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- 1 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg ..............................................................................................1 **Case Cross-x Guide(1/2)**..................................................................................................3 **Case Cross-x Guide(2/2)**..................................................................................................4 **A2:Inherency** ..................................................................................................................5 Inherency Iraq (1/2) ..................................................................................................................6 Inherency Iraq (2/2) ..................................................................................................................7 **A2: Missile Advantage** ...................................................................................................8 Turkey and TNWs ....................................................................................................................9 A2: Iran Prolif Prevention ..................................................................................................... 10 **A2: Terrorism Advantage** .......................................................................................... 11 A2: Spillover .......................................................................................................................... 12 A2: US presence causes terrorism ........................................................................................ 13 A2: Nuclear Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 14 **A2: Democracy Advantage** ........................................................................................ 15 A2: Proliferation .................................................................................................................... 16 **A2: Solvency** ................................................................................................................. 17 Squo Solves............................................................................................................................ 18 Missile Adv. Solvency .......................................................................................................... 19 Terrorist Adv. Solvency ........................................................................................................ 20 **Topicality** ...................................................................................................................... 21 Reduce is not eliminate ......................................................................................................... 22 Useless troops are not Military Presence ............................................................................. 23 In Means Throughout ............................................................................................................ 24 ASPEC ................................................................................................................................... 25 **1 Card DA’s (General)** ............................................................................................... 26 Job Placement DA ................................................................................................................. 27 PTSD DA ............................................................................................................................... 28 **DA’s (General and Specific)** ...................................................................................... 29 Econ DA (1/3)........................................................................................................................ 30 Econ DA (2/3)........................................................................................................................ 31 Econ DA (3/3)........................................................................................................................ 32 Arifjan DA (1/3) .................................................................................................................... 33 Arifjan DA (2/3) .................................................................................................................... 34 Arifjan DA (3/3) .................................................................................................................... 35 Isreali Relations(1/3) ............................................................................................................. 36 Isreali Relations(2/3) ............................................................................................................. 37 Isreali Relations(3/3) ............................................................................................................. 38 Israel Politics DA (1/3) ......................................................................................................... 39 Israel Politics DA (2/3) ......................................................................................................... 40 Israel Politics DA (3/3) ......................................................................................................... 41 Sunni Alliance DA (1/3) ....................................................................................................... 42 Sunni Alliance DA (2/3) ....................................................................................................... 43 Sunni Alliance DA (3/3) ....................................................................................................... 44 Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 2 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

**CP’s** ............................................................................................................................... 45 Consult NATO CP (1/4) ....................................................................................................... 46 Consult NATO CP (2/4) ....................................................................................................... 47 Consult NATO CP (3/4) ....................................................................................................... 48 Consult NATO CP (4/4) ....................................................................................................... 49 XO CP (1/3) ........................................................................................................................... 50 XO CP (2/3) ........................................................................................................................... 51 XO CP (3/3) ........................................................................................................................... 52 Phase out CP (1/2) ................................................................................................................. 53 Phase out CP (2/2) ................................................................................................................. 54 **Kritiks** ........................................................................................................................... 55 Fem K IR (1/3) ...................................................................................................................... 56 Fem K IR (2/3) ...................................................................................................................... 57 Fem K IR (3/3) ...................................................................................................................... 58 Security K (1/5) ..................................................................................................................... 59 Security K (2/5) ..................................................................................................................... 60 Security K (3/5) ..................................................................................................................... 61 Security K (4/5) ..................................................................................................................... 62 Security K (5/5) ..................................................................................................................... 63 Terror Talk K(1/3) ................................................................................................................. 64 Terror Talk K(2/3) ................................................................................................................. 65 Terror Talk K(3/3) ................................................................................................................. 66

Note to user: Make sure you read all the cards before using them. Some cards have special conditions, mainly Topicality. Use the cross-x guide to ask questions after the 1ac. This is a straight up neg. If you face a critical aff, don’t use the Kritiks, because they might be the advantages.

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 3 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

**Case Cross-x Guide (1/2)**
Inherency: Are you aware that there will be a withdrawal from Iraq? If yes then: Doesn’t that mean troops will be withdrawn? You state they aid in withdrawal. Missile Advantage:
1. IS IRAN CURRENTLY PROLIFERATING? (answer should be yes) 2. HAS THE UNITED NATIONS ATTEMPTED TO STOP IRAN’S PROLIFERATION? (answer should be yes) 3. HAS IRAN STOPPED PROLIFERATING? (answer should be no) 4. IS KUWAIT PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS? (yes) 5. IF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STOP IRAN FROM PROLIFERATING, HOW WILL KUWAIT, A TINY COUNTRY, FURTHER UNAIDED BY U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, WORK WITH IRAN TO STOP ITS PROLIFERATING?

Democracy Advantage 1.What kind of democracy will Kuwait become? Do the citizens have set any certain type? (the likely answer is no. bring this up as showing that the citizens are incapable of implementing an effective democratic government) 2. How quickly will Kuwait become a democracy after the U.S. withdraws? (if they say they don’t know, ask “Then how do you know it will? ) (If they name a specific date, ask, how do you know it will?) (If they name a general date, ask for specifics. If they don’t name any, ask, then is it certain that it will? ) 3.Okay, how will Kuwait even become a democracy? (if they name external influences, ask, how will they do so? How will they not come to the same as the power-hungry U.S.?) (If they name by itself, ask, how will they, with terrorists? How will they, on their very own? Many underdeveloped countries have become corrupted when trying to aim for ideal societies, such as Russia) 4. Do you have evidence that Kuwait will not become a dictatorship after U.S. withdrawal? 5. Will the Kuwaitian monarchy definitely lose power? 6. Will it be eradicated? (Remember, it took the French several centuries to become a democracy, literally) Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 4 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

**Case Cross-x Guide (2/2)**
Terrorism Advantage 1.Terrorism is sparked by U.S. presence in Kuwait, true? (if yes, ask Then the terrorists are the Kuwaitians themselves? If they answer no to this, ask, then why would they care about U.S. presence? If they make up some bullshit, ask Then why would Kuwait have reason to be afraid of them, if they’re just the public itself? If they say they’re just violent public, ask how stability will be maintained? Therefore the Terrorism Advantage is bullshit. They aren’t terrorists at all. If they answered yes to terrorists=Kuwaitians, follow the same path (why would Kuwait be afraid?)) (if no, ask, then what do they have to do with U.S. precence in Kuwait? How does U.S. presence relate to that terrorism? Obviously the U.S. has nothing to do with it. This is further reason to keep U.S. there, to protect the people against other terrorists) 2. Do you have evidence that terrorists will leave after U.S. withdrawal? (If they say that terrorists are there only because US, either see above blue highlighted, or emphasize LEAVE. Remember not to do both) Once again, do you have ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER that the terrorists will leave after the U.S. withdraws. (they’ll probably say no. if they say yes, listen for it, or ask for it directly. Use logic to strengthen case: because people, especially terrorists, like to take advantage of others’ weakness. Just look at the Taliban in Afghanistan) 3. Do you have any evidence that Kuwait would be able to defend itself from Terrorists without U.S. Military Presence? (state this in your speech: because the aff has brought up no evidence that the terrorists will leave, or die down, without U.S. presence, THERE IS NO SOLVENCY WHATSOEVER, AND THE AFF’S “IMPACTS” WORK FOR THE NEG AS WELL. TERRORISM WILL STILL SPILLOVER AND STILL AFFLICT THE COUNTRY. IN FACT, THE AFF PLAN WOULD WORSEN THE CONDITION, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULDN’T BE ABLE TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY.) (Remember to take a cynical point of view of people. Terrorists are opportunists. ) Topicality 1. From where in Kuwait are you removing troops? (If specific base, run In=throughout) 2. What are the functions of US troops in Kuwait? (If they answer “they have no function” run Useless troop=/=military presence.) Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 5 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

**A2:Inherency**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 6 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

Inherency Iraq (1/2)
Withdrawal from Iraq means troops will inevitably withdraw from Kuwait. The World Tribune, 4-22-10
(“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp)
WASHINGTON — The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in Kuwait. Officials said the Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They

said the U.S. military would thin its huge logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq concludes in September 2010. “We could have a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is no longer a need to support a combat presence in Iraq,” an official said. On March 31, the Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support Associates, based in Fort Worth, Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of U.S. troops and equipment from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to the U.S. military. “This procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for
supplies and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and tenant units moving into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait,” the Pentagon said on April 6. Officials said the U.S. military

has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal from Iraq. They said this has marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikdom in an
effort to enhance security and other functions. “Base operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides operational support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security commitments and theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Kuwait,” the Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been copying elements of its command and control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan. They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14 million contract to FedTech Services to develop an information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater Network Management Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat Support would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was solicited and received. The Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would support the transition of the military’s command, control, communications and computer capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S. embassy, and other enduring forward operating bases. “The majority of the services involve project management, program planning and analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems and network engineering and integration, and communications infrastructure installation to include inside and outside plant architecture,” DRS said on April 7

This clearly shows that troops will be withdrawn when troops from Iraq are withdrawn. Obama plans to remove troops from Iraq
The Washington Post 2010 (Wilson, Scott, Staff Writer “U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will be on time, Vice President Biden says” May 27, 2010) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html President Obama called Iraq his predecessor’s war of choice. Now it is his war to exit – and quickly. The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden, who says the U.S. military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government takes shape. “It’s going to be painful; there’s going to be ups and downs,” Biden said in a 40minute interview in his West Wing office this month. “But I do think the end result is going to be that we’re going to be able to keep our commitment.” White House officials say Iraqis are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing the need for U.S. forces. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains fractured.

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 7 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

Inherency Iraq (2/2)
This clearly shows Obama plans to remove troop, which mean that troops from Kuwait will follow. We have proved that the affirmative team has no inherent barrier what so ever. This is a voting issue for the neg. If we win on inherency we win the debate Also the affirmative team read a card in the 1ac that says troops will be guaranteed usage because they will be used in the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, so they concede to this. Since troops will be removed from Iraq forever, there will be no more use for those troops and they will thus be removed If the aff claims that this is not the case and that they will mot be used to do so, not only do they contradict themselves, but they will thus have no inherency evidence, and thus they loose, because they have the burden of proof in this debate. It’s a double bind. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 8 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

**A2: Missile Advantage**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 9 –Kuwait Negative MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV Division

Turkey and TNWs
The affirmative claims that by having troops and deploying patriot missiles, this increases tensions with Iran and leads to global war. Let’s look at this rationally. First off all we have TNWs in Turkey that are much more tensioning to Iran. TNWs in Turkey are certainly more of an issue, because nuclear weapons are. In fact a nuclear Turkey causes disruption in the middle east. P.D. Spyropoulos, Boston Globe, December 9, 1999, p.http://www.ahmp.org/bosglob8.html
Many are now convinced that a nuclear Turkey, already among the most highly militarized states in the world, will be the surest way to usher in a nuclear arms race in the Balkans and Mideast, two of the world’s most volatile regions, and both at Europe’s doorstep. Turkey’s military adventurism in the Balkans, Cyprus, Central Asia and the Middle East should further underscore the fact that placing nuclear power into the hands of governments that have not yet developed the maturity to harness it can soon develop into the greatest global security threat of the coming century.

What this evidence says is that Turkey is causing all these problems, yet we are still here, and there has been no war at all. We know Turkey has nuclear weapons, and none of these things have happened. It is almost impossible that the affs impact will occur of we have patriot missiles. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 10 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

A2: Iran Prolif Prevention
The affirmative states that if Kuwait – Iranian relations improve, that Kuwait can stop the proliferation of Iran. They’re completely flawed in their thinking. First off all Un sanctions have done nothing to Iran’s nuclear program Dareini 6/17 (Ali, The Chronicle Herald, The Associated Press, http://thechronicleherald.ca/World/1187652.html)JFS
TEHRAN, Iran — Defying week-old UN sanctions over its nuclear program, Iran promised to expand its atomic research Wednesday as its president vowed to punish the West and force it to “sit at the negotiating table like a polite child” before agreeing to further talks. Tehran, which insists its nuclear work is peaceful, said it will build four new reactors for atomic medical research. The United States and some of its allies believe Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, and the Islamic Republic’s plans to expand research could encourage calls in the West for more economic pressure against the country. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran will not make “one iota of concessions.” He said he will soon announce new conditions for talks with the West, but first he wants to punish world powers for imposing sanctions.

Kuwait is part of the UN, and has agreed to sanctions against Iran
Khaleej Times 10(7/12, Kuwait starts applying Un sanctions on Iran, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2010/November/middleeast_No vember269.xml&section=middleeast, date accessed: 2-2-11.) The central bank of Kuwait has asked the Gulf emirates banks, investment companies and money exchange firms to start implementing UN sanctions against neighboring Iran, local media said on Friday. The instructions for the freezing of assets and financial resources related to “Iran’s sensitive nuclear programmes or activities,” said Al-Rai newspaper, citing a circular by the bank.

This card shows that Kuwait is taking an active role in sanction giving. Those have done nothing. So even if Iran – Kuwait relations improve, Iran hasn’t even attempted to listen to Kuwait about nuclear disarmament, so the chance of that happening is practically zero. Iran will want to punish Kuwait because they helped in applying sanctions against them. The first card stated so, there will be no negotiations. In fact because of Iran’s intentions towards Kuwait, we should leave our troops in to defend them. The patriot missiles will be used as deterrence. The missiles are an advantage to the status quo. Look at this as a disad to the aff plan. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 11 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**A2: Terrorism Advantage**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 12 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

A2: Spillover
The affirmative claims that having US troops presence leads to terrorist build up, which leads to spillover and global war. Sounds great on paper, but in reality is completely and totally ridiculous. There is no way terrorist spillover will lead to global war, because there are terrorists currently in the Middle East, yet we haven’t had global war. So it is highly unlikely for such an event to occur. Also let us keep in mind that it is highly unlikely that such an event will occur because of the fear of nuclear inhalation, and economic ruin. A global will just not happen any time soon for us to be concerned. The affirmative is being very melodramatic, for you to appeal to them. However the status quo is not as they describe. There accusations are outrageously far fetched. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 13 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

A2: US presence causes terrorism
US-Kuwait relations are important- terrorism, Iraqi instability, civil war. Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07
(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.) This monograph notes that the United States can, if insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationship and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take Kuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have the potential to become more jaded and less cooperative in their relations with the United States if they view themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as subordinates. The United States has a long history of resentful allies carefully measuring the degree of cooperation they will give in return for security guarantees. There is no need for this to occur with Kuwait. Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relations thus become important and may become especially vital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S. withdrawal under less than optimal conditions. Strong efforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare in Iraq from spreading to Kuwait under such scenarios. Such efforts may require a great deal of new and creative thinking by both Kuwaitis and Americans as the threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now been overshadowed by the dangers of spillover from an Iraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and large- scale subversion.

What this card is saying is that the troops are actually key to preventing a terrorist disaster. The affirmative claims that removing troops will solve the problem of terrorism, because terrorism will go down. However Us presence checks terrorism. Also let us remember 9-11. When we were not fighting terrorism, we were attacked, and many were killed. Ever since the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, there have been no major attacks. We can thus deduce the US keeps terrorism at its heels, too concentrated on escaping us, then attacking us, so far a successful tactic. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 14 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

A2: Nuclear Terrorism
The chance of a terrorist using a nuclear weapon to lead to global war is extremely unlikely Cnn 8 (12-5,WMD terrorism is overthrown, Peter Bergen, security analyst for CNN, and analyst for New York Universities, security center, http://www.newamerica.net/node/8679., , date accessed:12-13-10)
The congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism issued a report this week that concluded: “It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” The findings of this report received considerable ink in The New York Ti mes and The Washington Post and plenty of airtime on networks around the world, including on CNN. And the day the report was released Vice President-

. Terrorists have already used weapons of mass destruction in the past decade in attacks around the world, and they have proven to be something of a dud. In the fall of 2001, the anthrax attacks in the United States that targeted politicians and jour nalists caused considerable panic but did not lead to many deaths. Five
elect Joseph Biden was briefed on its contents. So is the sky falling? Not really people were killed. The alleged author of that attack, Bruce E. Ivins, was one of the leading biological weapons researchers in the United States. Even this brilliant scientist could only “weaponize” anthrax to the point that it killed a handful of people. Imagine then how difficult it would be for the average terrorist, or even the above-average terrorist, to replicate such efforts. Similarly, the bizarre Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which recruited leading scientists and had hundreds of millions of dollars in the bank, embarked on a large-scale WMD program in the early 1990s in which cult members experimented with anthrax and invested in land in Australia to mine uranium. In the end, Aum found biological and nuclear attacks too complex to organize and settled instead on a chemical weapons operation, setting off sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995 that killed 12 commuters. It is hard to imagine a place better suited to killing a lot of people than the jam-packed Tokyo subway, yet the death toll turned out to be small in Aum’s chemical weapons assault. More recently, in 2006 and 2007 al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate laced several of its bombs with chlorine. Those attacks sickened hundreds of Iraqis, but victims who

There of WMDs because the ominous ter m ‘’Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ is something of a misnomer. In the popular imagination, chemical, biological and nuclear devices are all weapons of mass destruction. In fact, there is only one weapon of mass destruction that can kill tens or hundreds of thousands and that is a nuclear device. So the real question is: Can terrorists deploy nuclear weapons any time in the next five years or even further in the future? To do so, terrorists would have one of four options: to buy, steal, develop or be given a nuclear weapon. But none of those scenarios are remotely realistic outside the world of Hollywood. To understand how complex it is to develop a nuclear weapon, it is worth recalling that Saddam Hussein put tens of millions of dollars into his nuclear program with no success. Iran, which has had a
died in the assaults did so more from the blast of the bombs than because of inhaling chlorine. Al Qaeda stopped using chlorine in its bombs in Iraq more than a year ago. is

a semantic problem

in any discussion

nuclear program for almost two decades, is still years away from developing a nuclear bomb. Terrorist groups simply don’ t have the massive resources of states, and so the notion that they could develop their own, even crude, nuclear weapons is fanciful. Well, what about terrorists being given nukes? Preventing this was one of the underlying rationales of the push to topple Hussein in 2003. This does not pass the laugh test. Brian Michael Jenkins, one of the leading U.S. terrorism experts in a book published this year, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?,” points out that there are two reasons this is quite unlikely. First, gover nments are not about to hand over their crown jewels to organizations that are “not entirely under state contr ol and whose reliability is not certain.” Second, “giving them a nuclear weapon al most certainly exposes the state sponsor to retaliation.” For the same reason that states won’t give nukes to terrorists, they also won’t sell them either, which leaves the option of stealing a nuclear weapon. But that is similarly unlikely because nuclear-armed governments, including Pakistan, are pretty careful about the security measures they place around their most valued weapons. None of this of course is to suggest that al Qaeda is not interested in deploying nuclear devices. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly bloviated about the necessity of nuking the West and have even implied that they have the capability to do so. This is nonsense. Yes, in the mid-1990s when Al Qaeda was based in Sudan, members of the group tried to buy highly enriched uranium suitable for a nuke, but the deal did not go through. And it is certainly the case that a year or so before 9/11, bin Laden was meeting with veterans of Pakistan’s nuclear program to discuss how al Qaeda might get into the nuclear weapons business. But all of this was aspirational, not operational. There is not a shred of evidence that any of this got beyond the talking stage.

In 2002, former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright undertook a careful study of al Qaeda’s nuclear research program and concluded it was virtually impossible for al Qaeda to have acquired any type of nuclear weapon. However, there is plenty of evidence that the group has experimented with crude chemical and
biological weapons, and also attempted to acquire radioactive materials suitable for a “dirty” bomb, a device that marries conventional explosives to radioactive materials. But

even if al Qaeda successfully deployed a crude chemical, biological or radiological weapon these would not be weapons of mass destruction that killed thousands. Instead, these would be weapons of mass disruption, whose principal effect would be panic – not mass casualties. So if not WMDs, what will terrorists use in their attacks over the next five years? Small-bore chemical, biological and radiological attacks are all quite probable, but those attacks would kill scores, not thousands. What we are
likely to see again and again are the tried and tested tactics that terrorists have used for decades: The first vehicle bomb blew up on Wall Street in 1920 detonated by an ItalianAmerican anarchist. Since then, the car/truck bomb has been reliably deployed by terrorists thousands of times.Assassinations, such as the one that killed Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, sparking one of the bloodiest wars in histor y.Hijackings, such as those that inaugurated the worst terrorist attack in history on 9/11.Guys armed with AK-47s intent on murder and mayhem as we saw in Mumbai, India, brought one of the world’s largest countries to a standstill and generated continuous news coverage around the globe for 60 hours.Why go the deeply uncer tain, and enormously complex and expensive WMD route when other methods have proved so successful in getting attention for terrorists in the past? The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism makes all sorts of sensible recommendations. Among them is creating a WMD adviser in the White House who would coordinate all the issues of WMD proliferation and terrorism, something the Obama administration would do well to implement. Right now, responsibility for this important job is diffused over numerous agencies, from the Department of Energy to the Pentagon. But the report’s overall conclusion that WMD

What this card states is that it would be impossible for a terrorist to get their hands on a nuclear device. If a terrorist can’t get their hands on such a device, then there is no way that they can start a nuclear war. Its impossible. Ignore this aff advantage. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 15 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**A2: Democracy Advantage**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 16 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

A2: Proliferation
The affirmative claims that the proliferation of middle east countries has to do with the fact that there is no stable democracy. This is merely a coinsidence. Look at Isreal. It is a stable democracy.
The American Prospect 09 (12-4, Political Magizine, and Utne Reader Award reciever, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=is_israel_a_democracy, date accessed: 2-3-11) This a just a selection from the last few weeks' news reports on the ethnic gap in Israel -- not that inequality is big news. The most clichéd phrase in Israeli political discourse is that the country is a "Jewish and democratic state." The phrase is overused precisely because of the tension between the two adjectives, because of the majority's insecurity over whether both can be achieved at the same time. (The minority generally presumes it can't.) The standard line of the country's boosters is that it's the only democracy in the Middle East. The most concise criticism is that it is an "ethnocracy," as Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel argues in his 2006 book of that name. An ethnocracy, he explains, is a regime promoting "the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory … while maintaining a democratic façade." Looking at this debate in light of two new books by Israeli scholars and of a faded and remarkable document that I've just read in the Israel State Archives, it seems both sides could be right.

What this card is saying is that, true, Isreali is a Jewish state, but it is also a democracy. With this evidence, we can conclude that Isreali is a democracy in the Middle East, so the aff cannot claim to have a link. There is a stable democracy in the middle East and yet Iran is trying to proliferate. So an unstable democracy isn’t the cause here. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 17 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**A2: Solvency**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 18 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Squo Solves
Withdrawal from Iraq means troops will inevitably withdraw from Kuwait. The World Tribune, 4-22-10
(“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp) WASHINGTON — The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in Kuwait. Officials said the Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They said the U.S. military would thin its huge logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq concludes in September 2010. "We could have a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is no longer a need to support a combat presence in Iraq," an official said. On March 31, the Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support Associates, based in Fort Worth, Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of U.S. troops and equipment from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to the U.S. military. "This procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for supplies and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and tenant units moving into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait," the Pentagon said on April 6. Officials said the U.S. military has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal from Iraq. They said this has marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikdom in an effort to enhance security and other functions. "Base operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides operational support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security commitments and theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Kuwait," the Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been copying elements of its command and control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan. They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14 million contract to FedTech Services to develop an information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater Network Management Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat Support would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was solicited and received. The Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would support the transition of the military's command, control, communications and computer capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S. embassy, and other enduring forward operating bases. "The majority of the services involve project management, program planning and analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems and network engineering and integration, and communications infrastructure installation to include inside and outside plant architecture," DRS said on April 7

What this is saying is that the status quo will easily solve the aff’s case, so there is no point in doing the plan. The status quo will do it. Vote neg because we defend the status quo, and it will solve the plan. The aff must provide incentive to run there plan.
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 19 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Missile Adv. Solvency
The aff claims they can solve their missile advantage by removing troops, which removes patriot missile, and thus eliminates tensions. However they neglect Turkey, a much higher threat to Iran. The Turkish TNWs are causing tension as well. TNW’s cause Iran Prolif Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa, Fellow at the Harvard University’s BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#bio) PR Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of

Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on
Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Last year, Turkey held joint ministerial cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey had treated both countries as foes rather than friends. These meetings have produced a significant number of protocols, memoranda of understanding, and other documents on a wide array of issue areas including the thorniest subjects, such as ways and means of dealing with terrorism effectively and using the region’s scarce water resources more equitably. Moreover, these high-level meetings resulted in the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria and vice versa. That action has paved the way to an opening of the borders between the two countries; the borders had stayed closed for decades due to the presence of large numbers of heavy land mines on both sides. The mines will soon be cleaned up with a view to opening huge land areas to agriculture. In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a

willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them . Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed
as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies. Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclearweapon state.” There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

This card shows that the TNWs in Turkey cause the proliferation of Iran, so the aff cannot claim to solve for Iranian prolif, if there are TNWs in Turkey Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 20 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Terrorist Adv. Solvency
The aff cannot solve for terrorism leading to global/nuclear war, because there are terrorists throughout the Middle East Pakistan Daily News 10 (Where are Hideouts of Terrorists?, Sajjad Shaukat, Editor for the Pakistani
Daily News, and Gonvernment author, http://www.daily.pk/where-are-hideouts-of-terrorists-22120/, date accessed: 2-3-11) In the recent past, Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta has also called on Pakistan to “take serious measures against the militants groups” who launch attacks on Afghan targets from secure havens inside Pakistan. However, these are not new allegations against Pakistan because from time to time, both Afghan and US high officials have been accusing Islamabad of crossborder terrorism and hideouts of terrorists. In this connection, recently, US Vice President Joe Biden has pointed out during an interview with the ABC television, “everyone knew in these summer months, when they (Taliban) can infiltrate from Pakistan under the cover of foliage and the rest and it is open that there would be more deaths.” On July 18, during her latest visit to Pakistan US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Pakistan to ‘do more’ to counter terrorism. She elaborated, “There are still additional steps that we are asking and expecting Pakistan to take.” In a threatening style, Ms. Clinton also stated, “there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that if an attack against the United States be traced to be Pakistani, it would have a very devastating impact on our relationship.”

What this card shows, is that there are terrorists in Pakistan that are high threat, and thus the aff cannot solve for their advantage, because they cannot stop other terrorists like these from causing global war. Answer in C-X: Q: How are these terrorist threatening us? A: They aren’t so much threating us directy, but are threating the alliance between the US and Pakistan which would cause destabilization of the Middle East and result in global war. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 21 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**Topicality**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 22 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Reduce is not eliminate
A. Interpretation—Reduce means to make something smaller in size—it is distinct from eliminate Words and Phrases 2(Volume 36B, p. 80)
The word “reduce” is its ordinary signification does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state. Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363

B. Violation—The aff eliminates presence rather than reducing it. C. Standards: 1. Grammatical Predictability—it is impossible to predict an elimination of troops, destroying the negatives ability to generate ground. 2. Education— It is not real world to remove all presence from nations, eliminating military presence ignores the in-depth real-world debate about the strategy behind military withdrawals. D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it forces debate about what the topic should look like, while reasonability is arbitrary. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 23 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Useless troops are not Military Presence
Before runnning this T shell, make sure to ask what the function of Kuwait troops are. If the answer that they do nothing, the use this shell. Other wise DO NOT! A. Interpretation: Military personnel require active duty designation Office of the Secretary of Defense 88 (http://law.justia.com/us/cfr/title32/321.1.1.4.46.html.)
Military Personnel. Includes all U.S. military personnel on active duty, U.S. National Guard or Reserve personnel on active duty, and Military Service Academy cadets and midshipmen.

B. Violation: The plan removes troops without active duty station, which violates the topic, under the removal of military presence C. Standards 1. Fairness – The removal of useless troops moots neg ground, because we cannot have links that apply to disads. 2. Education – There is no way to predict such an aff plan such as this that removes useless troops which causes abuse. This leads the neg into a breath over depth situation, in which we cannot debate about the disads to the plan, and ruins our ability to learn about the complex interaction invovled in a military withdrawal D. Voter for fairness and education: -evaluate under competing interpritationsallows the debate to be about what the topic should be, while allowing for neg ground, and no aff abuse. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 24 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

In Means Throughout
Ask during C-X, where they are removing troops from. If they answer with a single base, then use this shell. If not , DO NOT! A. Interpretation—In means throughout. Words and Phrases 1904(Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases, Volume 4, pg. 3465)
In the act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to her and determine all complaints, etc., the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14 Pac. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

B. Violation—They only reduce presence in certain areas. C. Standards: 1. Predictable Limits—There are thousands of areas the U.S. has troops—it is impossible to predict what areas the aff would remove from, and all the permutations of these areas exponentially increase the topic. 2. Ground—Removing troops in certain areas allows the aff to spike out of perception links and DA’s by having more specific evidence about the area than the neg. D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it forces debate about what the topic should look like, while reasonability is arbitrary. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 25 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

ASPEC
Only use this if the aff does not provide a specific branch. Make sure you know what you’ re talking about. If the branch is provided DO NOT USE! A. Interpretation— The USFG is the 3 branches The Government of New Zealand 9 (http://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/subjects/law/pdfs/
RetrievingLegalMaterialsOrganisedbyRegion.pdf)

The United States federal government consists of the legislative branch (the House of Representatives and the Senate), the judicial branch (a hierarchy of courts), and the executive branch (the elected President).

B. Violation—The affirmative doesn’t specify which agent enacts the plan. C. Standards: 1. Predictable Ground—Not specifying allows the aff to spike out of agent DA’s or eliminate competitiveness on counterplans by choosing an agent in the 2ac. 2. Education—We lose education that is based off the real-world implementation of the aff. D. Voter for fairness and education. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 26 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**1 Card DA’s (General)**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 27 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Job Placement DA
Most of the United States Army Recruits around the world are high school dropouts, this means that bringing them back will force them to compete in a harsh economic environment with absolutely no job experience Schmitt, 09, Journalist for NY Times, Army Recruiting More High School Dropouts to Meet Goals http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/11/politics/11recruit.html
WASHINGTON, June 10 - The Army is having to turn to more high school dropouts and lower-achieving applicants to fill its ranks, accepting hundreds of recruits in recent months who would have been rejected a year ago, according to Army statistics. Eight months into the recruiting year, the percentage of new recruits in the Army without a high school diploma has risen to 40 percent, the upper limit of what the Army is willing to accept, from 8 percent last year. The percentage of recruits with scores in the lowest acceptable range on the standardized test used to screen potential soldiers has also risen to 2 percent, also reaching the Army's limit, from slightly more than a half-percent last year, reaching the highest level since 2001.

In the last major troop withdrawals in WWII and Vietnam, soldiers coming home were treated to free higher education in order for their placement back into society
Adolph Reed 01 Jr. “A GI Bill For Everybody” professor of political science on the Graduate Faculty of Social and Political Science at the New School for Social Research, a member of the Interim National Council of the Labor Party. Disent Magazine Fall 2001 JL Universal access to higher education is not entirely unprecedented in recent American history. The most dramatic approximation to it was the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, popularly known as the GI Bill, under which a generation of Second World War veterans received what was usually full tuition support and stipends (up to nearly $12,000 per year in 1994 dollars) to attend post-secondary educational institutions. By 1952, the federal government had spent $7 billion (nearly $39 billion in 1994 dollars) on sending veterans to college. This amounted to 1.3 percent of total federal expenditures ($521.8 billion) during that period. A 1988 report by a congressional subcommittee on education and health estimated that 40 percent of those who attended college under the GI Bill would not otherwise have done so. The report also found that each dollar spent educating that 40 percent produced a $6.90 return (more than $267 billion in 1994 dollars) in national output due to extra education and increased federal tax revenues from the extra income the beneficiaries earned.

So, without a mandate for higher education predicated in the GI Bill which was repealed in the late 20th century, bringing back troops from foreign countries will place them in an environment where they are unable to compete with fresh college graduates. Unemployment, which hovers at 9.8% will skyrocket if more troops return home and are unable to seek jobs. Therefore their plan which does not mandate any education reform bills or rehabilitation bills will lead to complete chaos economically. It is too early to bring back troops just of the top of your head. You need to establish a firm and stable environment for their return before you agree to pull them out. Since the Affirmative team thinks of no such solution, and simply absentmindedly decides to pull them out, voting for them is a mistake because of unforeseen consequences coming to haunt us after a seemingly easy solution to the problem. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 28 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

PTSD DA
Army Spc. Shawn Saunders was proud of his first two tours in Iraq. In his third year, he snapped. His parents say his breaking point was watching his best friend die while guarding a checkpoint. Texas medic Taylor Burke took Saunders’ turn, and the car blew up. "When he passed, it was like a part of me that's left me, and I haven't been the same since," Saunders said. Thousands of veterans just like this will suffer from PTSD when the return from their turn of duty. Without solid programs to mentally rehabilitate all the troops from neurological disorders, veterans find themselves in situations where violence and suicide seem to be the only option. William M. Welch, USA Today, 2-28-2005, (“Trauma of Iraq war haunting thousands returning home”, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-02-28-cover-iraq-injuries_x.htm) As the United States nears the two-year mark in its military presence in Iraq still fighting a violent insurgency, it is also coming to grips with one of the products of war at home: a new generation of veterans, some of them scarred in ways seen and unseen. While military hospitals mend the physical wounds, the VA is attempting to focus its massive health and benefits bureaucracy on the long-term needs of combat veterans after they leave military service. Some suffer from wounds of flesh and bone, others of emotions and psyche. These injured and disabled men and women represent the most grievously wounded group of returning combat veterans since the Vietnam War, which officially ended in 1975. Of more than 5 million veterans treated at VA facilities last year, from counseling centers like this one to big hospitals, 48,733 were from the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the most common wounds aren't seen until soldiers return home. Post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, is an often-debilitating mental condition that can produce a range of unwanted emotional responses to the trauma of combat. It can emerge weeks, months or years later. If left untreated, it can severely affect the lives not only of veterans, but their families as well. Of the 244,054 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan already discharged from service, 12,422 have been in VA counseling centers for readjustment problems and symptoms associated with PTSD. Comparisons to past wars are difficult because emotional problems were often ignored or written off as "combat fatigue" or "shell shock." PTSD wasn't even an official diagnosis, accepted by the medical profession, until after Vietnam.

Military neglects and denies PTSD troops treatment Kimberly Dozier, Chief Reporting Correspondent for Iraq, 12-20-2007, (“Is The Military Neglecting
PTSD Troops? Veterans' Advocates Say Ignoring Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Is A Military-Wide Problem”, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/20/eveningnews/main3637097.shtml) During home leave from Iraq, Shawn talked of suicide. At Fort Hood, his home base, he asked for help. Instead of treatment, he says he got bureaucracy. "I was basically just trying to find out what was wrong with me, because I was thinking about hurting myself, thinking about hurting other people," he said. His dad took action, flying him to a New York veteran’s hospital. Doctors there diagnosed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Army disagreed. Military police arrested him at the hospital, jailed him and kicked him out. Veterans advocates say it’s a military-wide problem, where symptoms of PTSD - from substanceabuse to rage to suicidal depression - are misdiagnosed or blamed on the troops themselves. . Discharging for a personality disorder takes days, and costs the military nothing. A PTSD discharge can take up to nine months, and treatment can last a lifetime - in severe cases, costing up to $2 million each. If the affirmative team brings home troops in significant number from the battlefields of *insert country here* without setting together a solution to solve the PTSD problem, they risk not only hurting the lives of the troops themselves, but also the citizens here in America. That is a risk we cannot take. Although the affirmative teams actions are well intentioned, the truth of the matter is, they cause more harm than good. We cannot afford to pass the affirmative teams plan unless we are ready to rehabilitate all the incoming troops that return home. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 29 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**DA’s (General and Specific)**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 30 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Econ DA (1/3)
A. Kuwait’s economy is on the brink now – a rescue package has stabilized the economy but if any worsening means catastrophe. Reuters 6/21 (Reuters, international news organization, [http://arabia.msn.com/Business/Market/AF/2010/June/1730513.aspx?ref=rss] AD: 6/24/10)JM
Kuwait's numerous trading and holding companies known as investment houses were hard hit by the meltdown, which prompted a government economic rescue package worth 1.5 billion dinars ($5.15 billion) last year. Critics note the houses require no banking licenses despite offering investment banking services, some real estate firms are licensed to operate as investment companies, and others lend without having to fulfil reserve requirements like banks. "This measure is just an attempt to accelerate the process of cleaning up the market," said independent
economist Jassem al-Saadoun. "(The central bank) believes that if things are left without controls, companies will remain hanging between life and death for a long time and that is harmful to shareholders and to confidence in the market." Saadoun estimated some 40

percent of Kuwait's investment firms were too weak to survive, and 40 percent were in good condition. The rest, like Global Investment House and Investment Dar, were "too big" to be allowed to fall. Their keeling over would be "catastrophic" for banks, asset prices, individuals who invest in their funds and even the judicial system that could be swamped in the aftermath, he said. Global has
reached a deal with creditors to reschedule $1.7 billion in debt, and Investment Dar, which is struggling to restructure about $3.48 billion of debt, has applied for support under the rescue package.

B. US security assurances are critical for oil investment
Habibi and Woertz 9 (Nader and Eckart, Nader – Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East and Eckart – Director of
Economic Studies @ the Gulf Research Center, Middle East Brief Vol. 39, Feb, www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB34.pdf)

JPG

The second component of U.S. oil policy in the region is close alliances with the oil monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. These six oil-exporting countries, which make up the GCC, rely on the U.S., and to a lesser extent on the UK and France, for their external defence and domestic security assistance. The third component of U.S. oil policy is to maximize the participation of U.S. oil companies in the production, refining, and transportation of oil and gas products in the region. Western oil companies such as Halliburton, ExxonMobil, Texaco, and British Petroleum (BP)—with a large American ownership—are actively involved in exploration, production, and refining activities in GCC countries. In the past two decades, American oil firms have continued their involvement in the production and distribution of oil and gas in several MENA countries. This cooperation has mostly taken the form of service contracts for specific activities—whereas
lucrative production-sharing agreements that allow international oil companies to show the oil reserves of a particular project on their balance sheets have been off-limits. Some American oil firms have also participated in publicprivate joint ventures in partnership with national oil companies. The Bush administration actively promoted the participation of American oil firms in these public-private partnerships and encouraged GCC governments to accept foreign investment in their energy sectors.4

C. Kuwaiti oil is key to the regional economy. Al-Fil 4/7 (Gérard, financial journalist in Dubai, [http://www.marcopolis.net/kuwait-economic-vision.htm?Itemid=112] AD:
6/23/10)JM

The country wants to play a pivotal role in the gulf region. With production of 3,15 million barrels per day (bpd), Kuwait, whose surface of 20,000 square kilometers is half the size of Switzerland, produces more crude oil per day than Algeria and Indonesia combined. Within the Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of
The objective: Kuwait aims to be a prosperous state that is less dependent on oil but based on a well diversified multi-industry.
12 members states, Kuwait stands at number four in production ranking, together with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Nigeria. In addition to its role as a major oil supplier, . From A like Agility to Z like Zain, Kuwait corporations are increasingly quoted in the Middle Eastern business news sections. Agility is a leading logistics firm in the region and is listed at both the Kuwait Stock

Kuwait is also the home of global players in the non-oil sector

The Kuwait-based telcom giant Zain (formerly MTC Kuwait), was founded in 1983 as the region’s first mobile operator. It has since emerged as one of the leading players in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena). Zain operates today in 22 countries and has a client base 56.3m people. Kuwait’s Minister of Commerce and Industry , Amad AHaroun , stresses that “Kuwait has a strategic geographic location, which is unique in the
Exchange KSE and the Dubai Financial Mar ket DFM.

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 31 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

region. Situated between three major economies, it has much potential to become a trade center and a trade route, bringing back the glories of the historic Silk Way.” Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic union founded in 1981, which is composed of Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, Bahrain , Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Among GCC members, Kuwait has always been on the forefront of investing abroad. No other people travel more. No one is investing more aggressively abroad than Kuwaiti businessmen.

Econ DA (2/3)
D. Middle East economic instability spurs political instability and terrorism. Raddatz 9 (Martha, reporter for ABC News, Feb 13, 2009
[http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/International/story?id=6895135&page=1] AD: 6/24/10)JM "Yes, we have to look at this as part of our threat matrix," the secretary of state said. "I know some people have criticized him and said, 'what does the economy have to do with terrorism.' That's a very short-sided view. I think what director Blair was saying is that we get fixated sometimes on the headlines of dangers, and that is not in any way to underestimate the continuing threat from terrorism, the instability in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan and elsewhere." "But this economic crisis, left unresolved, will create massive unemployment," she said. "It will upend governments, it will unfortunately breed instability, and I appreciated his putting that into the context of the threat matrix." In linking the economic downturn to instability, Clinton singled out Pakistan, where Taliban-linked militants have taken control of the frontier region along the border with Afghanistan, and of the once-tourist haven Swat. "... Look at Pakistan, a country that we know has to be stabilized for the benefit of not only South Asia, but beyond," Clinton said. "It is where the terrorists and their allies have found haven. But the economy in Pakistan is under even greater pressure now because of the global economic crisis. If Pakistan becomes even more unstable, that increases the danger we will face by the extremists to the Pakistan government." Asked about reports of shariah law being imposed in the Swat valley as part of a peace deal between the government and militants, and Pakistani officials saying that the government will not undertake any more offensive attacks on militants, Clinton said there have been some "contradictory reports" and that she wants to "get the whole picture" before commenting.

2. Terrorism causes extinction Alexander 3 [Alexander, Professor and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, August 28, Lexis ]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 32 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Econ DA (3/3)
<card continued

impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 33 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Arifjan DA (1/3)
(The aff may have good intentions, but they have failed to consider the effect of regional stability on Kuwait.) On the issue of stability, we agree with the Aff that Kuwait is stable at the moment. AFP 10 (June 4, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iliKXlauRMdj1Uijz1Zv-WkJ7RUQ) WASHINGTON — High-profile attacks and casualty figures in Iraq fell in 2010 to their lowest level since the US invasion, while the number of Al-Qaeda leaders captured or killed soared, the US commander in Iraq said Friday. "All of those statistics for the first five months of 2010 are the lowest we've had on record," General Ray Odierno told reporters in Washington. "Although there has been some violence -- there have been some bad days in Iraq -- every statistic continues to go in the right direction." He said US and Iraqi security forces in the past three months have detained or killed 34 of the top 42 AlQaeda in Iraq leaders, following a "significant" infiltration of AQI's apparent headquarters in the city of Mosul. "We've been whittling away at this for a very long time," Odierno said, adding that "we were able to get inside this network." The terror group, he said, "will attempt to regenerate themselves (but) they are finding it more difficult" in the face of persistent joint US-Iraqi security operations and what he described as a rejection of Al-Qaeda by "99.9 percent" of the Iraqi population. The

steadily improving security, the intelligence boon and the new statistics -- announced by Odierno two days after his White House meeting with US President Barack Obama -- bode well for Iraq as the US prepares a drawdown from 88,000 troops on the ground today to 50,000 by the end of August. But Odierno stressed: "There are still

some very dangerous people out there, and there are some mid- and low-level leaders -- we don't want them to develop into senior leadership." Iraqi security forces in late May announced the arrest of Al-Qaeda's Baghdad military chief Abbas Najem Abdullah al-Jawari, who went by the alias Abu Abdullah, as well as Mohammed Nuri Matar Yassin al-Abadi, who was in charge of AlQaeda's assassination units in the capital. In April, AQI's political leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the group's self-styled "minister of war" Abu Ayub al-Masri were killed in a joint US-Iraqi operation. Odierno

attributed the successes to dramatic improvements in capability by the Iraqi security forces, which he said are now leading security efforts "across the country," including on most counterterrorism operations. However, we ask the judge to vote negative because the affirmative’s plan triggers this link. Unfortunately, although Kuwait’s stability is improving it is by no means safe. The Middle East is currently on the brink of multiple wars, and all that’s needed to push it over the edge into a full-out conflagration is a trigger—just like the Affirmative’s plan. London 6/28 (Herbert, president of Hudson Institute, June 28, 2010, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-themiddle-east)

Comment [LD1]: Isn’t this a Uniqueness overwhelms link? >.>

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian
territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a

wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Comment [LD2]: >.>

- 34 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt

and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.

Arifjan DA (2/3)
US forces in Kuwait are critical to regional stability and preventing terrorism Leverett 7 (Flynt, The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_way_out_of_iraq, AD: 6/28/10) The forces in Kuwait, plus the offshore balancing of the carrier battle groups and the Marine Expeditionary Force, would give us sufficient military power to protect our existential interests in the Gulf, that is, preventing Iraq from becoming a launching pad for international terrorism or a catalyst for regional instability that is so great that it jeopardizes
U.S. economic or security interests.

Removal of Camp Arifjan from Kuwait collapses stability [Camp Arifjan key to troop presence] The previous card explains how integral US military presence is to maintaining stability. Now think of the poor American soldier, fighting for another country in the horrible, dusty desert conditions of the Middle East. America can’t just abandon its troops halfway across the globe, it is a moral obligation to support them! Camp Arifjan does just that, providing essential services to our troops. Global Security Dot Org 5 (26-04-2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-arifjan.htm) Camp Arifjan is a new $200 million state-of-the-art facility built courtesy of the Kuwaiti government. This new army base has literally risen out of the sand. The base will provide permanent support facilities for American troops in Kuwait, replacing temporary facilities that have been used since the Gulf War. The Army
component of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), maintains a forward presence in the region. Government-to-government agreements were negotiated with the Qatar and Kuwait to allow the

Comment [LD3]: We have to argue that troop presence is key first, once we do ‘Think of the poor American soldier fighting for another country in horrible conditions!’

The Army has met major milestones in its security strategy in the Middle East by completing a prepositioning facility in Qatar, and by the rapid pace of construction on a new installation in Kuwait. These facilities support USCENTCOM's efforts to protect US interests in this region in accordance with the National Security Strategy. US forces use these facilities under a variety of
prepositioning of military assets. agreements, which include host nation involvement with providing and managing the facilities. A new prepositioning facility is under construction by the Kuwait government at Arifjan, south of Kuwait City [Arifjan is also known as Araifjan, Arefjan and Urayfijan]. When complete, the facility will replace Camp Doha, a former industrial warehouse complex that has been converted for use as an Army installation. Camp Doha was leased by the Kuwait Ministry of Defense and provided to the Army to

support its three major missions in Kuwait -- to maintain prepositioned equipment, supplies and materials; direct joint exercises with the Kuwait armed forces; and ensure the security of Kuwait. Camp Doha was intended as a temporary facility until the permanent installation was designed and
built at Arifjan. A full brigade set of equipment is stored at Camp Doha, much of it outside. The new facility will have most

Comment [LD4]: Warrant? Need another link

<card continues>

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- 35 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Arifjan DA (3/3)
<card continued> of the equipment sets stored in large warehouses, similar to the ones built in Qatar, to protect them from the harsh desert environment. While troops jokingly call the pair of tall smokestacks near Camp Doha the "Scud goal posts," commanders have had to install makeshift measures around the facility to keep troops protected from terrorist threats. All that will change when the Army shifts its operations to a new facility now being built south of Kuwait City near the village of Arifjan and the headquarters of a Kuwait armored brigade. It will be absolutely state of the art, from force protection to life support. For starters, troops will live in actual barracks instead of the beehives carved out of the warehouses. Instead of hanging Kevlar netting across windows to protect against blasts, the new facility will use shatterproof Mylar glass. Armored vehicles will get special maintenance bays for the contracted mechanics who keep the equipment at one of the highest availability rates in the Army.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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- 36 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Isreali Relations(1/3)
U.S.-Israeli Relations are essential to maintaining Middle East peace. Uniqueness: Relations currently keep a strike on Iran in check, but it’s still an option Haaretz Service 7/8 (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama-israelwon-t-attack-iran-without-coordinating-with-u-s-1.300793) GAT
U.S. President Barack Obama told Channel 2 News on Wednesday that he believed Israel would not try to surprise the U.S. with a unilateral attack on Iran. In an interview, to be aired Thursday evening, Obama was asked whether he was concerned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would try to attack Iran without clearing the move with the U.S., to which the president replied "I think the relationship between Israel and the U.S. is

sufficiently strong that neither of us try to surprise each other, but we try to coordinate on issues of mutual concern." Obama spoke to Channel 2's Yonit Levy one day after what he described as an
"excellent" meeting with Netanyahu at the White House. The two leaders met alone for about 90 minutes Tuesday evening, during which time they discussed the peace process with the Palestinians, the contested Iranian nuclear program, and the strategic understandings between their two countries on Tehran's efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities.

Currently, strikes are an option but diplomacy seems to be prevailing Schneider 10 (Howard, writer for Washington Post, 1/1/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123101934.html?hpid=moreheadlines) GAT
Israeli officials say they will support President Obama's move to impose sanctions on Iran as a
next step in the standoff over the country's nuclear program, though the narrower measures being considered by the White House may fall short of the "crippling" restrictions advocated here. With the expiration of the United States' year-end deadline for Iran to resolve the issue, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is "focused on working with the international community to upgrade the pressure on Iran in a way that makes the Iranian regime know that its nuclear program is unacceptable, that they are going to pay a price that will make them rethink," said spokesman Mark Regev. Obama "has been successful in galvanizing an international coalition that many people were cynical about. We are on the same page." The endorsement is significant because it comes from a country that is considered the most likely to launch a military strike to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust and his anti-Israel rhetoric have led Netanyahu to draw parallels to the years preceding World War II, and

Israeli officials have said that all options are open in preparing for what some here regard as an "existential" threat. Israelis were initially skeptical of Obama's decision to engage Iran diplomatically, worried it
would lead to the same end as previous diplomatic overtures -- years of talks and ineffective resolutions while Iran continued its nuclear development. The events of the last few months, however, helped curb the doubts. Ongoing prodemocracy demonstrations in Iran have created the sense of a regime vulnerable to pressure, while revelations about the extent and nature of the country's nuclear program have broadened international support for action. Israeli officials and analysts say they understand the limits Obama faces in pushing more stringent measures through the U.N. Security Council, where China holds a veto and remains hesitant to act against the Islamic republic. But they also say Obama now shares their sense of urgency and will soon propose a meaningful set of restrictions on the Iranian leadership -- sticking to a rough deadline he mentioned in a meeting with Netanyahu in May. With European nations and, more importantly, Russia looking poised to go along, "Israel is a spectator, like most other countries in the international community," said Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon. "We trust that Obama and the U.S. will lead." Along with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Iran has been at the core of U.S.-Israeli discussions since Obama and Netanyahu took office in early 2009. They began with an overlapping set of priorities -- Obama viewing establishment of a Palestinian state as key to curbing Iran's influence over Islamist radicals in the region, and Netanyahu viewing Iranian influence as a security threat that needed to be addressed for the conflict with the Palestinians to be resolved. Beyond the risk of an Iranian nuclear strike on Israel -- considered unlikely because of Israel's nuclear deterrent capacity and the possible U.S. response -- Netanyahu has argued that a nuclear Iran would destabilize moderate Arab states in the region and embolden Iran-supported groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that sit on Israel's borders. Obama and Netanyahu seem to have reached an understanding, with some of Netanyahu's overtures to the Palestinians winning U.S. support and Obama's policy toward Iran gaining Israeli trust. Meanwhile, talk of an Israeli strike has been tempered by discussion of the complexity of such an operation and the likelihood that it would do little other than delay Iran's progress. "As long as Obama is engaged in some kind of diplomatic effort, Israel is going to wait and see how it plays out," said Emily Landau, director of

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the arms control program at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. "It is in Israel's interest for it to be dealt with diplomatically. The military option is only getting more and more difficult." Other options are being discussed. At a Jerusalem news conference this week, Canadian lawmaker and former justice minister Irwin Cotler announced an effort to try Iran on grounds that its actions and the statements of its leaders put it in violation of international treaties on genocide prevention.

Isreali Relations(2/3)
Link: If the USFG should completely withdraw all of its troops from Kuwait, Israel would feel even more insecure, because it is comforted by US troop presence. Israeli fear of rejectionist states is appeased through US troop presence in the Middle East Martin 3 (L.G., Middle East Specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute, Summer 2003.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB104.pdf) GAT Israel’s perceptions of its own national security threats are weighted heavily towards a strategic and military calculus. Israel’s experience with the Arab world since its war of independence in 1947-48 has been unremitting hostility punctuated by wars and terrorist attacks. This hostility has
been interrupted by quiet on its western flank since the 1979 Camp David Accords, by the cold peace with Egypt, and since the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, quiet on its eastern flank. Quiet without a peace treaty also has existed on Israel’s northern border with Syria―but not its northern border with Lebanon. However, espousals of intentions to eliminate the “Zionist state”by the so-called “rejectionist”states, primarily Iran and Syria (and previously Iraq), and their development of WMD, which may have a range of delivery systems from terrorists to missiles, have

stimulated Israel’s existential need to continue developing WMD to enhance its deterrent capability, as well as the Arrow anti-missile system that it has jointly developed with the United States. 12 Concern over the growing military capabilities of the rejectionist states also stimulates Israel’s desire for technologically advanced conventional weaponry to offset the conventional superiority of the combined forces of its regional Arab and Iranian enemies. However, less visible and more complex nonmilitary threats to Israel’s national security go underemphasized in this strategic and military calculus.
13 Paying for a strong defense puts a substantial strain on the Israeli economy. The economy is challenged to overcome the lack of natural resources such as water, and must expend valuable financial resources for the generation of desalinated water or to purchase water from Turkey. 14 Moreover, Israel lacks its own secure sources of energy, gas and oil supplies that are critical for its developing economy. 15 For all these reasons, Israel looks to its close U.S. alliance for strategic

and military assistance, as well as for economic assistance that is indispensable for its national security. 16

The US’s presence in the Middle East protects Israel Albright 8 (Scott, Apr 17, 2008, http://israel.suite101.com/article.cfm/obama_promises_to_defend_israel)KFC
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama defended the United States' policy to support Israel during a debate with democratic opponent Hillary Clinton in Philadelphia. The debate was held the same day Reuters cameraman Fadel Shana was killed in Gaza, Wednesday, April 16. Reports indicate that Shana was killed by a blast of darts, or flechettes, released from a projectile which exploded after an Israeli tank was seen firing toward the journalist. Neither Obama or Clinton mentioned the journalist's death during the debate, but both said they would support Israel if elected president. "An attack on Israel is an attack on our strongest ally in the region," Obama said during the April 16 democratic debate aired on ABC. The statement came after ABC's George Stephanopoulos asked the two democrats if it should be U.S. policy to treat an attack on Israel as if it were an attack on the U.S. Obama did not
give specifics as to how he would respond to an attack on Israel, but he did say that the U.S. would "take appropriate action." Obama stated that it was unacceptable to allow Iran to continue its nuclear weapons program and military support for Hezbollah and Hamas during the debate. Shana was killed after reported fighting between Hamas and Israeli soldiers had occured earlier in the day. Reuters news reported that Israeli troops killed 17 Palestenians, after three Israeli soldiers were killed in clashes in the Hamas controlled enclave. The news agency reported that fighting had ceased when Shana was killed. Some online bloggers believe the person who fired on Shana thought he was a threat because he was holding a television camera that could have looked like a weapon. Other bloggers have said that it was impossible to mistake Shana as anything but a reporter because his vehicle was clearly marked and because Israeli optics are too powerful for the soldiers using them to not be able to clearly identify their target. The Bush administration has labeled Hamas and Hezbollah as Iranian backed terrorist groups. The administration openly disapproved expresident Jimmy Carter's visit to the region where he has met with Hamas leaders in hopes of opening dialogue between rivaling factions. As U.S. president, Obama

said he would take no options off the table to keep Iran from

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obtaining nuclear weapons. He said the carrot and stick approach was a possible route in preventing the Iranian nation from becoming a nuclear power.

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Isreali Relations(3/3)
Israel is dependent on U.S. counter to Iran—key to relations Indyk 10(Martin, April 19, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy@Brookings, “When Your Best Friend Gets Angry”,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0419_israel_iran_indyk.aspx, accessed 7/8/10)jn At the heart of this disagreement lies a dramatic change in the way Washington perceives its own stake in the game. It actually began three years ago when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared in a speech in Jerusalem that U.S. “strategic interests” were at stake in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — a judgment reiterated by Obama last week when he said resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is a “vital national security interest” for the United States. In other words,

this is no longer just about helping a special ally resolve a debilitating problem. With 200,000 American troops committed to two wars in the greater Middle East and the U.S. president leading a major international effort to block Iran’s nuclear program, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become a U.S. strategic imperative. Ironically, as the U.S. position has evolved in this direction, Israeli attitudes have evolved in another. To many Israelis, especially those in Netanyahu’s rightwing coalition, peace with a divided Palestinian polity seems neither realistic nor particularly desirable. Given Israel’s dependence on the United States to counter the threat from Iran and to prevent its own international isolation, an Israeli prime minister would surely want to bridge the growing divide. Yet the shift in American perceptions seems to have gone unnoticed in Jerusalem. Hence
Netanyahu’s surprise when what he saw as merely a matter of a poorly timed announcement during Vice President Biden’s visit drew a stinging rebuke from Washington.

From these cards, one could very rationally conclude that by withdrawing, Israel would feel threatened by the looming superpower near it: Iran. It would feel threatened…and as the saying goes, offense is the best defense. Internal Link: When the US completely withdraws, Israel, feeling vulnerable to Iran, will attack it. US forces are key to reassuring Israel and thus preventing Israel from attacking out of desperation. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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- 39 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Israel Politics DA (1/3)
Netanyahu is prepared to follow Obama’s lead in peace talks, but to maintain control he must not make big concessions to the US Stolberg and Landler July 6 (Sheryl, writer for the New York Times, Mark, American journalist and Diplomatic Correspondent of the New York Times, New York Times, July 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/world/middleeast/07prexy.html?src=me) EH
WASHINGTON — President Obama said Tuesday that he expected direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians to begin “well before” a moratorium on settlement construction expired at the end of September, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel pledged to take “concrete steps” in the coming weeks to get the talks moving. The president’s comments, after a 79-minute,
one-on-one session in the Oval Office, were the first in which he articulated a timetable for peace negotiations. They also reflected a palpable shift in the administration’s approach to a relationship that has been rife with tension since soon after Mr. Obama took office. The meeting was laden with theatrics as the men shook hands vigorously in front of the cameras after a series of steps by the Israelis over the past few days to reduce tensions with the United States. But it was also deeply substantive, the leaders’ aides said, with Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu touching on a wide variety of contentious issues, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons program, as well as the peace process. A single

session in the Oval Office is not likely to have resolved a year and a half of deep policy differences, and the two leaders could hit more bumps in the months ahead, especially if Mr. Obama grows impatient with a lack of progress in the peace process. But on Tuesday, they sought to accentuate the positive. After publicly pressing Mr. Netanyahu for months to curb the building of Jewish settlements — an American policy that fanned resentment in Israel — Mr. Obama pointedly did not push Mr. Netanyahu to extend the existing moratorium. Instead, he said that moving from American-brokered “proximity talks” to direct talks would give Mr. Netanyahu the incentive and domestic political leeway to act on his own. “My hope is, that once direct talks have begun, well before the moratorium has expired, that that will create a climate in which everybody feels a greater investment in success,” Mr. Obama said, adding, “There ends up being more room created by more trust.” The Palestinian Authority reacted cautiously to the meeting, saying that it, too, wanted direct talks, but that the onus was on Mr. Netanyahu to halt the building of settlements and to agree on negotiations that would resume where the last direct talks, in 2008, left off. “It is about words not deeds,” said
Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, by phone late Tuesday. “We need to see deeds.” Tuesday’s much-publicized meeting in the Oval Office was in stark contrast to the frosty reception Mr. Netanyahu received during his last trip to the White House in March, when Mr. Obama left the prime minister waiting in the Roosevelt Room while he went upstairs to have dinner with his wife and daughters. The mood was so sour then that Mr. Obama barred news cameras. On Tuesday, photographers clicked away in the Oval Office as Mr. Obama praised the prime minister as someone “willing to take risks for peace” and blamed the press for reports of discord. Mr. Netanyahu loosely quoted Mark Twain, saying, “The reports about the demise of the special relationship aren’t just premature; they’re just flat wrong.” In another gesture to the Israelis, Mr. Obama emphasized that there had been no shift in American policy on Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons program, despite the United States’ signature on a recent United Nations document that singled out Israel for its refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, binding 189 countries. Israeli officials were alarmed by the American decision to allow Israel to be named, which came at the prodding of Arab states. Some in Israel viewed it as a sign of the unreliability of the United States, Israel’s most important ally. Mr. Obama also tried to soothe Israeli jitters about calls for a regional conference on a nuclear-free Middle East. Any such meeting, he said, would only be a discussion of regional security, not an opportunity to press Israel on its nuclear program. “We strongly believe that, given its size, its history, the region that it’s in and the threats that are leveled against us — against it, that Israel has unique security requirements,” Mr. Obama said, briefly correcting himself in midsentence. “It’s got to be able to respond to threats or any combination of threats in the region.” The source of the friction during Mr. Netanyahu’s last visit was Israel’s announcement, during a visit by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., that it was approving plans for Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Now,

settlements are again at issue, but the president’s modulated response seemed intended to return the American-Israeli relationship to one in which difficult issues are thrashed out in private, rather than through public lectures. Some analysts suggested that Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu might have reached a private understanding that Israel would extend the construction moratorium in return for direct talks. “This enables Israel to say it didn’t pay for direct talks, but
there’s an understanding that once the expiration date rolls around, the moratorium will be extended,” said David Makovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Among the other “concrete steps” Israel is expected to take toward the Palestinians, analysts said, is greater cooperation with the Palestinian Authority on security matters and increased economic aid for the West Bank. Mr. Netanyahu has suggested to aides that he has other steps in mind, Israeli officials said, but he has not yet disclosed them. Mr. Obama’s stance reflected domestic political pressures on both men. Mr. Netanyahu, who is

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struggling to keep his fractious right-wing coalition together, has been under pressure at home not to appear to pay an additional price to lure the Palestinians to the negotiating table.

Israel Politics DA (2/3)
The plan is a signal that Netanyahu is conceding Israel’s security on the Eastern Front Sofer 10 (Roni, staff writer, Ynetnews is the largest and most popular news source, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3916745,00.html) EH
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Wednesday met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and expressed his support of a move to direct peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians as soon as possible, in order to advance a peace agreement in the region. The UN chief thanked Netanyahu for easing the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu thanked his host for his leadership and his friendship and said the Israeli public is willing to take risks for peace. However, the prime minister stressed that any future agreement must ensure but any future arrangement needs to guarantee the cessation of rocket fire into Israel. The two also discussed the Israeli raid on the Turkish flotilla to Gaza, and the implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War. Before the meeting, Netanyahu met with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and outlined to him Israel's concerns about the rise of an eastern front after the US troops withdraw from Iraq. Netanyahu expressed concern that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, coupled with the strengthening of Iran might lead to a new "eastern front" against Israel. During his visit, the prime minister is slated appear on a series of interviews with US' leading TV networks.

New concessions will drain all of Netanyahu’s power Ephron 10 (Dan, Staff Writer for Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/04/between-barack-and-a-hard-place.html, 4/4) dc
It must feel like old times for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. At one end of his political tightrope, an American administration is pressing him to make concessions to the Palestinians. At the other end, the super-hawks in his coalition are warning him to stand firm or lose his majority in Parliament. The last time Netanyahu faced such a predicament, in 1998, he agreed to hand over 13 percent of the West Bank to Palestinian control under a deal worked out at Wye River, Md. The result: his right-wing coalition unraveled and Netanyahu lost his grip on power.

Now is the key time to fix the Arab-Israeli conflict – Netanyahu key. Meixler and Ferziger 10 (Louis and Jonathan; staff writer, Bloomberg Business Week, July 8, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-08/obama-says-mideastpeace-is-possible-before-his-first-term-ends.html) CH
Obama met with Netanyahu at the White House on July 6 and said direct Israel-Palestinian talks may get started within less than three months. Obama has been trying to persuade Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to move beyond the indirect talks they have been conducting through U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell and hold face-to-face negotiations. Netanyahu is interested “in being a statesman,” Obama said in the broadcast. “The fact that he is not perceived as a dove in some ways can be helpful.” Abbas and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are “willing to make the concessions and engage in negotiations that can result in peace,” Obama said. The president said there “is a constant contest between moderates and rejectionists” in the Arab world. Seize Opportunity “We probably won’t have a better opportunity than we have right now and that has to be seized,” Obama said. Obama said time may be running out for Palestinian moderates who are willing to make compromises “if they aren’t able to deliver for their people.” Netanyahu, whose Likud party supports Jewish settlement in the West Bank, said yesterday in New York that Israel is prepared

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to make “far-ranging concessions” to achieve a political solution. “I intend to confound the skeptics and critics,” Netanyahu said in a lunchtime speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. “ I’m prepared to do something. I’m prepared to take risks.” Obama, who described his two hours with Netanyahu as “excellent” and detailed, described the Israeli leader as “somebody who understands that we’ve got a fairly narrow window of opportunity.”

Israel Politics DA (3/3)
Middle east peace is key to solve Iran prolif David Williamson, 1/3/2009 (staff writer, http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/walesnews/2009/01/03/opportunity-for-obama-to-provide-leadership-91466-22595734/)
The constant sense of insecurity and danger only helps hard-liners and makes discussion of compromise seem like talk of surrender. If the present levels of violence and human suffering are permitted to routinely flare up it will be impossible to pursue other long-term goals towards peace in this vital region. Hezbollah’s forces in Lebanon retain the ability to rain rockets on Israel and any confrontation in Gaza has the potential to unleash such an attack from the north. Obama has put forward the bold foreign policy goal of negotiating with Iran with the aim of persuading the Islamic republic to abandon any nuclear programme and to stop sponsoring terrorist groups. This breakthrough will not happen if television screens are filled hourly with images of wounded and dead Palestinians.

Iranian prolif risks nuclear attack against Israel: Nile Gardiner, 2006 (Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow @ Heritage Foundation, April 24, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1047.cfm)
If Iran succeeds in building a nuclear weapon, which it may do within three to ten years, there can be no doubt regarding the regime’s willingness and intent to use it against Israel or other close U.S. allies. Nor is there any doubt regarding Iran’s potential to arm a terrorist organization such as Hezbollah or Al Qaeda with nuclear material. Significantly, a senior Iranian
spiritual leader recently issued a fatwa sanctioning the use of nuclear weapons.[4]

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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- 42 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Sunni Alliance DA (1/3)
UQ: US Kuwait relations are high- new nuclear agreement proves BERNAMA 10, (no author, June 24, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=508336 accessed June 27) CM
The United States and Kuwait here signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics, according to Qatar News Agency. The MoC was signed for Kuwait by
Secretary General of the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC) Dr. Ahmad Bishara and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Thomas D''Agostino. The MoC includes cooperation in nuclear legislation and regulations, human resource planning and modeling, nuclear safeguards and security, radiation protection and environmental. Among others are on the safety and health issues, low-and intermediate-level radioactive waste management, reactor operations, safety and best practices. During the ceremony, D'Agostino said it is clear that both countries recognise the importance of preventing nuclear proliferation, and keeping dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists and proliferators. "This agreement is an important milestone further underscoring the

commitment of the United States and Kuwait to address the global challenges of nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security," he added. "Understanding, developing and implementing proper nuclear
safeguards is an important part of any successful nuclear energy program, and this agreement helps strengthen nonproliferation efforts around the world," D'Agostino noted. Kuwait Ambassador to the US Sheikh Salem Abdullah Al-Jaber

Al-Sabah said Kuwait and the US already enjoy a very strong relationship and this cooperation will add another aspect to the relationship. "As Kuwait looks forward to its energy needs in the future, of course nuclear power is one of the options we are looking at very seriously and I see no better partner to work with other than the US on this venture that we are about to embark on," he pointed out.
"Kuwait is an oil-producing country but that does not put aside our willingness and ability to look into other sources of energy as our population increases and as our demand for electric generation increases," he affirmed. -- BERNAMA

Link: Kuwait commitment maintains strong relations – if we retreat it collapses Saudi threat perceptions David E. Long, ‘4 – Former executive director of the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and a former deputy director of the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. “US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and Future Prospects.” Mediterranean Quarterly 15.3 (2004) 24-37, Lexis.
These stresses

and repeated US retreats from its assurances of even-handedness over the Arab-Israeli issue contributed to continued Saudi anxiety over the strength of the US commitment to the kingdom's external security. These anxieties were exacerbated by the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran in early
1979. With the United States unwilling in Saudi eyes to save its close friend the shah, the Saudis feared that it would act the same way if the Saudi regime faced similar circumstances.9 When then Crown Prince Fahd canceled a trip to Washington in March of that year, not wishing to appear to support the Egypt-Israel treaty that was signed at the same time, the US-Saudi special relationship fell into disarray. 10 Despite the stresses and strains on the bilateral relations of

basically ambivalent partners, the United States maintained a close and cordial working relationship. Indeed, the US response in 1991, in which it led a coalition of Western and Arab states in Operation Desert Storm to drive Saddam's occupation forces out of Kuwait, could be considered a high point of cordiality in the relationship. The Saudis, on their side and with no publicity, footed the lion's share of the bill, amounting to over $50 billion. Not only was the relationship vastly beneficial to the interests of both countries, but a solid body of mutual goodwill had built up, begun in the 1930s by
the honest, straightforward business practices of American oil men, strengthened by the skilled diplomacy of a succession of American embassy and consulate personnel over the years, and expanded by the thousands of Saudi students who studied in the United States, particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s.

I/L: Military presence is k2 Saudi Arabia-US relations Blanchard 9, (Christopher M., December 16, a analyst in middle eastern affairs for CRS, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf Page 25 Accessed June 27 ) CM <card continues> Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

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Sunni Alliance DA (2/3)
<card continued> Long-standing military training programs remain an important pillar of U.S.-Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom’s defense requirements.53 Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative relationships between the U.S. military services and their Saudi counterparts. The Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military procurement and modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. defense surveys.54 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers

completed a series of massive military infrastructure construction projects across the kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain critical to the operations of Saudi security forces. As noted above, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent coalition efforts to evict Iraqi forces and enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions provided the basis for the expanded U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia that lasted from 1990 until 2003. Following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the U.S. military withdrew almost all of the 5,000 troops that had been stationed in Saudi Arabia and moved its Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to neighboring Qatar. Now, as before, between 200 and 300 U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia at any
given time to administer long-standing U.S. training programs in conjunction with U.S. civilians and local hires. Almost all U.S. training for the Saudi armed forces is funded via Saudi

government purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program. The existence of parallel U.S. training programs for different Saudi security forces reflects the relatively stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia’s security and defense establishment; anecdotal evidence suggests that different Saudi ministries and security forces do not operate jointly and may serve as sources of influence and patronage for members of the royal family. Relations prevent prolif McDowell 3(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf) States tend to acquire nuclear weapons for reasons ranging from the quest for power and prestige to the need to deter other states who present a considerable external threat. As discussed in the second chapter, Saudi Arabia is a realist state that faces a security dilemma. Its alliance with the United States reassured the Saudis that their security needs are covered, thus reducing the Saudi desire for nuclear weapons. However, in the wake of the planned U.S. military withdrawal from the
Kingdom, the Saudi regime will likely re-examine its security needs with respect to the removal of U.S. troops. The shift from a bipolar international structure consisting of the United States and the former Soviet Union had a dramatic impact on the security alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. One of the initial consequences of this change was the propensity among states to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, thereby establishing a causal relationship between the structure of the international system and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 86 Benjamin Frankel argues the unipolar world that exists today and the diminished technological difficulties of acquiring nuclear weapons that facilitates the spread of nuclear weapons as their acquisition “becomes a matter of political decisions.” The

Saudi incentives to acquire a nuclear weapon are directly related to the credibility of the security guarantees provided by the United States, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter four. In short, the perception of the U.S. security guarantee has been considerably weakened, causing the Saudi regime to explore the need to provide its own Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 44 –Kuwait Negative JV Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011 security interests, especially in the event that U.S.- Saudi relations deteriorate further. U.S. actions taken such as the military withdrawals from Lebanon in 1984 and Somalia in 1993 demonstrate a dynamic strategic environment that may have prompted Saudi Arabia to question the resolve of the U.S. security umbrella.
Furthermore, the Saudi regime must address: What is the level of threats in the Gulf region and are they acceptable to the regime?

Sunni Alliance DA (3/3)
Instability means lack of U.S. Saudi relations goes nuclear McDowell 3(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)
In the Middle East, the acquisition of ballistic missiles and WMD by one state has often been perceived as a reduction in security of other Gulf states. Due to its location, historical disputes, and the conventional and unconventional capabilities of its regional adversaries, Saudi Arabia still faces adversaries who compel it to replace its CSS-2 missiles, possibly with a nuclear capability. As a result, the Saudis must monitor the capabilities of its Gulf neighbors despite the status of their relations. The Middle East is all too familiar with revolutions and military coups, which have on several occasions successfully facilitated changes in leadership. Consequentially, instability in any Gulf state causes apprehensions in Saudi Arabia. Saudi potential adversaries possess strong military forces, larger populations, and in some cases advanced WMD programs. The perceived value of WMD along with the concerted efforts to
conceal them in the Gulf states will continue to distress the Saudi regime until such missiles are totally removed from all parts of the region. Further complicating the Saudi security dilemma is the continuation of various regional disputes. Saudi border disputes with Yemen show no signs of disappearing and Saudi relations with Iran, while cordial on the surface, could face diverging interests over the price of oil in the future. This may lead to hostilities between the two states. The future of Iraq still remains unclear; however, its previous efforts to acquire WMD coupled with a yet ‘unassembled’ Iraqi government will remain under the watchful eye of the Saudis. Until the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is resolved, Israel with its advanced WMD programs will continue to unease the Saudis. Despite the large U.S. military presence in the Gulf region, shifting U.S. strategic priorities will continue to weaken its security commitments and cause the Saudi regime to re-evaluate its relationship with the United States. Due to periodic instabilities in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia may feel that a nuclear capability is warranted in order to deter potential threats. However, the United States will continue to push for diplomatic resolutions in the region, which may satisfy Saudi security concerns. A deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations would ultimately increase the value of a Saudi nuclear capability.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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- 45 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

**CP’s**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 46 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Consult NATO CP (1/4)
Text: The United States should engage in prior, binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over whether to remove troops from Kuwait. The United States should advocate the plan throughout the process of consultation and should enact the result of consultation. Say yes – Europe is worried about American overstretch De Nevers 7 (renee de nevers, 2007, International Security, Nato’s international security role in the terrorist era, pg. 59-60 TBC 6/21/10) NATO’s members also differ on the means to respond to threats confronting the alliance. This was most apparent in the bitter dispute over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The dispute illustrated three points of disagreement. First, it rejected different understandings of the nature of the terrorist threat and how to combat it. Second, it exposed deep differences about the appropriate use of force, and in particular about the U.S. policy of preventive war. Whereas the United States insisted that the urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s supposed possession of WMD mandated immediate action, several European allies argued that Hussein was contained and could be deterred. Third, the dispute illustrated increasing European concern about U.S. unilateralism and the fear that NATO’s European members might be “entrapped” by their alliance commitments to support a reckless military operation. 92 As a result, both France and Germany balked at supporting the United States.93 Although the Bush administration sought to repair relations with key European allies and institutions after the 2004 presidential elections, the acrimony caused by this dispute has left a residue of ill will. The shifting alignments and attitudes toward threats confronting NATO have reduced the United States’ willingness to accept alliance constraints.94 Moreover, the United States’ strategic focus has changed, with greater attention being given to the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. This is evident both in the changing base deployments in Europe and the State Department’s decision to shift at least 100 diplomatic positions from Europe to other regions, including Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East.95 This move is a logical step and if anything overdue, given the end of the Cold War, but it is telling of shifts in U.S. policy priorities. Net Benefit: Alliance DA US – NATO relations high but remains vulnerable to US unilateralism Slocombe 10 (WALTER B. SLOCOMBE June 2010 PERSPECTIVE Towards A New NATO
Strategic Concept A View from the United States http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07299.pdf) Nonetheless, NATO remains for the US, as stated in the new national security strategy, »the pre-eminent securi-ty alliance in the world today«, both the »cornerstone for US engagement with the world and a catalyst for international action«. Most of the US’s other formal alliance relationships and all its less formal security partnerships are essentially one-way streets where the US commits itself to help partners in their own defense but without expecting much, if any, help from them outside the strict confines of the joint defense of the partner in question. NATO is – with the partial excepti-on of Australia and to a much lesser extent Japan – the only case where the US can realistically regard its part-ner as a potential source of assistance outside the con-text of the US guarantee. This broader relationship is not, however, without its problems simply because the US expects more of its NATO partners – so it is more likely that the partners will seem to fall short of what the US expects, and that the allies will believe the US is pres-sing them to act more in its interests than their own.

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- 47 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Consult NATO CP (2/4)
Unilateral withdrawal from collective participation causes failure of the alliance Hsiung 1 (James C. a professor of politics at New York University
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/hsiung1.html TBC 6/21/10)
It may not be a coincidence that European resentment to U.S. unilateralism is at its post-Cold War peak following the change of guards at the White House since January 20. A number of foreign-policy decisions by the new Bush Administration, ranging from the announced unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Kosovo and, for that matter, reduced U.S. commitment to the NATO, to the unilateral withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of 1998 when global warming has since become a more pronounced threat to humanity, and to a nonetheless unilateral decision (despite perfunctory, cursory "consultations" with European leaders) to scrap the 1972 ABM treaty with Russia, clearing the way for an equally unilateral National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This scheme, furthermore, goes against a common chorus of opposition even among America’s close allies in Europe and in Asia (Japan and South Korea). The ground of their common opposition is that the NMD may elicit new rounds of destablizing arms race not seen since the Cold War. True, unilateralism is not a monopoly of any Administration, nor any particular session of Congress. In 1999, the U.S. Senate unilaterally rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CNTBT), which the Clinton Administration had signed three years earlier along with 154 other countries. The United States, under Reagan, had unilaterally held out joining the 119 states that signed the epochal 1982 Law of the Sea Convention after seven years of diligent negotiations. The ostensible official reason was that the United States would have no part to legislating socialism by treaty. The real reason, however, was that Washington wanted to have a permanent seat on the governing council of the International Seabed Authority, an agency to be created under the United Nations with the authority to issue licenses to national mining companies bent on exploiting seabed resources. Having finally won such an exclusive concession following 12 more years of talks, the United States then signed the treaty in 1994. But, the truth is that unilateralism has only been carried to new heights unknown before under the Bush Administration. It has irked America’s allies. Hence, any sensible person can readily infer a correlation between this unprecedented pitch of unilateralism and America’s ouster from the Human Rights Commission after it lost the May 3 election. Unilateralism and After Unilateralism may take different forms. Withdrawal from collective action in producing collective goods (such as environmental control) takes the form of omission. It may, on the other hand, take the form of commission, such as in the U.S. invasion of Panama, in December 1989, under the senior Bush. In the latter event, the example thus set may have encouraged copy-catting, such as in Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait scarcely nine months later. A most common form of unilateralism is to set different rules for itself, as from those for others. In the EP-3E spy plane case, the United States asserted it had the right to spy on another coastal state from the airspace over the latter’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). When pressed, the Bush White House might claim, on the ground of non-ratification, that America was not bound by the 1982 treaty’s provisions establishing the rights of a foreign coastal state, thus freeing America from the duty to observe the "due regard" rule for the latter’s rights (including the right of privacy) while flying a spy plane over its EEZ. Nor, in this view, is the United States bound by the rule that the high seas are reserved for "peaceful purposes" only. We need not belabor the point that these rules are or have become customary rules in general international law binding on all nations. The fact is that the United States in 1983, under President Reagan, established a 200-mile EEZ of its own by [unilateral] proclamation. One wonders what would happen if any foreign nation should send spy planes, on routine missions, into the airspace over America’s EEZ so established. The consequences from such hegemonic unilateralism may vary. The recent troubles the Bush Administration has encountered in the

four events above are but a reminder of what kinds of bitter fruits are likely to result from America’s unilateralist approach to foreign affairs. The twenty-first century is one characterized by the rise of what is known as "comprehensive security," comprising environmental security, economic security, and human security. Remedies require collective action, not unilateral selfhelp. The ultimate lesson from these recent events is that they are a wake-up call that the time has come for America to shift gears toward greater use of collective action, on security matters as in foreign relations in general – or else, be prepared to face rejection even by America’s own allies.

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- 48 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

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Consult NATO CP (3/4)
NATO is the only institution that can solve existential threats from terrorism that can come immediately from anywhere Robertson 3 (Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the 9th Conference de
Montreal May 6 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm TBC 6/22/10 The scale of threats has also increased. Today terrorism is more international, more apocalyptic in its vision, and far more lethal. And despite the best efforts of our diplomats and counterproliferation experts, the spread of bio-chemical and nuclear weapons is already a defining security challenge of this new century. If not addressed, it will put more fingers on more triggers. And because not all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders, traditional deterrents will not always deter. All this adds up to a guaranteed supply chain of instability. It adds up to a security environment in which threats can strike at anytime, without warning, from anywhere and using any means, from a box-cutter to a chemical weapon to a missile. In the months leading to Prague, NATO’s 19 member countries demonstrated that they understood the nature of this challenge and were united in a common response to it. What this has meant in practice for the Alliance can be summarised under three headings: new roles, new relationships and new capabilities. NATO is worth retaining only if it is relevant. It evolved successfully in the 1990s to engage former adversaries across the old Soviet bloc and then to deal with instability and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Now NATO is radically changing again to play important new roles in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It already provides the common glue of military interoperability without which multinational operations of any kind would be impossible. Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 and Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were able to operate effectively against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan only because of decades of cooperation in NATO. After 9/11, NATO also played a supporting role in actions against Al Qaida. Most importantly, however, NATO at Prague became the focal point for planning the military contribution against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other organisation in the world could play. In doing so, we have put an end to decades of arid theological debate about whether the Alliance could operate outside Europe. NATO now has a mandate to deal with threats from wherever they may come.

Terrorism will escalate into extinction Morgan 9 (Dennis, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea Futures,
Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, World on Fire) LL Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that <card continues>

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

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Consult NATO CP (4/4)
<card continued> would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 50 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

XO CP (1/3)
Observation 1. Text: The President of the United States should <insert plan> Observation 2. Solvency Presidents have traditionally used their executive authority to control military redeployment. Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)
The deployment of troops has presented presidents with a range of political and military issues that involve measures from sending troops into harm's way in existing conflicts to low-intensity wars that had the potential to grow.95 More often, the administrations worked with various constellations of positioning troops and their equipment in strategically important or tactically advantageous locations. Such deployments have also been used to project force as well as to prepare for possible action, as in the case of President Kennedy's buildup of troops in Europe as conflict with the USSR over Berlin grew.96 As a number of recent presidents have, learned, one of the more complex aspects of deployment can be extricating the troops from difficult situations. Thus, President Reagan's NSDD 123 laid out the plan for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in the midst of continued fighting.97 National security directives have also been used both to launch military action and to direct combat operations. One of the more significant examples of such action was President Bush's NSD 54 that launched the Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1.991:98 Pursuant to my
responsibilities and authority under the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, and under the laws and treaties of the United States, and pursuant to H.J. Res. 77 (1991), and in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 666, 667, 670, 674, 677, and 678, and consistent with the inherent right of the collective self-defense affirmed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, I hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait by U.S. air, sea and land conventional military forces, in coordination with the forces of our coalition partners, at a date and time I shall determine and communicate through the National Command Authority channels.99 The next day, Desert Storm was launched. The order defines the purposes of the attack and the cautions to be observed during the battle. Interestingly, President Bush reserved the right to escalate hostilities and to target Saddam. Hussein directly if Iraq should seek to destroy Kuwait's oil fields. In such a case, the NSD announces, "it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I also want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq?, mo Iraq did set the fields on fire, and the United States did not "replace the current leadership of Iraq." Bush knew that his authority was limited both domestically, in terms of his dealings with the Congress, and internationally, in terms of holding the coalition together. To be sure, this

was not the first time that NSDs had been used for such a purpose. President Reagan had issued NSDD 110 in fall 1983, setting in motion the invasion of Grenada.ml

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XO CP (2/3)
Observation 3 Net Benefits A. XO’s preserve political capital Executive Orders avoid Congressional battles-helps avoid legislative defeats Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 90, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20 a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
Since executive orders are a unilateral presidential tool, presidents may use them to compensate for congressional opposition. This theme arises from histories of the civil rights orders, which have maintained that Democratic presidents used executive orders because they knew that Congress would refuse to pass legislation. Presidents may also use executive orders to preempt legislation or undercut Congress in other ways. When faced with the certain prospect of legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa in 1985, President Reagan successfully fractured a veto-proof coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans by imposing weaker sanctions by executive order. In doing so, he “managed to avoid a major legislative defeat and the further embarrassment of an almost inevitable veto override,” although
Congress overrode Reagan's veto of sanction legislation the following year. Presidents have restructured the intelligence community through executive orders, in part to undermine congressional efforts to reorganize the community via statute.

For the same reasons, presidents who have low levels of public approval may be more likely to resort to executive orders. Doing so offers a way of getting around other institutional actors who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak White House, and also provides presidents with a method of position-taking, framing policy questions, or delivering on promises made to key constituencies.

B. Presidential Powers First, Presidential power is decreasing under Obama The Gazette (Montreal), March 14, 2009 Saturday , Obama's rule of law; Breaks with Bush's 'enemy combatant'
The Obama administration dropped the term "enemy combatant" and incorporated international law yesterday as its basis for holding terrorism suspects at Guantanamo prison while it works to close the facility. The U.S. Justice Department said it had filed court papers outlining its break from Bush administration detention standards, and said only those who provided "substantial" support to AlQa'ida or the Taliban would be considered detainable. "As we work toward developing a new policy to govern detainees, it is essential that we operate in a manner that strengthens our national security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by law," U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder said. "The change we've made today meets each of those standards and will make our nation stronger." Unlike under former president George W. Bush, who greatly sought to expand presidential powers during his term, the new detention policy does not rely on the president's powers as military commander in chief to hold terrorism suspects at Guantanamo. Instead, the Justice Department said: "It draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority conferred by Congress."

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XO CP (3/3)
Second, must increase Presidential Power to secure hegemony Paul 98 (Joel, Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, California Law Review, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3481139) CBC
The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in power from Congress to the executive. "Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to implement integrated and responsible policy." In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a powerful executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the new world environment, the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy took precedence over the deliberative process: Executive officers, who are charged with the task of conducting negotiations with other governments, must be able to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, without being subjected to delays, obstructions, and disintegrating efforts by minorities... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly characteristic of past eras when economic and political change proceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the interests of the United States.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 53 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Phase out CP (1/2)
Text: The United States should undergo a gradual reduction of troops from Kuwait Drawdown needs to be slowest in areas with vulnerable groups – this is key to solving mass displacement Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf.
Although the displacement crisis will be long term, and vulnerable populations will face increased risk as U.S. forces draw down, the dangers emanating from both of these situations can be mitigated. Indeed, the drawdown of U.S. forces can potentially create opportunities for the United States to more effectively address this crisis and gain regional and international assistance to do so. A number of specific actions and general approaches can help ensure the protection of particularly endangered populations, mitigate the destabilizing effects of mass displacement, and prevent the chronic underdevelopment that may otherwise be its result. Lower Risk of Violence Where practicable and useful, adapt troop withdrawals to ensure the longest presence where violence is most likely, specifically in the regions of Baghdad, Diyala, and along the KRG border. Improve security
for the vulnerable and those at risk of deportation in Iraq by working with Iraq, regional governments, and other key international actors.

Net benefit: Turns the case and hegemony is a net-benefit Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf.
As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, it behooves decisionmakers to recognize that this drawdown, which started in June 2009 and continues at the time of this writing, will affect vulnerable and atrisk populations. The ways in which it does so have significant implications for the evolution of Iraq and U.S. policy interests in that country and the Middle East more broadly. Regardless of how the security situation evolves in the years to come, these issues will continue to create humanitarian challenges, and it is in U.S. interests to take steps to address them. A number of groups are at risk because of the U.S. drawdown and

withdrawal, because they have depended on U.S. forces and force presence for their security over the last six years. In addition, the drawdown may exacerbate the already precarious circumstances of displaced
Iraqis, both within the country and in neighboring states. That said, appropriate policies and actions can mitigate destabilizing regional scenarios and reduce the dangers faced by these populations in the years to come. Vulnerable Groups Groups at particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated with the United States in any of a variety of ways smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces for protection1 Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces3 contractors from around the world who work for U.S., other coalition, a nd Iraqi companies in construction, food services, and myriad other jobs and who may lack documentation.

Violence against these populations is a real danger as U.S. forces draw down. It would surely present a humanitarian tragedy to which the global community may not be able to respond in time. The United States would likely be held at least partially accountable, with detrimental results for U.S. image, credibility, and influence. It could also serve as a starting point for renewed violence in Iraq. Ongoing efforts to assist Iraqis with U.S. ties include the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and the Refugee Resettlement Program, now available to Iraqis with U.S. ties. There has been significant improvement in the last year in the processing of refugees, especially, and the SIV program has been expanded. Instead of having to first leave Iraq, U.S.-affiliated Iraqis can now apply to come to the United
States from Baghdad. Processing for both of these programs has remained slow and complicated, however, and no plan exists for rapid evacuation, which may be needed if the security situation deteriorates. For the other groups, the response thus far

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has been an effort by the U.S. government to engage Iraqi counterparts to ensure these groups’ safety and security, coupled with efforts by the UNHCR to resettle some of the refugees from elsewhere who cannot stay in Iraq. Success has been sporadic.

Phase out CP (2/2)
Solvency: Also turns Middle East stability Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf.
The millions of Iraqis who have been displaced as a result of the war face increasing dangers as U.S. forces draw down. If violence in Iraq worsens as and after U.S. forces draw down, as it may well do in at least some disputed and multiethnic areas, displacement will increase yet again. Whether or not violence increases in the near term, however, this displacement crisis may well breed instability in its own right. Unless these problems are addressed as part of a broad development and integration agenda, displacement will not only be long term, but it may also lead to increased risk of violence in the future, as grievances over lost land combine with perceptions of social and economic inequities between the populations hosting the displaced and the newcomers, both in Iraq and in neighboring countries. This has the potential to undermine the stability of key regional states, such as Jordan, and a range of broader U.S. regional goals.

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**Kritiks**
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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Fem K IR (1/3)
The affirmative is rooted in attempts at masculine action – their focus on troop withdrawal ultimately subverts the feminine tendencies in International Relations. Duncanson and Eschle 8 (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New
Political Science 30(4), p. 560)IM Nonetheless, the British state is, and must be, capable of decisive action. Such capability is central to Realist understandings of the state and shot through with masculine associations in contrast to feminised passivity and succumbing to constraint. Thus active verb constructions and descriptions of decisive action predominate throughout the text. The foreword and executive summary, for example, mention repeatedly that “we believe” and “we have decided.”90 Even when the state is doing nothing, or reducing its stockpile, it is actively choosing to do so: “we decided not to take an option . . . We will reduce . . . we have not conducted . . . we have increased our transparency . . . we have ceased production . . . We continue to make progress.”91 There is also an overt emphasis on avoiding inaction or constraint. “[O]ur capacity to act” must “not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by others,”92 “ we must not allow such states to . . . deter us and the international community from taking the action required . . . or fundamentally constrain our policy options.”93 The possibility of a “dormant” nuclear weapons capability cannot be entertained, the capability must be “active” and also “credible.”94 The need for British
nuclear weapons capacity to be “credible” is emphasised at several points so even if we do not act, it must be possible that we can, and others must believe that we can.

Our Kritik isn’t limited to military violence, but the security paradigm inherent with the masculine war machine Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A
Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ Anti-war feminists’ opposition to the practice of war is simultaneously pragmatic and moral. We have an abiding suspicion of the use of violence, even in the best of causes. The ability of violence to achieve its stated aims is routinely over-estimated, while the complexity of its costs are overlooked. Our opposition also stems from the perception that the practice of war entails far more than the killing and destroying of armed combat itself. It requires the creation of a “war system,” which entails: arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities which undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war. Even when it appears to achieve its aims, war is a source of enormous individual suffering and loss. Modern warfare is also predictably destructive to societies, civil liberties and democratic processes, and the non-human world. State security may sometimes be served by war, but too often human security is not

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Fem K IR (2/3)
This masculine ideology is the root cause of all proliferation, environmental destruction, domestic violence, and war Warren and Cady 94 (Karen J, Duane L, feminists and authors, Hypatia, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing connections,” pg 16-17)
Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors -- the symptoms of dysfunctionality -- that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is -- as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy. 11The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989 , 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" ( Spretnak 1989 , 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility ties in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

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Fem K IR (3/3)
Our alternative is to vote negative. Rejection of a framework that normalizes masculine warfare is critical to adopt epistemologies centered on a feminist ethic of peace Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A
Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves with them.17 Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon – including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of the seers.18 Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work. Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent. Grounded in this alternative epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.”19 In contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and geo-political effects of this use; the deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons. There is scant attention to the potential suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate complicated effects on possessor societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to grapple with the moral significance of willingly risking such massive, total destruction. When anti-war feminists think about wars, they take into consideration the political, social, economic, psychological and moral consequences of accepting the practice of war. When assessing weapons, they do not single out or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic effects from their embeddedness in and impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from the effects of the discourses which constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when asked to think about weapons of mass destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of social, economic, political, and environmental relationships within which weapons of mass destruction are developed, deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the perspective of women’s lives. It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war” and/or “technostrategic” frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the questions we are asked to answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions, we find we need to both think inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

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Security K (1/5)
Security is the metaphysical foundation for all modern political arrangements. Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of Security, pp. 12-14]
There is a preoccupation which links both the beginning and the end of metaphysics, and so also the beginning and the end of metaphysical politics. It is something which, because it furnishes the fundamental link between politics and metaphysics, affords me my entry into the relationship which obtains between them. That something is security. If the question of the political is to be recovered from metaphysical thinking, therefore, then security has to be brought into question first. Security, of course, saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our rulers (whosoever ‘we’ are) consistently hides behind it. It would, therefore, be an easy task to establish that security is the first and foundational requirement of the State, of modern understandings of politics, and of International Relations, not only by reference to specific political theorists but also by reference to the discourses of States. But I want to explore the thought that modern politics is a security project for reasons which are antecedent to, and account for, the axioms and propositions of (inter)national political theorists, the platitudes of political discourse, and the practices of States, their political classes and leaders. Consequently, to conceive of our politics as a politics of security is not to advance a view held by particular thinkers or even by particular disciplines. It is to draw attention to a necessity (which Heidegger’s history of metaphysics will later allow us to note and explore) to which all thinkers of politics in the metaphysical tradition are subject. In pursuing this thought it follows that security turns-out to have a much wider register—has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something which modern international security studies have begun to register—than that merely of preserving our so-called basic values, or even our mortal bodies. That it has, in Chapter 1 Security, philosophy and politics 13 fact, always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political itself is; specifying what the essence of politics is thought to be. The reason is that the thought within which political thought occurs—metaphysics—and specifically its conception of truth, is itself a security project. For metaphysics is a tradition of thought defined in terms of the pursuit of security; with the securing, in fact, of a secure arche, determining principle, beginning or ground, for which its under-standing of truth and its quest for certainty calls. Security, then, finds its expression as the principle, ground or arche—for which metaphysical thought is a search—upon which something stands, pervading and guiding it in its whole structure and essence. Hence, as Leibniz wrote: If one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue digging until one meets solid rock or firm foundations; if one wants to unravel a tangled thread one must look for the beginning of the thread; if the greatest weights are to be moved, Archimedes demanded only a stable place. In the same way, if one is to establish the elements of human knowledge some fixed point is required, on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out without fear.1 (emphasis added) It is for this reason, therefore, that metaphysics first allows security to impress itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very existence of life—both individual and social. One of those impulses which it is said appears like an inner command to be instinctive (in the form, for example, of the instinct for survival), or axiomatic (in the form of the principle of self-preservation, the right to life, or the right to self defence), security thereby became the value which modern understandings of the political and modern practices of politics have come to put beyond question, precisely because they derived its very requirement from the requirements of metaphysical truth itself. In consequence, security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics, including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational legitimacy. Thus, for example, and in a time other than our own, the security of an ecumene of belief in the ground of a divinely ordained universe promising salvation for human beings— something that, constituting the Christian Church, provided an ideal of community which continues

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to pervade the Western tradition—insisted: ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’2 (no salvation outside the Church). Salvation was the ultimate form of spiritual security. And that security was to be acquired <Continues>

Security K (2/5)
<Continued> through being gathered back into where we belong; a belonging, in other words, to God. What is crucial here is not what happens to us after death, but salvation as the expression of the longing for the return to a pure and unadulterated form of belonging; a final closing-up of the wound of existence by returning to a lost oneness that never was. The reverse of Cyprian’s dictum was, of course, equally 14 Security, philosophy and politics true. No Church without salvation. The outcome of this project was a rejection of the world through the constitution of an ideal world which—not least because of the model it offered, the resentment which it fostered and the economy of salvation and cruelty which it instantiated—acted in the world to constitute a form of redeeming politics.3 In a way that indicates the continuity of the metaphysical tradition, however, this slogan can be, and was, easily adjusted to furnish the defining maxim of modern politics: no security outside the State; no State without security. And this, in its turn, has given rise to powerful forms of what I would call the disciplinary politics of Hobbesian thought and the actuarial politics of technologised thought. Each of these is also concerned to specify the principle, ground or rule that would satisfy the metaphysically sequestered compulsion for security; thus relieving human being of the dilemmas and challenges it faces to discover, in its changing circumstances, what it is to be—to act and live—as humans. The basic thought to be pursued is one which, in simultaneously drawing both our current politics and our tradition of political thought into question by challenging their mutual foundation in security, serves, in addition, to illustrate and explore some important aspects of the political implications of Heidegger’s thought. My thought, then, is that modern politics is a security project in the widest possible—ontological—sense of the term because it was destined to become so by virtue of the very character or nature of the thinking of truth within which, through which, and by continuous and intimate reference to which, politics itself has always been thought. What is at issue first of all, for me, therefore, is not whether one says yes or no to our modern (inter)national regimes of security, but what Foucault would have called the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all, the way in which it is put into political discourse and how it circulates throughout politics and other discourses. I think Heidegger’s account of metaphysics provides a means of addressing that fundamental question.

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Security K (3/5)
Modern political relations are reduced to objects of calculation by the imperative to secure security; calculation replaces valuation, and we are confronted with the technologized arm of modern politics which would reduce us to cogs in the machine Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of Security, pp. 20-22]
The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too…well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be suprasensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things,
otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics’ guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that world. Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming one’s everyday conduct—public and private—to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon the philosopher—his ‘true’ mission—consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles.

Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, ‘that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be’.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they
were to be Security, philosophy and politics 21 secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method. The philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said— meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued—was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher’s task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence, though Nietzsche’s will to power may be differentiated as self-overcoming— against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle of self-preservation— it is arguable that this represents the security project à l’outrance.

The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you

and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then,

is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world. Western understanding of the political is, therefore, continuously suborned by metaphysics’ will to the calculative truth of correspondence, and its various regimes of power and knowledge to which Foucauldian genealogy alerts
us. It is consequently Foucault’s indebtedness not only to Nietzsche but also to Heidegger which antecedes, while it remains nonetheless integrally related to, the task of genealogy.15 In order to pursue the recovery of the question of the political from metaphysics, therefore, I not

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only have to be able to pose the question which I have used Foucault to pose, I have to use it to bring security into question and explore that question through the sources which Foucault himself drew upon. Metaphysics is itself unwittingly an aid here, for it bears its own deconstruction within itself. Consider the outcome of the guiding question—why is there something rather than nothing?—for with its closure we are challenged to rethink the question.

Security K (4/5)
The economies of value created by the technologisation of the political allow for all subject to the political to be both valued and consequentially devalued, because death is the frame of reference within which these calculations operate any comparative devaluation of an aspect of humanity is justifiable, there is nothing abstract about this, this is the zero-point of the holocaust. Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” Political Theory 27:2]
Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and
ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the under- standing of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first phi- losophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within

the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another
Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a selfpossession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of

sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of
Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encoun- ter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, know- ing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'dec- ision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The manage- ment science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and

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Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as het- erogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see.

Security K (5/5)
Our alternative is to question security. In order to politicize the system of technologically calculable objects that characterizes international relations, we must think the very foundations of that system. Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of Security, pp. 22-23]
Contesting our politics of security, therefore, not only requires more than a technical engagement over the meaning, range, efficiency, effectiveness, morality or accountability of conventional and nuclear, military and political, technologies of security, it also requires something in addition to genealogy as well; because genealogy, however politicising it might be—
Foucault arguing, powerfully, that this politicising takes place for, or rather around, the battle over truth as ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’16—does

not directly pose and seek to think the question of the political as such.17 However much it is therefore stimulated by the interrogatory disposition of the genealogist, my question, like any question, sets something else, or at least in addition, in train. It opens-up another world of thought and
discloses the prospect also of another form of life, because that is how all questioning works. Such a world goes beyond the project which allowed the question to be posed in the first place. In the world that a question opens-up, the question itself multiplies and plurifies. It divides and sub-divides demanding more of you and provoking you to other thought. That is the way the world of a question builds. And in this burgeoning world not only do new considerations arise but all manner of other established issues are amplified and intensified in different ways. Not least of these is the way in which the

question alerts us to that which is prior to the question, the source of the question itself to which the question is in fact responding. That which is prior here is that in which we are already immersed, the obligatory freedom of human being; what has happened to it, what might happen
to it in the effort to secure it, and what might become of it now it is so secured by and within the security problematic. Hence,

what ultimately concerns me is the very thought of security, rather than just its history or its genealogy, and how to let ourselves into the struggle of the duality which is entailed in security—that is to say, the indissoluble relation between security and insecurity which is, as you shall see, even contained within the word itself— from access to which we are secured for the moment, however, by security. This movement, integral to questioning, consequently carries us beyond the Security, philosophy and politics 23 genealogical. That is another reason why the question I have derived from it (‘Must we secure security?’) offers a way—I think, perhaps, the way—of opening-up the question of the political. ‘Must we secure security?’ is, then, not one question amongst many others. Neither is it a question that allows us to confine the response which it demands to genealogy or to the debates about the status of the International Relations of political Modernity. To embrace this question directs us towards an exploration of the link between the philosophical and the political in Western thought. It forces us to consider their current and shared predicament. It situates us right in the midst of the travails of the Western tradition, of the very differentiation between thought and action, and of all the questions which that separation poses. ‘Must we secure security?’ is therefore a question within whose realm the crisis of modern global politics reverberates and resonates with that of the crisis of modern thought. It forces us to think about the political at a time when the Western understanding of the political, having been globalised, has contributed to the formation of a world that it can no longer comprehend or command—to a world in which it is incapable of realising the very values which it is said to comprise—and that means thinking once more about the belonging together of security and insecurity.18 Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 64 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Terror Talk K(1/3)
Terrorist rhetoric reinforces a binary that pits the good in an endless war against the other Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG
On the day of the strikes on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. corporate television networks brought out an array of national security state intellectuals, usually ranging from the right to the far right, to explain the horrific events of September 11. Fox News presented former UN Ambassador and Reagan administration apologist Jeane Kirkpatrick, who rolled out a simplified version of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations (1996), arguing that we were at war with Islam and should defend the West. (4) Kirkpatrick was the most discredited intellectual of her generation, legitimating Reagan administration alliances with unsavory fascists and terrorists as necessary to beat Soviet totalitarianism. Her propaganda line was premised on a distinction between fascism and Communist totalitarianism which argued that alliances with authoritarian or right-wing terrorist organizations or states were defensible because these regimes were open to reform efforts or historically undermined themselves and disappeared. (5) Soviet totalitarianism, by contrast, should be resolutely opposed, as a Communist regime had never collapsed or been overthrown and communism was an intractable and dangerous foe, which must be fought to the death with any means necessary. Of course, the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, along with its empire, and although Kirkpatrick was totally discredited she was awarded a professorship at Georgetown and continued to circulate her extremist views through Fox TV and other right-wing venues. On the afternoon of September 11, Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel, himself implicated in war crimes in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982, came on global television to convey his regret, condolences, and assurance of Israel's support in the war on terrorism. Sharon called for a coalition against

terrorist networks, which would mobilize the civilized world against terrorism, posing the Good versus Evil, "humanity" versus "the blood-thirsty," "the free world" against "the forces of darkness," which are trying to destroy "freedom" and our "way of life." (6) The Bush-Cheney administration would take up precisely the same tropes, with President Bush constantly evoking the "evil" of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the
September 11 terror assaults. Bush also declared that the attacks were an "act of war" against the United States, presaging the era of war that was to come. (7) The Fox News network had its anchor Brit Hume ask former Reagan Secretary of State George Schultz whether military action by the United States was justified, and Schultz answered: "Absolutely.... We need to put people on notice that if they harbor terrorists, they are going to get it from us. No place to hide." He then recounted a story from boot camp when a sergeant handed him his rifle and said: "Here. This is your best friend.... And remember, never point this rifle at anybody unless you're willing to pull the trigger." (8) Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the House, noted that President Bush just described the attack as an act of war and urged Congress to move immediately toward declaring war against militant Islam. (9) Commenting later in the day, pundit Bill O'Reilly exclaimed, "I think we have to let the chains fall down and let the dogs of war," and his guest Colonel David Hunt enthused: "Bill, you've got to unleash the dogs of war." (10) Such all-out war hysteria, militarism, and extremist rhetoric was the order of the day, and throughout September 11 and its aftermath, ideological warhorses such as William Bennett came out and urged that the United States declare war on "militant Islam," asserting: "We have a moment of moral clarity right now in America.... There is good and evil in the world.... We issued a statement today at Empower America, Jack Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick and I, saying that Congress should declare war against militant Islam and that the United States should proceed as if in war, because it is war." (11) While Bennett and his group urged war on Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and other alleged sites of militant Islam, on the Canadian Broadcasting Network, former Reagan administration Deputy Secretary of Defense and military commentator Frank Gaffney suggested that the United States needed to go after the sponsors of these states as well, such as China and Russia, to the astonishment and derision of Canadian commentators. (12) And right-wing talk radio and the Internet buzzed with talk of dropping nuclear bombs on Afghanistan, exterminating all Moslems, and whatever other fantasy popped into their overheated rhetoric. Hence,

corporate television and radio in the United States allowed right-wing militarist zealots to vent and circulate the most aggressive, fanatic, and extremist views, creating a consensus around the need for immediate military action and all-out war. The television networks themselves featured logos such as "War on America," "Attack on America," "America under Attack," and circulated discourses that assumed that the United States was at war and that only a military response was appropriate. Few cooler heads appeared on any of the major television networks that repeatedly beat the war drums day after day, without even the relief of commercials for three days straight, driving the country into hysteria and making it certain that there would be a military response and war.

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 65 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Terror Talk K(2/3)
Terrorist rhetoric shuts off solutions to terrorism, necessitates eradication of those who its applied to, and incites racist violence Kapitan and Schulte 2 (Tomis and Erich, Thomas – Prof of Philosophy @ N Illionois U, and Erich –
, Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 30 Iss. 1, 2002, pp. 172+, Questia) JPG
Given that a population has deeply rooted grievances it is determined to rectify, and given that, continually, its members have been willing to resort to terrorist actions in pursuing its goals, then what is the intelligent response? One might try to beat them into submission, but short of outright genocide, retaliation against a population from whose ranks terrorists emerge will not solve anything so long as that population feels it has a legitimate grievance worth dying for and decides that terrorism is the only viable response. Such "counter-terrorist" retaliation, combined with a failure to address their grievances, only intensifies their hatred and resolve, their willingness to engage in more terrorism, and soon the parties will find themselves wrapped in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. Whether individual terrorists are driven by strategy, psychology, or a combination of both, the rational approach to persistent terrorism stemming from a given group requires examining the situation wherein terrorism is seen as the only route of resistance or outlet for outrage. Only then can intelligent moral responses be crafted. This brings us closer to our main contentions. The prevalent rhetoric of 'terrorism' has not provided an intelligent response to the problem of terrorism. To the contrary, it has shut off any meaningful examination of causes or debate on policies and has left only the path of violence to solve differences. Rather than promoting a free and open examination of the grievances of the group from which terrorists emerge, the 'terrorist' label nips all questioning and debate in the bud. Terrorists are "evil"-as the U.S. Administration has repeated on numerous occasions since September 11, 2001-and are therefore to be eradicated. This sort of response to terrorist violence is nothing new; the 'terrorist' rhetoric has been steadily escalating since the early 1970s, and under the Reagan Administration it became a principal foil for foreign policy. None of this has been lost upon those who

employ the rhetoric of 'terrorism' as a propaganda device, to obfuscate and to deflect attention away from controversial policies. A prime example in the 1980s was a book edited by Benjamin Netanyahu entitled, Terrorism: How the West Can Win. While it offers a standard definition of 'terrorism,' both the editor and the contributors applied it selectively and argued that the only way to combat terrorism is to respond with force, "to weaken and destroy the terrorist's ability to consistently launch attacks," even though it might involve the "risk of civilian casualties" (pp. 202-205). Throughout this book, very little is
said about the possible causes of terrorist violence beyond vague assertions about Islam's confrontation with modernity (p. 82), or passages of this calibre: The root cause of terrorism lies not in grievances but in a disposition toward unbridled violence. This can be traced to a worldview that asserts that certain ideological and religious goals justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists is more than a tautology. (p. 204) One is tempted to pass off comments like this as pure rant, save for the fact that this book reached a large audience, especially since its contributors included not only academics and journalists but also important policy makers. Netanyahu himself went on to become the Israeli Prime Minister, and among the American contributors were U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Senators Daniel Moynihan and Alan Cranston, all of who voiced sentiments similar to those of Netanyahu. This upshot of the book is that a

terrorist is portrayed as a carrier of "oppression and enslavement," lacking moral sense, and "a perfect nihilist" (pp. 29-30). Given that the overwhelming number of examples of terrorism are identified as coming from the Arab and Islamic worlds, and that "retaliation" against terrorists is repeatedly urged even at the expense of civilian casualties, then one begins to see the point of Edward Said's assessment of the book as nothing short of "an incitement to anti-Arab and anti-Moslem violence" (Said 1988:157).17

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 66 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

JV

Terror Talk K(3/3)
Reject the affirmatives construction of terrorism – recognizing that terrorism is not an objective reality sheds its violent representations Whitbeck 2 (John V., int’l lawyer dealing w/ Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Washignton Report on Midde East affairs Vol. 21 Iss. 2, March 2002, pp. 52+, questia) JPG
A Devalued Word However, the word

has been so devalued that even violence is no longer an essential prerequisite for its use. In recently announcing a multibillion-dollar lawsuit against 10 international
tobacco companies, a Saudi Arabian lawyer told the press: "We will demand that tobacco firms be included on the lists of terrorists and those financing and sponsoring terrorism because of the large number of victims that smoking has claimed the world over." If everyone recognized that the word "terrorism" is fundamentally an epithet and a

term of abuse, with no intrinsic meaning, there would be no more reason to worry about the word now than prior to Sept. 11. However, with the United States relying on the word to assert, apparently, an absolute
right to attack any country it dislikes (for the most part, countries Israel dislikes) and with President George W. Bush repeatedly menacing that "either you're with us or you're with the terrorists" (which effectively means, "either you make our enemies your enemies or you'll be our enemy--and you know what we do to our enemies"), many people around the world must feel a genuine sense of terror (dictionary definition: "a state of intense fear") as to where the United States is taking the rest of the world. Meanwhile, in America itself, the Bush administration appears to be feeding the U.S. Constitution and America's traditions of civil liberties, due process and the rule of law (the finest aspects of American life, and the principal reasons why the country used to be admired abroad) into a shredder--mostly to domestic applause or acquiescence. Who would have imagined that 19 angry men armed only with knives could accomplish so much, provoking a response, beyond their wildest dreams, which threatens to be vastly more damaging to their enemies even than their own appalling acts? If the world is to avoid a descent into

anarchy, in which the only rule is "might makes right," every "retaliation" provokes a "counter-retaliation" and a genuine "war of civilizations" is ignited, the world--and particularly the United States--must recognize that "terrorism" is simply a word, a subjective epithet, not an objective reality, and certainly not an excuse to suspend all the rules of international law and domestic civil liberties
which have, until now, made at least some parts of our planet decent places to live.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

- 67 –Kuwait Negative Division MSJHS Debate Club, 2011 Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

JV

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11