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SONY EUROPE - THE LEADERHIP JOURNEY CASE A: A HISTORY OF CHANGE CASE B: DELIVERING CHANGE and TEACHING NOTES
Werner Braun, PA Consulting Group Mark Wilcox, Sony Europe Paul Sparrow, Centre for Performance-led HR, Lancaster University Lancaster University Management School, Centre for Performance-led HR Case Study No 2007-01 http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/research/centres/hr/
Copyright © 2007, Werner Braun, Mark Wilcox and Paul Sparrow. All rights reserved. Do not quote or cite without permission from the author
Case studies are produced by Lancaster University Management School and are to be circulated for class discussion purposes only. The case studies may be published in due course, in a revised form and should not be quoted without the authors’ permission.
SONY EUROPE - THE LEADERHIP JOURNEY CASE A: A HISTORY OF CHANGE
Werner Braun, PA Consulting Group Mark Wilcox, Sony Europe Paul Sparrow, Centre for Performance-led HR, Lancaster University
Management of change, Leadership
How to quote or cite this document
Braun, W., Wilcox, M. and Sparrow, P.R. (2007). Sony Europe – The Leadership Journey. Case A: A History of Change. Lancaster University Management School, Centre for Performance-led HR Case Study, Number 2007-01, available: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk
Mike Tsurumi arrived in Europe in January 2002 in order take up his appointment as president of Sony Europe in April 2002. Although he was widely experienced within Europe he was the first Japanese to head this position in Europe, ending the reign of European CEOs. Mike knew that the mandate given to him by Sony Corporation was a difficult one. Throughout the 1990s Sony Europe had attempted to consolidate its business operations on a pan-European level with a focus on cost saving and streamlining its distribution processes. The results had been disappointing. With a rapidly changing business environment, Sony Corporation knew that it was vital for the company’s long-term survival to reduce costs dramatically. The company also needed to become more customer focused, reducing its pure reliance on product leadership. Looking at the way Sony’s operations within Europe had developed, and how previous attempts to move towards a truly pan-European organisation had underperformed, Mike Tsurumi was wondering whether he would succeed in communicating to Sony’s European executives the urgency for change. Would he be able to make the executive ”buy into” the necessary changes ahead, not only intellectually but also emotionally?
The development of the operations of Sony Europe
Sony Europe is the regional consumer electronics and professional equipment and services organisation for Sony Corporation of Japan. Sony has operated in Europe since 1960 when it set up a satellite office in Switzerland to service the whole of the European marketplace. In the 1970s, individual
sales companies were set up in Europe – either by acquiring an existing independent distributor, or by setting up a new operation, hiring European staff to run it. This was followed by the establishment of Sony manufacturing operations in various European countries starting from the mid-1970s (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). The country managers were often the former heads of Sony’s distribution companies in those countries and they were granted considerable autonomy in launching innovative products developed in Japan. As a result, country managers viewed their Sony operation as a private kingdom, in which they would act as “country kings”, a term coined by Jack Schmuckli, former Chairman and CEO of Sony Europe (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). In 2002 Sony employed over 13,300 employees in Europe working across 23 countries, concerned with all sales, marketing, distribution, research and development, logistics and manufacturing. The annual turnover peaked in Europe in 2000 at approximately €10 billion.
A rapidly changing business environment
Since the 1990s the market for consumer electronics in Europe has been evolving rapidly. Prices and margins are coming under increasing pressure. By 2004 the electronics industry was faced with doubledigit price drops regarding products such as DVD recorders, digital cameras, flat-panel TVs (Financial Times, 2005). From a product development perspective, Sony has come under tremendous pressures to reduce costs worldwide. This is due to both the rapid rate of technological change and the changing geography of production. Growing commoditisation – the digitalisation of nearly every electronic device from audio devices, TVs, mobile phones, cameras – has also lead to shorter lead times for replication of products by competitors. Further pressures to cut costs can be linked to the increase of outsourcing business models in the electronics industry. On the sales side, large retail chains and cross-border buying groups in Europe have increased power. Furthermore, we now see greater consumer price transparency Europe-wide as a result of growing internet-trade. The changes in the sales and distribution structure increasingly put Sony’s country organisations in direct price competition to one another. At the same time the autonomous nature of the country level organisations mean that these organisational entities are fighting over product allocation. Many country organisations were running their own warehousing and distribution system. This was further aggravated by the fact that until 2003 country managers’ performance was rewarded according to the country organisation’s profit & losses, country level volume, and country level delivery targets. This led to high inventory levels and lack of cooperation on product availability. So, when Mike Tsurumi took office in 2002 he was well aware of the rapidly changing business environment for Sony Europe and the pressure it would face. There was an urgent need to take action. He met with the European Executive Committee (EEC), Sony’s most senior management team. Mike Tsurumi knew that the intellectual argument for change was clear. For decades Sony differentiated itself from its competition through its product leadership. The company was and is known
for its innovation and engineering excellence. The market leadership proposition is built on the strength of the product. This has always allowed Sony to command a price premium based on the product being technologically advanced, containing more features than competitors, being smaller, lighter or just better designed than those of the competition. Sony does not try to compete by being the lowest cost supplier or the fastest to deliver or the most integrated into the customers supply system. Nor do they deliver services that 'wow' the customer in terms of customisation or specific solutions. Yet, aggressive competition from Korea, China and other manufacturing operations throughout Asia was becoming a threat to Sony's profitability in many of its established product areas. Not only were these new entrants competing on price, increasingly they were matching product specifications at lower cost. In the European business there were increasing demands from customers, both consumer and business, to develop more sophisticated support and service levels. Mike knew that Sony Europe was currently not configured to offer customised products and services and therefore to compete effectively in these areas. In addition, new technologies were being developed that would replace some of the areas Sony was traditionally dominant. For some of these new technologies, such as plasma TV, Sony has limited competencies, and therefore needs to buy the technology on the open market and integrate it into its products. Unfortunately competitors are also able to buy these technologies in the same market place. The brand proposition of Sony in these new product areas was not strong enough to command a premium. Mike Tsurumi's fear was that with competition catching up on product leadership, Sony could drift to a position where it was not able to command a premium on product alone and additionally might not offer value in operational effectiveness or customer intimacy. There was a clear fear that Sony might get ‘stuck in the middle’. A change needed to be driven to compete in new areas for Sony. Mike Tsurumi’s core objectives of the new business vision were then not to re-invent Sony in Europe but to create a quicker process of evolution. SGA (sales and administration expenses) had to be reduced drastically. Furthermore, the company needed to become a more responsive organisation and able to offer higher value services and more flexible solutions, particularly in the business and industrial areas. If value was falling in the area of product leadership then improvements needed to be made in the areas of customer intimacy and operational excellence. Sony was not configured to do this and it would require a major change process to achieve it. However, in contrast to previous senior management thinking within Sony Europe, Mike Tsurumi was emphasising that “structure was not the answer”.
4 A continuous process of change
The problem with change at Sony Europe is that some of the problems have invariably been tackled before, with more or less success. History cuts across thinking in the present and Mike had to make sense of this history for people in the current context. There were deeper waves of change taking place that also reflected the continued internationalisation of the business. Two historical eras had left their inheritance on the problems Mike Tsurumi faced.
The era of Jack Schmuckli and Ron Sommer (1986 – 1998)
The perceived need for stronger regional coordination for Sony Europe dates back to 1986. By then the number of sales operations had grown to 12. Additionally there were 6 manufacturing facilities across Europe. The newly appointed CEO and Chairman of Sony Europe GmbH at the time, Jack Schmuckli (a Swiss national) initiated the set up of a European headquarters in Cologne, Germany. The German market represented the largest European market for Sony in Europe. Through the set up of pan – European committees, managerial decisions were intended to be steered at a European level. One such committee was the Consumer and Marketing Committee where common distribution strategies for Sony’s consumer products were developed (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). With the recession in the early 1990s, the focus of pan-European coordination emphasised consolidation and cost savings. Faced with declining prices and profit margins, the industry was rationalising its manufacturing operations. The increasing number of chain stores, country-based and pan-European buying groups in the market meant that distribution strategies needed to be harmonised on a European level. The huge majority of Sony’s European accounts were present in more than one country and chain stores and buying groups were shopping around for “best deals” playing country sales organisations of Sony out against one another (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). Also, it was felt that Sony Europe should increase its influence on Sony Japan. It was felt that rather than being represented through individual country organisations, in order to increase their influence, the European organisations should speak with “One Voice” to Sony Japan (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). Under the leadership of Ron Sommer, former president of Sony USA, Sony Europe’s organisation had been restructured. Jack Schmuckli had brought in Ron Sommer to head the newly created COO position within Sony Europe. A new structure was formally announced in October 1993 termed the “Big Bang”. The restructuring efforts were completed by early 1994. Its main focus was the creation of several new headquarters functions which changed the role of country management significantly: Consumer Marketing Europe (CME) – Established to consolidate European marketing activities. Five product group heads would be responsible for line-up decisions, pricing, advertising and promotions, purchasing and inventory management – all areas previously dealt with my country level management.
Consumer Sales – The region was split into four territories each headed by a Regional Sales Director responsible for all sales and dealer relationships in their respective territories. Support Operations – Furthermore, IT, Logistics and Customer Service were put into a newly established headquarters function. Two areas were perceived to be crucial in terms of how they were addressed by the reorganisatio: lineup decisions and logistics, including inventory management. The idea was to replace individual countryby-country line-up deals with one European line-up decision. Similarly, by centralising logistics Sony Europe hoped to significantly lower inventory levels (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). In an interview Ron Sommer had expressed his hope the “Big Bang” restructuring would eventually lead to cutting SGA (Sales and general administration expenses) from a level of 16% down to 10% of sales (Sony Europe (A), 1998). Evidently the new structure curtailed the areas of responsibility and the level of influence of country management significantly. The product managers of the individual countries were no longer directly involved with marketing decisions, including line-up decisions with Tokyo. Instead, they were put into a direct reporting relationship with Consumer Marketing Europe (CME). Indeed, there was widespread resistance by the “country kings” who uttered doubts of whether the new organisation was really necessary (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). Furthermore, Tokyo was concerned that the new bureaucratic layer created by the new structure would distance the product groups from those closest to the markets. So from its very beginning the “Big bang” project was facing problems of “buy in” both from the country management level and from Sony Corporation in Tokyo. Moreover, another problem, emerged. Because of the way Sony Europe had developed, there was clearly a shortage of qualified managers to take on the more strategic roles created by the reorganisation. At this point in time, talent management within Sony Europe (as in so many other organisations at the time) was not yet seen as being strategically important. The McKinsey “War for Talent” analysis (Michaels, Handfield-Jones and Axelrod, 2001) that brought the issue of talent management centre stage was still some years away. In October 1994, the VP of Consumer Marketing Europe (CME) resigned from his post after less than a year of his appointment (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a). In November 1994, Ron Sommer appointed Shin Takagi, previously the country manager UK, to VP-CME. This decision was taken despite the knowledge that Takagi had openly criticised the central role of CME and had questioned the feasibility of a pan-European marketing function. Upon his appointment, Takagi shifted HQ functions back to country management. This also included inventory management, where CME was to act as a
coordinating force, but country level management assumed total responsibility (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998b). In 1995, Ron Sommer resigned to take on an external position. In December 1998, Jack Schmuckli retired as Chairman & CEO of Sony Europe. In 1999, Otto Zich was appointed Chairman & CEO of Sony Europe.
The era of Otto Zich (1999 - 2002)
Under the leadership of Otto Zich, there was a renewed effort to re-organise the business and to take advantage of some of the obvious economies of scale of operations across 23 European countries. A research project was commissioned using an external consultancy. As a result a comprehensive panEuropean re-engineering programme was started in early 2000, to reduce the many duplicated activities across each of the sales country operations and across the existing business groups. The project was resourced using a leading international consultancy firm working alongside Sony internal managers. After many false starts and frequent changes to the original scope the project was terminated in late 2001. Much of the value of the re organisation was lost due to the constant compromises made when local needs and centralised requirements came into conflict. The project was never completed and the failure to implement it was widely seen as a victory for the local country operations who had resisted attempts to integrate them into European Business Units. There was an enduring feeling, acknowledged at the top level within the business, that if the European management team asked for something to be done, a local manager could and would, play lip service to the request. Then if the central initiative failed, there would be no consequence or sanction taken with the local non co-operative manager. In April 2002, Otto Zich was reassigned to another Sony Europe role.
The era of Mike Tsurumi (2002 – 2004)
Ending an era of European leadership, as of April 1, 2002, Michaiki (Mike) Tsurumi, took over as president of Sony Europe (this was the first time the title “president” was used within Sony Europe). Since its origin of operations in Europe the top executive of Sony had always been either European or American nationals, reflecting Sony Corporation’s belief in the localisation of management. Under the leadership of Mike Tsurumi, the European Executive Committee (EEC) proposed a new organisational structure for Sony Europe. The EEC comprises as members the head of corporate planning; head of HR; head of Engineering, Customer Service and Manufacturing division (EMCS); head of the professional business; head of sales; head of marketing as well as the President himself.
To these senior executives it was clear that Sony Europe needed to reposition itself against the stiffening competition. The SGA percentage needed to be reduced, a percentage far higher than other Sony regions and most of the current competition. The consistent themes underlying all past change management efforts had been: Creating “One Voice” to Japan and the market place; Pan – European infrastructure harmonisation; Reduction in SGA overall.
In Mike Tsurumi’s time these themes were compounded by the evolving hyper-competition in the consumer electronics industry. While past change efforts had been addressing exactly these issues, they had all failed! Mike realised that Sony finally needed to create some synergy across the group, reduce unnecessary duplication of work and increase the efficiency of the operations by sharing some centralised resources. Additionally, Sony Europe needed to become more customer responsive and needed a real increase in the volume of sales in some new product areas and also needed to phase out products which had come to the end of their lifecycle (e.g. Cathode Ray Tube TV and computer monitors). To start the process of organisational renewal, Mike Tsurumi started with an organisational restructuring to reflect European business. This involved the creation of pan-European platforms in the functional areas of HR, Finance, Sales, Marketing and infrastructure. An example of this new structure for European Marketing is given in Figure 1. This in effect was an attempt to reduce complexity of the old structure, where these functional areas were replicated within each business division. Figure 1: New structure of European Marketing introduced during the era of Mike Tsurumi
Key: HAVE= Home Audio Visual Euroep PAE = Personal Audio Europe EMCS = Engineering Manufactrure Customer Service, Europe NACS = Network Applications Content Solutions, CRM = Customer Relationship Management BG = Business Group
Until early 2002, there were three main divisions: Consumer electronics sold to the public, business and professional broadcast equipment and services sold to key professional customers and in addition original equipment manufacturing products sold into the industrial markets. These products and services were provided by group businesses, called AV/IT (Audio Visual / Information Technology), BPE (Broadcast and Professional Europe) and CNCE (Core-Technology Network Company Europe). In the new organisational structure local sales companies in every country were working under the guidance of the sales platform (a central office attempting to coordinate sales on a pan-European level). The new structure had two main focuses of business, Consumers and Business customers. The other two divisional structures were to cover the supply chain: Engineering, Customer Service and Manufacturing (EMCS) and Corporate Services. In addition there were a number of corporate functions based in the new European headquarters in Berlin 1 , as well as business group head offices in Amsterdam or Basingstoke. The new structure was announced in June 2002 at the European Management Conference held in Brussels. It was evident to Mike Tsurumi and the members of the EEC that a change in the organisational structure was only the beginning and was not the answer to the problems Sony Europe was facing. True change required a new way of working across the operations within Europe. It required a new mindset within the management, a change in managers’ thinking and behaviour. Given the many change management projects the company had gone through over the last years, there were clear signs of change fatigue. Two trains of attitude could be observed. These attitudes were embodied by the two statements, not attributed to any individual but often heard on management meetings: "We are changing all the time, its nothing new, here its part of the way we work" and " If you keep your head down and stay quiet, carry on as normal it will all blow over, we've seen these European change projects come and go, this will be the same"
Years after the German reunification, Sony’s European headquarters was relocated from Cologne to Berlin. In 2000, the Sony Centre – designed by the architect Helmut Jahn – was opened in a high profile ceremony.
Mike Tsurumi knew that he needed to address both the general signs of change fatigue and the traditional but specific change resistance by country level management. Also, he felt that whilst most managers understood and accepted the necessity of the new structure, they did not fully understand the magnitude of the threat Sony was facing in its rapidly changing business environment. For the change effort under his leadership to be successful it was imperative to create not only an intellectual but also an emotional “buy in” at all levels of Sony Europe. Rather than the change effort being a topdown imposed grand masterplan, it was necessary for it to turn into a true hearts and minds campaign. In order to win hearts and minds an organisation needs its managers to first identify with the goals, then to actually internalise the requisite changes into their own way of thinking and behaviour, to show commitment in terms of emotional engagement, and to feel a sense of shared psychological ownership of the change programme (Sparrow and Cooper, 2003). Of these, what was lacking and needed was an effective means to communicate the urgency of change and to create emotional “buy in”!
Task As internal consultants to Mike Tsurumi and Sony’s European Executive Committee (EEC) you have received a request by Mike Tsurumi to come up with a plan to design and implement a change management initiative to ensure the success of the newly proposed organisational structure. The initiative needs to be completed in nine months. Sony Europe is prepared to set aside a significant amount of resources for your project. You can opt for the help of external consultants and/ or draw on internal resources. As an initial task to see whether you are really up to the challenge, Mike Tsurumi has asked you and your team to present to him your plan (including analysis of situation, different options for action, business case, implementation plan and a clear idea and ways of how success of your initiative can subsequently be proven). A lot of work needs to be done – Clearly identifying the external and internal challenges Sony Europe is faced with, addressing these challenges through an appropriate change management strategy and so on… You should present your way forward making use of appropriate analytical frameworks. As an initial guide to solving this task you may focus on the following questions. 1. What are Sony Europe’s key external and internal challenges addressed in the case? 2. What appear to be some of the underlying assumptions and beliefs within Sony in terms managing senior executives? What possible explanations do you have for these assumptions and beliefs? 3. Why have previous change initiatives failed and what steps does the company need to take to make the future change programme a success? 4. What possible options do you have in order to address these challenges?
5. What are the crucial steps in the design stage you need to take in order to assess in the future that your change management initiative was a success? 6. What does the implementation stage of your change management initiative look like? What resources do you opt for? 7. How would you know that your initiative was a success?
Financial Times. 2005. Sony still gloomy on electronics unit. April 28, 2005 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998a. Sony Europa (A). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0488 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998b. Sony Europa (B). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0489 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998c. Sony Europa (C). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0490 Michaels, E., Handfield-Jones, H. and Axelrod, B. 2001. The War For Talent. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Sparrow, P.R. and Cooper, C.L. 2003. The Employment Relationship: Key Challenges for HR. London: Butterworth Heinemann.
SONY EUROPE - THE LEADERHIP JOURNEY CASE B: DELIVERING CHANGE
Werner Braun, PA Consulting Group Mark Wilcox, Sony Europe Paul Sparrow, Centre for Performance-Led HR, Lancaster University
Management of change, Leadership
How to quote or cite this document
Braun, W., Wilcox, M. and Sparrow, P.R. (2007). Sony Europe – The Leadership Journey. Case B: Delivering Change. Lancaster University Management School Case Study, Number 2007-01, available: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk
After an assessment of the industry challenges Sony Europe was faced with, and an assessment of the history of change within the company and the internal challenges presented (see Sony Europe – The Leadership Journey Case A: A History of Change), Mike Tsurumi committed the HR Europe group to provide a means of building deep understanding and emotional commitment to his change efforts and the re-organisation of the company. “The Leadership Journey” was the response created out of the analysis of the current situation and the need to carry employees and senior staff along with the changes and to make them feel part of the process. Rather than the change effort being a top-down imposed grand masterplan, it was necessary for it to turn into a true hearts and minds campaign. In order to win hearts and minds an organisation needs its managers to first identify with the goals, then to actually internalise the requisite changes into their own way of thinking and behaviour, to show commitment in terms of emotional engagement, and to feel a sense of shared psychological ownership of the change programme (Sparrow and Cooper, 2003). Of these, what was lacking and needed was an effective means to communicate the urgency of change and to create emotional “buy in”!
Analysis of needs
Having received the mandate from Mike Tsurumi, HR Europe started by conducting an analysis of needs regarding the envisaged change process. This involved in-depth interviews with members of the two top
tiers of executives within Sony Europe. The first tier comprises twenty senior executives; the second level executives of approximately 30 managers cover major country roles and European business unit heads. While interviews were conducted with all managers from the first tier, interviews were carried out with a smaller sample of the second managerial level. The interviews showed a remarkable range of understanding of the vision regarding the change and a greater range of views on how this change would be implemented. It emerged that the major challenge for any initial event with this top executive team would be in aligning their views with the views of the EEC, building a strong team at the top level and to generate a strong commitment to the change process. The interviews showed that there was no depth of relationship within the top management tier. It appeared that the top executive team had not met in one room together ever before except to hear presentations from Japan. They had only met to make decisions in smaller boards or for specific single-issue projects. As a European executive group there was no mandate to meet or discuss strategy. As a consequence, it was of little surprise to find in the interviews with the second tier of executives a sense of perceived lack of consistency in behaviour and views of the top team regarding the change process within the organisation. There was also a perceived mix of levels of commitment to the changes ahead. Evidently, this inconsistency of the top team was seen as a major obstacle to achieving commitment to change from employees further down the hierarchy. With inconsistent messages sent from the top, these senior managers simply did not act as appropriate role models to commit the next management level to the change process. From this analysis, HR Europe proposed that a change management support programme would need to address the following objectives: To build a depth of personal relationships within the top team; To develop a deep understanding of the challenges and opportunities the new organisation and new vision of change presented; To explore the behaviours and leadership styles that would create success in the new organisation; To create real opportunity for dialogue about the future of Sony Europe and the role of the top team in driving forward the business. Furthermore, Mike Tsurumi felt that the change management support programme should aim to encourage an atmosphere of trust and honesty and to remove the veneer of politeness and acquiescence that often showed in management meetings. Tsurumi wanted people to "speak the unspeakable" and to openly and honestly disagree rather than pay lip service to concepts and project plans.
These objectives were used as a starting point for the initial design. Further refinement of the programme was made after taking into account the input from the participant interviews. HR Europe proposed that their change management support programme should be based on an Outdoor Management Development (OMD) programme, applying an experiential learning approach. The objective was to target at first the 50 most senior executives within Europe, and eventually cascade participation at the programme down the hierarchy to less senior management levels.
Setting up the OMD design team
In order to ensure the use of cutting edge knowledge, and to ensure a close fit between the OMD programme and Sony’s corporate culture, HR Europe drew on both internal and external resources when setting up the OMD design team and when commencing the actual design process (see figure 1). Internal Sony expertise would shape the format whilst using external consultants and training providers to test and enhance the design. This process was carried out both in real time meetings and in an online private project space created on a web collaboration platform owned by Sony but accessible to outside users. This asynchronous collaboration tool facilitated work within the multi-national team working across four time zones. Furthermore, the programme needed to reflect the international nature of the participants and the organisation. This needed to be considered both in the selection of members for the design team and for external speakers presented in the actual event. Design team members included Sony Europe’s Director People & Organisation, an American change management consultant, a consultant from a British OMD training organisation and a British communications and learning consultancy. In addition the external management speakers used were from Sweden, Singapore, Britain and for part of the early design a management guru from the Netherlands.
Figure 1: The OMD design team – Getting the mix right
The design process was iterative. At regular intervals the core team tested the draft design with internal business managers for relevance. External sources were used to give additional input to the process. The iterative process allowed for the inclusion of emerging needs into the final design. Enhancing the effectiveness of the OMD programme It was evident to HR Europe that if not properly designed, an OMD activity could easily slip into just “a fun time away from the office” for participants without realising the objectives set by the initial analysis of needs. On the other hand, if designed appropriately, it could turn into an intensive and memorable learning event. In order to achieve this, it was understood that the event would need to be tightly connected to real business issues Sony Europe was in need to address. Furthermore, it needed to be an intense and challenging, out of the normal experience for managers, encouraging self-facilitation and selfreview based on business critical issues. One of the real benefits of OMD is that the participants are out of their normal work comfort zone and this has some psychological effects on their openness to learning. It was further realised that the use of metaphors would aid in enhancing the intensity of the experience as well as in facilitating the learning process of participants. Metaphors are powerful ways to communicate complex ideas and can often communicate at deeper levels than that provided by factual speech. Especially within the context of change the use of a wellselected metaphor can stimulate more thinking about the core subject than straight narrative or factual presentation.
The design team opted for metaphors around which a programme design could be built which could recreate some of the common stages of change: I.e. recognition that change was needed, creating alternative futures and choices, creating a sense of urgency, communication of need and direction, mobilising to action, forcing participants to develop implementation plans, measuring success and learning capture. The metaphors chosen needed to create powerful images and frameworks of understanding from the change process within Sony. Two interlinked metaphors chosen were that of a Leadership journey and by using the James Bond genre, the creation of a mission to save the world from an evil villain. The metaphor of a journey is easily accessible and cross-culturally valid and conveys strong messages of endeavour, route planning, terrain changes, meeting new people, a destination, uncertainly, and excitement. All of these factors are present in the process of organisational re-newel and provide a framework to view the process. In order to increase the strength of the metaphor, it was decided that the OMD programme would take place in the Swiss Alps, and that the participants would go through a real and concrete journey (covering 60 miles of Swiss mountain terrain). The language of the journey was used extensively in all the communications associated with the programme and in the continuing change implementation. As can be seen from figure 2, key terms in the change process were adapted to the journey metaphor. It has since become the de-facto image of change in Sony Europe. Figure 2: Adaptation of key terms to the chosen “journey” metaphor
The use of the journey metaphor allowed a great deal of scope for creative design and the opportunity to make strong links directly back to the change process continuing in the business. The idea of a journey suggested a starting point and choices, not a final destination or event. This was an important perception to build and maintain. The additional metaphorical layer of a “Mission to Save the World” created some context for the journey to take place and for executives to be moving around the Swiss Alps. This was provided by a secret agent story line introduced in the early part of the programme. The mission was a vehicle to communicate the urgency of change, give direction, mobilise action and force implementation plans. Furthermore, it facilitated the introduction of many external elements such as logistics problems, transport methods, mountain top searches and external expert speakers. Besides, given the international and cross-cultural mix of the participants, the James Bond genre was chosen for its wide international recognition. This allowed for the injection of some memorable locations and challenging team projects as well as place the whole experience into an enjoyable context. The James Bond characters used were M and Miss Moneypenny (both were professional actors shot in vignettes and shown as video links to the participants). The mission embedded into the content of the programme led the participants to clues and descriptions of places they needed to visit. In this way the event was unfolding before them rather than going through a pre-determined plan. The experience was one of taking part in some real live event, changing and responding to new information and different choices the group could make. The only information participants would have would be what they discovered on their journey. Recreating some common stages of change, the story line and scenario created an initial need to change or take action but in a way that was not so transparent that the participants could immediately as a group agree on the way forward. Throughout the mission references were built in to the programme to enhance the metaphor. The evil villain within the mission story line and who wanted to take over the world was called 'Nino Sapac' - this was an anagram of Panasonic - one of the traditional competitors of Sony. Everything possible was used to make links to Sony. The successful completion of the mission required small group work and close co-operation whilst working in separate areas of the local terrain isomorphicaly matched to the business situation. Success on the mission and in the event would only come from the initiative, understanding and co-operation of all the participants. This was again a clear metaphor for the behaviour that would be required to be successful in the real challenge of change implementation in Sony. The main stages of change and the linkage in the story line and design of the workshop are mapped out in table 1. The design team knew that it was not enough to replicate a change process through the use of metaphors. The Leadership journey needed to be tightly connected to the real business issues Sony Europe was facing. Also, it should have a learning impact on each individual and the perception of their leadership role in the context of change. The entire programme of the Leadership Journey was built on
several threads (namely: the physical journey, the change model, the business change journey and a personal leadership journey) which needed to be tightly connected in timing and activity through programme delivery.
Table 1: Change process steps, OMD design and implications for participants
The physical journey through the Swiss Alps and mission combination created lots of opportunity to engineer activities to highlight some of the most common change model stages (see table 1). The business change journey issues would be addressed either when external experts gave input to the group or when there was dialogue sessions amongst the participants. The personal leadership journey was catered for in the team activities, the dialogue sessions and the learning capture activities that each person was asked to complete in the evenings of the project. Learning capture activities were designed to stimulate reflection and learning, they were carried out in the context of the mission but addressed real issues relevant to the leadership behaviours in Sony. Each participant was asked to complete the exercises alone in their own time and then “posted” them into a mobile letterbox completely anonymously. The data was collated after each event, interpreted and printed into a learning map of each event. The metaphor continuing with the “Map” of their learning process arriving after each event to individuals’ desks. The Map was a bespoke professionally printed and presented AO size account of their learning and main messages from the external speakers. Furthermore, activities were filmed and together with the learning capture results collated on a DVD for later use of the participants. Depending on the success of the programme, it was believed that participants would use this collated material to disseminate the objectives, experiences and results of the programme to their colleagues within Sony Europe. The cross over between the individual Leadership journey threads is shown conceptually in figure 3. Activities bridge the real physical journey into the change model. Each of these trigger some thinking regarding how this would affect the Sony business change situation. It was hoped that this would lead to some effect on the individual's perception of their leadership role in the context of change. This also closed the loop on the experiential learning cycle. Figure 3: Connecting the Leadership Journey threads
Delivering the programme The initial programme took place in the Swiss Alps in October 2002 involving 18 of the most senior executives. As a result of the success of the first programme additional groups of executives were invited to attend the programme and there were four events in total running from October until early November 2002. A specialist support team provided by one of the supplier consortium managed the total logistics of the journey. The transfer of luggage through to the organisation of safety equipment for specialist activities like rock climbing was their responsibility. In order to maximise the effect of the programme on the executives, details of the event could not be revealed. Invitations sent out to the participants were held deliberately vague. The invitation gave only a short description of the programme methodology, the event location and facilitation support. It did tell the participants they would go on a journey but gave no details of accommodation or contact numbers etc. A balance was attempted between giving enough information so people would attend and having so much that it seemed routine and predictable. Upon arrival of the evening of the first day, participants attended a presentation of an industry journalist. This was an expert on technology of the future and future scenarios. By setting the scene for the next few years of the global economy he made the participants aware of Sony’s future should the company not adapt to its changing business environment. The second day started off with a presentation by Mike Tsurumi, presenting the requirements and rationale of the new structure and the change process ahead of Sony Europe. His presentation was interrupted by a video satellite simulation. A government official of an external inter governmental organisation (representing the James Bond character M) was requesting the delegates for emergency help. This request triggered the time-pressured, high-energy programme across the five days, involving intensive team-based problem solving, self- and group reflection, scenario building etc, interlinked with external speakers whose objective was to shake people up, confront them with the rapidly changing business reality and present them with some of the most cutting edge ideas in current management thinking. The facilitation of the business discussions built into the programme was mainly the responsibility of the executives themselves, with some light interventions by members of the OMD design team. The external speakers were not formally announced but appeared as specialists brought in as part of the story line. The content of their presentations and discussions was very clearly targeted at the situation Sony was currently in or might find itself in soon. On the evening of the second day, participants attended a presentation by Jonas Ridderstrale, a radical Swedish Business Professor and author of “Funky Business”. In this presentation he focused on what
business needs to do to grow and retain talent in the new economy and how to energise people to be innovative inside an organisation. On day three a presentation by Tan Teng Kee focused on Sony’s competition in the East Asian region. Tan Teng Kee is an entrepreneur who has created business in China, Singapore, and worked for large US and European business. On day four a presentation was given by Simon Woodroffe, an English new business entrepreneur. His focus was on achieving the impossible in business. He runs a chain of businesses in the UK and Europe with lots of innovation. Day five concluded the programme with final words by Mike Tsurumi. The journey was designed to be physical as well as mental and needed to contain both team elements and reliance on individual activity and responsibility. To replicate this the participants took part in activities along the route that would offer opportunities to work together in small teams and individually. None were compulsory but the team decided along with each individual who did what and to what degree. The activities included, sailing small boats, kayaks, climbing, railways transport, mountain bikes, cable cars, mountain top walks, problem solving on clue trails, map reading, and also the co-ordination of finding their hotel base for each night. In one early part of the journey a small sub-team of 6 would need to navigate a lake journey of some 3 kilometres in four kayaks, collecting some clue information from remote parts of the lake, whist making a rendezvous with the rest of the team via waiting transport in the form of a minibus taxi. Their task was completely independently organised and self contained, but was part of the success of the whole matrix of the save the world scenario. In parallel other teams completed other tasks.
The Leadership Journey and beyond
Evaluation of the programme was conducted using a variety of methods. Design evaluation was carried out with each group at the end of the programme. This took the form of a feedback session in the final part of the programme on the format of the programme and on specific content issues. The results of this feedback shaped subsequent iterations of the event. A second evaluation method was used to survey the total participants of the programme after a reasonable period of time back in the business. It was decided to wait for the immediate halo and buzz of the programme to subside and then try to obtain a more meaningful evaluation when people were back in their day to day roles. The third method for evaluation of the programme was opportunity interviews with a sample of the executive groups. This was carried out from the end of the first programme and continued for three months. In this time a wide sample of first and second level executives were consulted on how they thought the programme had contributed to the change process.
When Mike Tsurumi looked at the evaluation resulting from the programme he realised that the programme was overall a success. From the more informal interviews he had heard that a large number of participants had used the DVD and learning maps to tell their colleagues about the event. Additionally, the survey had shown that 78% of the surveyed participants thought that the event developed a deep understanding of the challenges and opportunities for Sony Europe. 70% thought that the event created a real opportunity for dialogue about the future of Sony Europe and the role of the top team. 57% believed that they could contribute more to the change process lying ahead of Sony Europe. On the other hand one figure worried Mike Tsurumi a bit. Only 41% believed that the programme explored the behaviours and leadership styles sufficiently that will create success in the new organisation. Did the programme really produce the desired effects of building deeper personal relationships within the top team? Intellectual “buy in” into the change process had not been the problem. It was more the emotional “buy in” Mike Tsurumi had been worried about. Had the Leadership Journey really achieved this? Did the top executive of Sony Europe really change their leadership styles and behaviours which would result in a truly pan-European organisation which could both reduce its cost-base and additionally become more responsive, able to offer higher value services and more flexible solutions, particularly in the business and industrial areas? Mike Tsurumi had managed to put European structures in place. Overall cost to the business and its back office had been reduced. E.g. In one project the cost of infrastructure to the business was reduced by 134 € million in the three years since the Leadership Journey (ahead of schedule and on target with regards to cost savings). Furthermore, by mid 2004 the SGA figure had been reduced to 17%. The delivery of change was co-ordinated by a project called Triumphe Europe in four main areas: Growth, Innovation, Efficiency and Talent. Regular project meetings were set up with Mike Tsurumi and the head of corporate planning and the six sigma office to track progress on over 200 sub projects under the four heading areas. On the other hand, there were no hard measures with regards to changes in executive leadership styles and behaviours. There was a widespread belief and feeling within Sony Europe that there was a marked attitude change of people who had participated in the Leadership Journey compared to those that had just heard about it. What was lacking were quantifiable metrics to back this up. But was it at all possible to quantify this “softer” side of the Leadership Journey? The need for metrics on top management’s attitude and leadership behaviour was evident and eventually this led to drastic changes with regards to how talent management was conducted within Sony Europe (one of the four areas of Triumphe Europe). Sony Europe had no history of assessing its senior executives. There was a strong underlying belief and assumption within Sony Europe that evaluating the leadership quality of senior executives through
rigorous assessment was neither appropriate nor acceptable. It was not politically acceptable to put executives, some of whom with responsibility in excess of 1 billion €, through similar kinds of assessment as fresh-out-of-college graduates. The Leadership Journey and the resultant lack of metrics on executive attitude and leadership behaviour had led to a change in this underlying belief. As a result, Sony Europe approached Egon Zehnder International (EZI) (a leading search and selection consultancy with a wealth of expertise in executive assessment) in order to introduce an assessment process for its senior executives. Bringing in EZI had two major advantages: First, of all the engagement of a well-known consultancy added credibility of the ensuing assessment process in the eyes of the assessed executives. Secondly, EZI provided access to external benchmarking data which allowed Sony to compare their senior executives against top talent in the market. For each executive the assessment process involved two in-depth interviews with senior consultants from EZI. The first interview would be conducted by a member of the core team of four partners. The second interviewer would be from the same cultural background as the executive. Each interview took approximately 2-3 hours. The second part of the process was to follow up on the executive’s 360-degree nomination list. This was again conducted by EZI, cross referencing their findings against the reports and feedback from people the executives had nominated to give feedback. The output was a high-quality feedback report, delivered verbally and accompanied by a clear written report. The feedback session was delivered by one of the interviewing consultants and attended by one of the directors of HR for each of the European business groups. Within two months of starting the programme, three positions in senior management were reassigned. In more than one situation it was realised that there was a misalignment of talent, so people with clear ability and passion were somehow found in roles that did not play to their strengths. As a result Sony became more sophisticated and more confident with its people succession plans and more willing to act on the data provided by the assessment (Wilcox and Ensser, 2005). Looking back at his past years as president of Sony Europe, Mike Tsurumi knew that the Leadership Journey was considered to be a big success within Sony. The Leadership Journey had backed up the restructuring process “emotionally”. It had led to far-reaching change projects and it had built commitment behind these projects. The company was on its way of making a pan-European Sony a reality, SGA figures were decreasing and the company showed signs of becoming more customer focused. Furthermore, and perhaps even more importantly, the Leadership Journey had led to changes and challenges of underlying assumptions and beliefs regarding the management of its senior employees. It had made these assumptions visible. This was most evident with regards to the issue of talent management where some of Sony’s culturally embedded taken-for-granted assumptions had been challenged. Overall, Mike knew that he had taken the right decisions in the last years. However, in retrospect he was thinking whether the top management engagement programme (the Leadership Journey) could have been designed and delivered in an even more effective way? Had they overlooked
some of the taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in Sony’s corporate culture? In what way could these assumptions have been pre-empted, or were their discovery part of the change journey? Would the Leadership Journey and the entire engagement process have looked different, if Sony Europe had had its new talent management processes in place before the Leadership Journey? Could they have measured and tracked changes of the “softer” side of leadership attitude and behaviour in a more effective way? Had they measured the Return of Investment of the Leadership Journey in the best possible way?
In parallel to the events taking place in Sony Europe, fundamental changes were occurring at corporate level. In June 2005 Sir Howard Stringer was appointed as the new Chief Executive of Sony. Parallels were drawn to the appointment of Carlos Ghosn at Nissan, where a foreigner was appointed to successfully revive an ailing Japanese brand. Analysts noted that Sony was searching for the “optimal corporate structure” and needed to encourage co-operation between its business “silos”. They believed that by granting independence to operating units the group had sacrificed the benefits of integration and co-operation (Financial Times, 2005) . Sony also faced a choice as to whether it intended to focus more closely on the hardware side of the business or pursue an aggressive strategy of hardware-content convergence. In response to this debate, by September 2005 Sony unveiled its mid-term strategy plan which outlined a series of restructuring measures over the next three years aimed at bringing the core electronics business back into profitability, reforming the company’s culture and changing its business structure (Nakamoto, 2005a). The electronics division comprised more than 60 per cent of Sony’s revenues, but after three years of losses and high restructuring charges in 2005 this division was impacting overall profitability, which was reduced from a forecast of Y30 billion ($270 million) in July 2005 to a loss of Y20 billion by September 2005. The plan was seen as strict but practical. It involved lowering costs and reorganising the group structure, spinning off or divesting non-core businesses, bringing greater focus to the electronics operations (Nakamoto, 2005b). 10,000 jobs will be cut by March 2008, split 50:50 between the HQ/ administration staff and non-administration, and 40:60 Japan to overseas operations. Y200 billion of costs will be cut in order to establish an operating profit margin of 5% by 2008. The number of product models will be cut by 20% and 15 unprofitable product categories cut. Manufacturing sites will be consolidated with 11 factories closed. The network of Sony companies will be reorganised into five groups, two units and one division and the loss-making TV unit will continue to be restructured with the closure of product lines for cathode ray tube sets and the transfer of resources into LCD and rear-projection TVs. Profitability for the TV unit was set for the second half of 2006. By January 2006 Sony reported an unexpectedly strong performance in the third quarter, which took many analysts by surprise. Sales were up 10 per cent and operating income up 47 per cent. It was concluded that the electronics to entertainment group appeared to be finally on firmer footing and by July 2006, less than 18 months after Sir Howard Stringer's appointment as chairman and chief executive, he
had been able to report improved first quarter profits for the first time in four years (Nakamoto, M. and Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2006). Other issues were to hit Sony, such as a quality problem with computer batteries, but with regard to the cultural change process in European operations, it was clear that in the end, the impetus for radical restructuring came from the corporate changes in the Japanese HQ. Intellectually, the solution pursued at HQ could have been diagnosed a while back, but the emotional buyin to a radical change agenda had already been tackled in the European operations. Did the behavioural and relational change strategy initiated by Mike Tsurumi at Sony Europe enable successful execution of the corporate strategy? As Sir Howard Stringer noted when announcing the mid-term strategy: “… it is imperative that we deliver results, keep our promises, and achieve our targets at each milestone”.
Task Looking at the Leadership Journey and its resultant outcomes… 1. How do you evaluate the Leadership Journey? Reflecting on it post hoc, what are key lessons learned? From your perspective today, what could have been possible improvements in the design, implementation and assessment stage? 2. What are the lessons with regards to culturally embedded, underlying assumptions and beliefs about senior management at Sony Europe? How has the history of change programmes shaped the Leadership Journey?
Financial Times (2005) The corporate world’s constant midlife crisis. Financial Times, 22 p. 12
Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. (1998a) Sony Europa (A). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0488 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. (1998b) Sony Europa (B). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0489 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. (1998c) Sony Europa (C). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0490 Nakamoto, M. (2005a) Investors to keep a close eye on Sony strategy. Financial Times, 22 p. 17.
Nakamoto, M. (2005b) Sony plays safe and sets practical targets. Financial Times, 23 September, p. 18 Nakamoto, M. and Edgecliffe-Johnson, A. (2006) Quality control poser clouds Sony revelry. th Financial Times, October 19 . Sparrow, P.R. and Cooper, C.L. (2003) The Employment Relationship: Key Challenges for HR. London: Butterworth Heinemann. Wilcox, M. and Ensser, M. (2005) Talent Management: Walking the Talk. CriticalEye. June-August 2005: 20-24
LECTURE NOTES SONY EUROPE CASE A - A HISTORY OF CHANGE SONY EUROPE CASE B - DELIVERING CHANGE
Werner Braun, PA Consulting Group Mark Wilcox, Sony Europe Paul Sparrow, Centre for Performance-Led HR, Lancaster University
The two case studies Sony Europe Case A – A History of Change and Sony Europe Case B – Delivering Change are written at a time when Sony goes through significant organisational and cultural changes. In March 2005, the Sony CEO and Chairman Nobuyuki Idei was replaced by the first non-Japanese CEO Sir Howard Stringer. In response to the massive industry challenge the electronics division of Sony is facing, Idei had set a goal in 2003 to cut $3.2 billion from Sony’s cost structure by 2007, most of it from electronics. This involves the loss of 20,000 jobs (13% of the workforce), standardising parts, and cutting the number of global suppliers from 4,700 to 1,000. Analysts predict Sir Howard Stringer will have to go even further and estimate a further 10,000 jobs to go (Business Week, 2005). In fiscal year 2004 (ending March 31, 2005) Sony’s core electronics business, which had recently suffered sharp price drops, realised an operating loss of 34.3 billion yen ($323.6 million). In their view on Sony Europe’s most recent restructuring, the two case studies take a longitudinal approach by drawing on the valuable insights raised by three previous IMD case studies on Sony Europe published in association with the ECCH (Kashani and Kassarjian, 1998a,b,c). Both of the CPHR case studies touch on a wide array of subject areas within management teaching. Sony Europe Case A – A History of Change lends itself to being used as a strategy case. As a strategy case Sony Europe Case A – A History of Change could be used as a basis for industry and internal resources analysis. The industry evaluation within the case is in fact based on the Treacy and Wiersema (1995) model and was used by Sony Europe top management in order to communicate the industry threats the Electronics division is currently facing to senior management within the firm. In combination the two cases can be used for core HR courses including Strategic HRM, Strategic International HRM, Organisational Behaviour and Design as well as for a course introducing change management. The history of change initiatives and their failings documented in the Sony Europe case studies, furthermore, emphasise the evolution in management thinking over the last decades: From a Chandlerian view of “structure follows strategy” (Chandler, 1962) towards a stronger emphasis on the resource-based perspective of the firm (e.g. Hall and Saias, 1980).
The past change initiatives in the Schmuckli era clearly neglect an analysis of internal resources and their necessary development in order to create a successful outcome of the restructuring process. This is most evident with regards to talent management. Furthermore, there is a clear lack of leadership capability assessment. Evidence for this is also presented in the case study by Kashani and Kassarjian (1998a) who state that while some of the country managers within Sony Europe had been given positions in the new “Big bang” structure, by mid 1994, of the nearly 50 different positions, 10 were still vacant. Ron Sommer reacted by staffing these positions with young and eager managers from within the organisation, selling them as an opportunity for managers to develop (Kashani and Kassarjian (1998a). On a cultural note, it seems that the issue of “nemawashi” was neglected or underestimated during the restructuring of the Schmuckli era, with the result that prior to the beginning of the MBS cases, the firm faces change resistance both on a country management level as well as a corporate HQ level. As background information, Ron Sommer resigned from his position as COO of Sony Europe in 1995 and took up the position of CEO of the newly privatised Deutsche Telekom AG. The task description at the end of Sony Europe Case A – A History of Change is designed to put students into the role that HR Europe found itself in, designing and implementing a change management initiative to support the restructuring process proposed by Mike Tsurumi. The student proposals can then be linked with Sony Europe Case B – Delivering Change, which contains a detailed description of the Leadership Journey (a major and very sophisticated management engagement programme). Sony Europe Case B – Delivering Change is an ideal case to introduce key material on change management e.g. the framework developed by Kotter (1995) etc. One of the important outcomes of the Leadership Journey at Sony Europe was a revamping of the talent management processes, including the management calibration of senior management. Talent management and senior management assessment could be made a key discussion point in the case, especially since it can be assumed that an appropriate management assessment at Sony Europe would have significantly influenced the design of the Leadership Journey, had such processes already been in place before. The case could, therefore, serve very well as a discussion ground for such literature as the “War for Talent” (Michaels et al., 2001). The case could also be used for a discussion on how the “softer” side of change management initiatives i.e. attitudinal changes in senior managements’ behaviour could possibly be measured. Looking at recent developments in the HR literature (Becker et al., 2001; Huselid et al., 2005) and recent empirical studies with regards to HR metrics (e.g. Weiss and Finn, 2005), it becomes increasingly clear that HR functions need to establish a measurement system capturing leadership capability and competency development. Not only could such measures be used in order to evaluate the usefulness of management engagement programmes such as the Leadership Journey for particular managers, but it would also be a cornerstone in order to establish the Return on Investment of such programmes. This is exactly the area where
students/ lecturers could propose the biggest improvement steps for a programme such as the Leadership Journey, taking a post hoc perspective. The key protagonist of the two case studies, Mike Tsurumi retired effective April 1, 2004 as CEO of Sony Europe. His successor was Chris Deering. Prior to his new role Chris Deering was President & CEO of Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Ltd. (SCEE). Mike Tsurumi currently holds a retained consulting role for Sony Corporation and still resides within Europe. He acts as a mentor for new business development and remains highly respected within Sony Corporation and Sony Europe in particular.
Becker, B.E.; Huselid, M. A. and Ulrich, D. 2001. The HR scorecard. Boston, MA: HBS Press Business Week. 2005. Sony’s Sudden Samurai. March 21, 2005 Chandler, A.D. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Hall, D. and Saias, M. 1980. Strategy follows Structure. Strategic Management Journal, 1 (2): 149-163 Huselid, M. A.; Becker, B. E. and Beatty, R.W. 2005. The Workforce Scorecard. Boston, MA: HBS Press Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998. Sony Europa (A). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0488 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998. Sony Europa (B). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0489 Kashani, K. and Kassarjian, J.B.M. 1998. Sony Europa (C). IMD Working paper, IMD-5-0490 Kotter J.P. 1995. Leading Change: Why transformation efforts fail, Harvard Business Review, March April 1995. Michaels, E., Handfield-Jones, H. and Axelrod, B. 2001. The War For Talent. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Treacy M. and Wiersema F. 1995. The Discipline of Market Leaders, Cambridge: Perseus Weiss, D.S. and Finn, R. 2005. HR metrics that count: Aligning Human Capital Management to Business Results. Human Resource Planning, 28 (1): 33-39
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