* k ~ . , ­
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8 fEB 1941>
l t RNB
AI'O 109, U. S. Arm;y ,
5 October 1944.
SIlbJoct. G-4 ActiTitie. - Operation IWiltET
ro I Chio! of staft, XVUl Corps Airborne.
1. asien.
a. General .
To the limit ot our oapabUit1es to insure t hat good, 8JIIIlunition
am other
ouppl les we:e delivered to the 82d 1 A.1rbom e Divisions.
b. Specific.
( 1) Sinoe thi. Corps ..a. not part ot the troop. ""88Sed in t he
ope.l'a.tion" t heoretioally, we had no Jlpecitic responsibj,l. itiee.
(2) Because of t he Task Force Conmander ard. bilS bead uart. ers
cOJting t rom the British Anr.y and, theref ore, beins • __bat W>famlliar with
resupply procedure. , thi. heodqaarters accepted t he tollowiog specHlc r ....
• pcn.ibUitie• •
(a) To ..ccept the .fixed and on cell au re-supply no­
qa.ir«nente trol!l the dlvisionej to tranamit these requirsaente to Coamuni­
cations Zons; t o maintain active l iaioon between the dl.,.is ca, C wU.catlona
ne, arxi t he Air Forces; to lollow through on these aupplloa wrt.ll such
tim. aa the supplies were delivered t o the Air Forces on the departure
(b) To in the movement at the s$3borne echolons
on both divlsiollB from the United KingdolR to the to arc! cOlllbat area
(G-3 ;;ection) .
(3 ) At tho time of the oporatioQ, the consolidation of all
Troop Carrying forces aD:l all A1rborna ForcelJ umer one comma.rn hAd just
boen directed : The higher headquarters involved were now at t.hair jobs.
BecQUCle ot thi s, &1'Xl. beclluse t hese were our own divi si ons, thi s headquarter s,
althollgb not aocoptlog the r esponaibilit i es, act uelly per formed the f ollo....
ins odditional tunctions.
(a) "II••et up liaison at t he departure airtield. and
assisted t he Air Foroe in planni ng and f!DC.ecut ing t heir air r .... 'uppl,y functions .
nus invol ved co uting l ane requirsaents; eatablls t llgbt leheclules;
8stabllGhins, liaison between the divisions and the A1r FO.r089 and. within t he
Air Forces (i. e. - Between Troops Carrier Conmand arr::l t.he 490th ermast er
Dspct Company, a.pply); notit;ying division. of expected tiJRe ot arrival ot
e-suppl,. missions over the Drop Zone.
(b) 'lhrouglo the agoney of liaison otficers, w. did all
in our power to insure a smooth now of suppl ies from ground sources after
contact had been made with the ground torces.
I Dabt

, I
2. N8l'rative.
a. Prior to t he oper at1on.
(1 ) The epeeial gtaft ot t hi. headquart er. made a detailed
stud,y of the thad and call requir8l101lt . ot bot h div1oiol1ll and o""",11ad
an itOlllized llgt ot r equa emed.. t o be turui shad dsily and ot requir....
ments to be held at departure a.1..rtlelds, on call. A copy ot this list
was turnished to all interested agenci es and is attached.
( 2) Property on hand at depart ure ol.rf leld. wao carefully
invert.orlsed and t he shortages revsaled by thls inventory were brought
to the attention ot the agencies.
(3) Detsiled plan. were made and later euperY1.ed, to eee
to it that. the property on hand , at departure airf1elds, WIlBI prompt ly
cared .

(4) Appl'Oldmtoly fow-filt h. of t hlo r "':'.uppl y lte/llS were
Hence, the bulk of the wor k, i nvolvod in accomplishing t he
above, was done by the Ordnance Seot ion, thi s headqujp't era. It , JaG a
tremeooous t ask, lnvolving met i culous attent i on to :small, but important,
details . The task was ccompllsbed in an Gutstandingly s uceesstul
manner by a section f r eoh trc:m t he United states aai completal.:y unfamiliar
wit h airborne activiti es. 'lbe work of this section, during t he
is des erving ot the highest praise.
b. During the oper at i on.
(1) Fixed r.-supply.
(a) A table showing tonnage. actually deilver ed to
divisi ons , under·this s chedule, i s attached. In f'pl ann1cg dally div­
isi onal tonnage requir ements, the following est imates are as accurat e
as can be mat.! o, wit hout knowing the e.x.lict deiviliional. organi::z.at l OZl and.
the speci fic mission of the unit .
Class I 30 Tons
Cla•• nI 10 Tons
Class V 200 Tone
All othere 10 TOIlO
Total 250 Tons
(b) On D plus 1, a fhad re-.uppl mission ..... f lo""
by the Bemper Cccma.n:1 of the 8th Air For ce, B-24s were used. From. 75
t o 90 percent ,of the supplies delivered ctually reached t he troops on
the ground. These are, probably, the best r esults -.blch ave 6Ver been
obtained in tho [iold of parachute re-supply. UD1oubt edly. even bettor
results are pos8ible, i f t he Bomber Conmam I s given additional t l'ainirJg
in t hi s t ,ype of wor k. The principal reason f or suoh out standing sW)cese
on this, the tirst I-e-8upply mission eVer flown. b the BOIDbGl" Com:nand,
ani wi thout previous tra1n1ng_ ,"\
" I '
,,1 • fl Q L\

.,;: '

i . t he rae\. that the 1iI'.iM\ a,; . 1)' air5hl.p the" the C-47.
'the banber carrlera t ' . s possible t o drop t he whole
load i n Ll very r estri cted area. On t he . I a C-47 e&l"rlos from 9 t o
12 bundle., ot which i t b "".sibl e to drop 9 bundle. in a tairl,!' restr icted
area. Using equipment present ly provided, it i s not p083ible t o 8,Y'Oid scatte.r­
ing t he l ost three bundle• •
(c) Ths 9tb Troop Carrier Comman1 n ew t he remsin1!l8 re-s''Ppl,Y
missi ons.
!.. In setting up t"e-supply missions, t he Troop Carri er C0m­
mand. Worms t he 4jOt.b Quart,erma.ster Depot Company 3uppl y, the f ields trom
lfhich t he 'Ifill t ake of f . These 11elda are not, in all cases , t ho
same f ields which oont ain t he auppl1es. This means t hat a£tor recei ving -­
notifioat ion ot t he take-ofr fields, it. Is necessa r y f or t ne 490th art er­
mast er Depot Company Suppl y to move t he supplies f t'OlQ on r ield t o .another.
'Ihia i s a system, invol ving an mcpenditur e of noodles B t ime and etton.
It could be corrected in the planning stage by coordinating between the Troop
Carrier CCUIGUlIld, t he Dopot COOIpany and the divisions engaged in t he operation.
6,- There was cc. ns1cierabl e 1&51. minut o re-arrane;1ng of schedules,
..hich caused lIore confusi on_ This was due t o the Division COD'JMnders making
l ast minute decisi ons as t o 1rbether t hey would use the avail able planes
f or re- supplie9 or for bringing 1n addi t ional t r oops . It 1. believed t hat
such contusion i 5 inevitable in an operat ion wher o t he f or planes
ar e geeater thnn t he actual suppl , ot plnnes am ere a rapid.l y moving t act i cal
situat on a hurr ied pl anning. Al l agenci es 1..rwolved. Quat learn
to upeet t his contusion ao:1 be pr epared to deal with i t at. t he tJ..me. It is
part.icularl yat thia period t hat t he ever present need tor liai son be '""'ACS ,an
necosaity, due t o t he tact that so flWl1 88etlcies semi- indepond­
entl y ot each other, must be .t"apidly ani thoroughly coordloatecl, when
changf!'le occur.
62) On-coll ..... supply.
( s) A tabl e abowing tonnage. actually dellvered to the divisiollB
under this schedul e is attached.
( b) '!he system used was analogous to t he t 1.Jted r ..."l1pply system,
with the exception that r equirement s est abllBhed prior to t he operation were
eetioat es. 'lbe actual were presented. to thi6 het.d parterG at the
t 1me the need occurred. Practleall ;y aU administrat ive de y in tu.rnishing
these suppll-es \',as el1m.inated. by the establishment of it llaison eection wit h
tho 490th Depot Ca:tpany Supply and physicolly l ocated at t hat
headquarte s on ODe ot t he d.eparture airfields. en request s f or on-call
supplies were received by the divisi on base echelons, they were J.DII1ed1catel y
telephoned t o this secti on am direct arrangement s for set t ing u.p the pl anes
and l oading t he oupplies were made on t he spot . Arr aments we1"e also made
t o have a 11a1son section t the COl!III.unioation5 Zone est.abllshed at t he
same point. 'Ibus, when r equests tor supplies, not available on departure air­
f i elds, were received, mediate am. direct procure
the supplies treel the Commw1icat l ons Zone DeP9.t.'I. ',.>. .. •. l !
, ' i\: t.... ;
'2-- l' ",.. :' ...." ­

. .
I ,
(0) It n. r ound t hat supplies • • uld be 4el.ivered to divisiona
. ith the followi ng t .lJllo l .lJll1tation.. .
(1) All request . rs.si ved prdlor to m.1dnigllt c<U1 b. proc.....
oed and . upplie. delivered the f ollowing d8J' in a thorougblT etfie1. nt manner.
1b1s tim. l.lndt allows opportun1t,y tor complete planning, complete coordination,
and most eff icient use or necessary a1 lanes.
(2) Request s pr ior to '1000 hour. can be handled
tor delivery the l;Jamo day_ Such a system involves t he r eadjust1ne otn1ght
schGdul es and l ast minute procurement of supplies, la3t minute coordinat ion
between t he agenc10s izwolved, wi th t he consequent risk of .failure, anei, in ..//1
general, an inetticient 318tern. However, it i ll pract icable am ,.,as used wltff
(3) Requests received atter 1000 hours should not be con­
tor delivery that day, unless a crit icsl emergency exists, The fil­
ling ot t hese r e uest a invariably result s i n a disruptl('1n of n 1ght schedules,
allo" . insut!icient t ime r or t he proper briefing of pilote, 4nd insuffioient
t ime tor proper packaging and l oading.
(d) '!bore is an understandabl e tendenoy on tho p&rt of the
divl ns t o insist on air re-s upply att-er ground contact has been estab-
Ushed and beyond the l.IJII1t. set up bT t he original pl an. 'lb1s is t o be ..pect­
ed in an airborne operat. ion, since the init ial contact with t he gt'ouat forces
is almost oure t o be made at a time lIilen the groun:l suppl y sFv6Il\ is st.rettched
to the l.IJII1t of its capabilities and at a t. when transportation for hauling
s upplies 1s D.t a premium.. It i s, t heref or e, the line ot l &&st reaiet ance tor
t he divisi on ccmmander t o d i spatch a inesS4&e to his base section calling t or
air re-supply. nus means that his request will be considered separately aa1
his needs will not be ba.lancod agairuJt other unit.s in the area. The base sec­
tion, having no sure way or knowing t he 8Illergency of the need, quire properl y
f eel that a..U such requests should. be eonsider ad as operat i onal eMergencies .
'1'hia \'1Orks out ver y well for the d1vi:s i ons, but f r om t he overall pict ure, it
1s an unsound Method of operation. The use of airplanes f or supply
1s an expensive system, both in planes, canopies, an:l oontaineru, which ahould
be resorted t o only during the t ime ldten are i sol at ed tl'OJll ground.
sources ani turing those times when the g Wld supoly s yst. em b,UII compl etely
broken down. 'nlere were actually cases, during thi s oampaign, 'lihen suppli es
were tlown trom Fr ance t o fngland, unloaded in Ebgl..a.Di, l oeded. again, and fio..
back to France for t he use 'of t he Airborne Divisions. ere appears to be no
solut ion of this waste ar:rl inefti ciency, urJ.ess the di vision comnttUlder can
l ac.rUlce bis imedi ate needs in favor ot t he overall needs ot the entire
expeditionary f orces, or unless there 1s a higher commander on the ground who
will filt er t he r equests f rom the divisi ons and declde whether t.he 9uPRlies
should be furnished trom ai r or ground 8ources.


. .
(3) GroWlcl Supp1, .
A separate report on thi. phase "ill be submitted
1!hen sufficient lnro"""tlon beeome. avaUabJ,• •
Annex IIUl!lber 1 - !laU, Requiremen•• tor Fixed Re-Suppl y.
Annex lIuqber 2 - Liot of SUpplies Held ON - Call.
Annex Ilumber J - Ton""lle. del1ve""d, Fixed Re-3upp1l.
Annex number 4 - Tonnage. Del.l""red, on-Call Re-Suppl,•


171 S70

COPY i.O , ___
OfficE: of t he Corps Co:ruander
370 (CG)
liFO 109 - u, S, !'''my
0"1 Lecembcr 1944
'J;T : Operation It...ARY.i.T, Al roorne Phase, D 'to D Plus Ten) I ncl.J.s ive.
TO Co.:uua.'1ding General, rirst ,:.liled iii::."borne .-;rHW, APO 740, U. s. Army .
1. For Operat ion lo..h..l;,iCT, tne ti.2Q and 101s!;. A.lrborne Dl.vl.sions of this
Co r ps \\e re c. e t-ac hed and placed.uncer 8r .l.tish .:lperat.ional c ont rolp The re­
sponsibilities of the t..VIII Corps ( .lI.iI-borne)s .'fith ::''''espect to t hese two di­
vl.sior.a , were t he::.'eiore cO.l finect to cert-ain ad.idm.scrat i ve functions covered
1.'1 Inclosure 3, and to gener al obs ervat l.on of t he )lailIl.....ng a'1d conduct of
oper at i ons •
2 . To secure first R'hana of t he opc:r atl.on, the Cor ps CO!ll.uander
and sor..e of the Stalf partici,at ea ill the u Day operat.on, ooserving t he drops
or' SOUle of t he Seri.ll6 of bot h US divis.lons frem a B-17 i'l", .lI"-l;. \v ith and a few
hundr€:d fe et above t he 7roop Carrier f or wations at t l:e saI:le speed. They re­
in t he NI Ju[cl}tN " r ea u!lt.il appro;-L.:&.te1y H pl cs thirty .:-d.nutes to ob­
s e!'ve our l nit. ial ass e,lIbl,i' ana enelItv r eaction:; on t he gr ound. During t he r e­
mainder of t he operat .lon, and begillrling on D r-lu3 t ·. iD, vis i ts \'oere
Ha de to both divisions in 't he co,;.bat area.
3 . I nclos ures I and 2 a r e the re:-,crts r espect.ively 01 the Co.!IIJanding
Generals , &2d and l Ol st Airborne f or t t e per iod D to D ,Ius ten)
lllcl us ive. The l et t € .!' has beer. cl.oscn ... 5 the t er!lu.flal date 01· the essent j.ally
airborne phase of Operat i on £.. JJiliT. Tnere&l't er, t ha continued part. icipat i on
of the se divisions in the :UJ...t!X}.i!N salient ..as a purely gr ound opere..t i on. In
accor dance "ith ' ,::. r Dep;:..r t . .lent instruct.ions , a r e;;ort on the \".ho1e operation,
in.c lu.cil!1u t he 6.ir bcr ne ) r.ase, \ ill oe 1'0r ,lardea lc.ter .
4. The exp.;!rience of tperation kilRKST has pr oducad no oasic 6.1teration
of accept ed pr inciples r e spectinJ t he emp10,l ,nent of airborne fo r ces . It has J
in. f act, f ;.llt her str engthened co!wiction that c..ur are sounfj and,
f a corded due in the plRmung c nd execut ion of airborne oper­
a . ens , wili of fer t he !.na x:l. Juum pr ospec.1. 01 All 0 1. these pr inciples
enunciated in "ar Def1Brtlhent 'Iral:1.
J1g ... r 113,. 9 Oct ober 1943 . are
T.,eir incor por ation :.n the processes of t hought of co,,,,,ll£lnders and staf fs char­
ged '<l ith planni.ng and exec utL1g &ClJ' phase 01 airbcrne o!, erc:.ticns gr eatly
to the prop_€ :' and effect ive 6111plo,)-Ioent of al.rborne i'orce5 o
5. Para,§, rafl h 9b of t he :=lur Departll.ent Circular daBls with" the
r esponsibilit y for p::!..annin..; airb-:-'r nc operations . The o • .anner of application
of this principle in Operation !WU1.}I'...§ js deserving of careful st.ud,y.
SICILY there has been a steadJ trend t owar d vesting a s:L1g1e l"'Iith
.. 1 ­

. ·n
4 ! .r. .'
SZCRET Ltl', Hq X'iIII Corps (Airborne), f ile 0 (00), subject : lIOper ation.
J"irborne Phase, D t o D ?lus 'len, I nclusive, 1I dated 4 Dec 44, cont ' d.
direct cOIIlFuS.nd a ut horit z," over par t icipat i ng for ces , and ",.;. th oper ­
control over air forces in an airborne oper ation, In upar­
at ion . K..:.T t hi s trend took tCinSio.lc .lorll'. f or the r irst ti.lte €
Lo H. ahiliE'IQ}\!, Fi r st hl li!;:!d Airborne h.:..d all pa!'-­
tici pat .l.I1g airborne fc rces under his CO ....l..a'ld . The extent to ;Ihlch he exer­
cised oper at i onal cont r ol over associat ed air f orces b beyonC: tl:e 5co.r'e 01
t :". is r e;>ort, I beli eve i t pertinent , oIJwever ; to Llvit e attention to the
f al'-reachint implications involved i n the manner of a!JPlic ation of the pr.in­
c.i.plt:.: discusse6. . t hl:l plannin
i s ,i.nilcr .mt
in that of cOlr.!!l.i:l.lld, and the liwlt.ations placed upon co"n..and aut hor ity will
iJlpose i dentical limit at i ons o n the l'esponsioility for To what ex­
t ent unified cc!.!.nand is jualified over all air and airborne for ces partici­
in a singl;: oper "tion 1s a qll€stion to ce ansHer ed ).n light of the
V condit i oCls ootai rung ':n each pc..rticJ.lar sltu.:ltion . No sL,gle solutlon 'owo u.ld
satisfy all cases. I belili:lv.:l , :lO\.ever , t ILE: .• lCItt(l r is one of i'unda;t1bntal Ln­
por t anct3, and deserves car<Jf ul COr:tinuillg $t uo.r I t CWl ex.s:ccise a ,najor and 0
per haps a dt::c ..LsivQ L.'ll1uence on
6. I I!. aCJ.cition t c the foreboll1g , th<d following ci3t ails ar e conmen+.ed
upon in vic·... of the observatio:1s the Co. ol!1ClJ1ding Gene r als of the b2d
and l Olst 1!.lr iJorne Divisions have im:luded in th3ir attached r eports .
Prov iding ...eans are available t o .(.ini..m!i. ze G.an;-., e r of h05til e air
i nterception, anci to avoid or t o nt:; ut r alize hostJ.J.e £l'ound f i re up
t o Dnd i ncluding the DZ and LZ areas, providing the plru1 f or coor dlnation
v 6f the a irbor ne effort i(lth that of br ound forces p ermit s) a daylight
sirbc rne oper at i on Pl'es ents deCi ded udyaot.a{,.$S-o\ter t lliLa.am.e con­
ducte d at our pres ent cnor nous olr sUr1er iorit y f inds i ts
Ires €l ectIve enq:doj·r.r.ent in pr€vUlting hostilQ ui r and in i so­
l atHl€, the a uborne battlefield before, <lur ing and aftdr the t r oop deliv er y .
n night IIIaS offer t.actical rmrprise and c reate gr eat e r con­
fusion ana disorg.mization UI,>Ong en-3!fv 10rces. On the other hand, it r equir es
a far t ral.ning l .;; ve l for oot h Troop Carrier and airborne forces : ra­
sults in f a r gr eater disparsion) presents a alUch' loor 8 cli.ffic
i1.t problem of
ground as sel.ely, and sacrhi ces !:£1st, if not all, of t he advd..!1.taee 01' air
GUpNr-uaCY .
(1) In SICILY and in ;WP.!I.AiillY thl.. major f actol' deter !!l1nl.ng a
nifht operation was the f o r of airborne ef­
forta . I n ITALY, .... ith our fight er s at extr eJle h,....it 01 r ange; the
contr olling fact or in deciding upon a night o?er ation ,las a,ir pOYlar. In HOL­
f or t he first t·l.ffi9, bot h our air and the plan fo r coor dina+,l on
of airborne and gr ol.a1d elforts y.ero such a .vas f eas ­
( 2) lione of our_ w.gQ.:·s.cal e i:oirbcrne oper ations to date war­
r ant a c or.c lus ion that aAt..mslve hos tile gr ound. lir e can lbllor ed
ored..:quat ely n6ut r all.zed f rom t ho:; air. In SICll.Y, suc h f ire was n<::f:,l i &.l bl a .
- 2 ­

Ltr, Hq XVIII Corps (Airborne), rile 370 (CC) , subject : rt Operation'
Airbor ne Phase, D to D Plus T",n, Inclusive,t1 dated 4 :cee 44, cont'd
It is signiiicant , however, that in one night operation a loss of over fift een
per cent of participating Troop Carrier aircraft was inflicted by ground fir e
from our own forces . The,re is no r eason to suppose that hostile fire, had it
been available to first-class troops , not have been at least as e ffec­
tive. In ITALY, no gr ound fire whatever was encount er ed, except on the one­
battalion oper at ion at AVELLI1;O. In NOILlANIJY , ground fire cncounteriJ d was
generally l ight , and far l ess than anticipated , In HOl..LAND) froUl the data so
far available, it would be dang<:: r ous t o conclL:.de that str ong and extensive
AA 8round can ba ignor ed, or neutrali:;;ed by air action alone. We
do not yet know density of flak over which the Troop
Carri e r formations f l ew, nor do have suffici ..::nt data on \'Ihich to evaluate
the effect of our nl3ut ral ization from tht3 air of t hose enemy defenses which
did open f ireo The amount of cOJroat a ircraft available
the cont inu­
ity of this support, the str..:ngt.h and location of hostile flak defenses and
ground forces
the norale of these lorces , the durat ion of flight of
troop carriers over such def enses , ana will all gr eatly influence our
ability to provl.de adequate neutralization from the airo Under favorable con­
ditions is good reason to that this can be achieved, but the MAR­
KET Operation has by no means solved the probl em presented by a daylight ai r ­
borne operation ove r dense and ext ensive flak
b . RATE (],' BUTLIrUP.
This will be a function ot' the availabl e air l ift, distance from
base airfields, 'neat her , and enGmy interfer enc;; . JLS in any milit ary oper ati on,
the greatost possible r apidity of concentration is des ired . Particularly is
this true in an airborne operation, enemy I'Gactions will be as violent
and as rapid as he can make t hem. The objective, in our airborne operations ,
should to provi de t he stro 'est 'os sible troo deliver s upported
by the most rapi d possible build- up in J:it;: n ana s lies .
This has been r epeat edly discussed, but never executod. It is
believed that a unanLllity of vie't'/ no., proJvails , and that t his will be provided
in the future, coor dinat ed with a cOffi lland ship in t he air capable of influ­
encing the troop delivery, r 0gar ding last minut e deviations from
planned flight routes and the use of alternate DZ' s and LZ' s.
No gener alization is justified. In somo si:tuatlons it might be
per fectly f easible ; in others, not .
An evaluation of the ilrq:lortanc...: of air resupply s hould be made
at the outset of planning an airborne oper ation. Depending upon the estimated
period dur ing which t he airborne force must sustain itself by
- 3 ­
me (CG) , subject: "Operation
1.Aft KZT, Airborne Phase, D to D Plus Te n, Inclusive,tI dat ed:4 Dec 44, cont ' d
frl dndly ground forces , the irrportance of air resupply may vary fran. a very
s econda ry element to an essdnt.ial pa-rt of the operations p lan, to
that of the t :ro op del:h"'!..P:!Y> In thE! latt e r cas e, its .iJnportan ce must
be accorded the full consid6ra U.. on it raerits in all phases of planning . It
is entirely conct; ivable that an est iJ"lIO.tt:J} duly arrived at , of the i mpr "acti­
cability of air r es upply uJ..ght al one aictat e the a bandonment of an otharwise
feasible operation.
The conclus ion of the Division Coll1l1\.ander, that an airborne divi­
.. on is ci:lpablG of a strong effort in only dir ection, sound 'nhcn
applie d to Oper at ion UARKET} is subj ect to the usual whi ch t he

conditions of any pc1 rtici..J. b. r sltlliJ.tion may j ustify .
The COlllldanding Gener al, b2d Airborna Division, gives /;l.S his opinion
th..::t with Certa in provisos, thd s <.;:v-.;n d ays bt. t wc.:::n thtJ receipt of his
initiel mission <.:. nd the 1....., K<.;<-nff l'rom ddpc: rturi:! a irdromos w••s suffici""nt .
Through the int , ns o coniJincl d cfiorts oi tho COmlll<. nd end Staff of a vetordn di­
vision, this was s uf fi c bnt for this conduct ,Jd e:gainst tl r et ru<J ting
UffiOflg "flhos d troops disorg.:.:. niz<.: tion .:nd loss of control h<.1d th.m r <::l;L ch:;d
un I. ldv,. ncf.; d stHge . In tho... cv-.:.:nt of <I n ,. irborn0 mission ng<l tilst ,ill unshcl kon
\,; n-mly or strong ground dt. fcllses: u l(k. t""rL.:l in t his Hill be im­
per ative to pe r mit much ./lore ddt ... ilcd o.! nd pr ob ..:bly rchel:i rs C!ls .
Action h" s .:: lreaqy i nit L...toJd r oco,u, uenddtions forwc;lrded to
the Vjar Department fo r the incorporetion of Air Support Parties, under a dif­
ferent name, as organic elenents in the al. rborne division .:.nd corps .
1. PAl tACHUT:; H oLD .Rl 1LLERY.
The hi6hly succes s ful drop of the 376th Parachute Field Artillery
Battalion, Lieut enant Colonel ·il . Y. GRIFt'TIn Co,illllandJ.ng, in this daslight oper­
ation fully Justifie d the time and effort spent in t he dev.€llopment of tilis t ype
of unit . Its at nib ht is still of value .
j. SALVAG.6: .
The probl em of salvag..l.I1g the hug e 8loounts of hi ghly expc:nsive Air
equipme nt us ed in an airborne operation has been unddr study for some
time . It pres ents diii'ic ulties, but its i aq>ortancc is fully rucogniz ed.
I diss .:;nt irOH} the vit;w of' the COlIllnanding Gene.ral , 82d Airborne
Division, that this pl:1r sonnel b.., place d unddr the iJ!'Jnediat c co,ilI,l8nd of tha
- 4 -

1 U ...
__ Ltr, Hq (Airborne) , fil.;: 370 (CG), s ubJ.:ict : l1 Op.Jr ation
k.Al1KEl' , Ai rborn.;) D to D Plus TI::!t1, InclusivG, 1I dat ed 4 Dt.Jc 44, c antld.
airborne div i s i onal cO";"l.ondcr s for full-till\:... gr o.mci traim.ng. ThcSu lJ.\.;!n <ire
al.rman, an l.nt egrCil and essential part of an Ai r Force um.t , and ClO indis­
p(.nsabl c ",l<3f..ent of th..; gl i d.:: r-tug t eam. British pr actice to th ... c ontrary
I ... thq a r e now \whert: they - in thv 'l r oop Car ­
riur squudr ons . Such €,roW'ld training as is ct... sir abL. can bt: N ... dily given by
and within airborne divisibns .
1 . YlEAPOIiS .
in maividual C N\..... scrv..: d we apons within Cl irborn-: di­
vl.sions, to /Th:<Jt th...: sp ... cial r equi r e'1.io::nts 01' tJa r tl.c ular o,P-Jr ation&, have b-.:un
6. r ...:cogni zc d n .... c.:: ssity in this Tht::Dt ... r throughout this wa r J and g..:nvr ous as­
sist dnc..:: in this Ng..: r d ha.s b",i:l n provid...,d both in NORTH AFRI CA <.I nd the UNITED
KmGOOk. I bdi"'v.... s uch ch<. ngl.!s will cont i iJu.... to occur , and thCi t thes e ne\":l ds
should be 1I1.clt t o thu l.l.Jlti.t of our r -'lsources whon requests cr Q ffiQ de .
7. I concur .... ith thd Cit:neral, 82d Airborne. Division, in his
vi..:w thi-I t MARKi!oT W..:l.S nurginal , c:.nd th..1t th0 outcorru hung in b",l­
once for thu first !IJW d;...ys , but success is the ult.Ll18.te criterion by which
to judge a military decision, und the of Lhe two divisions of this
Corps achieve d success. However, there is d point here of such
vit al. iillX'rtance to f ut ure airborne operations in this theater .lIl this war,
that I >'Iis h to emphasize it in the str ongest possible .!Ianner . At the tl.ffie the
decision to undertake il.ARlCi.T was made we dealt wit h an enemY engaged in a hasty
and disorganiz ed 'l¥ithdr a'iYdl undlOl r powerful Allied pressure. This
r " t rograde r.lOve.uent had be en in pr oGress lor s ix waeks and over hundreds of llliles
of gro.md. Du.ring its c vurse oneruy COmmand had be en bddly shatter ed, and his
cont r ol seve r ely All thescl conditions favorabl e fpctors f or
the ef:1pl oyment of ai r born", whor e risks with them and with
the possibl e:, could well Dt. justlfi0d. Now face a elif ferent foe. His
pr ecipit4ted retr.;at has end.,;d , his cOJh.'lCl nd has r estor ad and invigorated ,
his control gnd t ights wit h aid of str ong gr ound defenses ,
clos",r to his SOW'C0S of supply . What we wer e abL:: t o accomplish with two
bornt. divisions in ,I.....RI(E.'T i s no indication of tray c::Xp&c t t o accoJoplish
in c..; rtui n situo:tions li nd tho; JIIeas ure of SU.CC-.lSS of t Ins opcrCition llluSt
under light of cold-blooded l est these
.r.agnific..;:nt divisions b", assignE::d a t ask wholly o",yond their str\3 ngth..
b . To thd lOjr<.llty, fic.tt:l lity, end spirit of the
l Olst ,ind 62d ..... irborn... t o of thuir COJl'lh..... nders,
Gc;nar d.l Y. D. Taylor ,lDd M.:ljor Gcn"r al J. Jd . Gavin, r espLctiv,.;ly, .... nd to
th", gnlJ.unt support of t h .. ir Briti s h coull' udes-in- r illS full credit i s dU-il . My
own c:. nd th t of this Corps for t h..:ir i s
/ 9 . Th ... pc r fo r ll....: nc;;: of the IX Tr oop Curri _r COJn.J.:'J1d was ..md ",n
contribution to success.
10. I c..mnot too str ongly W'g", tht.. studyJ the m.: st.... ry, ...nd a • .lplicdtion,
by upon who,l} d.avo]:v\,..$ d<:llSr vc 01 for the ClIlpl.0YJn..:nt or'
.J irborn", !orct;s, of in 'liar Dop,' rt".,mt Trdining
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Ai lrborn..
, ,

Hq XVIII Corps 1r.P370 ( GQ) , nOp.,) r ..
PhL! s ";', D t o D Plus 'Io::: o , I ncillsive, f
<i..tcd 4 Do..c 44, cvnt. ' d.
i , \ \
No . 113, 1943.
1 . f \ .
M. B.
u. s.
Army, \
Couuu,1lldl1lg .
3 Incl s : ,
1 - of 82d A13 Di v
2 - Report of l l ls t AB Div
3 - Admini strutiv0 Functions ,
XVIII Corps (A8)

- 6 ­


(Ai1;;o/ .w'
I nit : . 1" ,/1,
Date ; a'Da c 19 <it;
1i "" Of f ice of t he Divisi on CoJIli.LB.nder
APO 469, u. S. Ararr
3 December 1944
,s UBJEI: T: Lessons of Oper ation !.ii.RKh"'T.
TO Co.nma nding Gene;:-al; XVI II Co rps (Airbor ne )., APO 109, U. s.
1 . This l et,t er is subJIutted i n ccr:!p.lil'lnC'e with verbal orders, Coaunand­
ing General , XVI LI C0l1=6 ' (i< i !'bo- r.o)" The"C'e also sl!ba"J,ttad a
copy 01' this Division's oper ational r epon f or the pe.!.."iod 1 7 Septembe r - 1 6
o.ctober 1944.
2. GeneJ:'a.l : In ' general thi s operat -i.on ser ved t o emphasize the val ue
01' lessons learned in pas t airborne opC''t'a'':ions , Most of t hese l essons are
well covered in Training Circu.l.ar 1.1.3 1 i;iar IiP.pcr t ment , 19J.J, The content
.natter 01 tl':is circular i s bel ieved t o be basically sound and it is not re­
co.n:"enoe d that any changes be made in i t .. Al l of our past couobat e..<per iences
and our analys is of our ai rborne and t r a 1nLOg we re drawn upon to
provide the ba ckgr ound f or the and execution of operation
Although our t hr ee previous CQ,ub&t operations were c onducted under cover of
darlO'les s , trairling pr eviousl y conducted enabled us to arrive at a sound pl an
for r eorganizat i or. on the ground ana ProlUPt .lnitiation of Ol.ll' gr oWld act i on.
3 . SeQuence of Planning: ()n 10 Sept ellmer 1944, at 1800 hOUT::>, a con­
f erence was held at Headquarters , r'ir s t A...lied Airborne The mi s s i on
of the 82d Airborne to sieze and hold the bridges over the MAAS and
',:AAL River s and the h4 h gr ound aouLinllting t hese oridges \'ias given to the
Division Coumander at this t iJua . The 10110'o1ing t ,'ie1ve hours Vlere devoted tl'l
i ntens ive study of the ter rain \lit h a view t o a'rrivir"!& at an out l ine gr ound
tactical plan and t he of t'rope r landing zones . At 0800 ho '..lrs , 11
Septe.lober , Capt. HARRY i3ESTl!'J3R.l!.URTZE, Dutch COuLda ndo Officer and nat i ve of
HOLLAND, became av.ai lable to as s ist t he s t aff .. At 0900 hour s , 11
September , a conference was held at the operational headquarters, IX. Troop
Carrier COI..nand, at fiih l.ch tUll'! the drop and landing zones were s elect,ad) full
consideration being given to the accouplisl\.looot of the gr ound mis sions from
t he landing areas s el ect ed; the hostile fl ak likely to be encountered; capa­
bilities of the 'Tr oop Car rier COJl.If.L.a nd .in del i vering us t o the desi r ed loca­
t ions, and the loc ation of the dr op zones in r alation to the proposed line of
1'li[ht over the operat i onal area of the 1roop Car r i er aii·craft. A division
outline p l.an was prepar ed fol.lfJw.!.ng t hi s and presented to t he
unit cOJHll1s nders of the division the f ollowi ng day, 12 September 1944 . Troops
began movi ng to the t ak,?- off airaroJil8s on 15 Sept ember and we r e closed and
seal eQ at the airaromes at dayl ight, 16 Sept ember . The period bet ween 12
Sept embe r and 15 Se;>t euher was devoted to pl annlIlt and i ssuance of orders
and prepar ation of 10ads4 This time would have been mor e
than adeqlU.l.t e f or t his par.)ose, however 1 in thi s oper ation a number of ch<:lnges
in the basic pl an, each vitally affect ing the of the divis i onal
lift Imd the location of units at i·akr:off made definite plann.L"lg
difficult. The seven....ctay pt;:rio3 al10'ried bet ween t he t .i..oe Gt u.u:t
r ece ives its mission W'lt il it stagdS 8 '1 airtJor r:.e oper at ion i s aru;-le pr::vj ded
all supplies . are in the hands of the +-,reflps and t r ansport, ation is
to "X?ve troops to the ah.:'rL">'OIt."'s ' ", hen .
is to t.be .g Y.,ai i<!Ql e .
tal(e-nff __ ....?f' -2P.E9. H.y
drop Zones wit h... +.trJ nJ:!- " 'l l'Ii d c ':l. -Pl:-:'­
s uppos as 111JlP Brtd covel'age
.' ,
. ,
4. .. Thls, it is believed, is cQvered
in t he operat i onal report.
5. Lessens
(1) .. Tht:: pT'cl ct l ce of assignin6 an airbor ne division
front ar. e far in exce s s of that nornlB.l."!.y givdn 0 gr ound diviSion l.o.ust be weighed
vcry cardfUll.,y and full coosi d':: raticn given to the pr obable enemy groW'ld re­
action . 1;0 this oper at i on the staggdring t ask of crossj ngs over .three
lllB.jor waterways and dcu.U16tlng t. er; 'ain , as \0'011 as occilpying and w lding aP":
proxiulately 25.•000 yards of f ronc.agc: required t ho coupl ete rapid coUl..Jlit­
01' all' ttie troops <:lot thd disp:>sal of t hd Di vision Col'OIll.e.ndcr . As the bat­
tle d03velo,jed. in int ens ity, we;;'ght O.r· Gor man at tacks debouching from the R;!J:CHS­
tnlJ; de it to commt a " 1'0r'ce " '01 any size the NIJM$Ell
Bridge Until D-plus- 3. then :it W"iS an ext r emely marginal pez:for l1l8nce .
The pr oblem of mopping up the area ..it.hi n t he p W' illleter of defense alo:le was
sufficient to engage a great bulk of the I I the civilians were
IX hostile the probl em wo uld "have been i wmeasurably mo r e Holding
ke,Y terrain in an air bor ne oper at i on by seizing locations of high tae;tical
value and covering the gaps between them ' "Iith pat r ols and fire i s pract.\.«(lple
onl.\.' so long as t!1.e enelI\Y does not throw sufficient weight against the gaps to
force an entry into your lIlain battle posd.t .!. on. In t his operation, when the
undertook major attacks and penetrated the divisionis area to
about 1,000 yards , all weight thdt could be mustered o"las thr.own against them
at these points in vigoroas , desperat e countel"-attackB support.ed by evary means
available within the division. This resulted in wide gaps, oVl::lr 1, 000 j' ards
in cas ds , of the front being unoccupiea and undefended. A vigorous, alert
enemy , with the proper at his disposal, could have capitalized on these
opportunities s eriously jeopardize integrity of our dei' tmse
Operation"MARKET was a marginal as a ground operation from
to fi nish 'and should not. necessaril.,y bt:l taken as a f or the capa­
b.i.llti.as of an airborne division in an aver age situation.
(2) Neather ; Weather again proved to be a IIt)st iJrportant .faqtor
to consider in staEi ng an airborne operation, especi ally when the accomplish­
ment of' the i!. r ound mission is aependent upon an airbor ne lift that is to build
up for a period of several days aft er the initial landing. The failure of the
325th Glider Infantry to land in operation ....ARKEl' until D-plus- 6 may have well
caused thu de f eat of the enti re force if the Ovrman counter - at..tacldng forces
had been stronger . The late or non- arrival of the air r esupply lifts became
a serious l!l8tt er by D-plus- 3 . I f the successful execution of t he b"r oWld
,nission depends upon t r oops and supplies thut are t o . arrive subs equent to D-
day, ic. must be 8ppreciated of bad waather J.Jl8y .result in the
. ..l
. "

• •
failure to accomplish the mission and ?ossibly the defeat of the airborne
fo rce . 4 Therefol"e, t he present met nods of r esupply, both t r oops and suppl ies,
iaUst be {codified to p err.ti.t resupply by infiltration W1der any weathe r co.o­
ditions by borrbers or s imilar type aircraft \.it h especially traine d crews held
ready lor cQ.anitment t o assi st an airborne force on the g roW'ld if it becomes
necessary in the event of bad weather.
(1) Air Suppo rt : An airborne opl::! ration needs a maximum amount
of air SUppClrt, bl-fore, during and a.fter the landings .. The success of this
oper ation as a daylight operation was due l ar gely t o t he pre- l and­
ing a ir support and to the suppor t given dur .l..Og the l a nding .. F" riendly fight­
ers acco.npanicd Troop Car:t'ier a ircraft all the way i nt o the landing areas a.nd
were frequentl,}.' seen at tacking ground fiak positions . Spotty fiaK was r e­
ceived from the time the Troop Carrier aircr aft crosse.d t he hostile coast un­
til the l andings were made . I t is beliaved that it would have been Juuch heavi­
e r, with. a consequent heo.vier Tr oop Carrier loss , if thorough fi ghter coverage
had not been available . Support a fter l anding in this op er ation was g i ven by
the RAF . Air support illissions, the r efor e) had to be request ed through Head­
quar ters, Airborne Cor ps . The clos e a i r support in operation NEP­
TIJNli:, in NOR..1ANDY, could not ba obtaw e: d
Direct radio conmWlication for the
purpose of calling in f ight er s O[J hosti le targets was not a vailable.
(2f Air Support Air support parties should be
ently assigned to d so thot they become full y acquainted with
the diyision personnel ond airborne To assign an air support party
just be fore an operation is not a satisfactory solut i on to the air support ,
problem. These assi&ned air suppo rt parties should be to parti­
. cipate in all gr o Wld, as well as a irborne ope r ut i ons during training of an
air borne divisi on . Just prior to an operation the y should be given an op­
portW1ity to become a c quainted with th<J a ir supt'Ort squadrons that hl;l.VE:! bo:;::en
assigned the of th=ir Qivision. Air support part i es .need
l!IUch JIlore than they hav€ . had to date in handli.ng thElir particular
. type of equipment in airborne exe r cises.
c . Anti- Air c r aft Fire: 301311\}' a,ck-ack did not prove too serious an
oQstaclc , - pr incipalJ..y due t o our own oir support. Ack- ack crews at t he drop
zones \vere destroye d by the par ac hutists .L.lIllidi ately upon their landing. It
is believed, however , t hat the of enemy ack- ack could. be .tlJo r e t hor- I
oughly neut.ralizo;:;d by f urther eXpl oitation and development of new
1116<!sures. It is believed, for that sJl"IOke could well have been used
In tht:: vi cinity of and in t he vicinity of the on
to guarantee a mor e favorable airborne delivc rj ""nd possibly raduce ev/::!n f ur­
ther the actual l osses suffered•
.£. Drop & landing Zones :
(1) The careful selection of drop and lCinding :zones p.robably
has !tOre b{;;aring on the successful outcome. of tne ground phase of an air borne
than anY factor cons ider ed in operationa l planning. Their
proxiI.iity t o the obj ective, to cove r a nd conceallnent, to water si.mila r
hazards; and to terrain of high tactical value for dominatill& the enemy im­
.rredL,.tely upon landi.n6 all must be carefully considorod. I believe that the
par achute drop zones and trye gli d.; r landlng zones, and drop a r e as
- J ­

should be identical whenevdr possibLe, or very close to each other • . £Nen with
a mimimum of r 0sistance, it is to fight a mile outside
of the pc: riineter of ·a de f""nsc in orde r to socuro· t emporarily a area
or glider land1ng zone •
.' ,
. . (2) Ground: Glid<o r Co,lw,unications; Soma met hod must be arrived
at .... :d(..loy - -· o:"ts of thob .for 1 'a Na in which
they should land. In t his ,op,er at :i..on D/1 zones T and N wor e of· all Gcr­
il"lan troops an ho'..!r D. ft"r. our · l1liti.o.l lc.nd.tngs occurrvd on day. by D-.
duylight, D-plus- ·l > Ger IDcL. "1. s al.!'-·p>:'Opellad gW1S cnd af:,gr essive infw.t ry
ur.its had both l.:r: d.ing: pon(Js of committillents in
oth'_r diructlf) :')$: p"i ncipt!lly cloJani ng up t h..: ;.. r ea <..nd s eizlll6 the three brid­
(;:;)s. By 1000 hours , D-pl '.lS-.l, t3voJ "!:'Y G,·'Tc.il... bl e "l.... n was organized into two f.lo:Jin
l' orce s <!tt<.>ckj.ng shortly b\;; for o noon, drovtl G'ir­
.r". ns b;.. ck to th(;: l' ront.:..... r t: long .Ji; 'V":m so, th..:. por.ti.ons
of the L.nding zones word und.c r s r.1<l ll d ' lllS fire, soruet i.nes of great intensity,
c..nd .undi.r J.:nd mort:(r fires of nil c"llburs . It w .. s t oo l at e ut this
tLDE. to g.. t to th..; glid.... r pUots to V nd on LZ O. Instructions
wart:;l s t':: nt to· glld,,-r p.ilots ·to l ::;\ nd on tho western of
LZ!p,- n.L. r · th;.. noods on th.., GR03BrEK Th.::so woJ r" (;'?-tiNJ..y free'
of s.tt.all arms tir.·e. a.. 'l.:1;·.:'i:1 ·sorre e-aGes ) .frl'le 01' enenw observat ion and only W1deJ'
occasional artil.leory It. is be.heved t ha.t. thl.s information NlJ.ched only
very . fen of pilots and JD.'l 1:'y t,15dd::'S and gl ider troops lost could
otheI"V'!i.se have been. £cl ved if i t had been to give them .sbroe ground­
to- air signal, · ev.er, aft er their C1;rrival ove r the L2
s. This is a lilOst iL1pOr­
tant problem and a to its solution be conducted as
.as. the· /nG9;hs are o.vailabJ-e.
' . .
'. • . Par(;l.chute Art,i .l1-e:;:.y': The employment of tJ:1e parachute Field
.... Arti;t.lery of this . . as Ci p ar achute for cd .norc: t han justi1'i{id the . Troop
.Carritlr ,lift e.xpcnde.d in its ("olruait,J)1o;r.t . . The J 76t h · Parac hute Fi eld .Artillery
. engaged ' its tCirgets shortly and on D-plus:l, prior ' to tht:) UI'­
rival of th¢ arti l Lary, I bcl i evt3 de-cisj.vt:;ly·j ,' ·tc .the
success of gr oW1d
., .. '
f . Glid03rborn", heavy anti- tank wea}X>.ns, such as 57 :shoul9. ?c­
/::I - parachut e i tlfantry rog.L[,¢nt yossible • . In thl.s operd.t·ion
two . 51
s were ·,dth e&ch parachut..: N gi loent shortl y l.and-1-n8. ­
. r
g. Pbthflnd>:> rs: . Ni):\:"ig;..,.tion by Wldor con.d.tt,ipns,
although . not as critical ly TeCiuired o.S ..I.t ni gr.t., still is essential· tQ· t .hw ?uc­
oi . im ,:irborne op(; r ...:tior. . 'it; is bcli.:.:ved th;;:.t daylight . Path­
finders· should ' be eoou't ten nunutes prior to the <., rrival of the .first
ser.4l . .A longer aught jeo.pordil,. El the success of the entil·e oper<! tion.
The urea in which they drop ,Rust be vt.;:ry· carefully selected. ·
h. D<s.ylight. oper<...tions are ,nu.ch easier to ·c arry through to a succese­
i ul cOL,clusion tho.n nif!, ht Opert..i.. ions, provided the en6lD3 &r ound situation is
d duyli&ht Despite the success of operl::l tion
-it is believed however th t u " irborne operation would meet \dth
di Sdst rous results if <l hi..:. hly organiZed ground def ense , s upported by <lrJIDr,
Glistcd · l..fl the J."",,,.,di <.! t G locality of lLnding.
containers c.tnd gliders
PClTlichutes, p.-rachute
This hfl s not case to dnte.
in an operntion due
to ,the uncontrollca ,"- no. willful dt!struction WId I"isdppro) ri ation of gl ide!"s
o! natiioal1t i es .
It 15 balleved crrrc to Corps
uJ. ..mt than oth<;;:r troops " possibly Dccuuse of t heir f amiliill"ity with it <:.lna
t. lcir of its value . It is ioost iroporte nt thi.t a Tho.... t cl r policy
be to all troops dS soon e S on
gu::rding of equit>ment in uirborna
J.. Rapl Lc0u.tU1ts : Opportunity ulUst be t;, iven for airborne units to ab­
s urb and train r epldcements before being committed to an operl:ition. It is be­
lieved tho.t e i t; ht weeks are a minimwG for this purpose . All wlit cOJ,lJLanders
and .,.any soldiers of t his division, in a cOlilbat questionnaire recently conducted,
expressed the desire rooI'e opportunity bd given to them to train with thClir
new r epl uce.nents . The :1igh individual initiative and s kill "-nd the superior
s,/tall unit nnd bc1ttclion tea1Illwrk r eq:.lirea to carry nn airborne unit through
to Eo successful ..ussion requires r clalistic ... irborne training,
us we ll oS t round trc. ining. The l!1i! chint!- liKe dXt. cutioncof t he ullssions of each
battalion of t his division in t ilis opdrution, it i s believe d, rusult dd from
t horc. ugh truining and HJSist cnce upon prou;pt, pos itive c::. ction i"Jllddktely upon
h.nding. This cun onll-- bd l e ....rned through prop .. r training.
k. Glid( r Pilots: Glider pi l ots must be well trained ground soldie rs
or ""ill not live l ong. At bast ttcy will be <! lia bility to <lny <=. irborne
CQ,lilrul nder until th;;: y can be frolilo the conbet zone . It is rccom.ik ... nde d
thc:.t thoy be put :md.::: r i.:..mcdL.! td COl.it.lk.. nd of thQ :..I irborna divisionol COI.:ill1d ndt..rs
f or full- tw ground training, with nccess<..l ry , .. llocc1t ed to th("Jir glider
pilot truining.
1 . "::(:apons :
(1) Durin
the p<: st Yo,;dr und hull of d rborooJ opt:U' b.tions unit <I
cortmf:l nders of this division hiwo, through combat found it desira bl e
fro... tiul"; to time to &ug.fient or modify the weapons th_t were uu.tho­
rized in orde r to meet specific t a cticul Qonditions . -,hUe this condition
ut first gl ance, appei;>.r WlSOo.lIlQ and, at best, umdse, it has nevertheless
proven necess bry cnd, I believe, un effective contribution t o our cOJClbat suc.....
cess ". It i s believed to be sound, therefore, t o as cl guic;ling prin- .'
cip1e the S3Ct units may r equi r e: should hove 3va iluble, dif­
f e r ent I'/ edpons and equiprre nt for different missions . In t hd dyKe countr y of
IiOlJ..AND BAR' s . t a premilLlI . In this division e.:. ch pl.r a chute rifle sqUod
is now equipped with one BAR ov.... r li nd above its nor.n.:ll c0>--i:>l eillc:mt of W6d.pons.
Additione: l d.....R's '(we N obt. dincd in HOLlAt.U.
(2) At ont e Very wa s a r mQd u Gal . 45 pistol .
Tni s Wi:.S l at er r s..:; laced by th(: c3rbine . A 'n;Hpon of t his t ypt. 'NUS ncccssury
b..lc!l. uSC <..I ll rii'l..ls dropped in s qUu d cont uinors clnd it was csscnth.l thut:
tht. pbr tl chuLi s ts ha v ... a 00 their pe rson to be c.r.pl oyed until they could
obt ain rines . ',n th th'O. :..:. dvent of thu M- I r ifle conta ini:l r folding stock
has COmE: into disuse except it is Eo pri.•...:... r y hand tor
cl'.'Yl- stJ rvo;.d .... I;l ... pon creYrs . It is impr<! ctic....lb1d fu r ... to drop with
bot h f olding stock c"l r bl n.:l , fo r nis .i.lJunedi ,t e prot ....ction, ,:.nd tht3 M- l or
BAR in ? contc i ncr. It LO oper dtions for
tha i ndividu:.l p.... r ..: chut i st to drop with I:l pistol for his i mmodi i-. tc protection,
- 5 ­
'C" {
,. ' ".:'­

, . -;-: . .. "; ".
.. . ..
as viell us· "his noriilQ,l ha.nd either rifle, BAR or carbine. Since a uth­
ority does not now' exist for obt'cuning these p istol s J only a fortunate
L)divid.J.a1:s have '\:> e en s o . .. rilled . It aw belief th2.t a nwJ'ber of 11v'35 could
. sav ed iri ' t hl.s operct'lon if th.; individual tk1d been -,;ith a pis­
t ol upo.n 14l1ding, and it is Certain th...t droj:ls soong t.ostile civilLws will
result in sd.l'n& "loss 01 lifs ' froIl!- .ltt.:a ck upon l .": nding wess our ·
pa.rachutists· hre ...I rmc:d ·... ith pistols. It is ther e ford rcco,n,fi;,; nded t h..!t
jbcl t ..:.ken .to provid..: ove ry p.: rachu1;.ist ,',ith .1 CcQ . 45 pistol.
m. Fksu.EE..!z: R(; suppl.1 continues .to be one of our mt.jor unsolved
'problems.. Alt.li.ough c. solution ex;ists =.I t ' the pres ent , it is not believe d to
be J. s ·in.thtt !!CCO.npHl1ylng ope:r atioDe l report . · .Pras uming
pa r achute ri:supply is ·accurc!t.Jly and coapdctly deliver ad in territory
occupied. by friuild.ly it still would approximately one-tJtird
of the infantry forces or" the ' division to recover and deliver to the firing
line :J da.ily resupply . Parachute' resupply is an emergency meuns of resupply
at bes.t 1;.hat c an only augment & soiind plan for · resUilply by other rue.ms·. .At
troops of tills person suf ficient sme.ll urms
UaIlI.!lLlntt".ip n ...nd r gtions for seve r IJ1 · aays.. wl.th pr ope r t r aining und .
good supply discipline, an .luborno;: 1:or ce CWl. exist ior sevs. r <Jl d...ys on the
supplies i t brings .... ith it, provided resist...ncd is not too intense .
The resupply proble.n, the reior e, is not :" 5 ho?Cless : 5 it may first uppe.,. r ,
but it is th t this probl",m should bl:l g iven mor,; study ...: nd d.zveloyed
in tra ining". C:XIJrcises. It is b",licv..:d tho t by glid<:;I"'/'W0uld be i1 fur '
more jn.:;t ;.od thHn by p... r <.t chute. .. ' . / .
J; .
_ "
..Ih, .
" J. . ,
// / k:t. jor G...meral, U. S. Arll\y,
/ .' • CO'llal.<"!I1d.J.ng.
I ...
L .• '
1 I ncl - COpy of Report .
, . J .. •.
.;,' 01:.. ., .. !i. \.i. " t · c ,,":.l
.1 . , ' .. .. .. ..' •
> .... .
P}-\.Hr:I.' I

P.i.H'l' J. J.
j'J.ili:S H. GAVIP ,
d a,jor Gen8ral,:J .

J,;;mn its ret' lrn frorl on 1 9 ,Tul ,'f 19hh this llivision
''1e s locE-lted in tho :·fl1t,L.i.i , ;) ' "' - _,0 icc s't'3r - "l'kct }Io.:: ooro 'i'here
it tina trained un til its 1)F.!:ctlc"Lpotion ill oJ€l'Gtion ;;j]\ ­
ICE'r on 1'/ l qhl:. . 'l',·croty- :;.',-,Ul' bours r11':!..o:r t o talre - of f ,
all a:i. l'bDrnC f.lenentr:: 0:;'-' tbe. J) : vt3.i.on '.:ete clo::led (Jt seVf!.n alrl' ields
i n t he H:i,'e n . ,'!'.l.e1'i.l1C;s "Iere cOl!ducted ,
l OAdl nc l)lans tol'] til l s tGU , .::: L"L l"tmll (: u ndo , tln(l. the lJi vi Hion
to!)]': of!' for the _ ethc:L'load3 (It 170'1,0 .Je::; ·)tsTIl.bel'
'1.'i1l:) l1is:;l"lIl l1.r tlJ' l;j.viGior:. iLl this ',")(1S DS fo Llows :
"I,and by and r l ir]er cO!l!·lencin,"! D Dt.,,{ SU11th o f
J,"i j msglJrl; scL.:: t! und holG. tho hi" !1\'IllY bl'id.... ecr::JfiB t!Je
t .n ss Hiver ut and ehl3 . iSfll. IUver at ; s:;ize ,
ox,:::cniz.e , ond r,h'J hlgn ,'";rour.d betwuP'.ll and
Groesbcex ; deny the roods iH thn D!vision urea to the
enemY i at"!.rl d ..>lrinnte the ar9fl bOll11,ded l',' ortil liuG rtL.'1 ­
ninr:; from beet: ·.. .'rst t iu'oue;.1. t lh.H1Ce ;)(lut m'lest to
':;, Inds(: h.=strc.at , ":;uuth ' tlS3 ()'lU th(l •.

Glo ve -!'· i.iuegen hir::hwoy und Eetchs ­
weld , Gl:.d by l ine r unning 'iTortil and i')O 'lth
L i ndsohestraet . ·
The f irst l ift con sisted of:
.?r <:ht Glider
.- ',,-­
H9 " liq Co S2d •.II, [; 1;- ,.
•Iq :<. JIq .otl'Y Di v ...:;:oty
82d Sig Co
...."It· '...
1 ... l:.n
.u ... r y 0111 Jl J. j •..
307 ,./b i.no tin 27
504 .t'rcht ruf 137
505 l?:: cht Int 126
50B 2rcht Int 1:;0
Glld'!)r J:nf
;76 . .Il'cht eLl I 8
':.'otDl 50
Jl.ll units d!'ol)Y'le rt E1 S :pll:'l:ulUd 6:7CB'1t t\'!O of the
505 1.1ar3ch:;,-I;,e I nfElntry . ;.. lllX',ifl tn rnarohall i.rp cour.e,:. the 2d
Eot t aU.on soriol to dro9 br:.r"ore 3d;' bttc.liol1. ee':"iDl , 3jld c,s
e the L.3tta l ion seria l "OS dl·o··nac:. tvlO
Y<;lrds .:o_,t,}:,ousi", its sche(iulen (11'':)l) zone .
The ent.Ll'(' fliS!lt \;8S by e tomr. , which
l ondoc 0.:.1 'J'i'.J ,••J" te:c. T:l.Lnutn S Drlor to the 01'1' i 1 0:' t,lc i" i r:Jt
e l ements 01' tho lIla in ,' 1ttl ·i.be th", 5C5 ')C1'O ·­
chute nb::n;-G , n I L unit::; londefl on (irop zones ,
or I n 1.11e iHJ.i.',(;t1.idtC vicin lty the:ceof , on SChCd 11') . }I'I,, ': enr out o
r;DS s pott:r !.ll':,d 110:t . c ::)Z1lr:[', f::::01'I J}'L. nC" rirJ:1
b ut In(,Qc lu·o tr; . !l!h'3 first )8I' 3l!l1utists to l&nd de::; troyed a l l flaK
uJ'cws £.I ud took OVE':l' thEd.::· ',',1,.0)0:18 . ,· _.el::JY disiJOa:_tions 8lonr, t he
l'.EiClS - i.-.al i,;!Jnol in t ll( v1.cin.ity 01' all a nd 1.n t he v'ooded
coun try t.:.t.':Jr..Lid ths € :La the neicl!Gwu l d we r e , os
\,ell o:cr-vniz;id and 01' Db'Jut 0 of eIGht b£: t ­
t ol ions . fLee 0Jllti0.H2d t.,) CO','J j,'l'Jrl i',ho e,h;e s of t he
drop zones thl'oughout [.1J. 01' \..1.' until OVO:r;'CO;1£. . o:.r :J. :;!r.1y
r ea c tion Wb S unu 0 .. "'0 1'0110"/ n oJ,'inl t 13 po t tern . ];.11
l o ca l t roo,s \';c r e i'::!l1vc1ilJt.cl." ill 1100.1 1:1.'38 1 ft:shi on .
rTear h,Y "homsyll:uc" t,ViJC 1 :",' thro·, .• l i 'j ::of; es they
CO'lhl be r,whon to tl:, o' Ol'l.\..i . -·' ;. 1.::; mea l build up
until fl coord.Lni"t.c d 31,,\,:)C'( \:l:,. ; 'Vl<..1u., :r 6th
.. lara on Df h . 'OJ "I . '1
,.\" I .. .
111 • ,
- 1 - t> _
Loc'\ l. enemy units 1;161'6 ::: nd des troy ed or , exceIi t
fJ" t.hose in t hE: city of Ki}Dp.l:.>er.. proper , ti1.ey diaper' sed in t he
ti r- at several houts ,:.. fter 1::l11di ng .
.• by dj.Y summ.;:.ry o f the: ..l ctivl t1c;.s of ef;.-::h unit o f the
Dt vison f e llo· 11 (l' Uflfn ..:a :
o DoY. 17 hll!IL.ftIII I H L'
01 vi sien p r... te ele!!lcn "...e in fO'Jr' hundred and e1 6hty - two
0-47' Blond f:1 Beri 'l i cf fi:[t'l l0ft .... i rpor· ts in t he c..rea.
of Gr'..l.l1tham , S:81md, ..nj 1040 . ..11 ee,ri 3. 1s excopt
those of ;04 P::-. ra.::\.l.\ite i 'llf:":Jtl j . l...J..'Jed ::crth, L.st, 'lnd South
o f Gr·oesb0e!\. , 12C:O ..1j:lrj 14CO . 524
f<ll1try 1 3ndfl1 ' !est -:..f c!s s - '-! :... a l n ...l .;.TId _I O::t'rJ. of the j.1a3.8
River . drop P! .?c:.t ..!.nd e quipment
108S8S enroute Sin::l dUY'L-: t.:e dr ..) .... ...:ere ..ht , ..ld :' ssembly wa s
the best in the histc z'Y of' D.lvisil.::.. ..J .
t!eadq'Jarter@ [':M 1irs. ,-J] Oi vi s i en
P3. r ac'.1u to a 1 ;Lo j 511dcn:- f.le L.nded 1350 on
zone South ef GroeE.Uel'",:K
rr,ov(!;d ric:' t h \'/ooda , ':""l d establish­
ed Dlvision Co!t J! ."Jnd Pea t :I t predeai611di.ed l o c " ti on 1000
o f G- r cosocol{ "" t 1700 .
; 0 5 P :;. r a chuta I n f o.n t!"y
Droppod <l ft er t.he .a t 1300 , G:;."'oeebeek , occupied
its 13.r ': of defe:1sive froin •..I.iI,p Sout o'e,Hzt t o r.i ook ,
cl c:l red lts areq o f eaemy , Md cont a cted ::04 I nf.m try
a t the Ma'ls- ',i !!.•.'t l C.:.n.J. l brlde;e neal' HeUiIi '1n . .. 11 lnitL.l mi ssions
...Iere a ccompli shod by 2OCO •
..;,Q4 P<.Lrachu t€ J
:>rol)ped beginni n G 131} ',¥'e st of the .,1tu. s-'lLtS l C",i1ul on t hree dr'op
zone s , t'iIO North one S0uth of" th\;.l .. One ba"t. t .::.t li ol1.
drcped Nor'then st of Gver:!.sse l t d.na at 1600 ,
strong o!lsmy resis t 8,nce , c e-. ptul:ed i:-, t :..c t the ••1.J,. ... s - ··/eal ::;an.!ll brip.ge
.:I t Heum:;\I1 . The .sites c f oride;o s r;e) 'lr' 31.:.nkcnoer ;:, and
Hc. t ert, oath of ha d be:e-:1 d.&str'oyed by t ...... e (;;":';E; ,ilY up-::n t':-Ie
approtl. ch of t"/\ c b9.t t ..... lon , '.... er··3 c Jpt:'lTe. d before dc.rk . One b e tta lion
dro))ped "los t o f :.:.. 1 1 Sou thw-?,rd mc v€ ;. n:;..nt alone;
the Gr a ve - Nijn19y,€ !l I ::u1 cle r ed the r,1"1emy frem t he liest&rn
portion of t ne Division " r&;;:. . One b .. tt,.. llcn dropped one r ifle
comtJa.ny South of' t ·:l.G :'1 : 3.s :. t r:'r'·, ve .;..nd t ',l S be. lll':ce of the ba tts lion
North o f the river .'cs t ,)f Cvr:::r;,..se;ol t • .3c-:h 'f or c es mov6d
against the bl"1.dgo ''I t € L L... :-... dj,3tely . ccn:pl€;t e
snd the bridge c PVlrcd (. t J,43O , t ·J '.11l of C·rave ';Jas o ccupied·...
9. t 23C0 after , v l ng boen by 400 cnemy . ".11 inith ..... l
missions o f 504 '.oIe!"'0 oy 1930 .
508 Pa r achut e lr.ff.:.n ..try
Dropped ": or thc:; st of G-r o 0 sb€ek .:;. t 1328 . on .1 report from
the Du tch th:l. t the town (.... nc. or- i dees were l i6htly held, irnmcdia.t.z ly
movod into Nljoegen to .. o Vie ':/.;.t c l !"-t ivor br idge s . z,t 2000 the
a t t " ck me t he'lVY enomy t'osi st:J. nce about 400 .y 'l r'ds frc-m t he hi shway
b r i dge ...::'l d \'ie. S stopped . The l"' ee,i ;ncnt o ccupied th.3 ... . CSl tm:.Je dl 3. t e::ly
E:l 8t of thl) .... a l ;;...n d. cstt!.;:"li ehed r O!!Ld alocks to pro'l ent
enemy movowont S.ou th of :l. runni ng H.rld .Jest through
H1tert . One moved t o olth... r the Kl ldGr l .;J.ndinfl zone
(:'" at of r.rc Gs'r)eek hnd met considera ble One
batt :l lion , l ess b. oc cupied t hG importunt hi Ch 3rcun d.. in
tho vicl \.l l.ty of Berg en 0:::. 1 'rl it.hcut too cl.n oPPos,i ti on . One
compr.my on the :3-r-idgcs fr.Jm the &out,noc;. st J.tld a t
2400 h "d 'l tU 64. 4 )lo,- t hc'., st of Ubb c r _on . ., ll
missions of :-08 € ·.:cccmp11sn( d. by 2030 .

7"7 ' / --1 ':;""'- " ""-'0" -
: .
CC "i'i p -' ni(;s G, ;.:.;.;1 D, " 1.1 d·- oIy::eo. of '}roEls ­
be2k .;: t 132C , CC:!liJ.: ni:.s .3 j.n:: 0 f'u'cLi s.w'::: CJIJ".. r on rOilte
lP.;l1.... ch to clE::!lct.ta cf Dl.-J ..... £'i\")D '.·..;:11. i.:;--o':"0cted
CO .lh] }:;"st 'Ii :cr, it \': .. s ;:.\t 171: . Cc'm ­
P "lllY C movei ()l;t:.O ... ct :'&n: C:1U'':'C il1' (;st of
C_tn.l .
3 '). 'il"! ,",.r:: ..J.L1c. t L ... ..
!:i ::':': t !ffi .•110 te1 £: s fo;. ',(''.i s : Tw,) , 50S P.:...r,;.l chu t e
r:::, 'I o. T:-f"',',j"J'" 1"/10 "- 04
J' -' • ..­ ... ,,_ , .... _ ........ _ .. . _, ,
In1'c:.n t :'y upon co._ t :. ct ; 'Two , € r::.stJ r·V0 i n
vicinity of 8c...,i!'!3..r,d 2ost .

Ccn t :"nued to h;Jld t\").c,; ',lis:) 5 ::i vor brid.gc ';I. t th8 A.... ,'38 ­
!'fG:.sl C;.:..r:.c·. l bY·id;}.::. r:.: t I-Icuill :n . VL50rouG \'I' C. 5
on tno ,<..;:d tier cf thG r '";, ro.')_ t:'"!.c
.t 1-;::00 c'n(; 1-,l, .. t oor. !I!C-ied Ucrth
tho 'f!Cgt of tho C:.!: ':'. l ... l:d .' L::. t.nt.
tur e of the on t .1: "Jl'<" hi[/tw-:. y n6;'"r :--l·cniEg.­
hu ti o .
C: O: P""_ r.s.chu t€ Inf' :1 trY
:Z:i n t ,, 1:r:.o"l. i t s i:roa----or dc f011 8i v(: r 0::.11 n:::pcl1cd. enE.my
8. tt':': cks c t Hor3t , • .. !1ti c ..... ;·(;'.;I:<;;'1 _.n cne;my
p:: t r o l to viOrk its ;·,' ·'! Y to .•
Hcui:': .. n , _ t rfJ i n to iett-o G0::'ilh1"lY .
, t l?"O .... , .. -It -d "d n 1,"r'" 1","'_' l - ndir'5
-'. • -..,. ,..... <-,-, -'" '. ... , .... -. , .. <.;.... '".... .... •
z·:me South .;.1.1';0. S:ut".:1c::.:s,t of •
.5.CS P chu te I rf.!::::!lt ry
\'ii t ilir·t;., ..l bL.t.t e.licn i n Ni J;!:C-3cn ,:..tt'-. clt.0d to clGar th!) p;lider
zoY".c E·::,. s t cf Grooso<:.: ck . ':'bs- cr:)5S­
E:d. "':.L.c s'J·,.cdulcd. l i ne of dtJp '_r tur c ::..t 13l0 , GU1'prisod
t:'H: t:TIOii: ,." , .· !1i the Lnchns :.1"' 0.... . ·fr .8 by 14('0 . f:l x tocn .';.':1ti ­
p:,Uf' S l nd 149 pr·isor.ors of -"fi fo !' 111.LliVl. iu.:d
1. ts dc.f."e·,ls1ve thr:;Ueh01lt the 16th . ._ t 151200 c... pl:: toon ,
l.h.;:: "ssist ,; nce of ::04 F'.. Infa r.tr·y up
the .J ·.r:·.:: l fran:. t.he ··.' (';st . c.Jptu!""Gd the G·.tn,.;,l
br·.i.d:.;c HouL1Ghutl0 . Rr:[lill(':"1t h ,.:. "L<i ti1,) hiGh .. 1'o'..I1:d. vlc.ir.lty
Berg on 1)rJ.l t ho'.; 18t":1. !';.. i nG t Cl"1 Lnty ,? otrols .. nd eper;:;. ­
dic ;:-:non:y : l't.i.l .€ry .. c t i o;'! . 0 :10 cO;:l!1 _ny mcv(;::! i r. t c At
('900 , [' dVRllced to t he sp<)"t to ,.I \-.ich !oboe r:8inlBnt h8.d
e n t'1a f ou[:.:ht -r', [; force through t.he
enti ;-e d" j' , 1500 ';10. :; \.;it':tdr' ,- _\"n l..n t o t he G(; c tor ne,.l!"' ders
en DE-1 .
GU Cler
;;0t .,!')':'::r.. 1000 110':" .,. l.t .... t of 450 c ' r r'yins '.n ':..l1 ti ­
t l?nk '0: tt:JI'Y of" sou;. ;" .. Jl·: t ·· .L:cr: ft , tt, U.on , 319 Glider
F1-:,ld .. rtl1 lerjf :20 Fl.·;.. :;':' . .29. tti-i. l i on ,
456 r'lfJld ti 1 .. r';' J tt l.i0n , _ld 3(.7 . . lroorr. o i'iodlc<:::. l
- 3 -
departed from fialds in tha en! ted KinGdom flew
.. 11 LOLito the lift o f t. i':e ,Hc vi 'J U9 GU.dcrs
In zon e s . cloarod uy SOS } l:f.i:.'l.tl !i\" . . ,lEU
? :? r :... c hu to Inf ·:. nt.ry lr. tl:1e v:;. ty 01 J::, oewtt . 150' l'k '
gl i der -; t :-tc ZC!1r;: '1::.0. 1.5.:10
Gc....m:::' I: b orde: , but f SUbSt3Y,ti t 1 tlUi'!:b(..!" o f . WJ.!!'! "I · e thlSir
W3'j bac!" to t r:. c orea. overc, ll· 311d(.':' r ("cOV 6-1 'Y
\'las vcry s9ti s :&' ctol'Y 1. rt cr an d .. ss6!::b11n: ' , 319 GIl ­
d o ...... Fi :ld Ar ti. ll e:7 ', ' 8.s put \ :1 C: lr 3' ct s·.l!Ji:ort of
508 P: r 3.c hu t o I n f .lntry , -4:=6 r.i;.. r E, chut.& l:.. ...... til :.cr-y 3 o::t talion
i;} dl roct s'.lpport of 50S fJT 1. chut3 .: nd 320 Gl:'dc..r
Fi e ld Bt:. :.t.:.lion in support cf tho C: lvisicn .
FollcwTlls g l. ider l',ft by 20 :r. inutcs , ,;. fli t.ht of 135 5 - 24
bombers dropped on drop zone South of Groesbeck . Drop
pq ttorn ...,as F·ccovc.ry
csti m( ted to be 8070 _
Gu&rds ,.rr.:torod Di vi sica ::. c.; : G!'[..vc _no ::04 P,:;.r u. chute
I nf<' ntry at 08 20 .
.5:04 P"J.r a S!h,l t c
::("eci mont" on c left to s\.';:; rd i..lrid£;c: f. t GrE- ve ,
one cO"lly:: ny l oft t o [.u'.:. rd. 0 :" 0':1 o f' the l,i : ..• e- i:J', .... l C 1. , 1 :';'!"" i j e;;:;s
"t E e u:nt..n .:4 :ld Hc nl nshutit. , 3.r,.d 0 :1 0 CO.II:.J .-ny left t o p ::. tro l
gue rd the: h:'u:;hw::,y !'rem OrE;. vo "to t !1o S.... n l!" G:luti (.., J
mov(.;d 'Saet o t t :'-.c HFJ a s- ',:u1 1 r c1. : cvc j 20 B-:. t.t .i li 0TI :::08
P::s r r- cl:1t: tc.: Inff.'. ntry , (l i:ld occupi ed ":. pc J onl.. cr 3c sca 3d
3l1 tt ). lion ',r 'le; mcov e d to vicl..:1ity ,.1 ,.. ldcn f S 1)ivisi on r 05Cl"' VO.
Ir:fcll1 tD'
ROEi mt::',lt , I t:.. s :3 2.1 m,.:: i ntol lnc1. i t a o f i.·c apon­
on t he 30ut h of t 'J' Divisl c n th::OU..) lou t l,.hc. 19th.
2d &8 t t:.:,lion_';OS
t •. tt:. chcd to Gu .;.. rds----X-1"ffiCred D''\'v'\'si c n ",I t l?llOO ':,nd i!l ovcd Nor th
to .:- 5S:'.U} t t h.: Nijmcgsr. cri d:,",cs . ':I1,e b7,tt .::. J.!.on m .cha:i the
cd f!)c o f NiJ!:!(JCer. "',! ith) U-I: t..l1 d , i n nlol.o il1t1, thr ou3h the
outski r ts of th€ l t own , t ccr..: i \' 0G. onl y _rti 1 't.ery fi co . .i hCTI the
b .... t t..: 1i on r C ,t chtJd t i;. c t eX' 0 f t .1 e co.np •.ny st:. pported
seven Vinks ;!o rto.'iI0st I, d moved. 0;8· ir..st t ':lo r Gilr-o.... d
bridGc . ':' he ...nc(: or tl"lQ 1..1.: tt ' li m'i , the of the
vnks o f t i1. c 20. a .... tt...: lion cr. ': cornp.:: ny of
Br itis'1. rmor'cd t n f :: r.try d v: r.c ed t:.e·in :::.t t he bridgo .
The ' ..· ... a stc!,pcd t Pl e in , _' bcut 400 yp. r d s
south of the btl d;;;c: . . ',:i o l£.:::!t 1. stins throu(.hou t
tho evening :.md o f" th0 2.9U. f &il cc.. t o b re" li: t. he stron(5
<incrny d.efensive a r c , 9r:.c. ,. t uotlvity o f
into tho e trc nc, ;Jc i!'! t TIC" ;;;cr t,:.. ri.ne: it fr om the
c e motery scutt. of the friC';1d3..y positi on s _
.:98 PJ. r ach'.lte I n f t' fltry
Hc·ld 1:tr.dinr-: zone £ 8 at 0 f Grocsb..:;ck un ti 1 lGOC _ Clos red enemy
from and occupied h1gh e-,ro;'..md .... l on e-, N1.' mc,scn- Clovo:. hi8hway
b-;twccn Ubbcr :.. en I.I.n1 ·"yler . Est<:-. bliahcd ro blocks ilfy l r;:: r ,
B_nk , .ina 1m Ths l . by 504 in J onk-e r
BODcn """nd occupied sccto r botween 1L-rnp <:I n d Vo y. hill . 3.einforced ·
Beck r o: d ble c k with ple toon o f Comp" ny 0 , ?;07 Jj a Enc;inG-cr
3 e tt'J. U.;)!l ; r ( ..pell od cOlmt or e. ttacks ...,i r. st BOr'g through­
out entire
- 4 -

, .
iU'morea J and 5th.
C".wrds ,
att€lched to Divis:l.on and moved to Dekkersv!ald in Division Reserve .

"5':"Topyed at 15CO, 30 C- h7's frOB exccssivtdly high alt i ­
tude J u0giigible .
504 Parachut e Infa):trv
\¥ith 2d 11,lsb. (;u;:';:L'QssttE!che(l, c l c81'8f) area bet,ween Jonl.;:er Bosch
9nd We al River . Battfl1.:i.:l:i rel:'eve1 os Division Resel've . Regiz:tent
at 1500 effectecl crossl!Lg of i 'cal :;.iiyer l',est of Ases j at 1800 CB"J­
tured North end ra j.l:::oed aVe!' tr.'3 \'eel rave!' J seized end
cleared bri cf: € '!head lort.n 01' i..l:s'lrlz:p. pa,ss9gQ of G:.i8rds Armo r ed
Di vision . trapped : !estern OUtS1,::2.1-tS of and et ee South of
railroad bridge .
505 Pers-chute Infs_ntry
l es s 2d Battalion...., r eoel l ed shar'O 8tteck at Horst
and Heikent :b"ro:u 1 300 to 2000 repe lled et ,[ook ener(l.y
attack of en infantry regi:.-'!e:1t stror.;sl:T sUlJportej C:-," ar t il l ery a f ter
attack had penetrated Di visio!'. pe:rir.:.eter to de 1')tb. of 1000 yard s on 13
10(,{" ya rd front . Di vis::"cn ]Je!' imeter r e 3tored at 2UC'O. Re g.iJiJ.Gilt re i n '
f o:tced iJ i th attacrJilent of 185 @: l ider pi lots .
2d Battal ion 505 ?arech'--lte I nf antry
Attackea stl'ong pOj.r..tG at. bouthern €j1ds of liijn:.egen bridges
duri ng mornInr: . At :::to;''Y.led St-l '::>nP. point 30:.lt!1 of 11ighvlOY br i dge)
cl eered area of enc!'7 , <:::-:<1 rea ched D!' i ur,e by 1" 00 . Fi!'st tenk of
Gr t nedier Guords cros:::ed 18)0 .
50Q Paroch'lte I!!:"I;l11tr:·
.htt-scjced al; 10Gii ot-:-yl-?!' b"r or-a of oncmy infs::1.try movi ng
ane t wo cO"TJ:)e ni <?s of ene::.:....,Y inf"a nt:;.·y rno:i:1..Q" Sou th , all suppor ted
by arti l lery end armc:' . g ')l.. to \ "itl1L:.:' t.-J.' t.o h i ;::h rround to ylest .
Enemy hrr:edietel y o c cu'">!.ca. I:: 'rlla:!. e!:d J .. tt,QcL:ed at Beel(
a t l 20J by 2 betto 15: Jr:.s 0:- sts by
vehicl es , and forced t:> \ 10\.0 V, ,1' c19 to high p'r:nu:d to &outh­
·,'ieDt . By counterattae!: clrOl!e fr o:] &i1d rcoee tt')ied reek 8t 2140 .
Attecket: 8P."8.in e t Bef;!k: 23:::'0 b " e:l. '3f,l-.V no'.! r einl'o1'eet- end eO'UlJe l led to
withdra\'l , (. detec.h;.-:J.Elnt surrounded the ener:iY in tne tovm .
C€ntur ecl do,:nrr .• ent fl'o:n of val' "hich that € l:'..€ n....y
ett6clcS at flook , Be ek , ar.d I.'yler V.'9 re part of a cOQr l1 ineted Divi!Jion
ett acl{ intended to sl)l it Di 'vision cree c: nd seve!' the Gr8ve -:-:i imegen
',.. 1.-,· ,.... v . V
;,.,l."<.4" •
Sl161'wood Rf!::pers YeOti"..Cl nr y and one SQ
1adrcn of the P.orals , i t s r econ ­
naj.ssa::lC6 unit , attElcileci t o Division at 1700 end moved into Dekke:::: ­

504 Parech
lte Infantry
over' '€leI end on n i ssion of mooping
up South of l-i-inegen to nau5 - ;';081 Cana l .
- - 5

. . .
222-P.rachute Infant ry ( l ess?d Battalion)
Co!!tinued to hold ue!' ensi ve on South of Division a r e a f r om
Km:.r. p to Mook .
2d Batta l ion 505 Pe r acnHte In:taTl t ry
He l ieved of missio!'l c-f Iii,imegen ond
a s s u.T..ed 6.efense of l ine i" l' om B€s"tern e:d.ts of € to Ubbergen .
6 08 Parochute Infant r y
ounte:::,sttacked 11aek at. l i ght:. fro!T1 Forth0ast. , Eas t and South­
east . Initial etT.6c\{ f eiled , r,nd enell;·... , pr e ssing h i s tempora ry
advantage , .oerwtr(J1;.ed to wi 200 yards of' Be::::'g en Del , but was
held there . .H.tteck ot 1 300 , ond at 1800 Beck c l ear e:i of
enemy and a l l defenses r eest eblished .
ResuT) pl.'1
At 1500 su!)pl ies dropped f ro!! a
'i1::.'c}:irr.ate l y 40C C- 47
s on dr op zone
Hest of the 1I6€ ! fl -'}ar:l GeT'.al . Dr ol? patte::on 1/ /85 six :niles in l e ng t h
by mi l es in width . Rec()v'3rv estbu ted et 6{})"f, v:es tlcc.o!!F)lished
wi t h assist ance of Dutch civi : is!1s .
504 Parechute Infantrv ( l p.ss 2d Battalion)
Re l ieved of missio:1to .'il:meE-,on brldf,eheorl displaced t o De kker ­
s vta l d as Di vision Rese r vE' ,
2d Batta lion 50i.. Infant r:.'
Relieved 2d Bettalic">n J:'a-y3"ch
lt-€ Infantry in sector t et\'feen
Nijmegen and lJ'obergen a"1e. , l.11JOn Di vinion order , \:i th Roya l s , c l ea r e d
by 1700 area betvJeen ri:i.,i•.:e;;;e r: - Cleve 1ii(:[g'01 anti Ri·.rer J.,!e st to
l ine Ubbergen - Pals .
505 Parachute Infantr y (less 2d Batt611on)
Reestabl ished rond bl ') ck et },look . \.rith Royals , reconno ite r ed to
Ri ethorst and found rosd c l esI' of enerr.y .
2d Bett81ion 505 P<JT6chuteI:1fsn.trv
Re l ieved in Ni,1nsgen - U'b'uer .:;en sector bIt 2d B,r;ttalion 504 Para chut e
In:f'entry I r e vcl'ten to r eginentel conr,ro l , and !,61ieved Goldstream
GUbras 6 t HeULl€ In Br idge ,
508 Per ;"lchute Infz:ltr y
He l d ,tyler Berg through8ut day end nj.,c;ht against persisten t en8my
count ernttflcks . Olle COTIP)Bny attached , effected B r e con ­
in f orce to i\! el'cherGn e n.d high f:ro ·.mtl \ ;e.>t of I;r l e korn .
ri:e t str ong resistencE'! and ... :itlldleVJ t o hig:1 gr oW""'.d vlcinity Be rg en
Da l.
to attE!che.n to thi s Dt v ision end move d
South to Ver,el to restore l i ne of cOlm:lUI"!.ictAt i on of' Secon d British
Ar my .
- 6 .
...... . . .

On this dcte tre r.l idei' li:'t. of Di "lision t ootc cff from
six air .... ields in the E:,na beering 325
Glider 30t..h Alb less Bl;.tteries
A ar.d Bj COll:n.. L 307 A/S ::J!l[,in:;}er une. eleMents of
Divisi.o11 S-P3c.ic l '1'1'00:05, 8:1'1 on m:d in tr...:'.l vtcd.nity of LZ
1!0;1 . vt nu:ubcn: oi' rlid8:!.'f' o. i u not luno. on n1'o:"ler landing zone ;
..,."... .l: P"' r.l-,' d , _ f'O--1v ' .• ' I"...... _ ,' ':'v'.._.
1'O l-n". - ,'".1......'1,., < "" ,, )' (1 , "'- - -hre
"'Dr" , .". J ._. ,.. b""'-'ee" tn's
Cr)£.. nnd the LZ . '"on F.' li60r J stli.L t:.n:::cC'u',m':.ed fo:r . I l.'l,:eci. ­
i ntely unon lor.,eEnt' , L1C 325 GIid,);,.' clos'J<l in the
·) t of Groesbeck pr'e1)srcto::- :r to t t Id.:1g II') E :.;cct.:l !' O!1 tr_€

-.)T"S 7 k
_ _ D ,'J,iJ3 }O
The Divj.sio!l conti.nl:ed on its misajon uSf;ip.!led by 30 Corps of' hold ­
ing tile flreo bet\jdf'U i.·-e:. l 6"ld the ifac s River , l.-
tth :ts
front gCT'Grolly timt of' II " l UG 6 . ':1.'113 Jr:5 GliC.cr Inf ;.lnt ry cleaned
out tha ll.rr;er portior: ot' t ·ne riekbf'l'g I oodo:; N.d the right
fl anl< of tl,,'3 Div"!.s.:.on .
a . PeTCi chut.a Lift
Plunes crJtiLli t1;cd
Oro) )ed on or \!j tll ia 1 ·.:':D S 0:[' D7.
Fnllecl to en or "\;i',;.h:'r! le' ,lI ?t,:.' u;:
UnIJcco un:;ec. for
3<) , 2
10 , 8
b . Glider
Gliders tted
LLluded on or '. 'i t hj::l 10C10 :·81'(1.s of
Fe ilea to lD'1d on or wi l OGli 7nn(J.s
U!:::lc"o lmted for
of' LZ
3/, .6
4 , 1
C. 0111' loase s
J.:i ssing
. 69
3. 4
11... . 0
d . s
Prisons:.:o9 of

13 . of O")crl,tions





[)flAWIV {frCP/?(J[)V(,EO -­ gy ' ­ ' -: . - - ~ - ~ ~ .. i i i i i i i ~ · ~ ~ ~
/1. TOPO Co / - , . - • - - ~ ~
3060EN6. - .­ - - ~ . . . . . . ; ;
. I Cf:)/f'r-'S) -­
..L. S E CR E T
Offi ce of the Division CO!ll!lander
,....... r APO 472, U. S. f..rm,v
fr . r 5 October 1944

' It" ." "1 '
Participation of t e lJivision i.'1 UARl'ill T for
the peri od D - D t 10
TO ComE.nding Gene ral , First Allied t,irb0I":18 Army
(Thru COffi.'ll&."1 ding General , XVIII Corps CAB)
1. The attached report on Operat i on H/, ;t.KET prepared by Brigadier General
G. J. Higgins is forwa rded a pproved ':lith the following comments .
differed from all other Airbor-ne oper.::. tions Hnd in the cOlilpactness and
accuracy of the 0 day l andings . Ap.:'\ rt fr'OfU the na viga tional skill and steadiness
urjder fire sho'lIIn by Troop Carrier pilots, the f a ctor contributing r::.ost to this
a ccuracy Vias the· deci si on to stage the ope ration in daylight . Daylight aUOIved
the operation to be put on success fully with a rninimtun of !"' reparation. There was
no special oointi:'"lg for Opera tion :U, HKET on th'i:! part of Ai rborne Troops whereas
a full-dres s rehea rsa l would have been indispensable had the operation been in
darkness. Daylight sir.:.pl i fied the marsh<olling and problems of Troop
Carrier Conu::e:.nd ns well as the assembly of nirbome troops on the ground. The
l'apidity of this asse.r:'.bly permitt ed the accor:.plishment of the initial grou"1d
missions on B<: cause of the advantages it is thet consi­
derable boldne ss is j ustified L"1 choosing daylight than darkness for an
Airborne operati on i f , as in }.fJdUG:T
the on<.lll\V is on th0 run hnd a ir supremacy
J . lU.TE OF BUIW- UP OF THE 101ST ;'.D1l30hN "';; DIVISI(N. It rclquirud seven
days to bring in all the Airborne elUl!'.,mts of 101st Airborne Division . Dur­
ing this time the Division wa s obliged to the l anding field "lith consi­
d.:: rable forces while ca rry:l.ng out its ground missions. This requirument f or
l anding fie ld prote ction reduced the str..;ngth availa ble f or the esstmtial tasks
of Division . This inevit!!.ble div.:orsion of strength is a f a ctor which Must
b e borne in nind in a ssignillg missi on s to en :.irborne Division .
4 . TROOP CIIHRIER CliI '!HE naOUnD. Gene r a l Higgins in Jk"l.ra­
gr a P'l 4 .f conl.1ents on the nee d of en Air control unit on tho glid.., r field.
This would have been most useful in !.II RKET and should be overlooked in fu­
ture r.irbor:w operations . ;. Troop offic<J r on the ground could have
r adioed back locn.l we.:1.th.;: r conditions .:::.nd cxarcised a ir tr', ffic centrol. /,lso,
he could ha ve relayoo. the latclst infonn.:.tion rog:udbg the t a ctical situation on
the ground, thus preventing air format i ons from flying ov or a tk"l. ttle III progress.
5. Ca\ STHUCTICN OF ST!UPS. Oporat i on included pl.:"'\ ns for the
construction of l <.".nding strips to bring in air tr<I.'1sporte d units &nd sup!,lies .
Thi s 'IP- S n eve r possible of 3nemy ['.ction adja cu:1t t o the na rrow corridor
al ong the Eindhovcm- !, rnhem highway tlnd the absence of a dequate troops t o clear
and control the n.:>cess:. ry I tl nding field a r ea. As thl::l sittBtion is going
t o be oxtremely uncl3 rta in whenevo::r i.irbor.w troops 1:;.nd b<:: hind lines,
t he con struction and pr ot vction of :l l a nd.::.r.g field joes not appear fea sible with­
out an entire I: irborne division with th..: s ol n m.issi on of s,;: curing thoJ fie ld .
6. r, IH Operation n· m;: rt;T provid-3d lessons in air re­
s upply. At pre scnt , the:: de. ta a r <3 not compl e t e so t hat conclusions t untative.
Howcvo.: r , it wa s amply prov.x!. that glid:.; r Nsuppl y is much mo;,u than su
s upply by pare chute . The k tt.,; r wa s only :.bout 50% e f f oJ ctive nnd would have buen
LI1a deqtk'\toJ in to mainta in this Division f or any considi:: l"ublc pe riod. Ex:­
in Ope r :;. tion U·. R:O{ ET tha t air NSUpPly r emains an ellli!rg.... >ncy
mathod \'lith a long way to go before it can bo rclitl d upon to support Airborne
troops in :Hlr.lbt:r for an indefini t a period.
? GHOll-iD OPER' T10.'1 3 OF THE 1015T J. I HBOW:C Dr VI"=l I CN . Tht1 initial grc)lUld
missio!1 of th..: required its dispersion in t h rue a r ea s along a corridor
'!bout f i ftacn in l engt h. Thi s disposition made t hcl J. irbornt.l troops weak
at critical pOint q,nd IInde n<3cussa ry the most ener getic shifting of troops
to mee t t he numa r ous thrcDts as th-::!y !
anything 113ss t itan a superior drop I 'I 11ight 1"ell
hav') f Ct il<#:i , wholly or in part • . !.s

sevora l bef or e Airborne" troop:'! r e stored the s itlW.tion. The oxperi­
ence ga:ined by Division gave r enewt!d force to the conviction an !.irborne
division is c8p:1.bl o of. e.xart-ing- a strong uff.ort in but a s:1ngle diructian a t a
givC!1. time.

l LX' lELL D. T/.YLOl!, I t H L.
].tajor General , USf,, ' .
Commanding •
, .
'. ,

Office of the Asst. Div. Comdr.
A?O 1.72: U. S.
J.2 October 1<;; 44
SUBJECT: on Operation
" '!I!t\ril
Commandlng General, lOlst A:Lrborne ... . . 'f.
1. GENEH.AL: In accordance witil CC::1:11D.. '1IJing General
lOlst Airborne Division, the follc,dn $ :repcrt all the pC'.:,, ':.lci}Js l:.j.on of the lOlst
Airborne Division in OperRtion iNillKE'.i' j.s This report covers
the operations of the lOlst Jlirbcr!le Di v-i.sion f rem D to D I 10 ;n:lusive (Sep­
tember 17 to 27, 1944). 'me 1"5 into t.hree P'lrt s ' I-irst, the
Q.OVem.ent of personnel and !'rem t.he lJK to the cor.lbat. zone in a parachute.
echelon, a glider echelon, "and a seabo.rr.e sacond, the t.actical operations
of the Division, and units ther-:.- cf, t!'",c lending by parachute until
o t 10 inclusive, at which tit<8 tl':.t' t.act';.cul S:LtLl..'1tion became 1110:;'9 or less st<;t­
bilized; and third, gene:-dl COl!'.Jnents on vnrious operational and administrative '
' matters peculiar , to an airborne operatio:). .
a. Parachute Echelon: TM echelon of the lOlst Airborne
Divis;ion consisted of 436 C-47 transport planes carrJing s':){lle 6,a09 par,achutists
of the Division. Four hundred twenty-four pla!1es clroP$=e d on D-Day, and 12 p-lanes
car-rying Battery "Bu, 377tn Parachute Field Battalion, with 140 person­
nel and 6 guns, dropped on 0 f 3. Of the 436 pJancs whic.:h took off, 434 dr( ,pped
parachutists in a highly satisfactory canner (center of impact WbS SOQe 1,500
yards short of the selected DZ in one case and about 3 miles- northwest of the
selected DZ in anoth ar case. In both c ases I the .drop pattern was ex.cel­
lent and all parachutists of the serials were dropped together) . Only two planes
failf?d to drop parachutists ,!n tne selected DZ's, and these two planes were shot
down on the flight in and prior to reaching the DZ' s, All parachutists jwnped
from these planes, and 8 'frOOl one plane and 2 from <nother eventualJ.y joined their
units in tht! combat zone . Jur,1p casualites were less toan 2% of tho total n).llIlber
jumped. The average time of as::3elilbly was about one hour for each pattalion, All
initial objectives werereached prior to darkneSS . Recovery o! equip:,lent averaged
over Four Pathfinder planes preceded the serials by 15 minutes. Three of
the planes dropped wi tnout incident on the selected DZ's. OnIJ plo;ne was shot down
several miles short of the DZ in enemy and no information is available
on this ' plane. (For details of parachutt! tlcnelon, see Annex No, 1).
b. Gli der Echelons A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from depar­
turo bases in the UK ov(;:r a period of 7 days. Sl;!ven hundred and of
these gliders landcd ' witnout incident on the Ll. Approxiruattll.Y 5,000
men took off from the UK and somt! 4,800 6VC:ltUally joined their l,Ulits in the
I:ombat z.one . Some 30 51iders are unaccounted for on this date, practically all
of which are to have dropped in enemy The glider lift on 0 I 2
was because of heavy fog encounter ed over the Channel and along the
coast. Of BOt.l.= 384 glidl3rs that took off on this datl:l, only 209 landed safeJ...y on
the desir;nat cd LZ. Many others returnGd to the UK or landoJd on the cont inent in
enenv or friendly territory. No furthm- glider sdrialB were flcwm after 0 f 6,
but BOac 500 personnel and ossenti<il were flown in by C-47 transport
to thu Brussels Airport and joined their units in toe combat zone , by D flO. (For
Oetails of glider 'echelon see Annex No.2).
c. Seaborne Echelon: The seaborn\;! achelon of DiviSion consisted
of 1077 pcrsc;mnt:l and 444 vehicles of all typeS . Thu eche lon loaded on D r1 and
salll;;,d from SOUTHAUPTOll on D -f 2. It arrived a.t OLUUiA BEi\CH on D -I 3, -where it was
divided into two serials. The first s erial left tre beach on tho morning 01' D f 3
and. arriv'o!d at BOURG-lEOPOLD on t ne ' ev(;nlng of D t 4, It closed in the Div1s:ion
servi'Ce area at ZON oh' t"he evening of D -f 5, The se'cond Serial luft OW,HA BEACH
on tht.: evening of D i 3" aITivad at BOURG - ' lEOPOLD on D r5, and closed in the
Division .service area on thi:l evening of D -f 6. (For d.atails of seaOorne echelon,
see Annex No.3). '
- 1. ­
2;. The Div.ision fIlis called for the seizure of the four hl6hway
and railway bridges over the Aa RlVEH. and ItIU.EMS VAART CANAL at VECHELj t. he seiz­
ure of the highway bridge over the rlIVm at ST. OEDENRODEj the seizure of
the highway bridge over the \iIlJfBLi.!I.N'A CANAL at ZON; and the seizure of EINDHOVEN
and the IJain highway bridges over streNuS in that city. The Division objec­
tiVdS were spread over a road di8tance of some fifteen miles.
2. . 50ls t Parachut c Infantry, landing on two DZ IS m::ar
seized all four bridges without incident . The 502d Parachute Infantry landed near
20N, and with one battalion St;.iZ03d the main hi5hway bridge near 5T. OEOENliODE.
The 506th also landed near ZON and seized the Canal crossing, but only after the
enemy had blov.n the bridge. The 506th seized EIUDHOVEN shortly aft..;r noon the
next day.
c. In an effort to secure an alternate crossil16 over the HILHELiJINA
CANAL, and ilia to block 0ner.w traffic between EINDHCY'w'EN and HERTOGEIffiOSCH, one
comp<m.Y of the 502d was dispatcned to seize the hibhwa.! bridge near BEST. ThiS
company seized and held the brldgt! for a few haUl'S, but was driven off just befor e
dark. The enemy rushed strong reinforcements to this point, and huo.vy casualties
were suffered by both sides in the stiff fighting took place on Df 1 and
D f 2 in the attempt to secure t his crossing. The bridge was finally blown by the
before it could be captured , but the force defending it was
Wiped out .
d. On the of D f 2 made a raid on the brid6e at ZON
with tanks and self- propelled guns. \'las but the bridge was
held intact. Tho next morning: a n enell\Y tank - infantry attack was made, but was
he ld off. The 506th, riding British tanks, mado CUI attEmlpt to cut the attacking
force off from th:; south, but the em:!i\}' neld key points and eventually withdrew
his forces in good ardor.
Q. On the morning of D f 5 the onemy severed the main highway between
VECHEL and UDEN, and made a strong attempt to the town of VECHEL and destroy
the bridges . All available e161l ents of the Division were rushed to the vicinity,
a nd as they arrived tnroughout the day wer e formed into a task force under General
McAULIFFE and disposed to neet the enemy threats. Confused fi ghting continued
during too ent ire day and late into the night, with infa.'1try ana t",n1{s attacking
from s cveru.l directions Enemy penC:ltrutions. 'Werd made to within
500 yards of th"" bridges, but were eventu;.'.lly bcat <:m back. Th ... atti:l.ck w.::.s
the. n",xt morning, but the defense held firmly. The 2d Battalion 506th then
attacked tOn'ards UDEN, and made contact with C1 patrol of the Guards Armored DiviSion
advDncing on VECHEL from UDEN . The enemy was forced to withdraw toward E.RP, and
the road r eopened. By dawn the next morning t ll... enemy had withdra wn frolll the
VECHEL to the southeast.
f. On the afternoon of D / 7 the attacked from the northwest,
cut the ·main highway between VECl-I.EL and ST. OEDENRODE, and took up a dufensive
POSition astride t he road. The 506, with tanks attached, attacked on the r.torni ng
o( D f 8 cnd by dark had driven the enemy f.roru all but a portion of this iJosition.
The next .:iornin5 the attack was continued, in conjunction with British Armor ad­
vancing in force from ST. OEDENHODE, .md the road cleared.
g . From time of landing to D /10, the encm,y probed t he Division
sectors continuously, C!Od many small skirc.ushes ocCllTred each day. Defensive
positions, the main highway, Dl1d tl10 bridges ov e r the C,U1als and riv,"rs were sub­
jected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire . Cl.ty of EINDHOVEN was
hoavily bombed on evmdn5 of D f 2 . .. CF'9r opclrations, see
Anoox N
.4). . :_" k.. 81' ,
.,J;>N .',+,,,"8, .. •1l.
a. Casuulties : from D to D f 10 inclusive, the cusualtivs of t he lOlst
Airborne Divls-en wer e fol lows: - 373; wounded - 1436 j missing - 547; or
a grand total of 2,356 of a tota l of 13,112 who tht: combat
area. (For detailcld r eport of casualti£:s, see Annax No . 5) .

- 2 ­

b . Prisoners: A total of 3,511 prisoners were captured by the 101st
Airborne Division from D to D 110, inclusive .
.£. Evacuation: Tnd 326th Airborn<.!
cOlroa t aree in two echolons. The first eche lon, co s tl.n5 of 52
t:::l including <11l surgic3.1 team, arrived in ' CG4Jl. Gliders 0t;l the atte ­
:r,.. noon of 0 - The second ccnelon consisting of 219 personnel in 54 CG4A
Gliders, arrived on aftarnoon of 0 f 1. Immediately upon the landing of t he
first. echelon, a t emporary llospit a l w..... s set up on tne southern edge of the glider
landing First casualties were at 1500 and at 1700 the first major
surgical operation was perfor,ned . At 1800 a hospital at ZON was taken over and
personnel end equipment moved . The treatiJlent of casualties was carried on under
very good conditions. By 2400 D - l U7 had been and trea­
ted at this hospital. Upon the arriva l of the s e cond echeion, litte r bearer and
ambulance sections were s ent to their respective regiments and evacuation from
regimental and battalion aid stations was quito r apid. By morning of 0 I 2,
contact was established with 50lst at and an attached platoon of the
50th Ficld Hospit cd was sent to establish a station at The 493rd Medical
Collecting CompJ.l\Y establis ht.:! d conta ct with the DiviSion Medical Company at 1500
on D I 2, and initial eVacuation begun to the 24th Evacua tion Hospital at BOURG­
LEOPOLD. Due to t actic.?l requirements and the largo amount of traffic mov ing
north, little evacuation W<.lS until 0615 0 ;. 3, at which time normal
evacuation began. On 0 I 3, .30 ambulances ,1lld 4 - ton trucks evacuated all
available cases to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at BOURG-LEOPOLD. From D I 3 to
;. 10, evacuation of casualtios took place.
g. Air Support: In gencr a l, for air support missions were
"'handled satisfactorily by .Cle ans of the Air Support Party which lande d by Glider on
o - Bad wea the r, transmission and higher priority missions
resulted in many r equests or unable to be flown. (See Annex No . 6
for detailed report).
!. Glider Reception: Anticipating considerable in unit
assembly wh€ n a largl) number of glidors l:mded on ont:; field, i:I. Div is loon glider
party of 5 officers and 20 enlisted men from various units of
F' DivislDn came iu with the first t;lidcr on · 0 - D<\y. This party func­
tioned extremely well and in part was responsible for rapid and
assembling of units. Despite careful it was found to
expect to land near predetermined points or in small areas or fidlds. The
most practicable solution appears to be to sti'l. tion at points the
entire landing area and have these go to the nearest when they land,
orient., them, and give them the assembly point selected for the lUlit. This I>wthod
work:ed ve ry well und in c..ll but & few cases, units rapidly and VIi thout
f. Air Force Control Unit: It is desirable to have a senior
officer from the Troop Carrier COlanand arrive with the first ecnelon of gliders in
a situation of this kind. He should be provided with a r adio capable of direct
communication with a control station at the departuro airfields. In this way, he
could transmit on-the-spot information as to weathe r conditions, the tactica l si­
tuation, and too glider fidlds that are clear for the r e ception of that
lift. It is believed that many . plant: s were unne c<:!ssarily snot down by passing
over enemy held strong points, and which could have bCGn avoided hnd late infor­
"'mation been given the pilots as to tho tactical s ituetion.
g. Use of Glider Pi lots: The need for a rcguJ..c,rly constitut.;d tacti­
""' cal administrative organiza tion of glider pil ots w:.s quite appa rent on this
Theoretic3lly the pilots joine d thdr tactic;)l orgsm.zation after
landing and open:tod und(:r the senior office r of t h:::. t organiza tion. Actually, it
was for any one officer to control thu large numboJ r of glidt:::'.r pilots
who arrived in the combat area. Tnere weN many .inst<:!' nces of indivl.dual pilots
their assigned and disappea ring . Glider pilots were uscld for local
oi. va r10us insta llations ne ar LZ, the Division cP, and the Division
...J'$e'rVicc in gene r al, perforI;].ed (Jxce llent work individu:::.lly.
",. voluntarily joined cct'.lbat troops and purticipat.,d in ground fighting in the
vicini ty. It belicved thAt an organizu.tion in wnich the chain of COlilIlL:llld is
strongly forged is if glider pilots to bu used most in
an a irborne operation. I .... ,
- 3 - e. i
fa ' j \ .. . I'
, .;IiI J[(t" 61
l \ ,
..-..,. " .• 9,.
f. V
T .
h. Resupply: See Annex No. 7 .
5. A final report will be submitted when t.he Divisi on completes lots par­
ticipation in the Holland campaign.
ft44-1 ,
G.(fJ . H'ttGms, .
Brigadier General, USA,
D1V. Comdr .

) '
- 4 ­

The parachute echelon of the Division began its drop at 1300 on D-Dqy,
September 17, 1944. The 501st Parachute Infantry, wit h two platoons )26t h
Airborne Engineer Bat talion attached, dropped on two DZ' sj qne 2 miles west of
VECHEL and the other some 3 miles northwest of VECHEL. Tne hegiment, less the
1st Battalion, landed on DZ nAil west of VF.CHEL, proceeded to that tOV«l and by
1500 had seized all init ial ob j ectives which were the two Highway Br idges and
the two Railroad Bridges over the H;r,LlEMS VAART CANAL and the Aa hl.ver. No
r esistance was encoWltered on this DZ. The 1st Battalion landed on DZ II A_ I " ,
in the vicinity of KASTEEL; assembled and reached VECHiL by 1700. The 1st
Battalion received some resistance from scattered troops in the Vicinity
of the DZ. Some resistance f r om scattered enefflY groups was encountered in the
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the t own was made by the enemy .
At dark the regiment was well dug in and set to defend the town against any
enemy attack. All bridges were seized in- tact. The Engineer Detachment imme­
diately began the cons truction of a second bridge acrQss the WI I.J.Kt..iS VAART
CANAL in or der to permit two-wqy traffic if the situation so required.
502d Parachute witn thr ee platoons 326th Engineer
Battalion at tached, landed on Dol "Bn without enem;y opposition and all bat talions
were assembled by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded to ST. OED»fHODE and after
a skirmish, seized . the town and its objective , the bridge OVer the DOMMEL hIVER,
in- tact. This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had the situation
well in hand . CompaI'.\Y uHII of the 3rd Battali on proceeded to the Br idge
at BEST; secured it initially little enemy r eSistance, but was forced to
witndraw just be f ore dark by reason of n strong counte r attack. The "remai n­
der of the 3d B1!ttalion was then dispatched to join nHn Compa.I\Y, with or ders to
secure the the next morning. The remainder of tile itegimdllt went into
Division Reserve in the vicinity of
The 504th Parachute Infantry l.:Jlded on DZ IIC" without tmemy opposition.
Companies of the 1st Battalion departed immediately without fo r mal a.ssembly in
an effort to secure the three bridges over \;ILHi:::I...MINA CANAL in the vicini ty
of ZON before tht..'Y could be bl own by the enemy. Scatt';}red enemy re:sistancc was
encountered before reaching the main bridge and forward wer e within
100 yards of this bridge when it was bl own by the retreating (It was
found that the othe r two bridges had been blown several days before). The
Regiment began the crossing of the Canal by various Elxpedients, and by 2400 the
was on the south of the Canal and had a bridgehead exten­
ding some 2,000 yards .
The Command Echelon of Division Headquarter s with the 502d Para­
chute Regirat!l1t and establi shed an initial Command Post at ZON. SOtIl!;:; 70 glider s
car r,ying additional Command the Heconnaissance Platoon, Signal and
Medical personnel, and some transportation for tho combat units, landed on the
LZ about one hour after th.:l parachute landings . Overall time of landing of all
parachutist s and gliders was ono and one-half hours. Communicat ion was estab­
lished with al l elements except the 501 by dark on this date.
The "501st Parachut e Infantry continued the defense of VECHEL through. ut
the day. Communication was with Division at 0600 . Sev dral light
enemy at t.acks were repulsed, but no major effort to retrieve the town was mado.
The 1st Battalion of the 532d Par;'"" chute Inf.:mtry continued to hold ST. OEDENttODE
and likewise sever a1. light enemy attacks. The 3rd of the
502d attacked at first light in an effort to retrieve the Highwqy at BEST,
but suff €:- r ed heavy casual ties at the hands of the enemy force which had been
strongly reinforced during the night . The 2d Battalion waS then or dered to
assist the 3rd Battalion in securing the bridges . "Tho Battalion penetrated to
the outskirts of BEST, but wt;.s forced to withdr aw by ht.: C:lvy artillery, mortar,
and small arms fire , and took up a defensive position on the l eft of the 3rd
Battalion. At dark the entire regl.ment less tho 1st Battalion waS in a defensi ve
position east of the highwll,Y tht.! enemy dcfGns6s around "th<:; Highway Br idge
at BEST.

tr-'\\ ";. : " ,
The 5Q6t h Parachute Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion leading, advanced
on EI1IDHOVEN at first light. The 3rd Battalion was held up at one mile
north of the city, by determined resistance. The 2d Battalion made a wide
envelopment to the east of the city, outflanked the defenses, and seized
the town at 1300. qontact made with British Reconnaissance Patrol at
1215 north of the city, and with the main Britisn Forces at 1900 just south of
the city. At dark the Regililent W\lS in cop.trol of the cntird city and was in
positi'on defending the important bridges in t;lla city which were the main
objectives .
At about 1530, soma 428 gliders c<... r r.Y1ng. the 3rd Battalion of tho 327th,
the :Ehgincer Batthlion, the retaai.ndcr of the Medical und Signal Companies,
elements of the 377th Parachut e Field Artillery Battalion, and additional
and vehicles, arrived in the 3rd of
the 32?th waS assigned the missioQ of providing protection for the ·LZ and
the Division' service area.
.' !o• •
Forces reached south side of Canal at ZON at
2100 immediately began the constr.uction of a bridge across the Canal.
.-Jl1e bridge acros.s thu Canal .was coplp1eted during th<:l night and at 0615
l6adinge1omt:nts of the Household Cavalry and Guards Annored Division beg$"l .
crossing. These same elOOlents p...1ssed through ST. OEDENRODE Wld VECHEL
by 0645. One Squadron of the 15/19 Hussars was attached to the 506th at. EINDHOIEN,
and one Squadl"Oq to the 502d at ZON.
"C" Company of 501st w..s ordered to send ont: platoon to DIN-TER. Repor ts
from this company indicated the tmemy Wi:l.S in some force in and. around t his.. . town.
'Iha 3d Battu.lion ot: the 501st w.:l$ ordered to from VECHEL to EERDE and toke
up a strong defensivc' position at that point. The remainder of the 501st con­
tinued in a close in defcnsE:: of VECHEL and dur:if\s day thl.! 2d Batt3lion
repulsed en enemy attack from the northwe st est.irnat cd at ova.r 250 Infantrymen.
During tt"!-e late evening, Compeny "E" was driven beck from its outp!,st posi.tion
ab:>ut 200 yards by a well executed night attti. ck by enetll\Y parachutists .
.{ - " . .
. First .B.attalion of the 502d continued in the defense of ST. OEDENRODE.
The 2d at 0.600 i .n another to highway bridge
at BEST. This attack was repulsed by t 'ne enemy. At 1415 the
the 1st reinforced by one"" squadron or" the 15/19 HQ.Ss¥s·, launched a
co-ordin.:!.ted· d. ttack ... ..gainst the enemy position. This attack was very successful
and the objective seized at 1800. Fifteen S8mm guns wt:r e destroyed, 1,056·
und 300 enemy dead loft on the fi e ld after this
. .­
The 506th Parachute strong points· east and west
of ElNDH'OJEN omd continued ext i.:nsive patrols with the squadron of the 15/19
A .third glider lift began to a rrive at about 1400 carrying the 1st and
3rd of the 327th, the Slst Anti- Tank Battalion, the '3??th
Field -,i11cfY B.1.ttalion (less Battt;:ry tlB"), and the 90?th and 321st Glider
Field Artill ery Battalions . Due to fog encountered enroute, only a portion of
these units EJ. emcnts of the 32?th wero . giwn the mission of . protecting
the glider. landing fi,eld 3lld assisting thl..: attack of tile 502d ii' necessary. At
about 1700 enemy tanks word report ed approaching ZON from tnu southeast a
f,;w minutes later s eyer a l t .ws approached a. fow hundred y?rds of the ZQN
bri dge dnd shelled the the Division CP, and .thE. tOHn . Little damage was
nnd the tanks .withdrew When AT gU{1S arrived frem tne glider landing field..
Two tanks wer e ' knocked out by. A;.T fir e . .
Division Command Post moved to ST. OEDENRODE at 1200.
During thb morninS. tt.. 1st Battalion If.l;:'l · athaCked ani! r
DINTm. Four hundrod and twenty prisoners wer e t aklO? this The,' .2d
V . .
- 2 -

>' . ' ,
. " . ...
• I " •
Battalion continued a closJ-in defense of VE(}tEL. conduc
extensive p.atrolling to the nortn and west frem a strong point at. WtDE.
The 1st Battalion of the 502d continul::d the defense of 3T. OE.D3iffiOCE .
Dpring the afternoon the 2d and 3rd Battalions wer e order ed to proceed t o ST.
and the Regi.tnant ch.irged with the defense of the ST. OEDENRODl!:. area.
By 2100 t ho mtiN Regiment was closed in the area and had taken up strong
defensivd positions .
IUring the night too 1st Battalion of the 506th was ordE.rcd to proceed to
ZON in order t o assist in the defons. of t n. ZON bridge against the ""pcctod
enemy attack . 'lhl:l Battalion went :into position at 0600 and in conjunction with
elements of tho 1st Bat talion of t he 327th one comPanY of the 326th
r epelled t hl.l a ttack on bridge launcned by tile l 07th Panzer Brigade at about
0630. Tha 2d Battalion of 506th, ridLlg tanks 01 the squadron of the 15/19
Huss ars, attackod the enemy rear and a sharp took place at NUNEN.
The 3rd Battalion of t he 506th remained in EINDHOVEN as Regimental At
0900 tho ' 44th Armored Hogimcnt was to the Division and proceeded toward
HELMOND in a furth er attempt to destroy tho onGJn.Y attacking the ZON bridge.
Intormittcnt tank and in! antry fi ghting took place tiN remainder of the day.
The 2d and Jrd Battalions of J27th r e lieved too 5CQd of the defense
of tJ1e s ector east of ZON and the landing ZOn.:! and Division area. The
32lst Glider Field Artille ry Battalion was attached to t he 327th and fired
missions in support of that W1it dUri ng the dqy . At 1500 Battery ''E" 'of the J77th
arrivQd by parachute and joined 'its BattaEon. Tne 377th thEm moved t o ST.
OEDENRODE in support of t i-e 502d Parachute Irifantry. Battery nA" of the Blst
Anti-Tank Bat,tal1on was attached t o the 327th anO Battery "C" to the 5Q2d.
Battery liB" r emai ned in defense of thl! ZON bridge .
The 1st Battalion of the 50lst crossed t oe \'lILI..&B VAART CANAL in the
early morning at HEES\/IJK and conducted extens ive patrolling during thE:i day. At
1845 an attack was made on SCHIJNDEL 'and t he northwest section of the town was
s eized approximately 2215 . The 2d Battalion r emainud at VECHEL. The 3rd
Battalion moved at 1745 to the west and cut the ST . OED.i!NttODE - SCHIJNDEL Haad
in tho of the railroad station.
' The 502d Parachutod Infantry, Vfith the 377t h Parachute Field Artillery Bat­
talion .attached, continued to expand its defensive in ST. OEDENRODE
area. j'B" Company of the 1st Battalion received a strong enemy attack fran the
northwest in the early afternoon, but huld its position.
The 1st Battalion of t .le 5Qi.th i ts of the ZON bridge.
Tho 2d Battalion wo rking with the 15/19 H..... ssars and the 44th Tank Regiment, at­
tacked the enemy nE=ar N3DER\/hTIEN: The anomy wit odr ow in the face of this attack
and at l a:o contact was l ost. The 2d Batt alion went into a defenSive pOSition in
the vicinity of TONGELRE far night. The Jrd Battalion was ordured to ST.
QEOE.NftODE as Oivision iteserve. Thc Regiment was given a warning or der that it
wo..Q.d probably move to UDEN on the follanfng day.
At 0300 the 3rd Battali(ID of t ne 50{,th Parachut o Infantry closed in the
ST. OEDENHODE moving up from EINDHCNEN. At 0500 orders wer\! re ceived
that this battalion, as well as all other el erucnts of the regiment, would
to UDEN .vithout d clay. Movement was to be by lllOtor and marChing . The 3rd
Battalion bdgan its wove to UDEN, by .at 0900. Thd 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their inovelIlflnts, a s transportation became avail&b1e.
during the day.
The advanco detachm\:llt of the 506tn, consisting of appr.tximatel,y 150
officer s _sod men fran Headquar t or s and othe r units of the r egiment,
passed :tht:ough VE9HEL at 1000 . Immedia tel,y aftcr passing through the enemy cut
the main highw83 between VECHEL and UDEN, and this detachment bocaroe isolated
in UDEN,
- 3 ­
\ •
.The lO?th Panzer after withdrawing from its attack on the tON
bridge on D f 4, moved under cover of darkness to EdP, and in the lata morning
of D I 5 launched an ali-out attack to s eize the town of VECHEL and destroy the
bridges Enemy forc es in this attack were estimato:::d as
of 55 troops, by 30 to 40 tanks and artillery.
By 1200, the 2d Battalion 501st VlCHEL - ERP Road, was being
hard pr&s sed. Additional troops started VECHEL and
was placed in command of troops in the area and cn-'lrgCl d with of the town
and bridge s. At .about 1400 cno:::lI\Y tanks cut tho hi &l-tway northeast of VECHEL and
dcstroytl d transport parkt;!d th,:; Batt<3l"",f U!;lll, Slst AT Battalion,
arrived at the same want en tno end iromDdintcly destr­
oyed a Mark V tank l oadinb t he a'L tJi:ck . 'i'ilo 2d BattuH.on 506 took position on
the l e ft ox' UiC 2d Bat talion 501; fl j t n tno 1st Batt aDon 401st Glider Infantr,f on
its l eft. \;ith t h,;: <.:.ssist.:mc€ of British artillery gat. nIJr .:d from tht;l highway,
thE. attack from EHP \ :&5 by du:..'k. At 1400 em.my infMtry, with tank
support, uttack-.!d astridt::! tn..,; Canal from t.h{. northwest t.oward tho..:: highway bridge
southwt::! st 01 VECHEL. Company liEI'I , 506, which in VECHE.L on its way to UDEN,
was turned around, deploy",d naur thi: bridgE. and r epulsed the attack, "lith the
a.ssistance of ele.ru mts of the 44th n.cgi t:ltmt.
Ourint; t he thl: t;.O. emy l aWlchud ;.ill ...ttL.ck c"-8uinst town frO!ll
the north, and we,; r e final ly haltl,; d just. shorl; of t hc r uilrood bridge by GICf"uc;:nts
of the 2d Batt<tlion, 501, and on.:! platoon of "rill Corap:my, 506, which h:::.d taken up
1;1 dofans ive posihon a snort ti-ac bofore .
r unowed at t acks from so4th and southeast tnc
law afternoon, but by no\'; ndcitioni..1 forces hJ.d arrived <lll d enemy att1:l.ck
stopped. By dCt r k th.;: 506 ( l ess 1st B'itt t.lion and dct acllr.l.el'lt cut off at UDEN),
the 327th Glider Infantry, tl'J:.: Division w. connal.ssance Platoon, tht..! 321st Glider
Field Artillery B.:J.ttalion, Battery HBu, Slst AT Batt.Llion, t o(. 2d Battalion 501st
Para chute Infantry, cn:i the First Squadro.'1, 44th Royal T:mk ncgimunt had arrived
and formed tho task fore w under G::. n.;ral tiolcAULlfF'E chargud witil holdl11g the
In the mcantiJnu th", 1s t Batte-.lion of thu 501 at d3wn and had oc­
cupiE:: d luI of SCHIJNDEL by 0915. Some 400 prisoners Vlt.lr e token in t ins opar ation.
About 1200 orders Wli! r ... rilcllived for tho 1st Bf,t tahon to proceo.;d to '"EIBOSCH,
seize the town, .md provide flank for VECHEL. Tne £lOVclment
was compl et ed by 17liO, ilrld t he bi::l.ttalion t ook up a stror16 position in
and e.round tho town. Tho 3rd B<:I.tt ....1ion, whil.!h hi::l.d advUlccl d tow.:.rd SCiiIJNDl.L in
tho WId force ;, with th.; 1st B.:lt t.alion in s eizing SCHIJNDhl., was
to E»tDE, whor c It took up l! dcf o..:: nsl.v", poutlon &uarding froo
fl est.
Thu 502d Inf antry its dof cnsive positions during the day.
KJ.. l3llants of t hc 1st Battalion made contact 'Wi th t nt! 3rd Bcttalion 501 sout h of
SCHI JNDhJ., ruld join\:l d forct.ls in c1oCJll.11g out s av..; r 11 e;; nw:l,Y StroI16 points along tne
SCHIJNDEL - ST. higirNo,.
Tho 327th Gliddr Infi..ntry w... s ordcr tl d e:lt 0930 to proceed to VECHEL, <..Od
movement began ut 1030, thoJ 3rd Bc.tt.J.lion by truck .:.nd th... 1st 8.'1d 2d Batt.::l1.ions
by marching . Th... 1st and 3rd Batta lions corrraittod on both sidclS of t llo.; bridge
immoai at oly upon ?rrivnl; th", 2d Batt-alion continUvd into VECtfuL .:md bci c<:Ul\.:
force Tho tc:wn of VBCHEL \'I ...IS nCG<.vily s hwll\;d during th..,) lc.ttl ...:.ft..rnoon
i:Lnd early eVDning.
Soon uf t.er davlI1 th.., od ne w,," launched sm.:l ll s ccl.c 3ttacks <".g.."inst th.:: def en­
sive positJ.ons southeast of VE.CHEL. Th.,si.. wc:!r o l1uld off ldtnout difficulty .
night pluns drawn up wl:u,.ch c:..ll.::.d for :l 8ri tish ArJnored BTl.gdda,
recolled fromU .. NIJidEGEN ,on;V"S:h!t1! , join f orce s l'¥ith
2d Bil t t.!.hon of th", 506, .Its COl . _ . tOHud UDEN, end I
th" .ro:;l.d in ordor t.hat til '] flOlI oi "t fiM b1..: . f{(t r Os UIIl\;: d. following th.1. t,
thv Armor.:: d Brigadc W.:iS to swing shhrply sout h r..rd cut off tha cn{.ll1,}' CSCap<.l route
through ERP.
- 4 ­
Duo to • plan calling for <he tna
advance in force and en € 3t h Armored Brigade not
c&..rried out. . Th,J 2d Sa , OJ. t. J $G.c("mad", c6r\ta t wi tn a pat rol of M­
nored Brigace northedst of VECHEL a'o:lut "1700 . Sy thht tiillf.l t hd tont:lL\y had bo;:g un
hi s withdrawal, and soon cont&ct Was lost .
Durine; tr..1 I!lorn:..ng tb. 0 1st a.,. "1G 3rd Battalions of t i le 501st
thi:.ir Q,1 f <..nsiv,,; positioos and north of and at dark wsr..:l depl oyed
with 3rd oatt-alion alone; railroad from t.he Canal to EElWE, and
the 1st By.ttalion from EEitDE. dUe: south to til ", main h!f;hway . Tht! 2d Battall.on
continued the clos(J .in of Vc.CHE;L, .... i t.h tn..: !n6 ofi'l.'nsl.v;; missions
to th.. northeast and south . The 327th Vi as a dof onsivo sector north of
Tho 502d Parachu:t. :; Infantry conti nu;:,d its d...: f cns<) of .:iT . with
thG 377th Parachut ,; Fio::ld. ·itrtili.Jry hattalion i,1 support .
During t he day a 4th Glid.:;:r s 6rJ.al arnv.; c br ingioi; r c..mainit1.,5 ul::m.:nts of
the 327th GlidGr Inf antr:r am th;:, 907t.h Glid.:Jr 1"ie 1d Artill" ry Battalion. Th€ lse
troops W..,t N moved i.-.vn... di at.;ly to tho VhiCrlf..L ar... a, and to... 907th }o'iuld Artill€ry
Battalion was plac.:: d in dire ct sup:)ort cf til".: ) Olst rarachut ,; Infantry. Tn\,; 321st
Glider }-'id.d ArtL.!o:,ry Ba-t1..alion .. to t nu 506th ?arachut t: Infantry,
and fl.r ud sev·.xal •.liss10n5 durin.;. t :1e day .

At da\m as fer as Er' ..P ::"n:licat tl d t ru had mad,3 good his
withdrawal to th:. south..;ast, and til ... a!'c.a Was cl l:ar of c.nuq' troops . T.-lt:;) 506th
Parachut o Infantry, with t.it.: 321st Gli<ic r ArtiJ.l..:ry battall.on and i:!att.::ry IIDu,
Blst AB AT attacned , was to to tukc tne of
that ar ... a .
Th.,; Division Com-;land Post was r.lovt.:d from $T. Ol;;D.lil':rt0Di:. to VECt!EL at 1000.
Tho 32?th Glider Infa"'ltry was assi6ncd t h.J task of VECHEL, \'11 th
the 90?th Glider Fiuld Batt<:ilion in support. Tho.] 2d Battalion
501 was from its d..:fensiv.., assi&n£,lcnt in VL:CHEL und joim::d' its regiment
in tht:: EErlDE arca, as htJst:rvE: . B3ttury IrAII, BIst AT BattaUon, conti­
l1l:led attllchtJd to th\:l 501st, witn th<:1 907th Glid;;:r .Fii!ld Artillery in direct
Thl! 502d continued tha defense of tr..; ST. Bi::I.tteri.:.:s IIn
IIE", and 1It'1I, th lJ Anti- aircraft BatterieS of th e 8l st AT Battalion, in the
: S6aborn.... eche lon and W'-l ra assi6ncd to prott::ct. the Division S .. rvicc A;:'..Ja nortlrll\; st
of zm:.
, At 1000 the enemy launched a s 3rios oi probifi6 attacks acainst the 50lst
d..., f <:!nsiN from SCHIJtWEL to\'1e.rd h: OEVl!.1UIIG. Two l.:om.panios of the
. 502d wer;;;. dispatched to to int.Jrcf: pt this force, rt.port o:: d to b.... bo tanks
and about forty' infdOtrylol .Jl1. Tn.., untlr.ty moved r .Jpl.dly, end wert:
alClost in r(O::"Yl r:. I riG OO'ilp£.n1t..s liD" an'd Ilti" of th -! 502d arriv.. d . The two C01:1­
p:L.'1.i os · h...J.d KUi!.V.r.Jd NG, but oo uld not pr..: v.... nt tn. ... dlCm,y froiD cuttinc; th" hl.rlhW<J,Y
norchw';l? t of KOI:, Vi:.rlIlm just br.. forc! dark . Under COVlor of darknds;; th3 cnuny built
up his forc us with tanks, s olf- pr o;Jcllc. d artilh :ry, and fuirly 1:.tr
...: inf,:.ntry
usi% th p corridor hu uad f ound ' tn\:. 501st und tno 502d .
D t 8
Dur.in5 til ..., nignt til ... 506th with Batt.;ric s "bl! dlst AT Buttalior., to..;
321st Glid<:. r liuld Artill.... ry Battalion at tacodd, .1c:,S ord.... Nd to r 0turn to V1!.,;HLL
fror,1 th", UDBN a ree'. . j· :"' clm,mt b<... gan· at 0)00 , and ut dnylignt units w... r <:l Jus t
cast of VECH3L; At 0915 th... 506, with on" s quadron 44th 'ruth Jt",c;itlL€ nt
D. tt<..chod, -'l twckcd th..: c:.t KOc.VlitINu . 'l'n.,: at tu-cJ.. pro
Nsscd. f ...vor ubly for
SOIL- 2, 000 Y.:.Jrds, wh".: n botn 3ttackin;5 batto::.ions (fon.1at.ion, ht <!nd 3rd lLtt-lion
abr... Lst, u-s trid.J til .., rll .· n ro.:.. d) wt:ro pinnud dowo by wul.l- dir..:ct,,;d urtl.lkry and ,.
SII;.!.ll L.l' ta3 f i r ..: , .:1I1d fir.. fro.a ta.'1ks dug in aloTl6 t Ool Th..... 2d B...tt a l:i.on was
ordc r<...d to cx') cutu wid,;; ...nv .... lopro. .... nt o f th.., c mll:\y I s soutn..:rn fl4l.k, ..md began
its Qov cu..nt a t 1400 . In tll <... .:k. c.ntim... ,Jl.:..m. ants of tn<J 50th wi t h
- 5 ­
strong arnored force s , advance frofl tHe soutn . The 50lst and Cor.1panies
nou and II H" of t he 502d by providine bases of fire for the at.tackint;
f () rces . By darkness the enenw had been cleared frou all bLTt a very s[.18.11 area
south of road .
The ,02d continued its der"ense of the ST. Ol!.DElJttODE area, the ).(:7t..h its
defense of the VECHEL area, and the 501st. its deiense of tne MltDE area. All
three r egin ents had several 3ua11 scale ene.nJ.Y" attacks launched their posi­
tions durll1l;; t he day .
DI 9
Tne 506th resume d the atcack soon after dayli6ht , and by 0900 had driven
the eneqy north of the highway and I.ade cont.C1.ct with ttl; 501st on the right .
BritiSh forces continued the attack to the north, pinching out t.le 5U6th and
Companies ItOIt and It . PI of the )02d. At 1300 t he 506, wit :l a",tacru!.ents was order ed
..to .r eturn to t he UDLN area. . TIl'':: uov e:nent was cOr.l;>leteC: by 1700 .
The 502d continued it s defe!1se of the 5T. area, Corupanies "Du an:!
"HI! returmng to Regiment 6.1 contro::' at. 1:500 .
The 501st and the 327th continued their defensive miSSions, both
repe11i l16 5..':.la11 scale ene;.o"y attacks d!.ll"i. r16 the day.
D 110
No change in unit dispositions . Several enet\lY infiltration atte.npts on
front of 501st and 327th repell ed .
, . .
- 6 ­

Divi aion €
HQ Co & tIP Platoon
50I s t Fcrechut e I nfantry

502d Parachute: Infantr y
506th Pa.rachute I nfantry
327th Glider I nfantry
401st Gli der
321st Gli o.er Fi e l d .. B!l.
907th Gli der Field Art iEcry Bn.
377th ?arc:.chut6 Fi er ld .t3 n.
Blst JJ3 AAtiaircraft Battcl. i on
32Sth &B Engineer Battalion
lOlst Ai rborne Conpe.ny
426th Ai rborno Quartermast er Co .
80lst !IE Ord :.roint Co .
326th AB r.1cdical Company
Hq & Hq Btry , Div. f.rty
l Oht .foB Reconnaissance P!etoon
!JO .
1 2 2
8 65
103 450 75
7h 304 43
137 J59
12 64 26
'2 17
10 17 98
1 29 4
7 21 10
1) 41 12
a 1 8
0 1 o
1 o 2
0 2 2
7 5
1 1 12
373 1436 547
TOTAL - 2356

101 RIB
Thru 26 Sept 1944
No . TiI:le of Request Ar da t"Jld Nature of Ttxg.:l t ResultF
1. 20 0555
2. 20 Seryt 1700
Ar med Recan Ere.!:. Nunen, Neder­
wet ten and Helr:!ond. Tanks
r eported E'. t tack expected
on Zon .
Tnc Recon road PiE Sakstal
t v Best and r oad E froln Qirschut.
t o Best.. T" nks r eported moving
t -:·\"!I:!. J."d Bos·t,.
3. 20 Sept ar en 4J4222 s/'.v to E
4. 22 Sept llCQ
5. 22 Sopt 1315
6. 22 S.pt 1522
7. 23 Sept 0810
8. 24 Sept 0905
t o 496?15 Ill'll t o . 8;'::22. (Nunen
-....... 20J t cnks end
roeo from Beckel west to
400 t !.llks end ve hicles .
TG.c R... cn r r el', 5240 t o 584,0 to
52:;4 to 58)4. (Erp, Bockel I.nd
S/W of Volkp.l) . of
rnd vehicl es .
ArT:l cd Recon rO!ld Uden to Vecbel.
)0 tl 'nks and infr nt ry on r Of'd .
fi rmed Recon f'.r..:(' Ht.uvcl, Erp,
Bockl:!l and Krc.i-nt:1.ctr. Conccn­
trrtion t fnkS r nd vuhiclcs .
ArT.'led Recan cr er 5632 to 5641
t o 5932 t o 5941. :- nd
vehicles .
9. 24 Sept 1740 Ar med Recan 1000 yd rndius
E 42 5369. T•.nks, vehicles
cnel :- rtillery moving s/E.
10. '<4 Sept 1745 Armed Recan rIcr, Schij ndel
ll. Sopt 0645 l'.rmcd Recan CIt)r St.
Cest uI to Schijndel t o Dl nther
t o Berlicum,T"nks, vehicil:t s ,
r rtillt. rJ
Not reported
Not r epor t ed
Not r e;:lOrted
r eceived
1310 "TLr get
cccepted. Esti­
mnt ed timb of
t o follow . "
No .lat.er aessage.
Dclr:yed on nccount
of weather . No
rbsults r oported .
Not r eportt;d .
Position of our
troaps r equest ed .
\7c informed 1000
yd limit.
MiSSion c; ncclled
by G3 " t 1655.
Armed Recan of ('I en
icpassibl e .
for pin-point
t r rgcts . ktLr
reessro ge sr. id t'lission
r efus ed- friends in
Not r eported
post poned on
r ccount of Vicr t her .
No,. r eportt-d
No . Timo of RequC,;st f,r er rond Nl' turo of Tr r p£.. t Results
1;:. 26 Sc';t 0744 . BOI:lo wocds N of Ce.n, l. in grid
sqULrCS 4340, 4439 4539,
r 1. 50 villq;E:s of Beug , Dinthcr
.nd Hceswijk . T:nks ,
crtill ery r n,l. i nfc..ntry.
l\ske(! f or r ed
could not conply.
Bcug r- ttr' cked
r oport B Huns
kill¢d . Our uit ­
ness r1escribc:d

B l.'"\ncc; of tr-rg€t s
not r eport ed .
Note- - The hour in t he of r eqUE:Et i s t hl:: t ime t hl! mosst' ct:. W£ 5 : by
the Not Control St :- t ior.. ThU t imu of or :.gin i n Hl 5 much 0[ r1i er , but
('tue t o nsnitting c1 ifficulties t he ilCS could not be r cr.cbac1 or t he meSSt'ge w: 5
not clenrly r:cceiver.' , lir oisdons h .t .::r t hon 26 Sept 0744 wer e
thru Briti sh cht' nnuls . Our NeS clasen .30 Sept 4400 .
- - < -

DJ:;LIV "'''lJ)
7, 668
24, C()Q
64, 512
dO , uOO
1, 152

. au
2, 040
. 80
GUO"" ru;SUh 'LY ,.<lit 0 f 1
l oa;,

1.00' ,.
100' ,.


. .

1. Following is a report of all resup, .... lias ®liverad by parachute and
to tne l Olst Airborne Divit- ion. in !.:arke t:
• • D f 1
II 11
( 1) T\'lanty- two (22) gliders , CG-4-A, to DZ . .
Rations , type uK"
Bat ter;, BA- 37
Batt ery, BA- 38
Batt ery, BA- 39
Battery, BA-4.0
Battery, BA- 41.
Battl..r;,., BA-48
Bh- BO
Wiro , \1- 110 on IR- 4 (32, ,.lil Gs)
\.irc, vI - D O on 00.- 4 (24 r.rillJs)
Carbine J cal. . 30
Cal••30, AP, 6/clip
Cal . AP-Tr (4- 1) belted
Cal. . 45, S!.G and Pistol
bonw i:.iortar , HE
8ulm KLortar, (It)
Dextrose , btL
Sodium, Citrato, box
Sul!arulamidc, box
J dist . box
Pl asma, pkg .
rlLstcr, adhesivcl, spi.
Splint, basswood , s ot.
Splint , Arnt' L:lg FUng , .;;a.
Splint", ,.ire laddvr,
Pentothal, sodiUI:I, box
Alcohol, btl.
jGQrphim:, box .
Sl.41fadit1Zl.n(;, pkb '
BendQbu, plaster of ctn.
Dressing, first - aid, 1ar6o , oa.
lJres sing, first- aid, sme.ll , ce. .
Blankvt, \\001, 0D, t a. .
foldll1g, !:Ia. .
P,;;ac....' T.GL: 01' Ol
ANNJi.X 110. 7
Rf.COV ,jllj;D
' 12
24, 000
04, 512

2, 040
(2) un.
(by parachut.e
planes to DZ and Dt.
k tions, type "Ku 14,400 }, 480
Gasolint.l , gal s .
1, 260
o ,)
o 0
o 0
o 0
29 100.
o 0
o 0
II 24.4
28 . 3
1 3.J . 3
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o v
1 lOu.
1 100 .
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o v
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
2 , 3bv
63 . 5
56 . 0
100 .
lDO .
Battery, Dh-37
Batt ,ry, &- 38
Battery, B.,- 39
Batt..ry, Brl - 40
Battt:. ry, 5.1\-41
BJoI.- 48
Bc.tte: ry, SA- eo
Batt ery J B.A.-30 ·
Battery, 8:'- 70
t..iN, on 00- 4 (.r...lil....s)
on Dr- 4 (miles)
;;1ru, 1'- 130 on Ok-a
Radio, SCR-olO
Radio, SCR- JQO-h
liadio, SCR- 536
kdio , 5Ctt-b94
Mine Dat¥ctor, 3CR- 625

S\';itchboard, 8D-71
?4:.st Secti on, '0- 49
It.inton,,,,c" Equip ., i.S- 53
&tt"ry, BA-2
Bett\,..ry, 8.....- 23
Battery, BA- 27
Coil, C- 161
Tcl ogra) h, TG- 5
Tag, 1£-'/2
M- 209
Uassagc Book,
IUl.le J RL- 27- '\
kevl C3- 11
Crunk, CG-4- A.
Tepe , TL-83
Tape , T1-94
Climbor s J LC- 6
Tool Eqw.pocnt, 1£- 33
Flashh 6ht, TL-122-A
Lu:1p, LU-35
Glovos , LC-IO
To:. st Set, I-56
T<>st Equipme nt,
DJ.. Ir ,"
l O
Dl. ,I . it
Ca11ber . 30 AP 8 l du , OOO G 0 24, 000 21, 000 87.5
Cal . 30 427, 000 41,664 9. 7 500 53 ,760 57. 5
Cal . . 30, AP , 5 clip
Cal .. )O,rlall- AP , ct n.
3D , mO 0
2v,000 12, 000
bu .

Cal ..30, tracer,
15, 000'15, 000 100 1,500 , 500 100.

- ",-­
(Cant In)
DZ IInf! •
i #
I Jl 1fti
l!l p7j1' 't, r. ",..
RCI)..- : -' _ - "",,;;....1
.30 , tr:-. cer J
.45, :;rn c.ne.
I,P belte(]
Pir.t ol
66 ,600
50 .
120, 000
10, bOO
66 .7
;;2 .7
C"l. . 50 ,
37w.l Gun ,
(2 - 2- 1) 31 ,000
86 .1
17 .7
1, 320 1,320 100 .
37mn , HE 180 o o
37mm C.... IUli st e:r 60 o o
57illl!l , ER . SABOT '.2AO 240 100 .
57n:n , HE 600 352 56 .6
60mn Mor t,:!..r, HE 5, 850 1,O?E 13 .4 1,350 900 66 .7
60mn MartI r , Ill.
234 6 3.4 54 54 100 .
SI:;U1 MOl't l".r, Lt. 2, 700 ;;:: ,2)3
83·4 606 300 49,5
8lmmMorte r , Hv .
540 540
100 , III 60 54 .
8l.rr..r.l Smoke 162 162 100 .
33 33
100 .
75r.u!1 How. HE , M54 1,680 500 29 . 7
75rnm Horr . HE, 11.48 1, 200 505 4< .
75mm How . Smoke
o o
105rnm How. HE, U 54 BI 0 358 44.1
105mm How. HE, U48 540 o O.
l 05mm How . Smoke 100 o O.
lOSrnm How. 160 o O.
Rocket, HE, .W 1,900 1,419 74 . 7 240 100 41.7
Grenede , 7,200 2, 275 31.5 1,200 900 75 .
of f 3,600 o o 600 0 o
rifle , 2,470 250 10.1 260 .219 BO . B
Grenr.de , rifle , fro-g . J., Ooo 150 15. 100 90 90 .
rifle , smoke 500 140
50 5G
100 ,
Sj gnhl., f'.C, J,N, (3 colors ) 300 o O. 100 0 O.
Orrt. r ifle , grl::ll'..nde , M6
2': 000 o O. 200 150 75 .
Crrt, rifle, grenrde , M3
200 150 75.
Crrt. gr enl".de , M7
200 0 O.
DZ ti t, '1 32.7 DZ
64 .4 '..
,,; IDI C;, L
Dextrose, btl.
25. 16 6 33.3
Sod, Citrate, box
40 30 25 . 6 4 06 . 6
Sulfanilar.rl.de, box 160 25 . 24 8 33 . 3
\later, di st ., box
40 10 25 .
6 100 .
Plas.na, pkg.
240 60 36 12 33. 3
Bandage , gauze, box 40 10 25. 6 6 100.
Cotton, absorbent , pkg . 240 60 25 .
12 3J .3
Plaster, adnesive, spl . 160
2, .
24 8 33.3
Splint, basswood, set
10 16. 6
9 9 100.
Splint, ATOJI Lee; rl1n6
40 10 25 . 6 2 J3 .3
Splint , ladder, ea.
150 30 20. 15 15 l OV.
Pentotnal, s odiWi., box
40 10 25. 6 6 100.
Alcohol , e thy l, qt . 2 o 0
).lco:-Iol, denatl.lI' t! d, pt. 12 1 6 4 66 .6
Marpnine , box
125 30 24. 25 d 32.
Sulfadiazine, l>kg .
225 50 22 . 2 ) 4 20 50. 8
Bandage , pl aster paris 40 10 25 . 6 lOu.

Dressi ng, f i.'r:;; t - a....d , large )CO
70 2) . 3 45 16 35. 5
Dressl.ng, fust - aid, smal l 960 240 25 . 156 4!S 30. 7
Blanket , wool, 0. 0. 120 30 £5. 24 6 25.
Litter, f olding , alumi nUl!l
10 25. 6
2 33. 3
\ure, gQ.uze , roll
50 10 20.
7 o 0
OF ' .i..DICJ..L E ,JI?i.!ENT rt3COVi.HZD
D:t, II r.1I DL. ";;.11
...L !tAttF.rIJ'\.E
Gr enade, hand, 8I'Iloke , He, ¢I::S
Grenade, hand , inc end l.ary , J\N- 14
Grenade , hand, smokE, liP, 10:- 15

. lW"T
!!!J. .
Grenade, hand, sl:loke, col ored, 11-18
, oran&e
Grenade , nand , SriOK-O, . colored·, d-ld, grt.O!1 6
Grenade , hand, smoke , col ored, L"-lcs , r ed 6.
PJ;l!CENT.CE OF CH.i. I CAL ,.MF",ili &.UIPiiEilT rto.COitltcil -
Composition, C-2 . 250
Caps, bl asting, special, non-electr1c o
Fuse , blasting, (lOD 'roll) o
Fuse, lighters . ,
Prima- -cord (100 ' roll) O.
Bags, sand
0,' E/IGINEhJi E'.l<J iPlIDl'f rtEUllV'iIiED
PERCE/IT""" OF )(I:;CtlibllY 0)' rtl>5UPPLY FQt D t 1
Glider r'::5uPP!Y - 100',0
Prcht. resupply -
b. D t 3
. (1) Thirty- five (3S) C- 4? planes t o DZ " 'I II


Rations, type "K!! 9,120
Bags , vl.nyl 205
Blankets, wool, O.D. £,700
Litter s , folding
Bundles, cli ec . .kdical supfllies l2
RadioJ SCH-694
PEHClillTnG,,; OF ,,;;COV!1iY or' J<E:) Ut'l'LY
Parachut e resuyply - 30 .8%
(By Parachute)
)1)" D t 3
l C).
l OC.
16 .6

50 .
c . D t 4
(1) Thirty (0) C-47 planes to D'L. " .. ".
Rati ons, type ",\." 13, 960
0,' RE.COVlliY 0, .1I>SJi'I'LY
Parachute resutlPl,y -
d. D t 6
(By par.cl1ute)
l'Ott D t 4

(1) FoOl' (4) gliders CG-4-j, to D'L.
- 4 ­

" llT
oi!I' FeT
\ i- lll.'-mi .
20 100.
SCH- 536
4 4 100.
Radio, SCl<-6l0
2 2 100.
Radio, SCn- 694
4 4 100.
Batt eries , EA-30
1, 000 1, 000 100.
Bat.t el'iea , B;,-39
150 22 .6
0 .. - 40
25 24 96.
Batter ies, 13..- 70 100
Ees sase Books , ii- n O
300 50 16. 6
Tape, 'Cl,-83
l OV l UD 100.
Tape ,
lOu l CO l llu.
Flashl ight , TL-IU - ...
l vO l UD 100.
p::.RCE:r: ...':;B or' SlGltoJ. "S _.\J IP1UJT
<:s3 . 9;.,

Gun- s l.lb- ulacnine , mAl
15 15 100.
l:or t ar J 6Omm, 1.2 2 2 100.
Launcher J grenade, f7 & d l OU.
Launcher, is
5 5
Cloth, wiping, Ibs . 200 200 100.
Patches, cott on, 10 lU 100.
Radiator , l/k ton truck
4 4 100.
Kit , t l. rc r epair, cold patch 6 6 100 .
U. S. Cal • • 30, hI 20 20 100.
p;:;' JtCEN'l'.IGE ot' OiIDi'l"NCB ru,.;OV...:o:GD
Pt.aC.1iT,,(l,; Of' R;,;sU?, LY Ri'.CuVUtY Fa, D I 6 - 91. %
e . D I 8
(1) Thirty- foW' (34) G- 47 plar.es to DZ " •• " • (By parachute)
1, 000
0' ru>3UPrLY ,,,,,Cunl<Y D I 8
f . of recover s of resuppl y for entll' C operation .
Gll.der -
Prent . rl.esu.Jvl:r - 41.410
2. r esupply recov ared by units and not to dumps are
not mcluded in totals as figures 'ti€re not r tir'orted .
3 . Tne r eport is a glider i s
l'JOre as prac t ically 100lb of th.; aI' was r l;:c ov E; r ed .
4 . TIlE. last by air on 0 I S tnc best gaUf:i;i: on effectlVen<lSS
of par ac hute r esuPi>ly. Ac cordi l16 to from the r aar base , t.nirty- i our 1.34)
planes 'fll.t h six r <J.ck l Obds ar. d t hrde door loads uacn \'/or a delivdrad. hll rUCK
l oads droflpvd in a very small ar,..;a and wer e recovLred a hour s . ao
door l oads 'IIe r.;. s een comi% dmm . T,lis is ll;;.tllU!' e.n indlcation tnat tne door l oads
l.ere aischur bcd. far f r oli! t ho: tc..rget area or tnd door loads act.ua.lly not l oaded.
5. H..3 suppl,y by Parachut.:: COlLa 0(, eff ... ct .... vd a only ro.cy. loads were used W1d
all pl anas discilcll"gl.d th..:i r loads ovur elle idcatJ.f:"c::l.tion 1UU"I-:.ers on t h.:;: 6r ound.
is b... lioved t hat door l oads should not. normdll,y bd uSed doS i t caUSGS too gr eat
b dl.sporsion of s upplies and might ootain v€r y n1gh
of the t otal su droppod .
- 5 ­
"Oper at ion 1:ARKEr ,
1944 .
Incl No . 3 t o Rei-'ort :
dat ed J
For e pt.rution t hE; 82d and l Olst Airborne Divisi ons ,<,rere
detached from this Corps and pl aced undt:=r British opc:ratioOl:!l control.
ThG re,sponsibi li ti...s of' thE. XVIII Corls (Ai rborne) , uith rt..spt:ct to t hesE>
two di vi5i ons . was there ror e liti:i t\.. d to the foll mli ng ;
(1) r lan:;; ;.;er "" f onnul a teod , and the Corps Vias pl'E-parod to
tht. ccmbat aren a 3 to control
such gro1,.\ nd t rooj,l s 63. it might ho.; dew.vd l1cCE: ssary to
to til(:; CoTllS .
(2) Corp8 mon i tored a ll me:ssagf..s bc t wE,t; n th6 forward ech(; ­
I ons of thb 82d und lOl st Airbornu Divisions and thbir
basE: and a chuck was mnintainbd to insur u
tha t propc:r Be tion YI.:.t s t ak... n in t.ach ins tanc<J requi r ­
ing it.
b .
(1) d i stri bu t ed and to 82d and 101st
Ai r borne; Di vi sion;; a ll t han that
paSSi ng tl1rough t hb Briti sh Airborno Corps .
(2) Corps pr.... pare.d a nd de. livcrE..d to both di vi s ions , in
bulk : a terrain s tudy . A riv,,;,r and bridgt. s tudy was
and to th u Division .
(3) to\iO IJli:m and Jt:.;fc.nso.; ov .... r t'r int r ....qui rl:::l!lt;::;nts
\'I\...re s<.. t uiJ by Corl,S . and th" Corps had t h(... sole rt;. ­
sponsibility or l1roc.... ssi ng f rom br eaking
down , and d(..1i v.:..ry to th.... d i vbions . Th.... fo llowi ng
amoun ts \"I(.r.... 11 _ndlc:.d : '
\'/c i e h t ( !.
li'.tUps 20 205 ,100
Town r l ans (20 different
tm<1l s) 1. 990 19. 897
Dcfc.nsu Ovt. rprlnta ; 109 1, 890 I
(4) 1\.n udd iti onul tun (10) tons of maps 'rlbr!.... on hund ni th
arrancEJ!l.....r:ts IJlI:l. dt,; for r esuppl y by air if thtiy had
cal Iud f or .
(5) Corps s!.... t up a.... ri l:l 1 ? hotography rvquir...mun t s , i nclud ­
ing i n buH' , for both t he. 82d and lOl st Air­
born!.... Di vi s ion!:; i t b .... sumt. \'II:lS go. thurvd from dt. ve:loping
and plLal t s illld d... li v(..ry \TIl S mad... to the
d i yi sions .
c. Op6ro.tionul.
( 1) CorV3 accbptLd thL r(; si.. onsi bili ty for organlzl ng and
ar!'angi nt'; th(. d(.tuil::. f or til ... movwnc.nt of the St:oa- lif t3
01' tht.. 82d and lOlst Airborn..:. Di vi sions from t hu UK
to t h<;. zont... of a c t i ol) . Th(; s... n lif ts :.11'1'i v.... d in th....
combut ilr(;l:1$ u::; l)lannt.d und 'tI i t hou 'c incident . ThE;
'- 1 - "

.. ' ." t
,\ '.
s t:. o lif t of tluJ 101s t Airbor nt. Div.i.sion movc.d frOO!
BL\CH in two Svri uls whi ch cl os£id i n t h l.. ZON a r t.:J.
on 22 and 23 Svp t l..Ii.bl..r rl..lJp(. ctivt.l y . 'nl(; s(.." lif t of
82d Di vi¥i on closl..d in divis ion' & arVd
on 23 S",pt-.!1:be:r .
(2) Li a i s on ruc. i n t a i nt.d by u stuff off i c ... r tb t b<..
LX TeC. i n ordLr t o i nsur u of in­
rc.l8.ti vl.. to tilt.. OpEoI'L. tion .
An orri cl.. r ob;:;c.rvLr 1'11.. "" wi t h und t hrl.(, lif t s
t o r ... por t on thl.. cl CCUr .lC) oj' thl.. dr ops i nvolvo;:.d u n d
t.nt.Jlly f Ihk HC tion .
d . :Jupoly. Th& fol lo'.''iin <; epLcific supJ;. l y r Cispons i bU itil.. :3
,,(.r 0 uccl.. pt(.d by Corp,:; I
( 1) .ti!" r ... - supply , 'ro t-..d it und t r un3r.1i t t ht.. r ... qu irwn... nt s
fo!' t bt.. US c i .... i ni on's t o Cominun ic.J. t l ons Zon t. und to fol l o ...
t hrough on ih": ... e: r... quc3ta un til 3uch time. thl. suppl h .s
ut.r.... di::lvot chid t o t ho,. uni tD by I X TCe ; to mai nta in
Qc tiv<.:; liotr.on b .. t \· .......n th", d ivisions . Comnuni c';!' tion.:l
Zollt. and tht. ,\11' ror c(. .J to i n ...url.. tht.. fulf illml. nt of
till a ir r o;:. - oupply r C4,uc.s ts of th ... di vi s ions . (For
dt..tci I s of (.. i r r E:.. - OUD.,l y op... r uti ons S(..l. ,\l".nux No . 1) .
( 2) Cvur lund supplj- . To lrovidt. l1... i Don oi' f i c;' r s \,ho cou l d
t ivl. advicl. to th ... Bri t i bh on supply
of to U divi dio n3 .
(0) Dr ieudit. r Gt;..n(. rul 'Ihc..odorl.. E. Bul. ch l cr . CCl'ps
Artilll.. l' j' Comrm:mdcr • ./:.1.J d(.. t c.. ilc.d us lia. i s on of ­
fict:. r to Col' P3 (Br i tisb) i i.J.l j or Curti s Y. Kimba ll ,
. Assi st:.mt G- 4. us liLicon oJ.' i' icvr to St;cond (ilriti ::lh)
.\I7!lY ; <lnd t:..ljor ik.nji.l1lli n Wc. tzl... r . Ord­
nuncb Of f ic,;,r . us l i :.1 i son of f i cvr t o Connmmic..! ­
tiona Zon<.. Hl..cdqua.l' t (; l' U,
( b) offic...r s ..loai,stt:d ltU.\ t Qrl ul l y in sl.::tti r..g up
ttll.. oVl..rl:lr.d :,uppl y sys t \,om for thu d ivi sion.::! ,
supt. rvi dnc; its n!(.chlolll i c3 ':':'nU k... (.pi ng A'VIII Corps
( Airbor nb) und First .\llh.d Ai rborn,", .o\rlllY i nform... d
....s to suppl y st.. t us. Thl.. 1.:.: t k r tno dff i c6r !.1
func t i on....d in that c 1"·.;.J clty until t h l.. di vi ­
uions \, ... 1' .... wi tLdr":".n from t hl. linl.. ...iDd i n t hv lat \..;r
S t .gt.5 nl.Jo ill::l.Ji.!;tl..d ir. ttl", sclvug(. of unconslliCc.d
l l..ft ov(.r \.hl.n the.. di vi s i ol'..3 lii t hdrQ'W!l ,
1 i 1'.!.I..X ;,.
.• Func tions j.VI I I Corp.!;

No. 1 - Da ily Acqu i r .:.mvn t s f or l :i. xcd HV- Supply
Cb,. V (02d (, 101 s t All D1v.) C'"S It"'"'" (82d 1010t AB J i vs )
Cl uBS I & III (82 & 101 Di v .. ) (32 & 101 Di vs)
r,jl.dic.J. l (82 & 101 :li vJ) El':gi n(;l.. r It....m& ( 82 &. 101 DlvS)
No. 2 - Li st of SlPpl i... s Ho;:. l d Cn- C ...ll
Q;i _ t Dt.P' .rtur"" Air h:fo.dic:J l Items on Ct.l l
Ord !:u.t\..; r i ci on C....l l (82 & 101 Div;,;) D't8' i n\..; .... r Ituna or!. Loull
i xcd Re - SUppl y (82 101 Di vs)
. vt. r l. d . On- C._ll R .... - Bupply

, " ftl-lI('n
, . " ", IIM(,'
)al'1J}9X No .1. t.o I ncl r:o . 3 ·.to Report :. MGp-er a tion ." ...
D t o ·0 r 1u's ' T;m I nclusi ve ", dated 3 Decer.tber ' . ' .
AClrrrinistr·d.t t ve . funct Corl) s
1.:' Hission. .
a . neneral.
To the 1 i-r,it of our caoabilities t o insure :that . f ooo , smrruni­
'. tion, and' othe r sUI)")lies were delivered t o tne 82d 0.00 IO:}, s t Airborne
Divi.sions . .
1:1 , '. Spec.:i..'fic. .'
(1) Since Cor os not cart of the· trooos efl2af>e'd in

t he oneration , We h:ld no sl){. ciri.c r € , sDCl1s·ibillt i es •
. (2) Se"ullse t hp. Ta<;k Force and his hea(louar t er s came
f r o::o. the Pr iti.sh itrmV , all':I 'r'!ere, t t).:3 re "ore: , somellh... t unfdmiliar wit h r e­
sU')olv t Ills he'J!:'cuSll·ters t he follow in" spec ific' re­

" ,
(a ) To ac ; ent t oe fixed am on cw.l a ir r eouir e­
ments fr om the (livl..o;jon..<;; t o tra,"lscit these re.q·.li r em.ents to Com."'unica tions
Zone : to ml:d'ita'1n active l iaison the flvisions , COmr'unicat-ibh3 Zone ,
at)cl he' .Ur FO"l"'ces ; to follow tltroue'h on thes e s urmlies until s ilch tiIfte a s
.. t he to t he H r Forces on t he rel"lar t LU'e air f i elc's .
' . ' .
( b) To a<;sist in the 'Ilovc"'.ent of t he seaoor l1c echelons of
both f r em Unit ee Ki!1"'no!l1 t.o the forw3. r n "'&>mbat ar ea (rf- 3
, Bect ion) .
'. '. . ( 3) . At t he timP. of t'1e ooeNt ion, the of nI l
For ces ::mc' a l l .... irbol"' ''le For ces unc!er one cOlTf'!.arr hael 1115 t
be.en .c i reeterl . The hillher heac"oua r ters lnv &.verl n8'o" <:I t. t I-j(:ir i obs .
Cinc bec.:t.use thes'e Y'C 'R our own dIvisions , this heacauCt r ters ,
:lot t he resoonsib-ilitioo ) actually performed t he f ollo.... ­
in" &Ciditicnal functions .
(a ) We SGt U'J liairon at t he dt=o:;.:rture air fields arc .lS­
sishd the Air For ce ill I) l anning art c; x"cuti('lf1 thl3 ir air re- s'l'1pl y f U'1Ctions .
This .invcl vco com......ltine pl ane r enui r e'I1(· ntsj estc. blishin£' fl i pht scherlul es ·
cst.lblishine liaison t hI-: division::: a 1'1( the Air Forc.::s <inc ....1 tlti.o
the!\ir Forc es ( i . e . - Retwe-.n TroolJ Cu r rier Cor.rr mo dnd Qu :lr t e r­
m.. stc:r T' E;I)ot Com"t!O", Suml v): ' notifyinp d ivisior.s of FXP ctcd tirnE". of
:u::rival of r e- sul)'11v I'l:lss ion.s OV (; r t ro Oron 7..on(; .
( b) Thro'l"h the :1P6rtcyo f li:lison officG"rs, \\(; dicl all
.i'l.our "ow .. r to insure -.l wooth f l ov, of suo .,lics f r om proUn0 SOJrC6S
cort",.. t h;J r br C: i Irude wit'1 the: forc bs .
2 . Narr'lti...' e . ·
n .• Prio r to th::
(1 ) Th f, st l, ! !' )f t '1 is J:"!.aC E". .J oi t t·\ il:=: d'· .. ..
stucV of' t l-j (: fund on cdl .l'(.C'llir·:!l ., '1 w.o
bct\.'jljivtsions cinr'! cornnil( d
un lif':t of r ' t o b,: fu-rn..!.sh ' 0:1 d:t ilv .:: ncI of €
to I:H' h .-I ";( t r('').rrb.p·... cir r i c lr's , 0'; ('" ,:.11. I.\. COi" ol"l"-i$ list "' ;:' S furnishr.d
to "Ill 3,rlr (SEt
, ,
P .I)er ty on hmrl !.at cl';' "I"\ Cl rtur u .:tirfit: lrls w;<lS car f' .fully in­
vrntor ii '111(1 t he shor t r (- v· cl t lis i nv\;.ntorv were br ouo-ht to the
. .............
''''-Y-.' l' t r""lCL
] ' - 1 0 •
l'X,t:C 'loci to s E. to
c' c: n::. rt,ur .: lirfidd s , vns nroD.f')tl·, c p ' (. d f o r .
(4) four-fHt1.s of r E: -su? ....l., itens "'He am­
munition.. liencE, the rulk of thl.i work, i nvolv(' d in <lccomr-lishinp. the .:itOVE ,
V; JS rl on(; b r tho:: Orcln l nCG S.:::; ction, this hsJe"qu.:lr t E: r s . I t ""·IS a
t sk , involvL'11' tl!. t iculous .l tt€ntion to sm:lll , but import lOt , (ic;.tnils . Th(;
t sk Wl' J S :!. ccomplish ' r' in outst ,t..'lcinO'ly successf ul m.:.mt:r by 'l s (;;ction
fr l sh from Unit ed St.::: t " s .:.nc compht .:: ly unf..lmil b r with : irborn.:: l ctiv­
iti' .s . Th,," work of this s ection, c!uring the oOGr.:.tio'l , i s of the
h:1r;o hcst praise,
During the; cm;;.ration .
( Cl ) /\ t ,'.bh. showlnl? t Oll .II L S :lctuJ.lly d E. livGr €0 t o div­
isions , unr' :::, r this sch,,(lulc , is et t _ch-:.d . In "JLMjng d li1y divisicn:ll ton­
n:lge th e fo1lowL'12 c. stim.lt €s .Jr o .lS :l ccur.ltG .1S c ' 0 be m1:!.dc ,
wit hout knowino t he division-:: l orlZ :nizJtion and thG soccific mission
of tl-t ::- unit .
ss I 30 tons
Cl::ss III 10 tons
CBSS V t ons
Al l Othe rs 10 tons
Tot Jl 250 tons
(b) On D 1 , !! fixu 'l r t - sul"l ol" lJ'Iissic:1. l"'1s flown by
t"e DO':lb"r CO'1!ic:.nc\ of t he::: 8th For ct:: . B-245 VlEr e us w . From 75 to 90
l'lJ rc c;nt of sun.... U .. s -: .::; liv(,·rrr r 'J. chr.,j th. troo'1s on the pround .
ThES{'; .trc , t hr- best r esults l'!hicl-]. h'w" b.:: en obt:'in€.,C- in the
fic. ld of f)2r3chiJ.t,s r e- su.... "'l\.'. UncO'lbt ·.::dl 'f, (Vc;:l octt Gr r eEults :.I r e 'X)ssibl e •
.. if th(; POC'Ibc r CO:"'L"''' ltT is .ai\' &) J.-:'-' itio.nl tr intnl? in t his typE of work .
'Ph! nt:i l1ci"lOl r l;. for sucl-]. s uccess 0'1. t his , t he first re-
su,,",lv missio'1 nowl'! bv t,he b€r mri wit hout or cvious tr lin­
i n" , is t h..: f \'c t th-' t the is ..l much bett(; r r c -su,o....lv :l i r -shiD tha n
t hr C-47 . Th ..: oorrbcr c lrri(; s frO!"! "0 to 2:2 bunrllr-:s it is ')ossibl l::: to
t ho whcl e 10 .(1 i n a very r .' strict '-_ d 'lr e..L . On t" t:; c th€T h:::. nc' , :l C-4.7
c rriE.s f r om 9 t o 12 bunc'lefl , of i'fhich i t is !;"Io3sibh. to rlror'l 9 t.uncl 1€ .s in
:I f ,ir 1v r cstrict "d .I r e.! . Us iog. f. Qu1-lm..:nt Q'''''Ec ntl:y orov idcd, i t is not
to .voio s c ttcri'1g t hf: Ll s t buncl.:: s .
(c) The IX Troon Carrie r Corrrnand flew the remainine: r e­
1. In settinp u'" r e-s
Jo"!. v mi ssions , the Troop C'i r­
r ier Gorr-anr1 iflfo r lT' s the 49Jt.h Qua rte r n<:, ster Del')ot Cort"'l.my Su'X)lv, the fielr.ls
f r oM which t he nl J.OOS will take off . Thp.se fiel ds ar e not , in all cases ,
the sa!re fielcs wl1ich co '1t ain t he sunt')lies . This f"teIl OS th Jt ' aft e r receivine
!1.otific,lt ion of the takeoff fie les , it is n(cElssarv for the 49?t h QJ.3rter­
T)eoot Co:n....a!W SU')r.llV to move the fr Cfll. one fide to a ot;'t hEr .
Th is 15 ::l. cumbersc)!l's s'lstem, imolvi!'lr' a n ExpEnditure of n a:c'less time anrf
effort . It coulc be c orr ect e d io t he bv co-oreina t ion be­
t .... r-en t ry e Troo'" C'i.r -rifr Corw.anc , eoot COMO:ln" , anc the rfivisions en­
par: € . d in t he o:'\f::rat i o n.
2 . There was cons !·i.nute r E'.-3r-ranP'inc
of scocnql ' s , wh i ch. c aus ed c (I;'Jfusion . T'1i8 wac: c'u(. tc the:: Division
Co.r:".,lnt'f r: rs na!<in- f"li.,ut '· recisions to r 'o'Oulcl U S(i t he
....lam:s ror re- ml"lI')li.f' S or for i n ddc:'i t .ionu1 tr ooos . It
is hcliev(, c t,· t Ellen conf
.lsion is inevi jhlr in 3n 01'), r at.ion whc:rr the TC' ­
aui'r or:ents for "l'3n...,s are "l"l'lt e; r t l-t 11 t '":c lctull S' I"''1l" of '1l:inES and wh :: re
a r Broi rll,r mo vine n C!' S= tWt S l htirriCrl .., l &.nninP . All
a"' r "ci 'g L'1volvcr' mus t k ," rn to ""x"sC't this c mfl1 si('n anel b.:: nrcpa 1'" (; d to (lea l
wit'" it '.t t.br: t.w..: . It is rm-tiC'u.larl,· n.t - . iost.\hat D
n..:.(;o ('or br.coqr s om ur.acnt; necc·csttv , (I " \h9.t r , v
s",,( .,cic. s , o f' €.:lch ot. (
tho r ouphlv crorcinatcr" , "ilic.!'! i o.ccu 'l it: ,'>;..... ­
1 t o

- 2 ­
SEC .l E T
- --- ... ­

Ann"x NC? 1· to ;'0. :; to "Ol.Jerati on Airbor ne Phase ,
D to D Plus Ten ;rllclusiuo" SJilbC! b tl. .
On-o , l1 Ii Ii
.. a
( a ) jJ. tllblc sh . lpJ'tOrlMa'''C's l ctually del iver ed
divisions U"1dr:r t"tis schululf.;. is attacht::c1 . (See Table:s 2 & 4)
(b) The SVSt.E!:l usr e \''1&S to the fixed l'E-sunplv
sV'stGlll , with th(; e:xc0 "1tion that r . (luir cmt! nts cs til blls hcc o r ior to t he 01')- r­
ation .stVnites . ThG actual r i.;.'"' ui r G'lcnts w", re ')1" sc:nt(.d to t 'us head­
qlF' rtHs;;t h'· thr, nc" d QCC Urr loc . Pr .3.ctici::llly, il .:ldmini st r :l tivG de­
1liY in fu r nishin!l s U'Jolics W'i S e liminat ed tn6 establishr.:€nt of a
li.3 i son so;ction wit h t.h G 490th Qu l. rt !'r:!l.1stl r ficoot Compa ny Suooly e.nd
,.,hysic llv loc.;.. t r.c 'It tiHt he:.c''''u:' rt. r, rs on one:: o f r. em rturG a irfie lds .
When r t qu.-sts for 5u,)n1.i65 \'kr E bv t. he cltv is ion base echelons
t hti:y w( N to this s .;! cti on end f or
s ett 1m un t"J", m106 s 9.. nC: 10.:L0 .ino t"J ..; suO"p')li:c;s wel' t, on the spot .
Arr3. nDCMcnts w·r c .also rn.:r:: to h ... ..1 l i 2i500 s !: ction from t he
Zo'1€ 1t th.: ooint . Thus , € rt"uc sts for alomic.;.s , not
.:Lv.... iL:bk. on c c n1rtUl' r li rfic lc's , .,. ' ro:. r ec e ive d, irrJUboi .l te::ly ::.: nc dir ect
ection cO lllC\ Ix t .;!It;Gn to procur(: thi..: SLJ.J:lplit.,s from the Communic ,tions Zone
D€nots .
( c ) It 'Nas fou ne t h",lt sun'"\lies c Oltld be deliv ereCi to
divisions wi th the followitlf! t itre limit.1t ions .
1. All € r ecfdved orior to can be
nrocessed anfl suo-olies (ieliver ed t he d::I'7 in a t oorouj;!l1ly efficient
manne r . Th i s t, b"e 1 1r"' it !lllows o'1portunit v for CO!'l1?le te plAnniop. , coml')lete
anc' t "!e '1Qst e:fficie ""lt use of necessary airolanes .
2. Reouests r ecaiv p.d ol' i or t o 1000 hour s can be
for t:'eliverv t. he sarre r'a'l . Sue "! 3. svst.er.' i l1 vo lves iustinp
of f1iP'"rt. schedules ,Uld la·st Illirute of Su')pliES , l ast lIinute
hetw€e'l thb 'l"' e'lc i ES i ,vlJlved, with conseouent risk of
failur e ard , i '1 I' l1n(;r&] , inerr icient system. However , it is nrCl.cticable
aoc' "Was uSed satisfacto r y succoss .
3. Rcouests afte r 1000 hou r s shoul" oot be
c 01Sirlerec' for r! eliv!?rv t. hat Otl" . € a c r itlcal em.:rl"'"Cncv The
f ilUne: of these r eOuc-5ts lnvariA.blv r ssults in CI. 1 i s r Ul'.' t ion o f flipht
€ '11101'15 insufficient time for pr oper bridinp o f pUots , and
i..,suff ic ic.rrt far orOO,-T 3 nC loadinl! .
(0) The r e is.;in urxh.rstllndubh t · nce.'1cyon t hc oa rt of
tho divisions to insist on o lI' r t-;-su1) ('I ly aft t:. r qroun:' cc nta ct h:as ber.n es ­
tablish..: d anc! b(;yonc the limits Si:lt u':) bv t h: o r ipinal olan o This is to be
in ll..YI ai r oorne oo ::: ration
sinc l" th€ init ial CI)nt act with the oround
f orl'"GS is alJ'lost sure to bn IihlCC .,t 9. ...·h en the 171'Ounr1 sunnl v s';st (' 1J is
€ t o thr Ijr.;it of i ts (' 'loabilit i € s ann at u t irrr.; when tl"<.lnsportl3:­
tion for hlUlinp sunnlic.s is 1t 'loTl.. mium. It is, trer{for e , th" linE of
for t'1 G division cC)mm.1 rrcr to disPJt ch a Jll(;SsilP.e to his
boiS!,; s ... ction calling for Ciir ' This means tint hi s r Eq uest, will 00
consider red SE'p'lr1t r 1,r ."1nc his nf JCS wi ll "lot hE' b ",aC"aj,.ns t othe r units
in tho "'1' .:'9 . ThG b"l S\ sc CtiO;l , htving no surf': of knowinp' the <:m.:.rrrency
of Ul\". nt:..: d , orop" rl., f l;...: 1 th.lt. :l.ll such r '.ou", sts s.,ou1d bCo cons.id €r 6d
: s o"lcr 'ltion'll PIll r C' t·: J"lci (s . This wo rks cut v rv well for th., divisions , but
from ov r r 'l U .it is :In unSOJnd f'l . tooc' of 01) 1' .:.. t ion . U56 of
J il'"" l·: n.s for su..,...l v ,)U!"ry)S\:S is :11 (x'o.;nslvo f':'rst,"; r.'L , oot h in 'llJ.nes ,
c:Jt1Q'"1i r s, .mrl I"!'!ich shalld be ' ··-sorteO to only c!ul'1.nc t hl.: time
wh..: n t1'OOl)8 !l. r. i.sol itec' from pr ounc' s ourCGS in" r1urlnl! t'1 0Sl> tkes when
t,,!a "roune' SUD1))V s'·st.(fll h.'.S ccrn .. br ok(-: n dovm. Th...rc III rr. :: ctu .illv
CiS\.'; , rlurlnr this c :rlt),:.tipn, su , nli.. s \\ l n- flo\., n f rof'il Fr_nce to Enp11no ,
in Enpl .l no , 10{H":' d l o·. l n, ·.nr flaVin b ck t o Fr. ncf3 for thG us;:: at'
t!r Airbo r n
nivisions . T'1 r eo .. O"n:,.;. rs to no of t"Jis wdste :lIlC
in l' !"'ricl l l1cl' , unL:.t< s t.h" ..... tvis ion COir nt'f"r c_n sle'rii."icl:O his i...trrs r'i ·t \:l
n,'!-. c!s i ·1 f "' vor of t. "!", II nE.. - 5 of t. h, ( XT' t:cfit1onlr y forc.·;s , or
1)'11, :;3 th E. r ,. is ! hlfYw r comm _nn· r on th(: r r ounC who will filtrr th" r OU-.: St.3
from thE ciivi."jo'1S "la·.! vrhd. hl r the:: n
air or s ourC';3. '.J\. "I' tj
;Ii ....\ '& rr"
.a I'
AN!/EX 1 to INCL 3 - J - ..

'T''..i.blc NO r 1 to Inc! No . 3
rh Sv, n to D Plus T n
to ct<.:.tnr t) 5'\ L1 ct. :
Inclus.lv I ) J !:;ecGl!lber
FixGrI Su':.')"llv :'01' Dtv isl0'1
_ ._-­ '
Cl-:.ss V
C' rbi.n\-J C' 1. . 30, ill. 168. 000
C' l ••31, AP, R/clip 427 , 000
* , fI',:ll , a/clio
C 1. .3'1, AP , 5/elia 50, 000
i, , P'. ll 5/c1i1'"
* J quI f.. AP, rt as
C ,J'), Tr .c · r (ctn or clio) 20 , 000
C, l ••30 , AP-Tr , B. lt d (4- 1)
C::. l. L5 J 51':1", Ur l S0, 000
50 , AP- I -! , 2- ?- 1 35, 000
J?mm Gun , S' .
. * , 37m AP-T
37"" HE
37:run C:mnist l". t'
57rur Gun, fir , S'4bol 300
* J 57r:-rn. Gu:l , .\P- '" or APe
57llV'1 OJn, A?-T or ,\PC 600
57nw. nun, HE 600
* J or APe
60mr.!. Mort·, r J HF.
5, 850
6Q,m I II
6lmm Mor t .tl':, !.t 2, 700
Slrun Mo r t r, Hv 540
8l.mm Hor t ." t', Srookt.: 162
75l!1ll1 HE J w/f, 1:51, 2, 160
75f!r.l Ho\'l' , HE , w/F, I:48
1, 6<)0
75M lIoYl , Hf. J 340
75!,"JlI :-!ow , Smok 210
105""" How , fIl·; ..jF, 1'54 810
l 051'1'ffi How, iiF. \'f / F, )A8
1 ')5J:11l How , HE, 41 160
l OIj,':.m How , Srok 100
!ioc kC't. , AT , h'F , 2 . 36
2, 000
r·r h J;,r' , 8 , 001)
n .:o rl!' , r.: m""On Er
* J r;r'" n :l
r r
, h'lnr , Ofl';,;n.'1ivc 4, 000
Rifle , AT U9Al 2, 730
RUle- , Fr .".? 1, 0<}2
* , Gr.' n lciE , hlX, f r l Cl , wi lc'l'.pt Er
rtr n ' ("1 (" r 1 fle , Snoke
nu, . AC , Atl (3 col ors) 300
* , Sinn.1, srounr. , b '.lnchin q
C.lrt , rine pr , n .lc('; , E6
rifle ('r ""1ntr!.:. , in 2, 000
'lU:X lt7 2, 000
An lpt ..; r , prun:"'" Ml
576 ( plus those
subst for
rifle f r olg
Il r o: n..ld t;; s)
AcIdit :..utlM1 tnitioTl V., il l blc- on c l U .
* - E IV b: sur.3titut Tot. 1 ":G1rht - 215 Tons . No of 1862
- 1 ­
T.\J1J.F. IlO. 1
C'. ill

J ..
D.HLY SlJ?'::l'LY
J elL : 1) , 1'1 l ?O , CX))
CJ,1. 30 , \1' , 3/ eli.:) 427 ,om
* , P".11, $/cli"l
el l. .)n, A' , 5/clip 50,mo
* , !hil , 5/c1ir>
,;. , B1.1. 1 $: ,\P, ctns
C ;l, 30 , r , (ct.n or clio) 15 , 000
r . .ll. , )'1 , JID-Tr , bdt cI (4-1)

Cll . . /.; , S!:a Pistol 133,000
C 11 . . 5-); ,\p- 1- T, 2-2-1- 31, 000
J?Mf!l (".un , sv 360
" J7f1'm \F- '1'
)7"'ll!; HE . 180
J7rnm C nnht r
mm Gun , Er , S 240
, 571"Jr Jun , A.'")- T 0 r "PC
57rnm Gun , "'P- T or o\fC
S"'mm Gun, HE
* , 0 r A!"C
60-..1:' Uort ' r , HE 5, e 50
6"1mm Mort:lr ) III 234
8L-:unLfort r , 'Lt 2, 700
81:'"1. ! 'Ol't " , ' nV
81mm l!ort .r , :lItlokp
7S'""m .HO"I , HE , ':IF , HS4
1, 680
75r.m Hoyt , i--IF. , w/F, 1!48
1, 200
?5mr How, Smokt.· 14 4
?5 nm HO'Ii, HE , AT
l 05r.!:l How , H'? , wi f ,
lO"i"1I!} Ho," , HE, ·...,1:: , 540
l05mm , H:", \1'
(JOt·" s"\Oke
'1ockct. , \'l' , 1 , J'X>
r;r-n H .nrl , f1' ;; 7, 2'"0
Gr n .rL , G. J"lmo(1 , E!r
-\:' , (inn:lC' , Orf{J1Siv f'; 3, 6;)0
r.r n .:.rl r· , r i_ nf. , AT , E9Al 2, 470
Gr.n,r' r: j rif1.-: , 1,000
* , , w/.:ld ,pt( r
'}rcn' c't. , rifh; , :1)0
51"') 1 , .te , oUT (J colors) 300
, Gien_l , prn!) 1(' , ar C' '11ch ,
C ,rt , rifle Pl' c, n ': rT'( , ':'6 3,450
Crt , r i.fl· (1 1' n,{ .c , lO 2, 000
C .r t;, lUY r:' n (', ,
ptc-n Ml 576 (plus those
subst for
grE nJ.cus)
Arldition.J. ' lV " il b1(. on r.:: .ll.
* 1f bt: SI1l,r-t,j tut.L
Tot J Wl. ipht - '21') t (\ns ·No . of bunCL-s - 1760
- ;­

• r 2 3

'rablt! No . I t o Incl 1'10 .3 to RqJort , Suhj .ct : Airborrlu
Ph.:'s c j D to D plus Ten Inc lush' c: ") 3 t'ecE;mber
Wh. OllLY fl.\ IL:f
16, 000 27. 5
2,000 10.0
Oil , 120 . 6
40 . ?
Lbs .
38 . 4
Tot:.l Tons
76. 7
r IT)!
r'.\. tty
K Rltion F' . • 11, , 4'Xl 25 . 0
f' iv (; i n Oort E1 .
10 . 1
R::.ti on
r; 'so line G:l. 1,2m 7 . 0
01 E!1 P'i lE' I) ;.1 .
80 . 5
r LubQ
13 .1
r}l", Lbs ,
40 . 1
Tot : 1 '1'ons 32. S
.. ....
- 3 -
I, to '. '

. ",elf , .'

Table No .1 to l ncl J t o Report :
Sub i L ct J nOpEr Jt ion H/IRKErT , :i.ir bol' nc
Ph'\se , D to D Plus Ten Inclusive
• 3 December 194J.l. .
One of of rmoic.:.. l items for 82nd AB Div
fir st d 3. Y .::.nc' 0:tch chy ,
Stock Nq.
9115 5

717 '0
9?.l ,5·
] 0>'..4 5
1] <05
1 ?)';'52
Itf!M Unit
ne7t r ose 5% in ):hysiolot;iClll sor chI sol , "Ei'tl
1000 cc
Prnc::in;:! hyrl rochl or ir1 e , ?O c1utti:opcs ,
?5cc C[lrtritpe cont .'lininp -Z'; sol
Sor' 6 .1I!1P, 50cc \:'tp
%s t erile sol
Sulf:J.nil'lrrdflE' cr vst 12- 5 '"rtI envelopes US?
PbSI"lt.i nO')"!'I'Wl hU"'m ci rieC" '250co
B hnr':{ 0' 6 f' iUZr: r oller , J U x 11..0 -rcs 12
Pl.nster snrp. 1" x 5 vels
Splint ArtJlV Ie"" , l/i r inr
Splint wi r E l_rlder )t x J I "
Penthotho1 s<Y'iUM 25- ) . 5 f't'l !'lNR
with ?:5 - 20('c .... rno str. rile dist
Alcohol othvl 1 at US?
5 tubG
rressbp 1st ·.d.d srrnl1 white
Bane nl.lstr r p·l ris 6
:x 5 V{\s 12
Bhnke t od
Lit tt"r fo lr1i.nr c:lu!1
Pllstbr 1r'hcsivo S..lrq J!r "X 5 vels
Pct:-ol:.: tum 1 l.b usr
.I.ei<' ':'ccc tv] s licvlic 1000
5 [!r
Sc(l JU!lvt ,1 500 c \")s Nl\TTl J 9: r
1 1
Spl int wir'.:. f' .\U7,. ' :x 1 yn
t;Q0ain" sul["te 500 t:lbs USP t. fi r
Sul.f,.. 1)1)'") t :.:.bs USP 7 .7 Q1'
C'Jff€.it'l r f... bf::ns("Itc injEction
12 USP ?:cc
TO\'ld h...nr'
Tt.t"nus t oxoi(i pl"in 30cc USP
Snonec rurf' J 4 .x 4 J 500
I.hnrl.1PO t ri: nr>Ul' l'
AC'irl bol'ic oi"l.tl"'T nt, 1 It­
At-.brirx. 1')0 t .; bs 11 ar
t,tr ol"' i n(: su) Lt6 ?O 1/150 PI' HT
Chloroforn for 1ncsth.:si'l t Ib
COI"",pounrl c 1to.'! rti.c 1000 pills or t '1bs
(":r6301 c _n colI ot
f or <!1(;!>th <'-$i 1 .l lb
Ltl,.,l chor icl !.i :3 OZ
H"u'ro(l' :n o·y!"ox:i t:lc col 3,; 1 l b
J l' llv lubr lc ·tiop 4 oz
il1p'.onsiun "ulr· tE L Ibs
:..Ic; rc:.l r'.1 ridtlod
... 25') L'ff!" !)oi.son
t. ts
':orolli.nl;.. sLl.l r t(, ?O - 1/2 Pf !iI'
SoruM chloride i sotonic so'. l 'X)()cc
Sul f· th i .,z01< sofliu:·\ st<... f il. 6 vi. 115
USP 5 f" 1'
Tr O')iUM C \I" 1 pt
:"ntitoy in c-:s '"tro r ,,'lf nolvv 1.. nt w_o tr
tt,t nus '.I'\tlto)l"in
sociur- 100, 000 oy[orc uni.ts
dr " Oo.....rl l r
r ol l
v h l
.' "

to be fOrl'l"l.rded t he
1 . 5
8 8
12 3
144 504
12 14
12 2
12 50
65 36
4 15
8 21
2, 5
96 12
10 36
240 960
120 2190
24 10
2 2
1 1.5
1 1
10 20
1 1
6 1
6 , 5
I, 16
12 2A·
1 1
bt.l 1 1
t ub, 2
btl 1
btl 1 1
tin 4 15
e m 10
tube 1
btl 2 3
j or 1
C·ln 1 4
bt l 1 5
tube 2
btl 3 16
bx 2
, 5
btl 2 4
vLl 20 5
. \"
., t' ,
• ...--"

__.if, ., r'
.. \'.'
.. j
'l'able No . 1 to Incl No .
:3 to R port : Sui'icct , rtOoor.ticn 1.L.!tl0"T , .n i rbol'n;.>
?h'ls_ , !:' to D Plus Te n, InFlusivc." , 3 D-=ce.:.ber 19!J.':" .
St··.. ·( No .
Itel"\ Unit· Ql.la.'lt it v
- f7.j15
l"IextrosF. sol
btl" 0
1301R10 '5 ""!orne 1 . 5ec bx 1 1
?"O22 d -:.stic '11-cotto'1 J" y. 54 "cs 12 ct n 2 5
p Jll ze roD .:r 4'1 x 10 vrs 11 bx 2 I,
'2 ....1, 2')
"!c.rninC! slot· ,-t 5
x .; roll kg 94 ] 8
31'91 C-.thr, t r crrrt hr9.1rubbf:r 18 fr 1
33369 Knife: OT'lf;r bi r!o . 10 , 6 nkg­ 2
33> 1 Knjt\ or)..; r 1)1 ce 1'0 . 20 , 6 pko 2
36"30 size 7! or
36"40 G'.ov'.s ;;:.11' ');) sLz.; i' or 2
37:10 R ...1)1' b.' '-s p/,p 12
3""'790 SutU!' l' C"tP.L<t c!iro-i(' siztO 1 , 1 tube 24 1
37969 Sutolr· ,Uk br .V ,-rf I.or.- c .01111 .... siz.:; OrO
25 sol ?
37840 Sl.ltu:,c (' .t",ut. ))l-.in 00 1 !'atur c. ttl be 3Q 1
37995 Sut.ur E sil', ,: r'" 1 co 1 5uturo
luEr "'cc <-
1 . 5
3>170507 Tub..:: 1 !k !'r J.E:vin CJ_ 1
38700 TIl1:iOP r ubber 1u inq::'rr: ri. 1/16" w:.ll ft 6 . 5
71'770 b-J.h 2 1
74560 Brush h uta 2
74J90 SO"P 1.J.Un
r·' 1 b r ? 2
"'19J) So .., "j1it." no li 1"" 6 07-
b_r 8
800:10- EO
. 5
777&J Cun I") fY, r coll 250 ctn 1 1
n:60-;,) O.xYf! -/1 t :f11( 750 .• l i'ill....r 132
n127 Soon",l.; 4" y 3
b p
)9415 heat r e r ill o. 6 6
7,1,40 {I r in 11 (;'"0, h'i r· 1 1
1182 4235

TABLE 1'0. 1
Tj'lea.; . ] tlOpero.
Ph',sc J n to n Plus Ten Inclusi.ve,. j :Jec'3..1ber
One cay r esu,,,'ly of itsms fo r lOlst A= fiv t.o be t.he
r:...,. uor on .!!.}('''! Sllcceerlinl:t cay.
no . Unit
11650 5';" I)h" siolopictll sorl chI btl
11.305 40
14636 3u If'm t l"':n i crvst , 1?:- 5 Pm box 160 1, 0
11,917 'IJte" , oIif'-I;. 25 , 5'c,: ; am" ' ptrr i le I)'!ro"'en :-:ox 40 60
16089 PJ..JS.!l:.1
nOl"';al hL<·'i31, J pkp
240 840
oOn50 "'.:.I11?O . r."lc r J'I ... 1") 12 hox
40 45
20130 Cott.en , 10'1: "lkf: 240 15
?0340 PliJ!'1t-H, Sll!' !" , l ' x 5 ',,",s Sol 16') 27
$'"I]i.·lt , bqr;" "lor , 1,) ; ,)n roy IP'! set 60
17500 S.... 1 LIt. , ,t r 'w let> } t'-\ r-
40 105
37540 Snl i.:It , '''ire lar'''''''r, 3
;.; 31"
1331R05 Pent,,! :;orium, 25 O. c; q" NNR : boy
40 20
\.. 'l'i - 20cc am") ste)"l.le r'ist wat er
10)480 et';·.. l , 1 at US?
btl 12 105
91155 l'ornl1.in.e t.'1!'tr . .lte , 5 tu'1E box 125 12
91204 Sulf'lc'1'!ztne, USP7. 7 " r in 225 17

n130 01 st "'"r of ""'Gris , 6" y. 5 vrls, 12 atn 40 12'1
1st air" 1 VI1ite e,
92060 lst a i c' S!"'J]l yo; • ie ea 960 114
9QJ91 '·001 on e. 12'1 48)
9?380 Litt.er , fo1cii 11" , alwinum ea 40 730
93750 Snlint , "cUZG 5.! n X 1 yd r ol l 5) no
91020 .Heohol , c' c'\d I.i re d 1 I"t tin
TOT.lL 3438
l tf.'m
Tor.s F'oLl nc' D
p, "

r;r r· n·H'le , , ' 1$ 100 . 1 60 Ibs per box of 25
"rcnar'e I
, l14

. 1
Ibs r box of 25
.... rf H:.\nr, 5.l"lok.: 1'1' !.1. " 1210 1.7 75
of 25
S:nol(e , Colore'" , i:J..8
n 51 . 1 50 lb. ocr box 0"
50 .1 50
lbs er b07. of
(lr '"v,
. 5 50 los of
" "
q. r'
SO .1 5) Ihs ry(- r hoy of
50 . 1 50 lbs
bo, of
Y6110w 5·1 . 1 50 Its nc r box o!' 25
Tar L TO rs
' .'
TM. NO. 1
• 6

Pounds F,.t: Boy
60 Its po r bo)(' (If 25
75 Ibs 0, r box of
"'5 1be at r boy of 15
5"\ n-: r tox o f 25
5') I bs per bo '" of 25
51-, Ibs pH be:x of' '25
Pnn .1 Set A',\-50
O:ut t l"TY BA- 2
II BA.- 2J
II 9"- 27
" B\-)0
II P, \- 37
., ".\- 38
" n>.- 39
II P.\-40
11 RA-4J
II Q'\ - 70
11 n:l..-8Q
II FA- 20')...U
1 eauin:n, nt rt:'.-ll
Casr , GS- 34

Form (,r1·4.\ .
Ground rrp- 16
Hr:ii cl s'et 1 HS- 30
Pud J LC- 80
Lamp, UI - 35-A
liU:S S .l C, E: m"elop.: , JJ-40
Pencil , g- 140
Hess'H'€: hook ,
swi tchbo..lrd ,.
II , 9Tl...72

''l' M , !:C- 72
"Form SO .'/50
"ForI!' #159
f orm SC #160
1l..1oio 'SCR- 536
r i crooho'1c , T-45
Che st Set , TT)...3
TIr'-13- A
Knif"" TL- 29
T lO t: , TL-P,3
T.l 0(: , 'fL- ?4
CHo, TL-l 23
Ni. r!.! , "i- lfYI
, 11.J-IIO,. on rc<, l, r1- 4
nlire , .110 CX1 r. f:E!1 , nij- 5
II 1" -130 on r eol , nR.-4
.. n , W- l )) on re el , "'It- a
Batte ry , P\-48
Radio set J SC"R- 3CO
Qu antity ·'jt . U::s
1 50
al 1,0
5 10
20 30
1000 320
50 25
50Q 6'XJ
50 540
15 15
25 15:l
100 500
l llO
4 2

2 22
100 1
1 1
2 2

100 3;
300 7
1 58
1 103
50 .
l JO'j 1
250 2
2 20
100 20
1 lb
2J milcs 1640

25 mil.:- s J.rY/5
30 2000
30 mil es

2 100
TOT,L (in Tons) 5. 5 Tons
- 7 ­
sub l ect : IIOrer atio n l!.\RKE!' ,
December 1' 44 .
!l.irbo rn6
t:u"!.nt it.y Lbe
(Pe r n.v)
20 mil t:s 1640
Itlir e , "'1-110 on nR 4
25 miles 4075
W-110 on f'R5
30 mile s
",'-130 on T'R 4
30 mil<s 250
, '1[-130 o n DR 8
" 10 20
Sc: ct ion, t
, 1lS- 50
Sat , SCq 3DO-A
SCR- 536
, SCR- 694
[}(; t e cto r , SCit 625
1 350
Hll int E.Jlmx:e EQJ, i orn; nt, 1'E- 53
10 40
R'lt t ery , 8\- 2
, B.\- 23
" 500
, B\- 30
" 10 7
, n.\- 27
" 300
, 8,\- 37
" 500
, EA- 39
" 50
, B\-40
" 15
J fl;l\-41
BA- 43
" 20
B.<- 48
" 60
, BA- 70
" 50
" 2
Coil , C- 161
Set, TG-5
Te l c.phon e. , EFrS- A
Swit chboo rd , Bf).....71
,. B11-?2,
" l2 50
Tap , MC- ?2
ConvGrt er , U- 209
200 4
lJ... ssapG book, M- 210
\ xlr.: , RL-27- A
2 50
ReEl CE-ll
Crank, GC- 4 - A
50 ro 11s 10
T:lPE, TL-83
25 ro lls 5
T11>' , T1-94
1 7
Cl imbe. r s , Lc-f
Too 1 eouinmp nt J 'l'F. - 33
Fla sh l i ,..h t, TL-l 22-:'
L'J Ino , LH-J 5
10 Pr . 5
Glovrs , LC-10
f ollowi nl' tt b!"\ S t o be (l(' livbr f'd onl y once duri rv. t he five day pe.riod .
1 50
Te st sct , I- 56
1 30
Tc st GOU ioreen t, IE- I?
- 8 ­
TA",U; NO. 1
G _ .
Tlt.le No . 1 t o Incl No . 3 t o Rf"T)ort : Sul :h c t : nOp.::r ll ti on M RKET , Air borne:
<'ho" , n to D Plus ....
Fix' r "1IJ ilv "Y-.o. j 2 ,F\ DivJsi.on
C- ?
Ca ps , t.)f:\stl.,,,, sre.cLtl. n"ln r.lEctr"i. c
"'UE' '-:' , 1I1'stin" , timr.: (1J:J ' roll )
Fu:'f(' , I t"'ht rs
Prir.ncor d (lOO ! roll)
P:tPS , S'l-r
'Xl 'i11t it y

1. 0
8 . 0
0 . 8
110 . 0
660 . 0
1779. 8
rot'.... s , hI Ltltinf" , non-(..1. ctric
lSC , bla.!'1tin"', l il"'c (100' roll)
FUs( , 1 tpht · rs
po- i"luco rrl (101 1 roll)
tI,J.J>s J s'Old

TO'i' ••L
PounC s
l. 0
8. 0
0 . 8
llO. O
660 . 1
1779 . S
T \rlF '.0. 1
Tabl e No . t o .Inci No . 3 to RepOrt : Sub1cct : "Ooc ration M.:ocsI' , Airborne
Phase , D to n Plus Ten Inclusivc; ", dated 3 necember
Rect. i;r{'d R(. cuivl;d
Since [ JJg Pr ior to
1 - f or 1 ,.ur. fOT
tJ) Unit s ,iB & Grro in
Units units Tons
II Krr Rations
409032 24960 433992
68400 365592 783.185
.. T)'I R!ltions
43 2 NonG
. 2268
5 in 1 rations
10 in 1 rat ions 1300 NotT Non,;. 1300 4.3
Toil et (rolls) 1

080 lOBO Non e 1080 . 4
Tobac co Rat i on 160000 None 160000 Nom! 160000 5.
Cundy Ratton
Toilet ration 160000 None 16:JOOO No,..- 160000 2. 5
V-80(Gd1s) 62758 7746 70504 43351 27153 352.5
ruel (OS ls) 5616
599 6215 2052 4163 31.075
Oil #30 (n'us) 4392 252
None "6",, 23 . 22
Gre. 'lse f/2 (Lbs) 11.35 45
21.40 NOnE; 2440 1. 22
Ge..r lube (r.:1ls) 156 12 168 NOM 168 . 84
- 1 -
T"" c. f.' oP owi no O!'<7n lnCe t!9.tni l' l is o n C:.ll f o r tho I.n Division :
" .:, ior I t "M.':' :me
9J. 8."1 tity
Car h ine
Pouch , \'I ch
Clin, cart. , C1. l. . )0, w..
"l ifle; , HI
?ayone t , i'l , w/ sc jbl::<.!.Irr
Tool, Co:':\binilt i oo
Slirtf'; , r u 'l , 1'19:>7
" rownin!' Aut ctl'11::\tic Rif le 89
Pi stol
Hal stEr
S\l bmll chtne Gun
tfA. chite Gun , Light, 120
ine , j=lo:'! lt H Ub"' , cal. . J:) , l-a918 20
Hachlne r;un, cal. . 50, VI/mount 17
1:00 nt, All , l!6J 14
iWr ttt r , 6Ornr.., w/rroWlt sightinp eQU ipl'" mt 25
Horta r, 81,,1"\ , l'J/rnount ': S i l1l),t.dt" €1ubment 22
J Roc ket , l'9 100
Lqun('her, '1renafe. ,
Laun(' '¥>r , ('rr rnati e , 1:8
nun , 0F , 6 pounde r, Irk IV 15
Ho lo': , Puck , 7511U"! J w/on c ar r s i-'1tim' E!I" uioment 31
Ha." l 05mm, lfJ 3
Cir cle J Aimi n!" , t2 10
Te lescol")e , irvr
Te l escope J rlflO ram ie, ffl 4
!lou ''It , BI6 3
Tele .::l eone, t'l.bow , r!62 1
T(l loscopl.· , f.l(i :lpt or, i :9
flua cirant, rl1n c.e , H8
S u. h t, mortnr , U4 8
Teles cope , r loow, Ub I
Mount , td(>s co po , to, w/panoramlc t o:; l escope HI
Te l bsconlo , I.:lbow,
Qua. drant , ounn E!' s , US .
Kni" c , t"c::n c h, H3 150
Truc k , i ton 16
Tr8ilvr, t t on 16
Ti"e , 60') x 16 60
To1 bt J 61» x 16 60
Tir e , x 16 9
Tub< , 750 x 16 9
Tir e , c or.bllt. ,., /tubc , 8C() 7 16 1
r. l f' rr
Pr ESE.r!ln.F !!a.t erial
Oil \E f 30 qt 90
Gr casr , on , #0 lb 50
CLanc:. r, r ifle 1:o r e qt , 1198
Cl ot h , crocus awe t 450
Cloth , wlnLn'" Ib 3650
I r if1. 1,;0 e. 3 225
Oil , lub, 01"1. S , It . ot 1150
Patch,:s , cut , cott.on 62
.lut e· , tour) 'lO
:' n.. m6 I , am, on
R 8600
Y ,.
, 'f ,..(11).... 1'-:: ."' )1 . 42
Par)!;T,l 'ns t issue qu irt
PriMcr , avn, pr r v
Sorla , a sh, tvo, I lb 1<97
Sod!J. , c!£ustic, Iv.; l b 1043
on , f l. coiJ , snr. -cial
TAllV' t'O.
- 2 - '
----­ .-
?ahle No , , t o I ncl tion HYVE'I' , Airborne
Phas , ') to 0 Plus T( r _ _____________ .44
11 !1'i t r.tl 'lI!.t ib'
"PCHlPI: , borG , coarsE ) c 1lulos;
Twin€. , 1ut e lb 25
":' .<;te , cot.t O'l , 'lft i t c lb :L?12
Fl, il" , brain I hvrrau li('
..1 OJ
c3" !:x:m V-t r achlor'We ql 109
"'ho,,", , 3D ,a r. iO
'T'h :'"'1"', c 11. . 50 co "0
Oi 1, n Jt afoot pl

011, bu' 'f r , br , ,Q': u hS
Cloth , 'J Shf d 96
NOT' : . 11 (I f f't:irt.s for Orrln:lnct. V.Ltc rie l t o ai r oc-rnc
01')< r ' ,tions is h i(1\'1 r s rv c:d t '\ c'coot, Mrl c an h,: SUT,p] it:'d on ca ll .
Thr r,.,lloYj ; '1'" 'lrr''l il1 ". l..!'o.l i .-I is on (' ill f or t he 101 A9 Div islc'ln
":.I 1!.. ""!: llliL tce ';or h f'
Gl r b1.."X
Pou ch, ,. ,,,
Cl i,>, (' "r t r1. dv.!. , ,:n,
1irtL , !o'l
t , -,1 , ¥l/sr! ,11 .J. yyI
'rMl , c t.t ....bi.n. t.' on
S1tn!" , t"un , :!lQ,")7
1!1 "1 Aut or it 1c l.if

rio Jst ," r
SU '"' in" ",u n
l':"cl}lrh nun , lill'hl , ""/MO mt
)l\ hi 'l. ) h It c . l. . 3::1 E191S
" ,::!., ",un, cill o . 5 ') , y.' Imount
t'ou'lt. , . 1/' 1 J.!63
w!mcunt silO"l't inn
z:o r fJ r , cL.... "' , w/mount :;iO'hti:r ... .,ui>:r.I nt
1 ' lOC'h t' , t , Iff)
I.... lll'\("h· r , r. r C'1 3r/, , 1:7
!" , Gr .n<1(l,. , ':8
')un , 37(1"" , .... /si,,:1t qol i'Y!l!1.t
"rUt" , 00;0 . 6 ""Ounp, r J i};: 1\'
HC''' J rlC'!.r , 751'l1" , w/on c:J.r r si"hting ,,,uirlloc nt
HC"" , !:J
C'j'cl , irli., ,,, , 1'1
T, 1 :;C''''' ,
,.. I :' , p;morl!"ic , in
Eount , t, 1. rcor.. , !116
TI I, ltoYI,
'r· 1. :.I(l·,l)t, r I
0\.\ r 'm,',' , 1'8
mo.. t J. r , F4
"'t 1 ;CO'1,' , , 1bow,
" 0'.1 T'lt , t 1 "con • 1'1, r "1::.J'lO>'l'" ic t , ] "Sc on,-· III
r\Llrll' tnt , n'lnll' r'<! ,
' i"if' , t r 'nc " , 1' 3
r .... 'l r.
: , r t on
1' 1" :ti.1 ·r , ton
'rir , 6i't x 16
'1'u b. , 600 x 16
"' i r , 750 '{ 16 if
75'1 x 16
Ti.rt , C )',.1:\ t ' / tube , 8'Xl '( 16

T.\"I.!: 1'0. 2

TabId NO . 11: to I ncl No . :3 to !'h'nort : Subj- ct: "Op":; ["tio n Airbor!1l;.
Ph:;'SI' , D to T'l Plus Te n, Inclusive" , oate<l J Pect:::nber 1944 .
0\ i , S .. F:
ot 90
OD, ,If) 1b 50
Cleaner , r i 1'1 0 , tor e.
sho.£ t 450
Clot;." w
1b 3650
(:.r',a56 , rifl c
Oil , lub, It
Qt 1150
P'ltch, s , C'lt. , cotton
11 62
Em.-(..l , svn , on
0;, 1 171
burb,n vd
Oil , r cot 1, s'" chI
r'.:l l h2
Psry r r , 1 n.'\ tissu ,-,
C)'; t r ('
or Lll'r , sV"\ , rust nr(..v

!.Ish, tvr.lC "[
lb 1C97
Soc''1 , IV('
1b 1044
bore: . co.:l r se, c .. llulo:K:
co 17'XJ
Twi Ol. J .1u
1b 25
':lastc , co to:1 , "Whit e
1b 1312
Fl 'id, brak\"
p:.:J l 20
ca"bon tr tr
qt 109
Thom I c'l.l . .J0 ,."
C.1 70
Thone' , " .... 1. . 5f)
011 , nr. ·ttsfoot
Oil , buff( r, Pr
al 48
Clo h, :lbl'.l:;; i vt.;
NOTE: .\ stocle cf sour p-l rts f or Orrlnancc r olutiv<o to Ai r bor ne
Op- r3tions is ocio" t' l"srr vI .cl at a aoc' can b t; l3Ur)nlit.d on c!.:ll .
- 4 -
Tlru' 110 . 2
-- .

Table No . :2 to I ncl No . :3 to UARKET , Airborne
Phas t:' , n to T) Plus T, n I nclusiv{::" , 3
Item tIo .
I JS75



20'.) 50



f)l' 'Xtros c 5"" P1YS ChI Sol 1 'OOce btl
Procaine Hvdrochl oriC.: 20 2 . 5cc cart r id,c( box
containiM soL
Sodur:l. Cit r ':' <.i , 6 Urn!) , 5')c c 4% st eril e Sol box
Sulf Cl' yst , 12
-'Jut -r "'istj lJ i' d, 25 5:).....cc art'lS , st-: r il..;. , nvr o<::r .;n
fn e
Pl:1SI:.;l , nom" 1 ' U";\<.)H , a r t - d , 251-co
G::uz" rollcr , 3
x n yes 12 box
Cot.ton , ah so "P€·nt , l - oz , cr'TJ)r ·;5s'-d
?l'1.tt r- r ".cIh':si v· , :2ur '! , 1" x 5 ve's spl
Snli.nt J 1 )

Snli '1t , ? l"My l ;. c , l.-t im ,:
Solint , 1 :1c(, r ·;a
PGntot!l'o l Sorliu"\ , 15-0. 5 I'7fn u..'!1 .... wi th 25-Zlcc tox
dlst..iD ..;(1 .....:!tu·
t. lcohol (, thvl , 1 qu::.r t btl
!:or ..,hii ' t :'l r tn.tc 5 tube 1-ox
SuIf·let R t -I r. s 7 . 7 por in w . t l! r.,r oof okg pke
n Pl ·lst.i.. r r". r is, 6
x 5 yPs 1.'2 cto
:"t'\.. ssi '1,... , 1st 'l ttl 3:T1.l11
n1F.:l1k t..t , wool , ®. ,·a
lit tt-. !' , f 0 1c'i.n'< , llurr.i nu."!l (; '1
P1 st t' r :.<'i n.;s iv\.: sure 31! X 5 vel s spl
?:·t r obiulTo l-lb
Ac irl l r»)O t ,,-.bs btl
iM Sul!' ,to ! pr t'bs btl
5\ )] .. zine 7 . 7 pr 1')00 t ..l. bs btl
C' lffdn Sotiium ECr nzo lt o Inj<'; ction 12 .UIlD box
To\·)\·1 , h-::. '1rI
T t t oxo in '11·lin 3')..c c
Sronc:>\: su 4 x 4 500
At -JbriTl\;O- t blds 100
,\troolne sulf ·t o 20 - pr HT
C1llorofor r:l for _"H.. l /h I b btl
c 1t)')0 pills or t .bl "ts otl
Cr ' s ol ' 5.lpon .it t cl solI ot t in
for .l..'Y.:sth,.s i n. 1/4-1b
Ethyl chlor ide 3-oz
Hv(rop cn ") royicl
sol 3% 1 Ib
Jrllv lubric tinS!' 4-oz
H .l"In.... sium suU"t c 4 u.. e 'n "S
HLrcur v bichlorid<:; 250 L lr!7C Doison t .lb) c: ts btl
-· 5730
n 08
1; 11810

Porphin", sulf . t c 20 - lis pr HT
Socium c !11arlr[; i !3 otonic s al ut ion l ,)OOcc
Su l f .t ht · .. zonC' sol1ium st _rile 6 v.i · l s 5 om
Tincture Ooiur' C' Mr'\l-lon tcd Pi nt
r. ,5 fJ .ntitoxin Tl c: l yv ·hnt
T'I<..xtrosc 50'" $")1 50cc
25 l m"') s
(lie \;- l lf"t ic c ot t (' n rloz
P'1.nc'"CJA p 1UZ{ 4
}I 10 yrls 12
"r IcVlil1!7 , r t 5
y. 6 v de
C l th lt.(·: r u rdhr r u hb(: r 18 ft
Knlf '" oOf' r tjn... rIo . 10, 6
Knife ooer .t in" bl lC,' S tJo . 20 , 6
- 5 -
t ub£
vi J.
bo x
T·1,RLF. NO . 2
. t'
I). I
Tabl e 2 t o tn('l No . :3 t.o :lcoort: !jur i, "OoL, r lion !1..Ill(E.T , Air bor:1'"
t o n Ph Is 'l' pn Il')f"lusiv!; " , 3 Decer'lb3h 1944 .
1 It. .- ."S' on (' :11 t (CO'ltinuff' )
"'u :mlit v

"lov s . sur f' ons:
)': 840
'S , sur" -r) $ size 8
Tt lzo r, S_l r ty bl _rJ· 5 5
nkp 40
tl.:. 0... 123
suture chr of"ic c -t ,-,ut 5i 1
Sd.u r ... :W cl non-c _oi ll rv siz!' 000 ?5 yr's
spl 760
tur.. 130
SutllrL C .t"l.lt siZG 1


RU tun. nilk d J'TI'I 1 co!t'S (;
c, 18
) 1": /+60 l u· r 30cc
'-, 17
n':l l U f h vin .
ft 90
Tubin!' f ltlh· r 1/ 411 rl il1s1.,-I(.
(. ·l
1. , b It"
74 560
Pn. sh , h nr'
bar 30
Soap, burl'-' r v 1 I b
bar 40
:30.:11) YT"tit e: flo 'lt 5 OZ
e. 5
B3D in socnp.f'
et n 5
Cu r s pJ.p: r co1l3!}sml (;
c a
77<; 6020
Oxvt' cn t .:m, 1( , 750 f'):l D on fille d
S-xm Qc sur" te 3.1 h )' 1 189
eo 57
p:lr hl.'ot r t. fil
ea 5
Ur 1ml m ol m.: ] ... c
r oll
Splint .... -u:, '-"auze 5t x 1 yd
t in

'\l cohol, 1 pi nt
Tot31 FnoinH r-l.!{..rns on call
f)(' v i.e r. , f-t rinn' , "1.1 s h null
f'lr v i.(' '1 , f l d no, Tr>lUls,;
T'\ vicG! r trt nr'l , n r( :-su"c
t'/oll , P' l b tin, wt(1l.> ,
1'I'I ,_ d .
' 1 90
P.1o- r ,
mg\,) , l i t
fi r, ish ?.2" x 29
sj t i on , C-2
cnt<: r tn.l! ,,"t'\ r gr:
r. ap,
b l 'lst in,.. , sn€c i:l l ,
n- " hetrie
Fu z{' J
bwstl n
, t ifn i.: (100 '
r olls ) 3

\t''U z, li.r'1t ' r 9
PTir.:;cor d (1')0 ' r oll)
Shs.rx- einr"" (10#)
' 10 350
Sh nn,- Ch:l T": C (35
T ' 1
ttl f' S J
li1.:J , t t nr- ,
c. l r ct .
10 , 000

22 , 288 ll.144
T ,nLE !'O. 2 - 6 ­
_ -I
.'l. irborn ...
H' t-io . ') t o 3 to ilo"X)rt : Sub.;,·ct : "Ooc f :Ation :'nRKET ,
• 0 to n Plus 'i't; I"lc1
J. .::d.v l. l!, cllt.ed 3 T'lerembc r 1944 .

Cl us3

(0-24 Pomb rs )
Gbfl s 17
Qth ,'r
(C- 475)
r:1 '15 S T

Oth· r
TOT ,\J,
1'OT ',L (3 rl >l.VS )
p<n Div
1,1 , 9
'.17 .1
',' . 5
263 , 5 'rans
1 . 1 'l'ons
63 .1 "
64 . 1 Tons

.,., • 5 Tons
]0. 9
391 . 7
8. 5
444 . 6 Tons
772.2 Tons
D PU1S 1
lOlst niv
'2.4 .7 Tons

241. 1 7005
Q....!. IUS
9. 5 Tons
7 .h
16 . 9 T'ms
25B. O Tens
51. ? Tons
18. 6
417 . 2
17 .1
504. 6 Tons
1.1 Tons
63 . v
64 . 1 Ton9
37 . 0 Tons
1? 9
397 . 7
15. 9
461 . 5 Tons
1030 . 2 Tons
- ] ­
'I'..PF J
Torr J '.E.,s "'''' ITV EREr ,
• t-:3

G) 'U-3
leI' s s v Or r1n.:LnC l tc·..; rl 1. c...! 1 ..d r Corns .lll Totll
, . .
82 101 82 COl' ?s- l J l
32 ' -101
82 1,)1 '2 111 82 101 82- "101

" 'D
(?ar achut " '"' roY» ) 0 \
1) Plus 1 :3 3.Q
.J. ­
o J::­
n Plus 3 . 5 1 1. 5

'.::! c-t­
J Fl a s L. 8 1445
22 . 5

-- ;!iI
of n Fl u:;: 8 43
43 J )
( T<. j( ·l"} .. i th '1"' ;" ;; nv c:l i (l r r )
':.3 /
, _ ...!... . .. . .. • _', - ,,-. '. .. ' 'b';iW-.; ­
:r. ....

1) ?l!:s l 12 J2
; .(
, 4108
. ...'
-,p "'''',:

t: 1(;) 1 "

• .J ..... .
n Plus 2
I , .J

1 J::,

n Plus 3 1.5 ', '
I )
n 6 .1.
5L . a

( -l ir Lncl t'o .:it rru:) sd s )
.:::J ;:­
D ,
D Plus 5 . 5 1.+ • 'J . 3 .J 29 . 6
. l)
25 . 0 (iI ..
'I Plus 6 24
>-t "
D Plus 8 50 60
7. 5 122. 5

D Plu s 9 25
. 1 25 . 1

T) Plus 12 12 1 1 . 5 . 5 15.0 +:-::l
D Plus 13 12 35 . 5 1.3 1.0 1. 0 50. 8 ,.,..
D ?lus 14 47 . 2 . 5 . 5 48. 2

n Flus 15 Lt.9 ... 5 . 5 .5 50 . 5' £rj

of t he l Olst. Airborne 1n Operation ..:....i.:...... for
ne period D - D! lD
COIrmandi."lg General, First Alll.ed Airbonle Army
I :2,
(Tnru Coramandin6 General , XVIII Corps (AD)

1. 'Ihe a ttached relJOrt on Operation uJ-O!dCi,'£ prepared by Brigadier General
J . Hig:::-ins is fon:arded approved -..1th the followi;,g cOO'.,.'llt:nt S.
2 . OF' THE DJ;.YLIGH'? UttO:' 0£­' _ ;' . ;q.t . UiMET. 4leration
differed fr'':II., a.::"l ot.her Airoor!16 operatioCl_ LI. 'U exercises in the cOJ,lpactness and
accuracy of the D day landing s . Apart fro.n t oe navigational. slull and ... S:3
under fi::"e by Troop Carr:..er pilots , the factor contn.. buht16 most to t hi s
accurc..cy the decision to stage the operation in dayligilt. Daylibht.
t he operation to be put on successfully .lith a r.linimum of prepsration. There '" as
no special pointing for Oper ation l.iAh.}',ET on the part of AlTborne Troops wnereus
a full-dress rehearsal wou.ld have been indispensable had t.ne operar.ion been U1
da.n..ness . Day light simplified tne marsha.l..Lin
and pilot8.t;8 of
Carrier COI..-na nd as well as the asseabl,y of Airborne troops on 'the t:;rou."l.d. I ns
r a!Jidity oi' this assembly permit.ted the accolniJll.sn.'lent. of to ne llutial gr ound
mi sEol.oJns ::)0 Bec ause of the accrJing advanta6es it is felt t nat consi ­
der able boldness i s jllstl.fied in choosing ratner tnan for an
Airborne operation if, as in .. .;J U\ET ) the enem;y is on t ne r Wl and air sllpre.'lliI.cy
J . Rn'rE OF Or' TrIE 1015T A!ltOOrtN'E. DIVISIOtJ. It required seven
d8i'lS t.o br ine. in all toe ..n::-fJorne of t he l>uriTl&
time t.ne Division obl1ged to protect t he landi % field H:l. tll
f or ce3 carryiOG out l.t 3 gr ound missions . Tn15 for landin& f...e l d
prot'O.Ction r educ ed the strent;th avail able f or tne essent.ial tasks of t!1€ Divis loOll .
This inevitable d1Vers ion of si..rersc;tn loS a fac t or wniclt be borne in mind in
missions to an Airborne Division.
4 . TH.OOP ChltnIcil. UN" Trlh. Gttuu,m. Gener al llii!trl. n.
:':1 para;;r8,;lh
4 f. COtlfllents on the need of a.'1 Air Force cont r ol ur:it. on the fielo. TI .15
would nave been most useful in 1 .•• .l"tN:.1' and shOu::.d not. t.1:! ov..::r l ooi;;ea in fut ure
Airborne operations . A Tr oop earr:;.er ofiiciJr 0:1 :na could have radi oed
back local weather conditions an9 exer c isod A:11' traffic controL Also ) ha could
havo relayed the l atest info.rnat.,ion r ebarc":' l, lone t.actical sit.uation on t he
ground, t ;IUS pr cver:.ti!).b air f or:::ations fro!. r'lyinB OVf:;r a batt le in pr ogr ess ,
5. OF S':'fC.IIS . Opttration ..uUtKt.T i ncludad plans for the
of to in air truasported units and supplies .
Thi s was never possible beca!lSa of action adjacern. to the narrow cOl'ridor
along the EindhOven- Arnhem nigh\"/ay a.nd the a bsance of adequate troops to clear
and control the necesS8I}" landl.llJ; fil;lld area. As tne sit uatioll is alwa.y s going
to be extremely uncertain whenev'er Airborne troops land b..: hind hostile lines ,
the cCIlstr u.ction and protecticn of a landing field does not a pJJe:ar f e:.,.sible witho..J.t
an entire divi &ion with the sole mission of the field.
6 . AIk kESUPPLY . Operation liArlJili"'T provided valuable lessons in air
At presa nt , tha data are not coroplet a so tha t conclu.sions are t entd.tivo . nOi/lt-ver,
it Has amply ..Jrovod that resupply is much mar l;! than supply by
parachut-.J . Ths wal3 only about 50:0 and wo uld have been 1nado.!ql.late
i '1 i t :; '.:l l i' t o fII"d nt. ain tnl.S Divisl.on for a ny C01' 8ide. r ! ' lO pl;luod. hxperlc!1ce i.n
Op.:.ration bJArl.K£T erJi-hasizl.;!S t hat a ir r ""s uppl.Y an fIK:tllod a
l fmg way to .0 before it can 0"; r tJlh..Q upon t o Airborne: troops nu.;l.IX;r
for a d. ,
*' .. ..J -
- 1 -
..Jut c \ \969

I 7. GROmm O? _\TI ON3 Of T:ib-.h0lS'L T ')l :3 D1VISIOtL The l.nit.ial I;r ound
mission of t h..;: Divisio.1 r e quir .;J its di s._ .I. in thrtlC ar...z,.s alOrlh u. corridor
about fl.ft6iln miles in lengtn. This thd nirborm; troops ,"lea k
at every critical ncc.::s::::al7l thoJ most enIJr&ctic stliftirlb of tro.... ?s
to meet the nW'Jcrous threats as th;.;y d..::vt!loPed along this lonl corticio-:" . Had
anything l ess t han a parachute drop b.:cn th;,; r.ri.ssion miglu... <:ll
have fail ed , \'I holly or in part . As it. was , tne issue hung in ... Ul.ce on
several occasion,;:; before the .i,irbort :e troops r .. stored the situation. Tn_ ,..Xp.<L'l.­
cnca gaihl3d by the Div).sion g;w<.: roJn_'., I'c'; Lo ree to the cawictioit t l l<.1:. an ....
diviSion is capable of .ex/artlng c.. s\. ro!lb <.: ffort l.n but a a irt;;:t i on h'L c.
given time .

MajO!' G{:.nural, us,,;
Office of : the Asst . Div .
APO 472 , U. S. Army
12 October
SUBJECT : ' Report on Operation .r.LiUi.KST.
TO COf.lmand ing Gener al , l Ol st Al.rborne Divisl.on .
1. GE LHAl. : In accordance -.dth instructi o:1S Corn.:nanding General
l Ols t Airborne Divi s:.on, the ':0110'0in6 re . on t.:'e part icipation of t ht:; lOlst
Airborne Division in Operation j.tAR.t:ET i s .1... :.'<,;,;)y subr:titted . This r eport c overs
t he ope!'ation3 of tho; l OIs!. ..u.rborne Di. vis J.on fr Cl':l D to D I- 10 inclL;.siv e (Sep­
tember 17 to 27, 1944.) . Tre r eyort. is divided int.o t.nree par t s : F:'r s t , t he
r..oveme:"lt of personnel enc equipme!1t f ror" the UK to toe cor.lbat zone in a par achute
echelon, a gl i der echelon, a.'1d a seaborne eenelen; second , tile tac'tl.cal operations
of the und units thereof , f r otl t hE:: initis.i. lar.ciing by parac.lut e until
D f 10 inc lusi ve , at. v:hich U :re tht:; tactical s i t\l... t. ion becbl-ae u..ore or sta­
bilized ; and third, general cOlI'.11lent s on va. rious a per l!. t l.O a1 ana administr s. tive
matters peculiar to operati on .
2 . !.{OVE;IDlT TO SO...:B... l' ZONE:
a. Parac hute 3chelon : Toe parach...rt.e eChel on of t he lOIs t Ai r borne
DiviSion consi s t ed of 436 C- 47 transport p lanes cc.rrJi% 30 • .1e 6, tiV1
of the Division . Four nundr ed t wenty- raul' planes drof.lped on D-Day, ana 12 planes
carry i!J"'; Batter-y "B", 377tn Parachute Fi eld ArtL .. ler:t Bbttoalion , \ll.t. h 140 person­
ne l anc 6 guns , dropped on D f 3. Of the 436 planes wilic!l t ock of f , 434 dropped
parac:l utists in a hiohly sati s factory aanne r (cent er of impact ". .... 5 sO.:le 1, 500
yards s hor t of tnE:: selected DZ in one ':ase and about 3 r.d.les northnes t. of the
s elected DZ in a.t10t her c ase . L'1 both cases hOVievt;lr , t he drop pattern \Ias excel­
lent and all parach..ltist s of the seria l s were dr opped Or.1:' t'liO p lanes
faile d to dr op parachutist s on tni.o! selected DZ' s , al.d these two planes ¥Is r e shot
down on the flil ht in a'1d prior to r eacnlng the DZ ' s . All par achutist.s jumped
from thCl se and 8 frClll one plane and 2 fro.lIl 00 otoher ev €m .. ually joined t heir
10- unit s i n the combat zan\::: . Jump cas ualites were less tl1Ull 2% c1' th:J t ot a l nUCl.ber
jwnped . The ave r J.gc time of assetllbl.y was a bout Hour f or each b att.::..licn. All
initial obj ect ivos prior to aarknLss . ku covr:: ry 01' e qui pw;nt
ove :- Fo l.lI' Pathfl11dcr pla:l'::s . : ; ::>f: rials by 15 minut e s . Three of
the planes dropped voit:lout incident on tn-.: ..>... DZ · s . One pl a.'1e Vias shot do"'n
seve ral ltil::s short of tht. DZ in tma.,i.,Y t ;;: r ritol'Y and no info rmation i s availabl e
0:1 t i.l is :Jlan;:; . (for details 0: parachut..: ,-,cmllon, s oe Annex No . 1 ) .
2. Glida!' Ecnelon : A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from
tura bases in t ho UI{ over a period of 7 days. St.:ven hundred and sixty- seven of
the s e g lide rs l anded wit :10UT.. incident on th.1 Ll . Approxinlatt:; ly 5, 000
men took of f fran t ho; UK and some 4,800 evontually th!;.ir unit s in
corrllat zan:? Sam.; 30 51ider5 are unaccount ..: d for on t illS date, practically all
of which ar e aSSur.\cd to have dropped in enen" tern.tory. Th.;: glider lift on D -I 2
was dispdrsed bl! cause of heavy f og OV>Jr th;; Channc:l and along th.;
coast . Of S Ota.; 384 s lid..: r s that took off on t hi s datd, only 4)9 landed safely on
tht! designated LZ. !Jan.y others rt;)tum.::d to the UK or on the continent in
(:nGm;y or fri.::ndly t o::. rritory. No furth..;r 5:1id.., r St; rial5 wer e flown a ft. t.: r D .J. 6,
b-lt 500 p", r sonncl a'1d ess(;.nt.ldl € :qu i }J!Il Jlt ".er e flm.. r. in by C-47 t.ra."l sport
t o th.. Bruss ",ls Airport and join·. d tht-ir units i n t n..:; co.mbat zen.., by D flO. (for
Qotc..ils of g U d"r echelon SeC Armex No . 2) .
c . Sl)abom':? Echel on : Tn;; s oJabornt: e cholon of t ht; Dl.vision consisted
of 1077 por;onnel and 444 vc hich:s of all typo:: s . 1'h1S a cnelon loaded on 0 -I 1 and
saliLd from SOUTHAi.!PTON on 0 f 2. It a rrived at Bl:J.l.CH on D .J. 3, where it 'o'1b.S
divided into two serials . The first s .3rial left to.; beach on th\: I.o.ornine of D f ;3
and arrived at BOURG-LEOPOLD on tne evcnlng of 0 f 4. It closed in t he D1vi5ion
serviCE: ar..M at ZON on evening of 0 f 5. se cond Se r ial l\,!ft OUAHA BEACH
un t h ..... of 0 -I 3 , at BOURG - LEOPOLD on 0 -I 5, and clos ed in the
Dl.viaion 3urvicd ar Uil on t hb of D f 6. (For details of seaborn>J ecno;:lon,
s t:.:: Al'ltl.. X No . :3) .
- 1 ­
a , The Division missions called ay
and railw.s.:,l'- brid6es ove r the Aa RlVEK and seiz­
ure of t!lE ni g hwa.y b:-i die OVE:r the DO:&.:;E.L ttIVlli at ST. OillE.NdODE; t.he sei zure of
thE;! highway b ri dge over the CANAL at ZON; and t h<:l seizure of EIIIDEOV l!.N
and the {.lain hignway bri dges over t ne streaas i n t !1at city. The Divisl.on objec­
tiveS Wbr t;: OV0r a: road di.=>tance of some fifteen ruiles.
b . Th€ .; 501s t Parachut (l Infantry, landi ng on t i;Q Dt- ' s ntl aI'
seized all four wi t ho.1t inc:"ae:lt . T,le 'X)2d Infant r y l ande.d near
and with one battal i on s "i zcd t..;' e r.I.ain i1i C;ro.ay brid;c n.::.ar ST . Oi;,D£N'itOiJE.
The 506 th o. l so landdo n""tl, r ZON and sei zt: d t he Canal cros3 ' , but only aft.t; [' t he
onClI'.y had bridge . The 506th seized :S:WDAOVEH s hortly no,) n the
next day .
£. L'1 an. to secure an "-'-_ :"."l· n-'1.t e crossil'lb over t he UILHEI..:,lINA
CANAL, and also to bl ock ,me..:,;. t mffic bc·.....·,COI1 EliIDHO:,EN and i1.r..HTOGEl!BCSCH, '-Jne
company of t he 502.d Vi as dispatco<; d to seize tho::! lii ;h1t'a..i bridgl.; near B_ ·T. This
comp.:my seized al.lo h<..ld thi3 bri dgl,.; for a f "f: VI hOur s, but W:.J. S drivE..n oe jus t before
dark . The cn....:I!'.y r ushed stro;"lb r e inforcements to this point, and heavy cas ualties
wer e suf fl:lrcd by both sides in sti ff fi!;; htinb t "c.. t took place on D I 1
D .; 2 in the 3tt<:mpt to sccUr.;J this crossing: . The bridge was finally blov:n by the
be foru it could be captured , but thb eneuw forc e it WclS
wiped out .
d. On th (; I;:vcning of D t 2 th: :ns-de u r ,li d on t tlo;:: brid<::e .it ZON
with tanks und scl f-pr op0 l h;d g uns . SOJ."IC dacu<:tg13 ,:;",usuc , blt t nc bridge was
he ld i ntact . Tho next morning C.n enelI\Y tnnk - inf antry a ttack Vias Illadb , but wa s
he ld off. Th.:: 506t.h, ri din.b. British tanks, made An at t",mpt to CJ.t t IL a ttuckinb
force off from thG south, but tIlC eOf;;coJ'" held k€ ;y pointG Wel <.. vent.ua lly "Iithdr ow
his for cos i n good .
.£. On the mo rning of D f 5 the enemy st;v<;red the main bdtween
VECHEL ,wd UDEN, and made a strong attempt to seizi";: t he t m:n of ril1d destroy
the b::-idges . All aVJ. i labl e of t he Division rl 8re r usned t o tho;; vicinity ,
and as arr ived t hrou.::;hout.. the day Vl er o forme d in1.. o <l. t ask force und<:r Gene ral
Mc AULIFFE and disposed to the 6nemy Confusud f i fihting continued
dur i n!5: t oo entire day and l at e into t he ru..e;ht , with infantry ana t...... nKs at..thcking
f rom s-.:v<.:rc.:.l di r ecti ons sim.ultomt: ously. FncnlY p-=ncH,r '-l. tions. w"" r ;:; made to within
500 Yf.: rds of t ilt:: bridges , but 'tlCr e beat dn back. Tll"" att.. <.ck YI.:...s
t he n:;xt morni ng , but tht:: defE.. ns"" held fin:lly . Tr.e 2d Bi:. tt.:lli on 506th th.:;n
attacke d towurds UDEN, and made :.. patrol of the Guards Armor ed DivisiOl
advancing on VECHEL from UDEN . Tht: enur.JY·' . fo r Ctld to .dthdraw t oward EP..P, and
the road. € Ey dawn t oo next G'.orr..i..I .... t..,l":: enaL' had withdrawn from t he
VECHEL area to t it..: southeast .
..£ . On the afte rnoon of D t 7 the enl::lIlY at tacked frOJ,l the: north'ole s t ,
cut the twin highway VECHEL and ST. 0.iWFJ.fRODE, and took up a d...: f cnsive
Posit- i on astride thc r oad. Tne 506 , with tanks D.ttack""d on the Mo rning
o{ D;' B i.:.nd by do. rk ha.d dr ivon t he enerny frolu al l but a. portion of this pos ition.
The next iJorning t he att ack was continued, in conjunct i on wi th British Armor ad­
v ancinf; in force from ST . OEillNrlODE, an d th.... road clear.::d .
g.. From tine of l ancing to D t 10, the (;:ncmy pr obed t he Division
sect..ors continuously, und many Sflll:i l1 skirr:ti.sh..:s occcrr ",d tJach duy .
positions , t hE: j!la. in highway, t tl.:: bridges ov e r til...: Carre.ls and rivtJ r s w.ar e s ub­
j e ct;; d to interlllltt ,mt artille ry 'll1d fli.Ort ,J.r fire . Til..! clty of EllWHOVEN Was
hO:1v ily bomboJ d on th(;! of D p0r a tions , see
Annex N
. 4) . lli: " "
• J I. "
.. • , t
4. GEN:ili AL COAlliNTS : a. . .. .. _ ... .
Q. C."'!.sualtics : From D to D f 10 thtJ casu... lti...:s of the l Olst
Airborne Divis..on were -as follows : Kill€ .!d - 373j wounded - 1436 ; missing - 547; or
a. grand totul of 2, 356 non- t..: f ftlc tives , of a tota l of 13 , 112 \'Iho the cOllbat
urea. . (For d",tai l.:d r eport of casualti£s, s.: e AnneX No . \ 5) .

- 2 ­
g. Pri soners : A t otal of 3,511 prisoners c t
Airborn.3l Div·lsion froo D t o D /10 , inclusivo. nf
£. Evacuation: 326til Airborn..; .,:edi Af arrived ill t ilt,;
CO'loat ar\.;z- in t wo ecn...lons . The f irst cons1stlne, of 52 roedl.cell craon­
:1.;1 incllldi ng em sur Gical tt.lam. : a.rrivod in 6 CG4A Gliders on ... fter ­
noon of D - DJ.,Y . The st:cond c crmlo., cOllsi s ti.l15: of 219 personnd 1.."1 54 CG
Glidl; rs, arrivlJd on trJ::l of D f 1. Immt:.idiat e13 upon t ilt;! lundint;; of tIle
first. (';ch;:. lon , a t. empor ary hospit ul set up on t. 1l(l south€ . rn of t n.::
l endlI.g First cC' .su'll ties Viere c:.t 1500 and at 1700 the fir st mu jor
surgica l opo:; r ati on purfor.r.l1d . kc. IdCO Il hc :;pi at \i aS t nkdn O\' ",r :'nd
persormel :.:nd aquipment rua·Jed . cf C3su'uti·.;s was c...rl"i co. on Ullder
good conditions . By 2400 D - Duy , I v7 been c\rj.:..i.tt ... d and trea­
t e d a t hospital. UpoP.. arrival of t he s'OlcOtld tJcntJlcll , lit r.. ... r b{;.:>.Tor ::.nd
ambul<'.:l!lcG 3Gctions ¥.'€ l'a s clnt to their r ..ssp<..:ctivc :::.nd from
r egim,..; nt.:!l and battali on a i d "las quite r .:;;p'ld . By th.. £ilOr !1ins of D t 2 ,
conta. ct was es t ablishod with the 501st at V: '-.L e.."'1d an of t.he
50th Fi{; ld Hos pitul w:...s to estnbll.:;, _..1.:':m at. VE..:'!.;F'..L. TI';;' i.ir 1 "::..d.i cal
Collecting Co.JP1.. """ij' ",st.lolish..:rj _ ....:dical Ccrrps.t1)' <::t. 1500
0;1 D f 2, 2nd in.i..t.i.;;.j. cVCi.cui\ticn bCEWl t o ...: 24th ij"1.';":'."'.ti on at
LEOPOLD. Duo::: to t a ctic".l i!rl d t ht> 1b!'6\; amount. of tr:o.1'fi moving
nortn, l ittl u l..va cJ.ation wus until Gol; D f 3, iit wnJ.ch +·.a..:Ud nor mal
eva;::uc.tion bdGc:n , On D f 3, 30 ....nd 4 - 22 t on ev c.c_.:l<.ed a ll
avaiJ.<:d.Jle CaSes to th.... 24th Ev ac\.ld. tion Hospital E. t Frum D f 3 to
D flO, immedi ate ev acuation of t ook place .
d . Air Support: In gener ... l, ro;;qu<..:sts for ai r s upport mssiolls wer e
handled satisfactorily by .Il6MS of Air Support Perty which land,;,d by Glider on
D - Day . B.... d I", transmission difficulti>..: s, and priorhy ru.ssions
r csult.tJd in many r dql1", s t...S b(: in5 r .:: j.;.ctcd or unc.blt:! to be flo....n . (See Anm...x Uo . 6
for dct ail ud r epor t) .
e. , Glider Reception : Anticipating consido;: r abl c in Ulut
a.ssembly wh", n C'. lar 5e n umber of gliders Lande d on on(;' fie:1d , Div :;lld.;:r
Nception party consisti n:; of 5 officers and 2J enl isted men f ro.ll v lr;i.o..!S unit s of
Il.Lvis20n Cafl:.e ill \lit n t.he firs t t;l i dcr eche lon on D - Dej"'. Tn ..,.'; p ·rt,y 1'unc­
tion;:; d ext r er.cly we l l :md in gr eat.. p art Vi as for thl. r · p:.ct .• a
asst;mblinc;; :)1' units .. Despi te c .:o.Nful bri<:oi L"1E; , it WlJ.S found to
.;lXp"ct t,; h do;:; r s t o I nnd near prddetarraint:d or in small t.l' e;.s or n;:;lds . The
Inost solution appears to be to st:ltiOll ullides at m.:my pcints oVer t he
l andi rig area end these 6u1d,-s go to wh0n they land;
oriclnt. t h<.m, end give th . the assembly point s e lected for the unit . 1't--.i s lolt! tnod
worked very wli:lll and in bll but 5. cases , lU1its ass..mJ.blc.d r api dly and withoUt.
f, .A.ir Force Control Unit : It is believed desirable to have a senior
officer froa t he Troop Carrier Co;:mand p.,r r:.-:. with the first f<:c nc lon of gliders in
a situation of t nis kind . He s hould be with 3 r adio set capnblo of direct
corrmun-ication ·.'lit;l a cont.rol s t ation at the depa rture airfit:lds. In this way , he
could transmit on-the -spot as to weather conditions, tho t :lctical si­
t uat.ion, rnd tm: glider thltt are clea.r for t he r e ception of 6lider
lift . It is believed many wera unne c;:;ssa rily soot down by pa ssing
ov er enemy h .. ld strong points , nnd which could n. :lVC be on dvoideQ hnd late infor­
mation b een given t ne pilots as to tne t actical situation .
g. !is€ : of Glider Pilots : need for a constitut.zd tacti­
cal t'nd admill i s t.r ativ..::: or gani zntion of glider pilotz qt.d appa r t>nt on this
o r C'.tion . Tneor e tic:111y tho:! pilots joined th.:;ir t c. ctJ.c ;. l or gam.za tion
l:mding and opE:.n:tud undGr thc s enior offic.:: r of tru...t. org :mizc.tion . Actua lly, it
was fo r anyone officer to control l<'ll'"ge numb.:: r of glid8r pilots
who arriVed in t he combat area. There 'IIer" fi1 ,Ulj' .. of pilots
lo;l avll15 t hc; ir assigned are ..:.s and dis uppll e ring . Glid",r pilots He r o;) for loc':l.l
of Vil UOUS inst<i llations ne:lI' tht;: L2, the Division CP, and the Division
Servi ce rtr o;la , und in (Jxce llt;:l1t work S<:vdral
voluntarily joined conbat troops and purticiputcd in gr ound f ibhting in the
vi cini ty. It is bcli...vcd tna t an organiztJ.tion in whicn thd chain of cOluJnnnd is
strongly forgo;ld is .;:;sscntiul if glid0r pilots a!"ci to bl.; USed mos t. in
h . ResuPPlY : See An.'1ex 7.
5. A final r eport will be submitted when the Di vi sion par­
ticipation in the Pollanc callpaign .

'nle parachute echelon ot the Division began
its drop at gSil
r n
,\J September 17, 1944. The 501st Parachute .Infantry" at ' t W
Engineer Battalion dropped on tw . ; on .. .. , 0 ...
VECHEL and the other some :3 miles nortt;Mest of VEe. l ers 't:le
1st Battalion, landed on DZ nAil west of VECHEL, proc e to' that town 811:': :
1500 had seized all initial"objectives which were the two Highway Bridges
t he two Railroad Bridges over the HIU.EMS VAART CANAL and the Aa Xiver. No
r esistance was encounte'red on thi:r DZ. The 1st 'Battalion landed on DZ l1A_P J
in the vicinity of KASTEEL, assembled and reached VECH£L by 1700. The 1st .
Battalion received some resistance from scattered troops in the
of the DZ. Some resistllIlce from scattered enemy groups was enoountered lii the
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the town was made by the 'enemy .
At dark tht::! regiment was well dug in and set to defend the town against any
enemy attack. All bridges wert seized in-tact. The Engineer Deta chment iEme.
di ately began the ' construction at a second bridge across VA.ART
Ul order to permit traffic if the situation so
The 502d Parachute Infantry with three platoons 326th Al.rborne Engineer
Battalion attached, landed on Dl "B" without opposition and all b....
wer e by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded to ST. bnd after
a skirmish, seized the town and its objective
the bridge the D<l..it>S1. !lIVER,
in-tact. This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had t he
well in hand. Canparv tlH" of the 3rd BattC:l.l.ion proceeded to the Bridge
at BEST; secured it initially against little enemy reSistance, ,but was f or ced to
witndraw just before dark by reason oi a strong counteratt ack. 'rhe r emain­
der of the 3d Batt<:ilion was then dispatched to join I'HI! Compal1Y, Wit h or ders to
s ecure the bridge the morning. The remainder of the went into
Divi Sion Reserve in the vicinity of WOLFSlWINKL.
The 506th Parachute Infantry landed on DZ nc" without ener.iy opposition:
Companie s of the 1st Battalion inunediat ely vlithout formal ;Issembly in '
an effort to secure thl:! three bridges over the HilHEUHNA CANAL in t he vicinity
of ZON they could be blown by the enelll3'. ' Scattered r esi stance was
encountered before r eaching the main bridge and forward el uments weru wi thin
100 yards of this bridge when it was by the retreating enemy. (It was
found that thu other two bridges had been blown several dgys bef or e) . The
Regiment began the crossing of the Canal by various and by 2400 t he
entire regiment was on the south side of the Canal and had 8 , bri dgehead exten­
ding some 2, 000 yards.
The Command Echelon of Division Headquarters jumped with the 502d Para­
chute Regiment and established an initial Command Post at ZON. SOJll(: 7P gliders
Command personnel, the Heconnaissance ,Platoon, Signal and
Me di cal personnel , and some transportation f or the combat landed on the
LZ about one hour after parachute landings. Overall time of landing of <'1.11
parachutists and gliders was one and one-half hours. Communication WaS estab­
lished with all elements except the 501 by dark on this date . ,
The 501st Parachute Infantry continued the defense of VECHEL throughout
the day. Communication was establl.shed with Division at 06eX)'. SeVer al light
enemy attacks were r epulsed, but no major effort ,to retrieve tho town was made.
The 1st Battalion of the ;o2d Parachute Infantry continued t o hold ST. OEDENkODE
and likewise r epelle-d' sever al light enomy attacks. The 3rd B,'lttali on of the
502d attacked at first light ·in an effort to r etrieve' Bridgu at BEST,
but suffered heavy casualties' at t he hands of tile Cllt.lll\Y ,wlii ch had been
strongly r einforced during the night. Tne 2d- Battalion was th,m order ed t o
as sist thto! 3rd Batt.alion ill Se'cqring ' the bridg€ls. The Battalion penetr at ed to)
the outskirts of BEST; but W<.I'S forced ,to withdraw by heavy., artillery, mortar, ( \L­
and small arms fire , and' t .bok ' up. cr on th,; l eft of the 3rd \. 0,
Battalion. At dark the entire regiment 'less tho 1st Battalion was in a
position e<1 st of the highway f acing the enerD3" def '" I
at BEST. .
. ,
,i \
- 1 ­
Tho 506th Para.c-hut:ci Iirfanti-y,. 3r.d Battalion laading, .advanced

on EIUDHOVEN it first light:· The ·Jrd:.Ba.t tal i .on was held . up at ·\'K>ENSEL, one mile
north of the city; by' determined enemy r esi st.:tnce. The .2d Battalion made a wide
envelopme,nt t9' e ast cir the city, Qut.flanked· the entllD,}r- defep.ses , ana.
the town at Contact made a British ·Reconnaissance Patrol at .
1215 north of ' t"he city'; and wi. t h the mainr Fo-rcei3 .at 1900 . south of

city. At darK t he,'RegiLlent· \'I llS in contr.ol of · thc.. entj.rtl. city and v. as in
position the.: l.fupbrtant in t q; c1t.y wer e main
objectivt:s . . ",; . ., ... ..
, . I·· ·. '. , . . : . :... .
At aQout 1530; soma 428 glidt:l rs c:..rrying t he Jz:d 01' 327th,
t he Iihgincer hatte.liorl, thb"t' \lClaindcr o'f t he . f,Je qi ca1. Compani e.s .
el ements of t he J77th Pai'athllHf Ficid Artil l ery Bat:t;alion, . and. supply
and c.dministr"tive vehicles, arrived in th\.! comhc: t arca. Thfi:! Jrd Bat t al J.G:l of
t he J27th was assignad thE:: missi on of providing local protection for L1. and
tne Diyisio.n service ar ea.
, ,
British' Forces r e'ached the south side o,r thE: C.i;U1al at ZON "I-t. <torruximattl.ly
2100 and immcdiat cJ..y the cons truction of' a acros s the .."
D,I 2
.. ,-.
The bridge across the Canal wa3 ' COOlplet ed during th..:: night m.d 'at 0615 .
leading el ement s of th.;! Household Cavalry and Guards Armored Division b<::gan
crossing. T!1ese' S aJTC l eading p....ssed through gT. OEDENitODE and VEGHEL
by 0645. One Squadr on of the 15/ 19. atta ched the 506th EINDHOVEN.
and one Squ.i:ctron t o the 5020 at . ZON • .. , .
, , ,
ncn , COfllPany of t oe' 501st w'a s order ed' to. send ont:l platoon t o .DL'JlZ.i{ . Report:
frcw this company indicated the .t:ifenw ,.;as hl' SOt'D.<o! forc e i n and .around this t own.
The 3d Batt..l lion of the 501st 'W ;;!.S order.cd ,;0 .from VECHEL to EERDE and take
up a strons. 'def ensive position' at that poin'40 . The ' remainder : of 'the 501st con­
tinued in u cf.osc in defense of VECHEL and during ti'k! <iuy .thu 2d Batt:a1ion \
r epulsed an enemy atta ck fr<:xn the .nor·thwc;st· estimRt ed a t oVo,;:r 250 Infantrymen.
During the I nt e evening
Company 11£11 waS driven buck froin its out post position
aoout 200 yaros by a. well executed .night att hck by. cnt.:my para.chuti-::t.s .
First Battalion of t he 502d continued in the ·def.ense of 8T. oiOENRODE.
The 2d attr. cked at· 0600 · in another attempt to .t he highway br idge
at BESTl. This att'ack was 'rtlpulsed enlllAY. At .14+5 t he l ess
1st r einfor ced. by one .t.hc·•. Huss ars., l auncht:ld a
co-or di nat ed. against "Uie !jOeruy ·posi tiDn• .• Tlus att ack wa li. ve:r y
and the obj e c"4Y.c ' at ' 1000. '. Fifteen destroyed, .1,056 .
pr isone r s t<lk:en
c::n d over' 300 ' ""ne&3 deadl left· ,orv the after , t.his battle .
'. ": \ " " ,,,,, , " , ' n ,·, .. . .
The $06t n Pur achute . and we s t
of EINDHOJEN and continued ext ensive patrols with the 'squadron' of the 15/19
Hussars .. '. .,. . . .. ' ":­
. -, :. . or' . • " . , '
A li'f1; · began:.to ut ... the l,st and
3rd Bnttalio'ns of }27th
tho Blst ttJe Parachute
Field Artil.1c.ry Battilli6n (l:.ess and the 907tli ' and 321st Glider
Fidd Artill ery Battalions, Duc: to f og 'enoountereQ 'only a portion of
these unit s arriv-ed . Element3' the 327th wer.e gi yan ,the.. mission of protecting
the g lider ·i.analrig f i eld 'and ,a'S si'sting' t tlt.' · att,ack . of t.i"ia.. s02(f if necessary . At
about 171:>0 ' enemy t anks' were 'appro...obiI?g .ZON· fn:>Jli.·.the sputheast and C:t
faw Iat.ct se'vcr a l t 'arik-s 1QP}.lroacJo:led, w.i.thi-A ;a .. ya r ds C!f .t he ZON
bridge und shelle,d 'n . was
and tho tan.ks "Wl.thdrl:iw ..g;ll.dcF l e.ndlng fl.eld'
Two t anks .... ... ., .. ....,' . I .. . ' .
: . . ... . " ')":.)1' . : ' : ' A .' ' . : ' '"f' ' ,./-. •. .•
Df 3 , . .. ': .' ... .. .. :·..f: ... · 'I'!; , " • ... ..
• . • : '; i. ;.. •..• : ' ; , ' .'. \. ' •• ......... . ... .,
,P.:i.:Il.ision Command Post moved to ST. OEDENRODE at 1206: '.,
During the morning.. 1st Battalion of the 501st att acked .:m.d s ei zed
DINTrn . Four hu ldred Md' action. The 2d
" , .
, .
• •

Battalion continued a clos e- in def ense of VECHEL. The Jrd Battalion conducted
extensive p atrolli..1'lg to thE.! n ortn and west f r om a strong point at EErtDE.
1st Battalion of the 502d continued t he def ense of ST. OE.DENROD3 .
DJ,lring thC3 afternoon tho 2d and 31'0 Ba ttalions ..Qrp.eZ'ad t o pr oc Gcd to. ST.
OEIENitODE and t he Regiment charged '1dt h t he of the ST. area.
By 2:i.OU t h.:: a'l tiN Rcsiment was cl osed in the area a'1d had taken up strong
defensive posit .ions .
During t he night 1st Battalion of t he 506th was to pr oceed to
ZaN i n ord..::r to assi s t i n the der an se cf t ,'_ :..:Qtl against cxpcct '::d
enemy attat:k . 'llie P'-+-.t ali on v/{::1t into at 060J and in conj unction wi t h
el ements of the 1s"':. 3C'i:.taliO:l of t he G<.'1. d one company of t he 3 26th
th", c:.i" on t tl':; b:..ldge l aw1cu .... d by t,le 107th Panze r Br i gade at about
0630. The 2l! Bat t alicn of 506th, riding tanks 01 t he squadron of t he 15/19
Hu.ssa:::'s , rear aIle. a sharp on£agcm.... nt t ook place a t NUNEN .
The 3rd Battal ion of tOE: 506th rt,:;mained i n EINDHOVEN as rl.eservc . At.
0900 the, 4l+th Armored Hcgimcmt was attacned to t.ho Divi sion and proc{)ed€;d towa rd
h'F,Tl.:mm L'1 a f urth cr attempt to destr oy the e n(;JUj' attacki ng t h" ZON bri dge .
I nt er mi ttent t ank a.'1d i nfant ry fighting took place t he r emainder of t rHJ
The 2d and 3rd Bat talions of t he 327th r t: liev.:; d t he 502d of the def ense
of the s ector east of ZON and t he landing and Divis ion servi ce The
321st Glider Fi eld Artill<; ry Battalion was att ached to t he 327th and fire d
missi ons in suppor t of that mit duri ng t he d<\y . At 1500 Battc:l ry "B" of t he 377tt.
arri-lcd b;:r parachute and joined its Batta1.::.m. The 377th then move d t o ST.
OEDENP.ODE in suppor t of t l:e ;02d Infantry . Battery nA11 of the Blst
Ant i- Tank Batta::' i on was attached to t he 327th and Battery nc" to the ; 02d.
Bat ter-.f uB" r Gro.ained in defense of t he ZON
The 1 st Bat talion of t he 5015 t crossed t ne WII.I...aS VAART CANAL in the
early f.1.or nin:; at HEESkIJK and conducte d Gxtensive patrolling during t he day . At
IB45 an attack WllS made on SCHIJNDEL and the northwe st s ection of th e town was
s0i zud at approxirnatdy 2215. The 2d Battalion r emai n.:: d at VECHEL. The 3rd
Batt al ion moved at 1745 t o the wast a nd cut t he 5T. Ol£DENrtODE - 5CP..IJNDEL Road
i n the vi cJ.ni ty of t he rai l r oad station.
The 502d Par ac hut e Infantry, 'nith t;1_ 377th Parachut e Fiel d Artille ry Bat­
talion at tached , continued to GAPand its pOSitions in t hE: ST. OED9.nWDE
area . "B" Compal'1Y of the 1st Battalion a strong enemy attack fran t he
northwes t i n thoJ e arly aftur noon , but its position .
The 1st Battali... n of t .le .506th its de f ensl.! of the ZQN bridge .
The 2d Batt.alion wo r ki ng with tho 15/19 H... ssars and the 44th Tank at ­
tacke d t he ene'ny nE:aI' NEDEltilETI'EN. The enell\Y witndr ew in t h<l of chis attack
and at l20J cont a ct was lost. The 2d Battalion went into a def l:lns ive position in
t he vi ci nity o f TONGElliE for the night . The 3rd Battalion was order e d to ST.
OEDEl'ffiODE as Divitiion rte sarve . . The RegiJnent was given a orde r that it
would pr obably move to UDEN on tho; follc,..dng day.
At 0300 the 3rd Battalien of tile 506th Parachut e Infantry closed in the
ST. OEDENRODE area, moving up from EINDHOVEN. At 0500 order s wer .; received
that this b a ttalion, as we ll as all ot.h(! r ul cruents of the r egiment , would move
to UDEN l;ithout d el ay . Movement was to be by mot or and marching . The 3rd
Bat tall.on b.Ggan its Jilove to UDEN, by marchill
, at 0900. '!he 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their pi e cemeal, as transportation became aVailable
during t he day .
The advance de tachment of the 506tn, consisting of approximately 150
officers and from Regimental Hea dquarters and other units of the r egiment,
pas s e d t hr ough VECHEL at 1000. Immediate ly after passing through the enell\Y cut
t he ma.J.n highway betwe en VECHEL and UDEll , and this detachment bc catJle isolatod
in UDEN.
- J ­
Tho 107th Panzer Brigade, after withdr awing f r oJu ,its attac , on t he JON
bridge on D f 4, moved cover of dar kness to lHP, and morning
of D f 5 launched an all- out a t tack to s eize town of VECHEL and the
bridges th<.,l r c . E.. '1erny forc e s in this attack He r a \::st imatud as battall.ons
of 53 troops , support,-d by 30 t o 40 tanks and a rtillery .
By 1200, t ho 20 Battalion 50lst thtl V£;(11EL - 'liEP Road, was being
hard Additional troops started tOhard V£CHEL ano llcAuliffe
was placed in cowroand of troops in t.he area and cnarg;d witn de.fc!l1sc of till.; tonn
and bridges , ht s.bout 1400 t anks cut the highway nortn.... i:ist of Vl:;Ci-iEJ., and
dc.stroyud transport pu-kt:. d on th>3 high,my . Bat t.ary II B", AT Hattali!)n,
arriv>Jd at the Sa.410 ",em, i nto act- i on on t.n e higm,cy· U1d ilnm..:d.io. t cly
oyad a !..ark V tank 1ew:lir.o attack . Tno 2d 506 took posi t ion on
t :ll.. l uft or' the. 2d Battulion 501, \\-1...th t hu 1st 8<:.tta1ion 401st G1i d:: r Infantry on
i t s 1.:. f t . \ ,ith t n .... !).ss:'st .:mc.;. of British ... rti1lcry g!ltr.<Jr .::d froru. th...
t he. attl;l.\:k f r ot::. cJiP .... d<.rk. At about l40U ,jm..my infnntry, '"lith tC:1flk
s upport, u.t't.acT • .!o no.:: anel fl·O!".;. 1.11.... nor thwl.;st t o'o'IU'd high\\UY briclgt:.
soutnwes 't. 01 VECrlEL. COJ!":pu.·..({ 118
, 506 , \'Ihich WCl S i n VEX::tiEL on its to
was turned ar ouno , nd...r t.ik bridg.... and r e pul sed the. a t tack, "Iith
as sistw.ce of e l oclUl ts o f thiJ 44th Tunk rt.ogi t:lt)nt .
D-<lrifl-t; the t il... t!llcfilY kWlc"'l..;d I1ttl,. ck .:.g:linst t ilt: t OVln from
tht.> :l arth, und w..;rE;: fin.::J.1y h21t..;d just. ,0.,: tne ruilroad brld
.:.. by
of t he. 2d B..l.t.tallon, 501, and on... u..' uti
COIJp.ll1.r J 506, Vlhich h .....d t aken up
;.:. c... f.:nsl.v_ posit..:'0.1 tIllJrC '"" S:1o rt tiui.i.l 0... £01·" .
Th..: ,mcrr.y Nn...wcd t hci.r att acks from tnu south .:md SOUt.hUilSt. d...rl.!1g t nt.
lat. ... aitl..rnoon, but by noVi ., ddition" l ,:.rrivco and "nt...::y ...
By d....r k th... 506 1st ana th..:. cut off at UDEN) ,
tho 327th Gll.d er lnfar, try , Division rtt.connal.ssa,ncc Pl '!t oon, t ho.; 32lst Glider
Fh.ld i\l' t i llcry Batt ery "BII , 81St ....1 toe. 2d Bi:..tt.u.lion 501st
Parachute lnf:mtry, uni t he First 44tn fiR-d <:.rrivc d
ana foraod thll task force unde r i.l.cA1.H.u'FB chi!l'g\.!d '"lith ,101d:ne; tho::: V.l!:CHEL
e.r .J:l. .
In the mC3ntim-- 1st of t ho 501 dawn 3l1d oc­
cupi ..,o ;111 of SCHIJNDEL by 0915. Some prisoners y.' l.l r t1 t oken in t illS opi; r .:it ion .
About 1200 or der s weN r o:lcllivcd for tho 1st t.o proco... d to n!ilBOSt..:n,
sciz..; t he town, .md previdu protoction for VECHEL. Tne
was cornpl ... t e d by 1 700 , !ll1d tht;! b,'-l ttalion t ook up Ii strons dcftonsiv{: posi t i on in
and a r ound th,J town . The 3rd B!::.tt<ilion, which h.:1d adVJ'lCdd t ow:lI'd ::iC!"fIJNDLL i:1
Joo r ni.ne:: and forc es with t h.:: 1st E.l.t'L<l lion in s ei zi ng SC::IIJNDLJ., was
ord",r .::d to El!1tDE, ..-mor c! u. took up t! d..:fl.>nsl.v ,- posl.t.).on fro.rn t he
w.zs t.
Th.; 502d L1f ilntt'l' its dcf..msi ve PQsitions during the d.v .
i!ouGnts of 1st Battulion cade wi th j r d 501 south of
SCHIJNDliJ., w d forc ... s in clc61lir16 out sev_r 11 .:nt.:Jl\i' strol16 points a l ong tne
SCHIJNDEL - 5T. O'';DEllrtODE hiin.. ", .
Thu 32?th Glider I nfi..nt r y ord<.lT J' ,.'t 0930 to proceed to VECHEL, eond
mOVEmle nt oogan a t 1030, t hoJ 3 r c 3att:llior.... .;.rucl: .::.nd th... 1st and 2d Eatt..ll ions
by marching . Th.... 1st and 3rd Bat talions ...:r... co.mitt...'d on both sideS of t n..,
upon :',l'ri val; 2d Bat l; alion continu... d into ..nd bcc<:1J!o.c t ...sk
forc e; r ... sc;rvc . of Vt,;CHEL W...l.S h<:ciVily slll.: llt.d during l .::.t ..: ::fttornoon
and .:lllrly (;v..:lning .
Soon a f 'l..er davlO tl noulY launch<; d smnIl s s <.:
sivc posit1ons s outheast of VEGHEL.. -..dt.t1Olil.. difficulty. ,i,. "
Durirt" t h,,- ni gnt plullS \'j <.:! r oJ drawn up which c.:.r. lla d r aj) _ Brit: · s h
r ec.:.ll .:d from toc NIJ1.iEGEN :.J.Nd, to on frolil join forc e s with
2d Buttalion of thoJ 506, which W,.s t o advelJ'lC (; [rOOl t OHerd UDEN , .:'.nd
cl.....' r t.h o r o:z.d in ordt> r that til .; f10\1 of tr Sfic Lli6ht. b... r l;sum""d . r'olloHing t hat,
t hl.. Armorl.l d Br ig.1dc W,J. S to swing s hhrply south :uti cut off t he ,.melD,,}' CSC'-lPv route
through ERP.
da fe­ -t. !

Due to_ that part of tne plan calling f or the
advance Tn forc e and encircling movehicnt of British Armor ed Brigade was not

carried The 2d Battalion of t hc 506 contact with a patrol of t he Ar­
more d Erigade nor- theast of VEGHEL aoout 1700 . By that. ti.ute had begun
hi s withdrm-.al, a:1d soon cant.act Was lost.
. tho' f.l?rr:illg th e lst and 3rd Battalions of , t .1e
the l.r QGlcn31.Vtl POSl.tl.OI1S we st and north of EERDE rns . ..... 'e
wit h ":.he 3rd Battalion generally alone; the ratir e h t t 1Jj'
tho ls" ""T.t ation from ENlDB d<lo SOll"h " 0 tho m:9ft liYt 'B '.t;\Jubli .'
continu,;d the closu in dcf""nse of Vi!.GHSL, with the ;06
to ncrtht!3.st and south . Th..: 327th lIas assi6l1od a d(lf.Jr.,:,i' /o sector nort:. of
VECH1:t .
The 502d Parachll':.G L'1fantry cont.) '1" :.ts defense of :3T. y!i t h
377t .1 Pi::U' 3.chut..; F·.t. Artillery i3at l"" in c!J.J't.!et
f.:i.lri.1.i,i t.,_ cisy s .'.t h ·) ... i d.;:r s l'- rial bri nging r ...r;.a.i.lIi06 'Jlcmcrl ts of
t he- 32"' t::t GlidE:i r I nfantr:' a.,;:. til.:. 907th Glid0r t'i.:: ld Ar till",ry Bat talion . T'nese
troops H-.! r u r::ov ... d iror.J..... to the aro;:a , and tno;: <;07th }' i tlld Al'tilltlF,f
Bat ta.lion was p1ac\;;d in diruct sup!J ort. of t • .I1..: ,Olst Parae hut;; I nfantry. Tne 321st
Glider Fi eld Al'tilh:ry Batt-alion was to t hoJ 506t n Parachut.e Infantry,
and f H ed SC\I:.l'al I.lissions duri n,; the day.
At dawn r econnaissa:lC{; as fer as ERP :i.lxi i eat ,.ld tht) cnel:\Y had made good his
withdl'6.Wal to th<:l south..last } and th'>! area \"las clear of troops . nl:; 506th
Parachute hfantry, ...Iit h t he 321st Gli d(; r Fl.;:ld hr till 0ry va.ttal:Lon and B&.tt",ry tlB!
8lst AB loT Battal l.on att.ached , was ord.; r ;.:d to t o t<ikc ov... r tne defens\} of
t hat
TIl.: Ol ....ision Cotmland Post was (.loved frOfil 3T. to VECHEL at 1000 .
The: 327th Glide r Infantr y was assigned of VECHEL, with
t he 907th Glider Fi 0ld Artill ery Bat talion in 5cncl r al The 2d Battalion
501 was r .... l ei... s ed from. its ddensiv.... assibfll'Jcnt i n V':;CHEL and joined its r egiment
in t hb EEhDE area, as H.egime::ntal hcs.... rvo;: . Battery !lAlI, 8ls t AT Battalion, conti­
nue d a ttucht! d to the 501s t, wi th thcl 907th Gliccr .Fi el d .f\ rti l:cr'"! in direct suppor t
'The 502d continued t.he defense of tnl.l ST. OE.DEN!WD!l: aNa. Bhttcl rics 110
"E", and "FII , th e Anti- aircraft of t...'1c dlst AT Battalion , arrivo.;d in the
s eabornll eche l on and to prot <J ct Division S,-rvicc Ar:Ja northwe s t
of ZOO .
A.t 1000 the enet:!y l aunched a series of probin.-J at.-tacks .?..gainst the 50lst
d""f<3ns ivtl position , IlOVing f rot:!. SCHIJlJDEL toward Two of the
502d v;cri; dispat ched t o KOEVE.rtING to int .::;rcept this forc o, r eportl..d to bv two tankE
and about forty infantryl,ICn. ';1'nq iJn<!my for cO;.! movlld r upidly, howevEr , and Here
aliilOSt in KOLVi'lt I N"G '.'In....n Gompanit.ls !lO" and IIn
of t n ..: 502d arriv<.:d . 'ilia two COnl­
pani .::;s held KOb."1JRiUNG, but oould not pr.... v""nt tnt. ...nemy from cutting th..;
northwcst of KOhiVii:kmG just bofori..! da rk. Under covl.> r of untlmy built
up hi s f orces with tanks , solf-propell ed aitIlJ,. 1c: , a.-w f airly i nfantry
using' corridor he: had f ound .... n t nc.. :Dl st and to", 502d . .
o ..t 8

tho ni ght tlHl 506th with Bat ter i c s UBI! 8J.s t AT Battal ion, and the
321st Glider r' i uld Art illt;ry Bat talion att a cn-d d, was ordl.. r od to return to VEl.!HEL
from UDE!"! are/:!. . · bl.!gc:.n at Q300, and. dayli g ht t hese unit s WE. rc just
cast of VECHEL. At 0915 t he 506, with one squadron 44th Itoya l J1.&gi.rnen-t
a t1:.<lckod the enemy at KOEV.21t I NG. The utt... CK f ...,vora bly for
S0100 2 , OCO yards , wh'::n botll nttacki."cl: battalions (form3tion , 1st and 3rd B...I.tt....l ion
th", main roed) were pinned by art lilury
sJml l Ul'ms fi r a} 3I1d fir... frol:;' t anks dug in i..I.lone; t ru rOllct... Thl.! 2d
th..n ordcrad to llX<.:cut.) b wide of enell\Y ! s :
its mOVCl.l....n t nt 1400 . I n thw os.::Ilt i m", el t:ment s of i ' , ' l.:tlr
. -;w'U
- 5 ­
t . - .
strong aroored force s , bega'1 an a"dvan ce froe. tne south . The SOlst and Coopanies
"DtI and !t all of the ;02d assisted by providing bases of fire for the at.tackinG
f or ces . darkness t he eneL\Y hao been cleared fraj all but a very s.:tal l area
s outh of r oad .
The 502d continued its def ense of the ST. OEDE:'JrlOD3 area , the 327th i t s
de fens e of the V3CHSL area, a:1d the 5Ol st. its defens e of t!le area. All
t hree r egi.i.1ent s had several s uall scale ene.v att.acks launched against tneir posi­
tions durJJ1b the day.
The 506th resUL1.ed t he att. ack soon after daylit;! nt , and by 0900 had dr iven
t he no r t h of t he hiKhway and LBde contd.ct wit h t !l:! 501st on the right . The
Britis!1 for ces conti nued t he attacr<: to t he :1orth, out. t.le 506th and
Companie s ir D" and. Utili of the 502d. At 130 .... '.:. .. e 506, ·.dth at. tach:r. ents Vias ordered
to r eturn to the UD=:,N area . n It; i.l ovement ',. ..:ot:lpletec by 1700 .
The it s defe nse of the 5T. area, Cor.lpD.llies no" am
"Hit r eturlll.ng t o Regin.ental cont rol at l50t. .
The SOlst and the 327th continued their de f ensive cissions , both
r epel1il16 s:.lall scale ener.\y attacks d.rriIl6 the day .
D /10
No change in unit dispositions . Several eneJJ,Y inf l.ltration attempts on
front of 501st and 327th repelled.

- 6 ­

Di visl. on HOEdquer ter s
Hq Co & h!P Plat oon
5 01st }"'erac!'.ute I nfantry
5 02d Parachut e Inf antry
5 06th Parachute Infantr y
327th Glider Infant ry
4015 t Glider rnf an'try
321st Gli der Fiel d Art i llery Bn.
907th Gl i dEr Fiel d Arti llery Bn.
377th ?arechute Fiel d Ar tillery Bn .
81st .AS Antiaircraft Battcl ion
326th AS :Glgineer Battalion
l O! s t Airborne Si gnal Company
426th Airborne Quar termas t er Co.
eOl s t .AS Ord Uei nt Co .
326th AB Medical Company
Hq &Hq Btry . Div . Ar ty
lOl s t AS RecoJmai s s ence Platoon
Kill ed
\"founded ~ . ! i s s i n g
2 2
4 1
338 65
450 75
137 159
64 26
17 98
· 4
21 1
41 12
1 8
1 o
o 2
2 2
7 5
1 12
ANNEl( 00 . 5

Air SuPport Request; 101 'liB
Thl'u 26 Sept, 1944
No . Tine of He uest Area and Ull:t ur.o of Tc.r et
1. 20 0555 Jl r !!1cd Recon a er !iu..,e"', Nl"!der­
2 .
7 .
9 .
20 sept 1?00
22 Sept llCP.
22 Sopt 1315
22 Sopt 1522
23 Sept 0610
24 Sopt 0905
24 Sept 1740
24 Sopt 1745
25 Sopt
\"jet ten and Helrnond. T
l"C"?<,rtec1 t:nd e. t tack r ted
on Zon .
Tnc Recan r oed froa Bokst el
t o Best and r oad E from Oil' schut
t o Best . Tpr.ks r eported Ir.oving:
t owe.rd Best.
areo 431.<27 t o 1.£1<.17 F
t o 496.;uS N/V: t c (Nunan
t o Eeekstraat). 200 t!...nks :.'nd
v cli11clLs ..
Beitb roud from Beckel ,,:e5t. to
Er p. 400 t vnks Uld vehicles .
Tec Reen 5240 t o 5840 t o
5234 t o 5834 . Bookel l nd
S/fl of Volkel ) . Cc'nc !'Jntr: tion of
t rnks rnd vehi cles .
Arr.lcd Recon Udt::n to vachel .
30 t r nks und inff ntry on
Ar med Recon c.ret Ht ,·V":'!.. . Erp ,
Bockel nnd Kr('.rnJ:lr... '_ccn­
trr.tion t - nks r nd v. •... .
Arncd Reccn er ct 5632 t o 5641
t o 5932 to 5941. Tf'nks :o nd
vehicles .
Ar med Reccn 1000 yd radius
E 425369. Tr nks , vehiclos
rnd r rtillery moving S/E.
Armed Roccn Schijndel
I:.r mcd Roccn er c:" St. Michiol s
Gost el t o Schijnccl t o Di nthLr
to Berlicuo,T"nks , vehicilis,
r.nd infl' ntry.
Not r evorted
Not r e?ortcd
Messege r eceived
1310 I1 T(.r get
mat ed tin:e: of
rivQl t o follow. "
o cessage.
on nccount
of weat her. Uo
r usults r eoor ted .
Not r eportt:ld .
Pos ition of our
troops r equest ed .
tie informed 1000
yd s:'fet y li.:ni t .
Mission crncelled
by G3 -t l655.
l!.t1;lcd of orell
for pin-point
t: L::t er
mess"'gE. s""id oissio;
r efused- friends in
".r£U. •
Not r t!ported
Postponed on
c ccount of ViCf t her.
Not. r eported
No . Time of Request Ar er "nd N" t urc of T r g(.; t
12. 26 0744 Bomb N of Ccr.d in gr i d f or r L'f.
squr...res 4340, 44J9 A539, smoke on
::: I so villi..gos of BeW', Dinthor could not corply.
rnd Hces,djk . T: "' Baug r. t t.- eked [ t
t'.rtilbr"/ ,mel infrntl'.\ . 1045 . Civilirns
r uport 8 HunE
Our nit­
nCss (lc..scr ibod
B.- l -..nc& of
not r eported .
Not e-- The how' in t he t ii:! ... of is t he timf.: t he rnessrc(:; W'l". S 1 cknowlet1.ged by"
t he Net Control 3t· ticn . The ,Ir s much r lier but
f.uc:: t o t r' nsaitting !l ifficult ies t h(; NCS coulc' not be or t ho l!lcsst'gc. '.'irS
not cl cl' rly r eceivcc' . 1. 11" !""upport n!isLions l ....t (. r t hnn 2h sept (J]44 '.'Gr e h·· 'ndleC
t hru Srit i sh ch"nnc1.s . Our nes claSen )0 Sept 2400 .
- 2 ­
• •

1. Following is a report of all resup,l lids oolivONd by parachute and

glide r to the l Ol s t Airborne Division in opor ation Uarket :
• . D f 1
( 1 ) 'l'Ncnty- two ( 22) glidors, CG- 4- A, to DZ lr\,tr .
Rati ons , type UK11
Battery, BA- 37
Batt ery, BA- 38
Batt ery, BA- 39
Batt ery, BA- 40
BattEry, BA- 41
Battury, BA- 48
Battery, BA- SO
Vlirc, \1- 110 on re. - 4 (32!t lililes)
\jire , h-1.30 on DR-4 (24 failt.ls)
Carbine , cal .. 30
Cal .•30, AP, 8/clip
Cal. . 30, AP- Tr (4-1) belted
CaL .45, SU; and Pistol
60mm Mortar , HE
811Ml MortarJ ( It )
Dextrose , btl.
Sodium, Citrato, box
Sulfanilamide, box
dist . box
Plasma, pkg .
Bandage , gauze , box
Cotton, pkg.
Plaster, adhesive , apl .
Splint, basswood, s at .
Splint, ArIlt' klg Ring , ea.
Splint, wire ladder,
Pentothal, sodium, box
Alcohol, btL
Morphine , box .
Sulfadiaz1n6, pkg .
Band&gG, plaster of paris, ctn.
Dressing, first - aid, large, ell .
Dressing, first- aid, SJllC!. U, e...
wool, OD, bU.
Litter, foldl.ng , lll w.unw.l, ea.
ru;cov <RED
7, 668
7, 668
540 540
48 48
48 48
20 20
60 60
168 168
65 65
12 12
24, 000
24, 000
80 ,000

14,000 14,000
2 1,15

1,,0 lijO
120 120
240 240
..sO IJ<O
360 360
2, 040 2, 040
480 480
480 480
120 120
240 240
600 600
720 720
1,440 1,440
l dv 180
00 60
1'Oi< D f 1
- 1 ­
P ffiCli'.N'l'...GE.
l W",
l 00:t
l OU);

100' ..

l OOp

l CXYp

, .
(,2) ";r\e nundred
(by p., rachute)

, ; .,cl,it1';.;c.,.,ioSTffi
Rations, . type "A" iJ",4OO 3, 480 24 ..1 2 , 3bV 1, ,00 63 . 5
Gasolinl:!, gel s . 1,260
125 '1 . 9
200 100 50 .
Dl 1I ,"
17. D
. 11
56 . 0
Battery, IL.-37 300 o 0 75
o o
Bett.;ry , BJI.- 38
o 0
125 ' ..
o o
Batt_,ry, 8....-39
o 0
Batkry, BrI- 40 50 o 0
Bntt£ry, BA-41 15
o 0
Bat t :.ry , 811.-48
29 100 ,
o o
Bc.tt ... ry
o 0 20 o o
Battery , 0 . .,.- 30 500 o 0 100 o o
o o
"_ir,; , i, - 110 on 00- 4 (Lli l ... s)
11 24. 4
on Dr- 4 (clli::! s)
2H .3
,lire , ;11 - 1.30 on Ilt- B (ulildS)
5 5
100 .
Radi o, SCR- olO
3 1 .3
Radi o , SCR- JQO- n
o 1 o o
Radio, SCR-536 16 o \J 4 o o
3Ot- b94
o 0 1 1 100 .
Mino SCR- 625
o 0 1 1 lDO .
15 o U 1
l '
Switchboard, BD-71 1 1 lOu.
1 1 100.
Mast Suction , MS - 49 10 o 0
u..... s t Saction, US- 50 10 o 0
lA..:i.ntlln21lCll Equip ., liE- 53 1 o 0
B.:t t ... ry , B.i- 2
o 0
Battl".r.:r , &.-23 10 o 0
Battery , BA- 27 10 o 0
Coil , C- 161 2 o 0
Tcl ce;ra.::>h, TG-5 1 o 0
T3.g, 1£- 72 1 , 250 o 0
L.- 209 2 o 0
1!65SugC Hook, M-.110 200 o 0
hue, ftL- 27- n 1 o 0
i«,.;,;l Equ..i.pm... nt , CEo-II
2 o 0
Crank, CG-4-",
o 0
Tap. , TL-83
o 0
Tape , T1- 94 25 o 0
Cliinbor::J, LC- 6
1 o 0
-. TC9 I E.q.npt.ll3nt , TE- 33
40 o 0
Flashl.lght:, l'Jr.122- n
50 o 0
Lamp; Lll-35 100 o 0
Gl ovae, LC- IO 10 o 0
Test Sot , I - 56 1 o ti
Tast EqlJipml.! nt ,
1 o 0
9. 4
Dl 11\ II

Call.ber . 30 Ai> 8 clip 1<lU,000 0 0 24 , 000 21, 000 87. 5
Carbine , Cal . 30 427, 000 41, 664 9 . 7 93, 500 53 , 57. 5
Cal . . 30, AP, 5 clip 30, 000 0 0
Cal ..30, oall- AP, c t n. 20, 000 12, 000 f:iJ .
Cal . . 30, tracer, ctn/ clp 15, 000 15, 000 100 . 1,500 1, 500 100 .

• ,
ordnance (Cant lrl )
It A"

Hfl' ill.!!' peT 1J.fJ: HIIT PCT
crl. . 30, t r r-.cer J hP be l t ed 430,000 93, 000 21.6 120,000 80 , 000 66 .7
Cd . . 4 5, S?rJ nnd Pi s t ol
e,1. . 50, IIP-}-T (2- 2-1)
370Cl. Grul , SV
37t'J:1. , HE
37!!' ..I:I C"llr.ist er /
57m:::l , ER. SABOT
57crn , HE
60mm Mortar,
6 0mn Mor t ...r , Ill .
81!ll!3 Lt .
Mort"' r , Hv.
Blr.tn S::!ol-::e
75nM HE , M54
7S!:'.;, Ho,:/ . HE,
75r.1tl HOll .
Rot,' . HE, !.t 54
1')5.rJl How.
t:r.loke \.t.
He'."l . AT
HE, ft T
\',.r enf'.cle , hnnd,
Grenree , hand,
J t,;- rcn:-de ,
r i f lo,
Gr eru:.de , r i fle ,
Grenr-,\e , rifle ,
Sjgnal, I.C, AN,
Cr rt. rifle , grennde , ll/:J
C l't, rifle , gr enrde , rAJ
CI'rt. !'. UX . gr enr.de , r:t7
/ l

fr".g .
I' T

(3 color.)
Dextrose , bt·l .
Slll fan11<:. r..:itie,
\l ster, ch::t , J
Pls&lll a, pkb'

Cotton , ;'. ;.3orbent ,
pkg .
Plast er, a:1Ilesive, spL
Spli nt, set
Splint ,
Ar-=u' 1.e5 rUng
Splint , vH.:-e , ladder , ea.
.!''':1; ntothal , s C' dium, box
Alcohol, ethyl, qt .
denat ured, pt.
l:.orimi ne J box
Sulfadi azine , pkg .
Bandage , pl ast er pariS
Dressing , f l.rst - a:;.d , large
Dr essl.t1g, small
.Glen1tet, v. oo1, 0 . 0 .
Litter , f ol di ng , aluminum
SplJ.nt , ¥Il.re , gauze, roll
133, 000 66 ,600 50.
31, 000 86 .
360 64 1 .7

180 0
60 0
240 100.
600 352 58.6
1,350 900 66 .7
234 3.4 54 54
2 , 700 ;: , ;,:' 83 .4 606 300 49.5
540 5':' 0
100 . I II 60 54.
162 162 100.
33 33
1 , 680
500 29.7
1, 200 505 42.
0 0
353 44.1
540 0 O.
100 0 O.
160 0 o.
1,900 1,419 74.7 240 100 41.7
7 , 200 2, 275 31.5 1,200 900 75 .
3, 600 0 0 600 0 0
2 , 470 250 10. 1 260 .210 80.8
1, 000 150 15. 100
90 90 .
500 140 28. 50 50 100 .
300 0 O. 100 0 o.
2;000 0 o. 200 150 75 .
200 150 75 .
200 0 o.
32 . 7 DZ
II n
.r"; JDIChL
120 }C 25 . 18 6 33.3
40 30 25 . 6 4 06 . 0
160 40 25. 24
40 10 25 . 6 6 100.
60 36 12 33. 3
40 10 25. 6 6 100.
240 60 25. 36 12
160 40 25. 24 8 33 .3
60 10 16.6
9 9
10 25 . 6 2
33 .3
150 30 2u . 15 15 lOU •
10 25 . 6 6 100.
2 0 0
12 1 B.3 6
66 .6
125 30 24. 25 d 32.
225 50 22. 2 :; 4 20 58.8
40 10 25 . 6 6 lOU.
}CO 70 23 . 3 45 16 35.5
· 960 240 25 . 156 48 30. 7
120 30 25. 24 6 25 .
40 10 25 . 6 2 33.3
50 10 20. 7 0 0
T;"RCFJiT. GE 01' li;LDIChL E\(J'".JY!ffiJT itECOVEiiZIJ
DZ II •• " '<3 .1 DL. u.ro
52. 2
Crl"J,lIC. L ;u\rtF..utE
Grenade, nand, smoke, He, Md
;:;'r.mRde , hand, inc endl.sry, AIJ- 14
Grenade , n&nd , siooke , uP, 1:- 15
t '

- 3­
Warf are (Cant 'd)
M.IT htlI' PCT
Grenade ,
Grenade ,
Grenade ,
hand ,
!land ,
hand ,
sMoke ,
smoke ,
col ored , ii-18 ,
col or ed , !.i- ld,
col ored , !.- l d,
r ed
100 .
100 .
100 .
OF CH4.iICAl. r.J\lt.FArtE tt.:;CO/.cltill -
90 .

ComfXlsit icnJ 0- 2
250 250
Caps , blasting , spec ial , non- el ectr ic <5 o
louse , bl ast ing, (1<X) , roll ) 1 o o.
r"use , lighters
25 o v.
Prima--cord (100 ' roll) <
o. o.
Eags , sand 500
16. 6
PlliCE/lT;,GE or' Jili)OV ",H Ql, rt£SUP?LY ,.0., D I 1
Glidor r .. >1.. 1:1 - 100'-p
PrCht . 'i,l y - 39 . 6'p
b. D f J
(1) Tni r ty-five ( 35) C-47 pl anes t o DZ u\ , n (By Parachut e)
,lJnHT!;rl;.iAS TErt
",,'I: PCT
.1ations , t ype "K" 9, 120
216 2. 4
285 30
10. 5
6. 5%
Dlankio t s , wool , 0 . 0.
600 22. 2
Litters , f olding
272 120 44.1
Bundles , Ji sc . tiedical
12 5
41. 6
J 5. 9%
Radio J SCR- 694
2 50.
PEHCl'lIT;,GE OF 0;.' rtESUPJ'LY FO" D f J
c . 0 f 4
Parac hut e -
( 1) Thir t y (JO) C- 47 planes to Ol " .. ". (By par,cnut e)
d. D/6
1} , 96O
Parachute re s upply' -
Four (4) g lider s CG- 4- A t o DL. cr., II .
4, J2O
0 f 4
30 .9

- 4 -


nl!T ",: ,:r

fi CD
Il.re, ' :- llO-mi . 20 20 100.
R'\dio, SCrt- 536
4 100 .
h-'3.' li o , SeR.­ 6I0 2 2 100.
?3.dio, &CH.-6,. 4
Bat.t er i es , Bh- 39
1, OW
1, 000
100 .
22 . 6

25 24 90 .
':)att,; r i as ,
100 72
:-!o.. ssD..!:.e Boo1.. 5 , l:J.­ 210
300 50 10. 0
-'rape , TL·-83 l Ou l eO lOU .
1'ape J 'rlr94 100 100 l uv.
Fle::.s nlight,
l uO l VO lOU.
P-=... "'l.CbhT•. GE or' SlGNhL

Gun- Stlb- l.18Ctlinc , liAl
15 15 lOU .
w,rter, 6Omm, l!2
2 2 100.
Launcher , gr e.'1.ade, 1J7 8 d 100.
Launchor, gr el.111de, we
5 5 l OVe
:;loth, vd_ping, Ibs .
200 200 100.
:' atches ,
Pwadl ator, 1/4 t on truck
4 4 LOO.
Kit , tira r epair, cold patch
RLf I e, U. S. Cal . . 30, Yl
100 .
100 .
l'EitCEi'oJ'1'.tGE OF ORDN;l,ICE 100%
e . D f 8
(1) Thirty- four (34) C- 4? planes to DZ Irion • (By parachute)
75.iIl!:l How . a.rMiW1ition 2, 800 1, t>OO
?El!Ci:riT.Gl; Of RESUPPLY rl:>C0VEltY FD.i D f s
f . Percent age of of resupply for entire operation .
Gl, der Resup"ly -
Prcnt . -
2. rlQY r esupply recovared by units and not deliver ed to Dlvision are
not lIlcludcd i n t otals as figures "Iere not r eported.
3. Tne r eport is a clear indication that glider r esupply is considerably
more effective as practically 100);. of t hIS of ,;11der s was r ecov ered.
4. The last r esupply by air on D I 8 t i \dS tho bost on effect i veness
of parachut e r es upply. Accordirl6 to report s from tho r ear base, tnirty- four (34)
pl anes six loads and t hr ee door loads uach \'Ie r e delivered . hl l r ack
loads VH .. re dr opped in a very smal l area and were recovered wl.tnin a feVl hour s. No
door l oads we r e s een comifl6 down. Tnis i s an indication t hat tne door loads
¥ler e dischur ged far from t he t&rget arca or the door loads were act. ually not l oadod.
5. by ParachutoO could bE; effcctlVoJ if only racY. loads "Jere used and
all pl anas di schal'Ged t il..:: i r loads oVt:r t.he idontifl.cation marker s on t he &round.
:' t. i s believed that door l oads snould not normally bd used as i t causes too great
b. dl.sp;:'lrsion of s upplies and might enable eneJIV t o obtain a v6ry ru.gh perc<Jnt agc
of t he tot al dropped.
- 5 ­
1013T nIrt&k.I\1. D:LVISIUN
Offl.ce of t.he Corrlaunder
APO 472, U, S. Army
15 Oct ober
Purticipation of the 101st Airborne Dl.vl.sion i n
t ne period D - D .;. 10

TO COl!mandbg General , Fi rst Allied Airborne ­
(Tnr u Commanding Gene ral , XVIIl Cor;>s
1. nle attached r eport on Operation r.LlliKE.T prepared by Brigadier General
G. J . Higgins is forwarded approved Wi th the followi ng
2. OF THE DAYLIGH! OttOl' ON OP:a.AT !q.!. l.iAPJI. ET.
di !'fered f r oo. a:"l ot-her Air bor ne operations and exercises in the co .. lpactnes s and
accuracy of the D da.y landings . Apart from t he navigational skill and steacil.neS5
under fi:"e shown by Troop Carrier pilots, t he factor contrJ.butl.ng most to t his
accuracy was the decision to s t age the 0psl·ar.. ':O!'l. in daylight . Daylight allo'lled
the operation to be put on successfull,y ;: ... t }, l:I. lllinimum of preparation. Th.ere
no special point i ng for Operation i.iAn};,ET on the part of All'borne Troops
a full-dr ess re hearsal V'Jould have been indispensable had tne operat.ion been l.n
darlmess . Daylight simplified the and pilot&6e problet:lS of Tr oop
Carrier as well as the assembly of Airborne troops on the g round . The
r apidity of this assembly permitted the accomphsnment of the l.lll.tial Gr ound
misslons on schedule . Because of the accr.ring advantages it is felt t hat consi­
derable boldnes3 is justl.fied in choosi ng d<\)'light rl:l.tner t nan darkness f or an
Airborne operation if, as in ....ARKET J the enemy is on t ae run and air suprem<lcj'
co;r.plete .
3. RJ..TE OF BUILD- UP OF THE 101ST 1I.ntBOrli\E DIVISION. It seven
da;y s t-o bril16 in a ll toe Airborne eltltne-nts of the l Olst Airbor ne Dl.vision . Dcri ng
this time the Divl.sion was obl iged to protect the landil'lg field wl.th considerable
f or ces while carrying out its grou."1d missions . Tnis requirement for landi n& f:l.el d
protection r educed the strength available for t ne essent ial tasks of t he Oi vision.
This inevitable dlversion of st.r eflbtn :LS a factor which lnust be borne in mind in
missions to an Airborne DiviSi on .
4 . TROOP CARnD.R riL?FtESENTATI0:-i I,)U Trlh GkOUrID . General Higgins in parat;rajJh
4 f comr,IEmts on the need of a...'1 Air Force control unit. on the glider iiele . T1,is
would nave been nost useful l. n 1-JJiKET alld sho uld not be overlooked in f utW'e
Airborne operl:l.tions . A Troop Carr l.er officer on tne ground could nave raci oed
back local weather conditions and exercised air t.ra ific control . Also, hQ could
have relayed the latest L.'lformation r egardi.fJt; the tactical situation on the
ground, t .IUS preventing air format i ons from flying over a batt le in progress .
5. CC'lS'IRLCTI ON OF LJUt DnlG S'!1<I?S. .. ion J.1J\rtKBT included plans for the
r onRt.ruction of landing strips t o bring in . l' t rWlsported units and supplies.
This was never possible becaUSe of enemy a.ct.ion ad jacent to t he narra." corridor
a long the E.indhovcn- Ar nhem nighil B\{ and the absence of adequate t r oops to clear
and control the nec essary landmg field As t he 3ituation. is alw,\:,s going
to be uncertain whenever Airborne t r oops land lines ,
the construct i on and protect ion of a landing field does not f easible without
an entir e Airborne diviliion wit h the sol e mission of securing the field.
6. Ant ltESUPPLY . Operation Wuil\.t!."T provided valuabl e lessons in air resupp1.Y.
At presQnt, the data are not complet a so t hat are nowever ,
it Wa3 a.'llply that slider r esupply is much than supply by
parachutl:..! . The lat t e r was only about effective and would have been inadequate
i n it:l' elf t o main sin Di vis.lon f or any cOllsiderabl e pUrl. od. Exper l.E<nce in
Op{;ration t.tARKET that air r es upPly an emi;rgcncy fOC:t hod \'lith a
l ong way t o go before it can be r cl it:d upon to supjJort Ai rborne troops 1..!1 nU'iIOer
for an period. .
7. GROUND O?EllATION3 01" T:-tE lOlST ADIDQtNE DIVISIOIL The witial ground
::dssion of tha Division Nquired its disper $ion in ar... :'1S &lOfiJs, a corr idor
about f1ft&e n miles in l engtn. This disposition made the rtirbol' nt. troops weak
at every critical point 4nd made' necessary tho t.lost cnor,sctic sniftiflt, of troops
to moet the numerous threats as t he} a long this l ong corr idor . Had
anything IGSS t han a superior parachute drop beon rcccivodd I . ssi on Cli;;ht , .ell
have failed, wholly or in part . As it was , tne issue hung in c. nice ba.lance on
sevc.ral occasions b.. f or", t he Airborne troops r.:.stored the situation . TOl;;. cxporl­
once gai ned by the Di'/ 15ion gave force: to the oQlviction t ll;"'t. an hirbornc
division i s capable of exer1.l. ng e. st..r0rl6 e: f f or t in but a 0 ir ection &c a
given time .
- 2 ­

....... ' •
Office of the Asst. Div. Comdr.
APO 472, u. S . Army
12 October
SUB.BCT: Report on Operation dARKET.
TO Cor.unanding General, l Olst Al.rbol' . • l! Divis l.on.
1. GEUuf.." L : In accor da.'1.r:: e ;dth verbal instructions Comrnandind Gener<..l
lOls't i,irborne Division , t he report on tlle participation of the l Olst
Airborne Division i n Operati on ;.!Alti\=.T i s her eby subJutced . This report cover s
t he operations of the Al.rborne Divisl.on frorr. D to D I 10 incl us ive (Sep­
t ember 1'1 to 27, 1944). T'ne r eport. i s divided into tilree par ts : First , the
oovement of personnel ailel equipment f r oti. the UK to 'Lile combat zone in a parachilte
echelon, · a glider echelon, a'1d a seaborne eche l on; second, t he t acT"leal oper ations
of t he and units thereof, froo the init ial l anCing by paracnute unt il
D f 10 inclusi ve , at. which tL"!'le thf::! tactical s i t.Llation beci:uile luo. re or less s ta­
bilizedj and thi rci, cormnents 00 vario.us o perational and adruinistl' ative
matter s peculiar to. an airborne oper ation .
2 . Il:lVEOiElIT TO COiJl.T 20$:
a. Parachute Echelon : To:. parach..tte echelon of t. he least Airbo.rne
Divi sion consisted of 436 C- 4? transport planes c.:J'rJin& 50.,16 6, tsOO paraChutists
af the Divis ion. Four hundred twent;r- fou r planes dror:-ped an D-Day, ana. 12 planes
carryini: Batter; "BII, 377tn Parachute Fi eld Bb.tt.alion, ,dth 140 person­
nel and 6 guns" dropped on D f 3 . Of the 436 planes 'dhich took off, 434 dropped
paracilutists in a hiohly satisfactory aarL'1er (center o.f impact soone 1,500
yards s hort of selected DZ in one case and abwut. J r.dles north.lest. of t he
s el ect ed DZ in a.'lother case . b both cases howevtl r, the drop pattern 'tlas excel­
l ent and all parachJ.tist s of t he s erials were dr opped to.
ctb,:lr) . Only two planes
failed to. dro.p parachutists an t ne sel ected DZ ' s , and these bo. pl&nes Vle r e shot
dawn on the flight in and prio.r to the DZ 's . All parachut.ists jwtped
from planes , and 8 froo one plane ane ;:. froul d'lother evem. ually joi ned their
units ill combat zona . Jump casualitc. .; ., J .·O less t nan 2% of the total number
jwnped . The av er ago time of assefilbly was .!.. ... .;Llt one haul' fo r each battali o.n . All
initial o.bj ectives HeNr cach(;d prior to. da!';(fltl ss . H.ccovc;: ry of equipldimt aver&.g6d
over to'our Pathfmd<:l r p l anes precedt:d t he sel'.i al s by 15 minutclS . Three of
the plan.-;s dro.pped wi.. tnout incident on the DZ' s . One plane 'lias shot down
s eve ral miles short of the DZ in an.d no. inf o.rmation i s avai lable
on .t his p lane:. (For details o.f ...:cnelon, see Annex No . 1) .
b. Glidor Echelo.n : A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from df::!par­
turB bases in thY UK aVer a period of 7 day s . hundr ed and sixty- sev e n of
these gliders landed wit llout incident on t h03 dcsignatf;ld Ll. Appro.ximately 5,000
man t ook o.ff from t il", UK and some 4, 800 eventually jo.in<3 d thf:;ir units in the
cor..bat 30 Gliders aN unaccountad fo r on t his date, practically all
of which are to have dropped in anemy terr1to.ry. The bJ.ider lift on D t 2
was disper sed becaUSe of heavy fog enco.unt€Tl!d over to.:; Channt:l and alo.ng the
co.ast , Of som.: 384 glid.::rs t hat too.k off on this dat. d, only 2:>9 safe ly on
tho desiQ'latcd LZ. !Aany o.thl.! rs to the UK or landed an the conti!'le nt in
en61l\Y or fri e ndly t"rritory. No further glioo;;:r st;:rials we re aO"om aft.l:lr D f 6,
but Sa.:10 500 p.Jrsonnel and IJss.., nti... l equi .rna'lt flown in by C-47 transport
to t h". Airport and join".d thl:. ir units i n t n,j combat by D flO. (For
Qe tails of g lider echelon Annex No . 2) .
c . Soaborne Echelon : Tne s,Jabornc acholon of thu Dl.vision consisted
of 1077 pcrsannd and 444 vo;: hicles o.f all typc1S . Thl.s eonelon loaded on D t 1 and
frem SOUTIWlPTON an D f 2. It arrived at OUA.HA an D of ), "l'lheN it wa s
divided into t .... o serials. The first left t il<:.l beach on tht3 r.D.ornin6 of D f )
and at BOURG-LEOPOLD an tne af D f 4. It clo.sed in the Division
servi'cG are a at ZON 0:1 evening o.f D f 5. The seco.nd s a rial luft Q}AAHA BEACH
on th\.; eve ning: o f D f J , arrived at BOlF..G - lEOPOLD an D t 5, and clost.>d in the
Divisio.n s Ol'Vice aroa on the d\lo:;nil16 at D f 6. (For de tail s of seaborne ecno:::l o.n,
see Annux No . J).
- 1 -
a . The Division mis si ons called f or the seizur e of t he four hi6hway
and over the Aa RIVElt ar.1 r/Illl:J-.!S VAnRT CANAL at V2.CHELj t he seiz­
ure of the high..... s.;' bti d5e over too DO:..fL1:i:L rlIVER at 5T. the sei zure of
t. he high\ tsy over the CANJ..L at ZON ; and th", € of EIlillliOVEN
and the (.lain lrignway bridges over tiw: strca-'ls in ' that city . The objec­
Wti ZO t;- a r oad di;jtance of some fifteen miles .
2. . Th<.! 501st ParachLt. & I nfantry, landing on t\.;o DZ l s nt;ar VECffi:L,
seizod all four bridc;es withO-tt incident . Tile 502C! ParaCi1l..1td I nfantry l anded near
ZON, a nd with one batt.al i on s.... i zed the main hi ,;hway noar ST.
The 506th al so landed nt! ar ZOIi and too C:mal crossing, but only Gftur t he
enemy had blo'.'ol1 the bri dge . The 506th .. d ZItJD,iOVEH short ly noon the
next day .
£. L"l an offort to s ecure an a:tol'fu"l.t e crossillt( ov er the \HLHEr..:n:NA
CA.NAL, d11d also 'to block t ra ffic bot"ecn EDmHOVEN and HERTOGEJlBGSGH, one
comp<my of t he 502d waS to s(::ize t hd l!i c;h\'Iaj' bri dg..:; near This
comp:my s IJizcd and h\'!l d t he bri dg"" for a f ew hour s , but w:!s driven of!' just before
dork . The cnl:l'fl.y r ushod strorlb r e inforcements to t his point, a.'1d ..vy casualties
suffer ed by botn sidos in t he stiff fie:;hti ng: t ook pl ace on D f l a nd
D f 2 in the attempt to secure t his crossing . Tile bridge was f inally blown by the
beforo it could be captured , but eneqy force it WdS
wiped out .
Q. On th (; of D f 2 cnf;my made a r :1i d on th"" brid6e dt ZON
with t anks unci sclf - pr opallbd g un s. 50100 datllug: "Ias C<.lusuQ, but the bridge was
held i ntact . The next mor ni ng Gn tank - infnntr,y was but was
he ld off . The 506th, ri ding Br i tish tanks , mada an t o c ut the attackinb
force off fr om. t h.;; south, but til e held h.l:y points :lno ... ',iithdrew
his forc os in good order.
£ . On morning of D I 5 th<1 enemy seve r ed m'lin hishwc.y between
VECHEL .:l nd UDEN, and made a strong attempt to ::>eiz(:: t ho t o\m of VE'::H2L and des troy
t.he bridges . All aVJ. ilabl e el&nents of t oo Division wl;l r e r usned t o the vicinity,
and us they arr i ved t nr oll6hout. the day vIera formed int o a t c:.sk for CE: under Gener al
Mc AULIFFE and disposed to the enemy fi6hting conti nued
dur ing the ont ir..: day and l at e jnto the nil;ht , with infant ry ana t.....nkS a.ttacking
frolu s..:verul siro.ult<JIl<:: ously . Enemy wer" made to within
500 yards of bridbes , but VJer e Eiventufl. lly beaten uack . Th... at tCtck wo.s r "" n":;;led
the n ... xt morning , but tho; deft-nsc held firtJ.ly. ToC! 2d B<1.t t alion 506t h then
attacked towards UDEN, and lIw. de cont ::..ct \litol : patrol of the Guards Armor6d Divisie»
advanCing 0:1 VECHEL froc UDEJL The em.:r.J.,Y . fo rced to "Iithdraw toward Er.P, and
the road r eopened . By dawn next t.lloJ eneh\{ had withdrawn frOJ:I. t he
VECHEL area to th.... southeast.
f. On the afte rnoon of D t 7 the cOl::!fn,y attacked from t he northvjest ,
cut. main highway between VECHEL and ST. OBDEl.JRODE, and took up a dt!fcnsive
posit.ion astride the ro.1£!. 'rne 50o, with tanks cl.ttachl.!d, attacked on th;,; mornir.g
Of D f 8 hnd by dark had driven t he enemy frofel all but a portion of this position.
The next morning t he att ack was continued, in conjunction with British Armor ad­
vancing in forc e f r om ST. OEDElJHODE, E'nd thE;. r oad
g . From time of landing to D t 10, tha dneF.lY probed t he Di vision
sector s PJanY small skirmishes Def ens ive
positions , t he main <m.d t ho br idges over the Canals and riv0r s ware sub­
to intuTiaitt <Jnt artillary and J.1ort,!r fi r c . TU \J Cl.ty of EINDHOVEN was
heavily bombl.ld on t hG Gvenins of D f 2 . ( For i lt!d op>:ll' ations , see
Annux N . 4) . n-'II _"!; • QJ
4 . GJ::N);R.\I. CO:!l!llNTS : U U "'"
,g. C:>..Sualtics : Fro:n D to D f 10 incl usiVe, t he casualUo.)s of the WIst
Ai rborne Divis...on were 'is follows : Killed - 373; 'Wounded - 1436; missing - 547j or
cOJJbat a grand tot<il. of 2,356 non- cffl:!ctives, of a tota l of 13 , 112 who dntor dd
... rea. (For dutail ed r oil port of casualtks, s ee Ann""x No . 5) .
- 2 -

Thcl 326th Airbornu


g. Prisonars : A total of 3, 5L I-l'isoners wl;: r e captured by thl! WIst
Airborne Division f r om D to D f 10 , inclusive .
£. . i:::vucuction:
couba t e. r ca i n t wo The f irst eChcl lon,
nl:l including an att<,.ched sur6ical team: arrive.d
noon of D-Day . The second ccnclan consi s tin6 of
Gliders, arrived on of D f 1 . € upon the l anding of t he
.first. cche. lon, a t.empor ary hospi tal w.... s s e t up on tne s outhe rn of the 5lider
lendlr.g .1'i c ld . First casunl tit!s vli:! r e t rc<lted at 1500 and at 1700 t he f irst ma jor
surgical was pcr fonood . At. ldeO c. ho::;pi t c. l a t ZON was t ak im QV lSr and
per s onnel end .:l quiptnent «loved . ThE: of cas u'iltie s wus ' carr-l e: o on under
very good condit i on3 . By 2400 D - Duy , 107 c<:.s .uti ti.lS h'ld be en and t r ea­
t f::d at ttua hospital. Upon the £'Xrival of the s .... ccud ocnl;:lon, lit.t .:r bearer and
ambulance sections we re sent to r egimenta :md ev".!cu...'lt.iol1 from
r egim,Jnta l and battalion aid s t .? tions was quite r.::.pid . By th<> rn::lr!'ling of 0 f 2 ,
contact was cstablishcld with thc 501st at and an pl at- f)':.:J of the
50th Fiold Hospital wus sant to establis h u stuti on at VEC'i-IEL. '1':'13 1'7.l:r1
Collecting COr.l.pany establish>3 d with t h0 Divisi on :":", di cal CC'Ii'.p..:lY at 1500
on D f 2, end evac uat i on begun to 24t h at
LEOPOLD. DU<3 to tactice.l requirem-ents a.nd t he: li;iI'6G amount. of moving
north, littlu ...va cuation W:lS accomplish<.ld until 0615 D f 3, at time normal
eva cuation bdGan . On D -I 3, 30 ambulances ,.LOd 4 - t on tr ucks all
avai u\ble cases to the 24th E\l acua tion Hospital e.t BOUHG- LEC?OLD. F:-om D -1 3 to
D -I 10, immedi a t e ev acuation of took
Q. Air Support: In genGr a. l, r >;'1u·.;sts for air suppor t mssions wer e
handl ed s a tis f actor ily by means of t he , . ,;ort Pe.rtr l and.;; d by Glider on
D-Day, Bad wea.th,:: r, transmission dirt'::. _ and hiti her priority missions
r esulted in m.;:ny r .J qu(;;s ts b!;in
r e jected or ...nabl e to flown . (See Annex No . 6
for detailed r eport ) .
£. . Glide r Heception : Anticipa ting considerable cOnfUSJ.OII in unit
ass embly when a lar5c of gli ders l anded on one a. Div glider
r e ception party consisting of 5 officer s and 20 enlis t ed men f r o .• 1 v ,\: :i.O":'s units of
the DivislDn C.?r.1e i T! wi t n the f irst glider echelon on 0 - Da,Y. Th:"g p rty i'unc­
tiono;:: d extremely well and in gr eat part was responsible for t il..:. r a pi ci -;l.nd orderly
assl;J'Ublint; of unit s . Despite c ar ef ul briefin
, it was fouud i:aprdctJ. cable to
eXpdct $ lJ.do;:: rs t o l und near predet e r minad points or in smell al'el!.S c r f i elds . The
most prac t icable solution appear s to be to stRtion 6ili des at many points ov.:;r the
l andi ng ar eC!. end h ava t hese gtI J.des go to thd near ust 5li ders tht:::y land:
ori<mt t.hem, 2nd give them the assembly point s elected for t he uni t. This hl\::l tnod
worked v ery well and in all but 5. f ew cases , units assl;lffibl ed r api dly and without
Confus ion.
K. Air Force Control Unit: It is believed desirable to have a senior
officer from t he Troop Car ri er Command a rrive with the first e cnelon of glide rs in
a situati on of tnis kind . He should be provided with a r adio se t cu.p.:lble of direc1
communi cation with a control st ation at the departure airfields. In this way , he
could transmit on- the- spot information as to weather conditions, t ho t actica l si­
tuation, end t oo g lider fi .;lds that are clo..lar for t he r e ception of that 6lider
lift. It i s beli eved many plane s were unne cessnrily s not down by passin5
over enemy held strong points , and which could have bewn .;l.voidcQ hnd late infor­
mation been given tne pilots as to the t actical situa tion .
g. Us e of Glider Pilots: The nced for a t acti­
cal and or ganiza tion of g U,. :r pilots quito..! appar ent on this
ope r at ion. th,; pilots t.l ctic_l organuation after
l andi ng and ope1'£.ttJ d und03 r tho;:: s enior officoJr of t ru:. t organiza tion . J;l ctual ly, it
was impossibl t.: fo r any one officer to control th:: large nW.lber of glider pilots
who arriv ed in t he combat area. Tne r e vi e r.., fil."'Il1y .inst.'t nces of indivJ.du(.l pilots
l eavin6 their assigned and di supptJaring . pilots we r d for
protection of ins t a llations ne!1r thl;! LZ, the Divi.sion CP, and thc Division
Servic e hf ea, a nd in gener al, perforued exce llent work i ndi Sev er a. l
volWltarily joined cOOIbat troops and pcr ticipa.tt!d i n ground fighting in the
vicinity . It i s bclieved tha t an organiz iition in which tht:: chain of COlcLlIlHnd is
strongly is .;sscntia l if glider pilots ar o;:: to used mos t in
an opera tion.
h . See No.7.
5. A final r eport will be submitted '(jhen the Di vision compl e tes l.ts par­
ticipat ion in the Holland
- 4 ­

• ,


The parachute echelon or the Division began its drop at 1300 on D-1).::,- ,
September 17, 1944. .The 501st Parachute Infantry, with two pl atoons 326th
Airb9rne Engineer Battalion attached, dropped on two DZ':; 2
VECHEL and the other some 3 miles northwest of VECHEL.
1st Battal ion, landed on DZ "All west of VECHEL,
1500 had seized all initial which were
t he two Railroad Bridges over the HILlEMS VAART No
r esistance was encounter ed on this DZ. The 1st on DZ tt A_l" ,
in the :vicinity of KASTE!ll., assembled and reached VECHeL by 1700. The 1st
Battalion received some resistance from scattered troops in the vicinit y
of the DZ. Scvne resistance from scattered ene1l\Y groups was enoo untered i n
taking of VECHEL, but no organized defense of the town was made by the
At dark regiment was well dug in and s et ·to def end the town agains t any
enemy attack. Ail bridge s were seized in-tact. The Engineer Det a chment imme­
diately began t he eoostruction of a second bridge across the VAART
CANAL in order to permit two-wqy t r affi c if the situation so r equired .
The 502d Parachut e Infantry witn three platoons 326th A1rbomt:l Engineer
Batt.alion attached , landed on Dl IrB" without enemy opppsition and ull bo.ttalions
WB.r e as sembled by 1500. The 1st Battalion proceeded t o 3T. and after
a skirmish, seized the town and its objective, the bri dge over the rtIVER,
This Battalion then proceeded to dig in and at dark had the s1t uation
well in hand. Comparw llHH of the 3rd BatUilion.. proceed.ed to the H.l.ghway Bridge
at · BEST; secured it initially against little enemy resistanca, but wa s f erced to
witndraw just before dark by reason of a endOy COWlt er utta ck. remain­
der of tht: 3d Batta lion was then dispatched to join UHI! CompaI\Y J with or der s to
s ecur e t- he bridge the next morning . The remainder of t ile Regiindl"lt went into
Di viSion Reserve in the vicinity of WOlFSl.VINKL.
The 506th Parachute Infantry landed on DZ IIcn .without enen\y opposition.
Companie s of the 1st Batt3.1ion departed inunediatcly v;ithout formal as sl?:mbly in
an effort to s e.cure. the three bridges over the HILH.i:::LMINA CANAL in t he vicinity
of ZON they could be blown by the eneJOY. Scatter e d an.ml,}' r -:;s istanco wa.s ·
encounter ed reaching the main bridge and forward elements were within
100 yards of this bridge wh en it was blown by the r etreating enemy . ( It was
found t hat the. other two bridges had bean blown several ·days beforl?: ). The
Regiment pegan ·the. crossing of the Canal by various and by 2400 the
entire r egiment was on the south side of Canal and had a bridgehend exten­
ding some 2,000 yards.
The Cornaiand Echelon of Division Headquarters jumped with 502d Para­
chut e Regimffit and establiShed an init ial Command Post at ZON. Some 70 gliders
carrying additional Command personnel, the Heconnaissance Pl atoon, Signal and
Me dical personnod l, and some transportation for tne combat units, landE:!d on t he
LZ about pne hour after the parachute. landings. Overall time of landing of all
parachutis.ts and gliders was one and one-half hours . Comnunic ation was estab­
lished with all el ements except the 501 by dark on this dat e .
The 501st Para chute Inf antry continued the defense of VECHEL throughout
dsy. Communication wa s estab11shed with at ·0600 . light
snemy (ltL.ii cks wer e r epulsed, but no major dffort to r l::! trievc t h.:.: to\1n was made.
1st .Battalion of t he 502d I nfantry continued to hol d ST. OEDENltODE
and likewise repelled .several light enemy . attacks. The J rd Bl'lttalion of the
l 502d attaCked at first light an effort tQ r etrieve the Highway Bridgo at BEST,
but suffared heavy cas ualties at the hands of the enemy force which had been
strongly r einforced during the night. Thd 2d Battalion vias then order ed to
a.ssist .thl? 3rd Battalion in s e; curing ·the .. bridges. The Batt alion penetrat ed to
t he outskirts of
BEST, but wus forceq to withdraw by heavy' artille ry J mortar,
-ruld SI" a1J. fire., and took up a def ens.ive position on t he: l eft of · the 3rd
Battalion. At dark the entire regiment less the 1st Batta lion was in. a defensive
eastof the t:C rCllliAHigl lilEfl
The 506th .Pa.rachute .In.fantry, with the ,Battalion ·adv·anc,ed.
on EIIJP1:IOVEN·.at fi r st. light .. 3rd. was held up mile
north of the city;, by determined enemv .resi.:$t(JIlce. : Tha 2.d Battalion made .8 wide
to the , (Jil.st thtl enemy. arid se¥ed
the -t,OW)"l '<It 1300. was - ltli;l:\e w.i.th ;d. . .. 'British. ftcconnaiss'ahce Patrol
1215 of;- the . pity" ·and 'o\Ii. th ·tbe main Britisll. Forces . at 1900 just sou,t h of
t hd .city. .At : dark t he WD, S' in contr.ol of t he .entird city 'rutd ;', a3 i l)
·position def ending. t he 'bridge s in t tte ,cit,Y_w.hich· we r o. the mai, n
. : .
At 3.bout 1530/ 42B gliddrs c¥ rying t he 3rd Bat tali on of. tl'Y.: 327t.h, .
the Engineer .B,t..tclion, the of t ,he Medical. und Signp.l COfDpani es,.
el ements of t he 377th Parachut e. Field. Artille:.';y Bat talion, and additionill supply
a nd administr<:L tive ve hiCles ', a rrived in' combat a r ea . 3td B3.tta.l1.c.l1 of
·t he .327th was assigndd the mission of providing local protection for the 1.2 and
Divis ion service are a.
, . . ". . '"
, south side. of tlW: Can:ll at ZON at,
2100 ·an.d the 'of a briSig03 ,.. the Cunal.
.The bridge acros'::. ,thQ. Can{ll waS compl et ed' ,duriqg tho;) night undo at 0615
laading 610ments of the Hous e hold Cav<ilry and Guards Annored Divi s ion b(;lgan
crossing. These S atrll:l l eading p...!.ssed through ST. OEDENliODE Cil1d VEc.;HEL
by 0645. One Squadron of t he .15/19 liussars attached ,to the. 5.0qt h at
and· one Squadron
502d at ZON. . " , .. . . , .'. .
to .th",
. .,
. ,
liCit qompany ..of t h<:! 501st Was to .send ond platoon to DL'IIT'"'.I!<H . Re port:
from this company the dl1!3AY 'Y" as i n som.; .in ilnd arollOd this town.
'Ih.; .3d BatttJ.ion of ,the 501st was order ed ta.. m9V c 'from VECHEL to BERnE. and t£1ke
up a strong defensive position a t . The remainder of the 501st con­
tin).l(;d in i.!. cJ,.osc 1[: ,of and .during . the., d<:.y th0 2d Battalion
r epulsed · an enemy atta ck from t h e. QorthVit:st . estima t ed. a t . 250 Infantryman.
During t he l a t e evening, Company ItE" was driven bacX fr'om its out pO!"it pos1tion
a bout 200 . y3.I'ds by a night by enemy parschuti,,:,t.5 .
First Battalion· oi the: 502d, · conti.nued. in the def e nse of ST., OEDEt'ffiODE. .
Thf;; -2d Batta,li on att<.cke d at 0600 in another . attempt to s eize t he higrrtlay .bridge
at BEST. !bis attack . was repulsed by enemy. At 1415 the
the 1st Batta lion; rein-forced by onc . squadron of .t he. '15/19 HU,s s ars , a
.lttack against the. enemy position. this att ack Wd S very
and the seized at 1800. Fifteen..8Bmm. guns. we're ' destroyed, 1,056 .
prisoners taken, !Jll..d·.over· 300 . enemy· .deud laf,t on. t.he . after this battle
. '. .
The sQ6th P.urCichutc. Infant"ry' strong point; and we.st
of EINDHOJEN and 'contin'ued eXt ensive patrols with the squadron of the 15/19
Hussars a ttached .
A third ' goUder lift began to at , about ' 1460'currying the 1st and
3rd B<'.tta1ions of the 327.th, thg Blst . Anti.- Tank Battalion, the . 377th Parachute
Field Ar tillc'ry 'a.:J.ttplion (lc.ss Battery . IIBtI),· and the : 9t>7th and 321st Glider
Field Arti llery Bat t ·alions. Due to log. . enco.tintered. only . U..portion of
tnese Wl).ts a,rriveq. of gi v'e'n ' t .he .mission,' of ,protecting
the glider ,landing field :and at.t ack pf the 50.2d if At
about 1700 enemy tanks r epor,ted approaching Z.oN f:rpm the soutl').c.a st .and i:1
f",w minut.es· later .. a·, .. hundre,d ya rds. of the ZON
bridge dnd shelled .the cp:, . pnd, .. tlf .. Little damage iias
don", and ·the . tanks,..w.itharew when . AT guns, arriYed fran, tne gilder lending field .
'!Wo t.3!lks we re knocke4 .ot,lt , by. AT, fire.:, . . . ' .. ....: . ..
,. . ,
.. " .,
.. :,..; ; :
: ...'
, .
" ..
' .1 . : ':, ' . .. ., .. ....j : :' ' , ' :. ,
Division Co1lll'l'lC.l'ld ' Post moved to ST. a t 1200 .
During the morning, 1st Batt alion of the 501st attacked Dnd seized
hundr ed and\·trworrtY. t'a}ren .in, this action. Th.2d
, . , ..,.' " ..'

Battalion continued a cleGG- in def ense of VEa-IEL. Tho 3rd Battalion conducted
extE>.n sive p atrolli:tg to the n ortn and west fran. a strong point at ElliDE.
1s t Battalion of the 502d continued t he def ense of 3T. OEDEloffiOD3.
Dp.ring the aft ernoon tho 2d and 3rd Batt .3.'_ ..5 w..: r e ora.;;r ed to proceed to 5T.
OErEN!-tOllE and t he Rl;; siment charged 'Wit h a:.: i";:,nsc of tm, ST . OEDEJ:B.Om:: a.,--e 8 .
By 210-...1 thc £ntir"", l-1.egiment ....ias closed i n the area and had t aken up strong j
def,,":l·'1 iv.., positions .
During t he night the lst Battalion of the 506t h was order ed to proceed to
ZON in to as sist in t h.e def ense aT t he ZON brid,se against t he <:l xpcct od
enemy at\.s, e,; k . Tt:.e E.:\r. t alion wa.'1t into position at 0600 and in conjUnction with
elem..:nts 0 t he Is":' of t ho:; 32'"/t.n and one company of 320th EngineLrs,
t h!.l att. e;ct< on t n,;: bridge lawlcllcd by t Ile.. l07th Parlzer Brl.gade at about
0630 . Bat t alicn of tne 506th, tanks 0.... the squadron of the 15/19
Hussars , attack )o. tho; roar aud i:l sharp engagcffi .... nt t ook place at NUNEN .
The 31'd Battalion of too 506th r emained in EINDHOVEN as Rl:lgiiuental rlcservc . A.t
0900 t h;:, 44th Arr.:ore ci }b gilllent was attacned to t ho Division and procEed6-d toward
HEI..l!ONU i.Tl a f urther attempt to d estroy t he am.my attacking t he ZON bridge .
Int ermittent t ank and inf<>nt ry fi ghting took the r emainder of t he day.
The 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 327th r &licv<3'd t it:; 502d of th e def ense
of the s ect or east of ZON and the landing zonu and Division service area . The
321st Gli der Field Artillery BatAilion was attached to t hc 327th and fired
mi ssions i n support of that unit dw-i ng the day . At 1500 Batt..; ry uB
of the 377th
arriv.::ld by parachut u and joined its Battal::..on. Tne 377th then moved to ST.
OEDENP.ODS in support of t na 502d Parachute Infantry. Bat t ery HAn of t he 81st
Anti- Tank Batta1.ion was attached to t he 327th and Battery nc
to the 502d.
Batter:J nBn r emained in defense of the ZaN bridge .
Toe 1st Battal ion of t ha 50lst cr Os{i-.... d t nG WIllEt.S VAART CANAL in the
early mor ning at I-rFJ:.S',HJK and conducted " Isive patrollin,s: during thl;;! day . At
1845 an attack Vi as i::. ad.! en S:;:fI JNDEL ami trw s ection of 'tha town was
s ei zf..ld 1::I.t appl'o.:u.ll. at cly 2215 . The 2d Batt alion r emai ned at VECHEL. The 3rd
BattiJ.l :'on (:loved at 1745 to tile west. and cut tne ST. OEDENrtODE - SCHIJlIDEL Head
in t he vicl.nity of t he rail r oad station.
The 502d Parachute Infantry, ...with the 377th Parachut e Fi eld Artille ry Bat­
talion at tached , continued to expand its defensive positions in t hu ST.
area. US" Company of 1st Battalion received a strong ent!lllY attack irem the
northwest i n e arly aftC! rnoon, but h<.: ld its posi tion .
The 1st of t ,le 506th continued i ts of the ZON bridge .
'!he 2d Bat'Lalion worki ng with 15/19 H ... ssars and the 44th Tank Regiment, at­
tacke d t he enemy n&ar NEO&H,\iETl'EN. The encmy witndrew in th<J fac t.! of this attack
and at 12)) cont act was lost . The 2d Battalion went into a position in
t he vicinity of TONGELRE far the night . The 3rd Bat talion was ordurod to ST .
as Divis ion rte: sarve . The Regiment was given a warning order that i t
would pr obably move to UDEN on the follO\'ling day.
At 0300 the 3rd Battali. n of tna 500th Par achut e Infa ntry closed in the
ST. OEDENFDDE area, moving up from EINDHOVEN. At 0500 or der s wora received
that this battalion, as well as all other cl ements of the r egiment, would move
to UDEN '.vi thou'L delay. Uovemunt was to be by motor and marching. The 3rd
Battall.on b..;gan its move to UDEN
by marchin
, at 0900. Th od 1st and 2d Batta­
lions initiated their mov ements , as transportation available
during t he day.
The advance detachment of the 506t .. , consisting of approximat ely 150
officers and frcrll rtegir.tental Headquartlolrs and othe r units of the r egiment ,
passed through VECHEL at 1000 . I mmediate ly after passing through the enemy cut
tho; fJa.J.n highway between VECHEL and and this detachment bcc8fJle isolated
in UOEN.
- 3 -
Tho l07th Panzer Brigade, after withdrawiq& on the tON
bridge on D I 4, moved unddr cover of darknes s to ERP, and in t he latc morning
of DI 5 launched an all- out attack to town of VECHEL and destroy the
bridges thr.:re . forc es in this €:s t imated as t hNG battall.ons
of 55 troops, suppo rt'_d by 30 to 4D tanks c.nd artil lery.
9y 1200, thoJ 2d Battc.lion 501st VECHEL - mP Rood, was being
hard pr essad . Additional t roops w.;;r<:; started tOhard VECHEL ana Gendral lk:Auliffc
was placod in comrnand of troops in the area and with d£ifansc of thQ town
and bri dges . At about 1400 enemy t anks cut tn!J nighYlay nortu<.!ast of "JECtiEL and
d€stroyt,;d t r ansport parkbd on th.., highway . . Batt ... ry 11 Bn , Blst AT Bat.taJ..ion,
at the s ame tim!:> , ;Ient. into action on t:1" hignHCI,Y c-J1d i.mru..:cii.lt ...J.y d.::str­
oyed a Uark V l eudino Tno 2d 506 t ook posi t ion on
t n.Co l e ft Ol the 2d Battalion 501, 'lith tnIJ 1st B...tt a1ion I.iDlst Glider Infantry on
its l eft . t ith t ne .3.SSi::;t CltC":' of British eo.rtil1ery from th... nighway ,
t he atti;l.ck l r o;.! BriP ll;.,.e- r ...puls;::.d by durk . At a bout 1400 .:lm.. r.lY inf.ll'lt ry , \:ith ti1llk
suppcr t, tnt.> Cane l from t tl... northw(';st t owl..rd t i) ... high'·l o..v bridge
0.1.' V:gcHBl. Company liEu , 506, \'Inieh W-'l,S in VB:liEL on i ts weyr to UDiN,
was t urned ound, deployed nOt.r the: bri d6... and r opulsad th" 'll t 'tuck; with t hEl
as si stance of o f the 44th T.:ilk ttogi t:lt:nt ,
Durine; th:; c:. f t<Jrnoon t ilL. t.ln e ..oy 1a Wlch.:ld rill i..ttt.ck to;-1n froH!
t hf.; north, und fi:wlly halko just.. short 01' ruUr o<ld bn.dg", by
t ht. 2d 501, and one pl .::.toon of Utili COIJPGl1Y, 506, which h_d t.tKCn up
:.:. ckf03nsiv.... posi non .l. snort t1.i..... b.... .:oro .
Tho..: un'..; u.y runoYicd t hdr attad..s from south <lIld durl116 toe
l a t ,- aftl.rnoon, b ut by now forc.; s had ... .rrived and .... n...r.:y ,iliS
s topped . By dC\ r k t h<:1 506 ( l ess 1s t B.1.t. t .:. lion and t h ... d.... c ut off at UDEN) ,
t he 327th Glider Infantry, t h:. Division &conncussanc<:l P13t oon, t J1...: 32lst Glider
Fio;ld nI' tillE. ry B\lU.al ion, &'tt ery liEU, Blst ,." T Satt:-J.lion, t n<.. 2d Battalion 50lst
Perachutc Inf3nt ry, and t he First ;t.l Royal rlcgimunt had
and forClod t ask !'orce unde r G....no3I"nl ".' . . ! li. charg..:d with Lloldmg tht: VKCHEL
\l r ar. .
In tho mO:ll1tifa .... th.... 1s t Batta lion of tht:: 501 i-lt t \l ckc:d at dawn :md had oc­
c upi ,;d 1111 of SCHIJNDEL by 0915 . Sor.te 400 prisoners w", r <: t.:tken i.n t liis
About 1200 orders WlO: r ", for the 1st Bht tahon to proce",d to
SCiZ0 thu to".... n, o.l. nd pr ov i de protection l or VECHEL. 'I'nt: mOV <:1ment
was compl et e d by 1700, Qlld t he b;':l.ttal i on t ook up ci. s trol16 position in
and around th.1 t own . Th..: 3rd B.:!.tt.....lion, vlhi ch had adv.:ncL:d t ow:..rd $CrUJNDl:.L in
6l'ld join;;! d forc es with 1st BJ.t".) lion in s .)i zing SC:lIJNDbL, Vias
to EK'tDE, wh<Jr<:1 took up J. guarding froo the
Y/ 0S t .
502d Inf;mtry cxt ..; nd<:d it s d.... r ,msivE: positions during the day.
Elancnts of t he 1st m3dc contact wi t h the ; rd 501 south of
SCHIJNDE.L, end j oinl;l d f or c!;s in clc&lung out s ev .Jr -Jl <:nGlIl"i' s trol16 points along tne
5CHIJNDilL - 5T. O'';DENrtODE hi.hw;,.y .
'Iho 327t.h Glider Inf ,....nt ry w... s ordor t..d at 0930 to proceed to VECiiEL,
movement b<;1gan a t 1030, t h.3 3rd Batt:J.lion by truck .:md th'"- 1st and 2d Bat tJ.l..ions
by ma rching . Tn\;; 1st and 3rd Batt:).l.i ons \'I.., r u comitt..:ld on both sid... s of t nd bridg...
LnmOJ di at ely upon :-.r rivlIl; t he 2d Bat t..alion continu\.d into VE.;HbL :..od b
ci.1tn<;: t Cl.sk
f orce r .... scrvo . Th\3 tom of VgCHEL W<.I.S hCciVily SIH.:lh:d during t h <.! l e t cl ..J'tt;rnoon
and vurly <:vvning,
Soon e f l,..or demn the enGlIW l a unchod scc.lu :l.tt ilcks th", aJjun- '
siva posihons southeast of VECHEL. 1"n",$_ '.-1 o.! f 'td tilOut. ·difficulty. .II
t n.:o night plans drawn up Ylhicn c· . .ll" d tort Kt-British iU'ffior ed
r ec::.llcd from t hE. NIJLiEGEN nl' lola, t o .ldv,:illc ... on VECtlE.L from UDlil-J , join forCeS with
t hz 2d B<ltt:J.1ion of the 506, which W'I S to advanc G from V'.t:CHEL towc.rcl UDE."J , .::.nd
cl\.p. r rO:ld in t hat til .:! flo\1 of tr .rfic might b..., r t;stJm.:!d. }-'01lo\1in.g tha t ,
t ho ArmoNd Brigade \'faS to swing sharply south t:.n::l cut off t he enemy route
throuj;h mP.

- 4 ­

can'i ed out. . '!he 2d Batt alion of th.... 506 nad1.,; cont act wi th a patr ol of t ne Ar­
mored Br igade nor theast of VECHEL aoout l 'i\XJ . By that. to", anelo\y had V"OOgun "":":I
lOSn" .
hi s wit.hdr a\ial , a:ld soon ther eaftIJr cont act was
• • ( I r·

Due to conruuni ca t i on difficulties
t hat pa. rt of t ne plan c a lling f or t he
advancl:: i n f orce and encircli ng ll'.ove.t.lcnt o f Bri t i sh Ar mor ed Brigade was not
the nor ru.ng the lst and 3rd Battal ions r <Y&djfrst':;; d
t h"" i r dCl.... "13iv.: posi tims we st and nor t h of EEfillE, and a t da:'k
wi tt .... h..:= 3r1 Bat,talion gl; nerally alont, tne ra l l r oad f rol:! th<d CMal t.o l£.:'r-f,E. and
t m 1st B...tt.aEon f r om E!!"RDE dUtl south t o the main nig:1W417 . Tho 2d
continu.::.d thd clost; in def ense of V3GHEL, with t ne ;::)6 6i', ...n o:!l,;.nsl.v..,. mis'!ions
to th... ncrtile3st and south . Tho 327th l'/as assi gned & c;,actor nort:l of
The 502d ..hlt. e InfantrJr con ti . ' .ts ddcr.su of ::5T . ,dth
tho 377tll Par"lChl:l:d F· -:.d Art':':i.lor y Batt _ in .. :mpport .
DiJrLlg t!lr.. ds.y OJ. (hid.::r s ari al ar r l.v..;!d brillbii"ig .NI..a:i.lli l"l6 <.!l..::.:ncn ts of
t he 3L'l tn Glid6r th..: 9G7th Glidar li... ld Artilll7;:r y Ba.t talion . These
t r oops to thl,.) art.:a , and tnu 907th f:it.ld ArtilleI"J
Bat ta:ion was pl ac",d in di r<Jct. s up:)or t 01' '[.:10.,: ;Ol st I nfant ry. Tnc 32lst
Gl i der }'i dd Art i h :ry Batr.alion was at tac ncd to t rw 506t h Parachutto: Infant rJ,
and fl.r <.3:c scv;.rallJi ssltJns duri n.,; t ll... day .
At da\';n roconnaiss anct:: as f ar as i Ud i cat o;.d cneny had oade good his
Withdrawal to south.Jast , and th", ar(.a \laS of t r oops . '!he 506th
Parachute Infantry, ;/i th tnc 321s t Glidc r FLld hrti ll<J r y Battah on and liD'
8lst AB sT Bat-t al l.on at tacned , wa s or d.Jr i.! d t o UO'::;'v t o t ako OVer t ne dGf cnsa of
t hat B.r1..la .
Tha vision Conrnand Post was !Joved f rolil .3T , O.t;DWrlODl:. t o VECtiEL at l OCO .

TIm 3 27th Gli der Infantr y was assigned t h ) t ask of def&nding VECHEL, wi t h
t he 90 7th Glider Fi .-;! l d Bat t alion i n suppor t. Th:J 2d Eatt al ion
501 was r .... 1Ot. s ed f r om i t s dt: f ensivu assiblu.lCnt i n Vi.GHEL and joined i t s r ct;imcnt
in t h .... EERDE area, as ltagi..-:H:.nt al Rt:s.... rvu. Battery ul'. u, 8Is t AT Battalion, conti­
nued at t uchud t o the 5Olst, wi th t h..:: 907th Glider :icld Jl.r til:cry i "!. support
The ;J2d cont inued t ha def ense of t nu ST. OEDBN..'WDE ar..::a . :a... "D",
li E", and 111-' ", the Anti-aircraft Bat tfo: rios of th..:! tHs t AT Battalion, c:rrivoJ d i n the
s eabor nl3 eche l on and war ,;! as si6nad t o th...: Division Sarvicc Ar.1C:!. nortil'o';c s t
of ZOlI.
At 1000 l aunched a ser i es of at tacks against 50:st
dl.>f cnsiv<J position, movi nC!l: froo SCHI JNDEL to'·'ard h.03:VclUUG. ?wo (:OC:f'aai zs of t he
502d wert: di spat ched t o KOEVUi,ING t o thl.s forco, r epor t .... d ·t o C{.; t ..... o tankt
and about fo rty infantryl..!,m. moved Tupl.dly, howevEr , and wer e
alClOs t in wh.... n liD" crJ.d ll ri" of tll ...: 502d arriv\,; d . The two com­
pani es h..J..d but roul d not. pr t..v"" nt ....ner:lY f rom cut t i n6 th... hl.g:hYl ay
northwes t of j us t bu!oN dark . Under covor of darkno:J s :; t he cnCf<W bui l t
up his f or cos vli t h tanks , self-prope lled artiller-J, a., d f airly l!i.rl!u i n.fantry,
US i ng th e corridor he nad f ound but w,;.... n t hl:> 501st. 1.l.'10 thoJ 502d .
Dw-ing tho ni i;ht til i.! 506tn 'with Bat t'-r i c s uB" 8ls t AT Battal ion, and t he
321s t GlidGr Fi.... l d Art i l l er y Bat t alion waS t o t o
f roCil the UDEN aTO l:!. . j,:CN o;;tn:;nt b.;!grul at 0300, and at ¢ayUght .... units wc:.ro j ust
east of VEC' rl EL. At 0915 t h\.l 506, with ony squadron 44t h noyal
attached, "'l t tuckcd t hu enemy at KOEV cltI UG . Tu", .... t t ack pr 0
r ds s od f or
so!oo 4, 000 yards , wh.:: n bOt H at t c:.ckin6: bat t aU ons ( f ormation , 1st and 3rd B.J.tt..J. i on
abr .... ast , th u main FOed) wer e pi nned down by and
aI'f.13 fir.. , m d fi r .... froln t anks dUG in ul ol'l6 t oo r oad .. 2d B ...t t:;>hon vms
t hJl ordor .... d to cXucut u ;", \'Vide ..mvlJlopm... nt of .U11.'l eneLItY ' s southern flo:mk , ....nd
i t. COVocMt ,t 1400. I n tho of the5otU£cfASSlll
, '
strong araored force s, began an advance fl'!), tne south and "CofJp:m.es
"orr and tf j-{11 t he 502d assiatE; d by proviti:'!\, bases of "ire for the attacking
forces . By darkness t he eneqy had been clear ed fraJ. all but a very sl.lall area
south road.
The 502d continued it s defense of t.h e 8T. area, the 327th its
defense of t he VECHEL area, and the ;ellst. its defense of tne area, All
t hree regi.L1ents had sever al snaIl scale me.":\,}' attacks launched against their posi­
tions durlnb t. he day .
The 506th r esur.1ed t he att.ack soon after daylibnt , and by 0900 had dr iven
the ene.uy nort.h o t' the highway and l.lade conti:l.ct with too 501st on the ri6ht. The
Br i t i sh forc es continued the attact{ to the north, pinchi.'16 out t,\e 506th and
Companies nOli and Il d l! of t he 502d. At nov tne 506 , .... it.:l at.t acru:.ent s Vias ordered
to r eturn to the UD3N area . Tu !::! I.lOVe:r..ent was cOClpleted by 1700.
The 502d continued its defe:1Se of t he 5T. OEDbtll.'ODE area, COMpanies "0" arxl
IIH" to Re6i !:lenta1 c ont rol at 1500.
The 50lst and t he 32?t h continued their def ensive mis si ons ,
r epellillt; 5r.1al1 scale enemy at tacks dlring the day.
both regiments
D /10
change in unit dispos itions .
of 501s t and 3 27th repell ed .
Sever-al ener.ty i nfiltration attempts on

- 6 ­

Di visi on HGe.dquar ters
Hq Co & UP Platoon
501s t Faracr.ute I nfantry
502d Parachut e Inf antry
506th Parachu t e Inf antry
327th Glider l ot an try
401at Glider In!'anU'y
321s t Glider Fi e l d Artill ery Bn .
907 th Gl ider Field Artil lery Bn .
377t h Parachute Field Art illery Bn .
Bl st .AS Antiai rcraft Bat tcl i on
6 th .AB :Engi neer Battalion
l Ol s t Airborne Si gnal Company
426th Airbor ne Q.uarterl'l".as t or Co .
801st .\B Or d t :al nt Co .
326th AS Company
Hq &: Hq Btr y . Di v. Arty
l Ol st AS Reconnai ssance Pl atoon
YJ. lled
TOTAL - 2]56
.. ,

Air SuPport Recuclt s 101
Thr u 26 Sept 1944
1. 20 0555 Arl.'led Reean c:.rer Ht.:nen , Neder­ Not r eported
- we t ten and Helmond.
r epor t ed et tF.ck expect ed
on Zon.
2 . 20 Se?t 1700 TRC Recan r oad fiE fron BckGt el Not r epor t ed
t o Best and r oad E from. Qir scitut
to Best. Tpnks r eported moving
t 07i'ar d Best .
3. 20 Sept Bol:l.b ar ea s/TI t o 4£1217 ? Not
t o 496415 Il/,!; to £64-:;:2. (Nun6n
to EBckst r aat} . 200

4. 22 Sept 1102 Bo;r.b roed BClokel \,:,cs t t o
r eceived
Erp. 400 t ,..nks L.nd ve:hicl es . 1310 !1 TLrgct
rccept ed. Est i ­
ru'l.t ed t imt:l of
o.r r:,v'f."l t o f ollow. "
No er Dessage.
5. 22 s ept 1315 T: ,C RecJ'1. - r ev 5240 t .M..O t o
on account
5234 t o 5834 . Bockel l nd
of weat c er . IJe
t/n of \folkel ) . ConcFntrl t ion of r epor ted .
6. 22 S.pt 15?2 Art10d Recon r O:1d Udt.: n t o Vecbel . Not r eported .
30 and inf.nt ry on
7. 23 Sept 0610 pr mod Recon ca-et H<..uvcl , Erp ,
Position of our
Bocteel nnd Krt'I"nr;c. ...r. Concon­
troops r equest ed.
t r nks vuhiclcs .
no infor ced 1000
yd s ··fety limit.
rUssion c:-ncclled
by G3 ct :>.655 .
8. 2/,. f' cpt 0905 J\rtIcd Recon I;'.r c( 5632 t o 5641
i:e.!on of VI er
t o 5932 t o 5941. T., nks I'nd 1o:)c·3d:.tle . Asked
vohicles .
f or r in- point
.Lr. t cr
mess"'sc. s"id oiss101
"..r(;t •
9 . 24 Sept 1740 Ar med Recon 1000 yd r ndius
Not r t.:ported
E 425369 . vehicl es
r n(1 r rtillery moving P,/E.
10. 24 sept 1745 Ar med Recon r.rer. So: . . ';,1
Post poned on
recount of wor ther.
Ul!.<5) .
11. 25 Sopt 0645 Armed Rt..con St . Michit:l s
Gvst el t o t o Djnt hbr
t o Bcrli cun,T"nks ,
: rti1l8ry r: nd infr ntr y .

No . Time of Request /o, r e." -r.ad of T. r g(. t Result s
12 . 26 Se,t 0744 Bomb wOo:'ds N of Cc.n; 1 in &r id
squU'cs 4340, 44J9 "539,
. Iso viII· ges of Belli. 1 'nthor
:.nd T: nks) 'J' hicles
r'Itill!;;l'J' infc.ntry .
i.skct: f or r ee'.
Could not cor-ply .
r oport 8 Huns
kil10d . Our
ness c1escriof'd
B. of t r. r gtit s
not l' t.por t ed ,
Not c-- The hour :'n the t i.""!l: of r equest is t bb tim"" thl: moasre" \'Ir S, CknOt'16{1.gcd by
t hE: Net Control The t il!ll..: of origin in m=ny crsen >'it'S much t..: xlie.r
e.UE: t o t r : mo:1itt.ing t he NCS coule' not be r O" chat! or t he n1<.; ss:'gc. wt' s
not c1cf:.1'ly r cc:::ivet' . I.ir .?upport oisE.ions l ll t t, r t hnn 26 Sept 0744 wor e h·'nr
thru Sri t ish ch,,'nn<::l& . Our ncs closen 30 ,sept 2400 .

- 2 ­

Divi sion in ojJ<.!I' ution

1. Following is a report of all
glider to the l Olst Airborne
• . D f 1
t1) Twenty-two (22) gliders, CG-4- l\, to DZ UtI! .

nations, t ype 11K" 7, 668 7, 668
Batt er.f J BA- 37
,40 540
Batt ery, BA- JB no 720
Batt ery, BA- 39 48
Battery, BA - 40 48
Batt ery, BA-41 20 20
Batt ery , BA-48 60 60
Battery, BA- BO 168 168
Viire , \1- 110 on 00- 4 miles ) 65 65
rl- 130 on 00- 4 (24 milos) 12 12
Carbine , cal . . 30 24, 0:::0 24, 000
Cal . . 30, AP, 8/clip 64,512 64, 512
Cal . . 30, AP- Tr (4- 1) bel ted
dO , ("'00
"0, 000
Cal. . 45 , 51L and Pistol 14, W U 14,000
601Ml Mortar, HE 1, 15
8laru Mortar, (It) 528 528
Doxtrose , btl. ldO 180
Sodium, Cit rate, box 120 120
Sulfanil amide , box
240 240
di st . box 480 480
Plasma, pkg. 360
Bandage , gauze , box 2, 040
pkg. 360 360
Plaster, adhEsive , apl . 240
Splint, basswood, set . 480 480
Splint, Arm;' Ring, ea. 60 60
Splint, wire ladder, 480 480
Pentothal, sodiUl!l, box 240 24U
Alcohol, btl. 120 120
Morphine , box. 240 240
Sulfadiaz1n6, pkg . 600 600
Bandaf:;i3 , plaster of pc.ris , ctn. 72U 720
Dres sing, first - aid , large , ea. 480 480
Dr eSSing, first-aid, small , 6h. 1,440 1, 440
Blanket , wool, 00, 6a. ldG 180
Litt ar , folding, alW>ll.nW,l, ea. 1:0 1:0
P£aCll'ITAGE OF R.lCOVERY OF GLID;li rilllU?eLY ,'Od D f 1
- ! ­

l 00'p
l ClO';6


l 00j;
l00' h

ANNi£X Nu. 7
- ---
(2) voe ilundred

u r 1!i!."T

D"", «CD !i.CD
R&hons ,
typ e 1ti{1I
Gasolint.. J gal s .
14, 4W
'1, 260
}, 480
.. 125
24 . 1
, , 9
?!.rlC£l·rrJ·.G::B Or' ....rtT...r"?J../IST..ili .boc.iHr..::.!Jn n.XuV&..r..D
Battery, Bh-37
Batt. ... t:·, Bk-38
Batt.:r;r , Bh-39
Battvry, B.-40
Battt.ry , BA- 41
Batt.;;.ry, B.-48
E:!..tt ....ry, B4- 60
Battery , B.-3()
Bat.kry J Bi.- 70
:'Ii re, i. - liO on IR- 4 (IJil,s)
on Dr- 4
:'. - 1.)0 on 00. - 8 (f,uIdS)
Radio, SCR- blO
R.adio , seR- JOO-.
Radio , SCR- 536
R3.dio , so;,- 694
Mino' Dat ... ctorJ SCR- 625

Stli tchbocrd , BD-71
Swit.chboard, BD-72
Mast S.-Jction
16- 49'
Sccti on," U:3- 50
UolintonanC<l Equip .,
B... ttQry , B,l-2
Batt(;ry , Bh-23
Bl!ttory, Bil-27
COil, C- 161
€ TO- 5
1£- 72
CotlVlJI't",;r , L- 209
WSSUl;\J Hook,
..xle, l!L-27- .
neal Equ."i.pm... nt , CErll
Crank, 00-4-A
Ti:!pe , TL- 83
TL- 94
Climbers, LC- 6
Tcc..l Eq..u.pr.1ent , TE- 33
TL-122- .
Lsmp, 111-35'
Gloves, Lt- lO
Test Sat , I - 56
T.:st Eq...dpm..lnt ,
D£ II " 17 . .

SIGh'-' -'
300 0 v
500 0 0
50 0 o·
50 0 0
15 0 0
)'9 100.
500 U° 0
45 II 24 . 4
8, 2B. 3
3 1 33 . 3
0 0
16 0 0
0 0
0 0
15 0 u
1 1 lOu.
1 1 100 .
10 0 0
10 -0 0
1 0 0
20 0 0
10 0 0
10 0 0
2 0 ''>
1 0 v
1,250 0 0
2 0 0
200 0 0
1 0 0
2 0 0
4 0 0
0 0
25 0 0
1 0 0
40 0 0
50 0 0
100 0 0
10 0 0
1 0 0

0 0
DZ II,,"

Cabber . JO AI' 8 c...ip l SU, OOO 0 0
Carbine, Cal . 30 427, 000 41, 664 9.7
Cal. . 30, AP, 5 clip 30, 000 0 0
CaL . JO,Dall- AP , ctn. 2iJ, OOO 60.
2 , 3bV

, .. . .
to DZ 11",," end Df.. 111\"
1, 500
. ,) II

24, 000 21, 000
53 ,760
63 . 5
50 .
56 . 0
100 .
100 .
100 .
33 . 3
87. 5
57. 5
Cal. . 30, tracer,
ctnf p
15,000 100 .
500 1, 500 100 .
DZ "A" (Cont ' d)

. JO, tr:-. cer, liP belt ed 430,000
.45, S!'.G nnd Pist ol 133 ,000
Co l. . 50 , /,P-I-T )1 , 000
37mLl Gun , SV 360
37t:t:', , HE 180
J7rL-:I C"111nist er 60
57nm , HE 600
60mm. HE 5, 850
60mr. Mort rr, Ill . 234
8lmn Uort :cr , Lt . 2 , 700
81nm Hv . 540
S::loke 162
7Sr.L"l How. HE , 54 J. , 680
75t'J:l HO'it . HE, ri48 1, 200
7Sr.m How. Smoke
1:J5:-w.: Hmi . HE, U 54 310
l:)':;;',.:"l Hon . HE, 540
IJ:'J1I.':! How . er:'loke 100
: 05L1r:l HOi/ . ! T 160
HE, 1,900
.;-,t' tln"cs, hc.nd, fr-:-.g . 7 , 200
hond , off 3, 600
{jr cl)[ de , rif l e , I' T 2, 470
Gr enr.rle , rifle , f rr.e . 1 , 000
rifle , smoke 500
I.C, J<N , (J color s) 300
Cr r t . r 1f 1e, grennde, rA6 2, 000
Cort, rifle, Bren"de, MJ
Cr rt . !'.UX . grenr:de , r{(7
Dextrose , btl. 120
Sod , Ci1:: bo)f,. 40
Sul fani box 160
c:!t:.t . , box
Plabrlla, 'pk
. 240
box 40
Cot t on, .ehdorbent , pkg . 240
Plaster, 2. ...
j,esive , spl. 160
Splint, set 60
3plint , Ar""\r Leg rt1n6
Splint , ladder, ea . 150
s C' diwr. , box
Alcohol , ethyl , qt.
r:l co. lol , d'-l . t ..1I' ed, pt . 12
L:.or.t->l1i ne , box 125
i r.n' peT IJ.IT PCT
21.6 120,000 I ao,ooo - 66 . 7'")""'"
66 , 600 50 . 33 ,000 10 , BOO 32 . 7
:-'6 , 710 86 . 1 1, 320 1,320 100.
17 . 7 _
0 ­

;: , 253 • 606 300 49.5
540 100. ill 60 54 .
162 100. 33 33 100 .
500 29 . 7
505 42 .
u o
353 44 .1
o Q.
o O.
o O.
1, 419 74. 7 240 100 41. 7
2 , 275 31. 5 1,200 900 75 .
o o 600 o 0
250 10 . 1 260 .210 80 . 8
150 15 . 100 90 90 .
140 :18. 50 50 100 .
o O. 100 o O.
o O. 200 150 75.
200 150 75 .
200 o O.
DZ fl \"! 11 32 . 7
30 . 25 . 18 6 33 . 3
30 25 . 6 4 66 . 0
40 · 25 . 24 8 33 . 3
10 25 . 6 6 100.
60 25. 36 12 33. 3
10 25 . 6 6 100 .
60 25 . 36 12 33 . 3
40 25 . 24 8 33 . 3
10 16 . 6
9 9 100 .
10 25 . 6 2 33 . 3
30 20. 15 15 100.
10 25 . 6 6 100.
2 o 0
1 8 .3 6 4 66 . 6
30 24. 25 a 32.
50 22. 2 .,4 20 5a . 8
10 25 . 6 6 100 .
70 23 . 3 45 16 35 . 5
240 25. 156 4!J 30 .7
30 25. 24 6 25.
10 25 . 6 2 .J3 . 3
10 20 .
7 o 0
DZ ",."
pkg .
plaster paris
Drcssin&, f1r st - aid, small
wool, 0 . 0 .
Litter , folding, aluminum
lureJ gauze , roll

Grer.ade , hand , smoke , He, Md
hand, incend 1.:lrY , A.N - 14
Grenade , Iland , SIIlOks, .IP , •
- 3-
52 . 2
25 25
12 12
62 25
Chemical \jarfare (Cont ' d)

Grenade, hand, sMoke , colored , ii- lS, ora.rlge 1< 12 100.
Grenade , "nand , smoke, colored , .Ll- ld, grt::e.n 6 6 100.
Grenade , hand , smoke , colored , .:..- 16, r eo 6 6 100 .
GF .wtFJl.t(.!:o; h....COJ.ch.cJ) - 90 .
Compos1tion , C- 2 250 250 · 100.
Caps , blasting , special , non- electric l5 o o.
ruse, blasting, tim!:! , (100 ' roll) 1 o o.
Fuse , lighters 25
o v.
rrima--cord (100' roll) <
O. o.
136.6s , sand 500
o u.

p Qf 1!iJGlNE.&.Jt E.lU.I.?W!NT r-..ECuVcltED
16. 6
PERCbilTnG" OF &J;O/utY or' rtbBUfPLY ,A., 0 I 1
Glidor - l Q(Yp
PrCllt . - 39 . 6)'
b . D I- 3
(1) Tnirty- five (35) C-4? y. 't, " to DZ U\j ll (By Parachute)

...If A...!"I' ?CT
DEL kCD • .cD
t1.ations , t ype "K"
9, 120 216 2. 4
)ae;s , vl.nyl 205
10. 5
."..J.c;';IIT,GE QUAHT!!lll.IASTER l TEiZ RECO/ElillJ
6. 5%
•.:EDI C;u'
wool , O. D. £,700 600 22. 2
Litters, f old ing '<72 120 44.1
Bundles , ili sc . 12 5
Radio , SCa- 694 4
2 50.

Parachute - JO .B»
c . D I 4
(1) Thi rty (30) C- 47 plane. to Dl w,." . (By paracnute)
I5Urut l.o!.ttl.....tSTI!R
Rations , type "I\." 13, 960 4, 320 30 .9
PIihCDI 'UGE 01' RF£OVThY OF rtESlJI'PLY "Ott 0 I- 4
Parachute - 30 . 9!.o
d. D I- 6
(1) Four (4) g liders CG- 4- A to Ol lI , jl ll.
- 4 ­


R.:l.dio ,
:·t",di o ,

Batteries ,

:-)atter it::s ,

Tape ,
p..:... iCL.::T.. OF

.J!T peT
D:',1 RCD

20 20 I OU.
SCR- 536
4 4 100 .
,facii o, sen-610 2 2 100.

100. 4 4
OA- )O 1, OW 1, 000 100 .
Bh- 39
150 34 22 .6
fu .-hO
25 24 96 .

100 72 72 .
Books ,
300 50 16. 6
IL- 5J 100 leO 100.
1'1- 94 lOu 100 100.
Flas.!light, TL-lU - :, 1...; 0 l W lOU.
SlGNJJ. E . .:UIPt-ii!.NT R..oI£Ov.ltED
Gun- s ub- :llaC!linc , ' Al
15 15 LOO .
....ortar, 6OJam, U2 2 2 100.
gr enada, U? 8 8 100.
gr ;;:l1ade , £.is
5 5 100.
<,loth, 'lliping, Ibs . 200 200 100 .
cotton, 10 10 100.
".......aiator, 1/4 ton truck 4 4 l OO .
Kit , tiro r epair, cold patch 6 6 100.
ft..flfj , U. S. Cal. . 30 , :.l 20 20 100.
OF ORDN;lfCE 3'.;UI Plli:NT 100%
e . D I 8
(1) Thirty- foUI' (34) C- 47 ,>l U.1:::3 to DZ 1; ,11 • ( By parachute)
75m:n Ho-,j . amnunition 2, BOO l , 6CO 64. 2
?EaC;;:l'iT"Gb Or' ru;sUNLY i,,"CU'iEltY FOd D I 8 64 . ;;tj,
f . Percentage of of r esupply for ent ire operation.
GIlde r -
Prcnt . Resu!)vlJ.' - 41.4:.0
2. resupply recovered by units and not to D1vision dumps
not in "Lotals as figur es "'lere not r eported .
3. The r eport is a ch'! ar indic :ltion that glide r !,6suppl;).· is considcrabl,;{
.'!lor e as practically 100)' of the contents of c;lidoars was rt:lcov er ed.
4 . !'he last by air on D I 8 gives the best gauge on eff activeness
of parachut e r esupply . i.CCOrdine:: to reports from tho r ear "\.l ase, tnirty - foLlI' 1.34)
planes "W1t h six rc..i.c k loads and thri::le door loads each l'lere delivered. ./'.11 r ':"CI{
l oads were dropped in a ver y small area. and werE: recov e red wl.tnin a f ew hours .
door l oads 'hCr a seen COmill5 down . Tui s is eithtll' all i ndication t hat door loads
dis char ged far from t he ta.rget arca or t ne door loads wer f; act.:JalJ...:y not loaded.
5. li3s upply by co uld bt. cffcct lV<.3 if only rac;': loads were us ed and
all pl anas discharged t llui r l oads oVur "LIlo idontl.l'l.catl.on ("Juker s on 1...11e 6round.
: t. is believed that door loads snould not normally be used as it caUSGS too gr eat
to dl.sp.-.:rsion of supplieS and might enable tn3 enem,y to obtain a very (ugh percant age
of the total dropped .
under fire s hown
t he operation to be put
no special pointing
da rknes s.
Carr ier
r ayi dil:.:,-
mis61. 0nS
co;,lplete •
an entire Airborne divi IO ion with the sole mission of securing the field.
6 . AIR HESUPPLY. Operation MAtiKET provided valuable lessons in air
ht prescnt, the data are not complete so that conclusions arc t ent.c.:.tivo . iiowt;; ver,
it Has amply iJrOV od t hat glider resupply is much more ,d'ficient than supply by
parachute. The latte r was only about and would have been
in t o maintain tnl.s Divis:J..On for a n, pur l.od. ExpEOrH::nCd i n
Opera tion MARKET eMphasiZes that air r asu:.J., :.;,,!b. ins an dtn.:..r gc cy method wi t:t a
long way t.o go be:'or e it can bu rdi-ed upou -to stJP!=Jort Ai rborn() troops l.n nuw{.1;'
for a n l.nde hnl.t '" }J'Criod.
- 1 -
10131' AlliBlJt.:J..-E. D:LV IS! "
OffJ.ce of t. he Div ision COn:n.:
• V
, ,

APe 472, U. S. ,.MW .... r.
Il Oc t obOt' i
Purticipation of the l Olst Air borne Dl.vl.sion in Oper ation l.iI.ri.h..:1'l' for
the period 0 - 0 I 10
General, Fl.rst Allied Airborne Army
(Tnr u COIr.rranding General, XVIII Corps (Ab)
'Ihe attached report on Operat i on t1ArlIGf.T prepared by Brigadier General
Higgins is forwarded approved (lith the follovling COO'UD.f:mts .
fro,:!. all other Airlx>rne operations and exercises in the and
of t.he 0 day landings . Apart from the navigati onal skul and steael. ness
by Troop Carrier pilots, tho factor tI'k)st to this
\1a3 the decision to stage the operation in daylight . Dayll.g ht allowed
on successfully with a .mini.mum of preparation. There
for Operation l'.iArtl'.ET on the part of All'bome Troops wnere",s
full-dress rehearsal would have been indispensable had the operat.ion been l.D
Day light simplified the marshalling and pilotage problems of' Troop
COJ, ..Inand as ·lIell as the assembly of Airborne troops on the g round . The
of t his assemgl.Y permitted the of the bround
on Because of the accruing advantages it is felt that consi­
boldnesd is in choosing dayli
nt ratner than darkness for an
operation if, as in .,.AR1,:ET, the enem,y is on t :1e run and air supremacy
.3. RJ... 'fE OF BUILD-U? OF THE 101ST AThBO:ti-iZ OI'; ISION. It required seven
days to brinb in all Airborne elernents' -;('·t:1e lOlst Airborne Dl.visl.on. During
t hi s time t he Division was obllged to prot ect t he landi l'll;. field .ntn considerable
. forces carryi ng out its s:r oWld missions . This r equirement for lap.dint; f :LeI d
prot. 6ction r ed'J.ced the strength available for tne essential tasks of the Division.
This inevitable dl.version of s Lre!l6tn l.S a factor which lnust be borne L"1 mind in
ass 7&.gning mis51.0ns to an Airborne Division.
4. TR.(X)P Cp..Rtt. .Illi uN TrlE General Higgins in parabrsph
4 f com.ments on the need of an Air Force control unit on tile 6 lider fielo . 'IHi s
would nave been most useful in and should not be oV(:;l"look,:,d in .future
Airborne operations. , A Troop Carrier officer on the growld could have radioed
back local \'leather conditions and exercised air traf f ic control. Also, he could
have rela,red the latest information regardil1& the tactical situat.ion on the
ground, t .IUS preventing air formations from flying OV er a battle in progress.
5 . C(US'f:RtcTION OF LANDING STRIPS. Operation iJARKi:;T included plans for the
construction of landing stri ps to bring ill air tra{!sported units and supplies.
This was never possible because of im·emy action adjacent to the narr ow corrJ.dor
along the Eindhoven- Arnhem oighway. And the absence of adequate troops to clear
and control the necessar,r landlJ1g fie ld area. As toe situation is always going
to be extremely uncertain whenever Airborne troops land hostile lines,
the construction and protection of a landing field does not appear f easible without
7. GROUND 0,) TIONS OF r:lli, 1015'1' .l.. IRBOtNZ DIVISION . Th e l.nitial bround
mission of the Division r equired its in threo ar", as alont, a corridor
about fifteen miles in l ength. This dispos ition made: the Airborne troops \"I oak
at every critical point CLnd made: n.;cessar:, tho most Stlutiflb of troops
to moet the nutr.orous threats as they along this long- ce.'ridor , Had
anything l ass t han a superior parachut..:. drop beon received thQ lussi on oiJht ,.e ll
have fail ed, wholly or in par t . AS it Vias, the issue hung in b nice bal anco on
several 'occasions bdfore the Airborne troops r ", stored the situat ion. {;xp<;l r i­
once by tho Division gavD r onc'Woc force to tho cCClviction t llut an .... i.l'bomo
division is capabla of eXdr tl.ng a st..rollg effort in but a single direction Cit. a
given t ime .

Major Genoral, USA,
Commanding .
- 2 -


• •
Office of the Asst. Div .
APO 472 , u. S. Army
12 October 1944
SUBJECT: Report on Operation
TO Conmanding General , lOlst Airborne Divi
1. GENEaAL: In accordance witil verbal instructi ons Commanding General
l Olst Airborne Division, the 20110'llin5 report on the p articipation of the l Olst
Airborne Division in Operation MARKET i s her eby submitted. Thi s r eport covers
the operations of the l Olst Airborne Di vi s i on fr om D to 0 I 10 inc l usive (Sep­
tember 17 to 27, 19M.) . The repor t is divided into three parts : First , the
r.tOvem.ent of personnel and equipment froiT: t he UK to tne cor.!hat zone in a parachute
echelon, a glider echelon, and a seaborne echelon; second , t he tactlcal operetions
of the DivisJ..on , and units thereof, from t he init i a.l l anding by parachute until
D f 10 inclusive, at which titre thtl tactica l situa.t ion became JUor e or less sta­
bilized; and third, general cOOl.ment s on various 0 perat l.onal and administr at i ve
matters peculiar to an airborne operation .
2 . kVV];;lEtlT TO Ca mAT ZO)IE :
a. Parachute Echelon : Tre parachute eChelon of the l Ols t Airborne
Divi sion consisted of 436 C- 47 transport pla!1es car r Jing SOlue 6, I1.cYi parachutists
of the Division . Four hundred twenty- rour planes dropped on D-Day , and 12 planes
carrying Battery IIBu, 377tn Parachute Fiel d Artillery Battalion, with 140 person­
nel and 6 guns, dropped on D f 3. Of the 436 planes which took off, 434 dropped
parachutists in a highly satisfactory oanner (center of impact \iClS some 1, 500
yards short of the se l ected DZ in one case and about 3 miles nor thWes t of the
selected DZ in another casl::l. In both cases hOYlevtr, the drop pattern was excel­
lent and all parachutists of the serials were dropped Only two planes
failed to drop parachutists on t he selected DZ's, and t hese two planes we re shot
down on the night in and prior to the D2 '.s . All paracnutists jumped
from these planes, and 8 from on e plane 8l1 d 2 frolll Cllother event ually joined the ir
uni ts i n t hf:! combat zone . J ump casuali tcCi '" i)!'e less toan 2% of the tot al number
jwnped. The av er age time of asse{,lbly was b.t.vut one hour for each bc..ttal ion. All
initial obj dctives i'lcr e r eached prior to darknes s . Rccov(;: ry of equipi,tent averaged
oyer Four p l anes preceded the serials by 15 mi nutes . Thr ee of
the planes dropped witoout incident on the s elected DZl s. One plgnEl was shot down
several miles short of the DZ in o::neruy territory and no info r mation i s available
on t ilis p lan;:;. (For details of parachuti:l e che lon, see Annex No . 1) .
b, Glider Echelon: A total of 988 CG4A Gliders took off from depar­
turi:; bases in t ha UK ove r a peri od of 7 days. S<::ven hundred and sixty- seven of
these g liders landed wit hout incident on t he dc:signated Ll. Approximat e ly 5, 000
men took off from the UK and some .4, 800 eventually joined. their unit s in the
COli'bat Some 30 6: liders art! lUlaccounte d for on this dat e, practically aU
of which are assurncd to have dropped in enemy t erritory. The glider lift on D12
Vias disp<:: r s;;;d be cause of he avy fog encountt:l rcd over Channel and along the
coast . Of sam.; 384 gliders that took off' on this date, only 2D9 lande d safely on
the desi gnat e d L2, Many others r e turned to the UK or landed on the continent in
enemy or fri e ndly territory. No further gl id.e r Serials wer e floVin afto;;r D f. 6,
but 50ao 5<X> p..Jrsonnal and '}s s.;ntic:i.l equiJXl i31 t ','Ier e flown in by C- 47 transport
to Bruss els Airport and join..,d tht::ir units in tne combat zont! by D flO. (For
Qe tails of g lider echelon see Annex No .2),
c. Seaborne Echelon: The scat:Jbrne e chelon of the Division conSisted
of 1077 and 444 ve hicles of all types . Thl.s eClle lon loaded on D t 1 and
saile d from SOU'I'HAMPTON on 0 t 2. It a rrived a t OUAHA 8:E...aCH on D f. 3, -where it Vias
divided into two serials. The first serial, l eft t he beach on th..; lllorning af 0 t J
and arrived at BOURG-LEOPOLD on the evonlng of D t 4. It closad in the Division
service area at ZON on t hd evening of D t 5. The se cond s.;rial OMAHA BEACH
on the evening of D .; ) , arrived at BOURG - lEOPOLD on D t 5, and closed in the
Division serv i ce area on t he ev..,ning of D f 6. . (For details of se aborne ecnelon,
see An nex No . 3) . .....:;,
..... .. ....
- 1 -
s1 ....

a. The Division mis sions called for the seizure of the four
and railway-bridges over the Aa RIVEtt and uI LLEMS VAART CANAL at VECHEL; t he seiz­
ure of the highway bridge over the D01lliEL rlIV:Hlt a,t ST., OEDE..!'iftODE; tne sei zure of
the highway bridg.:= over t he \ilIHELMINA CANAL at ZON; .and seizure of BINDHOVEN
and the raain hignway .bridge s ov er t !1e s'treams in The' Divisl.on objec­
tiVdS were aver a road di s tance of some fifte.en I41es: "
, ' " J •
b . Thb 501s t Parachute Infantry, landing .on nit s 'rl bar VEGHEI:,.
s e i zed all four brid
es without Tne' Parachute-Intantr-.f l andect near
ZON, and with one battalion Sei zed the main hiGhway br.idge . ne ar 51. OEDl£NHODE.
The 506th also landed near ZON and seized the C<ll1ctl cr ossing , but only aftl:T t he
enemy "had blo....n the b r i dge . The 506th s eiz;;d EHmHOVEN shor t ly aftl:! r noon the
next day .
£. In an effort , to secure an ,' Ilat ,e crossi ng over t he \UIJ!EL:dINA
CANAL, and also to bloCk ,m0f.'C tl'a ffic be . 1 Eli'WHCNEN and Hm'IOGElffiOSCH, one
c ompal\Y ,of' the 502d vms dispatcned to seiz.... 'the hi tihWaJ bridge ne ar This
comp.:my seized a!.1Ci h<Jl d the bridgt:! for a f ew hour s , but was driven orf just before
dark. The e null\}· 'r ushed strollb r e i nforcements to t his point, and flt:avy casualties
were suffe r e d by both sidcs in t he stiff f ighti ng thc.:.t t ook pl ace 'on D f 1 a nd
D t 2 in t he a ttempt to sccura t his cr ossing. The bridge was finally blm-m by the
enemy before it could be captured, but forc e defending it complet e ly
wi ped out';" "
.2. On th (: of D f 2 tho:: enemy made u. r aid on t ho:: brid6e <:it ZON
with tanks u.nd self-prop<31lJ.:d g un s , Solie darlluge 'flas cd.usa o, but the bridge was
he ld inta.c t. next morning a n enenw 'tank - i nfa.ntry a ttack was Il'!.:lde , but was
he l d off . The 506th, riding British made an attempt to cut the a ttacking
force off fr om t he south, but thc held h iOlY points and e ve nt ually withdrew
his forc os i n good ordGr ,
£. On the morning of D f 5 tha enemy s eve r ed t he rr.ain highway be tween
VECHEL and UDEN, and made a strong a ttempt to seiZe t he to''" of VE,;HEL and destroy
the bridges . All ava i labl e elements of thd Division r usned t o the vicini ty,
a nd as they ;lI'r ived t hr oughout. t he day were formed into a t ask force under Gener a l
McAULIFFE and di sposed to t he enumy threats . Confused f i snting continued
dur .irlg the ent ire day and lat c into t he night , with infantry ano wnxs a ttacki ng
froll! sever .."l directions simultaneous ly. Enemy pen<:!tr a tiop5. wer... made to within
500 yards of t he bri dges , but were eventu.... lly b eat ..,n back. Thl; at tack was r ene\ied
the next morning , but the de f enSe held firmly'. The 2d Battalion ' 506t h then
attacke d towards IJDEN, and I'lade cont act with C:1 patr ol of the Guards Armora d Divisi Oi
a dvancing on VECHEL from UDEN. Tht! enotny was forc ed t o ;iithdr aw t oward EHP, and
the r oad r eopened. By dawn the next mornin.; t.lla ene[1IY had withdr awn from t he
VECHEL area to t he southeast.
f. On t he af t e rnoon of D I 7 the ent:my attacked from the nor thwes t,
cut nw.in highway between VZCHEL and ST. OlWENRODE, and took up a defonsive
POSit ion astride the road. Toe 506, with tanks at t ache d, attacked on the [,lorning
of D f 8 C:1nd by dark had driven the c'nemy frola all but a portion of this position.
The next morning t he attack was continued, in conjunction with Briti sh Armor ad­
vancing in 'f or oe from ST. OEDENRODE, elld the road clear e d .
6.' From time of landing to D lID, the enemy probed the Division
se ctor s continuously, <!Il d many Sllie.ll skirmishes occurrdd uach day . Defensive
positions, t ile main highway , and t he bridges ove r the Canals and rivers wer e sub­
to inter /uitt ent artille ry and mort,!!, fire . city of EINDH9V£N W1l6 ,.;.
heavily ,bomood on t ht;! evening of D f 2 . (For a",
Annox N
.4). ';\ •
4. co:mh:NTS :
.@:' Ci\sualti es : From D to D f 10 casualtius of the l Olst
Airborne Divis..on were as fOllows : Kille d - 3 - 1436 ; missing - 547; or
a grand t ot al of 2, 356 non- cffectives , of a , 112 who th!:.l combat
a rea. (For detailed r eport of casualties, see 5).
- 2
• •
£. Prisoners : A tot al of 3,511 prisoners were captured by the 101st
Airbor ne Division f r om D to D f 10, '....1.' 'til
£ . Evacuation: 326th Airborn\) riedical Company arrived in the
co.wat a r ea i n t.,.;o echelons. The first echelon, consistl.n6 of 52 mOdlCi:\.l person­
na l including en att ached surgical team, arrived in 6 CG4A Gliders on the c..fter ­
noon of D - D3.Y . The second cenelon consistirlg kc?'''-
Glide rs, arrived on t i'kl af t ernoon of D 11. ,
first echelon , a t empor ary hospit al w... s set up e , n ,.
l ending f i eld . First casualties were a . 500 at tfle major
surgi cal opGr ation W3S per for med . At 1800 a hospital at ZQN was taken oVer and
personnel end equipment moved. The t rcatfil.:nt of casualties was carricO on under
very good condit i ons . By 2400 D - Dc;,y , 107 had been admittt:!d and. trea­
t ed at Uua hospital. Upon the ar r ival of t he s econd ocneloll , litter bearor and
ambulance sections we r e sant to thGir r egiments and from
r egimenta l and battalion aid stations was quite r apid. By th\; morning of D t 2,
contact was es t ablished with the 50lst at '- '"1J. <l<"ld an att<:!.ched pl J.tor)fl of the
50th Field Hospital WuS sent to establisL ,_t.ion at VECHFJ. . Tr.e i" ):ird
Col l ecting Comp<.m;)' establish..:d contact "lit l tj,":' iJc:dical CcroPll:1Y at 1500
on D t 2, <.!1ld l.ni.t.ial eve:.cuation begun to .. he 24th Evacuation Hospit.al at BOU:tG­
LEOPOLD. Due to tactical r equirements und the large amount of traffic moving
north, l ittl ,;:; evacuation was until 0615 D f 3 , at Which time normal
ev a>! uation On D f 3, 30 1J.!Ilbulances ..1l1.d 4 - t on trucks evacuat ed all
av ai l able cases to the 24th Evacuat i on Hospital at BOURG- LEOPOLD. From D t 3 to
D flO, immediaw evacuation of casualti es took plac e .
1. Air Support: In for air support missions were
handl ed satisfact ori l y by means of th,= Air Support Party which landed by Glider on
D - Dey , Bad transmission difficulties , and higher pr ior ity missions
r esulted in maly r eq IJes ts bGing or to be flown . (See Ann",x No .6 ·
for detailed r eport).
e . Glid er N.eception : Anticipating consider able confus1.on in unit
assembly when a number of gliders l snded on ont: field, a Di visl.on glider
r e ception par ty consisting of 5 offi cers and 20 enlisted men frol,t v'".l'i::l us Wlits of
th<;! DivislOn came ill with "the first g,lider echelon on D - Day . ';'h1.5 party fWlC­
tioned extremely well Dnd in grcnt part was responsible for tht.. r apid ortifJrly
of units . c ar ef ul briqfi."6, it was found iJDpro.ct1.cab1e to
exp.:lct t o l and near predeterIiuned points or :in small tU'eHS or The
most prac t icable solution appdars to be to station at many points ovur the
entire l anding ar ea and have t hl::l sEl gUlde s go to th.,;: near est when thc::y l and,
orient t hem, and give ther... the a ssembly point s elect ed for the unit. This hLCt hod
worked very well and in .:.11 but a f ew cases , units ass <3mbl od r apidly and wi t hout
C.onfusion .
f, Air Force Control Uni t : I t believed desir able to have a seni or
officer from the Troop Car ri er COlrmand ar r:"vc with the fi rst ecno.lon of glider s in
a situation of t his kind , He should be provided with a r adio set capable of direct
convnuni cation with a contr ol station at the departure ai r fields . In this way, he
could tr ansmit on-the- spot i nforme.tion as to conditions, the tOl. ctical si­
t uation, end t oo g lider that are for t he r eception of that gl ider
lift. It i s believed t hat many planes Wl::l r d UIU1eci::ssarily Shot down by passi ng
over enemy s trong poi nts, and which could been avoided hnd l at e infor ­
mation been given t he pi lots as to t he t actical s ituation.
g . Us e of Glider Pilots : Tht: need for a r egula rly constituted t acti­
c al admbl i strative or ganization of glider pil ots on t his
oper ation . the pilots joined their t Ci. ctlc ..... l organuation ait.; r
l anding and open:tod und er the senior officer of t h.::.t organiz&tion . Actually, it
was fo r any one officer to control large numbPr of glider pilots
who arrived in t he combat area. T"nere wer e fil ,my .insti!.nces of indivldua.l pilots
l eaving assi gned and Glider pi lot s we r e f or
prot t:ction of var lOUS ins t allations near LZ, the Division CP, and the Division
Service Ares, and in gener al, performed work i ndi vidur'. lly" S"! vo:;! r al
voluntarily joined combat troops and pur ticipat cd in ground fighting in the
vicini ty . It i s believed th"Lt an or ganization in which t hE:: chain of COJ,II.Th.lOd is
s trongly is if gli der pilots arc t o mos t dfficiuntly in
an airborn. operati on . ... .r,' I r. ""', I'
h . Resuppl,y :
5. A final r ~ p o r t will be subrrJ..tt ed . 'n the: Division completes ~ t s par­
ticipation in the Holla!ld campr..i.
n . , .


'!he parac hut e echelon of the Divis i on began its drop at 1300 on J
September 17, 1944. The 501s t Par achute I nfant r y , with two platoons 326t h
Airborne Battalion attached, dropped on two DZ ' s j one miles west
VECHE.1. GIld t he otHer some 3 mil es northwest of VEGH3L. The Regiment , less the
1st Bat.t alion, l anded on Dl "A" west of VECHEl, proceeded to t hat t o;,n Mol bY ii\
1500 had s eized all i nitial objectives which were the two Highway Eridges arid t'
t he two Hoo.i l r oad Br idges over the l,lILLEMS VAART CANAL and t he An rtiver .
r esistancd was encount er ed on t his DZ ; The 1st Bat tal ion l anded on DZ "1.._111 ,
i n t he vicinity of assembled and r eached VECHAL by 1700 . The 1st
Battalion r ecei vdd some from scat ter ed enemy troops t he vi cini ty
of the DZ. Som; r esi s t ance from. scattered enemy gr oups was enoount ered ill the
t aking of VECHEL, but no or ganized defense of t he town was made by the enemy .
At dark the r egi ment was Vle ll dug in and set to defend the t own agdnst any
att. ack . All br i dges were seized in- t act . The Engineer Detacl'b1l8!1t imme­
di atel y began t he construction of a s econd bridge across t he iiILI.J:::...;s VAART
CANAL in order to per mit. t wo-way t r affic if the situation so r equired .
Tne 502d Parachut e Infant r y witn three platoons 326t h lb.rbor n.:l Engi neer
Bat talion at tached , l anded on Dl IIBI1 without enemy 0PiJos i tion and all bat t alions
\I,81'e as sembl':'l c by 1500. The 1st Battalion .proceeded to ST. and af t er
a skirmish, seized the town and its objective, the br idge over t he IXA!.lli'L nI VER,
in- t act. Thi s Batt al ion then pr oceeded to dig in and at dark had the
well in hand . GClInpuIV 11 HI ' of the 3rd Battali on proceeded to t he Br i dge
a t BEST; secured i t initially against l ittl e enemy r eslstance , but wa s f orced to
witndr aw j us t before dark by r eason of a strorl5 .m.;my cowlter at.tack. '!'he r emain­
der of t he 3d Batt :;.lion was then dispat ched to j oin "H" Company , nith or dE:: r s to
SE:! C\lr c t ho bridge the nr:: xt morning . The r emainder of t ile negi.m,;,.,t went i nt o
Divi sion Heser ve i n t he vicini ty of WOlFS.c.VI NKL .
The 506th ParllChut e Infant ry 1.::.11d.;;o on DZ "c" wit hout enemy opposit i on .
Compani es of 1st BattJ.1ion depart ed Ulffid01<.ttcly ...;it hout. f ormal assembly in
an effor t to tne t hre.., bridges t he . \1llifi:.UlINA ChN.-\L in t l'k. vicini t y
of ZON t hq could bot blown by t he eneu\y . SC<"l. t.t lol r ed .m..mlY r .., sist.mco was
encounter ed before r eachi ng the main br idge Wld forward o}...:ruents .... i thin
100 yards of thi s bridge when i t Vi as blOom by t ha r etr eating i3!1Gr.'.y . ( I t was
found t hat t ha otner had bean blown seve r al bef orE::) . The
Regim6l1t .ct:lgan t he crOSSing of t he Canal by various expedi ent s , and by 2400 the
entire r egiment was on t he south s i de of the Canal had 3 bridgehead exten­
ding socre 2, 000 yar ds .
The Command Echelon of Divi Sion Headquarters j umped with t he 502d Par a­
chut e Regiment and est ablisned an initial Command Post at ZON. Som.:: 70 glider s
additional Command personnel , the Pl atoon, Si gnal and
Medi cal per sonnel , and some t ransportation for the combat units, on the
LZ about hour aft er t he parachute landings . Overall time of l andi ng of a ll
:md glider s was and one- half hours. Communication was es tab­
l i shed with all el e.nents except the ::01 by dark on this dat e .
D i 1
50lst Parachute Inf antry continued t he defens e of throughout
the day. Communication was es t abll s hc:d witn Di vi s ion at 0600 . Sever e. l light
enemy wer e r epul sed, but no major e ffor t to town was made.
The .lst Batt alion of t he 502d Para chut<3 Infantry continued to hold 5T. OEDENXODE
and likewise r epelled sev,;r.ll l ight {: nc.rny attacks . Thg 3r d Br:.t t alion of t he
502d at t .acked at f i r st l ight in an ef for t to the HighWay Bridgl: at BEST,
but heavy casualties at t he hands , 0£ t ne for Ce whi ch ha d been
strol"..g ly r einforc ed durAng t he night . Tn", 2d B:::.ttalion waS then or der ed to
assist 3r d Battalion in s e curing t hc bri dges . Tho BJ. ttal i on penetrat ed to
t he outskirts of but w...:s f orclold to withdr aw by h<.;;J.vy artille ry J morta:r:,
an Sl'll fufd to oK up a as .; ns iv i:l position on the. l eft of t ne 3r d
Bat tal ioh . At dark t he enti r e r egiment l e ss t hu 1st Battalion was in a
posi t i on e<).st of the hi ghway f aclll.£ t.h13 enemy def enses a r ound the Highway Br idge
at B&'l T.
Tho 506th Par achut u Infantry ) r d Battalion l eading, advanced
on EJJlDHOVEN at fh'st light . · The. Jrd ..!.:m wes huld up a t one mile
north of th:: city, 'by enemy The.2d Battalion made a wide
enveloprilt:mt to of city, outflu.-lked the enemy def ensEls , and seized
t hoJ 1300. Cont act waS with a Brit.i sh Fc.cconnaissWlca Patrol at
1215 north of and l'lLt-:l the main Britian Forces :J.t 1900 just. south of
city. At dark ttK. Regi.J:J.ent. : ....as ·i.n controi of tnQ cllt ir..; city iind ... :i.n
position dufcnding thu important in tn& city whicn Vlerc: the (lat.")
obj.;:ctivds .
At about 1530, 428 c_rrying the 3rd of 327th,
Ehs inccT uatt&lion, the. r e.'J.aindcr of· tn", Mudicc.l l.!..'1d Signal CO.°.lpunies .
clam.e°nt.s of tne 377th :Parachute Field Artill-ery aattalion, and additi.on ... l supply
and e.dministl' ;.:.tive arr ived in the area. Tllo:I 3rd B3. :'i:.al . cn of
t he 327tn w<J s assignoJd mission of providing local protact.l.on for t l .,.; LZ and
the· Division service a Na.
British Forces re.:'l.ched sOllth sida of C;mul at ZeN at
2lOC and tha construction of a acr oss Canal .
Dt 2
The bridge the Canal was coo:.pl Gtcd duri ng nigh.. uud at 0615
l eaoing of tntl HOllSeholQ Cavalry ;md Guards Amo:t'dQ Divif:lor, b",gm
cr ossing. These s ame l oJacing ell:t.lcnts JkA.ssed throU6n ST . :.nd Vb;CHEL
by 0645 . One Squadr on of tht; 15/19 Huss<ll'S Was attached too tne 50bth at 3lNDHOVEN
and O:lC Sou.:ldron to the 502d at ZOH.
- '.
" en Comparct of thQ 5Qlst was to send on'::'! platoon to DINF:i . Rf: port;
from this COf.!;>any indicated the t:me.rny w<.:.s j , somd forc<J in unci aroW1d t.ms t o\.'n.
'Ih e 3d Batt c.lion of' tho[:! 501st w;;s order.... '; .. 0 , .• C:Nd from VECHEL to .EER.DE and take
up a strong ,cef&n3ivQ position at ·that point. . remainder of the 501st con­
tinued in u close in defense VECHEL and during t !h.; th 2d Batt 3. lion
r ..pul s{;d an enemy attack froni the northvl(';st at. oVer 250 u....l ::!ntryme.n .
During the evening, COlOpany liEU was driven hack frem its out.pn;t position
about 200 Y:D"ds by a well executed night att a ck by enomy par3.chllt.i3tS .
Fir st of continued i n t he defonse of ST.
The 2d Battalion att<:.cked a.t 0600 in att empt to seiZE:: the highw2Y bridge
at BEST. This a. tt ack was r epulsed by t he enemy. At 1415 the Rdgiru'>;o'!1t, h:S5
t h.; 1st B.:. t tz.lion, by one squadron of t ho· 15/19 HllSsars , D.
co-or dinattld .tttack age. i nst the enemy posit i on. TI1is attack: WdS VGry
end seized at l sba. · Fifteen 88rnm guns were destroyed, 1, 056
prisoner s taken, -nd over 300 dead loft on the after this battlc .
The 506th P<:rachute Inf..a1try strong points east and
of EINDHOVEN continued patrol s wi th the s quadron of the 15/ 19
A thir d glid€ ;: r lift to ·ut about 1400 carrying t he 1st and
3rd B<>.ttulions of the 327th, the Bl st Anti- Tank Ba.ttalion, th d 377th Parachute
Fi eld Art illery B.:tttal ion (less Bat t ,,;ry. "Bn), and t hG 907th and 32lst Gli der
Fi eld Arti U.., r y Battalions. Due to fog ttnroute , only a porti on of
these units urr i,ved . . EltU:lcnts . of 32?th 'wero gi. wn the mis si an of prote:cting
t he landing fi Gl d and as sist i ng: t hll attack of t nd 502d if necessary . At
about 1700 enemy tanks wer a r eported approilching ZON from th(l southeast and C!.
f aW mi nutes latt.r tanks approached within a f ew hundred y.:rds of the ZaN
bridgo .ll\d shdlled bridge , t ho;! Divi sion .md tn& t mm. d' e..' as
a nd the tunks withdr ew wh-.;n AT· ·guns · , t ne. glider --1.8.nding fie
Two t.:l1l.ks were o"UtpY-b ire : :\
Command Post t o ST. OEDSNRQoE a t · 1200 .
During tho morning, t re 1st Batt ... licn of 501st attacked ond
DINTI1L Four hundred r.nd twenty in this action. The 2d
- .. --,-".,_ ..;: ;"". . .
.. --' . . ,.' ­
.-':t " :: .....

Battalion continued a close-in of lot..(}{EL. The Jrd Battalion conducted
extensive patrolling to tht::! nor .tn and west 'from a stro'ng point· at EEitDE.
, ' ,
The 1st Battalion of the 502d continued the defense of 3T. OEDEi>ffiODl:i:.
09ring the afternoon the 2d and 3rd were ordered to proc eed t o to
OEDENH.O DE and t he Regiment charged with the def E-""Ct:J;'I;- FI a
By 210? the R.egiment was closed in the a hi. t,i e u SJ. f
posltlOns . I
During the night the 1st Battalion of the 506th was ordere d ' "("o proceed tc)
ZON in order to as sist in the dor ens:; of the ZON bridge against the expected
enemy attack. The Ba.t.talion went into pos.i.tior: at 1)(,00 8..1J in conjunction wi th
elements of the 1st of 327th 2nd company of the 326th
r epelled attack on tne bridge. launcHcd by t Ile 107th Panzer Brigade at about
0630. The 2d Bat t ali vn of the tanks Ql the of the 15/19
Hussars, a tacked the enemy rear and' a Sharp took place at NUNEN.
The 3rd Bat.talion of t h8 506th r emained in EINDHOVEN as Regimental Reserve . At
0900 t he 44th Armored ltegimcnt was attacned t o t he Division and proceeded toward
HELMOND in a furti1 er att cmpt to destroy t he enemy attacking tho ZON bridge.
Intermittent tank and infantry fighting took place the remainder of the day.
The 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 327th r e lieved the 502d of the defense
of the sector east of ZON and the landing zone and Division area. The
J21st Glider Field Artillery Battalion was attached to too 327th and fired
missions in support of that unit during the d<\}' . At 1500 Bat tdry uB" of the .
arrived by parachute and joined its The 377th then moved to S
OEDENRODE in support of tiJ.;! 502d Parachute Infant r y. Ba a " All e 81st
Anti-Tank Battalion was attached to the 327::'h and Battery ne" to .the 502d.
Battery frB U remained in defense of the Zc., ....dcge .­
D I 4
The 1st Battalion of the 50lst crossed the WILI.EMS VAART CANAL in the
early morning at and conducted extensive · patrolling during the day. Ai
1845 an attack was made on SCHIJNDEL and the northwest section of the town was
seized at approximat ely 2215. The 2d Battalion remained at VECHEL. The 3rd
Battalion moved at 1745 to the West and cut the ST. OEDENkODE - SCHIJNDEL Road
in the Vicinity of the railroad station.
The 502d Parachut e Infantry, vdth the 377th Parachut e Field Artillery Bai.·
talion attached, continued to expand its def ensive positions in th0 ST. OEDENRO·· ,
area. nB
Company of the 1st Battalion r eceived a strong enemy attack from the
northwe st in the early afternoon, but held its posit i on.
The 1st Battali:..n of t. le 506th continued its of· the ZON bridge .
'Ine 2d Batt-alion working with the 15/19 H.... ssars and t he 44th Tank Regiment, at ­
tacked the enemy nl::: ar The ene.IIIY withdrew in the f ace of this attaC'.c
and at 12:)) contact was lost , The 2d Batt alion wi3nt into a defenSive position i n
the vicinity of TONGElRE for the night . 'me Jrd Battalion was ordered to ST.
OEDENRODE as Division keserve . The Regiment was given a warning order that it
would probably move to UDEN on the follOlOing day.

At 0300 the 3rd Battalien of t ne 506th Parachute Infantr,y closed in the
ST. OEDENRODE area, moving up from EI Nr:iVVEN . At 0500 orders were r eceived
that this battalion, as well as all . . Jt1 <mts of regiment, would move
to UDEN. cLelay... Movement was t o .. oy motor and marching. The 3rd ­
bogan its ulove to UDEN, by marcniu5 J at 0900. The 1st and. 2d -Satta­
their as transportat on eeame aVailable
during the d"l'_
The advance detachment of ti1e 506th, consisting of approximat ely 150
officers and men from Regimental and other units of the r egiment,
passed. thr?ugh VECHEL at Immedia passUlg through the enemy cut
themaW highw"l' between VECHEL and UDEN, ' am! th,s
• .. I .
in UDEN_ . ­ ' 0' E
-;- - w

Tho l07th Panzer withdrawing from its attack on the tOO
bridge . on ,D t 4, :movad ' . covet of darkn.Js s t o .ERP, and. i .I.1 .,1;.ht.l latd morning
of 0 15 launched"ralf"'aTI-out -attackito ' sci:.c the town of and ' destroy t he:
bridges thl.l r u. Eneoi'-forc<3s in-this attaC!. estimatutl
of 53 troops, sup.iJort_d -bjiJO ·to 40 tanks a!1Q artillery.
. ' .
' ,_t·
By.. l.z....:O, tn.... 26 Battalion 501st astridt: thu ViCHKL - b1f.P ri.oa.d, was being
hard pl:_ss,)d . Additional troops wvr c started to\.. ard YECliEL..¥o Gcn",rai.
was plac\.!d i n cooc.'l.and of 'troops in the area and cnargl3d viitri of tho t ,o'.ln
•• • • • r • _ .-­
and bridgt!.:J . ht about l4OO" tanks cut the highvla,y. of and
t.ra"lsport pe.rko;;d on thu highwuy . Batt,Jry li B": AT t3attri.lion j
arriv...:d at t.he same ti.m.i., .,eng' into action on tno . •r.4· i..Wm,;.dl at cq . d,"str­
3 V tank loaduI6 t.ilt}'· a't.t.ack. rho 2d position on
t :1f or' the. 2d Battalion 501, v.ith th\J 1st Battalion L.Olst 'Glider Infantry on
i ts left . \,ith tn... of Brit. ish C1rtillcr',f gntnatd front th..;
t h" attack ,froo ZhP \;:- '1 r"pulsod by d:..rk . At about 1400 om,my infMtry, \lith t
suppor t, ,utt..ac!.. oJd cetriJc tn.;: CD.11a1 from thl.. northwest t o\>H.rd t h ... hi ghMlY bridg(;
soutnv.c:st. o.r" VECHEL. Ccc,pany U n 1i: 506" \;as on its "¥;e;! to UDm,
VIas t urnt;!d around, dcp1oy__ d nd<..r th..:. bridge the ,the"
as sisUncc of e1iU,h.;nts o f the: 44th Tenk . . .: \ .....
. . .
. , . ";.
D....lrinb, tho.; c:. f -cornoon t tL UfltUlly " t ti'ck ' ..g:!inst
t ht. north, ri:'l:J.lY ilaltl.:d JUSt sh oR 91' by ':;]:3'".tents
of ... 501, and on", p1.aoon of util I COJ..p.my,' ;0 ,Tv.hich h:::.d;, t cl<:tn , up
<.. ... posit1on t iwro:; a. snort ,tililc , b"JOI'(L
.. .
The..: ... n",my runcwed thGir att acks- from t n..: sQuth und sou t-hcast durmg t.n.Ul
lat... afternoon, but by noVi '':) dd1tional,forces h.3,cI cmd ",nt:.11\}' \iaB
s topp.::d . By dark thd 506 (less 1st B.1ttulion cl1.d tofu.. dvt.:J.ctJ.:lt:nt cut ;off at:VDEN),
t h(.. 327th Gll.df:: r Infa'1.try, t re Division Pl 'ltoon, t hu 321st Glider
...r t illc ry Bo.ttal ion, Battery nBn, alst ,:.. T tnt. 2d Battalion 501st
Perachut c Infantry, o.ro the Squ<>.dI'o:1. .. tn RQya1 rlogimcht hnd a rrived
and for ced the task forc e unde r G..mcrnl '- .. F"i. chars"d tloHllIlg the VKCHEL
a r .:lc,.
In the mc:mtim... th... Is t of tne 501 at d'3''In and hlld oc­
cupi", d 1111 of SCHIJNDEL by 0915. 400 prisone rs VI(:Irt;! in t ,u.s opl.: r ution.
About 1200 orders weN reC0ivcQ for tno 1s t B.1tta1l.on to prog,ca..cLto_ nEIB(5\.J{,
seiz...:. the town, "md prov i da prot ccttbn for VECHEL. Tna novement
was completed by 1700, and the battalion took u a strong s it·
.:md ar ound tho town, Tho 3r a t <.1 ion, Whi ch do a vc.ncc: " ovn rd' SCiUJNDl:..L in
forces with th..: 1st B.ltt..l1.ion in ' soizing SCHIJND.cI., WCiS
wncrd l.t took up guarding from thd
west .
To<:: 502d P.:1To. chutt: Infantry cxt und(;:: d its dc.. f l3I].s1.vEi' 'positions during ' the day.
Elolumts of t he 1st Batt.alion lilade. conta ct with tho) )rd B:.ttalion 501 south of
SCHIJNDhl., .md forc(;s in clc<llll.Il6 out, t.mt..llij' strong point.s along tne
SCHIJNDEL - ST. highw.y.
Tilt. 32?th Inf<.ntry wc=. s t;!t 0930 to proceed 'to VECHEL, cJ1d
l!lOvemont bi::lgan a t 1030, th1o! 3rd Battalion by truck und ·th... 1st cmd 2d Batt.llions
by ma rching. Tn"" 1st and 3rd Battalions \'I.., r a c:pm;littod ori bo'th sidds' of tlk: bridgf;:
LMloJdiat cly upon rr rivnl.; t he 2d Bat ...alion continue..:d ' intO VECHEL and bdCami::: t ask
forc e 1"n>3 tam of VBCHEL W.lS nt:o::.vily sl1<; 11(;d during t tl.). lo.t e :::.i1;.f::rnoon
and uvcning. .
Soon dawn the o::n6ICff launched sfl.ll l sc::.le :lttacks aguinst th.:: dEf en­
sive posihons southOllSt of VECHEL. , Th... st. w.jrJ 11.:: ld off difficulty.
nignt pl<lIls wer e drawn up whicn c:. l1.:. d for ::. British Armor ed
from too NIJiAEGEN nNcl , to ..l dv!.Ilc ... on VECtD::.L irofil UDJ!:tJ, join forces with
2d B.lttulion of tho 506, whico Wd S to advunce fran Vt.iCHEL towcrd UDEJ-l , ' end
t.h;;: rO.:ld in order t.hat flow of tr, Jfic might boJ rc's'UDldd. i 'ollowing th.'lt,
t h ... Ar mor ..i d Brigade to swing sharp),y south !l.rx:2 cut off the ..meoy route
t hrough mP. '

Due to cOlDl1unication difficulties , that part of toe planRi a1ling for th£l
advance in force and encircling moji1(,lont of t.l-te- British Armor ed :t3rigade was not
carried out. The 2d Battal ion of tou 506 cont act with a patrol of the Ar­
mored Br igade northeast of VECHEL about 1700 . By t hat tht; 1:::lnl:liLW had begun
his wit hdr awal, and soon t m reaftcl r cont act was lost .
Durine; t he mormn g th e 1st and Jrd Battalions of t .le 501st readjuste'd
defensive positions west and north of EERDE, and at Wer e deployed
with 3rd Battalion generally along the railroad from Canal to and
t he 1st Buttalion f rom EERDE due south to the main highway . The 2d Batta11vn
contirlu(;d the clos\,; in de f ense of VECHEL, with tne. ;06 6i'l-' n mise-ions
to the ncrthe3st and south . Tnc 327th \las assi gned a. def cr: :"'Jo n ort.1 of
The 502d Infantry continued .its d... fcnsG of ST. with
the 37?tn PaJ,9.ch'.li:.;;; Fi&"' d Arti lle r y 3att. ali o.:1 in dJ.Nct support .
I1..u"ing the d&y fl !;.th Glid.::r s e rial arnvcd bril1bing r emaini ng: c1.:..rnm ts of
t he 327tn Glide. r Infantr;__ am t he 90?th Glider Fie ld Ba t talion. These
troops imr:l.... diatuly to tht.: ThCHEL ar..:a, and t n..., 907th Fi t:.ld Artiller,{
Battalion Vi as in direct sUPIJort of tn..: ,Olst ParachuttJ I nfant r y . Tne 321st
Glider Field Artill ery Batt. alion was attach<ld to tiw 506t h Parachute I nfantry,
a.'1d fllea sev..Tal lJ.issions durin;; t h<> day .
At as far as B:.hl' vneoy had made good his
wi thd::a.wal to t.no:.: sout h-.Jast, and tho.; arua was of enM.y troops . 500th
Parac.Jutc Infantry , with t.he 321st Glide r 1:$attab.on and !1m'
Blst AB aT attacned , was to UDiN t o t<ikc OVer tne def ense of
t hat ar;,;a .
The Divisi on CotDuand Post was I.roVlo:d from 3T. Ol:!;Dlil>l'rlODh t o VECrlEL at 1000 .
The 327th Glide r Infantry was assignee! t h J t ask of defending VECHEL, \'lith
t he 907th Glider Fi ..::ld Battali on in gen<;! r al suppor t . ThoJ 2d Battalion
50 1 was r ""loc sed from its dcfensi v ... assibflI_lcqt i n V3GHEL and joined its r egitilcnt
i n t he EERDE area, as RG6imental R.es...-rv... Battery !l A
, Bls t AT Battalion, conti­
n ued attache d to t he 501st, wi th 907th Glider Fiel d Artillerj direct suPvor t
The 502d continued tha defense of t ne ST. OEDEN..tWDE Bhttcl rio::s "DIt,
li En, and "FIt, the Anti- aircraft Batteri es of the gIs t AT Battalion, in t he
eche lon and wer e assi 5l1ed to prot e ct thu Division Se rvice Area nor thwest
of ZON.
At 1000 the l a unch ed a seri es of probing attacks against t he 501st
position, mavin!!; from SCHI JNDEL toward KOEV.liliING. Two l:om.panics of t he
502d were di spat ched to KOEVEnING to intercept this forco, r r::portud to be; t wo
and about forty infantry-IUal _ The force movl3d howev",r, and were
almost in KOE'lbltI I>l'G wh... n "Dn rod uri" of til ", 502d arrivud . The tl'olO COf.l­
pani cs held KO:l!."VERI NG, but oould not pr... v .. nt tnlt> from cutting t h ... hJ.gh\·Ia.Y
northwes t of KO:l!.VEitlliG j ust bufort: da r k . Under cov() r of darkn..J s ::; t he enell\Y built
up his f or cos with tanks , solf- pr opelled ar-, il::'zT",f, and fairly lar5'" infan try uniUi
using th e corridor hI.> nad found w t wel,..n to. ... .... l .st ·and th<J 502d.
During t ile night th u 506th wit h Batter ies "BII Blst AT Batt al i on , and the
32lst Glider }o'ioJ l d Artil1er ;;t Bat t a lion was or dcrod to r .J t urn to VECHEL
frorJ th03 UWJ area. i..i ov o;:m;mt bIJgan at 0300 , and at dOlYlight unit s wlt>ro jus t
cast of VECHEL. At 0915 tho.; 506, wit h one squadron 44th L1.oyal T<.:nk
attached, a t tacked th() at KOEVcltI NG . 'rhe a tt.... ck pr o&r dsscd f ...vorably for
some 2 , 000 yards , when botn battalions (formation , 1st and 3r d B.J.tt_+.ion
abr uas t, thu main were pinned down by and
smal l tu:m3 .::nd fir.::. f r olil t anks due in <.Il oll6 t a.; rOf'_d . 2d was
t h..n ordcr lJd to execut e 1.1 wid() o f onelI\Y ' s southern fLmk , ..l!ld hegar.
its JilOVullU1 t a t 1.400 . In thu f.l6ll.t1tiru<; of thd}Oth Division, with
_. ­
- 5 -
. ---­
strong am.ored forces , began an a dvance £tOfl tne south. 50lst and CoapCll'li es
"0" and "HI1 of the 502d_.assiBted by providing bases of fire f or the attackL,
f orces . By -darkness t he ene"lY had be en cleared froo all but s. very s.clall area
south of the road .
The 502d continued its defense of the ST. OEDE1JF(ODE. area, the 327th its
defense 01' the VECP.EL area, a.'1.Q t h. e 501st. i ts defens e of t oe hFltDE area. All
t hree r egiIlents had several snall scole ene.':\}' attacks launched 'against t.neir posi­
tions durlllb the
The 506th resllL'led tre attack Scan after daylie; ot, and by 0900 had driven
the eneJ.V nor th of the highway and l. lade contC:lct \'lith tre 501st on the i- l
ht . The
British forces continued tne attack to the north, pinchin
out tile 506th and
Companies "0" and ilrll1 of the 502d. At 1300 tile 506 , with at..t ach:!1ent s Vi as ordered
to r et urn t o the UDEN area. r.1OVet.ler:t \; - conpleted by 1700.
The 502d cor.t.inucd its' defense of 3T. area, Cor,!panies "D" an:!.
IIH" to cor.trol at 150(,; .
The 50lst and t he 327t h continued their defens i ve r.U.ssions , bot h r egiments
repelling s!.lall scale attacks d..u"i1'l6 the day.
D flO
No change in unit dispositions . Several ene:.;..! attempts on
front of 501st and 327th repelled .
• •
• •
AiP SuPpor t A/B
Thru 26 Sept 1944
No . Time of Re uest Area nnd Nature of Tc.r et
1. 20 Rept 0555
2. 20 sept 1700
3. 20 Sept
4. 22 Sept 1102
5. 22 sept 1315
6 . 22 Sept 1522
7. 23 Sept 0810
8 . 24 Sept 0905
9. 24 Sept 1740
10. 24 Sept 1745
11. 25 Sept 0645
Armed Recen ar en Nunen , Neder­
wet ten and Hclmond. TClnks
r eported and at tack expect ed
on Zan .
TRC Recon r oad S/E fro:., Bakst el
t o Best and road E f r om Oirar-hut
t o Best. Tpnks repor ted moving
toward Best.
Bo"b area 484.222 S/W t o 481217 E
to 496?15 N/fl t o 484.222 . (Nunan
t? aeekstraat ) . 200 tLDks and
·!j;;hicl es .
Boob r oed from Bockel to
Erp. 400 t c.nlcs Lnd vehicles.
Reen Rren 5240 t o 5840 to
5234 t o 5834. (Erp , Boekel "nd
S/W of Volkel). Concentrction of
t anks nod vehicles .
Arl!'lcd Recan r oad Ud&n to Vechel.
]0 t rnks and infcntry on r ondo
Ji r med Recon nre(l. HI;luvel, Erp,
Bockel nnd Concon­
trr'tion t f' nks (' cd ve:hicl es .
Recon cr ee 5632 t o 5641
t o 5932 t o 5941. T.nks end
vehicles .
Armed Recon 1000 yd r ndius
E 425369 . Trnks, vehicl es
moving S/E .
Armed Recon c.r er. Schij ndel
Jlrmcd Racon ('.ren St . Michiel s
Gest el to Schijndel t o Diother
t o
,'.rt1l1ery {'.od infr ntry.
Not r eported
Not r eported
Message r eceived
1310 "Tcrget
ccce9ted . Esti­
mated time of
IU' r ; vq1 to follow. "
No la..er oessage .
Delayed on account
of weather. No
r esults r eported .
Not r eported.
Position of our
troops r equested.
We informed 1000
yd spfet y limit .
by G3 et 1655 .
Ar med of nrel)
f or pin- point
t :"' r gcts . Lc t cr
messC' ge sr.id I:lissi Ol
r efused- friends in
Qre[ •
Not r tlported
Postponed on
l'.ccount of wer ther .

Not r eported
Annex No . 6
• •

No. Time of Request /I r e::. t.nd Nr ture of Tcr gct Results
12 . 26 0744 Bomb woods N of CencI in grid
squcres 4340, 4439 4539,
l: lso vill r.ges of Beug , Dt nther
rnd Hees1'Iijk. vehicles ,
crtillery nn0.
for r ed
smoke on
could not conply.
Beug nt U' eked [ t
1045. Civili:ns
r eport 8 Huns
killed . Our ''fit ­
ness cescr ibud
{l est r oyed.
not r epor t ed .
Not e-- The hour i n t he of r c.quest is t he time the cesse-go \11:5 Icknowledged by
t he Net Control The time of origin in mr ny cns es Wl\S T.luch c.t:rlilll', but
(! ue t o trl.nsrait ting thE;; NeS couli! not be r el'.ched or t he r.t8ss"ge wr s
not clenrly r eceived . 1 i r Support mstions b,t Gr t hnn 26 Sept 0744 wer e h"ncUeci
thru Brit ish chl'nnels . Our NCS closed 30 Sept 2400.

- < -


1. Following is a report of all resuP.jli03 S by parachute and

to the l Ol s t Airborne Ihvision in orl w-ut.ion ..:arkt. t :
• . 0 f 1
1) 'I\'Ic:nt y-two (22) gl ldars
,-. ·.· ..;. - A, to DZ "\," .
iiations , type 11K"
<l ot t ery , B-'- 37
Battery, 8.\- 38
Batt ery, BA- J9
Batt<::l rj' J &.- 40
Battt. ry, bA- 41
Battl.: I'j' , HA-h8
Bat.t o:> ry J 810. - 80
Ilirc, \, - 110 on 00- 4 Qilcs)
Ilirc, \1- 130 on 00.- 4 ( 24 ailus)
Carbine , cal. . 30
Ca" .•30, AP, 8/ clip
Cal . . 3U, AP- Tr ( 4- 1) bel t ed
Cal. . 45, SU, and Pistol
60Jntn i:.iortar , 1£
81ar.. worterJ (It)
Daxt rosc , btl..
SOdiUr.l , Ci t rato, box
Sulfaml .u.lidc J box
'1 ,atE:rJ dist . box
Plasma, Pk6 .
Band"s c , !!\:auzc , box
pkg .
adhbsiva, apl.
Splint, baSSi'iOod, snt.
Splint , ...rat" .l.dg Ring ,
Splint J \;'irc l eddar, 0;:"" .
Pent othal , sodi UIl , box
Al cohol , btl.
IIOOrphinc , box .
pkg .
ea ,
BanaubU, pl ss t or of ctn.
DrOBSi "6, first-aid, l arge , ea.
Dr Iil ssing , firs t-ai d, small, Ch .
Bl ankC! t, hool, OD,
Litttl r, f ol dlJ'lg, lll wllnuL1, 6 B. .
7, 608

24, 000
64, 512

14, 000
1, 152

2, 040
l du
pffiC.Jlr"CE OF R.>COVEllY 01' GLIIl..i<. ,u,sUi">'LY r"Oit D f 1

100' ,.
l OOp

lOO' ..
100 ,0




7, 666
24, 000

1, 15
l dO
; 60
2, 040
1, 440
Arnn:..x tl 0. 7

- -
vrlG hundred 3-24 'planus t o

OZ " : . II and DZ.
II h ll

!Jd'r ,",T peT
MT ..u..'r PCT
I TEii
DEL ItCD Dci. !f,.CD RCD

Rations ,
type IIKu
14, 400 }.,480 24 . 1 2, ) bu
1, 500 63 . 5
Gasoline, gals . 1,26C
125 9 . 9
200 100 5Ci •
AG;)) Or' i.,;jIr... tW;oV:&t.::.D
11 II
Ol II .."
17. o. .. 56. 0

Battory , Dh- 37
0 0
75 0 0
Batt £.lj. , BidS 500 0 u 125 0 u
Batt\,; ry , llh- 39 50 0 0
, B.- 40 50 0 0
Batt(;ry , Bh- 41 15 0 0
Batt.:.ry, 8&- 48
29 100. 5 0 0
Fbttt.ry, BA- SO
50 0 0 20 0 0
Battery , B.'- }O 500 0 0 100 0 0
Battery, 8/, - 70
5 0 0
on 00- 4 ( Iuil... s)
45 II 24 .4
llire, ',/- 130 on Dr- 4 (milGs) }O

28 . 3
Ilire, on OH-8 (miles)
5 5
Radio J SCR- 610
1 3J . 3
Radio J
SCR- }OO-.
0 0 1 0 0
Radi o, SCR-536 16 0 0
0 0
« .:.d10, 5Clt- b94
0 0 1 1 100.
Yine Dct",ctor, SCR- 625
0 0 1 1 lOO.
EJr8- B
15 0 u 1 1 100.
Switchboard, BD-71 1 1 l Ou .
Sv!i t chboard , BD-72 1 1 100 .
Mes t Section , 1\5- 49 10 0 0
iL-').s t Scction, J.1S- 50
10 0 0
i.lE-53 1 0 0
Bc:.. ttury, BA- 2
20 0 0
Ba.ttery , B.- 23 10 0 0
Battery, BA- 27 10 0 0
Coil, C- 161
2 0
Tc l ogra..?h , TG-5 1 0 u
lC- 72 1,250 0 0
Conv lJI'tcr,
' - 209
0 0
Mos s ugo Book, ....210 200 0 0
ilXle, RL- 27-.rl.
1 0 0
heel Equipm,<;;lnt , CE- 11 2 0 0
Crank, CG-4-A
0 0
Tc!.pe, Tl-83
0 0
T.:!pc , TL- 94
25 0 0
Climber s , LC- 6
1 0 0
Teo1 Eq.up!.limt,
TE- 33 40 0 0
Flashlight , TL-122- ;;
50 0 0
L_ , Ul- 35
100 0 0
Glovas, LC- lO 10 0 0
Test Sot, I - 56
1 0 0
Test Eqllipml.! nt,
1 0 0
PEIc.CENT"GE OF SIGi'l,.. L E. ,;UIt>:iillT lu!.COVllihD
Dl n,,"
Cal1ber . 30 AP 8 C..i..l.p
Carbine, Cal . 30
Cal . . 30, AP, 5 clip
Cal .. JO,tiall- AP, ctn.
Cal . . 30, tracer, ctn/ clp
' . •
180, 000 G
427, 000 41, 664
30, 000 0
2u,000.. 12,000
15,00<1' 15,000
bU .......
1,500 1,500

87. 5
Ordnance (Cont ' d)
. . )0, hP baIt ed
430,000 93,000 21.6
Gel. .45, 5/,1:; nne Pist ol 133,000 66 ,600 50.
Ge1. . 50, [,P- I -T (2- 2-1) 31, 000 26 ,710 86 .1
371:1.":1 Gun , SV 360 64
37rz:. , HE 180 o o
371:1tl C:-nnist er 60 o o
57m."!'l , BU . SABOT ', 240 240 100 .
57"", HE
600 3'52 58 .6
60mm Mortnr , HE 5,850 1 , 078 18 .4
60mn Mortrr , Ill .
234 8 3.4
8lmm Uortl1r , Lt . 2 , 700
2 , 253 8) .4
Morter , Hv . 540 540
Bloom S:"!oke 162 162 100 .
750n HOR. HE , M54 1,680
500 29. 7
75i:T: HO'.I . HE, r148 1, 200 505 42 .
7500 How. Smoke
o o
105"., HOI; . HE,l.l 54 310 353 44 .1
How . HEi :.v..B 540 V.
How . Scoke 100 O.
l05tu:l How . /l.T 160 v O.
:lccket, HE, /I T 1,900 1,419 74.7
;.rennce , h'md , frn.g .
7, 200 2,275 31.5
GraM_eEl , hend, off 3,600
Grcnrde , ri f le, 2, 470 250 10.1
Grenr.de , r ifl e , 1, 000 150 15.
r ifl e , smoke
500 140 28.
Signal , te , AN , (3 colors) 300 o o.
Crrt. rifle, grennde , rth 2;000 o O.
Cl rt, rifle , gren('de , fA3
Cl' rt. f.UX . grenr-de , M7
DZ "WI! 32 . 7

Dextrose , btl. 120
30 25 .
Sod, Ci:.:"a.:. ;; , box
40 30 25 .
Sulfani box 160 40 25 .
bater, box
10 25 .
Plasma, 240 60 25 .
BandQge , box 40 10 25 .
Cot ton, a=30rbent , pkg. 240 60 25 .
(laster, adhesive , spl. 160 40 25.
Spl int, set 60 10 16.6
Splint , Ar.-:t' Le6: !tina
10 25 .
' Splint, l adder, ea.
150 30 20.
:-",mtt,lthal , 5C'dium, 'cox
40 10 25.
Alconol , ethyl, qt .
A1conol, denHtured, pt. 12
1 8.3
tior;>nine , box
125 )0 24.
pkg . 225 50 22 . 2
Bandage , plaster paris 40 10 25 .
Dressing , fust- a.l.d , large 300 70 23.3
DrOSSl.rtg , fl.r s t - aid, small 960 240 25 .
Gro1 nCl.de ,
Grent.:.de ,
nlanket, wool , 0. 0. 120 30 2, .
f oldi ng , aluminum
10 25 .
gauze , roll
10 20.

• Dl ",. 11 £3 . 1
Crl.c2iIC.,.,i. ,/AttF..uili
nand ,
iland ,
80 , 000 66 .7
10 , 800
1,350 900 66 .7
606 300 49 .5
111 60 54.
33 33 100.
.240 100 41.7
1 ,200
900 75.
600 o o
260 210 SO. S
90 90 .
50 50 100.
100 o O.
200 150 75 .
200 150 75.
200 ' 0 O.
DZ "Ie"
l S 6 33 .3
6 4 06 . 6
24 S 33.3
6 6 100.
36 12 33. 3
6 6 100 .
36 12 33 . 3
24 S 33.3
9 100.
6 2 33 .3
15 15 lDV.
6 6 100.
2 o 0
6 4 66.6
25 a 32.
34 20 58. 8
6 6 100 .
45 16 35. 5
156 4B 30 . 7
24 6 25.
2 33. 3
o 0
52 . 2
smoke , HC , Ud

smolte, loP ,
Chemical \iarfare ( Cont'd)
Al..T I'\:T
Grenade , hand, sJ:lOke, col ored,
Grenade , nand, smoke, col ored,
Grenade, hand, smoke , col ored,
Compos1tion, C- 2
Caps , blasting , special , non- elecLric <5
Fuse , blasting , time, ( l<X)'roll) 1
Fuse , lighters
Prima- -cord (100' roll)
Bags , sand .
P!l(Ci:l.T"GE or' EIlGI NEEk
b. D f 3
( 1) Thirty- five (35) C-4? pl anes to DZ "I J" (By Paraohute)
.wr &.J.'T
t ype "KII 9,120 216
lags , vlnyl 285 JO

Blanket s , vl ocl , 0 , 0 . :.c ,700 600
Litter s, f olding 272 120
Bundles , ilisc . iJedical supplies 12 5
Radio, .3Crt-694 4
PlliCHllThCE D)' J(l!:COVEkY Or' llliSUPt'LY FOn D f 3
Parachute resupply -
c . D f 4
(1) Thirty (30) C- 47 planes to Dl ".. ". (By pal'achute)

Rations , type "1\ 11 13, 960 4, 320
Parachute re supply -
d. D f 6
(1 ) Four ( 4) gliders CG- 4- A to Dl Jr.l " ,
- 4 ­

PERCEl'lT"a.> OF Iili:OV ilIlY or' rtiSUPPLY rCA, D f 1
Glider resupply -
Prcht . resupply -
" - LO. orange 12
green 6
tt.8COJcltill ­
12 100 .
6 100.
6 100 .
250 100 .
16. 6
<!C D
2. 4
10. 5
6. 5%
22 . 2
44 .1
41. 6
35. 9%


nliT iWT PCT
. il.re , 20 20 100 .
"P.::I.dio , SCH.- 536
4 4
.":adio, SCR- 610 2 2 100.
SCH.- 694
4 4
EA-30 1,000 1,000 100.
Batteries, 8;.- 39 150 34
22 .6
Batt er:u;! s , BJt- 40 25 24 96.
Batteries, &- 70 100 72 72.
?I.o ssage Books J 1,- 210
300 50 16. 6
Tape , TL-83 100 100 100.
Tape , 1'"1,-94 lOu 100 100 .
Flasnlight, TL-l 22- h 100 100 100.
Gun- SLl.b-I,lscrlinEl , MlAl 15 15 100.
.r..:ortar, 6Ornm, 12 2 2 100.
grenade, U? 8 Il 100.
grenade, M8
5 5
.;l oth, wiping, Ibs . 200 200 100.
cotton, M 10 10 100.
1/4 ton truck 4 4 100.
tire repair, cold patch 6 6 100.
Rl. fle , U. S. Cal. . 30, m.
20 20 100 .
CI' msUPPLY RECOVEr<Y Fat D I- 6 - 91. 9%
e . D I- 8
(1) Thirty- four (J4) C- 47 planes to DZ ".:" . (By parachute)
75.nm HOil . amnW1ition 2,800 1, 000
?EHc;l1IThGl:. Of RESUPPLY rto.C0V-LltY FOrt D I- 8
f . Percentage of recovery of resuppl,r for entire operation .
- 95 .9p
Prcht . - 41 .4p
2 . JIIlY resupply recovered by units and not delivered to Duision dumps are
not lllcludad in t otals as figures Vlere not reported.
3. rne report is a clear 1ndic ation that glider € i s considerably
more effective · as practically of the of bl1dcrs was recov ered.
4. 'Ills last resupply by air on D t 6 gives tho best gauge on
of parachut e resupply. According t o reports from tho rear base , tnirty- i'otU' (34)
planes Wl.t h six rack loads and three door loads wora delivered. nll rack
l oads were dropped in a very small ar;,-;a and were recovered wl. tnin· a few haUl'S . No
door l oads we re se en comins down. Tilis is o:1ither an indication that the door loads
,Iere di schurg6d far from the t&rget area or tne door loads were aC1..ually not l oaded.
5. liasupply by Pc:..rachutc could be if only rack loads were used and
al l planas dischargtld t ht.dr loads ovo)r the idontif1cation r.u:.rkers on the gr oWld.
: t is believed that door loads should not normally used as it causes too great
of supplias and might th3 enemy to obtain u very h1gh percentage
o f the t otal dropped.
- 5 ­

- - .. " ....
- ..
- 0 Al 7'
t;: r.. ',1

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