4 Ca 14 2 168 10 10 5 1 3 Ca 14 2 169 26 125 45 5 1 2 18 2 Da 20 3 170 24 30 10 4 3 7 14 4 Db 1 171 7 132 132 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18 2 172 8 322 317 2 1 3 24 2 Ea 17 1 173 5 96 5 1 3 Ea 19 1 174 28 5 0 1 1 3 16 4 Ec 2 175 1982 8 12 12 5 2 3 20 2 Aa 6 P 1 176 24 9 5 1 3 18 2 Ab 2 1.000 1 177 8 2 1 1 3 20 2 Ca 3 178 12 8 5 1 3 16 4 Ca 15 30 3 179 10 400 16 5 1 3 19 2 Ca 15 1 180 5 20 5 3 3 10 4 Cb 1 181 7 140 140 5 1 3 16 2 Cb 3.report no.500 1 197 28 3 3 2 4 11 2 Ab 2 120 2 198 8 16 3 5 2 2 17 2 Ab 2 720 1 199 34 5 2 2 3 4 13 4 Ba 8 1.000 1 191 7 148 110 5 1 3 17 2 Ea 17 18.

000 2 239 11 80 80 2 1 3 35 1 Ca 15 1 240 28 5 1 5 2 2 31 1 Ca 15 400 2 241 10 305 5 2 1 3 23 2 Da 20 5.200 1 277 20 20 13 5 1 3 24 2 Aa 7 4.350 2 301 10 2 2 1 4 30 Bb 3 302 8 200 5 1 3 25 2 Ca 300 2 303 24 13 1 5 1 2 27 4 Ca 250 2 304 6 3 3 4 1 3 49 2 Ca 15 2 2 305 12 75 75 5 1 3 28 2 Da 23 2 306 8 50 50 4 1 3 25 2 Ec 20 2 307 8 25 25 4 1 3 25 2 Ec 60 48 .000 2 263 6 52 27 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 2.800 1 251 1989 26 3 2 5 1 2 26 2 Aa 5 100 3 252 12 1 5 1 2 4 Aa 5 6 2 253 1 25 7 5 2 7 1 2 Aa 7 10.500 2 270 8 9 2 2 4 48 2 Bb 12 10 3 271 11 325 11 2 1 3 22 4 Ca 15 2 272 11 225 194 5 1 3 11 2 Ea 17 3 2 273 6 3 1 5 1 3 34 2 Ea 18 324 2 274 10 189 34 5 1 3 24 2 Ea 18 2 275 1991 20 275 118 3 1 3 24 2 Aa 1 14. 4/10 Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact (") detected by part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 2 227 1987 20 1000 120 4 1 2 20 4 Aa 5 4 228 26 2 1 5 1 3 25 2 Aa 7 1.000 2 1 255 10 66 16 2 1 2 27 2 Bb 11 1 256 9 25 5 4 1 3 48 2 Ca 14 50 3 257 12 240 150 2 1 3 17 4 Ca 15 2 258 10 400 90 3 1 3 24 2 Cb 2.000 1 267 11 2 5 1 3 26 2 Ec 18 2 268 1990 13 105 105 5 1 4 2 Bb 12 30 2 269 10 252 221 5 3 6 33 2 Bb 11 1.100 2 300 5 1 2 2 8 22 4 Bb 10 1.000 1 229 9 25 2 5 1 1 46 2 Ab 2 200 3 230 16 550 150 2 1 3 39 2 Ca 15 200 1 231 9 8 1 5 1 3 46 1 Cb 280 2 232 12 12 10 5 1 3 21 2 Da 20 P 2.500 2 278 12 25 7 2 3 7 20 4 Aa 6 150 2 279 12 5 2 5 1 7 21 2 Aa 7 320 2 280 12 29 29 5 1 3 38 2 Ab 2 600 2 281 4 1 3 3 7 31 4 Ab 4 250 2 282 172 68 3 3 4 11 4 Ab 2 100.200 2 250 6 18 1 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 1.400 2 296 113 8 2 3 4 12 4 Ab 2 2 297 8 30 15 2 2 2 33 4 Ab 5 2 298 8 5 5 6 1 3 13 5 Ab 2 10 2 299 275 248 2 3 4 4 Bb 11 1.000 2 264 8 3 5 1 3 32 2 Ea 19 66 2 265 8 186 126 5 1 3 29 2 Ea 18 1 266 40 40 5 5 1 3 17 2 Ec 4.500 2 237 8 97 21 2 3 2 28 2 Ab 4 500 1 238 34 81 1 5 1 3 17 4 Ca 15 5.000 2 287 8 15 10 4 1 3 17 4 Cb 25 2 288 8 4 5 1 3 49 2 Ea 19 6 2 289 6 21 13 5 1 3 34 2 Ea 18 500 2 290 6 1 5 1 3 37 2 Ea 19 2 2 291 84 75 3 3 4 1 2 Eb 25 2 292 13 485 485 2 3 3 24 2 Eb 25 7.report no.000 2 276 50 38 5 1 7 10 2 Aa 1 1.000 2 242 20 40 10 5 1 3 24 4 Ea 17 30 1 243 3 2 1 5 1 3 28 2 Ea 17 100 1 244 10 14 1 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18 100 2 245 8 3 1 5 1 3 35 1 Ea 17 20 2 246 16 3 1 5 1 3 16 2 Ea 19 150 1 1 247 16 650 650 3 1 3 23 1 Ea 17 550 2 248 4 2 1 5 1 3 26 2 Ea 19 9 2 249 6 63 56 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 17 1.000 1 254 26 155 5 5 1 3 26 2 Ab 5 P 2.000 2 283 2 5 2 2 2 Ab 2 284 10 80 4 5 1 3 26 2 Ca 15 1.000 2 233 22 3 1 5 1 7 20 4 Ea 19 10 2 234 16 300 115 5 1 8 18 4 Ec P 1 235 1988 34 10 1 5 1 2 26 4 Ab 200 2 236 12 90 42 5 1 1 30 1 Ab 2 P 1.000 2 293 8 10 1 5 1 3 24 2 Ec 30 2 294 1992 8 1000 400 2 1 3 34 4 Aa 2 2 295 128 98 2 1 2 2 Ab 5.500 1 285 7 20 5 1 2 30 2 Cb 300 2 286 8 100 60 4 1 3 17 2 Cb 10.000 2 3 259 16 253 253 5 1 3 22 2 Ea 19 500 2 260 16 660 472 3 1 3 20 2 Ea 18 P 2 261 10 82 4 3 2 3 24 2 Ea 17 200 2 262 12 298 298 2 1 3 32 2 Ea 18 6.

500 2 337 10 1000 270 1 1 3 31 4 Ca 15 55.000 2 323 6 250 14 2 3 2 16 4 Ab 50 2 324 6 1 1 1 1 3 16 4 Ab 2 25 2 325 11 5 5 5 2 2 9 2 Ab 100 1 326 2 2 5 3 8 4 Ba 9 100 3 327 12 90 60 5 1 3 24 2 Ca 14 1 328 32 10 5 2 2 3 21 4 Cb 500 2 329 10 285 285 5 1 3 26 2 Ea 17 2 330 9 195 170 3 1 3 37 2 Ea 18 P 8.000 2 378 12 7 1 5 1 3 26 1 Ea 19 2 379 24 1 1 5 1 3 41 2 Ec 19 150 49 .000 2 333 10 30 30 5 1 2 35 2 Aa 5 750 2 334 53 41 5 1 7 5 2 Ab 2 2 335 6 115 1 1 3 36 2 Ab 2 500 1 336 16 132 82 3 1 3 30 2 Bb 11 6.000 1 322 16 1350 1295 2 1 3 31 2 Ab 2 25.000 2 309 3 5 3 2 2 4 Ab 80 2 310 12 2 1 1 1 4 23 4 Ab 400 2 311 18 14 13 6 1 3 27 4 Ca 400 2 312 13 580 500 2 1 8 26 2 Cb 800 1 313 20 2000 500 2 1 3 19 2 Cb 25.800 1 349 10 2 0 1 1 2 7 4 Cb 20 2 350 12 422 341 2 1 3 30 2 Cc 2 351 12 435 267 2 1 3 30 1 Cc P 2 352 8 13 2 2 1 4 33 2 Ea 19 150 2 353 12 40 1 5 1 3 24 4 Ec 17 1 354 1998 30 4 2 3 5 30 4 Ab 1 400 3 355 6 0 0 5 1 3 34 2 Bb 11 2 356 13 486 247 2 1 3 42 2 Bb 11 100 2 357 16 250 20 5 1 3 30 4 Ca 14 2 358 10 340 313 3 1 3 6 1 Ea 17 500 2 359 10 15 14 1 1 3 4 2 Ea 19 600 2 360 9 176 67 3 1 3 42 2 Ea 18 160 2 361 30 2 3 1 7 2 Ea 19 650 2 362 8 0 5 1 3 25 2 Ea 19 4 1 363 1999 7 2 3 6 4 Bb 11 200 3 364 1 30 2 1 3 32 4 Ca 14 300 2 365 11 167 64 2 1 3 32 2 Ca 14 60 2 366 6 1 1 3 1 3 25 2 Ca 14 5 1 367 4 1 1 5 3 8 35 4 Ca 14 2 368 8 80 20 5 1 3 48 2 Ea 17 500 2 369 13 84 13 3 1 3 10 4 Ea 17 2 370 6 29 14 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 18 2 1 371 8 80 30 5 1 3 35 2 Eb 26 1.000 2 348 1997 12 19 3 1 1 3 27 2 Ca 14 2.report no.000 2 317 8 3 1 5 1 3 37 2 Ea 19 100 2 318 12 101 19 5 1 3 31 2 Ea 19 2 319 20 3050 1450 2 1 3 29 4 Ec 2 320 7 3 3 5 1 3 13 1 Ec 6 1 321 1994 16 200 160 3 1 3 31 2 Ab 2 6.000 2 314 26 10 7 5 1 3 31 5 Da 20 P 2 315 9 8 6 5 1 3 30 2 Ea 50 2 316 24 49 39 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 40.000 2 372 11 36 28 3 1 7 5 2 Eb 26 100 2 373 12 1 2 1 3 36 4 Ec 2 374 2000 175 3 5 2 4 24 4 Ab 60 1 375 12 10 7 5 1 3 30 4 Cb 150 2 376 12 8 8 5 1 3 31 2 Ea 17 2 377 11 159 64 3 1 3 8 2 Ea 17 5. 4/10 Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact detected by (") part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 1 308 1993 34 248 18 4 1 3 31 2 Aa 2 45.500 2 339 9 20 20 3 1 3 39 4 Ea 17 100 2 340 13 139 113 5 1 3 5 2 Ea 17 300 2 341 6 12 3 1 3 37 2 Ea 17 30 2 342 1996 9 165 99 2 3 2 5 4 Ab 40 2 343 14 292 209 5 1 3 40 1 Bb 10 300 3 344 12 1 5 1 3 30 4 Ca 16 2 1 345 9 437 343 2 1 3 40 4 Ea 19 20 2 346 7 19 19 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 17 350 2 347 10 500 62 5 1 3 64 4 Ec 23.000 2 331 8 46 5 1 3 36 2 Ea 17 1.000 2 338 9 48 18 3 1 3 28 2 Ea 17 1.150 2 332 1995 280 80 2 2 6 22 4 Aa 7 10.

000 1 406 20 280 30 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 17 12.000 1 403 30 2 5 2 2 40 4 Ea 19 40 2 404 8 170 120 4 1 3 57 2 Ea 18 1 405 16 750 45 1 1 3 39 2 Ea 17 20.500 2 425 10 3 1 8 29 1 Ea 2.000 1 432 10 15 5 2 4 22 3 Bb 12 1.000 2 421 2004 16 2 0 1 1 3 32 3 Aa 4.000 2 451 11 12 10 2 1 4 28 3 Eb 26 1.000 2 429 6 20 2 1 1 28 3 Ab 4 S 58 2 430 6 38 5 1 1 28 3 Ab 4 S 42 1 431 9 30 4 3 1 8 14 2 Bb 12 G 1.000 2 399 6 17 2 2 3 33 4 Ca 400 2 400 8 70 2 1 2 ? 4 Ca 2 401 13 225 58 3 1 3 46 2 Cc 400 2 402 24 250 20 5 1 7 39 4 Da 22 5.000 2 381 10 1 1 5 1 2 39 2 Aa 5 10 2 382 10 5 5 5 1 3 38 2 Ab 2 500 2 383 6 37 7 4 1 1 27 2 Ab 2 900 2 384 12 10 2 5 1 1 15 4 Ab 2 120 1 385 34 6 1 3 1 3 29 4 Ca 14 500 2 386 12 4 4 5 1 3 26 2 Ca 14 1.000 2 426 2005 12 19 19 2 3 4 3 Aa 7 2 427 12 5 1 2 4 Aa 5 G 1 428 20 350 10 3 1 8 45 2 Ab 1 G 15.200 1 457 16 7 5 3 3 40 3 Cb SG 700 50 .000 2 408 8 190 3 1 3 4 Ec 19 2 409 2003 14 30 30 3 1 8 Aa 4 410 20 2 2 1 3 52 4 Ca S 2 2 411 12 2 5 1 3 32 4 Ea S 5 2 412 11 83 74 3 1 3 46 3 Ea 18 1.000 2 422 10 26 18 2 2 7 40 2 Aa 6.000 2 433 10 3 1 5 1 3 25 4 Ca 14 S 50 1 434 24 64 1 2 1 8 40 4 Cb G 150 2 435 8 15 8 5 1 3 41 2 Ea 17 G 1.000 1 407 12 40 15 5 1 3 33 2 Eb 26 6. 4/10 Cause Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Impact detected by part (") (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 1 380 2001 20 800 8 5 2 8 35 2 Aa 5 10.report no.600 2 452 13 301 38 5 1 3 17 3 Ea 19 452 2 453 9 117 54 2 1 3 50 3 Ea 19 120 2 454 9 2 2 5 1 3 16 3 Eb 26 100 2 455 11 182 133 5 1 3 50 3 Ea 19 S 500 2 456 13 185 159 2 1 3 50 3 Ca 14 1.800 2 413 11 45 31 5 1 3 46 4 Ea 17 600 2 414 6 2 3 1 8 Ea 2 415 11 74 49 3 1 8 46 3 Eb 26 500 1 416 16 5 5 1 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 120 2 417 16 28 10 5 1 3 29 2 Eb 26 400 2 418 16 52 3 4 1 3 29 2 Eb 26 400 2 419 12 11 7 4 1 3 45 4 Ec 800 2 420 20 2500 1100 5 1 3 31 6 Ec 19 P 80.000 1 423 22 20 6 2 3 8 5 4 Ab 200 2 424 8 90 50 5 1 1 5 3 Ea 18 1.000 3 398 10 1 5 1 3 28 2 Ca 15 14.000 2 437 2006 12 75 5 1 4 58 4 Ab 50 2 438 8 6 6 2 1 4 19 4 Ab 2 60 2 439 9 5 1 2 2 1 3 Aa 7 2 440 14 5 2 2 4 4 Ab 2 2 441 11 245 2 1 3 13 3 Ea 18 2 1 442 11 37 5 2 3 3 Aa 5 2 443 11 223 5 1 3 5 Ea 17 2 444 13 4 1 2 7 4 Ab 1 2 445 20 2 3 1 3 4 Cb SG 1 446 12 10 3 5 1 1 8 4 Cb 50 2 447 6 23 3 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 G 100 2 448 6 16 3 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 G 80 2 449 2007 8 150 70 3 1 3 4 Ec 4 400 2 450 8 30 1 5 1 3 2 Ea 17 2.000 2 436 24 0 5 1 3 46 Ec 19 SG 3.000 1 387 13 103 50 2 3 8 23 4 Cb 225 2 388 11 55 51 5 1 3 9 2 Ea 17 2 389 10 10 1 5 1 3 11 2 Ea 17 2 390 6 5 5 5 1 3 47 1 Ea 18 400 1 391 12 10 7 5 1 3 30 2 Eb 26 250 1 392 12 17 12 5 1 3 30 2 Eb 26 400 2 393 16 2 2 5 1 3 18 2 Eb 26 350 2 394 8 85 24 2 1 3 47 2 Eb 26 P 404 2 395 2002 8 10 10 5 1 3 47 2 Ab 325 1 396 20 100 2 1 3 36 4 Ca 15 500 2 397 10 80 20 5 1 3 38 4 Ca 14 10.

4/10 Spillage ID 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact (") detected by part (m3) Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land bodies area (m2) 2008 16 2 4 4 6 1 3 40 4 Aa 5 25 40 1 6 5 2 7 36 7 Ab 2 11 2 30 3 3 5 29 4 Ab 2 40 11 2 52 37 3 1 4 29 3 Ab 4 50 11 2 12 1 2 4 20 4 Aa 7 11 2 129 108 3 1 3 29 3 Ab 2 90.600 6 2 40 2 1 3 52 4 Ea 5.report no.000 16 1 328 3 1 3 46 4 Ab 4 3.000 4 2 28 5 1 3 3 Ea 18 250 16 1 294 3 1 3 46 4 Ea 17 11.600 18 1 1 1 5 1 3 1972 2 Ca 14 S 51 .000 9 2 44 17 3 1 3 16 3 Ea 17 3.